J-S03009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHRISTOPHER ADAMS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 951 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004313-2009

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2023

Christopher Adams appeals from the order dismissing his petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Appellant’s counsel, Gary 

Server, Esquire, has filed a petition to withdraw and brief pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). We affirm and grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder in 2012 for the 

shooting death of Korey Anderson. Briefly, the evidence presented at trial 

established that Appellant believed Mr. Anderson’s friend had shot Appellant’s 

friend. As a result, Appellant told Kenyon Childs on the evening of July 22, 

2008, that he was going to “deal with” Mr. Anderson. Five minutes later, 

Appellant walked directly toward Mr. Anderson, who was sitting in a chair on 

a street corner in Philadelphia, “and shot him in the head. Mr. Anderson fell 
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to the ground and Appellant stood over him and continued to shoot him 

repeatedly. Appellant then fled[.]” Commonwealth v. Adams, 108 A.3d 

107 (Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum at 2) (cleaned up). Later 

that evening, Appellant told Mr. Childs that he had shot Mr. Anderson. Two 

eyewitnesses identified Appellant as the shooter in statements to the police

shortly after the shooting, but both individuals recanted their identifications

at trial.

1

 

Following Appellant’s conviction, the trial court imposed the mandatory 

sentence of life imprisonment without parole and denied Appellant’s postsentence motions. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his judgment of 

sentence. See id. Appellant did not timely file a petition for allowance of 

appeal (“PAA”) with our Supreme Court. After his right to file a PAA nunc pro 

tunc was reinstated, Appellant filed a PAA, which our Supreme Court denied. 

See Commonwealth v. Adams, 145 A.3d 722 (Pa. 2016). Of particular 

relevance to the instant appeal, we note that Bobby Hoof, Esquire, 

represented Appellant throughout the aforementioned proceedings. 

The PCRA petition that is the subject of this appeal was timely filed by 

Appellant pro se. Appellant raised three claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel against Attorney Hoof, namely: (1) failing to investigate potential 

eyewitness Michael Harris; (2) failing to request a cautionary eyewitness jury 

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1 This recitation of the evidence established at trial is based upon Appellant’s 

second jury trial for the murder of Mr. Anderson. The jury was unable to reach 

a unanimous decision at the conclusion of the first trial.
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instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 

1954); and (3) erroneously advising Appellant that his juvenile firearms 

adjudication would be admissible as impeachment evidence if he testified. 

See Pro Se PCRA Petition, 5/2/17, at 2-3. Appellant attached a letter from 

Mr. Harris, dated January 7, 2016, wherein Mr. Harris stated that he was 

present at the shooting and that Appellant was not the individual who shot 

and killed Mr. Anderson.

The PCRA court appointed new counsel, who filed an amended petition

raising an additional claim of after-discovered evidence pertaining to Mr. 

Harris’s letter. See Amended PCRA Petition, 4/10/18, at 3. Appellant’s first 

PCRA counsel passed away and, ultimately, Attorney Server was appointed 

and filed a supplemental petition reasserting Appellant’s three original 

ineffectiveness claims.2 See Supplemental PCRA Petition, 12/31/19, at 2. 

Subsequently, Attorney Server submitted a certification from Mr. Harris 

attesting to the truthfulness of the contents of the January 7, 2016 letter. 

See Certification, 5/28/21. 

After a significant delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the PCRA court 

held an evidentiary hearing on the after-discovered evidence claim, as well as 

the alleged ineffective assistance of Attorney Hoof for failing to call Mr. Harris 

____________________________________________

2 While it is unclear from our review of the certified record whether this 

supplemental petition was filed with leave of court, since the PCRA court did 

not strike the supplement and in fact considered the merits of the claims raised 

therein, we deem the PCRA court to have implicitly granted leave to file the 

supplement. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 503-04 

(Pa.Super. 2016).
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as a witness and advising Appellant that he could be impeached with his 

juvenile adjudication. In that regard, the court heard testimony from 

Appellant, Attorney Hoof, and Mr. Harris. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition.3

This timely filed appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. As noted, Attorney Server has filed a 

Turner/Finley brief and motion to withdraw as counsel. Although counsel 

notified Appellant of these filings, he has not responded. Attorney Server’s 

brief presents the following issue for our consideration:

Whether the PCRA court erred when it dismissed the petition

where the Appellant provided that trial counsel was ineffective for 

misadvising the Appellant about the effect of [his juvenile]

conviction upon the Appellant’s ability to testify at trial and where 

counsel failed to locate, to interview and to call to testify an after

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3 The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim pertaining to 

Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954) without a hearing. As 

the PCRA court held a hearing on the remaining claims, Rule 907 notice was 

not required prior to dismissal if Appellant “had ample notice and ample 

opportunity to set forth the material facts that, in his view, remained at issue 

and accordingly justified an evidentiary hearing.” Commonwealth v. 

Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 322 (Pa. 2011). Instantly, the court’s decision to 

dismiss the Kloiber claim without a hearing was not specifically discussed in 

any pre-hearing order of court, on the record at the hearing, or in the order 

dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. Therefore, the record before us does 

not establish whether Appellant had ample notice and opportunity with respect 

to the court’s dismissal of his Kloiber claim without a hearing. We need not 

explore this quandary further, however, because Appellant waived his Kloiber

issue on appeal by failing to include it in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); see also Turner/Finley brief at 8 n.* 

(acknowledging that “counsel inadvertently neglected to raise the Kloiber

claim” in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement). Thus, we agree with counsel 

that there is no merit to the Kloiber claim on appeal, albeit on different 

grounds. 
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acquired witness, whom counsel should have known about, 

Michael Harris?

Turner/Finley brief at 6 (capitalization altered). 

Since Attorney Server filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to 

Turner/Finley, we must first address counsel’s compliance with the attendant 

procedural requirements:

Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation . . .

must review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must 

then submit a “no-merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal 

to this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent 

review of the case, listing the issues which petitioner wants to 

have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit, 

and requesting permission to withdraw.

Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the “no 

merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw; 

and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro 

se or by new counsel.

Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that satisfy 

the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court—trial court or 

this Court—must then conduct its own review of the merits of the 

case. If the court agrees with counsel that the claims are without 

merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief.

Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 510-11 (Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned 

up).

Upon review, we conclude that counsel has satisfied these technical 

requirements. Therefore, we now turn to our own merits review to determine 

whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. We do 

so mindful of our well-settled standard of review:

When reviewing the propriety of an order pertaining to PCRA 

relief, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party at the PCRA level. This Court is limited to 
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determining whether the evidence of record supports the 

conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of 

legal error. We grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings 

that are supported in the record and will not disturb them unless 

they have no support in the certified record. However we afford 

no such deference to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions. 

We thus apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s 

legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Mojica, 242 A.3d 949, 953 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned 

up).

Appellant’s PCRA claims all implicate the effective assistance of Attorney 

Hoof. Thus, our review is also guided by the following principles. “When 

reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts must presume 

that counsel provided effective assistance.” Id. at 955 (cleaned up). In order 

to overcome this presumption, a petitioner must “plead and prove that (1) the 

claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel lacked any reasonable basis for the 

action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result.” Id. 

(cleaned up). “Failure to satisfy any prong of the test will result in rejection 

of the appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Id. (cleaned up). 

Appellant’s proposed argument is two-fold: the PCRA court erred in 

dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition because Attorney Hoof was ineffective for

advising Appellant that his juvenile adjudication could be used to impeach him 

if he testified and failing to call Mr. Harris as a witness.4 See Turner/Finley 

brief at 25-29. We begin with the principles surrounding a PCRA claim that a 

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4 Counsel also addresses the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s Kloiber

claim, concluding that it lacks merit. See Turner/Finley brief at 18-25. As 

noted, this claim is waived on appeal because it was not included in Appellant’s 

Rule 1925(b) statement.
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petitioner waived his right to testify at trial based upon the erroneous advice 

of counsel. In considering whether a petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, the question is “whether the result of the waiver 

proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s ineffectiveness, not 

whether the outcome of the trial itself would have been more favorable had 

the defendant taken the stand.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 269 A.3d 

1255, 1264 (Pa.Super. 2022) (en banc) (cleaned up).

At the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Hoof and Appellant offered 

diametrically opposed testimony with respect to Appellant’s decision not to 

testify. According to Attorney Hoof, Appellant never indicated that he wanted 

to testify. Moreover, he maintained that he told Appellant that the juvenile 

firearms adjudication would not be admissible at trial. See N.T., 3/4/22, at 

16-18. After discussing the evidence that would be presented to the jury, 

Attorney Hoof testified that he and Appellant strategized and decided that 

Appellant would not testify. Id. at 17. 

Contrarily, Appellant averred that he wanted to take the stand to 

present an alibi defense but Attorney Hoof “repeatedly told [him] that if [he] 

testified that [he] would be impeached due to [his] juvenile gun conviction[.]” 

Id. at 50; see also id. at 51, 53. Appellant claimed that he only elected not 

to testify because he did not want the jury to see him as someone who carries 

guns. Id. at 52, 63. 

The PCRA court credited the testimony of Attorney Hoof that he knew 

the juvenile adjudication would not be admissible and, as a result, found 
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Appellant’s testimony that Attorney Hoof advised him otherwise to not be 

credible. See N.T., 3/4/22, at 119. The PCRA court explained in its Rule 

1925(a) opinion that “[b]ecause the court found as a fact that [Attorney] Hoof 

did not give misinformation to [Appellant], the court held that there was no 

basis for [Appellant’s] claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

in connection with his decision to waive his right to testify.” PCRA Court 

Opinion, 6/8/22, at 7 (cleaned up). 

The PCRA court’s credibility determinations and findings of fact are 

supported by the record. Essentially, Appellant’s claim is a challenge to the 

PCRA court’s credibility determinations. This Court is bound by the PCRA 

court’s credibility determinations where, as here, they are supported by the 

record. See Mojica, supra at 956 (related to findings or credibility 

determinations). Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in 

denying this claim.

Turning to Attorney Hoof’s alleged ineffectiveness for failing to call Mr. 

Harris as a witness at Appellant’s jury trial, we note that we are guided by the 

following principles. To prove arguable merit for a claim that counsel was 

ineffective for not calling a witness at trial, a petitioner must establish (1) the

existence and availability of the witness; (2) that counsel was aware of the 

witness, (3) the witness was willing and able to testify on the petitioner’s 

behalf, and (4) the petitioner was prejudiced by the absence of the proposed 

testimony. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1133 (Pa. 

2008). Further, the petitioner must demonstrate that the witness’s 
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“testimony would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case.” 

Id. at 1134 (cleaned up).

In the case sub judice, the PCRA court heard testimony as to this issue 

from Attorney Hoof and Mr. Harris. Attorney Hoof testified that he saw Mr. 

Harris’s name in the police activity sheets and that a defense witness, 

Madeline Nixon, mentioned having seen Mr. Harris around the time of the 

shooting but that he had walked away prior to the actual shooting. See N.T., 

3/4/22, at 19, 33-34. Attorney Hoof relayed further that the activity sheets

indicated Mr. Harris was a friend of Mr. Anderson, he had not provided a 

statement to police regarding the identity of the shooter, and Appellant had 

never mentioned him. Id. at 30. Based on the foregoing, Attorney Hoof 

testified that he had no reason to believe that Mr. Harris had witnessed the 

shooting and therefore no reason to believe that he had any exculpatory 

information. Id. at 36; see also id. at 42 (explaining that he did not “explore 

[Mr. Harris] because [he] didn’t feel like it would help him”).

At the hearing, Mr. Harris admitted to writing the January 7, 2016 letter 

and signing the certification. Id. at 68-70, 83. However, Mr. Harris testified

bluntly that “the truth of the matter” was that he was not at the scene when 

Mr. Anderson was shot, that he did not meet Appellant until they were in 

prison together, and he only knew that Appellant was in prison for Mr. 

Anderson’s murder because Appellant told him as much. Id. at 84; see also 

id. at 68 (“I didn’t see anything. I was talking to [Mr. Anderson] and I walked 

away. I got off the block and I heard some shots. When I turned around, I 
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seen him on the ground. I was stuck at the corner when I seen him laying 

like that. And that was, like, it.”), 74 (reiterating, when testifying that portions 

of the letter were false, that “I didn’t see [Mr. Anderson] get shot, so I didn’t 

see nobody creeping up on him”).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCRA court credited the testimony 

of Attorney Hoof and found that “it was within the realm of reasonable defense 

counsel investigation of a case not to follow up with Mr. Harris based on what 

was in the activity sheets, based on Ms. Nixon’s statement, and based on what 

his theory of the case was.” Id. at 120. Moreover, the court found that 

Appellant could not establish prejudice because Mr. Harris “would not have an 

impact on the case.” Id. The court found that “[h]e basically said he knew 

nothing at all that would tend to exonerate [Appellant], that he didn’t see what 

happened.” Id. at 120-21. In fact, the court made “a finding, he was utterly, 

a hundred percent incredible, unbelievable witness in every regard and would 

not have impacted the case.” Id. at 121; see also PCRA Court Opinion, 

6/8/22, at 9 (“Mr. Harris was completely incredible, and in any event, offered 

no testimony that was helpful to the defense. Accordingly, [Attorney] Hoof 

could not have been ineffective for failing to locate, interview and call Mr. 

Harris as a trial witness.” (cleaned up)). Finally, the court rejected the afterdiscovered evidence claim as to Mr. Harris because “[n]obody could possibly 

have been swayed by what we just heard out of the mouth of Mr. Harris.” 

N.T., 3/4/22, at 121.
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Once again, Appellant takes issue with the PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations, contending that the court should have credited Mr. Harris’s 

letter and certification over his testimony at the evidentiary hearing. See 

Turner/Finley brief at 28 (“Appellant’s position was that [Mr.] Harris was not 

truthful in court and that the PCRA court should have believed the 

representations made in the letter and the certification and thus concluded 

that [Mr.] Harris was indeed an exculpatory witness[.]” (cleaned up)). Since 

the PCRA court’s credibility determinations are supported by the record, we 

are bound by them. Accordingly, Appellant has failed to establish prejudice 

or that Attorney Hoof acted unreasonably. Therefore, we conclude that the 

PCRA court did not err in denying this claim. 

Based upon the foregoing, we concur with Attorney Server’s conclusion 

that Appellant’s claims are meritless. Therefore, we grant counsel’s petition 

to withdraw and affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA 

petition. 

Order affirmed. Gary Server, Esquire’s petition to withdraw is granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/22/2023
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