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*********************************************** 
JOHN DOE v. TOWN OF MADISON

(SC 20508)

JOHN DOE v. TOWN OF MADISON ET AL.

(SC 20509)

(SC 20510)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, X, Y and Z, three former high school students, sought to

recover damages from the defendant town, its board of education, and

the town high school principal, S, for injuries the plaintiffs allegedly

sustained as a result of sexual abuse by A, a teacher at the high school.

A was acquainted with the plaintiffs through her roles as an English

teacher, faculty yearbook advisor, and conditioning coach for the high

school football team, of which the plaintiffs were members. At various

points, A started exchanging messages with each of the plaintiffs on a

social networking platform. A’s messages initially concerned school,

athletics, and the yearbook, but the messages progressed to include

personal topics, such as A’s marital problems with her husband, R,

who also was employed as a teacher at the high school, and sexually

suggestive photographs and banter containing sexual overtones. A had

summoned X to her classroom more than twenty times, and she had

called Y and Z to her classroom approximately five times each. To avoid

detection, A varied the days and times at which she summoned the

plaintiffs and often used an issue related to the yearbook as a pretext

for the meetings. On one of those occasions, A performed fellatio on

Y. She also touched Z in an inappropriate manner several times. Although

A had a good reputation and strong performance evaluations, her attire

at summer football practices, specifically, tight fitting shorts and only

a sports bra for a top, attracted the coaches’ attention. Additionally, R

took issue with A’s attire and what he believed to be her flirtatious,

attention seeking behavior. R was concerned that a rumor had spread

among the teachers that A had been flirting with X, and he confronted

A about her social media contact and one-on-one meetings with X, as

well as certain flirtatious behavior he witnessed A displaying toward

players at a Friday night football game. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,

that the defendants were negligent in supervising A and in failing to

train school employees to identify and report inappropriate relationships

between teachers and students. Various teachers and coaches, including

C, the high school’s athletic director, were deposed during discovery.

C testified that he expected his subordinates to enforce certain standards

of professionalism, including requiring any coach to cover up if shirtless.

The defendants thereafter filed motions for summary judgment, claiming

that the plaintiffs could not establish negligence or causation and that

the defendants were entitled to governmental immunity. The trial court

granted the defendants’ motions, concluding that, although the defendants had a ministerial duty to report abuse or an imminent risk of

serious harm pursuant to the mandatory reporting statute (§ 17a-101a)

and the reporting policy set forth in the board of education policies and

bylaws, there was no evidence that any of the school employees had

reasonable cause to suspect that A was sexually abusing the plaintiffs.

The court also concluded that the identifiable persons subject to imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity did not apply. The

trial court rendered judgments for the defendants, and the plaintiffs

appealed. Held:

1. The trial court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact

existed as to whether the defendants breached their ministerial duty to

report a reasonable suspicion of child abuse, as imposed by the mandatory reporting statute and the board of education reporting policy: in

view of the totality of the circumstances, the school faculty and the

coaching staff did not have reasonable cause to suspect that A was

sexually abusing the plaintiffs or exposing them to an imminent risk of

sexual abuse, as A had an unblemished personnel record and was held
in uniformly high regard by her colleagues and students at the high

school, she was known to handle student crushes appropriately by

politely rebuffing them, and none of the teachers or coaches who testified ever witnessed A flirting with any of the plaintiffs or any other

student; moreover, the plaintiffs’ repeated visits to A’s classroom did

not appear unusual to other faculty members in light of A’s role as a

yearbook advisor, the measures A took to avoid detection, and the

common practice of students visiting other teachers’ classrooms; furthermore, even if A’s attire during football practices was inappropriate,

there was no evidence that A ever exhibited nudity or that her attire

indicated that she was inclined to engage in sexual impropriety with

students, and any flirtatious behavior A may have displayed at the football game was too far removed from any type or instance of sexual abuse

to supply reasonable cause to suspect an imminent risk of such abuse.

2. Y could not prevail on his claim that C’s testimony established a ministerial

duty of professionalism and that there was a genuine issue of material

fact with respect to whether the failure of staff members, including

coaches, to address the issue of A’s attire during football practices

constituted a breach of that duty: S testified that the school had no

dress code, and there was no evidence that C’s views of professionalism

as they related to attire ever were communicated to school employees

in a manner that clearly established a duty to dress in a prescribed

way, without the exercise of judgment or discretion; accordingly, C’s

testimony concerning his expectations of his subordinates and his opinion of what constituted professionalism, standing alone, was not sufficiently definite to establish an enforceable ministerial duty of professionalism, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment with

respect to this issue.

3. There was no merit to Y and Z’s claim that the trial court incorrectly

determined that the imminent harm to identifiable persons exception

to governmental immunity did not apply in the present case, as it would

not have been apparent to a reasonable school official that the defendants’ acts and omissions were so likely to cause harm that a clear and

unequivocal duty to act immediately to prevent such harm was created:

the evidence suggested that A’s conduct, and particularly her sexual

assaults of Y and Z, were the culmination of a generally clandestine

pattern of behavior, and, although some might have viewed her attire

at football practices as inappropriate for an educational setting, there

was nothing to suggest that anyone would reasonably anticipate that a

sexual assault of a student would be the immediate result of that attire,

especially in light of A’s otherwise unblemished record and the uniformly

high regard her students and colleagues had for her; moreover, there

was no evidence that the plaintiffs’ repeated visits to A’s classroom

were abnormalities that should have been apparent to staff members,

as it was undisputed that students routinely visited teachers’ classrooms

at numerous times for legitimate pedagogical or extracurricular reasons,

and A took measures to avoid raising any suspicion; furthermore, R’s

negative response to A’s interaction with the players at the Friday night

football game did not evince a belief that A was imminently about to

engage in an inappropriate sexual relationship with any student, let

alone one of the plaintiffs.

4. The trial court properly granted the town’s motion for summary judgment

with respect to Z’s claim that the town was liable for the failure of its

police officer, who was assigned to the high school as a resource officer,

to monitor the school’s security camera footage, which Z claimed would

have shown him entering A’s classroom, as Z did not establish that the

defendants had a ministerial duty to monitor the security camera footage;

S’s testimony that, although the police had access to the security footage,

the footage was not regularly monitored and reviewed only when an

incident was reported demonstrated that there was no policy governing

the manner and frequency with which security cameras and their footage

were monitored, and, accordingly, the failure of the school resource

officer to monitor the security cameras was a discretionary act subject

to governmental immunity.

Argued January 20—officially released July 30, 2021*

Procedural History

Three actions to recover damages for, inter alia, the

alleged negligence of the named defendant et al., and
for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of New Haven, where, in the first case,

the court, Agati, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to

add the named defendant’s Board of Education as a

defendant; thereafter, the court, Abrams, J., granted

the motions to consolidate filed by the named defendant

et al. and consolidated the three cases; subsequently,

the actions in the first and second cases were withdrawn as to the named defendant; thereafter, the court,

Abrams, J., granted the motions for summary judgment

filed by the named defendant et al. and rendered judgments thereon, from which the plaintiffs filed separate

appeals. Affirmed.

James M. Harrington, for the appellant in Docket

No. SC 20508 (plaintiff John Doe I).

Matthew D. Popilowski, with whom, on the brief,

was Brendan J. Keefe, for the appellant in Docket No.

SC 20509 (plaintiff John Doe II).

William B. Bilcheck, Jr., for the appellant in Docket

No. SC 20510 (plaintiff John Doe III).

Catherine S. Nietzel, with whom, on the brief, was

Jonathan C. Zellner, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
Opinion

ROBINSON, C. J. These appeals present several

issues of governmental immunity under General Statutes § 52-557n arising from the sexual abuse of the

plaintiffs, John Doe I, John Doe II and John Doe III,1

by Allison Marchese (Allison), who was an English

teacher at their high school, the Daniel Hand High

School (high school) in Madison. The plaintiffs appeal2

from the judgments of the trial court granting the

motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants,

the town of Madison (town), the Board of Education

of the Town of Madison (board), and Anthony Salutari,

Jr., the principal of the high school,3 on the ground of

governmental immunity. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim

that the trial court incorrectly concluded that (1) there

was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to

whether the teachers and football coaching staff at the

high school had reasonable cause to believe that Allison

was sexually abusing the plaintiffs, which would have

triggered their ministerial duty to report suspected child

abuse under No. 5120.4.2.5 of the board’s policies and

bylaws (board reporting policy) and the mandatory

reporting statutes, General Statutes §§ 17a-1014 and 17a101a,5

(2) the testimony of Craig Semple, the high

school’s athletic director, did not establish a ministerial

duty of professionalism, (3) they were not identifiable

persons subject to imminent harm for purposes of that

exception to discretionary act immunity under § 52-

557n (a) (2) (B), and (4) John Doe III did not plead or

establish a ministerial duty on the part of the town’s

police officers, one of whom was assigned as the high

school’s school resource officer, to monitor the high

school’s security camera footage. We disagree with the

plaintiffs’ claims and affirm the judgments of the trial

court.

The record reveals the following facts, which we view

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiffs,

along with the procedural history of these cases. In the

spring of 2014, when the events giving rise to this appeal

began, the three plaintiffs were students at the high

school, where they were members of the football team.

At that time, John Doe I was a fourteen year old freshman, John Doe II was a seventeen year old junior, and

John Doe III was a fifteen year old sophomore. In addition to her duties as an English teacher, Allison also

served as the high school’s faculty yearbook advisor

and as a core conditioning coach for the football team.

Until the events leading to this appeal, she had an excellent reputation in the school and the community, with

strong performance evaluations and ‘‘a sterling disciplinary record . . . .’’ Allison’s husband, Robert Marchese (Robert), was also employed at the high school

as an English teacher and the head of the English department.

Allison first met John Doe I in the spring of 2014,
when he was a student in her freshman literature class.

John Doe I, who had a reputation for being unusually

bold and mature for a freshman,6 bantered with Allison

during class. Although she did not banter or flirt back

with John Doe I publicly, they later developed a relationship through one-on-one meetings in school and messaging through various social media platforms, including Instagram. The messaging began when John Doe I

messaged Allison through Instagram, initially about a

book; the correspondence then progressed to more private and sexual topics. The messaging continued into

the summer until John Doe I left for a family vacation

to Africa; he asked her not to contact him during the

summer. Over the rest of that summer and into the fall

of 2014, however, Allison pursued John Doe I by paying

special attention to him at football practices, summoning him to her classroom approximately twenty to

thirty times, sending him a bagel with a note while he

was in another class, and sending him dozens of sexually explicit online messages and photographs through

social media platforms, including Instagram. Around

this time, Robert learned that Allison and John Doe I

had connected on Instagram when John Doe I began

to follow her profile; he confronted Allison multiple

times about this connection and their one-on-one meetings, as well as rumors that Robert believed had spread

among the teachers that Allison had been flirting with

John Doe I.7 There is no evidence, however, that Robert

was aware of the content of Allison’s private Instagram

messages. Although John Doe I tried to end his contacts

with Allison, she persisted in sending him messages

through the fall of 2014, continuing until her arrest on

January 7, 2015, for charges arising from the sexual

assault of John Doe II, which we will discuss subsequently.

Around the same time, Allison attempted to develop

her relationship with John Doe I by initiating a similar

online relationship on Instagram with John Doe III, who

was John Doe I’s best friend. John Doe III initially went

to Allison’s classroom a few weeks into the 2014–2015

school year at the request of John Doe I to try to resolve

the tension that had developed between Allison and

John Doe I by the end of the summer, as John Doe I

had tired of their communications and did not want to

speak with her any more. Thereafter, Allison called

John Doe III to her classroom approximately six times

during school hours, summoning him from multiple

classes, for conversations about her private life, her

marriage, and her fantasies. She also asked John Doe

III to relay messages to John Doe I. During several of

those classroom visits, Allison touched John Doe III

inappropriately by hugging him tightly in a way that

put her breasts in close proximity to his face.

During the summer of 2014, Allison also became

acquainted with John Doe II, first in her capacity as a

core conditioning coach for the high school’s football
team, and later as the faculty yearbook advisor. John

Doe II learned that Allison and John Doe I were

exchanging messages on Instagram after he asked John

Doe I several times about the special attention that she

was giving him during football practices and conditioning sessions. John Doe II did not think that anyone else

at practices, including players or coaches, had noticed

these interactions. During a subsequent conversation

after summer conditioning practice had ended, John

Doe I showed John Doe II the various Instagram messages between John Doe I and Allison, which John Doe

II described as ‘‘creepy’’ and akin to what a ‘‘high school

girl’’ would send a ‘‘high school guy . . . .’’

In the fall of 2014, John Doe II and Allison also worked

together in the school gym, which she helped to manage,

and where he went on a daily basis in order to stay

conditioned during recovery from a football injury.

Their conversations initially focused on exercise. Subsequently, Allison and John Doe II exchanged Instagram

contact information in connection with her role as a

yearbook advisor and John Doe II’s drafting of his senior

quote. Allison, who was not one of John Doe II’s teachers, summoned him from his classes to her classroom

on more than five occasions during school hours, ostensibly to review his yearbook quote. She repeatedly

declined to approve his quote on the ground that it was

not appropriate for publication; John Doe II disagreed

with her assessment because the quote made no references to profanity, drug or alcohol use, or sexual activity. During these brief visits, Allison raised the topic of

the recent passing of John Doe II’s father and offered

to help because she had experience involving a friend’s

suicide attempt. Their conversations then became more

personal and included the topic of her troubled marriage to Robert.

John Doe II and Allison also began to exchange messages on Instagram; John Doe II was curious to see

whether her communications with him would be as

inappropriate as they were with John Doe I. Several

weeks later, the content of the messages progressed

from school or athletic topics to ‘‘[s]trictly . . . personal’’ topics, including Allison’s marital problems, and

she sent him sexually suggestive photographs of herself

and engaged in banter containing sexual overtures.

Although John Doe II became increasingly uncomfortable with the conversations, he did not report or try to

stop them because he was afraid of the social repercussions should other students learn of his relationship

with Allison.

In December, 2014, Allison sent an Instagram message inviting John Doe II to her classroom during a free

period, where she closed the blinds, locked the door,

kissed him, and performed fellatio on him. This was

the sole occasion that Allison and John Doe II had

physical contact. After that encounter, John Doe II was
‘‘scared’’ and ‘‘ghosted’’ Allison; she continued, however, to try to contact him, with further Instagram messages inviting him over to her home for sexual activity

because Robert would be away performing with his

band.

All three plaintiffs tired of Allison’s advances and

conduct, particularly as they feared the spread of

rumors about what Allison had done with John Doe II.

The plaintiffs then met—in the words of John Doe II—

to create a plan ‘‘to get rid of her.’’ The plaintiffs subsequently met with Allison in a contentious encounter,

after which John Doe I and John Doe II reported her

to Salutari, the high school’s principal. On January 7,

2015, Allison was arrested and charged with the sexual

assault of John Doe II. She ultimately pleaded guilty

and was sentenced to two years imprisonment.8

Although Allison was secretive about her activities

with the plaintiffs, her appearance and attire had

attracted attention around the school and the community.9 At summer football practices, Allison would wear

only a sports bra and tight fitting athletic shorts made

of a spandex type material,10 leading some of the male

football coaches to compliment her appearance and

ask her to wear the shorts again.11 She did not think

that request was appropriate but was not offended

because she considered it ‘‘good-natured teasing

amongst friends . . . .’’ Most of the football coaches,

including Steve Filippone, the head football coach, considered Allison’s attire to be appropriate because it was

consistent with what they often saw young women wear

to exercise in settings like the gym, particularly given

the summer heat. The coaches flirted with Allison often,

and they frequently engaged in ‘‘locker [room] talk’’

among themselves about her appearance.12 They

believed that she was trying to get the attention of

the male students, with one coach, Michael Ferraiolo,

joking that she would not be interested in a group of

‘‘middle-aged bald men’’ like themselves.

Semple, the high school’s athletic director, believed

that it would have been unprofessional and inappropriate for any female coach to wear only a sports bra

around the student athletes; although he did not personally witness Allison dressed that way, had he done so,

he would have asked her to cover up by giving her a

high school T-shirt.13 Allison was not the first woman

who worked professionally with the football team; they

frequently had women contracted as athletic trainers.

The coaches hired Allison because of her training expertise and excellent reputation as a teacher. No member

of the high school’s athletic staff ever witnessed Allison

flirting with any student athletes.

Finally, we note that Allison attributed her behaviors

that gave rise to these cases to her troubled marriage to

Robert; those difficulties were exacerbated by Robert’s

view of the public attention that she was attracting on
social media and around the school, including attention

from male students who had been flirting with her.

Allison and Robert often fought publicly at the school

in front of other faculty and students, during lunch

in the teachers’ lounge, at staff meetings, and in her

classroom, where he once threw items off her desk and

across the room. One incident involving their marriage

occurred at a Friday night football game, where Robert

witnessed Allison interacting from the stands with three

suited up football players, who were standing on the

sideline below, in a way that made him feel uneasy;

Robert was angered by Allison ‘‘act[ing] as though she

was a wonderful mother’’ by holding their toddler

daughter as a ‘‘prop.’’ He was ‘‘disgusted’’ because he

believed that she was ‘‘very appreciative’’ of how the

football players were watching her while she was elevated above them in the stands, smiling, laughing, and

flicking her head back to clear the hair from her eyes.

Robert thought that Allison’s ‘‘preening and posturing

behavior’’ was intended to elicit a reaction from him,

given their marital difficulties.14 He told her that ‘‘we’re

going to read about [you] in the newspaper someday.’’

Robert believed Allison to be ‘‘a woman [who] was

teetering on the precipice of being kind of unhealthy

and making some bad decisions and being very

unhealthy and making some bad decisions, never at the

expense of [her] students but at the expense of [their]

marriage and [their] own . . . security.’’15 Indeed,

Robert described Allison as someone who, to that point,

had otherwise been a ‘‘law-abiding’’ person ‘‘who

walked the straight and narrow,’’ which made the news

of her sexual activities with the plaintiffs even more

shocking to him. Subsequently, Robert wrote a book

about the events of these cases.16

The plaintiffs brought these actions for damages pursuant to the municipal liability statute, § 52-557n, claiming in the operative complaints that they were injured

by the defendants’ failure, among other things, (1) to

prevent and/or interrupt Allison’s inappropriate relationship with the plaintiffs and her participation in

extracurricular activities involving the physical training

of male students, (2) to report Allison’s conduct to the

proper authorities in violation of their ministerial duties

under the board reporting policy and the mandatory

reporting statutes, given their ‘‘constructive notice’’ of

her conduct because multiple teachers had reasonable

cause to believe that she was sexually abusing the plaintiffs, (3) to monitor Allison’s social media usage to

ascertain whether she was violating policies concerning

communications between teachers and students, and

(4) to properly train and supervise their employees,

particularly with respect to the warning signs of inappropriate relationships between students and teachers,

and the use of classrooms and hallways.17 The trial

court subsequently granted the defendants’ motions to

consolidate the three cases for discovery, trial and
apportionment of liability. See Practice Book § 9-5 (a).

After discovery, the defendants moved for summary

judgment, arguing, with respect to the issues in this

appeal, that the plaintiffs could not establish negligence

and causation and, further, that they were entitled to

governmental immunity under § 52-557n. In response,

the plaintiffs contended that there were numerous genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment, including (1) whether the defendants had breached

their ministerial duty to report Allison under the board

reporting policy and the mandatory reporting statutes,

and (2) whether the plaintiffs were identifiable persons

subject to imminent harm for purposes of that exception to discretionary act immunity under § 52-557n (a)

(2) (B).

The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for

summary judgment in all three cases. Determining that

the duty to report the abuse of students is ministerial

in nature given the dictates of the mandatory reporting

statute and the board reporting policy, the trial court

nevertheless concluded that there was no evidence to

provide any of the high school staff members with the

requisite ‘‘reasonable cause to suspect’’ that Allison was

sexually abusing the plaintiffs. See General Statutes

§ 17a-101a (a) (1). The trial court contrasted the record

in these cases with other Superior Court cases in which

‘‘the mandatory reporter either witnessed the abuse or

the child told the mandatory reporter or school

employee about the abuse.’’ The trial court emphasized

testimony that no school employee, including the football coaches, had ever witnessed Allison flirt with any

male students and that she had always reacted appropriately when male students flirted with her. The trial court

observed that none of the social media posts at issue

would have triggered a ‘‘reasonable suspicion that a

student was being abused or was at risk of imminent

harm,’’ and rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Allison’s

attire at football practices because ‘‘the fact that [she]

dressed inappropriately is not enough alone or in conjunction with any other event to cause reasonable suspicion in a school employee that a student is being abused

or at risk of imminent harm.’’ Further, the court

observed that the plaintiffs’ visits to Allison’s classroom

would not have created reasonable cause to suspect

abuse, insofar as they were brief in duration and spaced

out in frequency, giving no reason for any teacher to

question the plaintiffs’ whereabouts or the legitimacy

of their visits to her classroom. For the same reasons,

the court also concluded that the plaintiffs had not

raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect

to the applicability of the identifiable person-imminent

harm exception to discretionary act immunity.18

Finally, with respect to other issues, the trial court

declined to consider the arguments of John Doe II and

John Doe III that a ministerial duty of professionalism
was established by the testimony of Semple, the high

school athletic director. The court concluded in footnotes that a breach of any such duty was not pleaded

in the complaints. Similarly, the court concluded that

John Doe III had failed to plead the claim, first asserted

in his objection to the motion for summary judgment,

that the town or its police department had breached

an obligation to monitor the security cameras at the

high school and emphasized that a plaintiff cannot make

a factual allegation for the first time in response to a

motion for summary judgment.19 Accordingly, the court

granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment

in all three cases and rendered judgments accordingly.

These appeals followed.

Before turning to the plaintiffs’ specific claims, we

note the following relevant background principles.

Beyond the well established standard by which we

engage in plenary review of a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the ‘‘following principles of governmental immunity are pertinent to our resolution of the

[plaintiffs’] claims. The . . . doctrines that determine

the tort liability of municipal employees are well established. . . . Generally, a municipal employee is liable

for the misperformance of ministerial acts, but has a

qualified immunity in the performance of governmental

acts. . . . Governmental acts are performed wholly for

the direct benefit of the public and are supervisory or

discretionary in nature. . . . The hallmark of a discretionary act is that it requires the exercise of judgment.

. . . In contrast, [a ministerial act] refers to a duty

which is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion. . . .

‘‘Municipal officials are immunized from liability for

negligence arising out of their discretionary acts in part

because of the danger that a more expansive exposure

to liability would cramp the exercise of official discretion beyond the limits desirable in our society. . . .

Discretionary act immunity reflects a value judgment

that—despite injury to a member of the public—the

broader interest in having government officers and

employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in

their official functions, unhampered by fear of secondguessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury.

. . . In contrast, municipal officers are not immune

from liability for negligence arising out of their ministerial acts, defined as acts to be performed in a prescribed

manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion.

. . . This is because society has no analogous interest

in permitting municipal officers to exercise judgment

in the performance of ministerial acts. . . .

‘‘The tort liability of a municipality has been codified

in § 52-557n. Section 52-557n (a) (1) provides that

[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person
or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee,

officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his

employment or official duties . . . . Section 52-557n

(a) (2) (B) extends, however, the same discretionary

act immunity that applies to municipal officials to the

municipalities themselves by providing that they will

not be liable for damages caused by negligent acts or

omissions which require the exercise of judgment or

discretion as an official function of the authority

expressly or impliedly granted by law. . . .

‘‘For purposes of determining whether a duty is discretionary or ministerial, this court has recognized that

[t]here is a difference between laws that impose general

duties on officials and those that mandate a particular

response to specific conditions. . . . A ministerial act

is one which a person performs in a given state of facts,

in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate

of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of

his own judgment [or discretion] upon the propriety of

the act being done. . . . In contrast, when an official

has a general duty to perform a certain act, but there

is no city charter provision, ordinance, regulation, rule,

policy, or any other directive [requiring the government

official to act in a] prescribed manner, the duty is

deemed discretionary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cole v. New Haven, 337 Conn. 326, 336–38, 253

A.3d 476 (2020).

I

MINISTERIAL DUTY CLAIMS

This appeal presents two issues with respect to

claimed violations of a ministerial duty. First, the plaintiffs contend that there was a genuine issue of material

fact with respect to whether the defendants breached

their ministerial duty to report a reasonable suspicion

of child abuse, as imposed by the mandatory reporting

statute and the board reporting policy. Second, John

Doe II claims that the testimony of Semple, the athletic

director, established a ministerial duty of professionalism and that there was a genuine issue of material fact

with respect to whether Allison’s attire constituted a

breach of that duty. We address each claim in turn.

A

Mandatory Reporting of Sexual Abuse

The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that there was no genuine issue of

material fact that the defendants had not breached their

ministerial duty under the mandatory reporting statute

and the board reporting policy to report child abuse,

the language of which mirrors the statute in all relevant

aspects. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly required them to prove that the teachers involved

had actual knowledge of abuse, rather than applying

the objective standard of ‘‘reasonable cause’’ to believe
the existence of abuse. The plaintiffs then cite an array

of conduct by Allison that they argue constituted reasonable cause for numerous high school employees to

suspect an imminent risk of sexual abuse or sexual

abuse of students by Allison. With respect to the football

practices, they contend—in the words of John Doe III—

that Allison’s ‘‘sexually explicit’’ act of wearing ‘‘skimpy

shorts and sports bras that exposed her genitalia and

breasts’’ created reasonable cause for the coaches to

‘‘suspect or believe’’ that they were at ‘‘imminent risk

of sexual mental abuse,’’ particularly given the coaches’

apparent belief that she dressed that way to get the

attention of the male student athletes. Turning to events

during school hours, they also rely on Robert’s claimed

awareness of Allison’s inappropriate attire in numerous

settings and her flirtatious behavior with students,

observing that John Doe I specifically believed that

Robert did not like him and was aware that he had

connected on social media with Allison, and Robert’s

confrontation of her at a Friday night football game,

some of which Robert highlighted in a book he wrote

about this incident. See footnotes 7 and 16 of this opinion. John Doe I and John Doe II also argue that reasonable cause for suspicion of sexual abuse or the imminent risk of sexual abuse is established by their repeated

visits to Allison’s classroom, with John Doe II being

summoned from multiple classes to revise his yearbook

quote, and the fact that she had locked her room for

ten minutes during the school day when she assaulted

John Doe II. John Doe III cites the unmonitored security

cameras, which would have aroused a reasonable suspicion with respect to the plaintiffs’ visits to Allison’s

classroom if monitored, as illustrative of the ‘‘lackadaisical environment’’ at the high school that he contends

reflected a dereliction of duty, reminiscent of ‘‘the three

sitting monkeys: Hear no evil. See no evil. Speak no

evil.’’

In response, the defendants concede the existence

of a ministerial duty to report a reasonable suspicion

of sexual abuse but argue that there was no breach of

that duty because the facts in this record do not support

a reasonable belief of sexual abuse given the ‘‘totality

of the circumstances’’ at the time. They observe that

there are no cases supporting a finding of reasonable

suspicion without a reporter witnessing or being told

firsthand of abuse. Turning to the specific facts of this

case, the defendants argue that evidence of Robert’s

anger at Allison’s attention seeking behavior, including

her interaction with the football players at the Friday

night game, did not amount to reasonable cause

because Robert did not think that Allison was a danger

to students.20 The defendants also rely on undisputed

testimony that it was not unusual for students to be

called out of classes or to visit with teachers individually, and that Allison’s visits with the plaintiffs were

brief in duration and occurred in a way that would not
draw the attention from any individual teacher. They

emphasize that there was no evidence that any teacher

ever saw Allison actually flirt with or make sexual overtures to any student, including the closest situation,

namely, when Robert saw her interact with the football

players at the Friday night game. Similarly, the defendants argue that there is no evidence that any staff

member was aware of the social media messaging

between the plaintiffs and Allison or Allison’s paying

attention to John Doe I during football practices.

Finally, the defendants contend that Allison’s attire

would not support a conclusion that she was abusing

students because (1) most teachers and staff members

viewed her attire as appropriate, and (2) as is reflected

in the advisory committee notes to rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the use of a person’s attire to

establish her sexual proclivities is ‘‘unreliable, at best,

and sexist and narcissistic, at worst.’’21 We agree with

the defendants’ argument that, on the facts of this case,

there is no evidence to support reasonable cause for any

of their employees to suspect that Allison was sexually

abusing the plaintiffs or exposing them to an imminent

risk of sexual abuse by her.

We begin by noting that it is undisputed that the

employees of the town and the board—Principal Salutari, all teachers, including Robert, and the various football coaches—had a ministerial duty under the board

reporting policy and the mandatory reporting statute

to report to the Commissioner of Children and Families

if, ‘‘in the ordinary course of [their] employment or

profession,’’ they obtained ‘‘reasonable cause to suspect’’ abuse of or ‘‘imminent risk of serious harm’’ to

a child or student.22 General Statutes § 17a-101a (a) (1);

see also General Statutes § 17a-101a (b) (providing

criminal penalties for failure to report); General Statutes § 17a-101b (prescribing content of report, twelve

hour reporting deadline from point at which reasonable

cause to suspect abuse occurs, and reporting process).

Consistent with case law governing the concept of ‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ in the criminal law context, the mandatory reporting statute provides that ‘‘suspicion or

belief may be based on factors including, but not limited

to, observations, allegations, facts or statements by a

child, victim . . . or third party. Such suspicion or

belief does not require certainty or probable cause.’’

(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 17a-101a (d); see,

e.g., State v. Peterson, 320 Conn. 720, 730–31 n.4, 135

A.3d 686 (2016) (‘‘Reasonable and articulable suspicion

is a lower standard than probable cause. . . . Proof of

probable cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence, or in other words, less than proof

that something is more likely than not.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Thus, reasonable cause to suspect ‘‘is an objective standard that

focuses not on the actual state of mind of the [decision

maker], but on whether a reasonable person, having
the information available to and known by the [decision

maker], would have had that level of suspicion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peterson, supra,

730. The assessment considers the ‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ at the time of the decision and must be

based on ‘‘specific and articulable facts’’ and ‘‘rational

inferences’’ taken therefrom. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 731. Whether reasonable cause or suspicion exists in view of a given set of facts presents a

question of law subject to plenary review. See, e.g.,

State v. Houghtaling, 326 Conn. 330, 353–54, 163 A.3d

563 (2017), cert. denied, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 1593,

200 L. Ed. 2d 776 (2018); State v. Butler, 296 Conn. 62,

72, 993 A.2d 970 (2010).

Considering the totality of the circumstances demonstrated by the evidence produced by the defendants,

and unchallenged by the plaintiffs, we conclude that

none of the defendant’s employees had reasonable

cause to suspect that Allison was sexually abusing any

of the plaintiffs or exposing them to an imminent risk

of sexual abuse. First, Allison’s personnel record was

unblemished, and she was held in uniformly high regard

by her colleagues and students at the high school;

indeed, she was known to handle the common situation

of student crushes appropriately by politely rebuffing

them.23 Second, although all of the teachers and coaches

who testified at depositions in these cases agreed that

it would be inappropriate and reportable misconduct

for a teacher to flirt with a student, none of those teachers or coaches ever witnessed Allison flirting with a

student, including any of the three plaintiffs. Even if

we assume, without deciding, that Allison had acted in

a flirtatious manner—consciously or not—at the Friday

night football game by smiling, laughing, and tossing

her hair in front of Robert and three football players,

that conduct is simply too far removed from any type

or instance of sexual abuse to supply reasonable cause

to suspect an imminent risk of such abuse.

Third, the three plaintiffs’ repeated visits to Allison’s

classroom did not appear unusual to other faculty members at the school because, as numerous faculty and

staff members testified, teachers frequently called students to different classrooms at various points during

the school day. It also was common for teachers to visit

students in other classrooms for a variety of academic

and extracurricular reasons, often to address academic

performance issues, such as incomplete work. There

also were open periods at the end of the day when

students could freely visit teachers for extra help. Moreover, Allison had a seemingly legitimate reason to summon students in her capacity as faculty yearbook advisor, and she varied the days and times at which she

summoned the plaintiffs in order to avoid detection.

John Doe II and John Doe III testified that they were

never called out from any individual teacher’s class

more than twice.
Fourth, even if we assume, without deciding, that

Allison’s attire at the football practices and in the gym

pushed the boundaries of propriety in an educational

setting, there is absolutely no evidence of nudity in

front of students; see footnote 11 of this opinion; and

her attire does not indicate that she was engaged, or

inclined to engage, in sexual impropriety with students.

Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 412, advisory committee notes (‘‘The

rule has been amended to . . . exclude all other evidence relating to an alleged victim of sexual misconduct

that is offered to prove a sexual predisposition. . . .

Admission of such evidence would contravene [r]ule

412’s objectives of shielding the alleged victim from

potential embarrassment and safeguarding the victim

against stereotypical thinking. Consequently, unless the

(b) (2) exception is satisfied, evidence such as that

relating to the alleged victim’s mode of dress, speech, or

[lifestyle] will not be admissible.’’ (Emphasis added.)).

In his brief, John Doe II identifies a seventeen fact

chain24 that, he argues, would suggest that people at

the school should have known what was happening

with the plaintiffs. We agree with the trial court that

this piling of inferences distorts the actual reality apparent to the various employees in real time. See Doe ex

rel. Brown v. Pontotoc County School District, 957 So.

2d 410, 418 (Miss. App. 2007) (‘‘[i]n retrospect, it is

easier to see the signs of inappropriateness in [the

coach’s] actions, but at the time they were occurring,

there was insufficient proof to claim the [school] [d]istrict was negligent in not taking action’’); see also Lodge

v. Arett Sales Corp., 246 Conn. 563, 575, 717 A.2d 215

(1998) (‘‘virtually all harms, in hindsight, are literally

foreseeable’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). By

aggregating the facts as they do, the plaintiffs impermissibly attribute knowledge of all of the facts to each of the

high school’s employees. As the plaintiffs themselves

agree, each defendant must be judged on the basis of

only those particular facts known to that person. Put

differently, aggregating the seventeen facts to create

reasonable cause to suspect sexual abuse or imminent

risk thereof is akin to charging the various high school

employees with the responsibility of viewing a completed jigsaw puzzle, when all any of them could see

at any relevant time was a piece or two. We do, however,

emphasize that mandated reporters, such as the school

employees involved in this case, should not hesitate to

ask questions or to act further—including by making a

report—when confronted with a situation that might in

fact be an indicator of abuse. Indeed, the legislature

envisioned such difficult decisions when it extended

immunity to good faith reporters of suspected abuse

or neglect in General Statutes § 17a-101e (b). See Ward

v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539, 559–60, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004).

Moreover, even when the facts of this case are viewed

in the aggregate and with the benefit of hindsight, they
are still far less compelling than those in cases in which

sister state courts have held that there was no duty to

report under mandatory reporting statutes.25 See, e.g.,

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550,

556–57, 562–63 (Ill. App. 2014) (distinguishing case from

those involving more ‘‘unequivocally salacious overtures’’ and concluding that volunteer’s report that scouting executive was ‘‘ ‘weird around kids’ ’’ at church and

would go to YMCA on day of boys’ swim team practices

and position himself in way that he could use mirror

to watch boys change clothes did not trigger mandatory

reporting obligations because it was ‘‘not so clearly

prurient, and did not signal such an immediate danger

to scouts, as to warrant depriving him of any opportunity to explain himself’’); Doe v. Logan, 602 S.W.3d 177,

187–88 (Ky. App.) (teacher was not obligated to report

colleague because he was not aware of colleague’s

abuse of special education student, despite fact that he

had observed colleague engage in otherwise ‘‘inappropriate behavior’’ that he did not ‘‘believe . . . was sexual in nature,’’ including ‘‘holding, hugging, or putting

arms around students’’), review denied, Kentucky

Supreme Court, Docket No. 2020-SC-0085 (July 1, 2020);

Doe ex rel. Brown v. Pontotoc County School District,

supra, 957 So. 2d 418 (school did not breach duty to

report affair between teacher and teenaged student

when evidence consisted of single ‘‘uncorroborated

rumor,’’ all physical contact occurred while teacher and

student were alone, except for rubbing of shoulders at

basketball game that ‘‘apparently went unnoticed by

attendees,’’ teacher had good reputation and employment history, and their interactions were ‘‘under the

guise of innocence,’’ such as tutoring); cf. Doe v. Dimovski, 336 Ill. App. 3d 292, 296–97, 783 N.E.2d 193 (contrasting case to one consisting only of rumors that had

been denied by students themselves and concluding

that female student’s direct report of sexual abuse to

school counselor created ministerial duty to report),

appeal denied, 204 Ill. 2d 658, 792 N.E.2d 306 (2003).

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly

determined that, on the facts in this record, none of

the high school personnel had reasonable cause to

believe that Allison was sexually abusing any of the

plaintiffs or exposing them to an imminent risk of sexual abuse.

B

Whether Semple’s Testimony Established a

Ministerial Duty of Professionalism

We next address John Doe II’s contention that the

trial court incorrectly concluded that the testimony of

Semple, the high school athletic director, did not establish a ‘‘ministerial duty of professionalism for his subordinates.’’ Specifically, John Doe II relies on Semple’s

testimony that he ‘‘expected his subordinates, including

head [football] coach Filippone, to enforce certain stan-
dards of professionalism, including requiring any coach,

male or female, to cover up if shirtless.’’ John Doe II

argues that the ‘‘failure to enforce this duty’’ resulted

in ‘‘the defendants’ permitting the now convicted sexual

predator Allison . . . to dress in only the most fundamental attire while addressing the high school football

team in her role as a core conditioning coach.’’ John

Doe II then contends that there is ample evidence to

establish that Semple failed to communicate the duty

of professionalism to his staff, which itself raises a

question of fact precluding summary judgment.

In response, the defendants rely on Ventura v. East

Haven, 330 Conn. 613, 199 A.3d 1 (2019), and argue

that, with no formal dress code or policy in place at

the high school, Semple’s testimony about ‘‘professionalism’’ did no more than establish a general practice by

which discretion is exercised, particularly given that

the faculty collective bargaining agreement would have

created problems with enforcing his version of ‘‘common sense’’ rules about attire. See footnote 14 of this

opinion. We agree with the defendants and conclude

that Semple’s opinion of what constitutes professionalism, standing alone, cannot provide the basis for a

clearly promulgated policy directed toward all school

employees and does not, therefore, create a ministerial duty.26

‘‘[O]ur courts consistently have held that to demonstrate the existence of a ministerial duty on the part of

a municipality and its agents, a plaintiff ordinarily must

point to some statute, city charter provision, ordinance,

regulation, rule, policy, or other directive that, by its

clear language, compels a municipal employee to act

in a prescribed manner, without the exercise of judgment or discretion.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cole v. New Haven, supra, 337

Conn. 338. A ministerial duty need not be written and

may be created by oral directives from superior officials, the existence of which are established by testimony. See Ventura v. East Haven, supra, 330 Conn.

639–41; see also Cole v. New Haven, supra, 342 (‘‘[w]hen

the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, we conclude that [the police sergeant’s] testimony, in combination with the [municipal pursuit policy] and the [statewide pursuit policy], establishes the

existence of a ministerial duty as a matter of law not to

use a complete roadblock maneuver to stop the plaintiff

simply for violating the city’s dirt bike ordinance, and

also provides evidence from which a reasonable fact

finder could conclude that [the police officer] violated

that ministerial duty’’); Ventura v. East Haven, supra,

640 n.14 (‘‘in the absence of an explicit written directive,

the testimony of a municipal official may be sufficient

to establish the existence of a ministerial duty’’). In

contrast, descriptions of general practices or expectations that guide an employee’s exercise of discretion

do not create a ministerial duty. See Ventura v. East
Haven, supra, 640–41 (‘‘There are, no doubt, any number of guidelines and practices that police officers

adhere to when responding to the myriad situations

they confront on a daily basis. The mere fact that an

officer, either by training or experience, ordinarily

responds to a situation in a particular manner does not

transform his or her response into a ministerial duty.’’).

Specificity is required in all aspects of the directive.

See Strycharz v. Cady, 323 Conn. 548, 566–67, 148 A.3d

1011 (2016) (concluding that school superintendent’s

‘‘testimony provided a sufficient basis to conclude that

school administrators had the ministerial duty to assign

staff members to monitor students throughout the

school’’ but also ‘‘contains no directive sufficient to

support a finding that [the administrators] had the ministerial duty to ensure that assigned staff members, once

notified of their responsibilities, actually reported to

and adequately discharged their assignments’’ (emphasis in original)); see Marvin v. Board of Education, 191

Conn. App. 169, 176–78, 213 A.3d 1155 (2019) (ministerial duty was not created by custodian’s ‘‘job description

[that] provides [only] generally that the custodial staff

‘[p]erforms necessary work to maintain the cleanliness

and appearance of all hard surface flooring, including

. . . mopping,’ ’’ and ‘‘there was no specific policy, procedure, or directive that applied to the inspection and

maintenance of the floors at the school, and . . . there

existed only a general policy that the school should be

maintained in a clean and safe condition’’).

We agree with the defendants that Semple’s testimony about ‘‘professionalism’’ lacked the specificity

necessary to create an enforceable ministerial duty.

In contrast to a specific dress code—which Salutari

testified did not exist at the high school because of

collective bargaining issues; see footnote 14 of this opinion; there is no evidence that Semple’s views of professionalism in attire ever were communicated to the

school employees in a manner that clearly established

a duty to dress in a prescribed way, without the exercise

of judgment or discretion. Accordingly, we conclude

that Semple’s conception of professionalism is not by

itself a sufficiently definite and specific concept to serve

as the basis for a ministerial duty and that the trial

court properly granted summary judgment with respect

to this issue.

II

IDENTIFIABLE PERSON-IMMINENT HARM

EXCEPTION TO DISCRETIONARY

ACT IMMUNITY

John Doe II and John Doe III next claim that the trial

court incorrectly concluded that the identifiable personimminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity, as explicated in Haynes v. Middletown, 314 Conn.

303, 312–23, 101 A.3d 249 (2014), and Doe v. Petersen,

279 Conn. 607, 616–21, 903 A.2d 191 (2006), does not
apply in this case. Acknowledging that the trial court

correctly determined that he was an identifiable person

during school hours, John Doe II argues that the seventeen facts that provide reasonable cause to report a

suspicion of sexual abuse; see footnote 23 of this opinion; also render him a person subject to imminent harm,

with the likelihood of that harm apparent to the defendants as public officials. John Doe III argues similarly,

relying on (1) Allison’s attire at summer football practices, ‘‘in full view and knowledge of the coaching staff

three times a week for six weeks,’’ (2) his deposition

testimony about how often he was summoned from

class, and (3) numerous hall monitors’ collective failure

to question any of the plaintiffs ‘‘as to their reasons for

being out of class or going to [Allison’s] classroom.’’

John Doe III also relies on the fact that the school

resource officer and the school administration did not

actively monitor the high school’s video security system.

In response, the defendants argue that John Doe II

and John Doe III were identifiable victims only during

school hours, and not during the optional summer football program, meaning that only four of the claimed

circumstances apply to support a claim that there was

imminent harm. Citing the remoteness of the harm considered in Brooks v. Powers, 328 Conn. 256, 178 A.3d

366 (2018), the defendants emphasize that no one was

aware that the plaintiffs had been called out of class

excessively, as it was not unusual for a student to visit a

different classroom or to receive a bagel from a teacher.

They also contend that there is no evidence to support

the proposition that Allison’s attire made it more likely

that she would perform a sexual act on a student, particularly given that the act did not occur until December,

2014, and that she wore the attire in question during

the summer. Quoting Edgerton v. Clinton, 311 Conn.

217, 231, 86 A.3d 437 (2014), the defendants emphasize

that there is no duty to inquire and that ‘‘[t]he ‘apparentness’ prong of the identifiable person-imminent

harm exception is an objective test pursuant to which

the courts ‘consider the information available to the

[school official] at the time of [his or] her discretionary

act or omission.’ ’’ The defendants emphasize that,

because additional inquiry is not required, ‘‘the same

reason that the circumstances did not support reasonable suspicion of abuse of’’ John Doe II or John Doe III

means that ‘‘there is no evidence that the circumstances

would have made it apparent to a reasonable school

official that harm . . . was imminent . . . .’’ We agree

with the defendants’ argument that there is no genuine

issue of material fact with respect to the apparentness

element of the identifiable person-imminent harm

exception to governmental immunity.27

It is well established that ‘‘[§] 52-557n abandons the

common-law principle of municipal sovereign immunity

and establishes the circumstances in which a municipality may be liable for damages. . . . One such circum-
stance is a negligent act or omission of a municipal

officer acting within the scope of his or her employment

or official duties. . . . [Section] 52-557n (a) (2) (B),

however, explicitly shields a municipality from liability

for damages to person or property caused by the negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of

judgment or discretion as an official function of the

authority expressly or impliedly granted by law. . . .

‘‘This court has recognized an exception to discretionary act immunity that allows for liability when the

circumstances make it apparent to the public officer

that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject

an identifiable person to imminent harm . . . . This

identifiable person-imminent harm exception has three

requirements: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable

victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent

that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim

to that harm. . . . All three must be proven in order

for the exception to apply. . . . [T]he ultimate determination of whether [governmental] immunity applies is

ordinarily a question of law for the court . . . [unless]

there are unresolved factual issues . . . properly left to

the jury.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Martinez v. New Haven, 328 Conn. 1, 8, 176

A.3d 531 (2018).

We begin by noting that it is undisputed that, because

John Doe II and John Doe III were ‘‘public school student[s] at school during school hours, [they were] . . .

identifiable person[s] for purposes of the imminent

harm to identifiable persons exception’’; id., 9; and, for

the purpose of addressing the plaintiffs’ claims in this

appeal, we assume without deciding that they occupied

that status during football practices, as well.28 But see

St. Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420, 436, 165 A.3d

148 (2017) (‘‘[O]ur decisions underscore . . . that

whether the plaintiff was compelled to be at the location

where the injury occurred remains a paramount consideration in determining whether the plaintiff was an identifiable person or member of a foreseeable class of

victims. . . . Accordingly, [t]he only identifiable class

of foreseeable victims that we have recognized . . . is

that of schoolchildren attending public schools during

school hours . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Maselli v. Regional School District No. 10, 198

Conn. App. 643, 656–57, 235 A.3d 599 (middle school

soccer player was not identifiable person given voluntary nature of participation in sport), cert. denied, 335

Conn. 947, 238 A.3d 19 (2020). Accordingly, our focus

in this appeal is on whether the trial court correctly

concluded that the defendants’ acts or omissions did

not implicate either an imminent harm or ‘‘a public

official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct

is likely to subject that victim to that harm.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Martinez v. New Haven,

supra, 328 Conn. 8.
Our recent decision in Martinez aptly summarizes

the line of decisions in the wake of Burns v. Board

of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 649, 638 A.2d 1 (1994),

overruled on other grounds by Haynes v. Middletown,

314 Conn. 303, 101 A.3d 249 (2014), which apply the

identifiable person-imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity in the public school context, and

we need not repeat that detailed analysis here. See

Martinez v. New Haven, supra, 328 Conn. 8–10. It suffices to say that ‘‘the proper standard for determining

whether a harm was imminent is whether it was apparent to the municipal defendant that the dangerous condition was so likely to cause harm that the defendant

had a clear and unequivocal duty to act immediately to

prevent the harm.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 9. Applying that standard, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact

with respect to either the imminence or apparentness

prongs. Sexual abuse causes unmistakably serious

harm to its victims, but the facts of this case suggest

that Allison’s actions—in particular her sexual assaults

of John Doe II and John Doe III—were the culmination

of a generally clandestine pattern of behavior. Although

some might have viewed Allison’s attire at the summer

football practices as inappropriate for an educational

setting, there is nothing to suggest that anyone would

reasonably anticipate a sexual assault of a student

would be the immediate result of that attire.29 Cf. Brooks

v. Powers, supra, 328 Conn. 273–75 (woman who

drowned in water one-half mile from where she was

seen standing in field during storm was not identifiable

person subject to imminent harm for purposes of constables’ failure to respond given attenuation between

drowning and risk of being in field); Maselli v. Regional

School District No. 10, supra, 198 Conn. App. 658–59

(‘‘exacerbated postconcussion symptoms and diminished academic performance’’ were ‘‘too attenuated’’

from injury and allegedly negligent response by coach

when middle school soccer player was struck in face

by ball to be imminent or apparent). This is particularly

so, given that Allison’s professional record had been

unblemished until the events of this case, and she was

held in uniformly high regard by students and faculty

alike. Moreover, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs’

repeated visits to Allison’s classroom were abnormalities that should have been apparent to any staff members, given the undisputed evidence that students routinely visited teachers’ classrooms at numerous times

for legitimate pedagogical or extracurricular reasons,

and Allison avoided raising suspicion by summoning

the plaintiffs at a diverse array of times over an

extended period of months. Indeed, those staff members, such as hallway monitors, were under no duty to

ask questions beyond what was immediately apparent.

See, e.g., Edgerton v. Clinton, supra, 311 Conn. 231–32;

see also Doe v. Petersen, supra, 279 Conn. 609, 619–21
and n.11 (fifteen year old tennis player who suffered

emotional distress when supervisor ‘‘ ‘cut [her] off’ ’’

from further disclosure of sexual abuse suffered at

hands of coach was not subject to exception when

manager had no idea of sexual assault that had been

suffered). Finally, Robert’s apparently negative reaction

to Allison’s interaction with the football players at the

Friday night game cannot be understood as evincing a

belief that she was imminently about to engage in an

illegal sexual relationship with any student, let alone

any of the plaintiffs specifically. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that neither John Doe II nor John Doe III satisfied the imminent

harm to identifiable persons exception to governmental

immunity.

III

VIDEO MONITORING CLAIMS

Finally, we address the claim of John Doe III that

the trial court incorrectly determined that he failed to

allege in his complaint that the town was liable for

the inactions of a police officer assigned as a school

resource officer at the high school because that officer

was an employee of both the town and the board. John

Doe III contends that the trial court incorrectly determined that he had raised this claim for the first time

in his memorandum of law objecting to summary judgment when his complaint ‘‘clearly alleged’’ that the

town, acting through the police department, ‘‘failed to

properly monitor the classrooms and hallways with

proper personnel or through the use [of] video surveillance that existed [when] the sexual assault of John

Doe [III] took place.’’

In response, the defendants do not challenge John

Doe III’s argument that the trial court improperly construed his complaint, but argue—ostensibly as an alternative ground on which to affirm the judgment of the

trial court—that the ‘‘trial court rightly analyzed the

evidence, which was that [Principal Salutari] said the

police had access to the footage, not that they had a

duty to monitor the classrooms or anywhere else [that

John Doe III’s] activity may have occurred.’’ The defendants contend that there was no evidence that ‘‘the

police [had] the ability to monitor security video transmissions’’ and that, ‘‘even if they did, it does not establish that the police had any duty to do so. . . . Salutari

expressly stated that the video was not monitored,

much less that anyone had a duty to monitor it in any

way differently from the way he testified it was used,

namely, to go back after an incident to determine if the

cameras detected it.’’ We agree with the defendants and

conclude that there is no evidence of any ministerial

duty to monitor the security camera footage, rendering

this a classic discretionary act subject to governmental

immunity under § 52-557n (a) (2) (B).
Having reviewed the record in the absence of a reply

brief challenging the defendants’ assertions, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that there

was no evidence of a policy governing the manner and

frequency with which security cameras and their footage are monitored. See footnote 19 of this opinion.

Insofar as the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence

of a ministerial duty in this regard, the high school’s

use of the security cameras remained a discretionary

act. See, e.g., Lewis v. Newtown, 191 Conn. App. 213,

232, 214 A.3d 405 (‘‘it is clear that the adoption of the

school security guidelines by the defendants was an

act of discretion encompassed within their general duty

to manage and supervise their employees and the

schoolchildren, and, therefore, was protected by governmental immunity pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (2) (B)’’),

cert. denied, 333 Conn. 919, 216 A.3d 650 (2019); see

also Strycharz v. Cady, supra, 323 Conn. 568–69 (public

school administrators’ ‘‘general responsibility to manage and supervise school employees’’ is discretionary

act). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* July 30, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 We refer to the plaintiffs individually where appropriate for purposes

of clarity.

2 The plaintiffs appealed from the judgments of the trial court to the

Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeals to this court pursuant to

General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. Although the appeals

were briefed and argued separately, we resolve them in a single opinion

given that they were consolidated in the trial court and present several

common factual and legal issues.

3

John Doe I initially named only the town as a defendant; subsequently,

the trial court, Agati, J., granted his motion to add the board as a defendant.

Thereafter, John Doe I and John Doe II withdrew their claims against the

town.

John Doe II and John Doe III also named Allison as a defendant. Allison

has not appeared in these appeals. Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, all

collective references herein to the defendants are to the board, the town,

and Salutari.

4 General Statutes § 17a-101 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) The public

policy of this state is: To protect children whose health and welfare may

be adversely affected through injury and neglect; to strengthen the family

and to make the home safe for children by enhancing the parental capacity

for good child care; to provide a temporary or permanent nurturing and

safe environment for children when necessary; and for these purposes to

require the reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect, investigation of

such reports by a social agency, and provision of services, where needed,

to such child and family.

‘‘(b) The following persons shall be mandated reporters . . . (9) any

school employee, as defined in section 53a-65, (10) any social worker, (11)

any person who holds or is issued a coaching permit by the State Board of

Education, is a coach of intramural or interscholastic athletics and is eighteen years of age or older, (12) any individual who is employed as a coach

or director of youth athletics and is eighteen years of age or older . . . (15)

any police officer . . . .’’

Like the trial court and the parties, we refer to the current revision of

the statute. We note, however, that the legislature has made significant

changes to § 17a-101 since the 2013 revision of the statute, which would

have governed when the events underlying this appeal began, including in
2014; see Public Acts 2014, No. 14-186, § 6 (effective October 1, 2014);

when those events were ongoing. None of those amendments changed the

obligations of any of the various actors in these cases.

5 General Statutes § 17a-101a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) Any mandated reporter, as described in section 17a-101, who in the ordinary course

of such person’s employment or profession has reasonable cause to suspect

or believe that any child under the age of eighteen years (A) has been abused

or neglected, as described in section 46b-120, (B) has had nonaccidental

physical injury, or injury which is at variance with the history given of such

injury, inflicted upon such child, or (C) is placed at imminent risk of serious

harm, or (2) any school employee, as defined in section 53a-65, who in the

ordinary course of such person’s employment or profession has reasonable

cause to suspect or believe that any person who is being educated by the

Technical Education and Career System or a local or regional board of

education, other than as part of an adult education program, is a victim

under the provisions of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or

53a-73a, and the perpetrator is a school employee shall report or cause a

report to be made in accordance with the provisions of sections 17a-101b

to 17a-101d, inclusive.

‘‘(b) (1) Any person required to report under the provisions of this section

who fails to make such report or fails to make such report within the time

period prescribed in sections 17a-101b to 17a-101d, inclusive, and section

17a-103 shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except that such person

shall be guilty of a class E felony if (A) such violation is a subsequent

violation, (B) such violation was wilful or intentional or due to gross negligence, or (C) such person had actual knowledge that (i) a child was abused

or neglected, as described in section 46b-120, or (ii) a person was a victim

described in subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section.

‘‘(2) Any person who intentionally and unreasonably interferes with or

prevents the making of a report pursuant to this section, or attempts or

conspires to do so, shall be guilty of a class D felony. . . .

* * *

‘‘(d) For purposes of this section and section 17a-101b, a mandated reporter’s suspicion or belief may be based on factors including, but not limited

to, observations, allegations, facts or statements by a child, victim, as

described in subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section, or third party.

Such suspicion or belief does not require certainty or probable cause.’’

Section 17a-101a, like § 17a-101, has undergone significant revisions since

2013. See, e.g., Public Acts 2017, No. 17-237, §§ 95 and 96; Public Acts 2015,

No. 15-205, § 2; see also footnote 4 of this opinion. Those revisions do not

have any effect on this appeal, and, like the trial court and the parties, we

refer to the current revision of the statute.

6 Andrea Donovan, a paraprofessional employed by the board, was present

for this exchange; she believed that John Doe I had ‘‘teas[ed]’’ Allison in

class by acting as a ‘‘prankster’’ or ‘‘jokester . . . .’’ Afterward, Donovan

told Allison that she believed that John Doe I was very mature for a freshman,

which was a view that had been shared by several other teachers at the

high school. Donovan also shared that John Doe I had been attracting an

unusual amount of attention for a freshman—even from senior girls, who

had been asking him to the prom.

7

John Doe I testified at his deposition that he felt uneasy during his

meetings with Allison because he suspected that Robert did not like him,

and she had told him that Robert did not like how much time they were

spending together.

8

John Doe III’s relationship with Allison did not come to light until more

than one year later. In the spring of 2015, he asked his guidance counselor,

Christine Coyle, to allow him to transfer out of Robert’s class, but he did

not disclose any personal involvement with Allison to Coyle, and she believed

that his request was because of his friendship with John Doe I.

9 Allison also began to draw attention online, particularly on a now defunct

social media app called Yik Yak, which permitted users to post discussions

anonymously based on their location. The ubiquity of Yik Yak’s use by

students resulted in its ban from the high school’s Wi-Fi network because

of its reputation for enabling cyberbullying and other student conflicts.

Allison first learned of this online attention on Yik Yak in the spring of 2014,

when she accompanied some female students to Salutari’s office to report

some negative or sexual comments that had been made on the app about

those students. Salutari was already aware of her mentions on the app, as

were other teachers, with one, Paul Coppola, jokingly calling Allison an

‘‘Internet sensation . . . .’’ She then informed Salutari of the sexual nature
of the comments; because of Yik Yak’s anonymous nature, she did not know

who had made them. Salutari informed Phil Rosati, the high school’s school

resource police officer, of Allison’s complaint about the Yik Yak post,

although he was skeptical that anything could be done because there was

no illegal content and the post was anonymous. On Rosati’s advice, Salutari

told Allison to keep Salutari informed if there were any more posts and if

she heard the names of any students who might be involved; Rosati himself

offered to continue to monitor the situation, as he often first learned of

problems directly from students.

10 The plaintiffs also emphasize that Allison dressed similarly on runs

through town, attracting attention from motorists who would honk their

horns. They claim that this was unusual behavior, given that many teachers

make efforts to avoid running into students and their families outside of

school.

11 John Doe III claims that Allison’s attire exposed her breasts and genitalia

to the students, which constituted ‘‘a form of mental sexual abuse’’ that

triggered the football coaches’ reporting obligations. The cited deposition

transcripts do not, however, support the assertion of actual exposure, indicating only that the color of her thong undergarment and the outlines of

her buttocks were visible through the thin fabric of her athletic shorts; John

Doe III testified that he could not see any skin color through the fabric.

12 One assistant coach, Erick Becker, stated that he was ‘‘pretty darn

surprised’’ about Allison wearing only a sports bra and thought the attire

was inappropriate in a school setting. He thought she was trying to attract

the attention of the coaching staff. He nevertheless viewed any locker room

talk about Allison’s appearance to be inappropriate commentary on a woman’s body, and he attempted to avoid such conversations.

13 Although there was no formal dress code for student athletes, it was

undisputed that the female students at the high school would have been

directed to cover up had they been dressed similarly at an athletic practice.

John Doe II testified that Allison’s shorts were consistent with what the

female student athletes wore to practice, but he thought it was ‘‘unusual’’

for an ‘‘authority figure’’ not to wear a tank top to cover a sports bra, given

that the female student athletes would not be allowed to dress similarly.

14 During another episode in which Robert was concerned about Allison’s

conduct at the high school, he asked another department head, Peter Nye,

to speak to Allison about her attire, namely, the propriety of a slim fitting

red dress and high heeled shoes that she had worn to school, including for

a back-to-school night with parents. Robert was upset that ‘‘people were

talking’’ about Allison’s dress, and Nye himself—who did not think the dress

was inappropriate—had heard approximately six conversations about it

among faculty and staff members who believed that Allison wore that dress

to highlight her recent weight loss. Mia Corvino, a female colleague, similarly

did not believe that the dress was inappropriate or excessively revealing.

When Robert and Nye met with Allison, the conversation ended abruptly

when she said that Principal Salutari ‘‘likes the way I dress.’’ Robert and

Nye did not escalate the matter further because they believed that Salutari

would not be receptive to their concerns about her attire, especially as there

was no dress code for faculty and staff at the high school, and it would

have been difficult from a labor relations perspective to approach that issue

with a faculty or staff member.

15 Robert testified, however, that this comment was unconnected to the

conversation with the football players, and he did not believe that she was

engaging or was going to engage in sexual conduct with them; instead, he

intended to shock her given the negative effect technology had been having

on their family and his anger that he was carrying the majority of the

domestic responsibilities in their household.

16 See generally R. Marchese, Land of July: A Real Life Scandal of Sex &

Social Media at a Connecticut High School (2018).

17 John Doe II and John Doe III also claimed indemnity from the town

and from the board pursuant to General Statutes §§ 7-465 and 10-235, respectively, for the negligence of Salutari. John Doe II also brought claims against

Allison personally for assault and for negligent and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

18 The trial court then applied these principles to conclude that commonlaw immunity for discretionary acts similarly barred attempts by John Doe

II and John Doe III to use an indemnification theory under General Statutes

§§ 7-465 and 10-235 to hold the board liable for Salutari’s alleged negligence,

including a breach of any policy.

19 The trial court nevertheless considered the merits of this claim, as it
rejected John Doe III’s assertions that the defendants breached a duty to

monitor the security video cameras in the hallways, which would have

shown when he entered Allison’s classroom. The court relied on Salutari’s

testimony that he or the police view the camera footage only when there

is a reported event and that the video footage is automatically erased every

few weeks when the storage is full. The court stated that, ‘‘[w]ithout [John

Doe III’s] reporting [Allison’s] conduct, there was no reason for the [high]

school or the police department to watch the security camera footage.’’

20 The defendants also argue that Robert had no duty to report under

§ 17a-101a because he was not acting within the scope of his employment

when he remarked, with respect to Allison’s interaction with the three

football players at a Friday night game, that ‘‘we’re going to read about

[you] in the newspaper someday’’ or when he learned of her attracting

attention while running through town. We need not address this scope of

employment argument because, even if we assume, without deciding, that

Robert’s duties as a mandated reporter extended beyond school hours, we

conclude that the facts of this case, viewed both individually and collectively,

did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of abuse or imminent abuse.

21 See Fed. R. Evid. 412, advisory committee notes.

22 Numerous Superior Court decisions, which were followed by the trial

court in this case, hold to this effect. See, e.g., Doe v. Kennedy, Superior

Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-09-5013921-S (November

29, 2012) (55 Conn. L. Rptr. 193, 196).

23 We note that Allison had told Mia Corvino, a colleague, that John Doe

I, among other male students, had a crush on her; Corvino believed that

Allison properly laughed that off and acted appropriately and professionally.

Corvino had heard during her classes that other boys had similar crushes

on Allison, which she did not consider unusual; it was ‘‘the nature of the

business’’ for some students to have crushes on teachers and the responsibility of the teachers to respond appropriately.

24 John Doe II identifies the following seventeen facts that he claims

establish reasonable cause to suspect that Allison was sexually abusing him:

(1) Robert, as her husband and department head, ‘‘thought her dress and

appearance [were] so inappropriate that he asked another teacher to address

the issue with her’’; (2) Robert testified about an evening at a high school

football game where he ‘‘saw some players flirting with [Allison], and he

commented to her that ‘we’re going to read about [you] in the [newspaper]

someday’ ’’; (3) Allison and Robert ‘‘routinely fought with each other—in

front of students and staff—in order to start a fight or make a scene for

the purpose of making [Robert] jealous’’; (4) Robert ‘‘testified that [Allison’s]

personality had changed and that she was disappointed that the students

no longer flirted with her—a fact she attributed to her ‘mom’ status’’; (5)

‘‘on at least one occasion, Allison . . . sent John Doe I a bagel during school

hours and in front of students and other teachers’’; (6) ‘‘in her role as

yearbook [advisor], [Allison] required John Doe II to change his yearbook

quote at least five times, each time requiring him to be pulled out of a class

and meet with her in person’’; (7) ‘‘on some of these occasions, [Allison]

would call [some] of [John Doe II’s] teachers to request that he come to

her classroom for the ostensible purpose of discussing his yearbook quote’’;

(8) ‘‘students commented to [John] Doe II that it was unusual to see an

authority [figure] remove her tank top to reveal only a sports bra during a

workout with the football team’’; (9) ‘‘it was not permitted for the female

student athletes to wear only their sports bras’’; (10) ‘‘during the summer

football program, [John] Doe II observed [Allison] paying special attention

to [John] Doe I’’; (11) ‘‘[John] Doe I and [Allison] were exchanging private

messages on lnstagram, and [John] Doe II learned that it turned into flirting’’;

(12) Allison ‘‘had multiple conversations with the football coaches about

her attire, including one conversation [during which a] coach asked her to

wear her tight fitting pink shorts again’’; (13) Allison ‘‘testified that she

believes much of her conduct at the time was designed to fuel a need for

attention she did not feel she was getting through her marriage’’; (14) Allison

‘‘testified that the coaches flirted with her incessantly’’; (15) ‘‘an assistant

coach, Erick Becker, testified that [Allison] dressed provocatively such that

it was hard not to notice’’; (16) ‘‘Becker further testified that it was an

inappropriate way to dress around students’’; and (17) ‘‘Becker and another

coach had a conversation about the fact that Allison . . . appeared to be

trying to get the attention of the students.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)

25 Looking beyond mandatory reporting statutes, we note that other Connecticut, federal, and sister state courts have held similarly in the context

of negligent hiring and retention claims in considering whether it was fore-
seeable, for duty purposes, that a school or church employee would sexually

abuse a child in his or her charge—some in cases with fact patterns akin

to this one. See Gough v. Saint Peter’s Episcopal Church, 143 Conn. App. 719,

731–32, 70 A.3d 190 (2013) (existence of church’s sexual abuse prevention

policies did not render it reasonably foreseeable that priest would sexually

abuse teenage boy, given ‘‘the uncontested evidence . . . that no one who

knew [the priest] saw, heard or observed anything that alerted them that

[the priest] would harm anyone in any manner,’’ and ‘‘the plaintiff averred

that he did not think that anyone at [the church] was aware of the incident

and that he did not disclose to anyone that the incident occurred until

decades later’’); Doe 175 ex rel. Doe 175 v. Columbia Heights School District,

ISD No. 13, 873 N.W.2d 352, 360–61 (Minn. App. 2016) (there were insufficient

‘‘red flags’’ to make sexual abuse of teenage girl by high school football

coach foreseeable, even when (1) girl had yelled ‘‘ ‘I love you’ ’’ to him at

practice, prompting another coach to say ‘‘ ‘[t]hat’s trouble’ ’’ and to ask her

to leave, (2) girl and coach were spotted talking in parking lot, which was

considered common occurrence, (3) girl used computer in weight room

office while coach was supervising weight room, and (4) coach had been

seen ‘‘alone with an unknown ‘young girl’ ’’ in weight room on Saturday);

Dia CC v. Ithaca City School District, 304 App. Div. 2d 955, 956, 758 N.Y.S.2d

197 (‘‘[There was] no evidence that the [school] [d]istrict had any knowledge

or notice that the [English as a Second Language] teacher may molest a

student,’’ given the teacher’s good employment history for more than fifteen

years ‘‘without incident,’’ the teacher’s clean background checks prior to

hiring, and the fact that the student’s ‘‘classroom teacher acted reasonably

in releasing [him] to another teacher. Allowing a teacher to work alone oneon-one with a student did not breach the [school] [d]istrict’s duty to supervise

students . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)), appeal denied, 100 N.Y.2d 506, 795

N.E.2d 38, 763 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2003); A.H. ex rel. C.H. v. Church of God in

Christ, Inc., 297 Va. 604, 629–30, 831 S.E.2d 460 (2019) (church’s knowledge

of past sexual abuse allegation did not trigger duty to terminate youth pastor

when there was no pleading that church was aware of specifics or that

allegation had been verified by social services or law enforcement authorities).

26 As a preliminary matter, we note that John Doe II relies on Haynes v.

Middletown, 314 Conn. 303, 315 n.8, 101 A.3d 249 (2014), and argues that

the trial court improperly declined to address the issue on the ground that

it had not been pleaded in the complaint. The defendants argue in response

that the trial court correctly determined that John Doe II did not plead a

theory of negligence arising from Allison’s wardrobe, which distinguishes

this case from Haynes, in which we held only that the plaintiff need not

affirmatively plead an exception to discretionary act immunity. Given our

conclusion with respect to the merits of John Doe II’s claim, we need not

address this pleading issue.

We also note that, although John Doe III raised a similar claim before

the trial court, he does not renew it on appeal.

27 The defendants also argue, as an alternative ground for affirming the

judgments in the cases of John Doe II and John Doe III, that their failure

to proffer expert testimony to support their claims as to the defective

supervisory structure at the high school is inherently fatal to their negligence

claims. We need not address this argument, given our conclusion as to

discretionary act immunity.

28 Describing as ‘‘unconscionable’’ this court’s failure ‘‘to expand the exception for identifiable victim[s] to include any student on school property who

has a right and purpose to be there,’’ John Doe III asks us to overrule the

line of cases standing for the proposition that the ‘‘only identifiable class

of foreseeable victims that we have recognized for these purposes is that

of school children attending public schools during school hours.’’ Durrant

v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 107, 931 A.2d 859 (2007); see also St.

Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420, 437–38, 165 A.3d 148 (2017) (citing

cases). Because we assume, without deciding, that John Doe II and John

Doe III were identifiable persons at all relevant times, we do not address

this request.

29 Contrary to John Doe III’s characterization of her attire as ‘‘a form of

mental sexual abuse,’’ there is no evidence that she actually exposed any

intimate body parts to him or any other students at the football practices.

See footnote 11 of this opinion.