[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 17-14319

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-21915-DPG

ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, 

HENNY CRISTOBOL, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

PATRICIA RAMIREZ,

 Plaintiff,

versus

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_______________________

(August 10, 2018)

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Before MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and HOWARD,∗ District Judge.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge: 

Again today we face the question whether the speech of two public 

employees of the Miami-Dade County School District is protected by the First 

Amendment. Whether they spoke as private citizens or public employees and about 

matters of public concern makes all the difference. Sometimes, answering these 

questions is difficult, particularly as we remember that “citizens do not surrender 

their First Amendment rights by accepting public employment.” Lane v. Franks, 

134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (2014). This is not one of those cases.

Dr. Alberto Fernandez and Henny Cristobol (occasionally referred to as “the 

Administrators”) served as the principal and the assistant principal of Neva King 

Cooper Educational Center, a public school that specialized in educating students 

with severe physical and intellectual disabilities. Determined to improve the 

school’s instructional quality, Fernandez and Cristobol resolved to convert Neva 

King into a charter school. They directed staff members to research charter 

conversion. They held a faculty meeting, where they attempted to mobilize the 

faculty’s support for their initiative. Moreover, with Cristobol’s assistance, 

Fernandez urged Neva King’s Educational Excellence School Advisory Council 

(“the School Advisory Council”) to pursue charter conversion. After the School 

 ∗ Honorable Marcia Morales Howard, United States District Judge for the Middle 

District of Florida, sitting by designation.

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Advisory Council agreed to hold a vote on whether to convert Neva King, 

Fernandez and Cristobol began arranging the ballot process. 

Upon discovering their efforts, the Miami-Dade County School Board

launched an investigation and disciplined both of them. Fernandez and Cristobol 

sued in federal court, alleging that the School Board’s response to their conversion 

efforts abridged their freedom of speech and association in violation of the First 

Amendment. The district court concluded that their speech was not constitutionally 

protected because it was uttered pursuant to and as part of their “official duties” as 

public employees, and, therefore, granted summary judgment to the School Board. 

We hold that D’Angelo v. School Board of Polk County, 497 F.3d 1203 

(11th Cir. 2007), compels the affirmance of the district court’s judgment, and that 

the Supreme Court’s most recent opinion in Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 

(2014), does not undermine, let alone abrogate D’Angelo’s precedential effect. At

the end of the day, the Administrators spoke not as private citizens but as the 

principal and assistant principal of a public school, pursuant to their official duties, 

when they undertook to convert their public school into a charter school. Under 

controlling precedent, their speech was not protected by the First Amendment.

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I. 

A.

In the summer of 2011, the principal and assistant principal of Neva King

became interested in converting their school into a charter school under Florida 

law. The principal, Dr. Fernandez, explained that a conversion to a charter school 

would yield “better programs and services to our students,” it would increase 

funding from the state and federal government, and “perhaps get the private sector 

involved” in the affairs of the school. Accordingly, Fernandez directed staff 

members, including Cristobol, to learn more about charter conversion. The 

Administrators devoted substantial time and effort to their pursuit, conducting 

research, drafting budget proposals, and currying support among community 

members. 

On February 2, 2012, Fernandez addressed a meeting of Neva King’s 

Educational Excellence School Advisory Council -- a body consisting of interested 

community members, including parents, teachers, students, administrators, support 

staff, and business leaders, and devoted to improving the school’s educational 

performance. See Fla. Stat. § 1001.452. Fernandez recommended that the School 

Advisory Council vote to apply for charter conversion. The Advisory Council

agreed, and submitted an official request to the principal to conduct a conversion 

vote. Also on February 2, 2012, Fernandez held a meeting with the faculty and

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delivered a PowerPoint presentation in support of charter conversion. He invited 

attorney Robin Gibson to address the faculty and answer their questions. 

Fernandez and Cristobol then scheduled a date to take a vote of the school’s 

parents and teachers. After convening the School Advisory Council and the

faculty, Fernandez notified his superiors on the School Board of his intention to 

conduct a charter conversion vote. In response, the School Board dispatched 

personnel to Neva King to monitor all meetings where conversion was discussed

and to prevent the principal from directly addressing the parents. 

The conversion attempt quickly unraveled. On April 4, 2012, the School 

Advisory Council sent another letter to Fernandez, this time notifying him that 

“[e]ffective immediately, we are rescinding our request to apply for possible 

conversion to charter status.” And on April 20, 2012, the School Board informed 

Fernandez and Cristobol that they were under investigation by the School District’s 

Civilian Investigative Unit based on allegations that they had exploited their 

official positions to influence the vote, and that they had inappropriately devoted 

school time and resources to these efforts. The School Board placed them on 

alternative assignments during the pendency of the investigations, and warned 

them that they were forbidden to “contact, visit, or engage in any type of 

communication with staff, parents, or community members from” the school or to 

“contact or engage in any type of communications with the subject of, or 

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witness[es]” to the investigations. Fernandez and Cristobol’s reassignments 

consisted of tedious tasks for which they were overqualified. 

Not surprisingly, the investigations revealed that the Administrators had met 

regularly with faculty and staff during school hours to discuss charter conversion. 

The investigative reports, released on June 22 and July 13, 2012, found probable 

cause to believe that Fernandez and Cristobol violated School Board policies 

relating to ethical standards, staff interactions, internet use and safety, and staff 

email use. The reports also included several statements from School District 

officials representing that, in attempting to convert Neva King to a charter school, 

the Administrators exceeded their official duties. The School Board reviewed the 

probable cause findings and informed Fernandez and Cristobol that they were 

subject to discipline.

B.

During the course of the investigations, Fernandez and Cristobol initiated an 

administrative proceeding against the School Board with the Florida Department of 

Administrative Hearings under Florida Statutes Section 1002.33(4)(a)(1). They 

claimed that the reassignments and “gag orders” -- the prohibitions on interacting 

with potential witnesses during the investigations -- amounted to unlawful reprisal.

See Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(4)(a) (prohibiting “unlawful reprisal,” defined as “an 

action taken by a district school board or a school system employee against an 

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employee who is directly or indirectly involved in a lawful application to establish 

a charter school, which occurs as a direct result of that involvement, and which 

results in [adverse employment action]”). A final hearing was held in early 2014, 

after which a state administrative law judge concluded that the School Board 

committed an unlawful reprisal against Fernandez and Cristobol. The judge also 

specifically found that, in advocating charter conversion, the Administrators acted 

pursuant to their official duties. He observed that the Florida Statutes obligate the 

principal to arrange the vote on charter conversion, and that, when Fernandez and 

Cristobol did so, they necessarily acted in their official capacities. 

The Florida Department of Education adopted the administrative law judge’s 

recommendation in a final order dated November 6, 2014. The Department 

awarded Fernandez out-of-pocket expenses and lost employment bonuses totaling 

$10,590. However, the Administrators were not reinstated to their former 

positions. Thereafter, Fernandez accepted a new position within the School District 

as Exceptional Education principal assigned to the Special Education Outreach 

program at Ruth Owens Kruze Educational Center. Cristobol voluntarily left the 

School District to become the principal of Villa Lyan Academy, a charter school. 

In May 2015, Fernandez and Cristobol sued the School Board in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. They brought a single 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the School Board infringed their rights 

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to freedom of speech and association by subjecting them to adverse employment 

action. They sought compensatory damages, including lost wages, and 

reinstatement to their former positions, among other relief. Following discovery, 

the School Board moved for summary judgment. 

The School Board’s central argument was that the Administrators’ pursuit of 

charter conversion and their concomitant speech fell squarely within their official 

duties. As a consequence, they spoke not as private citizens, but rather as public 

employees, insulating their speech from the protection of the First Amendment. 

The district court agreed. In attempting to convert the public school, the 

Administrators spoke at their workplace, during working hours, and with the aid of 

school resources. Their speech was covered by their formal job descriptions. And 

insofar as some School District officials made various statements that Fernandez 

and Cristobol’s conversion efforts were not part of their official responsibilities, 

the court found that evidence to be immaterial, since the status of their speech was 

a legal question for the court, not for School District officials, to decide. Because 

Fernandez and Cristobol plainly spoke in the course of their official duties, their 

speech did not enjoy First Amendment protection, and the School Board was 

entitled to summary judgment.

The Administrators filed this timely appeal in our Court.

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II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying 

the same legal standards that governed the district court. Feliciano v. City of Miami 

Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate 

when the record evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The only issue 

we address today is whether the district court properly concluded that the 

Administrators’ speech was not protected by the First Amendment. We hold that it 

did.

A.

To determine whether a public employee may invoke the safeguards of the 

First Amendment, we begin by asking whether the employee spoke as a public 

employee pursuant to his official duties or as a private citizen on matters of public 

concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). If the employee spoke 

pursuant to his official duties, then he is denied protection under the First 

Amendment, thereby ending the inquiry. Id. If, however, he spoke as a private 

citizen on matters of public concern, the question becomes “whether the relevant 

government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee 

differently from any other member of the general public.” Id. at 418. In that event, 

the Supreme Court has instructed us in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 

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563 (1968), and its progeny that we must balance the employee’s interest in 

speaking freely and openly about matters of public concern against the State’s 

interest “as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 

performs through its employees.” Id. at 568. The question, then, boils down to 

whether the principal and assistant principal spoke pursuant to their official duties 

when they spearheaded a charter conversion effort for their school.

We addressed a nearly identical question in D’Angelo v. School Board of 

Polk County, 497 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2007). There, Michael D’Angelo, the 

principal of Kathleen High School, explored converting his school into a charter 

school under Florida law. Id. at 1206. As principal, his job description included the 

obligation to “provide leadership for and implement school improvement 

initiatives.” Id. at 1207. During his charter conversion effort, D’Angelo attended a 

seminar on charter schools, held staff meetings, and directed faculty members to 

study charter schools. Id. at 1206. He also wrote to his assistant principal that, 

“with the charter opportunities granted by the State of Florida, he would be remiss 

in his duties as the leader of Kathleen High School if he did not explore any and all 

possibilities to improve the quality of education at the school.” Id. His initiative 

ultimately foundered and the school district terminated him. Id. at 1207. He 

responded by filing a First Amendment retaliation claim in federal court. Id. 

During trial, the district judge ruled for the School Board after the close of 

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D’Angelo’s case in chief, entering judgment as a matter of law. Id. The court held 

that, under Garcetti, D’Angelo’s speech was not protected by the First 

Amendment. Id.

On appeal, we applied Garcetti and assessed whether D’Angelo sought 

charter conversion pursuant to his official duties as the principal of Kathleen High. 

Id. at 1210. Our decision hinged on two essential considerations. First, we looked 

to the Florida Statutes’ description of charter conversion and observed that “[a]n 

application for a conversion charter school shall be made by the district school 

board, the principal, teachers, parents, and/or the school advisory council.” Id. 

(quoting Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(3)(b)) (emphasis added). “Because there [was] no 

evidence that D’Angelo was a parent or a teacher, his efforts to convert Kathleen 

High to charter status necessarily were in his capacity as the principal of the 

school.” Id. Second, we relied on D’Angelo’s admissions at trial. Id. Although he 

testified that charter conversion was not one of his assigned duties, he conceded 

that he explored charter conversion pursuant to his “number one duty,” which was 

to “improve the quality of education” at Kathleen High. Id. Since Florida law 

clarified that D’Angelo administered the conversion effort pursuant to his official 

duties, and because D’Angelo effectively admitted as much at trial, we concluded 

that his speech was not protected by the First Amendment and affirmed judgment 

for the school board. Id.

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The factual matrix presented by D’Angelo is on all fours with this case. For 

starters, Dr. Fernandez’s job description provided that he was responsible for 

“providing effective education leadership” by “developing and implementing plans 

that effectively utilize the personnel and material resources necessary to produce a 

quality instructional program.” Similarly, Assistant Principal Cristobol’s 

occupational summary listed among his official duties “[a]ssist[ing] the principal 

in planning and administering the instructional program and in conducting other 

activities necessary to provide quality instruction.” 

Moreover, both Florida law and Fernandez’s statements fully support the 

determination that he and Cristobol advocated charter conversion pursuant to their 

official duties. Florida law establishes the process for effecting the conversion of a 

public school to a charter school. Among other things, it enumerates who may 

apply for charter conversion, expressly including the principal. Fla. Stat. 

§ 1002.33. Again, the statute provides: “An application for a conversion charter 

school shall be made by the district school board, the principal, teachers, parents, 

and/or the school advisory council.” Id. Just as in D’Angelo, Principal Fernandez 

and Assistant Principal Cristobol held numerous staff meetings, spoke to many key 

players including the school faculty, and arranged for a vote on charter conversion. 

And, just as in D’Angelo, the Administrators did not claim to have launched their 

conversion effort as teachers or parents. See D’Angelo, 497 F.3d at 1210. Plainly, 

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their “efforts to convert [Neva King] to charter status necessarily were in [their] 

capacit[ies] as the principal [and assistant principal] of the school.” Id.

Moreover, Florida regulations likewise provide that, in order to initiate the 

ballot process for charter conversion, “[a] district school board, the principal, 

teachers, parents, and/or the school advisory council at an existing school . . . may 

submit a request in writing to the school administrator to conduct a vote for 

conversion. . . . The administrator shall initiate the ballot process within sixty (60) 

days of the written request . . . .” Fla. Admin. Rule 6A-6.0787. In order to conduct 

a vote on a charter conversion, an official request must be sent to the principal 

who, in turn, is responsible for initiating the ballot process. Here, it is undisputed 

that the Educational Excellence School Advisory Council sent Dr. Fernandez an 

official request to conduct a charter conversion vote. Fernandez then scheduled a 

vote. Under Florida law, Fernandez and Cristobol necessarily acted as 

“administrator[s],” and not as private citizens, when they received the School 

Advisory Council’s official request and began arranging the vote.

We add that, during the state administrative hearing, the administrative law 

judge found that Fernandez and Cristobol’s pursuit of charter conversion fell 

squarely within their official duties. Indeed, he concluded that the School Board’s 

actions were “plainly at odds with” Florida regulations, which “obligate[d]” the 

principal to oversee the charter conversion ballot process. He observed that “no 

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reasonable person would expect” those duties to be executed in a private capacity. 

The Florida Department of Education adopted that finding wholesale.

Further, Miami-Dade County Public Schools Policy 9150, entitled “Visitors 

Invited by Other Administrators,” provides that “[s]upervisory or administrative 

staff who have invited professional visitors may elect to receive the visitors whom 

they have invited, as well as other visitors who may have a mutual interest or area 

of competency.” At the February 2, 2012 faculty meeting, Fernandez and 

Cristobol, again in the exercise of their official duties, invited attorney Robin 

Gibson to speak about charter conversion. Thus, on top of Florida’s statutory and 

regulatory regime, Miami-Dade School District policy suggests that the 

Administrators spoke as public officials acting pursuant to their official duties 

when they advocated charter conversion. 

Also, just as in D’Angelo, Fernandez and Cristobol effectively conceded that 

they sought charter conversion pursuant to their official duties. Thus, for example, 

on February 2, 2012, Margaret Getchell, the School Advisory Council’s 

Chairperson, sent a letter to Fernandez accepting his recommendation and 

requesting a conversion vote. The letter read this way: “On behalf of the 

Educational Excellence School Advisory Council, please accept this letter as an 

official request to conduct a vote to submit an application to convert Neva King 

Cooper Educational Center to a charter school . . . ” (emphasis added). When asked 

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about the Advisory Council’s “official request” at the state administrative hearing, 

Fernandez replied, “Yes. This is a letter that I drafted for Ms. Getchell after I 

recommended to the [Advisory Council] to consider conducting a vote to submit 

an application for conversion charter. And the [Advisory Council] voted 

unanimously in favor of it. And the next step was for me, as the principal, to 

receive the request in writing to conduct the vote, and this is such request” 

(emphasis added).

The principal’s efforts did not end there; nor did his description of those 

efforts. On February 10, 2012, Fernandez sent a memorandum to Associate 

Superintendent Milagros R. Fornell responding to Fornell’s warnings that 

Fernandez’s conversion efforts threatened to violate the School Board’s ethical 

standards. Fernandez replied that he had reviewed the standards and, “[a]ccording 

to Florida Statutes, the official duties of a principal can include an application for 

charter status.” As principal, he was “by law allowed to make” every effort to 

convert Neva King to a charter school.

Indeed, in a section of their amended complaint entitled “The Principal’s 

Role in a Charter School Conversion,” the plaintiffs averred that Fernandez 

exercised his statutory authority under Florida law when he pursued charter 

conversion. Specifically, they alleged, after the School Advisory Council agreed to 

hold a vote, Fernandez was “vested exclusively” with the responsibility to initiate 

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the balloting within sixty days of the Advisory Council’s request; ensure that only 

eligible voters participated; appoint an arbitrator to tally the votes; and complete 

the vote at least thirty days before the charter application deadline. In fact, they 

claimed that the School Board “asserted itself to dominate the [charter conversion] 

process and usurp the authority granted by Florida law to the principal.” Thus, in 

their own complaint, the Administrators characterized their receipt of the Advisory 

Council’s request and their initiation of the ballot process as “The Principal’s Role 

in a Charter School Conversion.”

Finally, at Fernandez’s deposition, the following exchange took place:

Q. Now, in your capacity as the principal, around the fall of 2011, you met 

with Mrs. Ramirez and Mr. Cristobol and you asked them to research what 

would be necessary to convert Neva King Cooper into a charter school; true?

[Fernandez]. I was the principal at Neva King Cooper, and at the time that I 

asked them to look into the feasibility or exploring the idea, yes.

Despite some equivocation, Fernandez was asked whether, in his capacity as 

principal, he met with Cristobol and directed him to research charter conversion; 

Fernandez acknowledged that he did. Likewise, when asked about attorney 

Gibson’s visit, Fernandez was asked:

Q. [Gibson] couldn’t come unless you allowed him to come on school 

grounds?

[Fernandez]. Of course.

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Fernandez conceded that, in inviting and receiving Gibson at the February 2012 

faculty meeting, he exercised his official authority pursuant to Miami-Dade County 

Public Schools Policy 9150 and Florida’s statutory regime. 

In short, the application of Florida law and the Administrators’ statements in 

this case yields the same result as in D’Angelo. What’s more, this result is wholly 

consistent with all of our Pickering caselaw, including Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 

567 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2009); Alves v. Board of Regents, 804 F.3d 1149 (11th 

Cir. 2015); and Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2015). 

Our cases have identified, among others, these considerations as relevant in 

determining whether a public employee spoke pursuant to his official duties: (1) 

speaking with the objective of advancing official duties; (2) harnessing workplace 

resources; (3) projecting official authority; (4) heeding official directives; and (5) 

observing formal workplace hierarchies. See Abdur-Rahman, 567 F.3d at 1280, 

1283–84; Alves, 804 F.3d at 1161, 1164–65; Moss, 782 F.3d at 618–20. Dr. 

Fernandez and Assistant Principal Cristobol checked virtually every relevant box. 

B.

Fernandez and Cristobol advance several objections. None are persuasive. 

First, they claim that Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014), narrowed the 

construction of “official duties” set forth in Garcetti, and that the application of 

Lane should yield a different result today. There, a public employee, Edward Lane, 

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was fired after testifying under oath before a grand jury and twice at a criminal trial 

pursuant to subpoena. Id. at 2375. It was undisputed that Lane’s testimony was not

given pursuant to his official duties. Id. at 2378 n.4. The Supreme Court held that 

the First Amendment protected Lane’s speech because “[t]ruthful testimony under 

oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as 

a citizen for First Amendment purposes. That is so even when the testimony relates 

to his public employment or concerns information learned during that 

employment.” Id. at 2378. Lane thus clarified that Garcetti divests speech of First 

Amendment protection when it is uttered pursuant to a public employee’s official 

duties -- not just if it merely concerns or relates to those duties. Id. at 2379. 

Fernandez and Cristobol cite Lane, suggesting somehow that they did not seek 

charter conversion pursuant to their official duties; rather their efforts only 

concerned or related to their duties. 

But Lane was a wholly different case. There, Edward Lane spoke pursuant 

to an independent duty, binding all private citizens, to testify truthfully in judicial 

proceedings. Id. at 2379. The fact that Lane’s testimony concerned information 

acquired in his official capacity did not change the source of his obligation to 

testify. Id. In sharp contrast, under Florida law, only a parent, a teacher, or a 

principal may trigger the charter conversion process. A private citizen cannot. Nor 

can a private citizen oversee the ballot process designed to effect the conversion. 

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Florida law expressly delegates the tasks of overseeing the charter conversion 

ballot process to the principal. When Dr. Fernandez and Assistant Principal 

Cristobol attempted to convert Neva King Cooper Educational Center into a 

charter school, and sought to arrange a vote, they invoked their official 

prerogatives under Florida law. 

Moreover, since Lane was decided, our cases have continued to cite and give 

effect to D’Angelo’s holding. Thus, for example, Alves presented the question 

whether a memorandum composed by university employees documenting their 

superior’s poor leadership constituted public-employee speech beyond the 

protection of the First Amendment. 804 F.3d at 1153. A panel of this Court held 

that, because the employees drafted the memorandum in order to correct conduct 

that interfered with their official duties, they penned it pursuant to those duties. Id. 

at 1164–65. We relied almost exclusively on pre-Lane precedent, including 

D’Angelo. Id. We observed that Lane did not create “a substantial shift in the law” 

but rather, if anything, offered “a slight modification and a useful clarification.” Id. 

at 1163. Similarly, in Moss, we addressed whether an Assistant Fire Chief for the 

Pembroke Pines Fire Department spoke pursuant to his official duties when he 

criticized the Department’s collective bargaining strategy. 782 F.3d at 616–17. We 

held that he did and again compared the case to D’Angelo. Id. at 620 (citing 

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D’Angelo, 497 F.3d at 1210). We labeled our inquiry “Garcetti Analysis” and 

relied almost entirely on pre-Lane caselaw. Id. at 620–21. 

Alves and Moss instruct us that, while Lane explicated some of the 

boundaries of Garcetti and its progeny, it did not disrupt our pre-Lane precedent, 

let alone unclench D’Angelo’s grip on this case. Lane cannot save Fernandez and 

Cristobol from summary judgment. 

The Administrators further urge that they did not speak pursuant to their 

official duties because charter conversion was not among their “ordinary” 

responsibilities. In Garcetti, the Supreme Court framed the relevant question as 

being whether the speech was uttered “pursuant to the employee’s official duties.” 

547 U.S. at 413. In Lane, the Supreme Court modified the phrasing slightly, 

although not the substance of the question, and asked whether the employee spoke 

pursuant to his “ordinary job duties.” 134 S. Ct. at 2378. Fernandez and Cristobol 

lean heavily on the extensive use of the phrase “ordinary job duties” and argue that 

“neither Fernandez nor Cristobol, during their many prior years of employment 

with the District, had ever initiated charter school discussions [before fall 2011].” 

Their argument misses the mark. In order to determine whether speech is uttered as 

a private citizen or as a public employee, we ask not whether the speech itself is 

made ordinarily and regularly. Rather, we inquire whether the speech falls within 

an ordinary duty. It is entirely consistent with Lane to conclude that Fernandez and 

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Cristobol spoke pursuant to their ordinary duties even though they had never 

before attempted a charter conversion. 

To illustrate the point, in Alves, the Court explained that “[w]hile the 

memorandum does not bear the hallmarks of daily activity,” it was drafted “in the 

course of performing -- or, more accurately, in the course of trying to perform --

their ordinary roles as coordinators, psychologists, committee members, and 

supervisors,” and could not “reasonably be divorced from those responsibilities.” 

804 F.3d at 1164–65. We did not read Lane as requiring that the speech itself was 

made frequently. The employees spoke pursuant to their ordinary duties because 

they wrote the memorandum “in the course of performing [their] jobs.” Id. Our 

caselaw compels the conclusion that Fernandez and Cristobol pursued charter 

conversion in their official capacities as well. They too spoke pursuant to their 

ordinary duties even though they had initiated a charter conversion on only one 

occasion.

Fernandez and Cristobol also claim that the duty of exercising “leadership” 

over Neva King cannot be characterized as “ordinary” because the term 

“leadership” is too amorphous and too closely related to advocacy and other 

bedrock First Amendment activity. That argument is foreclosed by D’Angelo as 

well. We held that D’Angelo spoke pursuant to his official duties in part because 

he sought a charter conversion in order to improve the quality of education at 

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Kathleen High, which was part of his official duties; indeed it was an obligation he 

described as his “number one duty.” D’Angelo, 497 F.3d at 1210. D’Angelo 

claimed that those statements were related to his “moral obligations as a human 

being” and not to his professional responsibilities. Id. We rejected the argument, 

holding that “[a]ny reasonable reader of [D’Angelo’s emails and statements] would 

understand that D’Angelo believed he was obliged to carry out his duties as the 

leader of Kathleen High and pursue charter conversion.” Id. 

And in Alves, we defined the scope of the university employees’ ordinary 

duties as fulfilling their “roles as coordinators, psychologists, committee members, 

and supervisors.” 804 F.3d at 1164. We compared the case to D’Angelo, where 

D’Angelo’s “broad administrative responsibilities” rendered his speech 

unprotected. Id. at 1165. The phrase “broad administrative responsibilities” was 

neither nebulous nor unclear. We reaffirmed D’Angelo’s holding that, when a 

public employee’s duties include “broad administrative responsibilities,” and the 

employee speaks pursuant to those duties, then the speech is not protected by the 

First Amendment. Id.; see also Moss, 782 F.3d at 618–19 (holding that Moss’s 

speech was insulated from First Amendment protection because it fell within his 

official duty to “ensure that the fire department provided the best service 

possible”). 

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The long and short of it is that the principal and assistant principal of Neva 

King Cooper Educational Center spearheaded this charter school conversion 

pursuant to their official duties. They may not sue the School Board under the First 

Amendment. We affirm.

AFFIRMED 

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