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THE SPACE LEADERSHIP PRESERVATION ACT 

AND THE NEED FOR STABILITY AT NASA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

February 25, 2016 

Serial No. 114–62 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan 

STEVE KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DARIN LAHOOD, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts 

DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

MARK TAKANO, California 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

February 25, 2016 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 10 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12 

Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 22 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24 

Witnesses: 

Panel I 

The Honorable John Culberson (TX–7), U.S. House of Representatives 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 14 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18 

Panel II 

Dr. Michael Griffin, Former Administrator, NASA 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 27 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29 

Colonel Eileen Collins, USAF (Ret.); Commander, STS–93 and 114; and Pilot, 

STS–63 and 94; and former Chair, Subcommittee on Space Operations, 

NASA Advisory Council 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 34 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 36 

Ms. Cristina Chaplain, Director, Acquisitions and Sourcing Management, 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 40 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 42 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 67 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. Michael Griffin, Former Administrator, NASA .............................................. 92 

Colonel Eileen Collins, USAF (Ret.); Commander, STS–93 and 114; and Pilot, 

STS–63 and 94; and former Chair, Subcommittee on Space Operations, 

NASA Advisory Council ....................................................................................... 102 

Ms. Cristina Chaplain, Director, Acquisitions and Sourcing Management, 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) .......................................................... 106 

(1) 

THE SPACE LEADERSHIP PRESERVATION ACT 

AND THE NEED FOR STABILITY AT NASA 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith [Chairman of the Committee] presiding. 
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Chairman SMITH. The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology will come to order. And without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of the Committee at any time. 

Welcome to today’s hearing entitled ‘‘The Space Leadership Preservation Act and the Need for Stability at NASA.’’ 

I’ll recognize myself for an opening statement and then the 

Ranking Minority Member, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson from Texas. 

And let me say just looking out on the audience today I’m glad 

to see so much interest in this subject. And we have actually two 

panels today. We’re going to start off with Congressman John Culberson, and then we’ll go to a panel of three witnesses after that. 

Presidential transitions often have provided a challenge to NASA 

programs that require continuity and budget stability. But few 

have been as rocky as the Administration change we experienced 

seven years ago. 

Even before he was elected President, then-candidate Barack 

Obama planned to delay the Constellation program being built to 

take humans to deep space destinations. One of the Obama Administration’s first acts, in fact, was to cancel this NASA program outright. 

These jarring decisions have been accompanied by repeated 

budget proposals that continue to cut key programs designed to 

take humans to deep space destinations like the Moon and Mars. 

The most recent proposal released just a few weeks ago would 

shrink the Space Launch System and Orion crew vehicle by more 

than $800 million. Even worse, the entire budget depends on makebelieve budget gimmicks. 

This regrettable approach continues to make a Mars mission all 

but impossible. It is not the approach of an administration that is 

serious about maintaining America’s leadership in space. 

The recent report from the National Academies of Science titled 

‘‘Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. 

Program of Human Space Exploration,’’ stated that: ‘‘The human 

spaceflight program in the United States had experienced considerable programmatic turbulence, with frequent and dramatic changes 

in program goals and mission plans in response to changes in national policies. The changes had a high cost in program resources 

and opportunities, and imposed what many feared was an intolerable burden on already-constrained human exploration budgets.’’ 

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, an advisory body established by Congress to report to NASA and Congress on safety 

issues that affect NASA, stated in their recent report in January 

that ‘‘NASA faces another challenge that has historically led to disruption and inefficiency and arguably has impact on safety and 

good systems engineering. This is the challenge of starting over 

with new programs and directions following administration change. 

As in prior reports, the ASAP urges constancy of purpose. Failing 

to stay the course with current programs of record will make it an 

even longer, costlier, and potentially less safe trip to Mars.’’ 

These facts are not lost on this committee. The most recent 

NASA Authorization Act from 2010 contains several provisions that 

remain the ‘‘law of the land’’ and continue to guide NASA activities. 
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The Act notes that the ‘‘commitment to human exploration goals 

is essential for providing the necessary long-term focus and programmatic consistency and robustness of the United States civilian 

space program.’’ 

The Act states that ‘‘It is in the United States’ national interest 

to maintain a government-operated space transportation system for 

crew and cargo delivery to space.’’ 

The Act directs that ‘‘The United States must develop as rapidly 

as possible replacement vehicles capable of providing both human 

and cargo launch capability to low-Earth orbit and to destinations 

beyond low-Earth orbit.’’ 

The 2005, 2008, and 2010 NASA Authorization Acts are consistent in their direction to NASA. NASA needs the same certainty 

from the executive branch that it receives from Congress. Today, 

we are discussing how to provide that stability to NASA once again 

as we look toward a presidential transition in less than a year. 

My friend and Texas colleague, Representative John Culberson, 

has a bill that seeks to do just that. I thank Representative Culberson for his leadership on this issue, and I am a cosponsor of his 

legislation. We share the goal of providing NASA with long-term, 

consistent support, and it is great to have him here today to discuss his bill. 

One of the first hearings that this committee held during my 

chairmanship was, in fact, on this very topic. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today how we can 

ensure stability in our space program through the next presidential 

transition. 

Dr. Michael Griffin provides a unique perspective as the last 

NASA Administrator to serve before a presidential transition. Colonel Eileen Collins not only has served as a pilot and commander 

of space shuttle missions, but also as a member of the NASA Advisory Council during the last transition. And Ms. Cristina Chaplain 

brings the Government Accountability Office’s insightful perspective. 

We look forward to hearing their testimony and learning how we 

can ensure that NASA remains on the forefront of space exploration through the next presidential transition. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Smith follows:] 
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Chairman SMITH. That concludes my opening statement, and the 

Ranking Member is recognized for hers. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good 

morning. I’d like to start by welcoming our witnesses. 

NASA is a cornerstone of our nation’s R&D enterprise, a source 

of inspiration to our young people, and a worldwide symbol of 

America’s technological prowess and dedication to the peaceful exploration of space. We want it to succeed. 

Today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘The Space Leadership Preservation 

Act and the Need for Stability at NASA.’’ While I have concerns 

about the legislation itself, I wholeheartedly agree with the 

premise that we want to preserve America’s leadership in space, 

and that NASA will need stability if it is to maintain that leadership role. I am heartened that Chairman Culberson has long felt 

the same way. 

That said, I regret that the legislation being discussed today, 

while obviously well-intentioned, unfortunately is not likely to fix 

the fundamental causes of instability at NASA. Let me give just a 

few examples of my concern with what the bill does and doesn’t do. 

First, the bill would establish a Board of Directors apparently 

modeled after the National Science Foundation’s National Science 

Board. Of course, NSF and NASA are quite different agencies with 

quite different missions. So the applicability of the NSF model to 

NASA is unclear. 

But there are other differences that also need to be noted. As we 

know, the members of the NSB are all nominated by the President. 

The Board of Directors established in this bill, on the other hand, 

would have a majority of its members named by Congress using a 

formula that injects partisan politics into a board that ostensibly 

is supposed to insulate NASA from politics. 

In addition, the Board would be tasked with preparing the budget for NASA in parallel with NASA’s own budget preparations process. This seems to be a prescription for wasteful duplication at 

best, with the potential for serious confusion and instability as the 

more likely outcomes. 

It is unclear to me how this small group of individuals with no 

agency management responsibilities or accountability is supposed 

to develop a detailed budget for a $19 billion agency without having to set up an unwieldy competing administrative infrastructure 

of its own. This is an approach that will not lead to a good outcome. 

Instead, we should let the dedicated men and women at NASA 

who are tasked with carrying out NASA’s challenging programs be 

the ones to develop its budget requests. It should not be done by 

a group of individuals who, though may be talented, will not have 

any accountability for delivering results under the budget they may 

propose. If we’re concerned that OMB is adjusting NASA’s budget 

request in unhealthy ways, then we in Congress already have sufficient oversight and budgetary tools at our disposal to correct that 

situation. 

Next, the bill would establish a fixed ten-year term for the NASA 

Administrator. I frankly don’t know what problem this provision is 

intended to correct. A mission agency benefits from having an administrator chosen by the President or she—that he or she serves. 
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Having a carryover administrator from a previous President’s term 

will do nothing to ensure stability if the President wishes to pursue 

a different policy agenda from his or her predecessor and doesn’t 

see the Administrator as being part of his or her team. 

In addition, as history shows, having a fixed term for an agency 

head means little in practice. Only 5 of the last 15 NSF Directors 

served out a full six-year term, and similar instability has been the 

norm for FAA despite the five-year term for its Administrators. 

I could go on, but the reality is that we don’t need to set up a 

new bureaucracy outside of NASA or alter the appointment process 

for its leaders. If we’re interested in ensuring stability at NASA, 

it is already in our power as Congress to do so. We are the ones 

who ultimately determine NASA’s budget. We can provide the necessary budgetary stability to NASA or we can destabilize it with 

appropriation delays, continuing resolutions, and shutdowns. The 

choice is ours. It’s right here in this Committee. 

In addition, we have the ability to set a stable direction for 

NASA, and we did just that in the 2015 NASA reauthorization bill 

that passed the House. We see that Mars should be the goal of our 

human exploration program. The President has agreed, though 

that was determined before he became President. We should take 

that consensus and build on it rather than having an unelected 

board put forth its own exploration vision every four years. 

The two Congressional actions that I have just described, one 

budgetary and one policy-oriented, will do more to maintain space 

leadership and ensure stability at NASA than anything we might 

do in this bill that we are discussing today. 

So in closing, I again want to welcome our witnesses. I appreciate your service, and I look forward to your testimony. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:] 
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Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. 

Our witness on the first panel today is Hon. John Culberson, 

Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and Science. 

Congressman Culberson represents the 7th District of Texas, a 

district formerly represented by President George H.W. Bush. A 

longtime space enthusiast, Chairman Culberson is the sponsor of 

H.R. 2093, the Space Leadership Reservation Act of 2015. We 

thank him for being here this morning and look forward to hearing 

about his bill. 

And the gentleman is recognized for five minutes. John, make 

sure your mike is on there. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN CULBERSON (TX–7), 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. CULBERSON. I want to thank you, Chairman Smith and 

Ranking Member Johnson, forholding this hearing today to review 

the Space Leadership Preservation Act of 2015. I also want to 

thank your staff, particularly Chris Shank and Tom Hammond, for 

working with me and my staff on this important legislation. 

Chairman Smith, thank you for supporting this bill as an original cosponsor. I’m deeply grateful for your confidence and support 

on this important matter. And I also want to thank your fellow 

Committee Members, Representatives Sensenbrenner, Posey, and 

Bridenstine, for their support as cosponsors. 

I especially want to thank my predecessor Congressman Frank 

Wolf, who chaired the Commerce, Justice, Science Committee, in 

helped me develop this legislation originally because Frank saw, as 

I have, as all of you have, that we simply have to give NASA greater stability. We need to make this agency less political, more professional, and give them the ability to see far into the future with 

the knowledge and with the confidence that the Congress will be 

there behind them. 

I have some of my very best memories as a boy growing up in 

Houston. I’ve been to the space program. All my earliest heroes 

were the Apollo astronauts. I got my first telescope for Christmas 

when I was 12. I’ve had one ever since, bought myself a rather 

large telescope as a high school graduation present. These men and 

women have been heroes to all Americans. 

And when I was assigned to the Appropriations Committee, I 

asked but one thing. I wanted to be—to serve on the Commerce, 

Justice, Science Committee and one day be there to share it. And 

it’s an extraordinary privilege for me to work with you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Johnson, all the Members of this Committee, as we do our best arm-in-arm in—to make sure that NASA 

has the funding, the support that they need to do all that’s on their 

plate. 

In the appropriations bill that the Congress just approved—I 

made certain that NASA has today the largest appropriation that 

they have ever received since the agency was created in 1958, and 

I will continue to make sure that NASA has the resources they 

need to accomplish all that is before them. And that again is a 
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year-to-year effort. That is again something that tends to be reliant 

too much on who is in the White House and who holds the chairmanships of these important subcommittees. 

I also want to be sure to thank my counterpart in the Senate, 

Senator Richard Shelby, who chairs the Senate Commerce, Justice, 

Science Committee. He’s an ardent supporter of the space program, 

and it’s been absolutely vital to have him there for his support. 

You know, although it’s been over 44 years since any human has 

set foot on the surface of another celestial body, when Gene 

Cernan, my constituent and good friend, and Harrison Schmitt left 

the moon after three days exploring the Taurus-Littrow lunar valley, mission control in Houston read a statement from the White 

House to the Apollo 17 astronauts that said, ‘‘As the Challenger 

leaves the surface of the moon, we are conscious not of what we 

leave behind but of what lies before us.’’ But today, the glory days 

of the Apollo program seem to be behind us, and the country seems 

to have lost focus on exploring what lies before us, or all the wonder that would be, as Tennyson said so well. 

The team at NASA unfortunately has faced program cancellation 

after program cancellation. And as Mike Griffin points out so correctly in his testimony you’ll hear in a moment—Dr. Griffin points 

out, ‘‘As the year 2009 opened, we had a plan for our nation’s space 

program, a plan of generational scope for what it was that NASA 

expected to do.’’ But by early 2010, barely a year later, this carefully hewn strategy that had been approved twice by Congress in 

two successive authorization acts of 2005 and 2008, Dr. Griffin 

points out, had been abandoned and cancelled. 

And I have a chart here that I’ll make sure each one of you have 

a copy of that. 

[Slide.] 

Mike Coats, the Director at the Johnson Space Center first pointed out to me that this is the fundamental problem at NASA, that 

in the last 20 years, NASA has spent more than $20 billion on cancelled development programs. No entity, no company, no entity, no 

agency of the federal government, no agency of any state government or local government can function in this environment. And 

think of the heartbreak. 

Brian Babin, my good friend and colleague from the east side of 

Houston, represents the Johnson Space Center. We all know the 

heartbreak that those great men and women, those brilliant engineers and scientists who have devoted their life to making the 

dreams of the future come true, to build these incredible machines, 

these great rockets and spacecraft, they pour their heart and soul 

into it only to have it yanked out from underneath them. That is 

very, very damaging to their morale and destructive to our program as a whole. 

This is not a partisan issue. Completely set politics aside. Now, 

forget who’s in the White House, what party label. It’s just intensely destructive, and we cannot continue. It’s wasteful, damaging, and it damages our ability as a nation to preserve our leadership in space. And space is the high ground. I cannot imagine 

General Meade at Gettysburg abandoning Little Round Top, just 

giving it over. You do not surrender the high ground. And yet I’m 

very concerned that in the absence of stability, in the absence of 
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giving NASA a greater level of professionalism and making them 

less political, that the country is going to wind up abandoning the 

high ground. 

There is no clear mission today, and we simply have to come up 

with a way to get the agency the ability to give us that vision, and 

with the guidance and support of Congress, make that come true. 

I had the chance, the honor recently to hear former Navy SEAL 

Robert O’Neill speak about his work in identifying and taking out 

Osama bin Laden, and one of the things that really stuck with me 

from Rob’s remarks was he said that a lack of a clear mission hurts 

morale. That’s true of all of us as human beings, and it’s certainly 

true with the team at NASA. We can help fix that problem with 

this legislation. 

I have welcomed suggestions or ideas on how we can modify the 

legislation, but I put a lot of thought into this. With your help, 

Chairman Smith and Chairman Frank Wolf, we looked at the— 

some of the models in government that work well. The Director of 

the FBI, for example, has—that—the ten-year term for the Director 

of the FBI is serving very well. We know that the FBI is a pillar 

of integrity, and that Director does not think about politics or who 

the President is. They focus on enforcing the law and doing the 

right thing for the right reasons for the country. 

Whether it is the President, Ms. Johnson, or whether it’s the 

Congress, your human nature being what we are, there’s going to 

be politics either way. And the idea of the Board of Directors was 

to make sure that we had members from both parties recommending appointments to that board, who would have to then be 

submitted by the President to the Senate for confirmation, preserving the separation of powers and the Executive’s role in making that appointment so there are no constitutional issues, and you 

also have both parties in both Houses of Congress having an impact on that Board of Directors. 

The idea of the budget being submitted directly to Congress is 

important because if—we don’t all of us—none of us know exactly 

what NASA’s best minds have recommended. They submit their 

budget to the Office of Management and Budget, and the budget 

that we get, Mr. Chairman, and the budget that I receive—the 

budget recommendation from the President is not really from 

NASA. It’s from OMB. As a practical matter, we all know that 

OMB runs NASA today. The bureaucrats, the bean-counters at 

OMB are the ones making the big decisions for our nation’s space 

program. And it’s just unacceptable. 

I’d like to know, as I know you would, an honest, accurate number. What do the best minds at NASA recommended to the Congress? What’s necessary for you to achieve all that’s before you? 

And that’s the idea behind the direct budget submission, Ms. Johnson, that we would, as Members of Congress, receive budget submissions from the Board of Directors at NASA. We would also get 

OMB’s recommendation. Then we can lay them down side by side 

and see what is necessary to make those dreams of the future come 

true and balance them and figure out what is necessary for American taxpayers to fund that recommendation. 

That longer term for the Administrator, I think, is not only necessary for stability to make the agency head less political, but to 
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give that individual the time to make sure that these tremendously 

complicated and expensive spaceflight programs come to fruition so 

we don’t see this start and stop, as you see on this chart right here. 

[Slide.] 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I really think that from my experience 

working in the Congress, I started out here on this Committee, and 

then when I went to the Appropriations Committee and was able 

to see, as you have, the extraordinary men and women at NASA 

who are so dedicated to make sure that the American space program is the best on earth, who are so dedicated to make sure that 

the spacecraft and the rockets they build are truly the best that 

have ever been conceived or built by human hands. 

I keep coming back to the fundamental problem. The cause of the 

instability is governance. We could continue to fund NASA. We can 

continue down this path of year-to-year pillar-to-post funding, or 

we could make fundamental long-term changes that our successors 

will inherit an agency that is less political, more professional, more 

stable, more focused on making the dreams of the future come true, 

more focused on achieving the goals of the Decadal Survey. 

Quite frankly, I wish one thing that you could add, I’d like to figure out a way to have a human spaceflight Decadal Survey. The 

scientists at the National Academy of Sciences do a great job when 

they prepare the Decadal Survey for astrophysics, for earth 

sciences, for heliophysics, for planetary science. And you’ll see in 

my CJS bill I wired in there that NASA shall follow the recommendations of the Decadal Survey as they prepare what is necessary for missions in the future, and I made certain they got the 

money to do it. 

But what I can’t figure out and resolve is how do you have a 

Decadal Survey for human spaceflight without having all those 

conflicting passions from the different contractors that are involved? That’s a challenge that I’d ask for the help of the Science 

Committee in resolving. 

But it is governance. It all circles back to governance. And if we 

want to ensure that America maintains its leadership role in outer 

space, if we want to make sure that we are protecting the high 

ground and that our children and grandchildren will live to see 

interstellar flight, that they’ll live to see the discovery of life on 

other worlds, I encourage you, urge you to join me in passing this 

legislation and modifying it. Make it better, and help us find a way 

to give NASA the stability that they need at headquarters, again, 

to make those dreams of the future come true. 

And I thank you very much for having me here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Culberson follows:] 
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Chairman SMITH. Chairman Culberson, thank you for the comments about your bill and also thank you for all you have done for 

NASA over the years and into the future as well. 

You are welcome to join us up here if you’d like to, to listen to 

the next expert panel. And we’re going to take a brief recess while 

the witness table is prepared for the next panel. 

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SMITH. And while we’re taking a recess, I understand 

that the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Babin, the Chairman of the 

Space Subcommittee, is recognized for an opening statement if he’d 

like to make one. 

Mr. BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning. It’s a great pleasure to be here this morning with 

our esteemed colleague and our first witness, as we just heard, 

Chairman John Culberson. 

And I represent the 36th District of Texas, which is the home of 

the Johnson Space Center. I’ve had the privilege of visiting JSC on 

a number of occasions. Every time I stop by there, I am reminded 

of the truly extraordinary accomplishments that we have made as 

a nation. I am also inspired by the potential that exists at NASA 

to continue expanding our horizons deeper into space. It’s truly an 

awe-inspiring mission that is pursued with dedication by NASA’s 

personnel and its contractors. 

Space exploration and science captures the American people’s interests, it inspires us to pursue extraordinary goals, and keeps us 

on the forefront of scientific achievement. It is a challenging endeavor that distinguishes the United States as a global leader. It 

supports innovation and economic growth, and inspires the next 

generation to build, explore, and discover. 

The missions of NASA that we should be focused on are complex, 

they are expensive, and they are long term. Unfortunately, the last 

eight years have been characterized by turmoil, and by upheaval 

and uncertainty. If there’s anything that we have learned from this 

experience, it is that our national space program can ill-afford to 

change our program of record every time that there is a new President. Space exploration requires stability and unwavering dedication. 

Chairman Culberson, a strong supporter and good friend of our 

nation’s space program, has been vocal, as you heard this morning, 

about how the billions of dollars have been dedicated, directed, and 

redirected over the years with fits and starts of various NASA 

projects. Your pursuit of a solution to this challenge, Representative Culberson, is greatly appreciated by me and many of our colleagues. 

Space exploration is a very worthwhile investment for the taxpayer and for the Nation. It inspires the next generation of explorers to pursue science, technology, engineering, and math; it advances U.S. soft power and international relations; it reinforces our 

aerospace industrial base; increases economic competitiveness; and 

advances our national security interests. 

There’s a great deal of promise in the future of space, but if we 

fail to provide stability for NASA’s space exploration programs, we 

may well lose our leadership in space. Make no mistake, other nations are nipping at our heels and we can ill-afford to rest on our 
23 

laurels. Losing U.S. leadership in space will significantly undermine our national interests, erode our industrial base, undermine 

our international influence, and cause the loss of a skilled workforce and will jeopardize our national security. Our colleague Bill 

Posey often says that the Chinese are going to the moon, and 

they’re not going there just to collect rocks, and I couldn’t agree 

more. 

Mr. Culberson’s Space Leadership Preservation Act offers us an 

opportunity to review many of the challenges facing our nation’s 

space agency. There may be many ways to achieve the goals of this 

legislation, and so I have an open mind. Presidential elections offer 

both challenges and opportunities, and that’s why it is imperative 

that our colleagues in the Senate consider the bipartisan NASA 

Authorization Act that passes via unanimous consent over a year 

ago. They must bring this up. NASA would be well-served by the 

guidance that legislation provides. It would provide stability of purpose in an uncertain time. All that they would have to do is update 

the funding levels to match the recently passed Omnibus Appropriations levels for NASA. 

And I appreciate hearing the testimony of Representative Culberson and looking forward to hearing our other distinguished witnesses this morning, and I thank them for appearing here. 

And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Babin follows:] 
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Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Babin. 

We are awaiting the arrival of a Member of the Science Committee, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, who is going to 

introduce our first witness, Dr. Griffin. And while he is on the way, 

I’m going to proceed and introduce our other two witnesses today. 

And our second witness is Colonel Eileen Collins, Retired United 

States Air Force Colonel and former NASA astronaut and resident 

of my hometown San Antonio. Colonel Collins was selected by 

NASA to become an astronaut in 1991. In 1995, she flew the space 

shuttle as pilot aboard Discovery and then again as pilot in 1997 

aboard Atlantis. Colonel Collins became the first woman commander of a U.S. spacecraft with shuttle mission Columbia in 1999. 

Her final spaceflight mission was as commander of Discovery in 

2005, the Return to Flight mission. She has logged more than 6,750 

hours in 30 different types of aircraft and more than 870 hours in 

space as a veteran of four spaceflights. 

Colonel Collins received her bachelor’s degree in mathematics 

and economics from Syracuse University, her master of science degree in operations from Stanford University, and a master of arts 

degree in space systems management from Webster University. 

Our final witness is Ms. Cristina Chaplain, Director of Acquisitions and Sourcing Management at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Ms. Chaplain has a responsibility of GAO assessments of military space acquisitions, NASA, and the Missile Defense Agency. Prior to her current position at GAO, she worked 

with GAO’s Financial Management and Information Technology 

Team. She has been with GAO for 25 years. Ms. Chaplain received 

her bachelor’s degree from Boston University and her master’s degree from Columbia University. 

Okay. I’m sure that the gentleman from Alabama will be joining 

us shortly, but in his absence, I’m going to go on and introduce our 

first witness today. And that is Dr. Michael Griffin, former NASA 

Administrator and current Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 

of Schafer Corporation. Dr. Griffin served as both Chief Engineer 

and Associate Administrator for Exploration at NASA, as well as 

Deputy for Technology at the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. Dr. Griffin is a recipient of numerous honors and awards, 

including the NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal and the Department Of Defense’s distinguished Public Service Medal, the 

highest award which can be conferred on a nongovernment employee. 

Dr. Griffin received his bachelor’s degree in physics from Johns 

Hopkins University and master’s degrees in aerospace science from 

Catholic University, electrical engineering from the University of 

Southern California, applied physics from Johns Hopkins, civil engineering from George Washington University, and business administration from Loyola College of Maryland. By my count, that’s 

five master’s degrees. And his Ph.D. is in aerospace engineering 

from the University of Maryland. 

We welcome you, all three of you, to the hearing today. 

And the gentleman from Alabama has arrived, but I still want 

to recognize him. Even though I just finished introducing Dr. Griffin, I know that the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, will 
27 

have some comments to make as well. And he is recognized for that 

purpose. 

Mr. BROOKS. I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman. This is my third hearing 

since 9:30. 

From what I understand, you’ve already introduced—— 

Chairman SMITH. I just—— 

Mr. BROOKS. —Dr. Griffin. 

Chairman SMITH. I just finished, but I’d like to recognize you to 

make any additional comments you’d like to make. 

Well, Dr. Griffin, thank you for being here. Roll Tide and War 

Eagle. I’ll make it short. 

Chairman SMITH. In that case, we will proceed, and, Dr. Griffin, 

you’re welcome to start your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. MICHAEL GRIFFIN, 

FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, NASA 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Chairman Culberson, 

Mr. Brooks, for the kind introduction and recognition. I’m—and 

thanking Ranking Member Johnson and Members of the Committee for appearing here today and allowing me to appear to discuss the future of our nation’s space program. 

With the inauguration of a new Administration and Congress, we 

will have both the need and the opportunity to restore American 

preeminence in space, and after that, to ensure stability in the policy and programs we create. We should begin now, and in that context, it may be of some value to review some of our recent history. 

Some of that has been summarized by Chairman Culberson in the 

earlier panel, and I will not repeat it. 

I will make the point that, following the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board identified as 

one of the root causes of that failure the lack of a clearly identifiable long-term strategic plan for NASA. As has been stated, by 

2009 that issue had been remedied, and we were executing a powerful and compelling new plan. That plan respected the need to 

complete existing commitments, the constraints imposed by the geography of the solar system, and the existing state of our technology and operational experience. The plan respected the need of 

our international partners for a roadmap for human spaceflight beyond the International Space Station, while offering critical challenges to which they could make critical contributions. Finally, 

being achievable with only incremental real dollar budget growth, 

it respected realistic budget constraints. It was a good plan. 

This strategy received nearly unanimous bipartisan endorsement 

by successive Congresses, Republican and Democratic, in the NASA 

Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2008, clearing the path for a period 

of unimpeded progress. And by early 2009, the shuttle was flying 

regularly, the ISS was nearing completion, a new crew transportation system was in work, and the first two contracts for commercial cargo delivery to the International Space Station had been 

signed. Some 14 nations had embraced partnership with the United 

States to return to the moon and were orienting their own national 

space policies to that end. 

But by early 2010, just a year later, this strategy was in disarray. Human lunar return had been abandoned, as had NASA’s 
28 

development of a new crew transportation system. There was no 

plan beyond ISS save for a nebulous commitment to visit an asteroid sometime in the 2020s. Inasmuch as this—such a mission is inherently a one-off exercise with limited opportunities for international involvement, our existing space station partners rightly 

felt abandoned and potential new partners saw very little merit in 

working with the United States. 

The nations that were eager to participate in space exploration 

in 2009 still wish to do so today, but a leader is needed for such 

an endeavor, and for now, the only possible leader is the United 

States. If we do not choose to engage, then eventually other nations 

will, and we’re unlikely to be pleased with that result. This is not 

a future that the United States should allow to come to pass. 

Our space policy is bankrupt. While I certainly support the stability for NASA that is the topic of this hearing today, I would not 

want that desire to prevent us from correcting the problems that 

have been created over the last seven years. To quote my friend 

and colleague Jim Albaugh, the former Boeing commercial aircraft 

CEO, the current Administration’s plan for space offers ‘‘no dream, 

no vision, no plan, no budget, and no remorse.’’ We can fix this and 

we must. 

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Griffin follows:] 
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Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Dr. Griffin. 

Colonel Collins. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EILEEN COLLINS, USAF (RET.); 

COMMANDER, STS–93 AND 114; AND PILOT, STS–63 AND 94; 

AND FORMER CHAIR, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

OPERATIONS, 

NASA ADVISORY COUNCIL 

Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member 

Johnson and Committee Members. It is a pleasure for me to be 

here today to talk about the future of our great country and to 

share my perspective as a former space shuttle commander. I have 

a passion for exploration, and I’m firmly committed to the future 

successes of our country’s space program. 

A few words about my background, I’m a former Air Force test 

pilot, a graduate of the Air Force Test Pilot School, and a veteran 

of four spaceflights. I served for five years on the NASA Advisory 

Council from 2007 to 2011. I currently serve on the National Academy of Sciences’ Aerospace Science and Engineering Board, and although I serve on this and many other boards and advisory panels, 

I want to say that I’m here today representing myself and not any 

of these other panels. 

So in my opening comments I have three general points. The 

first one is I want to thank you for asking the opinion of the operators of our space systems or the guys in the trenches so to speak. 

I hope I can give you an operational perspective from the astronaut’s point of view. 

Secondly, I can’t emphasize enough the love that Americans have 

for our space program. As a speaker and as an advisor, I routinely 

meet people from all around the United States. They are inspired 

by human spaceflight and they are very excited about scientific discoveries. They see the space program as a bright future, where we 

can imagine possibilities both human and technical. 

And frankly, the brand of NASA is easy to love. For example, my 

story began in 4th grade when I read a magazine article about the 

Gemini astronauts. Since then, I’ve wanted to fly in space and be 

part of this great adventure. It led me to study of mathematics and 

a career in flying. 

Today, I see people of all ages light up when the subject of space 

travel is discussed. In my opinion, the history of American exploration is right up there with baseball, apple pie, and the Fourth of 

July. And I might add that the recent announcement for new astronauts brought a record number of applicants, 18,300 applicants, 

which is more than twice as many as the previous record. 

Now, my third point concerns the purpose and stability of the 

human spaceflight program. Obviously, the success of any decadeslong program is related to the long-term commitment from the top. 

So first, a mission is defined. Next, a strategy is set. And then, an 

operational plan is written. Now, that operational plan includes a 

test plan, and a test plan includes a build-up approach. This is one 

of the fundamentals that we learn when we go—and that we teach 

when we go through the test pilot schools. 

As we run a test program, occasionally, technical changes will 

need to be made because we learn as we go. Sometimes, we make 
35 

mistakes when we do things for the first time. But necessary technical changes will not affect the originally defined mission. That 

must stay stable so that the team members can stay focused on the 

mission. 

I understand the long-range vision for U.S. human—for the U.S. 

human spaceflight program is landing a human on Mars. I support 

that mission. And I sincerely hope that that first person is an 

American. We can do it, and frankly, we can afford it. Those who 

say we can’t are just putting their priorities elsewhere. 

When asked about how to best prepare for a successful Mars mission, as a crewmember, I certainly would like to see the hardware 

tested on the moon’s surface first. This is part of a test plan’s 

build-up approach. Policy leaders are asking astronauts to risk 

their lives on space journeys, and it is our experience that testing 

in similar environments like the moon will minimize risk. 

When the Constellation program was cancelled in 2010, some 

people said, ‘‘why go back to the moon? We’ve already been there.’’ 

Imagine the year 1806, when Lewis and Clark returned from their 

2–1/2 year journey of exploring the western continent. They and 

their team members are declared national heroes. But then no one 

else goes back because we had already been there. Of course, this 

is almost inconceivable. It would diminish the entire reason for 

going in the first place. 

I was a member of the NASA Advisory Council when Constellation was cancelled. I was shocked, as were my colleagues, first, because it was so unexpected, and second, because the timing, so 

close to the end of the space shuttle program, left NASA with no 

options. 

The legislation that we’re discussing here today has ideas that 

will certainly address this problem. I’m not wedded to any specific 

proposal myself, but the problem does need to be addressed, especially given the billions of dollars wasted as a result and the lost 

time and motivations of engineers and astronauts. 

I believe program cancellation decisions that are made by bureaucracies, behind closed doors, without input by the people, are 

divisive, damaging, cowardly, and many times more expensive in 

the long run. As a shuttle commander, I would never make a huge 

decision without input from all the experts, even the ones I do not 

agree with. 

So what will keep us from having surprises like this set us back 

years? A continuity of purpose over many years and political administrations. I know there are ways to do this through policy, organizational structure, and strong leadership. And finally, strategic 

stability will give the teams efficiency and a focus that we saw in 

the Apollo program. Apollo happened by the end of the decade because people knew exactly what the mission was and when it 

should happen. They believed in it. And of course it was properly 

funded. There was not much division over what the mission was, 

and NASA was given the responsibility to figure out how to do it, 

and the result was dedication, passion, and success. And I know we 

can do this again. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Collins follows:] 
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Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Colonel Collins. 

And, Ms. Chaplain. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CRISTINA CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, 

ACQUISITIONS AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Johnson, and 

Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss 

the Space Leadership Preservation Act. You’ve heard the policy and 

strategic perspective, as well as the operational perspective, and 

I’m here today to discuss the acquisition management perspective. 

As you know, NASA’s acquisition management has been on 

GAO’s high-risk list for more than two decades because of persistent cost growth and schedule slippage. In recent years, however, NASA has made progress in reducing this risk. Specifically, 

in 2012, shortly after NASA re-baselined its largest project, the 

James Webb telescope, development cost growth averaged about 46 

percent. This year, we plan to report that it is at 17 percent. And 

when James Webb is excluded, cost growth is just 1.3 percent, 

though that number is affected by the addition of Space Launch 

System and Orion to the portfolio. 

NASA has made positive changes in the past five years that have 

helped contribute to the improved performance of its projects. 

These include better cost and schedule estimating, use of management reserves, and program monitoring. Moreover, many projects 

are able to demonstrate that they have closed gaps in knowledge 

about technology and design at key junctures in their development 

process. 

This does not mean NASA’s acquisition problems are solved. Several projects in the portfolio are experiencing significant problems 

that are not just the result of inherent technical risk. Programs 

still struggle with underestimating complexity and managing and 

overseeing contractors. Moreover, the most complex and costly development efforts, the human spaceflight projects and James Webb, 

are entering their most risky phases of development. Before we can 

take NASA off our high-risk list, we need to see how these projects 

perform in times when they are most tested. 

Further, while initial estimates are more realistic, we are finding 

larger projects do not plan to update their estimates on a regular 

basis and that estimates are not always well supported by well-defined schedules. The baselines for human spaceflight projects also 

provide little visibility into long-term planning and costs. 

Today, this Committee is discussing the concern that NASA 

needs more stability in order to truly thrive. That is what the 

Space Leadership Preservation Act is focused on. The concept of 

stability is an important one for NASA since projects require heavy 

investments both in terms of time and money, and they require the 

cooperation and support from a variety of communities. 

We have not assessed the extent to which the act can insulate 

NASA from instability, but I do have a couple observations. First, 

if NASA were to implement a Board of Directors, that board must 

be willing to hold program managers accountable, as well as leadership, by cancelling or restructuring programs that do not perform 

well. I recognize there is a frustration that shuttle successor pro-
41 

grams never seem to make it very far, and it’s clear that these programs are impacted by politics. On the other hand, when projects 

prove to be too ambitious or poorly managed, not cancelling them 

or not changing them can be damaging to the rest of NASA’s portfolio. 

Second, the act emphasizes the use of longer-term or multiyear 

contracts. Multiyear contracts can potentially save money and improve the industrial base by permitting more efficient use of the 

contractor’s resources. It’s important to keep in mind, however, 

that they are generally used for more production items and lowrisk technology. Not too many NASA projects fit this description. 

Multiyear contracts can also reduce Congress’s flexibility, as well 

as the agency’s flexibility in making changes to programs and 

budgets, so the decision to use them needs to be carefully considered. 

Finally, as you assess these measures, I would like to emphasize 

that our examinations of complex acquisitions across the government continually show that acquisition success hinges on 1) having 

robust long-term plans to guide programs; 2) having a sound business case when starting a program; 3) providing the right support 

and oversight throughout the life of the program. 

We look forward to continuing to work with NASA and the Committee in instituting these improvements. 

Thank you. I’m happy to answer any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:] 
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Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Chaplain, and thank 

you all for your testimony today. I appreciate your candor and directness both. 

Dr. Griffin, let me address my first question to you, and actually 

this is a question from Chairman Culberson, and that is, how 

would you design a process to create a human spaceflight Decadal 

Survey? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Such a question reminds me of a rye joke among 

engineers about the dangers of doing math in public. With that in 

mind, I think I might offer some broad comments—— 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. —but—and I would be more than willing to discuss 

the question offline—— 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. —with Committee and staff. But the details are 

probably not best hammered out here. I would say broadly that, in 

order to craft a plan of decadal scope, a process much like what 

science does in their various disciplines would be helpful. One 

would have to gather together recognized experts in human 

spaceflight ranging from operators to, in point of fact, philosophers. 

Why are we doing this in the first place? These were the kinds of 

questions that were addressed in the period following the loss of 

Columbia and that did allow us to come up with what I thought 

was a plan, a quality plan of decadal scope. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. The key to such a plan is having as many knowledgeable stakeholders as possible contributing to it, having it done 

in the open, and then having the opportunity to discuss it and debate it when it’s done rather than having it, as Colonel Collins suggested, foisted upon us as a surprise. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Dr. Griffin. We’ll look forward to a further discussion—— 

Mr. GRIFFIN. All right. 

Chairman SMITH. —on the subject with you as well. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I would as well, sir. Thank you. 

Chairman SMITH. Great. Colonel Collins, does NASA have a set 

of clearly defined strategic goals and objectives? And if not, what 

should those goals and objectives be? 

Ms. COLLINS. Yes, thank you for the question. I think it depends 

on your perspective because some say yes and some say no, so I 

think at the top NASA does have a final goal of landing a crew on 

Mars approximately 2030, 2033. But how you get there is where 

there is maybe disagreement or some confusion possibly on how 

we’re going to do that because the mission has changed and NASA 

has defined the roadmaps and they are in those National Academy 

of Sciences’ studies that have been published, one in 2012 and one 

in 2014. 

We go there by using the moon as a testbed or by visiting an asteroid, and I realize the asteroid mission has changed several 

times. It was originally astronauts would visit an asteroid and 

work there, and as time went on, the asteroid got smaller. It was 

difficult to find the right asteroid. One of the problems is these asteroids are moving around in space so they’re not always where you 

think they’re supposed to be. You have to project where it’s going 
68 

to be in the future, and then if your mission delays, that’s going 

to change some of the planning and possibly may even change the 

destination to a different asteroid. And of course all these asteroids 

are different and they have different makeups, different sizes. 

So NASA then decided to capture an asteroid and bring it to the 

lunar space, do that robotically, and then have astronauts visit. So 

that mission has changed because, as we go along, we find that 

there’s technical difficulties. 

So I see that that’s where the disagreement is in the scientific 

and operational community as to how we should do that mission. 

Most people agree that we need to go to Mars. The problem is how 

do we get there? 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Colonel Collins. 

And, Ms. Chaplain, what are your recommendations for how 

NASA should address their deficiency in their proposal to go to 

Mars? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. I think the long-term planning is very critical 

here, and they do definitely need a strategic plan that, again, lays 

out how they’re going to get there, also what technologies you need 

to get there. There’s many more systems and subsystems that are 

going to need to be developed for the eventual trip to Mars, and 

to also have cost estimates at least in ranges for the different kinds 

of choices that you can make. At this point, we only have cost estimates going up through the second fight for Orion and nothing 

after that. And for SLS we only have cost estimates going up 

through the first flight, so there’s a lot of important questions 

ahead about how much is everything going to cost and what else 

do you need to get in order to get there. 

Chairman SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Chaplain. 

The Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Johnson, is recognized for her questions. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Chaplain, based on GAO’s work on NASA, what are the top 

two issues that need to be addressed to ensure stability in NASA’s 

programs over the long term and what should Congress do to address those? And would any of the other witnesses care to comment 

after you? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. So that’s a good question. I think it speaks to the 

levels of discussion that we’re having. One is a good strategic longterm plan that helps provide stability, and the plan itself, if it has 

agreement from a lot of different communities, you have a better 

chance of maintaining support over the decades that need to happen. 

But at the more tactical level, acquisition programs have to be 

well-managed, too, and Congress has done a lot for NASA in that 

regard by helping them get more transparency into costs and 

progress, instituting good metrics and project management tools. 

There’s always more that can be done, especially in terms of holding programs accountable when they don’t meet their goals and 

they don’t have good plans for going forward. But I see the solution 

as being on both those levels. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Any other witnesses care to—— 

Mr. GRIFFIN. No, I don’t need to comment further at this time. 

Thank you, ma’am. 
69 

Ms. JOHNSON. Okay. Okay. 

Ms. COLLINS. The question was on the top two things that NASA 

could do? I think that—although I’m not a policy or budget expert, 

I think that there may be something in a multiyear funding that 

seems to make sense. 

And the other comment I have is on the Board of Directors that 

we had heard mentioned earlier today. I think the key thing about 

having a Board of Directors in adding stability is getting the right 

people on that board that are entirely independent. And I serve on 

several boards, and I think the key to having a board that works 

very well and very healthy is getting people that love the mission, 

have a passion for the mission, and are good listeners and can listen to all sides of the issue before they come in with their recommendation and their good governance. So I think that where 

there could be problems with that I think is something that’s worthy of looking at. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. This Committee and Congress will be 

considering and deliberating on the budget—the President’s fiscal 

year budget 2017 in the coming weeks. What in your view are the 

top three challenges for NASA over the next two years? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Ms. Johnson, I don’t know that I would have a top 

three. I think the topic of this hearing today is a critical one. What 

should NASA be doing? What as a nation do we want to do with 

our civil space program? I personally have been very clear that I 

think the proper next step is a human lunar return. That will occupy us in the near term and allow us to cement the international 

partnerships that helped us to build the space station. 

Beyond that, we should be doing everything that we do in returning to the moon in such a way that it has maximum applicability 

toward going to Mars. As Colonel Collins has said, this is something the United States can do, and I believe it’s something that 

we should do. 

And so if I get my top three, the third thing I would say is once 

these goals are locked in place by the legislature, I think we need 

a cultural change. Our program is not something which the Nation 

can afford to have be a playground for newly elected Presidents 

and unelected staff. The legislature is the proper repository of the 

long-term stability in these plans and programs that we need, and 

it needs to be enforced. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Ms. COLLINS. I had a minute to think about the question. You 

asked about the top three important things for NASA. I would say 

first is most people know American astronauts right now have to 

go to Russia and train in Russia to get to our space station. So of 

course a very top issue is getting launch from our country’s soil, 

our astronauts to our space station, which I understand is funded 

through 2024. 

The second I believe is heavy launch, obviously for our long-term 

space goals, and the third is getting the best people. We need to 

get the smartest people into NASA by going out and recruiting, and 

the best way to do that is having a mission that they believe in. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I’d like to echo my support for Eileen’s comment 

that we need to restore American access to space as soon as pos-
70 

sible. That might have been something I was assuming was a 

given, and I think I should state it explicitly. Thank you. 

Ms. JOHNSON. My time is expired, but I’d like you to comment 

if you could. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. So I’ll be quick in light of that. To add to the conversation just to note that some of the largest programs will be entering their most difficult phases of development where we tend to 

see more cost growth and more problems. So getting through those 

couple of years and ensuring issues that happen on these huge programs don’t affect and overwhelm the smaller programs that are 

equally important. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Posey, is recognized. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling 

the Space Leadership Preservation Act hearing. I thank all the 

panelists for appearing and for their wisdom and foresight that 

you’ve shared with us so far. 

You know, I’ve heard a lot of criticism from different directions 

about this proposed legislation, but I’ve not heard one single person 

propose an actual solution to the problem that we have of lack of 

programming and foresight and how we’re going to get on track 

and stay on track and keep America’s space program first. 

Mr. Chairman, I think you brushed over the beginning a litany 

of events that kind of throws us into instability even more. I mean, 

we have a candidate that runs for office that says if he’s elected 

President, he’s going to abolish NASA and put the money into education. Then, when he appears on the space coast, he says I’m 

going to close the gap between the shuttle in Constellation and 

keep America first in space. Then, he gets elected and he asks for 

the NASA Administrator’s resignation, and he doesn’t fill the position. So when they’re doing their planning and strategic planning 

for the Administration’s future, the NASA Administrator seat is 

empty. That’s kind of a shame. 

So then we get a great NASA Administrator appointed, and then 

we have an Augustine Commission appointed—I may have these 

two out of order a little bit—to tell him what to do. And the Augustine Commission says, of course, the shuttle is terribly dangerous 

and needs to be scuttled. 

We all know better than that. We know they were designed for 

over 100 missions and they were only in the 35th mission, mile per 

mile the safest space travel of any kind in the history of mankind. 

And we know the catastrophes, the tragedies were human error. It 

wasn’t any failure of NASA. 

And so then we go in a different direction and we have SLS and 

Orion now, which I think are great plans, great goals, but we have 

an Administration that frankly underfunds them. They suggest 

them, promote them, and then underfund them. So then NASA 

ends up being criticized that they can’t keep up schedules that 

they’d foreseen before, and we know that when you delay projects 

and instability is going to cost increases, too. 

So, you know, you have to wonder if you are NASA or you’re a 

NASA employee or a potential NASA employee or even just a 

bright STEM student or, like the 18,000 who applied to be astro-
71 

nauts, what is our future going to be? What is our future going to 

be? And I love Neil deGrasse Tyson when he says, you know, our 

investment in space is fundamentally basically the only thing our 

Congress does strictly for future generations, to benefit future generations. 

And so I think Congressman Culberson’s bill is much too important to ignore not only for those reasons but for reasons of national 

security, our technological advancement, and eventually, the survival of our species. 

Now either Dr. Griffin and Colonel Collins, China is rapidly developing the capability to access and use all regions of cislunar 

space. If the United States cedes that and moon base sole use to 

China, what do you foresee as the strategic and long-term impacts 

on the national interest of our country? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, you mentioned me first, so I’ll go first, Mr. 

Posey. Thank you. I have a couple comments on that. First of all, 

I think you can infer all that needs to be inferred about how the 

Chinese will behave in space by watching today how they are behaving in the Western Pacific and the concern that that causes not 

only the United States but all nations in that region. There is no 

reason to suppose that they would behave any differently in space, 

and I think that should give us concern. 

More broadly, since World War II, the United States has been a 

superpower and one certainly would say, I think, the superpower 

in the world. The world is a better place when that situation is so. 

I believe Western values and customs and respect for individual 

rights and the rule of law matter. If we want those cultural values 

to prevail upon in the new frontier that is space, then we will have 

to be there. The decisions are made by the people who show up, 

not by the people who watch on TV. 

For those reasons, which I believe are existential for our culture, 

we need to be in space first among equals irrespective of what 

China or any other nation seeks to do. Thank you. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. Colonel? 

Ms. COLLINS. When the Apollo 11 crew landed on the moon, 

1969, they put a plaque that said, ‘‘We came in peace for all mankind.’’ I’m not sure China would put a plaque like that on the 

moon. 

I am concerned about China. I’m not an expert on China, so I’ll 

get that in the record. But I’m not sure what their intentions are. 

And as Dr. Griffin said, we can only guess based on what they’re 

doing now, what their performance is. We don’t really cooperate 

with China in space although we cooperate with all other nations, 

and I believe in international cooperation. Whether or not we cooperate with the Chinese is a big question mark. It’s just a little 

bit scary, and sometimes, part of me says competition is good in 

many ways, and if we ever end up in a race back to the moon 

against China, that might give us a little kick in the pants—— 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. 

Ms. COLLINS. —to get out there and do it, whether it’s the moon 

or Mars or whatever we’re doing in space. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Posey. 
72 

The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter, is up next. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I’m way down here. Thank you very much to 

the panelists. Thank you to Chairman Culberson for bringing his 

bill before us. 

And there are a lot of principles that I think we all share. Sometimes, you lose sight of those when you take shots at each other’s 

party or each other’s President. I remind my friends on the Republican side of the aisle, did the math, and I did this in public, 2016 

minus 1972, it’s been 44 years since we’ve been on the Moon and 

24 of those years we’ve had Republican Presidents and 20 of those 

years we’ve had Democrats. So we need to get back into space. 

And whether—so for me—and my colleagues know that I like 

this time frame to get us to Mars, when the planets lineup, it’s 

time to get there. We set an outside date, 2033. That’s a responsibility of us on the political side whether it’s the Administration or 

Congresses, which change every 2 years. 

So I’m going to give my friend, who’s the Chairman of CJS, the 

benefit of the doubt because he’s been through this. And if there’s 

some way that we can put together a structure that takes out the 

vagaries of each Congressional election and each presidential election and gets us to Mars by 2033 and you folks with the engineering degrees and the physics degrees and the accounting degrees figure out how to put the building blocks in place, then I’m there. 

That’s your job. My job is to find you the money. 

And we’ve had testimony that over the course of—to get to Mars 

is $200 billion plus. That’s a lot of money. But we found $800 million for the banks over a weekend. We found $250 billion a year 

to be in Afghanistan and Iraq. We can do this. 

So, I’d like to have some kind of structure at NASA that allows 

for long-term thinking. So I’ll start with you, Ms. Collins. You said 

you didn’t have a real position on the Chairman’s bill, but what 

would you do that—what would you say to me? How can we put 

long-term planning into place when we have two-year cycles for 

Congress and four-year cycles for the President? 

Ms. COLLINS. Well, thank you for the question. I think—well, 

first of all, let me say our system of government is the greatest in 

the world, and I think that discussions that we have are wonderful. 

We get things out on the table. We have disagreements. I think the 

end goal—everybody’s goal is the same. We want to have a strong 

human spaceflight program with a mission, we want to succeed, we 

want to get there at the best cost, and we want to do it safely. We 

don’t want to hurt anybody in the process. 

My first answer I would say is don’t give up. So this applies on 

all levels. I mean, we did give up on Constellation. I think that the 

reason given was the cost, and yes, the cost was high. I mean, we 

all admit that. But instead of just giving up on the whole program—and I’m talking about not the past; I’m talking about the future here if this happens again. Let’s just take a good hard look 

at can we—where can we cut the fat? Do we have the right people 

in there working the program? Maybe there’s changes that need to 

be made, but we don’t really need to give up on the end mission 

once that’s been defined. We might need to change course a little, 

but keep—don’t give up. Keep the mission in sight. 
73 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. In mind. So for me—and I really agree with a 

lot of the things that Mr. Posey said and some of the others, you 

know, that there is—there are two pieces to this. One is our basic 

desire to learn, science and exploration, to get to Mars, to be in 

space. The second is a national security question. And so between 

the two of them we ought to be able to get out there and get going 

for a long time, for however it might be. 

So, Dr. Griffin, you’ve had your taste of political science and obviously you’re a scientist as well. So as Administrator, you’ve been— 

you’ve run into both buzz saws. So how would you—you know, just 

saying, hey, you guys got to have a longer-term approach to this, 

what would be your view? How do we do it? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. I cannot resist going 

for the simplest possible explanation or recommendation. I’ve been 

very clear in today’s testimony and on earlier occasions that I very 

much admired the authorization bills of 2005 and 2008, which this 

Congress passed and frankly were originated in this Committee. 

The 2010 bill was also a good bill. 

When proposals are made by the executive branch that conflict 

with the existing law, why does Congress go along? I have to say, 

had Congress merely made it extraordinarily clear to the incoming 

Administration that while that Administration had many problems 

before it, space was not one of those problem, that the Congress 

had decided upon the space plan, the space policy of the United 

States, and that policy would be kept. Had that been communicated, we would not be sitting here having this hearing today. 

I said earlier in my testimony that I’ve regarded the Congress as 

the long-term body of stability if you will in the political system to 

capture the desire that Americans generally have for a particular 

course of action, to capture that in legislation, and to preserve it. 

If we treated our Navy the way that we treat NASA in terms of 

stability, we would not be able to project power upon the oceans 

the way that we do. 

It takes as long to build an aircraft carrier as it took to go to the 

moon even when people are really working hard at it. If we decided 

with every incoming Administration whether we were going to preserve aircraft carriers, the United States would have none. 

So I’ll simplify my comments. The first recommendation I would 

have would be let us again, as we did after the loss of Columbia, 

decide as a nation what we want to see accomplished in space. Let 

us, as we did after Columbia, codify that into law. And then let us 

obey the law. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. And I thank the Chairman for letting me go 

over. And I want in the law that we’re going to be on Mars by 

2033. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I’m not fighting that. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. We’re with you on 

2033. 

And the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, is recognized for his comments. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
74 

And I would like to say to my friend Mr. Perlmutter—actually 

to the Chairman if it’s all right—I think we should have our own 

sticker that says 2032. We don’t want to settle for 2033. Republicans ought to go for 2032. 

In 1982, President Reagan reorganized our Navy’s Nuclear Propulsion Program, citing the need to preserve structures and policies. While ensuring the program continues to function smoothly 

and efficiently, he ordered that the director of this program of great 

national import be appointed for an eight-year term. This change 

ensured that the leadership and direction of our nuclear Navy remained constant over at least, at least two presidential cycles if not 

multiple Administrations. 

Likewise, NASA is an agency carrying out programs of national 

importance, which by their very nature take years, as Dr. Griffin 

just talked about, if not decades, to formulate, develop, and carry 

out. It makes complete sense to me to remove the Administrator 

of NASA from the political cycles in order to allow for continuity 

and stability. 

I am proud to be a cosponsor of Chairman Culberson’s bill, which 

proposes a ten-year term for the NASA Administrator. The Space 

Foundation’s pioneering doctrine recommends a term of five years. 

I am working on legislation that includes a provision that establishes a five-year term as well. Regardless of the number, however, 

it seems that there is growing consensus among stakeholders and 

advocates to set the length of the Administrator’s term beyond the 

standard political cycles. 

Ms. Chaplain, while you focus mostly on space programs, have 

you gotten a sense from your time at GAO of the differences in how 

NASA acquisitions differ from those of government agencies that 

are run by nonpolitical or nontraditional heads? Have you seen a 

difference in how those acquisition strategies go? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Most of the agencies with large acquisitions and 

complex ones like NASA do have political appointees. We don’t get 

too much insight into the intel world, and that might be something 

to look at, but they’re still political there, too. So I don’t have a 

model there to look at. 

There—other situations—agencies that have longer-term ten 

years for Administrators, GAO is actually one of them. We have a 

15-year appointment for our Comptroller General, and the purpose 

is to keep the politics out of our work. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Sure. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. So there are other good models out there. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Butfrom your assessment, and maybe you 

don’t make assessments since you’re with GAO, but those kind of 

models, are they better at—— 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We don’t have one that looks at that from an acquisition perspective. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. There’s also other space agencies internationally 

that have boards and different structures that could be looked at, 

but we haven’t done that ourselves. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. And, Mr. Griffin, when you think about 

some of the stumbles, obviously your testimony today at the beginning, talking about, you know, 2010 and beyond with NASA and 
75 

some of the stumbles that we’ve encountered, if your term had been 

extended and you would have been the Administrator, can you 

share with us how things might have been different? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, sir, I don’t know that they would have been 

because Administrators and appointees take orders from the chief 

executive. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I see. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. If the chief executive really wanted to change the 

space program, then I would have had the choice of either following 

orders or resigning. Had I been given the orders that my successor 

was given, I would have resigned because I thought, as I said now 

multiple times, I thought that the direction of Congress in 2005 

and ’08 was extraordinarily good. I believed we were on the right 

path and should maintain it. Therefore, if ordered to deviate from 

that path, I would not have remained. 

I think, again, the issue—I have no objection to considering a 

five-year term, a six-year term, an eight-year term, whatever 

length of term for the Administrator, nor do I have any objection 

with the way it’s done today. I think these kinds of discussions are 

a symptom of the problem we face, which is a lack of understanding at the top levels of government of the importance of our 

space program and the need to have both a quality program and 

stability of that program. 

I’ll use another analogy. If we treated the Air Force as we do the 

space program, we wouldn’t have any flying aircraft. We would— 

we cannot decide every few years what we want the purpose of the 

space program to be. We have to have a societal-level agreement 

as to that purpose and then let our appointed officials carry it out. 

And it almost doesn’t make any difference to me how they are appointed or what their term is. Thank you. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Bridenstine. 

And the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Babin, is recognized for his 

questions. 

Mr. BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Great testimony, thank you. Thank you all. 

Dr. Griffin, you testified that the most logical step beyond the 

ISS is an international partnership led by the United States to return to the moon, this time to stay. How does returning to the 

moon and maintaining a permanent presence there help us eventually send American astronauts to the surface of Mars? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, thank you, Dr. Babin. I love that question. I 

believe that if God had wanted us to go to Mars, he would have 

given us a moon to practice on. 

Colonel Collins made the remark earlier—I’m not trying to quote 

her, but to the general effect that learning how to live on—in space 

and on another planetary surface would transfer directly to learning how to go to Mars, and I believe that to be the case. 

As in—I’ll summarize by saying, as an engineer, if you wanted 

me to say when we’re ready to go to Mars, if you will, like the head 

of naval submarines certifying a submarine for sea trials, then I’ll 

say you’re ready to go to Mars when you can put a crew on the 

International Space Station for six months, and they have to live 

there without any further help from the ground. Then, they get 
76 

ferried to the moon and they live on the surface of the moon in 1/ 

6 gravity for 13 months. And then you bring them back and you 

let them live on the space station again for six more months in zero 

G. and during all this time they get no additional help beyond that 

which was preprinted on the surface of the moon or on the station. 

So that ends up being a total of about a 26-month cycle for that 

crew. 

When we can do that and the crew is still alive and healthy, then 

we’re ready to go to Mars and not before. 

Mr. BABIN. Excellent. Thank you very much. 

And, Colonel Collins, you testified that program cancellation decisions made by bureaucracies behind closed doors and without 

input by the people are divisive, damaging, cowardly, and many 

times more expensive in the long run. I cannot agree more. 

What do you recommend that we do as a nation to prevent these 

types of cancellation decisions and ensure consistency of purpose 

over many years and over many political administrations? 

Ms. COLLINS. We as a country need to discuss these very, very 

important missions out in the open. They have got to be discussed—I don’t believe this was discussed—in fact, I’m sure it 

wasn’t because I was very shocked and very surprised when I 

learned that the budget was rolled out that first week in February 

of 2010 and there was a big fat zero in the Constellation program. 

I asked one of the top managers at NASA—in fact, I was up here 

on the NASA Advisory Council—did you know this was coming? 

And he said well, we thought we might have lost Ares I. We had 

no idea that we were going to lose the whole thing. I was just 

amazed that—does our government work this way? This can’t possibly be true. 

Mr. BABIN. It shouldn’t. 

Ms. COLLINS. So to answer your question, what do we—we have 

got to ensure the discussion takes place in the open and that—and 

this is the way good businesses need to be run. You’ve got to talk 

to the people that work all throughout the organization, people outside of the organization from academia, from industry. It is most 

certain that everyone will disagree on how we do it, but that’s 

healthy. And then we make a decision by—I mean, you can vote 

or we can be autocratic about it, but it cannot be a surprise, so 

however you do that. 

And I’d like to add one other thing to your previous question 

about going to Mars. It is very, very, very important that the lifesupport systems work, and the space station, this it—I know I’m 

saying the obvious here, but what we’re doing on the space station 

is essential. But the moon and Mars are different places. You’ve got 

dust, you do have some gravity, it’s just a different place. You have 

got to test your closed-loop life-support systems, whether it’s in 

habitat, a spacecraft or in a spacesuit. A spacesuit is a—like a mini 

spacecraft. 

Mr. BABIN. Right. 

Ms. COLLINS. So I just wanted to add that to the previous question. Thank you. 

Mr. BABIN. Okay. Thank you so very much, witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Babin. 
77 

And the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, is recognized for 

questions. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And witnesses, again, I 

apologize for being a little bit tardy, but I had a 9:30 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing with Secretary of State John Kerry 

over the State Department budget, followed by Armed Services at 

10:00 a.m. with General Breedlove on U.S.-European commands, so 

I hope you’ll bear with me. I got here as quick as I could. 

I do have a question for each of you. And, Dr. Griffin, if you could 

please lead off. Why do you believe—excuse me. What do you believe the proper role of commercial space could be in the context 

of a stable, long-term NASA strategic plan? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, as I pointed out in my testimony, the first 

commercial cargos for carriage to the International Space Station 

were signed under my tenure, so I’m a strong supporter of the utilization of commercial space purveyors in our strategic plans. 

That said, I think we’ve maybe a bit drifted off the path. When 

I use the term commercial to describe an enterprise, I’m talking 

about an enterprise such as I’ve run in the past where you have 

to raise your own money, develop your own product, bring it to the 

market, and then you sell it for every dime that you can get. I’m 

not talking about enterprises where the government has to invest 

the lion’s share of the money in order to earn the right to buy a 

ticket. 

And if the public record is examined, I think that you’ll see that 

in recent years in our so-called commercial space portfolio, that’s 

what happened. The lion’s share of the money has come from government. In fact, I’m not sure there’s a share that the lion didn’t 

have. 

So these types of arrangements I would call private-public partnerships, and I’m not always certain that we’re getting the best 

deal on the public side of those partnerships, and I think we need 

to look carefully at it. 

The second thing that I would observe is if we have—if we were 

to be so fortunate as to have again a national strategic plan for 

what we want to do in space, it certainly should include as much 

contribution as commercial space providers can offer. But they need 

to offer what it is that the government wants to buy. It’s not our 

purpose in government to figure out what our space program 

should look like so that commercial providers can sell what they 

want to sell. And again, I would say that the experience of recent 

years offers some guidelines in that regard. So I’ll just leave it at 

that. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. Colonel Collins or Ms. Chaplain, do you have anything to add? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. I’ll just add that, you know, the government is 

usually the one to push technology and discovery, and in all those 

areas that’s where the government’s role should be. When you have 

lower-risk technology or something that’s already proven that’s 

needed, that is a good place to use pathfinder types of commercial 

efforts where they can prove themselves and even take over some 

kinds of operations. 

If you look more broadly beyond NASA, commercial space is 

starting to play a bigger role in doing things like hosted payloads 
78 

for government, providing bandwidth for DOD, and even running 

ground operations. There’s all good areas for them to be playing in. 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, ma’am. 

Colonel Collins? 

Ms. COLLINS. Sir, I’d like to just mention the space station as far 

as commercial space. I know this may sound like it’s a crazy idea, 

but—okay. The space station, we know, is funded to 2024, and the 

United States has to decide are we going to find that out to maybe 

2028 or do we stop funding in 2024 and put it into heavy lift or 

deep space? Having been in space, I believe that there will be a 

commercial interest in the space station. I can’t really say timingwise 2024, but there are plenty of tourists and people that have 

money that would love to go up in space and live on the space station. It is such an amazing, wonderful human experience. People 

would pay big money to do that, and if we could find a private company that’d be willing to take over the space station and sell it like 

a hotel, sell space up there like a hotel, we may be able to kind 

of wean ourselves off the space station and get NASA back into 

deep space, just a thought. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, what are we paying the Russians now? Some- where in the neighborhood of 60 or $70 million per ride? 

Ms. COLLINS. Somewhere—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Do you think there’s a market for the space station 

at that ticket price? Well, the Russians have sold one or two, 

haven’t they? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. If I could make a comment, I don’t think we’ll find 

out if there’s a market until we try. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I would echo Colonel Collins’ comments about 

value—the longer-term value of the space station. I have to add, I 

think it’s really shocking to be considering that after the multi-decade and multi-tens of billions of dollar investment in the space station that now we’re talking about what date we’re going to reenter 

it into the Indian Ocean. I cannot think of another example of a 

large laboratory investment or a large facility investment that the 

day it’s completed we start figuring out when we’re going to tear 

it down. 

If the government cannot find suitable uses for a laboratory in 

space, then I would echo Colonel Collins’ comment. Maybe we 

should consider turning it over to a private entity and seeing what 

they could sell space on the space station for. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you for that interesting insight. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Brooks. 

In the interest of balance and because he is such a diligent Member of this Committee, without objection, the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter, will be recognized for an additional 2 minutes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Mr. Chair. 

And my friends on the Financial Services Committee wonder 

where I’ve gone. I just said I’ve gone to the Science Committee, so 

that’s what’s happening here. 

Ms. Chaplain, I’d like to ask you, because Dr. Griffin has used 

the comparisons of the Air Force and the Navy and, you know, 

building this and building that. From a GAO standpoint, I mean, 
79 

how can we have a multiyear—how does a multiyear kind of acquisition process work when no Congress combined the next Congress? 

How do you do that? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. So typically, you do commit over time to any program. Even NASA does that. The contracts work year-by-year. The 

multiyear authority allows you just to go beyond that first span of 

time, five years, and to commit to buying a lot more items upfront. 

That does tie the hands of Congress, but it doesn’t tie funding so 

much because that’s still done on the year-to-year basis. So you’re 

just making a longer-term commitment. 

The issue in taking this authority and applying it to NASA is it 

works better in a production environment. Even DOD, before it can 

employ a multiyear contract, has to demonstrate that there’s stable 

design, stable requirements, that there’s going to be substantial 

savings achieved from buying in bulk. Instead of six airplanes, for 

example, you’re committing to 30. 

So we have some questions in our head about how this could 

work in the NASA arena. Most NASA projects are just one-off satellites, for example, and the cost-plus arrangements that they use 

for that because they involve a lot of discovery, are appropriate. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Well, see, I guess one of the things we’ve been 

talking about is a Mars mission, all right? And I—there’s a lot of 

support for something like that, and we pick a date and, you know, 

we’ve had the scientists who say 2033 is when the planets line up 

in a way that makes it easier for us to get our astronauts there. 

So that’s why I’m taking that date. 

If we give—if we the Congress say to ourselves and to the President, you know, we want a date, and then we let NASA and its experts kind of say, okay, this is how we’re going to do it, these are 

the building blocks that includes going back to the Moon and that 

this—I mean, they’re the experts on this side. Is there—have you 

seen anything in your experience that gives us—we could do a 

multiyear acquisition or approach where we could dedicate money 

for the next 17 years? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Usually, for long-term projects within DOD, 

money is dedicated up front. But again, if you’re developing and researching a Joint Strike Fighter, all those contracts up until the 

point that you’re ready to produce are sort of in that cost-plus 

range and they go year-to-year because you have a lot of unknowns 

and you kind of have to revisit things on a year-to-year basis. Once 

you enter the production phase, you’re in a better situation to do 

fixed-price contracting that can actually go through many years. 

So I don’t know if what we have now would work ideally, the authorities now would work well for the Mars situation. If you committed everything up front, it would be an incredible amount of 

money that you would have to put aside to guarantee that it’s all 

there for the 20-year effort. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. No, and I thank you for that. I mean, it’s a big 

amount, there’s no question, but we, you know, at least during my 

tenure here in the Congress since 2006, we’ve spent a lot in the 

Middle East. We’ve spent a lot to keep Wall Street from collapsing, 

you know, and it’s been sort of bipartisan in nature in terms of 

those appropriations. So the country is a wealthy country; it’s how 
80 

we prioritize things. We can do this. There’s—from a money standpoint if we’re prepared to make this a priority. 

And that’s why I’m prepared to listen, you know, to an approach 

like Chairman Culberson has of a way that might give both sides 

of the aisle some comforts going long term because we—this has to 

be long term. We have to think long term. We can’t think just next 

year. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. And I would just add the bill talks about 

multiyear contracting. There are also options for multiyear funding 

and appropriations that work sometimes on the DOD side that 

wasn’t mentioned in the bill, but there are some other mechanisms 

that could be explored on the appropriations side. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. Thank you. And I thank the Chair for 

giving me this extra time. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And I also apologize 

for being tardy today. I was at that meeting with Secretary Kerry, 

and I happen to believe that our space effort is actually as important as American foreign policy to our future, so I tried to run between these two. 

I’ve been here 28 years, and of course Dr. Griffin and I worked 

together over these years, and I certainly—let me just be on the 

record that I certainly agree with your concept of making sure we 

go to the moon before we go on to Mars and learn a lot as we’re 

doing that, getting back to the moon. 

What I have seen, Mr. Chairman, is our biggest problem in having space—a rationale space program is with us. I mean, we just 

seem to try to—we prioritize projects and we spend money for 

projects that we can’t do. And thus we—and then we end up 

defunding what we can do. And that’s—it’s irrational, and I understand, with all due respect to my friend and colleague who is so 

adamant about going to Mars, I have several of my friends who are 

that way, we’re not ready to go to Mars right now. We don’t even 

know—the technology’s not there. But there is the technology and 

availability of doing things that we can actually accomplish right 

now. And if we want the respect of the American people, we’re 

going to do it by making sure we get things done. 

And having a long-term commitment that drains money away 

from the projects that we can do in order to accomplish something 

that we can’t do now and maybe won’t be able to do within our lifetime, that is not being responsible, and frankly, I think that’s 

where the problem comes from. We continually try to finance 

projects that we are incapable of accomplishing at that moment. 

And of course you’re going to have a high failure rate if you do 

that. 

So I would hope that as we—and I—as I say, I agree with Dr. 

Griffin on his approach that we need to step by step—several of the 

things we could do, by the way, which we could do which may be 

totally unfunded if we just spend all our money on going to Mars 

is we have a space debris challenge. We’re not going to be able to 

do anything in space unless we have some sort of space debris program. It’ll have to be an international effort. But in the years 
81 

ahead, that’s going to overwhelm us. It’s already beginning to overwhelm us. 

We don’t have a global defense system set up so that if an asteroid—and I’ll ask this of the panel. If that meteorite that skimmed 

the surface over in Russia a couple of years ago, instead of going— 

being in uninhabited areas would have hit a major city anywhere 

in the world and killed hundreds of thousands of people, do you 

think that that would have then changed the entire course and direction of our own space budget? Wouldn’t that have been a factor 

that would have overwhelmed—and then all of these other programs that we’ve financed like long-term missions to Mars would 

just go by the wayside? So we need to take care of that issue, don’t 

we? Don’t we need to take care of space debris? Don’t we need to 

take care of those things that we can get done and in the private 

sector we could leave things up like—by the way, refueling stations, et cetera? 

There is one other lab, by the way, in terms of the space station. 

I remember, wasn’t the space lab also a huge investment that we 

just allowed to come down as well? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. That was Skylab, sir—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Skylab, excuse me. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. —and yes, we did. We have an unfortunate record 

of not preserving our capital assets in space. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. It reentered in 1979. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I would think that the problem of not 

being able to accomplish our missions is—can be found right here 

in the fact that our judgment has been to try to do things we can’t 

do while defunding those things we can do. Thank you very much. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Beyer, is recognized for his 

questions. 

Mr. BEYER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all 

very much for being here. 

Dr. Griffin, in his prepared statement this morning Representative Culberson stated ‘‘that over the years, a lack of clear mission 

has worn down morale at many centers.’’ And he talked, interestingly, about people saying, well, is our mission to go to asteroids 

or is it to go to the moon again or is it to go to Mars? 

But I also find the assessment somewhat puzzling when you consider the findings from the annual survey by the nonpartisan Partnership for Public Service that consistently ranks NASA as the 

best place to work among federal agencies. And while the median 

overall index score for large agencies has shown a slight downward 

trend 2011 through 2015, NASA’s score actually went up during 

the same period. 

And according to the partnership, the biggest factor affecting employee satisfaction and commitment overall in the best places to 

work rank is related to effective leadership. How do you reconcile 

NASA being a great place to work with Representative Culberson’s 

concern about a lack of morale? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I’m sorry. Was that for me or for Colonel Collins? 

Mr. BEYER. Oh, either one, yes. Colonel, Doctor, Colonel Collins? 
82 

Ms. COLLINS. Well, I think that’s a very good question because 

it depends on who you talk to. I can tell you, though, that when 

I was at NASA, morale was very high. We had space shuttle program, we were building a space station and supporting the space 

station with the knowledge that the long-term goal is going to 

Mars. I know that’s very far out in the future. I sure hope I’m alive 

when people walk on the surface of Mars, but I’m pretty sure my 

kids are going to be here when we walk on Mars, and I think we’re 

going to get there. 

But to answer your question, you know, I think that would— 

that’s not entirely clear to me. I know that when I did surveys like 

that, I gave NASA the highest ratings possible because I felt that 

the leadership within the astronaut office and flight crew operations and even at Johnson Space Center was outstanding. And I 

think that was the perception of my coworkers also. 

Every organization has its cultural issues. I would have to say 

of all the places I’ve worked, NASA is the tops, no doubt. 

Mr. BEYER. Let me follow up. Representative—— 

Ms. COLLINS. But—— 

Mr. BEYER. Oh, excuse me. Go ahead. 

Ms. COLLINS. Okay. When the Constellation program was cancelled, what happened shortly after that was people thought, did I 

just lose my job? What am I going to do tomorrow? Do I go to work 

tomorrow? I think there was a very unstable period there, and I’m 

not even sure that the bosses knew what to tell their people. Just 

keep coming to work, just keep doing what you’re doing, but when 

am I going to lose my job? 

So I think that’s a—that’s really a tough question to answer. I 

can see both sides of the issue. 

Mr. BEYER. Let me ask a follow-up. Representative Culberson 

also in his testimony talked about—I think it was 27 projects— 

major projects have been cancelled, $20 billion that basically had 

to be written off, invested but then lost. If you had a ten-year Administrator who emerges from this new board, is it less likely that 

these projects would have had to be cancelled? 

Ms. COLLINS. That remains to be seen. I do want to make a comment on the proposal for the ten-year Administrator. I think that 

the concept is good. I think it might be too long. In reality, if— 

when you start searching for someone who is willing to commit to 

ten years of a very, very difficult job, which is your—it may be 

hard to find somebody of all the qualified people out there that 

want to initially commit for ten years. And then how do you know 

that they’d be willing to stay that long? It’s just a long period of 

time. If you went more with 5 or 6, I think your pool of qualified 

potentials out there would be bigger and you’d have more people 

willing to take on the very difficult job of NASA Administration. 

Mr. BEYER. Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. COLLINS. But I think it remains to be seen. On the surface, 

I would say yes. 

Mr. BEYER. Okay. 

Ms. COLLINS. Just based on what I have seen with over government agencies. 

Mr. BEYER. Let me—one last question of Dr. Griffin. So the bill 

proposes a budget proposed by the management board in addition 
83 

to the one proposed by NASA and OMB and what we’re working 

at here on the Hill. Do you have any concerns about a the Board 

proposing a detailed budget when they have neither the management responsibilities, nor the accountability for delivery and results? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, I do. I do have concerns about that. I had to— 

one of the key things for which I was responsible for when I was 

Administrator was preparing with all of my staff a detailed budget, 

and it was something that we paid close attention to because, of 

course, it had to go from us to the OMB, where we would have to 

defend it to the OMB, and then it would come from the President’s 

budget submission to Congress and we would have to defend it to 

the Congress. And I didn’t want anything in it that I didn’t support 

and didn’t agree with. 

It would be, I think, very difficult as a practical matter to support that exercise and then to have a similar but in some ways different budget coming from an independent board. I would wonder 

where they would get their information. If their information came 

from NASA, as it almost must, then really how would it be different than the budget the Administrator prepares other than they 

have different priorities. But I can ask any group of people what 

your priorities are, and they’re as, you know, likely to be different. 

So I would have concerns about that approach. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you. Thank you, Doctor. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. But equally, sir, I must conclude by stating that 

anything which can be done to ameliorate and control the influence 

of the OMB on the process would be welcome. I mean, the OMB 

is a haven for largely unelected, un-appointed, not-very-well-qualified staff who seek to exercise a level of power and control in their 

area that their accomplishments have not earned. 

Mr. BEYER. You’re not doing anything to help OMB morale right 

now, Dr. Griffin, so—— 

Mr. GRIFFIN. You know, that’s really too bad. So anything which 

can be done by the Congress to ensure stable budgeting of appropriate projects, I think, would be a good thing. I’m not sure that 

the Board-of-Directors approach is that method. Thank you. 

Mr. BEYER. Thanks for your perspective. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. BABIN. [Presiding] Yes, sir. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Griffin, we hear over and over again about a need for constancy of purpose at NASA and the detrimental impacts of shifting 

priorities, organizational conflicts, mixed signals from Congress, 

and I can go on and on. How much of this lack of purpose do you 

think can be changed through a reorganization such as the one outlined in the Space Leadership Preservation Act? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, sir, as we talked earlier, I think the Space 

Leadership Preservation Act might be one tool to achieve that constancy of purpose, but it’s just a tool. If the Congress at large can 

codify into law a space policy for the United States that its citizens 

support and the space community supports and that we want to do 

as a society, that is the crucial step. 
84 

Mr. PALMER. You’re saying we’ve got to work through the ideological differences Congress? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Yes. Yes, sir. And I will remind you, if that sounds 

a hopeless task, I was here. 

Mr. PALMER. Well, if it were up to my colleague from Colorado 

and me, we could work this out fairly quickly. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. But we did this in 2003 and ’04 following the loss 

of Columbia, and for a two-year period, I myself participated in 

four hearings in both House and Senate, along with many, many 

other people, and these things were thrashed out, and we emerged 

from that period with a good plan. 

Mr. PALMER. I come from an engineering background, and I believe the space program is fundamentally more engineering than 

science. Obviously, there’s science and in engineering, I think anyone who’s been involved in that field understands that you have to 

have clearly defined objectives. Otherwise, you’ll never build to design. You’ll—and you will spend an enormous amount of money 

and get nothing. And so I do think we’ve got to have that—a vision 

that we can design to, which, I guess, does the lack of continuity 

at NASA affect some programs more intensely than it does others? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I couldn’t agree more with your comments, sir. I 

could not agree more. And the longer-term and larger the project 

is, the more that lack of consistency of purpose affects it. If I have 

a discovery program, a small satellite mission program to another 

planet that costs $500 million and can be done in three or four or 

five years, then, no, such a program would not be much affected. 

If we’re talking about recreating a new heavy lift launch vehicle, 

as we are with the Space Launch System that Colonel Collins mentioned earlier today, well, that is a multiyear proposition and a 

multi-billion-dollar proposition, and it needs to be sustained or not 

done at all. 

Mr. PALMER. I’ve actually visited the facility where that work is 

being done, and it needs to be completed because there’s not a 

whole lot of use for it if we don’t. And I think many of my colleagues here would agree with this, that we do need to allow NASA 

to define the vision with our oversight but get behind it. Otherwise, 

we’re going to continue to waste an enormous amount of money. 

Dr. Griffin, I’ll ask you this question. There’s an op-ed in Space 

News, Mary Lynne Dittmar of the Coalition for Deep Space Exploration touts the flexibility of the Space Launch System, which was 

just mentioned, which will be capable of launching a wide array of 

missions, given the lack of continuity, how important is it for 

NASA systems to be adaptable to changing priorities? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, it would be nice to say that NASA’s systems 

and programs could be easily adapted to changing priorities. I don’t 

think it’s very realistic. It’s one of those things that everyone would 

like but is pretty hard to do. When it takes five or six or seven or 

eight years to accomplish a great thing, if the priorities change in 

the meantime, you know, you’re left hanging. And—— 

Mr. PALMER. That’s where you run into all of the change orders 

and—— 

Mr. GRIFFIN. That’s—— 

Mr. PALMER. —the run-up in cost and then everybody’s frustrated. 
85 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Exactly, sir. It costs more money and you don’t get 

the product out in the end. I thought Mary Lynne’s op-ed was very 

well done. She’s far more articulate than I am, and I was glad to 

see such an op-ed in Space News. 

Mr. PALMER. Well, I had to go to another hearing earlier, but 

while I was here, I heard you talk about the overall vision for space 

and what it means for us and Colonel Collins’ comment on this as 

well. And that was an inspired—in my opinion, an inspired view 

of America’s role in space, and I commend you for it. 

My time is expired. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BABIN. Yes, sir, Mr. Palmer. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Hultgren. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you all for 

being here. 

First, I seek unanimous consent to enter into the record an article that was coauthored by former Commerce, Justice, Science Subcommittee Chairman Frank Wolf and Norm Augustine, who this 

Committee knows very well. So I’d ask unanimous consent for submission—— 

Mr. BABIN. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 
86 
87 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you. 

Again, I want to thank you all for being here, so grateful for your 

work. I especially want to just thank Colonel Collins. I really appreciate your service to our nation and the inspiration you are to 

young people, but especially to young women of incredible opportunities and how we need them to be involved in space and science 

and discovery. So thank you. 

And, Dr. Griffin, so grateful for your service as Administrator, 

really I think a bright time and a time we can be proud of of your 

service there, so I want to thank you so much for that. 

This is an important hearing, and as we continue to look for 

ways to bring long-term vision and stability for NASA, National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration. I think it’s something we 

need to be looking at across our entire scientific ecosystem as well. 

As science becomes an increasingly collaborative and international 

enterprise, other countries are putting their stake in the ground to 

find a place with they will lead. America has traditionally led 

across the board. It is not the only measure, but one need only look 

at the list of Nobel Prizes per country. We are the number one, but 

other countries are catching up very quickly. 

If we rest on our laurels, we may have a future where we have 

to send our kids overseas to get the best education in the world and 

to do groundbreaking research to get that next Nobel Prize. 

One idea outlined by the article that I entered into the record, 

but the article written by Congressman Wolf and Mr. Augustine is 

for a dedicated fund for scientific research that we can actually put 

together 5-, 10-, or 25-year plans. As our witnesses should be able 

to attest, our researchers and scientists are walking on pins and 

needles just hoping that their project can stay on pace, on budget, 

and outside the ire of OMB bureaucrats or a disinterested Administration. When the President leaves or shifts around Administrators, researchers have to spend their time catching new people up 

just to let them know what we are doing. 

A program can be cut or priorities can be shifted without the full 

picture. The cancellation of Constellation was a disaster. I think we 

all can see that now. It has been not just a setback, but it also 

hurts our standing in the world. I think Russia snickers when we 

need them to take our astronauts to the space station that our 

shuttle built. 

Dr. Griffin, what are the first questions that we get from other 

nations when we come to them with an ambitious long-term project 

that will require all sides to deliver to see success? What response 

do we get back from them? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, in my time we were still working on trying 

to do two things. We were working on completing the International 

Space Station because only 1/3 of it was finished when the shuttle 

went down, and so the first questions I faced almost immediately 

after my confirmation hearing back in the spring of 2005 were from 

our partners. Are you really going to stick with this? Are you going 

to see it through? 

And following the loss of Columbia, we knew that we were not 

going to be able to have as many shuttle flights as we had previously planned, so we had at that time to cut back somewhat 

our—what we called our utilization flights in order to prioritize as-
88 

sembly. And I committed—with the backing of then-President 

Bush, I committed that the United States would finish the station. 

And the sighs of relief were palpable. So I’m answering your question by my experience is what they want to know is are you going 

to see it through? 

Mr. HULTGREN. Yes. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. When we asked them—the second thing we were 

doing—per our instructions from the White House Congress, the 

second thing we were doing was embarking on a plan for human 

lunar return. And the written words in the policy said that we 

would do it in company with our international partners, so it became my job to put that partnership together. 

The first question they asked is, are you really serious? And at 

first they didn’t really believe it. As several years went by, they did 

believe it, and by early 2009, they were fully in support of returning to the moon. And in the next year we cancelled. I had—I was 

of course gone from Washington by then, but I had phone calls 

from all over the world. 

Eileen made the comment earlier that the NASA Advisory Council did not receive any information prior to the cancellation of Constellation, that it would happen. Well, you can take that and 

square it for our international partners who woke up on a Tuesday 

morning to find out that the lunar program they thought they were 

a part of was gone. 

I know I’m overstaying my time and yours, but I must conclude 

this question with a story that I think is sad for what it conveys. 

In the spring of 2010 I happened to be down at Cape Canaveral 

and having dinner at one of my favorite restaurants down there 

over the years, and a waiter, an immigrant from Italy who knew 

me well, came over to my table and said, Dr. Griffin, he said, what 

is this I hear they’re cancelling the moon program? And I said, yes, 

that’s true. And in typical Italian fashion, he starts waving his 

arms and saying I came to this country because you were the people who can build space shuttles and build space stations and go 

to the moon, he said, and now you’re not? He says what is it with 

these people? Do they not know what it means to be a superpower? 

And I will never forget that conversation. That is what people from 

other countries think of us when we start and stop. Thank you. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you. Well, I totally agree. My time is up, 

but really, we need to put our money where our mouth is. We need 

to follow through on our commitments. And so I appreciate it. 

Again, my time is up. I yield back, Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. BABIN. Yes, sir. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Loudermilk. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Griffin, I know during your tenure at NASA you put a lot of 

focus on international cooperation, but you were cautious about 

putting international partners on a critical path, especially from 

the lessons from the International Space Station program. What— 

I’m sorry. What recommendations would you have for the future 

Administrators regarding international cooperation? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, sir, the way that I would characterize that— 

and that’s a superlative question. And when we talk about critical 

path, we have to understand what we mean. Certainly, our inter-
89 

national partners in terms of our lunar program were—I’ll use the 

quote on the critical path for a lunar base because the United 

States certainly wasn’t going to build everything we needed for a 

human outpost on the moon, far from it. 

When I say that it’s a good idea to keep partners off the critical 

path—and that may apply as well internally to the country as externally—a given piece of hardware, a given mission support function should probably, as best you can, be confined to one entity. So 

we were going to build the heavy lift rocket. Maybe the habitat 

would be furnished by the European Space Agency. Maybe a laboratory would come from Japan, something like that. Maybe the 

power system would come from France, which is, you know, as you 

know, 80 percent nuclear in—domestically. 

So my comments about critical path have I think in the past 

often been misinterpreted. When we’re doing international programs, we need everybody’s contribution. I don’t want to build a 

car by having, you know, the tires come from one manufacturer 

and the engine from—I think you get my point. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Right. Yes. I appreciate that. You know, growing up during the Apollo time period, NASA and those astronauts 

were an inspiration to me. And that—my life was surrounded by 

the idea that we were exploring the unknown, that we were doing 

something that a superpower does, that we were taking risks and 

we were beating the odds of things that people said that could not 

be done. There were more reasons that we could not go to the moon 

than there were that we could. But I think that helped define 

American exceptionalism is that we set our mind to do it and we 

did it. And I think that inspiration set us on a path to further 

greatness, and I know it inspired me. It inspired a lot of my schoolmates. 

What can we do going forward so that our space exploration will 

have that type of impact on the generations that are following us? 

It seems—I know that there is a lack of inspiration, I think, in our 

education system because a lot of children are asking where are we 

going? What are we doing? What am I here for? At least during 

that time period of my life there was a destiny. We had a purpose. 

And for Colonel or Dr. Griffin, anyone, will we ever see that time 

again? 

Ms. COLLINS. Well, thank you for the question. I think that’s 

great. And obviously, the mission we had—now, I was inspired by 

the Gemini astronauts, as well as the—— 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Yes. 

Ms. COLLINS. —Apollo astronauts. I wanted to be one of them as 

a young child, and it led me into the study of math and science and 

eventually becoming a pilot in the Air Force and it was—— 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. I was Air Force as well, so thank you. 

Ms. COLLINS. Yes, and it was just seeing what can be done. I 

wanted to be part of it because to me it was just a great adventure. 

And to answer your question, though, we need to teach our 

teachers because every astronaut cannot be in every classroom. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Right. 

Ms. COLLINS. Now, I learned about the space program from a 

magazine. There’s not enough astronauts to get into all the classrooms. I wish there were, but the teachers need to have continuing 
90 

education because I think some of them are a little bit afraid to 

teach space because they think the kids might know more than 

they do. So some of them—they don’t—they want an astronaut to 

be in the classroom, but otherwise, they don’t want to talk about 

it, so education for the teachers so they can get pumped up, it 

doesn’t have to be done by the U.S. Government. A lot of private 

entities, educational groups around the country teach teachers, and 

I think we need to do more of that because that’ll get more young 

people involved not just in the space program but we’re becoming, 

you know, so much more technical. We need kids in cyber, we need 

kids in engineering, energy, there’s—it’s everything. But you can 

tie it all to the space program. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. That’s right. I mean, and as I go back and look 

at movies such as The Right Stuff, and the one Tom Hanks did, 

the series, it—what it emphasized to me was the ingenuity beyond 

just the engineering but the thinking outside the box, the development of the lunar landing module, how we broke every other design 

because we needed to make it lighter. Whoever thought of a pilot 

standing up? 

But these are the types of things that we just broke the mold and 

decided we’re going to do it our way, and that’s the type of thing 

I think that we need to see again, something to inspire this next 

generation to move forward and take what—the hearing we had 

yesterday was the discovery of magnetic waves. Well, one of the 

questions was how is that going to be a practical application? Well, 

my sense, the guys who discovered it are not going to be the ones 

who will take it and make a practical application, but it’s the next 

generation that will take that discovery and then match that to 

something. 

I applaud you for what you’re doing. I still admire those who 

have the courage to break the surly bonds of Earth and go and explore the great unknown. Thank you. 

Mr. BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Loudermilk. 

And I want to thank the witnesses. This is one of the best hearings I have attended since being a Member of Congress, a Member 

of this Committee. 

And I want to thank the Members for their questions, and the 

record will remain open for two weeks for an additional—for additional written comments and written questions from any Members 

who desire to do so. 

Without any more ado, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
(91) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
92 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Michael Griffin 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 

Responses by Colonel Eileen Collins 
103 
104 
105 
106 

Responses by Ms. Cristina Chaplain 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 

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