Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed January 12, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-1342

Lower Tribunal No. 18-15594

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G.C., The Mother,

Appellant,

vs.

Department of Children and Families, et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Denise 

Martinez-Scanziani, Judge.

Twig, Trade, & Tribunal, PLLC, and Morgan L. Weinstein (Fort 

Lauderdale), for appellant.

Karla Perkins, for appellee Department of Children and Families; Sara 

Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Laura J. Lee, 

Assistant Director of Appeals (Tallahassee), for appellee Guardian ad Litem 

(Tallahassee).

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. 

LOGUE, J.
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G.C. appeals the decision terminating her parental rights over her 

minor son K.C. K.C. was sheltered and placed in the care of G.C.’s aunt and 

uncle two months after the child was born due to several incidents where the 

child was placed at risk when G.C. violated an in-home safety plan. G.C. was 

given a case plan with the goal of unification and provided services for two 

years. The Department of Children and Families filed a petition for 

termination of parental rights. After a three-day trial, the trial court granted 

the petition.

The trial court found that the Department had proved grounds for 

termination of G.C.’s parental rights under subsections 39.806(1)(c) 

(parent’s continuing involvement threatens the child, irrespective of 

services); (1)(e)(1) (continuing abuse or neglect based on failure to 

substantially comply with case plan); (1)(e)(2) (material breach of case plan);

and (1)(e)(3) (child in care for 12 of last 22 months and conditions for return 

not met), of the Florida Statutes (2021). The trial court further found that 

termination is in K.C.’s manifest best interests and is the least restrictive 

means to protect him from harm.

On appeal, G.C. does not contend that she is presently able to safely 

reunite with the child, and she admitted at trial that after two years of services 

she has not yet qualified for unsupervised visitation with the child. She 
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argues that she should have been provided additional, specialized services 

in light of her borderline personality disorder. G.C. did not raise this argument 

in the court below and even now, on appeal, fails to indicate with any 

precision what further services could have led to a different outcome. In any 

event, the record reflects that (1) G.C. was provided with services 

recommended by the two psychologists who diagnosed the borderline 

personality disorder and (2) her dyadic (parent-child) therapist provided her 

specialized individual therapy to address parenting issues related to her 

condition. 

In these circumstances, the record supports the trial court’s findings

that G.C. has not substantially complied with the case plan and that 

termination of G.C.’s parental rights is the least restrictive means to protect 

K.C. from harm. See § 39.01(84) Fla. Stat. (2021)(“‘Substantial compliance’

means that the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan 

have been significantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety 

of the child will not be endangered upon the child’s remaining with or being 

returned to the child’s parent.”); S.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 202 So. 

3d 769, 772 (Fla. 2016) (“The least restrictive means prong does not require 

the trial court to consider a permanent guardianship, instead of adoption, 

after the grounds for termination have been established by clear and 
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convincing evidence and reunification would not be in the manifest best 

interests of the child.”).

Although not necessary to our decision, we note as an aside that the 

maternal aunt and uncle, who have been acting as K.C.’s caregivers for the 

last two and a half years, are willing to adopt K.C. See § 39.001(1)(h), Fla. 

Stat. (2021) (permanent placement should be achieved within one year); § 

39.0136(1), Fla. Stat. (stating “time is of the essence for establishing 

permanency for a child in the dependency system” and time limitations are 

a right of the child).

Affirmed.