Filed 9/18/23 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THOMAS MOYER,

Defendant and Respondent.

 H049408

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. C2015936)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

BY THE COURT: 

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on August 25, 2023, be modified 

as follows:

1. On page 1, line 9, the word “reasonable” is deleted and replaced with the word 

“strong” so the sentence reads: 

We also conclude that the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to 

raise a strong suspicion of such bribery.

2. On page 21, line 9, the word “reasonable” is deleted and replaced with the word 

“strong” so the sentence reads: 

Thus, the grand jury had more than enough evidence to create a strong suspicion 

that Undersheriff Sung was abusing his authority over CCW licenses to extract 

favors from, among others, Moyer. 
2

3. On page 21, line 13, the word “reasonable” is deleted and replaced with the word 

“strong” so the sentence reads:

The grand jury also had enough evidence to create a strong suspicion that Moyer 

promised a sizable donation of iPads to the Sheriff’s Office to persuade 

Undersheriff Sung to release Apple’s CCW licenses.

4. On page 23, line 5, the word “reasonable” is deleted and replaced with the word 

“strong” so the sentence reads: 

In light of the delay in releasing Apple’s CCW licenses until the iPad donation 

promise had taken shape, the discussion of both the licenses and the donation at 

the February 8 meeting, Captain Jensen’s subsequent involvement with both the 

licenses and the donation, and other evidence of unusual activity, the grand jury 

had adequate grounds for entertaining a strong suspicion that Undersheriff Sung 

demanded, and Moyer gave, a promise to make the iPad donation in exchange for 

release of Apple’s CCW licenses.

5. On page 26, line 1, the word “reasonable” is deleted and replaced with the word 

“strong” so the sentence reads:

The evidence presented to the grand jury, however, created a strong suspicion (and 

therefore permitted the grand jury to find) that Moyer proposed the iPad donation 

principally for another purpose: to secure release of Apple’s CCW licenses.

There is no change in judgment. 
____________________________

BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________

GROVER, ACTING P.J.

_____________________________

LIE, J.

People v. Moyer

H049408
Filed 8/25/23 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THOMAS MOYER,

Defendant and Respondent.

 H049408

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. C2015936)

This appeal raises a question not yet addressed by any California court: whether a 

public official may be bribed with a promise to donate to the official’s office. According 

to the People, the Santa Clara County undersheriff requested—and defendant Thomas 

Moyer made—a promise to donate iPads to the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office in 

exchange for releasing concealed carry weapon (CCW) licenses that the sheriff had 

signed. Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of California law, federal law 

and the law in many states, we conclude that such a promise may constitute a bribe. We 

also conclude that the evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to raise a 

reasonable suspicion of such bribery. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order 

dismissing the bribery count against Moyer, reinstate that count, and remand for further 

proceedings.
2

I. Background

Because defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the 

grand jury, we recount that evidence below. As required on appeal, we consider that

evidence in the light most favorable to the indictment, drawing all legitimate inferences 

in favor of it. (See, e.g., Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 Cal.4th 368, 406-407 (Stark);

People v. Guzman (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1096.) 

A. CCW Licenses in Santa Clara County

The Penal Code authorizes, but does not require, county sheriffs to issue licenses 

to carry concealed weapons to applicants who are of good moral character, have good 

cause for a license, reside or work in the county, and have completed a specified course 

of training. (Pen. Code, § 26150, subd. (a)1

; but see New York State Rifle & Pistol 

Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S.__, __ [142 S.Ct. 2111, 2123-2124, 2156]

[noting that California’s good cause requirement is similar to the New York “propercause” requirement held unconstitutional under the Second Amendment].) In the Santa 

Clara County Sheriff’s Office, CCW applications are processed by the public information 

officer, who is responsible for conducting background checks, arranging fingerprinting, 

and ensuring that applicants complete the required trainings. 

During the relevant time frame, the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office rarely 

issued CCW licenses. Indeed, the office’s practice was to not even process an application 

for a CCW license absent a special instruction to do so. Only Sheriff Laurie Smith and a 

small number of others in the Sheriff’s Office had the authority to give such instructions. 

One of those individuals was Rick Sung, who appears to have run Sheriff Smith’s 2018 

re-election campaign and after the election became the undersheriff, second in command 

to the sheriff. Undersheriff Sung also had authority to place license applications on hold 

even after licenses were signed by the sheriff. 

1

 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

Undersheriff Sung abused his authority over CCW applications to extract favors. 

In 2016 or 2017, Harpreet Chadha, a business owner, applied to renew a CCW license. 

After the license was signed, Sung placed the license on hold and met with Chadha. 

Afterwards, Chadha attempted to schedule an event for the sheriff in his company’s 

luxury suite in the San Jose sports arena. The event did not take place then, and 

Chadha’s CCW license remained on hold for more than a year until Sung spoke with 

Chadha in December 2018 and a new permit was prepared. On February 14, 2019, 

Chadha hosted an event for Sheriff Smith in his company’s luxury suite. That same day, 

Chadha received his CCW license. 

B. Apple’s CCW Applications

Thomas Moyer is Apple, Inc.’s head of global security. The company’s executive 

protection team is under his supervision. In 2016 and early 2017 the team began 

receiving more serious threats against Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO, and became concerned 

about its ability to respond to these threats. As a consequence, in early 2017, Apple

decided its executive protection team should be armed and began taking steps to obtain 

CCW licenses for team members, many of them based in Santa Clara County. 

1. The 2017 Meeting with Undersheriff Sung

In August 2017, after several initial approaches were rebuffed, two Apple 

officials—David Gullo, senior director of global security, and Eric Mueller, senior 

director of operations for the security team—met with Undersheriff Sung to discuss CCW 

licenses. In the meeting Sung said he would help Apple obtain licenses. 

At the end of the meeting, Undersheriff Sung brought up the upcoming election

for sheriff and asked Gullo and Mueller if they would support Sheriff Smith’s re-election.

The request raised “a red flag” for Gullo because Sung appeared to be linking CCW 

licenses to his request for political support. Consequently, Gullo reported to Moyer that 

“we were approached by the Sheriff’s Office, and they wanted us to support the Sheriff 

for re-election.” Moyer responded with a “[c]ouple of rules”: “You are free to support 
4

whomever you like,” but “[y]ou should not feel like you need to support her because you 

work for Apple.” Moyer also added pointedly, “We will not give money or anything of 

value in exchange for CCW[s].” 

2. The 2018 CCW Applications

For nearly a year, Apple’s CCW applications made little progress. In June 2018, 

Moyer got involved personally and secured a meeting with Sheriff Smith. After the 

meeting, Moyer told the leader of the executive protection team that the sheriff would 

approve the CCW licenses, and he should “start preparing the Santa Clara CCW 

paperwork for the team.”

The next month, members of the executive protection team submitted CCW 

applications to the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office. The public information officer, 

however, did nothing because he received no instruction to process the applications even 

when he specifically asked Sheriff Smith about them. 

3. Moyer’s Donation to Sheriff Smith’s Campaign

Although Moyer had said in August 2017 that Apple would not give anything of 

value in exchange for CCW licenses, in October 2018 Mueller donated $1,000, the 

maximum allowable amount, to Sheriff Smith’s re-election campaign based on 

Undersheriff Sung’s “ask” a year earlier. After Mueller informed Moyer of the donation, 

Moyer likewise donated the maximum amount to Sheriff Smith’s campaign, and Mueller 

informed the sheriff’s campaign of both donations. 

4. Processing of the CCW Applications and Signing of the Licenses

Several days after donating to Sheriff Smith’s campaign, Moyer emailed the 

sheriff to check on the status of Apple’s CCW applications. Moyer followed up the next 

week, and at the end of the month Apple put together a report on the increasing number 

of threats against its CEO in hopes of speeding up issuance of the CCW licenses. 

After the November 2018 election, the public information officer asked 

Undersheriff Sung about Apple’s CCW applications. Sung responded that one of 
5

Apple’s security officers had actively supported Sheriff Smith’s opponent in the election 

and that he would not allow the licenses to be granted if that officer was the one 

requesting them. 

Later in November, Undersheriff Sung called Mueller. Sung expressed anger that 

some Apple security officials had endorsed Sheriff Smith’s opponent. After this 

“venting,” Sung turned to the CCW applications and asked to meet about them in person. 

Later that day Mueller again talked with Sung, who told him that the licenses had been 

“signed off on” and asked to meet with Moyer. The following day, Mueller sent an email 

to Sung’s personal email address “[r]eintroducing” him to Moyer. 

That same day, Undersheriff Sung directed the public information officer to

process Apple’s CCW applications. In January 2019, after the applicants were 

fingerprinted and had completed their firearm range qualification tests, Sheriff Smith 

signed the CCW licenses, which were sent to an administrative assistant. However, 

before the assistant could tell the applicants to pick them up, the licenses were removed

from her desk. 

5. The February 8, 2019 Meeting

On January 23, 2019, Undersheriff Sung sent an email from his personal email 

account to Moyer, asking to set up a meeting with Moyer, Sheriff’s Office Captain James 

Jensen, and himself. This meeting took place on February 8 in the visitor’s center at 

Apple Park. 

Although Apple had no established program for donating products to law 

enforcement agencies, and the Sheriff’s Office had no immediate need for iPads, during 

the meeting Moyer sent himself a blank email with the subject line: “IPad Donation.” 

Immediately after the meeting, Moyer emailed the leader of Apple’s executive 

protection team that “[y]ou will have your permits shortly.”
6

6. The Promised iPad Donation and Release of the CCW Licenses

On February 10, 2019, two days after meeting with Undersheriff Sung and Captain 

Jensen, Moyer emailed a senior finance manager at Apple asking about the rules for 

donating iPads or computers to the local sheriff’s office for its “new training facility.” 

The following day an Apple compliance attorney replied that California public agencies 

may accept donations but asked Moyer to “make sure that there are no significant matters 

or purchases pending with the agency.” In response Moyer made no mention of Apple’s

pending CCW license applications. Instead, he told the compliance attorney that “we are 

not doing this because we are receiving anything in exchange.” Moyer informed the 

attorney of the applications only after the licenses were issued and does not appear to 

have disclosed that the applications were pending when the iPad donations were first 

proposed. 

About a month later, Moyer emailed Captain Jensen. Although in fact the 

Sheriff’s Office was not setting up a new training center, Moyer said that “[y]ou 

mentioned previously that you folks were setting up a new training center.” Then, Moyer 

said he was “[c]urious if you have a need for iPads or potentially computers for that 

facility.” 

Captain Jensen forwarded Moyer’s email to Undersheriff Sung and Assistant 

Sheriff Michael Doty. Later that day, Sung asked Doty to “start thinking of ideas on how 

we could utilize either computers or iPads from Apple in the training division.” When 

Doty suggested asking for 50 iPads, Sung told Doty to think bigger, and ultimately they 

asked for 200 iPads, which were worth $50,000 to $80,000. 

On March 26, 2019, members of Apple’s executive protection team were told to 

pick up their CCW licenses, which they did at the Sheriff’s Office. Although by that 

point he had no regular involvement in processing CCW applications, Captain Jensen 

personally handed out the licenses. 
7

7. Termination of the Promised iPad Donation

In the months following the release of Apple’s CCW licenses, Moyer took several 

steps to complete the promised iPad donation to the Sheriff’s Office, such as meeting 

with Assistant Sheriff Doty in late April to agree on the number of iPads and making an 

internal proposal for the donation. Moyer also asked Captain Jensen if the Sheriff’s 

Office had any color preference and apologized for “the wheels moving very slowly.”

Notably, however, Moyer did not inform Gullo, the head of Apple’s executive protection 

team, of the donation, and Jensen likewise did not inform the law enforcement personnel 

primarily responsible for Apple’s headquarters. 

In August 2019, Moyer terminated the promised donation. On August 7, he 

informed Apple’s chief litigation attorney that the treatment of CCW applications by the 

Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office was being investigated. Although Moyer had failed 

to mention Apple’s CCW applications to the compliance attorney in February, he then 

disclosed the approved applications as well as his $1,000 donation to the sheriff’s reelection campaign that had been made while the applications were still pending. Moyer 

also said that Apple had approved a donation of $50,000 worth of iPads to the Sheriff’s 

Office, adding later that day that “we should table Apple’s iPad donation.” The attorney 

agreed, and less than three minutes later Moyer instructed the personnel handling the 

promised donation to stop it. 

C. Procedural Background

In November 2020, prosecutors presented evidence concerning Apple’s CCW 

applications and the promised iPad donation to a grand jury, which indicted Undersheriff 

Sung and Captain Jensen for soliciting bribes and Moyer for making one. 

1. The Instructions

After the People finished presenting evidence to the grand jury, the prosecutor 

instructed the jury on the law, including the elements of bribery. In particular, the 

prosecutor instructed the jury that a “bribe” is the payment of “something of present or 
8

future value or advantage, or a promise to give such a thing,” made “with the corrupt 

intent to unlawfully influence” official action by the person bribed.

In subsequently urging the grand jury to indict Undersheriff Sung, Captain Jensen,

and Moyer, the prosecutor elaborated on what may constitute a bribe. Many people, the 

prosecutor observed, think of a bribe as “money . . . sort of slid across the bench in a 

brown paper bag to a person.” In fact, the prosecutor continued, “the thing of value does 

not have to go to the person that is being influenced” because a bribe “can either be 

something of value or a promise to give something of value. So it could be that the 

promise is given to the person that you are trying to influence and the thing of value 

could go to someone else.” 

The prosecutor offered an example: “if the police officer stops you on the side of 

the road and they’re going to ticket you, and you say hey, if you don’t ticket me I will 

give your niece $5,000, of course that’s a bribe. Obviously, the officer is not getting the 

money, but the promise is going to the officer.” 

2. The Indictment

On November 19, 2020, the grand jury issued an indictment. The first count 

charged Undersheriff Sung and Captain Jensen with asking, receiving and agreeing to 

receive a bribe in violation of section 68, subdivision (a). The second count charged 

Moyer with bribing an executive officer in violation of section 67 by making “a promise 

of iPads to the Sheriff’s Office” with the intent to influence an official action. 

3. Dismissal of the Charge against Moyer

Moyer moved under section 995 to dismiss count 2 of the indictment. He argued 

that the prosecutor erroneously instructed the grand jury that it could charge him with 

bribery based on a promise to give a thing of value to a third party rather than to the 

target of the bribe. On June 1, 2021, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed 

count 2 of the indictment. 
9

The trial court found no error in the instructions given to the grand jury. Noting 

that no case holds that a payment must go to the target of the bribe and that a target may 

benefit indirectly from things of value going to third parties, the trial court saw no reason 

why an official could not be bribed by promising to give a thing of value to a third party

designated by the official. 

However, the trial court concluded sua sponte that the evidence presented to the 

grand jury was insufficient to establish that Moyer had a corrupt intent in promising the 

iPad donation. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that, by the time of the 

February 8, 2019, meeting in which Moyer allegedly promised the iPad donation, Moyer 

already had been repeatedly informed that Apple’s CCW licenses would be issued. The 

court also observed that Moyer submitted the request to make the iPad donation through 

proper channels at Apple. It dismissed as unreasonable the inference that Moyer offered 

the donation to persuade Sung and Jensen to release Apple’s CCW licenses. 

The People timely filed a notice of appeal. 

II. Discussion

The People argue that the trial court erred in ruling the evidence of corrupt intent 

presented to the grand jury insufficient to support the indictment. Moyer defends this 

ruling and argues as well that a promise to make a payment to a third party or entity

cannot constitute a bribe, even where, as here, the target of the bribe directed payment to 

that party or entity. We disagree and conclude that under the Penal Code’s definition of 

“bribe” a promise to make a payment to a third party or entity may constitute a bribe. We 

also conclude that the evidence of corrupt intent presented to the grand jury was 

sufficient to support Moyer’s indictment. 

A. The Bribery Instruction

Moyer challenges the gloss that the prosecutor placed on the definition of bribe. 

As the trial court recognized, the prosecutor largely followed the Judicial Council’s 

pattern instructions in defining bribery and describing the elements of the charged
10

offense. (See CALCRIM Nos. 2600 & 2603.) Later, however, the prosecutor informed 

the grand jury that a promise to give a thing of value to a third party may constitute a 

bribe, as when a motorist promises to give money to a police officer’s niece if the officer 

does not write a ticket. Moyer argues that this gloss is erroneous, and his indictment 

must be dismissed because the grand jury may have been misled into indicting him on an 

impermissible theory. (See, e.g., Stark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 407; Cummiskey v. 

Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1018, 1022, fn. 1). 

This argument raises a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de 

novo. (See, e.g., People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) In interpreting statutes, 

our primary objective is to “ ‘ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the 

purpose of the statute.’ ” (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 849 (Carmack), 

quoting Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272.) “We look first to ‘ “the 

language of the statute, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and 

viewing them in their statutory context.” ’ ” (People v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53, 61.) 

We also “ ‘keep[] in mind the statutory purpose’ ” and seek to harmonize statutory 

provisions concerning the same subject “ ‘to the extent possible.’ ” (Carmack, supra, 2 

Cal.5th at p. 850.) If the meaning of the statute nonetheless remains uncertain, we turn to 

other indicia of the Legislature’s intent such as “ ‘the consequences that will flow from a 

particular interpretation.’ ” (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 354, 358.) 

As the trial court correctly recognized, the Penal Code defines the term “bribe” 

more broadly than Moyer contends. That definition does not limit bribes to promises to 

convey a thing of value to the target of the bribe, and we see no reason to imply such a 

limitation into the definition. Instead, consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 

California law, federal law and the law of many states, we interpret the Penal Code’s 

definition of “bribe” as it is written to include promises to give a thing of value to a third 

party or entity. 
11

1. The Penal Code’s Definition of “Bribe”

Moyer argues that the target of a bribe must either receive payment or be promised 

personal receipt of payment, and therefore a promise to make a payment to a third party 

cannot constitute a bribe. The Penal Code, however, defines the term “bribe,” and while 

that definition is not a model of clarity, nothing in it limits bribes to promises to make 

payments to the target of the bribe as opposed to a third party selected by the target. 

Moreover, implying such a restriction into the definition would exclude corrupt conduct 

such as Undersheriff Sung’s alleged actions in this case from the scope of California’s 

bribery statutes. 

The Penal Code defines “bribe” as follows: “[t]he word ‘bribe’ signifies anything 

of value or advantage, present or prospective, or any promise or undertaking to give any, 

asked, given, or accepted, with a corrupt intent to influence, unlawfully, the person to 

whom it is given, in his or her action, vote, or opinion, in any public or official capacity.” 

(§ 7, subd. (6).) This language divides bribes into two general categories or prongs. The 

first prong concerns direct payments: “anything of value or advantage” that is requested, 

given, or accepted with the intent to corruptly influence its target. The second prong 

concerns promises: “any promise or undertaking to give any[thing of value or 

advantage]” that is requested, given or accepted to corruptly influence its target. 

While the payment prong requires that the target of the bribe receive a “[]thing of 

value or advantage”—typically, a payment—the promise prong requires only that the 

target receive a promise to make a payment, not a promise that the target, rather than 

some other party, will receive a payment. As Moyer points out, the Penal Code’s 

definition of bribe requires a corrupt intent to influence “the person to whom it is given.” 

(§ 7, subd. (6), italics added.) In the payment prong, “it” refers to the payment made

(ibid.), and therefore the payment must be made to the target of the bribe. In the promise 

prong, however, “it” refers to a “promise or undertaking to give any[thing of value or 

advantage].” (Ibid.) Thus, under the promise prong, the target must receive a promise 
12

that a payment will be made. There is, however, no additional requirement that the 

payment be promised to the target of the bribe. To the contrary, under the plain language 

of the definition, the promise may be to make a future payment to anyone, whether a third 

party or the target. 

This conclusion is supported by the specific language of the promise prong. The 

Penal Code defines “bribe” to include “any promise or undertaking” to give a thing of 

value. (§ 7, subd. (6), italics added.) As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[u]se of the 

term ‘any’ ” in a law “demonstrates the Legislature intended the law to have a broad 

sweep.” (Ennabe v. Manosa (2014) 58 Cal.4th 697, 714.) Indeed, “any” is defined to 

mean, among other things, “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind” (Webster’s 

3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 97), and therefore a reference to “any” item or object in 

a statute is “most naturally read to mean [items or objects] of whatever kind.” (Ali v. 

Federal Bureau of Prisons (2008) 552 U.S. 214, 218-219.) As a consequence, the Penal 

Code’s reference to “any promise or undertaking to give any[thing of value or 

advantage]” is naturally read to mean promises to make payments of any kind, not just 

promises that the target of the bribe will receive payment in the future. 

This interpretation makes sense. The Penal Code’s definition of bribe applies not 

only when a bribe is “given” to a public official, but also when a public official has 

“asked” for a bribe. (§ 7, subd. (6); see § 68, subd. (a).) If a personal receipt requirement 

were implied into the promise prong, and that prong were limited to promises of future 

payment to the target of the bribe, executive officials would be free to demand payments 

to their relatives or friends in exchange for official actions without fear of prosecution for 

bribery (at least as long as such payments are not an indirect conduit to the officials). 

Indeed, were Moyer’s interpretation adopted, Undersheriff Sung’s indictment for bribery 

might have to be dismissed because he demanded that iPads be donated to the Sheriff’s 

Office rather than to himself. We see no reason why the Legislature would have defined 

bribe to allow such alleged corrupt conduct, and certainly no reason to force into the 
13

definition of bribe an implied restriction allowing it. (See, e.g., People v. Bullard (2020) 

9 Cal.5th 94, 106 [statutes should not be interpreted to create “ ‘obvious injustice’ ”].)

Moyer contends that a personal receipt requirement must be implied into the 

promise prong to avoid an untenable difference with the payment prong. According to 

Moyer, “[b]ecause the statute does not apply when a would-be briber delivers a thing of 

value to a third party, it cannot possibly apply when the briber promises to give a thing of 

value to a third party in the future.” In fact, there is good reason to punish promises to 

pay third parties but not unsolicited payments to such parties. When a public official 

extracts a promise to give something of value to a third party selected by the official, 

there is a clear danger that the official’s action will be improperly influenced. The danger 

of improper influence is much lower where, without any solicitation or promise, a party 

gives money to a third party. In that situation, the deed has been done, and the official 

presumably has little, if any, incentive to take improper action as a result of the payment. 

It is true that an unsolicited gift to a relative, once known by an official, might generate a 

sense of gratitude that in turn might influence the official. The Legislature, however, 

reasonably may have deemed this threat minimal. Indeed, the federal government has 

done just that: while the federal bribery statute covers both payments and promises to 

make payments to public officials, it covers only promises to make payments to “any 

other person or entity.” (28 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1).) 

Moyer tries to find support for his personal receipt requirement in an 1895 

Supreme Court decision, People v. Ward (1895) 110 Cal. 369 (Ward). While this 

decision was issued after the current definition of “bribe” was adopted (Amends. to the 

Codes 1873-1874, ch. 614, § 1), nothing in the decision suggests that the Supreme Court 

even considered that definition. In Ward, the Supreme Court observed that there was no 

“promise to do something, or an undertaking of some kind which was, or would be, 

beneficial to the supervisor” targeted by the bribe in that case. (Ward, supra, at p. 373.) 

The issue before the Supreme Court in Ward, however, was whether the indictment 
14

complied with the then-applicable pleading requirement that an indictment describe the 

acts constituting the offense. (Id. at p. 371.) In the passage quoted, the Supreme Court 

simply concluded that the indictment did not comply with this requirement. (Id. at p. 

373.) There is no indication that the Supreme Court considered the definition of bribe in 

reaching this conclusion, and therefore the decision has no bearing here. (See, e.g., Santa 

Clara Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 243 [“It is 

axiomatic that an opinion is not authority for an issue not considered therein.”].) The 

Court of Appeal’s decision in People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919 is similarly 

inapposite because it involved payments made to the target of the bribe and does not even 

mention promises of future payment. (Id. at p. 928.) 

Thus, nothing in the Penal Code’s definition of bribe supports the personal receipt 

requirement that Moyer seeks to imply into the promise prong of the definition. 

2. The Political Reform Act

Moyer also argues that a personal receipt requirement should be implied into the 

promise prong of the bribe definition to avoid a conflict with the behested payment 

provision of the Political Reform Act of 1974, Government Code section 81000 et seq. 

That provision requires elected officials to report payments made at the official’s request 

for, among others, charitable or governmental purposes. (Gov. Code, § 84224, subd. (a); 

see also id. § 82004.5 [defining behested payment].) Moyer asserts that, unless the 

promise prong is construed to include a personal receipt requirement, it will permit 

prosecution of behested payments and “chill the willingness of elected officials and 

donors to engage in these charitable/governmental practices.” 

Moyer fails to substantiate this assertion. The promise prong of the Penal Code’s 

definition of “bribe” does not subject most promises to make a donation at the behest of a 

public official to prosecution. A promise to make a payment to a third party satisfies 

only one element of bribery. To constitute bribery, such a promise must be made “with a 

corrupt intent to influence, unlawfully, the person to whom it is given” in an official 
15

activity. (§ 7, subd. (6).) Moyer fails to identify any situation in which a promise made 

in good faith to contribute to a charity, or a government entity could satisfy the corrupt 

intent requirement. As a consequence, Moyer fails to show any conflict between the 

promise prong, as written, and the behested payment provision of the Political Reform 

Act. 

In any event, the Legislature has instructed how to harmonize the Political Reform 

Act with other statutes. The Act states that “[n]othing in this chapter shall exempt any 

person from the applicable provisions of any other laws of this state.” (Gov. Code, 

§ 91014.) Thus, if there were any conflict between the Political Reform Act’s behested 

payment provision and the promise prong of the definition of bribe, the Political Reform 

Act would have to yield. 

3. The Rule of Lenity

Moyer argues as well that, “to the extent there is any ambiguity,” the rule of lenity 

requires that a personal receipt requirement be implied into the promise prong. In fact, 

the rule of lenity is inapplicable. When a statute defining a crime or punishment is 

susceptible of two interpretations of roughly equal plausibility, the rule of lenity requires 

adoption of the interpretation more favorable to the defendant. (People v. Avery (2002) 

27 Cal.4th 49, 57 (Avery).) In other words, “the rule of lenity is a tie-breaking principle” 

(Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1102, fn. 30 (Lexin)), which applies if 

there is “an egregious ambiguity” and “ ‘two reasonable interpretations of the same 

provision stand in relative equipoise’ ” (People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 889, 

quoting Lexin, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1102, fn. 30; see also Avery, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 

58). The rule has no application where a court can “fairly discern” legislative intent. 

(People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 980, quoting People ex Rel Green v. Grewal (2015)

61 Cal.4th 544, 565; People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1277; Avery, supra, 27 

Cal.4th at p. 58.) As shown above, that is the case here. 
16

4. Constitutional Considerations

Finally, Moyer argues that a personal receipt requirement must be implied into the 

promise prong because otherwise California’s bribery statutes would be expanded in an 

unforeseeable fashion in violation of due process. (See People v. Heitzmann (1994) 9 

Cal.4th 189, 199 [statutes “must be definite enough to provide a standard of conduct for 

those whose activities are proscribed” and “must provide definite guidelines . . . to 

prevent arbitrary and discriminate enforcement”] (Heitzmann)); see also Walker v. 

Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 141-142 (Walker).) In fact, it was foreseeable that 

California’s bribery statutes would be construed to cover promises to make payments to 

third parties because Ninth Circuit precedent construing California law, federal law, and 

the law of many states, all allow bribery prosecutions for payments, or promises to give 

things of value, to third parties.

The Ninth Circuit interpreted California’s bribery statutes to apply to payments to 

third parties more than thirty years ago. In United States v Frega (9th Cir. 1999) 179 

F.3d 793 (Frega), an attorney and several Superior Court judges were charged with 

violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1961 et seq. The indictment alleged multiple acts of bribery in violation of sections 92 

and 93 (Frega, supra, at p. 799), including several payments to family members of the 

judges (id. at p. 807). The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants’ assertion that 

“payments to family members [are] beyond the reach of the bribery statute.”2

 (Ibid.) As 

a consequence, for at least three decades, there has been precedent for applying 

California’s bribery statutes to payments to third parties. 

2 In Frega, the Ninth Circuit also rejected the defendants’ contention that the jury 

should have been instructed that a payment to a family member cannot be a bribe if the 

judge is not made aware of the payment. (Frega, supra, 179 F.3d at p. 807.) We express 

no opinion on the correctness of that ruling.
17

In addition, in other jurisdictions it is well established that promises to make 

payments to third parties may constitute a bribe. Federal law makes it a crime to make 

“promises” to a federal official “to give anything of value to any other person or entity[]

with intent[] [¶] to influence any official act.” (18 U.S.C. § 201, subd. (b)(1)(A), italics 

added.) Similarly, the Model Penal Code defines bribery to include any offer to confer a 

“pecuniary benefit” in consideration for official action (Model Pen. Code, §240.1, subd. 

(1)), and “benefit” is defined in turn to include “benefit to any other person or entity in 

whose welfare [the beneficiary of a bribe] is interested.” (Id., § 240.0, subd. (1).) 

Moreover, at least ten states have adopted in whole or in large part this definition of 

bribe. (See Del. Code Ann., tit. 11, § 1209(3); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1000; Ida. Code

§ 18-1351(1); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-916.01(2); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27-1(a); 18 Pa. Stat. 

and Const. Stat. Ann. § 4501; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(2); Tex. Pen. Code 

§ 36.01(3); Va. St. Ann. § 18.2-446; W Va. Code Ann. § 61-5A-2(8).) Thus, federal law 

and the law of at least ten other states recognize that a promise to a public official to 

make a payment to, or confer a benefit upon, a third party may constitute a bribe. (See, 

e.g., United States v. Menendez (D.N.J. 2015) 132 F.Supp.3d 635, 639-640; United States 

v. Siegelman (11th Cir. 2011) 640 F.3d 1159, 1165-1166; Commonwealth v. Moran (Pa. 

2014) 104 A.3d 1136, 1146.)

As a consequence, based on longstanding judicial construction of California’s 

bribery statutes, federal law and the laws of many other states, Moyer had fair warning 

that a bribery charge might be based on a promise to make payments to a third party. 

Moyer also argues that, without a requirement that promised payments be made to 

the target of a bribe, bribery statutes might be enforced in an arbitrary manner and 

become a convenient tool for discriminatory enforcement. As noted above, however, 

more than thirty years ago the Ninth Circuit interpreted California’s bribery statute to 

cover payments to third parties, and federal law as well as the law of other states have 

long recognized that promises to make payments to third parties may constitute bribery. 
18

Nevertheless, Moyer fails to cite a single instance in which those laws have been applied 

in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion, and he does not identify a scenario in which this 

might happen. 

We therefore find Moyer’s constitutional objections unpersuasive and hold that the 

Penal Code’s definition of “bribe” should be interpreted as it is written, without implying 

any personal receipt requirement into its promise prong.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Indictment

The People challenge the trial court’s determination that the evidence of corrupt 

intent before the grand jury was insufficient to support an indictment. The People argue 

that the circumstantial evidence presented to the grand jury was sufficient to create a 

strong suspicion that Moyer bribed Undersheriff Sung and Captain Jensen when he 

promised to donate over $50,000 worth of iPads to the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s 

Office in exchange for release of Apple’s CCW licenses. We agree. While the evidence 

presented to the grand jury might be interpreted innocently and by itself may not be 

sufficient to support a conviction, it is sufficient to satisfy the much less stringent 

requirements for an indictment. 

1. Standard of Review

Under section 995, an indictment must be dismissed if the grand jury indicted the 

defendant “without reasonable or probable cause.” (§ 995, subd. (a)(1)(B).) “Reasonable 

or probable cause” means a state of facts leading a person of ordinary caution or 

prudence “[to] conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” 

(People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 473.) 

The evidentiary showing needed to satisfy this standard is “exceedingly low.” 

(Salazar v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 840, 846 (Salazar).) “ ‘Evidence that 

will justify a prosecution need not be sufficient to support a conviction’ ” (People v. 

Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 582 (Scully), quoting Rideout v. Superior Court (1967) 67 

Cal.2d 471, 474), and “[a]n indictment may be justified even if the evidence leaves some 
19

room for doubt” (People v. Superior Court (Costa) (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 690, 698

(Costa)). Reasonable or probable cause to indict exists “ ‘if there is some rational ground 

for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the defendant is 

guilty of it.’ ” (Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 582; see also People v. Superior Court

(Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226 [“Thus, an indictment or information should 

be set aside only when there is a total absence of evidence to support a necessary element 

of the offense charged.”].) 

With respect to an indictment, the grand jury sits as the finder of fact (People v. 

Pic’l (1982) 31 Cal.3d 731, 737 (Pic’l)), and we review de novo the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the grand jury’s determination. (People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 

711, 718.) In doing so, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment on the weight 

of the evidence for the fact finder’s (Williams v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1144, 

1147-1148 (Williams)), and “ ‘[e]very legitimate inference that may be drawn from the 

evidence must be drawn in favor of the [indictment]’ ” (Pic’l, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 737). 

In addition, while there must be some showing concerning each element of the charged 

crime, “such a showing may be made by means of circumstantial evidence supportive of 

reasonable inferences.” (Williams, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1148.) 

2. The Evidence Presented to the Grand Jury

Drawing all legitimate inferences in favor of the indictment, we conclude that 

there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a strong suspicion that Moyer 

promised to donate iPads to the Sheriff’s Office with a corrupt intent to influence 

Undersheriff Sung to release Apple’s CCW licenses. This evidence showed that Sung 

used CCW licenses to extract favors, that he released Apple’s CCW licenses only after 

Moyer promised to make the donation of iPads in their February 8, 2019 meeting, and 

that Moyer’s subsequent actions displayed a consciousness of guilt. 
20

a. Undersheriff Sung’s Misuse of Authority over CCW Licenses

The People presented evidence to the grand jury showing that Undersheriff Sung 

had broad authority over CCW licenses and that he used this authority to extract favors. 

Under California law, sheriffs have authority to issue licenses to carry concealed 

weapons. (§ 26150.) Although the Penal Code sets forth requirements that applicants 

must satisfy, the Code does not grant an entitlement to a license: it merely states that a 

sheriff “may” issue a license when the statutory requirements are satisfied. (Ibid.) In 

fact, during the relevant time period, the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office generally 

did not process applications for CCW licenses. The Sheriff’s Office, however, would 

process applications on instructions from several high-ranking officials, including 

Undersheriff Sung, and Sung had authority to hold licenses even after they were signed 

by the sheriff. This authority gave Sung the power to extract favors from applicants, and

he exercised that power. 

For example, Undersheriff Sung forced one applicant to allow the sheriff to use a

luxury suite. Harpreet Chadha, the owner of a business with a suite at San Jose’s sports 

arena, applied to renew his CCW license in 2016. Although Sheriff Smith signed the 

license in October 2017, Sung put the license on hold so that he could meet with Chadha, 

and when he did, he attempted to schedule an event for the sheriff in Chadha’s suite. The 

event, however, did not take place until February 14, 2019, and it was only on that date—

roughly sixteen months after Sheriff Smith signed Chadha’s license—that Chadha picked 

up his license. 

Undersheriff Sung also used his authority over CCW licenses to pressure Moyer 

and Eric Mueller, the senior director of Apple’s security team, into contributing to Sheriff 

Smith’s re-election campaign. In August 2017, Mueller and another Apple official met 

with Sung to discuss the CCW licenses that Apple was trying to obtain for its executive 

protection team. During the meeting, Sung brought up the sheriff’s upcoming re-election 

and asked whether Mueller and another Apple official would support the sheriff. The 
21

suggestion raised a “red flag” because it appeared to connect the CCW licenses to 

political support for the sheriff, and when Moyer was told of it he responded that “[w]e 

will not give money or anything of value in exchange for CCW[s].” 

Over the next year, however, Apple’s CCW applications languished, and in 

October Moyer and Mueller donated money to Sheriff Smith’s campaign—as

Undersheriff Sung had requested the year before. Moreover, it was only after the election 

that the final steps for processing the applications took place and the sheriff signed the

licenses. 

Thus, the grand jury had more than enough evidence to create a reasonable 

suspicion that Undersheriff Sung was abusing his authority over CCW licenses to extract 

favors from, among others, Moyer. 

b. The iPad Donation Promise

The grand jury also had enough evidence to create a reasonable suspicion that 

Moyer promised a sizable donation of iPads to the Sheriff’s Office to persuade 

Undersheriff Sung to release Apple’s CCW licenses. 

Apple’s CCW licenses were not released immediately after they were signed and 

ready for use. Sheriff Smith signed Apple’s CCW licenses sometime in mid-January 

2020, and normally the licenses would have been released immediately afterwards. They 

were not. Instead, shortly after Apple’s CCW licenses were signed, they were removed 

from the desk of the administrative assistant who normally would have notified the 

applicants to pick them up. 

Indeed, release of Apple’s CCW licenses was delayed for two months, until after 

Undersheriff Sung had met with Moyer, the possibility of an iPad donation had been 

raised, and Moyer had returned with a concrete proposal. In late January 2019, around 

the time that release of Apple’s licenses was held up, Sung—who, as mentioned above, 

had authority to hold up licenses signed by the sheriff—requested that Moyer meet with 

him and Captain Jensen. During this meeting, which occurred on February 8, 2019,
22

Moyer sent a blank email to himself with the subject line “IPad Donation.” Two days 

later, Moyer began inquiring how to arrange such a donation, and in early March, Moyer 

emailed Jensen to propose donating iPads for a new training center. Three weeks later—

and nearly two months after they were signed—Apple’s CCW licenses were released. 

This sequence of events creates a suspicion that Apple’s CCW licenses were 

released in exchange for the promised iPad donation. This suspicion is heightened by 

evidence that both the licenses and the donation were discussed at the February 8 meeting 

between Moyer, Undersheriff Sung, and Captain Jensen. As noted above, during his 

February 8 meeting with Sung and Jensen, Moyer sent himself a blank email with the 

subject line “IPad Donation,” which suggests that the donation was discussed during the 

meeting. In addition, shortly after the meeting, Moyer emailed the leader of Apple’s 

executive protection team that “[y]ou will have your permits shortly,” which suggests 

that the CCW licenses also were discussed. Furthermore, Jensen played an active role in 

both handling the iPad donation and handing out the CCW licenses, even though the 

donation was not for a program under his direct supervision, and he had no direct 

responsibility for CCW licenses. 

Other evidence raises further suspicion. First, the promised iPad donation was 

both unusual and large. Apple had never before donated any products to law 

enforcement agencies. In addition, at Undersheriff Sung’s suggestion, the Sheriff’s 

Office requested 200 iPads—worth $50,000 to $80,000—even though previously the 

office had no need for iPads. Second, Moyer did not appear to have been much 

concerned about how the iPads would be used. He offered them for a new training 

center, even though the Sheriff’s Office was not setting up such a center. Third, the 

donation was made secretively. Neither Mueller nor Gullo, the head of Apple’s 

executive protection team, were informed of the planned donation, and the officers 

primarily responsible for law enforcement in and around Apple Park were likewise kept 

in the dark.
23

In light of the delay in releasing Apple’s CCW licenses until the iPad donation 

promise had taken shape, the discussion of both the licenses and the donation at the 

February 8 meeting, Captain Jensen’s subsequent involvement with both the licenses and 

the donation, and other evidence of unusual activity, the grand jury had adequate grounds 

for entertaining a reasonable suspicion that Undersheriff Sung demanded, and Moyer 

gave, a promise to make the iPad donation in exchange for release of Apple’s CCW 

licenses. 

c. Moyer’s Intent 

The grand jury also had evidence sufficient to create a strong suspicion that Moyer 

had a corrupt intent in promising the iPad donation. The trial court found insufficient 

evidence of corrupt intent because, by the time of his February 8, 2019 meeting with 

Undersheriff Sung and Captain Jensen, Moyer had been repeatedly informed that Apple’s 

CCW licenses would be issued. As noted above, however, despite receiving assurances

from the sheriff in June 2018, Apple’s CCW applications had been languishing for 

months. In addition, Moyer had a “red flag” warning that Sung was using his authority 

over CCW licenses for improper purposes. As a consequence, the grand jury had ample 

ground for inferring that Moyer understood that he had to promise Sung something to 

obtain the release of Apple’s CCW licenses. 

This inference is supported by evidence showing Moyer’s consciousness of guilt. 

Although, as the trial court pointed out, Moyer went through proper channels at Apple in 

requesting the iPad donation, Moyer was less than candid in doing so. For example, 

when a compliance attorney asked whether Apple had any significant matters pending 

with the Sheriff’s Office, Moyer initially failed to disclose the CCW licenses that he had 

spent so much time trying to obtain, saying instead that “we are not doing this because 

we are receiving anything in exchange.” He only revealed the licenses after they had 

been issued and does not appear to have disclosed that applications for them were still 

pending when he first proposed the iPad donation. Especially as Apple’s CCW licenses 
24

were discussed in the same meeting in which the grand jury reasonably could have 

inferred that the iPad donation was mentioned, the grand jury could have found this 

omission surprising and suspicious. As a consequence, the grand jury reasonably could 

have inferred that Moyer was trying to hide the connection between the donation and the 

licenses. 

The grand jury also had grounds for suspecting that Moyer tried to create a false 

paper trail. As noted above, during his February 8 meeting with Undersheriff Sung and 

Captain Jensen, Moyer sent himself an email about the iPad donation, which suggests 

that the donation was discussed during the meeting. A month later, however, Moyer sent 

an email to Jensen saying he was “[c]urious if you have a need for iPads or potentially 

computers for that new facility[.]” Moyer also stated that Jensen had mentioned that the 

sheriff was “setting up a new training center,” even though there was no new center. The

grand jury could have inferred that these statements were intended to conceal that Moyer 

had discussed the promised donation the month before in the same meeting where 

Apple’s CCW licenses were discussed. 

Finally, the grand jury could have found further evidence of consciousness of guilt 

in the speed with which Moyer reacted upon learning that the Santa Clara County 

Sheriff’s Office was under investigation for its treatment of CCW licenses. On August 7, 

2019, the press reported that the Sheriff’s Office had received a subpoena concerning 

CCW licenses. There was no mention in the article about Apple or the promised iPad 

donation, and in February, when asked by the compliance attorney about matters pending 

before the Sheriff’s Office, Moyer had not disclosed Apple’s CCW applications. In 

August, however, Moyer not only made a connection between the licenses and the 

promised donation; he also immediately emailed Apple’s head litigator to disclose that 

the CCW applications had been pending when the iPad donation was promised and to 

recommend tabling the donation. And within three minutes after the litigator agreed, 

Moyer instructed those working on the donation to cease work. The grand jury could 
25

have inferred from the speed with which Moyer made the connection between the CCW 

licenses and the iPad donation, disclosed it, and tabled the promised donation that he was 

gravely worried.

Moyer argues that the inferences urged by the People are speculative and 

unsupported. He contends that there are innocent explanations for many of the actions 

that the People contend are suspicious, such as Moyer’s email to himself during the 

February 8 meeting and his reaction to news of the investigation of the Sheriff’s Office. 

He also downplays his failure to disclose Apple’s CCW licenses to the compliance 

attorneys, objects that he had no knowledge that Undersheriff Sung was holding up the 

licenses, and contends that the People are “piling inference upon inference.” 

These are substantial points, which, absent additional evidence, may be 

challenging to overcome at trial. At the indictment stage, however, proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt is not required. To the contrary, at that stage the standard is 

“exceedingly low.” (Salazar, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 846.) To overcome a challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury, the People need show 

“reasonable or probable cause” (§ 995, subd. (a)(1)(B)), which requires only “some 

rational ground for assuming that an offense has been committed and the defendant is 

guilty of it.” (Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 582, quotation omitted.) We conclude that 

the evidence presented to the grand jury provided such a ground. (Ibid.)

3. Corrupt Use of Donations

Moyer argues that, even if his promise to donate iPads to the Sheriff’s Office was

intended to persuade Undersheriff Sung to release Apple’s CCW licenses, he cannot have 

had a corrupt intent because the Political Reform Act allows behested payments. This 

argument is unpersuasive for three reasons. 

First, Moyer has not shown that the proposed iPad donation would have been a 

behested payment. Donations “made principally” for “charitable” and “governmental

purposes” may qualify as behested payments. (Gov. Code, § 82004.5, subd. (c)(4), (5).) 
26

The evidence presented to the grand jury, however, created a reasonable suspicion (and 

therefore permitted the grand jury to find) that Moyer proposed the iPad donation 

principally for another purpose: to secure release of Apple’s CCW licenses.

Second, while Moyer notes that behested payments are allowed by the Political 

Reform Act, he has not pointed to anything in the Act authorizing public officials such as 

Undersheriff Sung and Captain Jensen to demand (or receive) donations in exchange for 

performing their official duties. Indeed, it would be surprising if the Act authorized such 

demands. It has long been recognized that “[p]ublic policy and sound morals alike forbid 

that a public officer should demand or receive for services performed by him or her in the 

discharge of official duty other or further remuneration than that described by law.” (52 

Cal. Jur. (2023) Public Officers & Employees, § 357; see also Noble v. City of Palo Alto

(1928) 89 Cal.App. 47, 51.) 

Third, the People presented to the grand jury evidence that Moyer was less than 

candid about the iPad donation. As the trial court recognized, there is no corrupt intent 

when a corporation publicly offers to fund a public works project in exchange for a city 

council tabling a tax proposal, because in such a case the deal is made openly and 

lawfully. The situation here is different. Far from making a public deal, Moyer allegedly

struck a private bargain with Undersheriff Sung and Captain Jensen to donate iPads in 

exchange for release of Apple’s CCW licenses. In addition, far from disclosing this 

bargain, Moyer failed to mention the applications when compliance personnel asked 

about matters pending before the Sheriff’s Office, and he took steps to actively conceal 

the connection between the applications and the promised donation until the investigation 

into the Sheriff’s Office created too great a danger. While no corrupt intent may be 

inferred when a party openly makes a deal with a public entity, the grand jury reasonably

could have inferred corrupt intent from such an undisclosed, “clandestine” bargain. (See 

People v. Wong (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1448 [corrupt intent can be inferred from 

“clandestine” payments and failure to fully disclose pertinent facts].) 
27

III. Disposition

The order dismissing count 2 of the indictment is reversed, count 2 is reinstated, 

and this case is remanded for further proceedings. 
28

____________________________

BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________

GROVER, ACTING P.J.

_____________________________

LIE, J.

People v. Moyer

H049408
29

Trial Court: Santa Clara County

Superior Court No.: C2015936

Trial Judge: The Honorable Eric S. Geffon

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney

The People of the State of California:

John Chase, Deputy District Attorney

Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent Edward W. Swanson 

Thomas Moyer:

Mary McNamara

Britt H. Evangelist

The People v. Moyer

H049408