COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 14, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP2066 Cir. Ct. No. 2021JV1057

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.J., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J.A.J.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: 

AUDREY K. SKWIERAWSKI, Judge. Affirmed. 

¶1 GEENEN, J.1 J.A.J., a juvenile adjudicated delinquent and placed 

in the Serious Juvenile Offender Program (SJOP), raises two issues in his appeal. 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2021-22). 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2022AP2066

2

The first issue, one of first impression for this court, is whether the circuit court 

erred when it entered a dispositional order under WIS. STAT. ch. 938, the Juvenile 

Justice Code, ordering J.A.J. into the SJOP with placement at Lincoln Hills 

School, a Type 1 secure juvenile correctional facility operated by the Department 

of Corrections (DOC),

2

in light of statutory amendments to ch. 938 in 2017 Wis. 

Act 185 (2017 Act) and 2019 Wis. Act 8 (2019 Act). These Acts made changes to 

the dispositional options for the secured confinement of juveniles adjudicated 

delinquent and provided that Lincoln Hills be closed by July 1, 2021. The second 

issue is whether the circuit court erred when it ordered restitution based on the 

victim’s testimony of the value of the items for which restitution was sought rather 

than require receipts or other documentary proof of value.

¶2 This court holds that the amendments to WIS. STAT. ch. 938 

contained in the 2017 and 2019 Acts do not prohibit circuit courts from entering

dispositional orders placing juveniles adjudicated delinquent into the SJOP with 

placement at a Type 1 juvenile correctional facility where the court has determined 

that the criteria in WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4m) apply. This court further concludes 

that, where the circuit court has determined that an SJOP placement is appropriate 

and it determines that secured correctional confinement is necessary, it is not 

prohibited from ordering placement at Lincoln Hills. We also affirm the circuit 

court’s restitution order.

 

2

 The DOC operates two Type 1 secure juvenile correctional facilities: Lincoln Hills 

School for boys, and Copper Lake School for girls. There is only one other Type 1 facility in 

Wisconsin, Mendota Juvenile Treatment Center at the Mendota Mental Health Institute, which is 

a Type 1 secure mental health treatment facility operated by the Department of Health Services, 

and which is not a juvenile correctional facility as defined by WIS. STAT. § 16.99(3b).
No. 2022AP2066

3

BACKGROUND

¶3 On November 17, 2021, the State filed a delinquency petition 

charging J.A.J. with three counts of armed robbery—party to a crime (PTAC), 

three counts of fraudulent use of a financial transaction card—PTAC, one count of 

operating a motor vehicle without owner’s consent—PTAC, and one count of

violation of a nonsecure custody order. 

¶4 The delinquency petition was based on a series of events occurring 

between October 19 and November 8, 2021. At the plea hearing on February 23, 

2022, J.A.J. entered admissions to one count each of armed robbery—PTAC, 

fraudulent use of a financial transaction card—PTAC, and operating a motor 

vehicle without owner’s consent—PTAC. The remaining counts were dismissed 

and read in. On March 31, 2022, the circuit court entered a dispositional order 

placing J.A.J. in the SJOP for five years with placement at Lincoln Hills. 

¶5 On May 20, 2022, the circuit court held a restitution hearing. Victim

J.S. testified at that hearing and his written impact statement was admitted into 

evidence. It listed the items for which restitution were sought (AirPods, LED 

lights, a shammy, a wallet, and J.S.’s driver’s license) and their values, amounting

to $375. On May 26, 2022, the circuit court entered an order that, among other 

things unrelated to this appeal, ordered restitution to J.S. in the amount of $375 

based on J.S.’s testimony. 

¶6 On November 28, 2022, J.A.J. filed a notice of appeal challenging 

both the March 31, 2022 and May, 26, 2022 orders. 

¶7 For the following reasons, this court affirms both orders.
No. 2022AP2066

4

DISCUSSION

¶8 J.A.J. raises two issues on appeal. First, J.A.J. challenges the circuit 

court’s ability to enter a dispositional order that places him at a Type 1 secured 

juvenile correctional facility, generally, and Lincoln Hills, specifically, in light of 

the 2017 and 2019 Acts’ amendments to WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4m) and the 

nonstatutory provisions that directed Lincoln Hills to close by July 1, 2021. This 

issue is one of statutory interpretation, a question of law that this court reviews de 

novo. State v. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81, ¶15, 395 Wis. 2d 215, 952 N.W.2d 836. 

¶9 Second, J.A.J. challenges the evidentiary basis supporting the circuit 

court’s restitution order, arguing that the evidence of the value of the items was 

insufficient, and that the circuit court should have required receipts or other 

documentary proof of value. The circuit court’s factual findings related to the 

value of the items will not be set aside unless they are “clearly erroneous,” that is, 

“when the finding is against the great weight and clear preponderance of 

evidence.” Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen’s Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 46, ¶¶11-12, 290 

Wis. 2d 264, 714 N.W.2d 530.

I. Juvenile Justice Code

¶10 The Juvenile Justice Code, WIS. STAT. ch. 938, creates the 

framework for addressing juvenile delinquency, protecting the rights of citizens, 

imposing accountability for violations of the law, and equipping juvenile offenders 

with tools to live responsibly and productively. See WIS. STAT. § 938.01(2). The 

legislature, in enacting ch. 938, intended to “respond to a juvenile offender’s needs 

for care and treatment, consistent with the prevention of delinquency, each 

juvenile’s best interest and the protection of the public,” by allowing circuit courts 

to utilize the most effective dispositional option. Sec. 938.01(2).
No. 2022AP2066

5

¶11 Therefore, after a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent, a circuit court 

enters a dispositional order that specifies the juvenile’s placement and treatment 

based on the evidence submitted and consistent with the goals of the Juvenile 

Justice Code. WIS. STAT. § 938.355(1). The statute instructs the court to decide 

dispositions based on the seriousness of the offense and any read-in delinquent 

acts. WIS. STAT. § 938.34. Dispositions include, among other things, counseling, 

supervision, probation programs, intensive supervision, electronic monitoring, 

Type 2 residential care centers, the SJOP, or correctional placement. Id. Secure 

placement in a juvenile correctional facility or a county-supervised secured 

residential care center for children and youth (SRCCCY) is presumptively 

appropriate for juveniles adjudicated delinquent for certain acts that would be one 

of the enumerated felonies if committed by an adult and satisfy other statutory 

criteria. WIS. STAT. §§ 938.34(4h)-(4m), 938.355(1), 938.538. 

a. Pre-Amendment Dispositional Placement Under WIS. STAT.

§ 938.34 and Post-Amendment Changes

¶12 WISCONSIN STAT. § 938.34 provides the possible dispositions a 

circuit court may order for juveniles adjudicated delinquent. This case considers 

two separate dispositional options, WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4h), placement in the 

SJOP, and § 938.34(4m), correctional placement.

¶13 Before placing a juvenile adjudicated delinquent in the SJOP, the 

circuit court, among other things, must find “that the only other disposition that is 

appropriate for the juvenile is placement in a juvenile correctional facility under 

[WIS. STAT. § 938.34](4m).” WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4h)(b). Prior to the 2017 and 

2019 Acts, § 938.34 permitted dispositional orders to “[p]lace the juvenile in a 

juvenile correctional facility,” which included Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake, if 

the circuit court made the required findings under § 938.34(4m)(a)-(b) (2015-16). 
No. 2022AP2066

6

As a result, a circuit court entering a disposition under sub. (4h) could also 

unquestionably order placement at Lincoln Hills once the court made the findings 

required by sub. (4m).

¶14 In 2018, the legislature passed 2017 Wisconsin Act 185 which made

changes to the Juvenile Justice Code and the administration of the juvenile justice 

system in Wisconsin. Among other things, it provided for the creation of countysupervised SRCCCYs, directed the closure of Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake, and

required the establishment of a new DOC-supervised Type 1 juvenile correctional 

facility by no later than January 1, 2021. The 2019 Act made some additional, 

mostly minor changes, to facilitate the implementation and goals of the 2017 Act,

and it amended the deadline to close Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake to July 1, 

2021. 

¶15 The Acts made no changes to the SJOP dispositional option at WIS.

STAT. § 938.34(4h). Section 62 of the 2017 Act, however, eliminated reference to

“juvenile correctional facilit[ies]” in § 938.34(4m). As a result, while still titled 

“Correctional Placement,” § 938.34(4m) now reads: “Place the juvenile under the 

supervision of the county department in a [SRCCCY] identified by the county 

department[.]” Although that statute now unambiguously requires initial 

placement at an SRCCCY, section 66 of the Act created a procedure by which a 

juvenile’s placement may be changed at WIS. STAT. § 938.357(3)(b), which

provides: “Notwithstanding [§ ]938.34(4m) and subject to par. (c), the court may 

order placement in a Type 1 juvenile correctional facility operated by the [DOC]

for a juvenile who was adjudicated delinquent under s. 938.34(4m) if the court 

finds, after a hearing under this section, that” the county does not have space for 

the juvenile in its SRCCCY or that other statutorily prescribed conditions apply.
No. 2022AP2066

7

¶16 The 2017 Act also changed the definition of “juvenile correctional 

facility.” Before the 2017 Act, WIS. STAT. § 16.99(3b) (2015-16), defined 

“[j]uvenile correctional facility” to mean “the Copper Lake School and the 

Lincoln Hills School.” The 2017 Act eliminated the specific references to Copper 

Lake and Lincoln Hills; § 16.99(3b) now reads: “‘Juvenile correctional facility’ 

means a Type 1 juvenile correctional facility, as defined in [WIS. STAT. §] 938.02 

(19)[.]” See 2017 Wis. Act 185, § 4. Despite the change, Copper Lake and 

Lincoln Hills remain “Type 1 juvenile correctional facilit[ies]” and “juvenile 

correctional facility[ies]” because they are operated or contracted for by DOC for 

holding in secure custody juveniles adjudged delinquent. Sec. 938.02(10p), (19).

¶17 The 2017 Act contemplated transferring juveniles currently placed at 

Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake to county-supervised SRCCCYs or other Type 1 

juvenile correctional facilities as part of the closure process. In nonstatutory 

provisions of the 2017 Act, the legislature provided: 

“On the earlier of the date on which all juveniles have been 

transferred to [SRCCCY] and Type 1 juvenile correctional 

facilities under subsection (1) or January 1, 2021, the 

[DOC] shall permanently close the Type 1 juvenile 

correctional facilities housed at the Lincoln Hills School 

and Copper Lake School in the town of Birch, Lincoln 

County.” 

2017 Wis. Act 185, § 110(2)(a). Subsection (1), relating to the transfers, provided 

that “[n]o juvenile may be transferred to a Type 1 juvenile correctional facility 

until the [DOC] determines the facility to be ready to accept juveniles, and no 

juvenile may be transferred to a [SRCCCY] until the entity operating the facility 

determines it to be ready to accept juveniles,” with the transfer of all juveniles to 

occur no later than January 1, 2021. 2017 Wis. Act 185, § 110(1)(a). Section 

110(7) required that DOC establish or construct a new Type 1 juvenile 
No. 2022AP2066

8

correctional facility by January 1, 2021, to correspond with the closure and 

transfer deadlines. Sections 61, 62, and 68 of the 2019 Act extended the 

respective deadlines to July 1, 2021. 

¶18 The deadline to close Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake was not further 

extended and has passed. It is generally known within this court’s jurisdiction and 

the parties agree that, as of the date of this opinion, Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake 

remain open and are the only DOC-operated Type 1 juvenile correctional facilities 

in Wisconsin. Since July 1, 2021, the state legislature has appropriated and 

continues to appropriate funds for improvements, operation, and the care of 

juveniles placed at existing Type 1 juvenile correctional facilities, and for the 

planning and construction of new facilities, including SRCCCYs. See, e.g., 2021 

Wis. Act 58, §§ 109, 199, 388-89; 2021 Wis. Act 252; 2023 Wis. Act 19 §§ 51, 

242-243, 454g, 9104(5). No SRCCCY or replacement Type 1 juvenile 

correctional facility has been built.3 

b. J.A.J.’s Challenge

i. Statutory Interpretation

¶19 Before a court can place a juvenile in the SJOP, it must find that the 

juvenile is at least fourteen years old, has been adjudicated delinquent for 

committing certain statutorily prescribed violations, and “that the only other 

disposition that is appropriate for the juvenile is placement in a juvenile 

correctional facility under sub. (4m).” WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4h) (emphasis added). 

 

3

 A judicially noticed fact must be “(a) A fact generally known within the territorial 

jurisdiction of the trial court” or “(b) A fact capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 

to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” WIS. STAT. § 902.01(2).
No. 2022AP2066

9

There is no dispute that J.A.J. was at least fourteen years old when he was 

adjudicated delinquent for at least one of the statutorily enumerated violations or 

that the circuit court concluded that the only appropriate placement was in a 

secured facility. 

¶20 At the dispositional hearing, the circuit court considered the meaning 

of WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4h), specifically, the phrase “placement in a juvenile 

correctional facility under sub. (4m),” in light of the fact that, due to the 

amendments, sub. (4m) no longer permits placement in or even refers to a 

“juvenile correctional facility,” and the only available initial placement under sub. 

(4m) is in a county-operated SRCCCY. J.A.J. argued that placement in the SJOP 

was an impossibility because an SJOP placement requires the court to first find 

that the only other appropriate “placement [is] in a juvenile correctional facility 

under sub. (4m),” when sub. (4m) does not allow placement in a juvenile 

correctional facility. According to J.A.J., this language prevents circuit courts 

from ever making the finding required to enter an SJOP disposition. The circuit 

court disagreed and concluded that the SJOP remained a permissible disposition.

¶21 J.A.J. appears to abandon this argument on appeal, instead arguing 

that, because the 2017 Act eliminated the reference to “juvenile correctional 

facilit[ies]” in WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4m), the only appropriate placement for a 

juvenile placed in the SJOP is in an SRCCCY. He further contends that, even if 

placement in a Type 1 juvenile correctional facility was permitted, J.A.J. could not

be placed at Lincoln Hills, in particular, because it is supposed to be closed. J.A.J.

concludes that there is currently no secured facility at which a court can place 

juveniles adjudicated delinquent for serious crimes because no SRCCCYs and no 

Type 1 juvenile correctional facilities other than Lincoln Hills or Copper Lake 

exist. J.A.J. does not contend on appeal that the circuit court was without 
No. 2022AP2066

10

authority to enter a dispositional order under sub. (4h), placing him in the SJOP. 

Nevertheless, J.A.J. seeks the reversal of the circuit court’s dispositional order 

placing him at Lincoln Hills. 

¶22 The effects of the 2017 and 2019 Acts on WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4h) 

and (4m) are an issue of statutory interpretation. “[T]he purpose of statutory 

interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 

full, proper, and intended effect.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane 

Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. We begin with the 

language of the statute because it is “assume[d] that the legislature’s intent is 

expressed in the statutory language.” Id. Statutory language is given its common, 

ordinary meaning, and if the meaning of the statute is plain, the inquiry ordinarily 

stops. Id. at ¶45.

¶23 Statutory language is not, however, interpreted in isolation. 

“Statutory interpretation centers on the ‘ascertainment of meaning,’ not the 

recitation of words in isolation.” Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 

WI 7, ¶13, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1. The context and structure of the 

statute in which the operative language appears are important to its meaning. 

Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. Thus, “statutory language is interpreted in the 

context in which it is used; not in isolation, but as part of a whole; in relation to 

the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid 

absurd or unreasonable results.” Id. This means that “[s]tatutory language is read 

where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid 

surplusage.” Id. “Properly applied, the plain-meaning approach is not 

‘literalistic;’ rather, the ascertainment of meaning involves a ‘process of analysis’ 

focused on deriving the fair meaning of the text itself. Brey v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶11 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46, 52).
No. 2022AP2066

11

¶24 The circuit court found that the statutory language was ambiguous. 

A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably wellinformed persons in two or more senses; it is ambiguous if the language is

reasonably and objectively confusing. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47. If the 

statute is ambiguous, the court may rely on extrinsic sources to ascertain its 

meaning. Id. at ¶50.

c. WISCONSIN STAT. § 938.34(4m) is not a “correctional placement 

authorized under” the SJOP. 

¶25 J.A.J.’s contention that the only correctional placement authorized 

under the SJOP disposition (i.e., WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4h)) was under 

§ 938.34(4m) (i.e., in an SRCCCY), misreads the statute. Subsection (4h) is a 

separate dispositional option from sub. (4m). Subsection (4h) was not repealed or 

amended. Subsection (4h) does not require a physical placement under sub. (4m) 

or in an SRCCCY or any physical placement at all. It requires only a finding that, 

if the court does not enter a dispositional order for the SJOP, the only other 

appropriate option is mandatory secured confinement pursuant to a dispositional 

order under sub. (4m).4 Subsection (4h)(b)’s use of the word “other” with respect 

to the sub. (4m) finding is further confirmation that the two dispositions are 

distinct from one another. 

¶26 Additionally, WIS. STAT. § 938.538 governs the administration of 

the SJOP and was not amended or repealed by the Acts. Specifically, WIS. STAT. 

§ 938.538(3a) controls the correctional options available when a juvenile is placed 

 

4

 The circuit court correctly reconciled the apparent tension between the two provisions 

by explaining that, to enter a disposition order under sub. (4h), it must find that the only other 

appropriate placement is under sub. (4m), which requires that the court find that both sub. 

(4m)(a)-(b) apply.
No. 2022AP2066

12

in the SJOP, and those options include placement in a Type 1 juvenile correctional 

facility or in a SRCCCY. J.A.J.’s contention that the amendments limited the 

correctional options available under the SJOP to county-operated SRCCCYs 

renders sections of the statutes surplusage and ignores the fact that the legislature 

left the SJOP fully intact. The lack of amendment to the SJOP statutes is 

indicative of the legislature’s intent to keep the SJOP and all of its placement

options available to circuit courts.5 

¶27 No reasonable interpretation of the amended statute, WIS. STAT.

§ 938.34(4m), results in the conclusion J.A.J. offers. Subsection (4h) cannot be 

read to require a placement under sub. (4m), or only in an SRCCCY. The only 

reasonable interpretation is that subs. (4h) and (4m) are separate dispositional 

options and that, once a juvenile is ordered into the SJOP, physical placement 

options are controlled by WIS. STAT. § 938.538.

d. DOC’s Failure to Meet the Nonstatutory Closure Deadlines for 

Lincoln Hills does not make J.A.J.’s Placement at Lincoln Hills 

Unlawful.

¶28 J.A.J. also argues that it is unlawful for circuit courts to continue 

placing juveniles at Lincoln Hills, via the SJOP or otherwise, because under 

 

5

 There is no question that the Acts left the SJOP statutes untouched. Nonetheless, it is 

noteworthy that the Wisconsin Legislative Council Memo regarding the 2017 Act specified that 

“DOC maintains supervision over ... juveniles in the SJOP [under the 2017 Act], but the 

supervision of juveniles under other correctional placements is transferred to the counties.” 2017 

Wis. Act 185, Wisconsin Legislative Council Memo at 6; see also Teschendorf v. State Farm 

Ins. Companies, 2006 WI 89, ¶14, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (courts may look to 

legislative history to confirm a plain meaning interpretation).
No. 2022AP2066

13

nonstatutory provisions of the 2017 and 2019 Acts, the school was to close by 

July 1, 2021, at the latest.

6

 

¶29 Nonstatutory provisions are not codified in the statutes. They are 

typically enactments of limited application or duration or both. They include 

declarations of intent or purpose, laws that are temporary or limited in duration, 

and provisions affecting the timing of a law’s application or non-application, 

among other things. WISCONSIN STATE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY JOINT R. 53(2).

Whether nonstatutory provisions have the force of law is not clearly settled and 

depends on the specific provision. Compare RURAL v. Public Serv. Comm’n of 

Wis., 2000 WI 129, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 N.W.2d 888 (treating nonstatutory 

provisions of 1997 Wis. Act 204 as binding when analyzing PSC and DNR 

compliance with the expedited review process for a certificate of public 

convenience and necessity contained therein) with Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶65, 

69 (Abrahmson, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that nonstatutory provisions qualify 

as a type of “legislative history”). 

¶30 J.A.J. urges this court to interpret the legislative enactments 

providing for the closure of Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake. Whether binding 

authority or not, the nonstatutory provision arises out of a legislative enactment,

and J.A.J. tasks this court with determining the legislature’s intent with regard to 

such enactment. We thus consider the nonstatutory provisions in the same manner 

as a statute and in the context of the whole enactment and applicable statutory 

framework. 

 

6

 We note that while the State identified this argument in its brief, it did not meaningfully 

engage the argument. The State argues that the “change of placement” statute, WIS. STAT.

§ 938.357, somehow rebuts J.A.J.’s argument with respect to the closure deadlines in the Acts. It 

does not. Nonetheless, we do not deem the issue conceded. Instead, we analyze J.A.J.’s closure 

deadline argument and ultimately reject it on other grounds.
No. 2022AP2066

14

¶31 It is undisputed that Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake continue to 

operate, and that circuit courts continue to enter dispositional orders under 

sub. (4h) placing juveniles, including J.A.J., in the SJOP with physical placement 

at those facilities. J.A.J. argues that on July 2, 2021, it became unlawful for 

Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake to continue operating, and it likewise became 

unlawful for circuit courts to enter dispositional orders that placed juveniles in the 

SJOP if it resulted in a placement at Lincoln Hills or Copper Lake. We reject 

J.A.J.’s argument.

¶32 The 2017 and 2019 Acts contemplate (1) the construction of 

SRCCCYs and new Type 1 juvenile correctional facilities to be operational on or 

before July 1, 2021, so that (2) the juveniles currently at Lincoln Hills and Copper 

Lake can be transferred to the new facilities on or before July 1, 2021, so that (3)

Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake could be closed on or before July 1, 2021. The 

Acts did not alter, waive, or change the requirement in WIS. STAT. § 938.34 that 

the court’s dispositional placement account for and meet the juvenile offender’s 

and the public’s needs. WIS. STAT. § 938.355(1).

¶33 Furthermore, a legislature makes laws that establish the policy of the 

state. Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶138, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 

N.W.2d 337 (citing National R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 

470 U.S. 451, 466, (1985)). Therefore, a legislative enactment is presumed not to 

create “contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until 

the legislature shall ordain otherwise.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Neither the 2017 nor the 2019 Act contains a remedy for noncompliance with the 

nonstatutory closure deadlines. They do not create a private right of action for 

J.A.J. or anyone else. The lack of any enforcement mechanism suggests that the
No. 2022AP2066

15

deadlines were aspirational policies and not intended to prohibit placements at

Lincoln Hills or Copper Lake if the deadlines were not met.

¶34 Although Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake were ordered closed by the 

legislature, these facilities continue to be the only Type 1 juvenile correctional 

facilities in Wisconsin. There are no SRCCCYs currently in operation. If J.A.J.’s 

argument was adopted, Wisconsin’s most serious juvenile offenders, juveniles for 

whom the circuit court determines secured confinement in a SRCCCY or Type 1 

juvenile correctional facility is appropriate, would instead receive a significantly 

less restrictive disposition than what the circuit court found was warranted by the 

evidence. This result runs directly contrary to WIS. STAT. § 938.01(2), wherein 

the legislature declared all seven purposes of the Juvenile Justice Code to be 

“equally important,” and made repeated reference throughout to the “protect[ion 

of] citizens from juvenile crime” and the “protection of the public.” J.A.J.’s 

approach would eviscerate the circuit court’s duty to faithfully consider and 

effectuate the intent of the legislature if it is unable to place juveniles adjudicated 

delinquent of acts that would be the most serious felonies if committed by an adult

in a secured facility.

¶35 This court’s conclusion that circuit courts may continue to order 

placement at Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake is further supported by the 

legislature’s 2021-23 budget, 2021 Wis. Act 58. This budget, enacted on July 8, 

2021, continued to appropriate funds for existing Type 1 juvenile correctional 

facilities (i.e., Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake) and for the construction of new 

ones. The budget also increased “the per-person daily cost assessment to 

counties ... for care in a Type 1 juvenile correctional facility,” and increased the 

“the amount authorized for ... ‘Type 1 juvenile correctional facilities—

statewide,’” “for the purpose of project planning, development, and design, site 
No. 2022AP2066

16

selection, and land and property acquisition for a new Type 1 juvenile correctional 

facility in Milwaukee County.” Id. at §§ 109, 199, 388-89, 9104(5)(d). The most 

recent biennial budget made similar appropriations. E.g., 2023 Wis. Act 19

§§ 454g, 9104(5)(a), 9104(8).

¶36 These appropriations were made by a legislature with full knowledge 

that: (1) no SRCCCYs were currently operating, and (2) the only DOC-operated 

Type 1 juvenile correctional facilities in existence were the two that they had 

ordered closed in the 2017 and 2019 Acts.7 The legislature did not amend the 

nonstatutory deadlines, nor did it provide any remedy for noncompliance with 

those deadlines. Instead, the legislature continued to fund the facilities that they 

had ordered closed.

¶37 In sum, this court concludes that the SJOP at WIS. STAT. 

§ 938.34(4h) remains a lawful and valid dispositional option, notwithstanding the 

reference to “juvenile correctional facility” in relation to sub. (4m). Furthermore, 

the 2017 and 2019 Acts did not limit physical placements under the SJOP at Type 

1 juvenile correctional facilities. Therefore, and because Lincoln Hills and Copper 

Lake continue to operate as Type 1 juvenile correctional facilities, physical 

placements at those facilities is lawful. 

II. Restitution

¶38 J.A.J. argues that the record does not support the circuit court’s 

restitution order of $375 to victim J.S. J.A.J. argues that J.S.’s testimony and 

 

7

 It is presumed that the legislature acted with full knowledge of the existing law. Kindy

v. Hayes, 44 Wis. 2d 301, 314, 171 N.W.2d 324 (1969); Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 225

Wis. 2d 837, 845, 593 N.W.2d 809 (Ct. App. 1999).
No. 2022AP2066

17

written victim impact statement attesting to the value of the items for which 

restitution was sought was insufficient, and the circuit court should have required 

receipts or other documentary proof of value. This court rejects J.A.J.’s argument.

¶39 “[T]he purpose of restitution is to return victims of a crime to the 

position they were in before the defendant injured them.” State v. Johnson, 2005 

WI App 201, ¶14, 287 Wis. 2d 381, 704 N.W.2d 625. “[A] restitution hearing is 

not the equivalent of a civil trial and does not require strict adherence to the rules 

of evidence and burden of proof.” Id. The circuit court is free to accept and reject 

evidence and give accepted evidence the weight it desires. State v. Boffer, 158 

Wis. 2d 655, 663, 462 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1990).

¶40 During the May, 20, 2022 restitution hearing, victim J.S.’s written 

victim impact statement was admitted into evidence. It listed the value of the 

items for which restitution was sought:

1. AirPods—$200

2. LED light—$60

3. Shammy—$25

4. Wallet—$50

5. Driver’s license—$40

J.S. testified that the values on the victim impact statement were correct. 

¶41 There is no authority supporting J.A.J.’s contention that J.S. should 

have been required to provide documentary proof of value to support his request 

for restitution. The circuit court accepted J.S.’s testimony as sufficient evidence 

and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, its finding was not clearly 
No. 2022AP2066

18

erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s May 25, 2022 restitution 

order.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.