#28501-a-SRJ 

2018 S.D. 79 

IN THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee, 

 

v. 

ANTONIO D. LEDBETTER, Defendant and Appellant. 

 

* * * * 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 

THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 

LINCOLN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS E. HOFFMAN 

Judge 

* * * * 

DAVID A. STUART 

Peterson, Stuart, Rumpca 

 & Rasmussen, Prof. LLC Attorneys for defendant 

Beresford, South Dakota and appellant. 

MARTY J. JACKLEY 

Attorney General 

PATRICIA ARCHER 

Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for plaintiff 

Pierre, South Dakota and appellee. 

* * * * 

 

 ARGUED ON 

 OCTOBER 3, 2018 

 OPINION FILED 11/28/18
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JENSEN, Justice 

[¶1.] Antonio Ledbetter appeals from three consecutive fifteen-year 

sentences handed down by the circuit court after Ledbetter pleaded guilty to three 

counts of aggravated assault. Ledbetter claims that the circuit court erred by 

failing to follow the terms of a plea agreement that limited the maximum prison 

term on each count of aggravated assault to ten years. Because the plea agreement 

was not binding on the circuit court, we affirm the sentences. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[¶2.] In the fall of 2016, Sara Inboden broke off a romantic relationship with 

Ledbetter. However, Inboden maintained contact with Ledbetter because she had 

become pregnant with his child. 

[¶3.] On October 11, 2016, Ledbetter insisted on visiting Inboden. Inboden 

hesitantly agreed. After arriving at Inboden’s apartment, Ledbetter demanded to 

be involved in her evening plans. When Inboden refused, he punched her in the 

face. Ledbetter continued to strike Inboden and slammed her head onto the floor, 

knocking her unconscious. While unconscious, Ledbetter cut off Inboden’s nipple on 

her right breast with a pair of scissors. After Inboden regained consciousness, 

Ledbetter attacked her again, cutting off the nipple on her left breast and choking 

her until she passed out a second time. Inboden regained consciousness and 

escaped the apartment. Inboden suffered multiple injuries from the attack and 

required reconstructive surgery to repair the disfiguring injuries to her breasts. 

[¶4.] Ledbetter was indicted on one count of aggravated kidnapping and 

eight counts of aggravated assault. The court appointed counsel to represent 
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Ledbetter and he pleaded not guilty to all charges. A jury trial was scheduled for 

January 31, 2017. After issues developed in the attorney-client relationship 

between Ledbetter and his court-appointed counsel, the circuit court appointed cocounsel to assist in Ledbetter’s defense. The start of trial was delayed to August 29, 

2017 on Ledbetter’s motion. 

[¶5.] On August 14, 2017, Ledbetter’s counsel emailed the circuit court 

requesting an informal meeting to discuss a plea agreement negotiated between the 

parties. Defense counsel’s stated purpose for the meeting was to determine if the 

plea agreement would be acceptable to the court. The meeting with the court took 

place the next day in chambers with the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel. 

The meeting occurred off the record, but Ledbetter claims that the terms of the plea 

agreement were explained and the court orally stated the plea agreement was 

acceptable. Following the meeting, Ledbetter’s attorney drafted a written Petition 

to Plead Guilty and Statement of Factual Basis (Petition), which included the terms 

of the plea agreement. Ledbetter signed the Petition on August 16, 2017. 

[¶6.] Two days later Ledbetter appeared at a change of plea hearing. The 

Petition was presented to the circuit court and described the plea agreement as 

follows: 

[Ledbetter] has accepted the terms of the plea agreement 

negotiated between his attorneys and the State. The terms of 

such plea agreement call for a plea of guilty to Counts [three], 

[six], and [eight] of the Indictment filed on October 17, 2016. In 

return for such pleas of guilty, the State has agreed to cap its 

argument for actual penitentiary time to [thirty] years. 

However, the State may request additional suspended prison 

time in addition to the [thirty] years actual. Lastly, Defense is 

not able to argue for any actual time less than [eighteen] years 
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actual penitentiary. The State has a cap of [thirty] years and 

the Defense has a floor of [eighteen] years actual time. 

[¶7.] Nothing in the Petition stated that the circuit court had accepted or 

was bound by the terms of the plea agreement. Rather, Ledbetter acknowledged in 

paragraph 2(d) of the Petition that he understood, 

[i]f there are any agreements between the State and [Ledbetter], 

the [c]ourt is not bound to accept any such agreements as to 

sentencing. In other words, if there are such agreements, 

including recommendations as to sentencing, the [c]ourt can 

either accept or reject such agreements. 

[¶8.] The Petition also advised Ledbetter that the maximum sentence on 

each count of aggravated assault was fifteen years, that “the [c]ourt may run these 

counts concurrently or consecutively,” and if the sentences were run consecutively, 

“the total imprisonment could total [forty-five] years.” Ledbetter acknowledged his 

understanding in paragraph 2(f) of the Petition that: “[Ledbetter’s] lawyers and 

[Ledbetter] also have discussed the maximum and minimum sentences that apply 

to his case. He acknowledges that his lawyers’ predictions are not binding on the 

[c]ourt and that the [c]ourt can give him any sentence up to the maximum sentence 

provided in the statute.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, the Petition stipulated that 

“the Judge has not made any suggestion to [Ledbetter] as to what the actual 

sentence will be.” 

[¶9.] At the plea hearing, Ledbetter and his defense counsel affirmed that 

counsel had reviewed the Petition with Ledbetter and that Ledbetter signed the 

Petition. Defense counsel also orally confirmed the terms of the plea agreement at 

the start of the plea hearing: 
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The plea agreement is a plea to three counts from the 

Indictment. It will be a plea to Count Three, Count Six and 

Count Eight. Each of those counts is a count of aggravated 

assault domestic. We provided the [c]ourt with a written 

petition to plead guilty as well as the statement of factual basis 

as laid out for those three counts. It also includes the plea 

agreement which is in return for those pleas, the State has 

agreed at the time of sentencing, that it will not ask for any 

actual jail time beyond [thirty] years, so it would be a cap of 

[thirty] years. The State is free to ask for additional suspended 

time, so as an example, could ask across those three counts for 

[forty-five] years with [fifteen] suspended. That would be within 

the terms of their agreement. 

Likewise, on the defense side, we have an agreement where 

there is a floor on the plea agreement. We are not able to argue 

for anything less than [eighteen] years. 

[¶10.] The circuit court explained to Ledbetter that if he pleaded guilty the 

“maximum penalty for each of those counts by statute is [fifteen] years in 

prison . . . .” The circuit court also explained that the court could impose the 

sentences consecutively. Before accepting the pleas of guilty, the court asked 

Ledbetter whether he had been “promised anything other than the plea agreement 

which is set forth in the written petition that has influenced your decision to plead 

guilty?” Ledbetter responded, “No, sir.” The court then accepted Ledbetter’s guilty 

pleas to the three counts of aggravated assault and delayed sentencing to allow a 

presentence report to be completed. 

[¶11.] At the November 28, 2017, sentencing hearing, Ledbetter and the 

State presented arguments requesting sentences consistent with the plea 

agreement. Following the parties’ arguments, the court addressed the plea 

agreement stating, “the State would not ask the [c]ourt to impose more than [thirty] 

years actual in connection with the case” and “the defense would not ask the [c]ourt 
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to impose the sentence of less than [eighteen] years actual . . . but the plea 

agreement is not binding upon the [c]ourt in terms of whether or not the [c]ourt 

should sentence the defendant to more or less than the plea agreement.” The court 

further explained that the plea agreement was binding upon the parties to restrict 

their arguments at sentencing. The court imposed the maximum sentence on each 

count of aggravated assault and ordered the terms to run consecutive, for a total 

sentence of forty-five years. 

[¶12.] Ledbetter orally objected to the sentence, arguing his plea was 

conditioned on the bargained-for sentencing cap of thirty years. Further, Ledbetter 

pointed out that the court had never indicated dissatisfaction with the terms of the 

agreement, and that Ledbetter should have been given an opportunity to withdraw 

his plea if the “sentence was going outside of the contemplated plea agreement.” 

Based on those objections, Ledbetter asked the court to reconsider its sentence 

before the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. 

[¶13.] The circuit court denied Ledbetter’s oral request to modify its sentence, 

stating that the sentence complied with the plea agreement as set forth in the 

Petition. The court referred specifically to paragraph 2(f) of the Petition concluding 

that the plea agreement limited the parties’ arguments but was not binding on the 

court. 

[¶14.] The circuit court entered a written judgment and sentence on 

December 8, 2017. On January 3, 2018, Ledbetter filed a motion to reconsider 

sentence for the same reasons explained in the oral objection at sentencing. 

Defense counsel forwarded the motion to the circuit court by email. The motion 
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stated that the plea agreement was presented to the court at the informal meeting 

in chambers to see if the plea was acceptable to the court. Defense counsel stated 

his belief that the court had “given the thumbs up” to the agreement at the meeting. 

However, defense counsel’s email also acknowledged that “this was not an agreed 

upon plea offer technically binding on the court.” On January 5, 2018, the court 

denied the motion to reconsider. 

[¶15.] Ledbetter raises two issues on appeal: 

1. Whether the circuit court was bound to the plea 

agreement. 

2. Whether the circuit court erred by failing to enter a 

sentence consistent with the plea agreement. 

Analysis and Decision 

[¶16.] Whether a circuit court is bound by the terms of a plea agreement is a 

question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Hale, 2018 S.D. 9, ¶ 11, 907 N.W.2d 56, 

59. 

[¶17.] Ledbetter argues that the parties reached an agreed disposition for 

sentencing pursuant to SDCL 23A-7-8(3) that was binding on the circuit court. 

Ledbetter contends that after accepting his guilty plea, the circuit court was 

obligated to sentence him consistent with the plea agreement or permit him to 

withdraw his guilty plea under SDCL 23A-7-11. Ledbetter also asserts that the 

circuit court implicitly agreed to be bound by the caps in the plea agreement at the 

informal meeting with counsel. The State argues that the plea agreement bound 

the parties under SDCL 23A-7-8(2) to make certain recommendations at sentencing 

but such recommendations “shall not be binding upon the court.” See SDCL 23A-7-
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8(2). The State further contends that there is nothing in the record showing that 

the circuit court implicitly bound itself to the terms of the plea agreement. 

[¶18.] SDCL 23A-7-8 permits the parties to negotiate and resolve pending 

criminal charges through the use of plea agreements. In exchange for a defendant’s 

agreement to plead guilty to one or more criminal offenses, the prosecuting attorney 

may agree to do any one or more of the following: 

(1) Move for dismissal of other charges or not file additional 

charges arising out of a different occurrence; 

(2) Make a recommendation, or agree to oppose the 

defendant’s request, for a particular sentence, with the 

understanding that such recommendation or request shall not 

be binding upon the court; 

(3) Agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate 

disposition of the case; or 

(4) Perform other specified acts to be made a part of the 

agreement. 

SDCL 23A-7-8. 

[¶19.] SDCL 23A-7-8 prohibits the circuit court from participating in plea 

negotiations and “generally circuit courts are not bound by plea agreements.” State 

v. Reaves, 2008 S.D. 105, ¶ 4, 757 N.W.2d 580, 582. However, “if a trial court 

accepts a binding plea agreement, it is bound to honor its promise to sentence the 

defendant within the bounds of the agreement.” State v. Shumaker, 2010 S.D. 95, 

¶ 6, 792 N.W.2d 174, 175 (Emphasis added.) Once accepted by the court, plea 

agreements under subsection (3) are binding on the court and limit the court’s 

sentencing discretion to the terms (i.e., caps) of the plea agreement. Hale, 

2018 S.D. 9, ¶ 12, 907 N.W.2d at 60. However, the court may delay accepting or 

rejecting a plea agreement under subsection (3) until after the guilty plea is 

entered. See SDCL 23A-7-9. If the court elects to defer the decision to accept or 
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reject such a plea agreement, SDCL 23A-7-11 requires the defendant to be given an 

opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea before sentencing if the court rejects the 

terms of the agreed disposition. See Schumaker, 2010 S.D. 95, ¶ 6 n.1, 792 N.W.2d 

at 175 n.1 (explaining that SDCL 23A-7-11 only applies to subsection (3) plea 

agreements). Additionally, we have held that a circuit court may implicitly agree to 

the sentencing restrictions set forth in a plea agreement by indicating it is bound by 

the agreed sentencing caps before a guilty plea is entered. Schumaker, 2010 S.D. 

95, ¶¶ 7-8, 792 N.W.2d at 176. The court is then obligated to impose sentence 

consistent with the terms of the agreement. Id.

[¶20.] In contrast, plea agreements under subsection (2) do not bind the 

circuit court to impose a sentence consistent with the terms of a recommended 

sentence. Hale, 2018 S.D. 9, ¶ 12, 907 N.W.2d at 60. When a plea agreement is 

made under subsection (2), the circuit court’s decision to sentence a defendant 

outside the terms of the recommended sentence is not a rejection of the plea 

agreement that permits a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea under SDCL 23A-7-

11. State v. Lee, 1997 S.D. 26, ¶ 8, 560 N.W.2d 552, 554; State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 

390, 393 (S.D. 1981). A circuit court can accept a plea agreement made under 

subsection (2) and not accept the sentencing recommendation if the record shows 

the defendant has been informed and understands that the court is not bound by 

the sentencing recommendation at the time the guilty plea is entered. Lee, 

1997 S.D. 26, ¶ 8, 560 N.W.2d at 554.

[¶21.] Here, the record demonstrates that the parties intended the plea 

agreement to be a recommendation for sentencing under subsection (2). The 
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language of the plea agreement only binds the parties to the recommended 

sentencing parameters. Further, the Petition presented to the circuit court 

expressly provided that the court was not bound by the parties’ agreement and the 

court could impose any sentence up the statutory maximum on each count of 

aggravated assault. Defense counsel also acknowledged in his email to the court 

following sentencing that “this was not an agreed upon plea offer technically 

binding on the court.” 

[¶22.] Ledbetter was also fully informed that the plea agreement was a nonbinding recommendation to the circuit court before entering his guilty pleas. 

Ledbetter acknowledged that the circuit court was not bound to accept the parties’ 

recommendation for sentencing. Ledbetter further acknowledged his 

understanding that by pleading guilty “the [c]ourt can give [Ledbetter] any sentence 

up to the maximum sentence provided in the statute,” explained to be up to fortyfive years in the penitentiary on all three counts. The circuit court also orally 

advised Ledbetter before he entered his guilty pleas that he could be sentenced up 

to the statutory maximum of fifteen years on each count of aggravated assault and 

that the sentences could be imposed consecutively. Because the plea agreement 

was a recommendation for sentencing under subsection (2), the court was not 

required to sentence Ledbetter within the caps or to allow Ledbetter to withdraw 

his plea under SDCL 23A-7-11 before sentencing Ledbetter to a prison term 

exceeding the recommendation. 

[¶23.] The record also fails to show that the circuit court implicitly agreed to 

be bound by the recommended caps at the informal meeting before the plea hearing. 
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To determine if the court implicitly agreed to be bound by a plea agreement, we look 

to the words used by the court during the proceeding. See Hale, 2018 S.D. 9, ¶ 16, 

907 N.W.2d at 61 (looking to the context of the change of plea hearing since the 

court did not explicitly say if it was bound to the plea agreement); Schumaker, 

2010 S.D. 95, ¶¶ 7-8, 792 N.W.2d at 176 (examining the court’s statements to 

determine if the plea agreement was accepted). We will also consider the context of 

the proceeding to see if the court accepted the plea. See Hale, 2018 S.D. 9, ¶ 18, 

907 N.W.2d at 61 (determining the trial court accepted the plea by saying on the 

record that it was accepting the plea and explaining the plea limited the court’s 

sentencing discretion). 

[¶24.] At the plea hearing, the court did not expressly or implicitly indicate 

that its sentencing discretion was hindered by the plea agreement. When the plea 

agreement was referenced by the court, it was only to make sure the parties 

reviewed and understood the contents of the agreement. Additionally, there was no 

effort to memorialize the informal discussions between the court and counsel about 

the plea agreement. “This Court has repeatedly instructed that the party claiming 

error carries the responsibility of ensuring an adequate record for review.” State v. 

Andrews, 2007 S.D. 29, ¶ 9, 730 N.W.2d 416, 420. In the absence of an adequate 

record, “this Court presumes that the trial court acted properly” and “any claim of 

alleged error fails.” Id.

[¶25.] Therefore, we hold the circuit court was not bound by the terms of the 

plea agreement between Ledbetter and the State. Because the agreement was not 
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binding on the circuit court, it is unnecessary to discuss whether the court’s 

sentences were consistent with the terms of the plea agreement. 

[¶26.] The sentences passed by the circuit court are affirmed. 

[¶27.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KERN and SALTER, Justices, 

concur.