COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Benton and Coleman 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

DONESH R. ZAMANI 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1645-96-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 NOVEMBER 18, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 

Porter R. Graves, Jr., Judge 

 John Burns Earle, III (Miller, Ralston & 

Earle, on brief), for appellant. 

 Robert H. Anderson, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Donesh R. Zamani appeals from his convictions for two counts 

of sexual battery. He claims the circuit court misinterpreted 

Code §§ 16.1-133 and 16.1-133.1 by holding that the general 

district court lacked jurisdiction to reopen his case after he 

had appealed the convictions to the circuit court and after he 

had appeared therein. As a result, he contends, the circuit 

court erred in affirming the original judgments of the general 

district court by applying the provisions of Code § 16.1-133 when 

he "withdrew" his appeal from the circuit court in order to 

reopen and transfer the case to the district court. He further 

contends the circuit court should have recognized the general 

district court's authority to reopen the case pursuant to Code 

§ 16.1-133.1 and should have transferred the case to the district 

court. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order of the 
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circuit court affirming the original convictions and we remand 

the case to the circuit court with directions. 

I. BACKGROUND

 On March 21, 1996, the General District Court of Rockingham 

County convicted the appellant on two counts of sexual battery in 

violation of Code § 18.2-67.4. The district court sentenced the 

appellant to suspended sentences of ninety days and sixty days, 

respectively, placed him on probation for one year and referred 

him for psychological evaluation. 

 The appellant timely noted his appeal to the circuit court 

for a trial de novo pursuant to Code § 16.1-132. On April 8, 

1996, he appeared in the circuit court to set a trial date, at 

which time he also waived his right to a jury trial. 

 On April 12, 1996, the district court granted his motion to 

reopen the case pursuant to Code § 16.1-133.1. On rehearing, the 

district court found that sufficient evidence existed to convict 

the appellant on both counts, but withheld final adjudication and 

took the case under advisement for one year. 

 On April 16, 1996, twenty-seven days after the original 

conviction in the district court, the appellant appeared in the 

circuit court and "withdrew" his appeal. The circuit court held 

that because an appeal had been taken and more than ten days had 

elapsed since the date of conviction, when the defendant appeared 

and "withdrew" his appeal the district court had been divested of 

jurisdiction to reopen and reconsider its initial decision and 
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sentence; therefore, under Code § 16.1-133 the circuit court was 

required to affirm the original district court decision. 

Accordingly, the circuit court affirmed the district court's 

original judgments pursuant to Code § 16.1-133 and disregarded 

the subsequent disposition imposed upon rehearing. This appeal 

followed. 

II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS

 This appeal requires that we reconcile the Code's provisions 

pertaining to two different post-trial procedures in courts not 

of record: (1) Code § 16.1-133.1, dealing with a petition to 

reopen and rehear a case by a general district court; and (2) 

Code §§ 16.1-132 and 16.1-133, dealing with appeals from a 

general district court to a circuit court for a trial de novo and 

the withdrawal of appeals. 

 Code § 16.1-133.1 provides: 

 Within sixty days from the date of conviction 

of any person in a general district court 

. . . for an offense not felonious, the case 

may be reopened upon the application of such 

person and for good cause shown. Such 

application shall be heard by the judge who 

presided at the trial in which the conviction 

was had . . . . If the case is reopened 

after the case documents have been filed with 

the circuit court, the clerk of the circuit 

court shall return the case documents to the 

district court in which the case was 

originally tried. 

 Code § 16.1-132, on the other hand, provides for the appeal 

of a conviction from the general district court. It states that 

"[a]ny person convicted in a district court of an offense not 
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felonious shall have the right, at any time within ten days from 

such conviction . . . to appeal to the circuit court." 

 An appellant may withdraw an appeal to the circuit court "at 

any time before it is heard" by the circuit court. Code 

§ 16.1-133. If the appeal is withdrawn more than ten days after 

conviction, the circuit court shall forthwith "enter an order 

affirming the judgment of the lower court . . . ." Id. Thus, if 

the appeal is withdrawn before ten days have elapsed after 

judgment, the district court judgment remains in force and 

effect; if the appeal is withdrawn after ten days, the judgment 

is affirmed and becomes a judgment of the circuit court. 

 III. ANALYSIS

 The question in this appeal is whether, upon the appellant's 

withdrawal of his appeal in the circuit court, the circuit court 

was required to affirm the district court's original judgments or 

whether the provisions of Code § 16.1-133.1 pertained and 

authorized the district court to reopen and reconsider its 

judgments even after the appeal to the circuit court. 

 Neither Code section expressly addresses this issue. See

Commonwealth Dep't of Mines, Minerals & Energy v. May Bros. Inc., 

11 Va. App. 115, 118, 396 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1990). On their face, 

the two Code sections grant unqualified jurisdiction to each of 

the courts during the sixty days following conviction. In order 

to reconcile the statutes, we apply the applicable rules of 

statutory construction. 
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 "'[T]he primary objective of statutory construction is to 

ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.'" Crews v. 

Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 531, 535-36, 352 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1987) 

(quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 

337, 338 (1983)). In interpreting statutes, "courts should give 

the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in 

the entire statutory enactment." Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. 

Clay, 9 Va. App. 152, 157, 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989). To do so, 

"[t]wo statutes which are closely interrelated must be read and 

construed together and effect given to all of their provisions." 

ACB Trucking, Inc. v. Griffin, 5 Va. App. 542, 547-48, 365 S.E.2d 

1, 3 (1988) (citations omitted). Potentially conflicting 

statutes should be harmonized to give force and effect to each. 

See Board of Supervisors v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756, 761, 214 

S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975). 

 Applying the rules of statutory construction to the two 

statutes, we believe the General Assembly intended to make fully 

available to a person convicted of a misdemeanor or traffic 

offense both the right to seek review by a de novo appeal and the 

right, within sixty days, to petition to reopen the case in the 

district court. Neither statute contains language indicating 

that the exercise of one right limits or precludes the exercise 

of the other. Thus, the two statutes must be construed in a 

manner that affords a convicted person the full opportunity to 

employ both post-trial procedures to the extent that the exercise 
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of one does not conflict with the exercise of the other.1

 The Commonwealth urges that we construe Code §§ 16.1-133 and 

 16.1-133.1 to provide that when a defendant is convicted in the 

district court and appeals to the circuit court, the defendant 

cannot after ten days avail himself or herself of the statutory 

right to petition the district court to reopen and reconsider, 

particularly if the defendant has made an appearance in the 

circuit court. In other words, the Commonwealth contends that 

Code § 16.1-133.1, which allows a defendant sixty days to 

petition the district court to reopen, should not apply where an 

appeal has been perfected to the circuit court and the circuit 

court has assumed jurisdiction of the case. Under the 

Commonwealth's approach, if an appeal is taken to the circuit 

court, unless the petition to reopen is filed and granted within 

ten days from the district court judgment, the circuit court must 

affirm the district court's judgment if the appeal is withdrawn. 

 The Commonwealth further argues that under this approach, when a 

convicted defendant appeals and appears in circuit court to move 

for a continuance or waive a jury trial, the circuit court has 

exercised its jurisdiction and the district court may not reopen 

or rehear the case. 

 1Virginia courts have long favored rehearings because they 

reduce the time and expense of appeals. See Summers v. Darne, 72 

Va. 791 (1879); Michie's Rehearings § 4 (1987). Thus, Code 

§ 16.1-133.1, which grants authority for the district court to 

reopen and rehear a case, is supported by strong public policy 

considerations. 
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 If the legislature had intended to limit the right of the 

district court to reopen and rehear a case under Code 

§ 16.1-133.1 in the manner suggested by the Commonwealth, it 

would have expressed this intent in the language of the statute. 

 The legislature has provided, without limitation, a sixty day 

window for the district courts to reopen and rehear cases, 

provided that good cause is shown for doing so. We cannot impose 

such a limitation by judicial edict. See Crews, 3 Va. App. at 

535, 352 S.E.2d at 3 ("[T]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning 

of the statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, 

or strained construction.") (citations omitted). 

 Reading the statutes in conjunction with one another, we 

hold that when an appeal has been perfected to the circuit court, 

and until a de novo hearing on the merits has commenced, the 

district court may "for good cause shown" reopen and reconsider 

its judgment within sixty days from the final judgment. 

 The circuit court affirmed the original judgments of the 

district court when appellant "withdrew" the appeal. The 

appellant was not required to "withdraw" the appeal under Code 

§ 16.1-133 before the district court could reopen and reconsider 

its judgments. Code § 16.1-133, providing for the withdrawal of 

an appeal and affirmance of the district court's judgment, has no 

application once a proceeding to reopen has been granted. Code 

§ 16.1-133.1, which controls the reopening and reconsideration of 

the district court's judgment, expressly provides that "[i]f the 
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case is reopened after the case documents have been filed with 

the circuit court, the clerk of the circuit court shall return 

the case documents to the district court in which the case was 

originally tried." Thus, when the district court granted the 

petition to reopen, the clerk of the circuit court was required 

to return the documents to the district court. Therefore, the 

"withdrawal" of the appeal in the circuit court and its 

affirmance of the district court's judgments was ineffectual and 

a nullity. 

 Finally, the Supreme Court's holding in Greene v. Greene, 

223 Va. 210, 288 S.E.2d 447 (1982), relied upon by the 

Commonwealth, is inapplicable to this case. In Greene, the 

Supreme Court held that a trial court could not modify a child 

custody order while an appeal from such order was pending in the 

Supreme Court. Id. at 212, 288 S.E.2d at 448. No statute 

similar to Code § 16.1-133.1 exists for cases appealed from the 

circuit court to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court 

retained jurisdiction, for good cause, to rehear and modify its 

judgments in the appellant's case when it granted the petition to 

rehear. Accordingly, the circuit court was required to return 

the case documents to the district court, and its affirmance of 

the original district court order is reversed. We remand the 

case to the circuit court to vacate its order affirming the 

original district court judgments and for entry of an order 
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remanding the case to the district court for entry of its order 

pursuant to the rehearing. 

Reversed and remanded.