June 2012 CSWMD Proceedings 1

The risks of nuclear proliferation—the further 

spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 

material, technology, and expertise—derive in 

part from the technical characteristics of the nuclear fuel 

cycle and the national and international management of 

fuel cycle activities. Civilian nuclear power plants themselves are not considered a high proliferation risk because 

it is difficult to make weapons-usable material from reactor fuel. The principal proliferation risk is that states can 

use the civilian nuclear fuel cycle as a source for the material, technology, and expertise needed to develop nuclear 

weapons. A state’s intent to develop a nuclear weapons 

capability can be concealed if its activities otherwise 

appear compliant with its obligations under the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Creating more effective barriers to the diversion of civilian nuclear programs 

to military purposes—as North Korea has done and as 

Iran appears to be doing—is central to current efforts to 

strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Nuclear Fuel Cycle

There are two proliferation pathways associated with 

the diversion of the nuclear fuel cycle: the enrichment 

of natural uranium to weapons-grade levels (over 90 

percent of the fissile isotope U-235), and the chemical reprocessing of “spent” or irradiated nuclear fuel to 

separate out sufficient weapons-grade plutonium (typically about 93 percent Pu-239) to build a bomb.1

 These 

two processes and their associated technologies are 

commonly referred to as enrichment and reprocessing 

(ENR). At the front end of the fuel cycle—the process 

for preparing uranium fuel for reactor operation—most 

civilian power plants house light water reactors that 

run on low enriched uranium (LEU), which is uranium 

enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235. The same techniques 

used to produce LEU can be used to produce both high 

enriched uranium (HEU), which is uranium enriched 

above 20 percent U-235, and weapons-grade uranium. 

The industrial effort and time required to convert LEU to 

HEU is considerably greater than that required to convert HEU to weapons-grade uranium. Thus, once a state 

is capable of producing HEU, it has mastered the most 

challenging aspects of the enrichment process; further 

enriching to weapons-grade requires less effort. The figure on page 2 illustrates this phenomenon.

Current concerns surrounding Iran focus on its 

growing stockpile of LEU, its further enrichment of 

www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter

Proceedings

Proliferation Risks of Civilian Nuclear 

Power Programs

June 2012

By Paul I. Bernstein and Nima Gerami

Paul I. Bernstein is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSWMD) at the National Defense 

University. Nima Gerami is a Research Fellow in CSWMD.
June 2012 CSWMD Proceedings 2

uranium to 20 percent (ostensibly to fuel the Tehran 

Research Reactor for the production of medical 

isotopes), and its growing capacity to produce weapons-grade uranium should it decide to do so. When 

proliferation analysts speak of Iran’s “breakout” potential, they are referring to the capacity to convert LEU to 

weapons-grade levels.

At the back end of the fuel cycle—relating to storage, reprocessing, and disposal—spent nuclear fuel 

is removed from the reactor and generally stored as 

waste. A small number of countries (for example, 

France and Japan) reprocess spent fuel to separate out 

plutonium for reuse in reactors. But plutonium can also 

be diverted directly to manufacture nuclear weapons. 

This is the pathway that North Korea pursued to produce the nuclear devices it is believed to possess. Syria 

appeared to be proceeding down this path as well; the 

nearly completed (but undeclared) nuclear reactor at 

al-Kibar, destroyed by Israeli air forces in September 

2007, was closely modeled on North Korea’s plutonium 

production reactor at Yongbyon.2

Nonproliferation Regime

The dual-use nature of the nuclear fuel cycle 

therefore poses an inherent proliferation risk and an 

ongoing challenge for global nonproliferation efforts. 

The proliferation risks of nuclear energy have been 

widely recognized since the nuclear age began nearly 

70 years ago. Early efforts to stem nuclear weapons 

proliferation culminated in the 1968 NPT, which 

enshrines a set of basic bargains. Nonnuclear weapon 

states permanently forswear the pursuit of nuclear 

weapons and are assured the “inalienable right” to 

access nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nuclear 

weapon states, in turn, agree to work “in good faith” 

Moving from Reactor- to Weapons-grade Uranium

Note: In terms of the Separative Work Unit (SWU), a measure of energy used in the enrichment of U-235, the number of SWUs required per tonne of feed 

material (natural uranium) increases in relatively smaller increments as the desired level of enrichment rises.
June 2012 CSWMD Proceedings 3

toward eliminating their nuclear weapons and may 

not transfer or in any way assist nonnuclear weapon 

states in developing such weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

establishes and administers a system of safeguards and 

inspections to verify that nonnuclear weapon states 

do not divert nuclear material to the manufacture of 

nuclear weapons. Additionally, the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group (NSG), established in 1975—a year after India 

exploded its first nuclear device—encourages restraint 

in the transfer of ENR technologies through a series of 

voluntary guidelines that govern nuclear exports. These 

guidelines are intended to ensure that states not part of 

the nonproliferation regime, or not fully compliant with 

their NPT obligations, do not engage in nuclear commerce that could advance a weapons program.

The vast majority of states that are party to the NPT 

are fully compliant with their obligations. However, 

the last two decades have revealed serious weaknesses and gaps in the nonproliferation regime that have 

allowed illicit nuclear programs to advance, facilitated 

the spread of material, technology, and expertise used 

in nuclear weapons, and eroded confidence in the 

NPT. The cases of North Korea and Iran, and the revelations surrounding the global nuclear black market 

created by the Pakistani metallurgist A.Q. Khan, exemplify this challenge and have led to a variety of efforts 

to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Continued 

efforts to control, limit, or even end the further spread 

of ENR technologies thus remain critical to ensuring 

that future nuclear aspirants cannot use the guise of a 

legitimate civilian nuclear program to pursue a weapons capability. In essence, the goal is to prevent the 

“next Iran.”

Nuclear Renaissance?

Lending added urgency to nonproliferation efforts 

is the possibility that nuclear power will expand significantly across the world as more governments seek to 

address increasing energy demands, rising oil and natural gas prices, and growing pressure to reduce greenhouse 

gas emissions. Some observers have called for a civilian 

nuclear “renaissance” to create new or wider markets, 

particularly in Asia and the Middle East. According to 

the World Nuclear Association, nuclear power is under 

serious consideration in more than 45 countries that do 

not currently possess it.3

 If these states follow through 

with their plans, nuclear energy capacity could double or 

triple by 2030.4

Experts debate two issues: whether this renaissance will actually occur on a significant scale, and the 

degree of proliferation risk it would pose. Although 

the use of the term renaissance almost certainly 

overstates what is likely to occur in the next couple 

of decades, there is no doubt that nuclear power will 

expand worldwide. Nuclear power is expected to 

expand significantly in some states, such as China and 

India, more modestly in other countries with established nuclear power programs, and it is likely that at 

least a few additional states will embark on new programs. Despite the significant interest expressed by 

many governments in expanding or adopting nuclear 

power, it is difficult to predict how many will actually 

proceed down this path. Civilian nuclear power infrastructures entail complex, large-scale projects shaped 

by political and other factors.5

 Economic and financial 

constraints, as well as new concerns about safety and 

public confidence following the Fukushima crisis in 

Japan, could limit the extent of a nuclear energy revival. In the aftermath of Fukushima, some governments, 

particularly in regions that are seismically active and 

prone to tsunamis, have cancelled their plans to pursue nuclear power. Some countries are deferring their 

plans, while others have vowed to stay on track.6

What are the proliferation risks if nuclear power 

expands significantly, including expansion to many 

new states? Some experts argue that it makes more 

sense for proliferators to pursue dedicated nuclear 

weapons programs than to divert material, technology, and expertise from a civilian program. In this view, 

the risks posed by the revival of nuclear energy are 

limited, at least in the near term. Over time, however, 

this judgment could change if nuclear power expansion leads to the emergence of a new group of states 

capable of providing fuel services and equipment. 

Only a small number of advanced countries provide 

such services today.

Other experts are less sanguine, arguing that it 

will be difficult, if not impossible, to prevent ENR 
June 2012 CSWMD Proceedings 4

technologies from spreading if nuclear power expands. 

In this view, despite the risks and costs, many governments opting for nuclear power will choose to construct 

indigenous ENR infrastructures, if only for reasons of 

independence and prestige. While most states that do 

so are likely to use these capabilities responsibly and 

strictly for peaceful purposes, some states may also 

view these capabilities as providing a security hedge. 

Should one or more of these governments make a 

strategic decision to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, key building blocks will be in place. The IAEA 

is working to transform its safeguards system to meet 

the challenges of proliferation and growth in nuclear 

power, but the agency is limited in its ability to detect 

undeclared nuclear activities in a timely way, particulary since there is not yet universal adherence by NPT 

member states to the IAEA Additional Protocol, which 

grants the agency expanded inspection rights.

Some states have pledged to accept ENR services from others and forsworn indigenous acquisition 

of such technologies (for example, the United Arab 

Emirates). Other governments (for example, Egypt, 

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil) have refused to make 

such a pledge, insisting instead on keeping open all 

their fuel cycle options as part of their rights under 

Article IV of the NPT. While welcome, voluntary 

restraints can be reversed and thus seem unlikely to 

provide more than a token degree of risk mitigation as 

nuclear power expands. As a result, a number of proposals have emerged to help limit the further spread 

of these capabilities as a more decisive way to manage 

future proliferation risks.

Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

In 2004, President George W. Bush called on 

members of the NSG to deny the sale of ENR technologies to states that do not already possess them, 

including nonnuclear weapon state parties to the 

NPT.7

 President Bush asked these states, in turn, to 

renounce ENR technologies in exchange for reliable, assured access to nuclear fuel at a reasonable 

price. These proposals were controversial and widely 

opposed by nonnuclear weapon states that argued 

they were being asked to limit or forfeit a basic NPT 

right when nuclear weapon states had not made sufficient progress in meeting their own NPT obligation to 

work toward disarmament. Some nonnuclear weapon 

states argued that these proposals would therefore 

deepen the divide between nuclear haves and havenots. Many nonnuclear weapon states also questioned 

the reliability of any mechanisms established to provide fuel services. The Bush proposal was a nonstarter 

in the NSG, but after several years of deliberation, the 

NSG agreed in July 2011 to tighten the rules governing the transfer of ENR technologies, establishing a 

number of specific conditions and criteria that recipients must meet to obtain ENR items.8

A number of other proposals have offered more specific and concrete approaches to the third party provision 

of fuel services. These proposals focus on establishing 

international or multilateral mechanisms to guarantee 

the supply of fuel, provide enrichment services, and 

establish fuel reserves. Some of the more prominent proposals over the past decade include the following:9

ElBaradei Proposal. In 2003, then-IAEA Director 

General Mohamed ElBaradei, noting that “the margin of security under the current non-proliferation 

regime is becoming too slim for comfort,” proposed to 

restrict ENR technologies exclusively to facilities under 

multinational control, and to develop multinational 

approaches to manage and dispose of spent fuel and 

radioactive waste.10 A 2005 Experts Group commissioned by ElBaradei to explore this concept proposed 

reinforcing existing market mechanisms by providing 

additional guarantees by nuclear suppliers or through 

an IAEA fuel bank, converting existing facilities to 

multinational facilities, and creating co-managed, 

jointly-owned facilities.11

Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure. In January 

2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed the 

creation of a “Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure” 

comprising international centers for enriching uranium, reprocessing and storing spent fuel, 

training personnel, and researching more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies.12 In 2007, Russia 

further proposed the establishment of an International 

Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) and a LEU fuel 

reserve at Angarsk under IAEA auspices. In November 

2009, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the 
June 2012 CSWMD Proceedings 5

Russian proposal to establish the Angarsk fuel reserve. 

The guaranteed LEU reserve has been available for use 

by IAEA member states since February 2011.

Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable 

Access to Nuclear Fuel (Six-Country Concept). In 

June 2006, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, 

the United Kingdom, and the United States proposed 

a “Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable 

Access to Nuclear Fuel.”13 The so-called “Six-Country 

Concept” would allow the IAEA to facilitate the provision of alternative sources of LEU to states when a 

commercial supply relationship is interrupted. Only 

states not possessing ENR technologies would be eligible, and these states would have to meet a number of 

criteria regarding their nonproliferation obligations and 

their safety and physical protection standards.

Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project. In 

May 2007, Germany proposed the construction of a 

new enrichment facility at an “extraterritorial” location, 

to be owned by the IAEA and managed by an independent board.14 The plant would operate on a commercial 

basis but the IAEA would decide whether to supply 

LEU to recipients based on nonproliferation criteria. 

This concept, known as the “Multilateral Enrichment 

Sanctuary Project,” is being considered by the IAEA 

Board of Governors.

International Framework for Nuclear Energy 

Cooperation. The International Framework for 

Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), established by 

the U.S. Department of Energy in 2010, has its roots 

in the earlier Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 

(GNEP), which was created in 2006 to explore 

advanced fuel cycle concepts that would allow for 

commercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel with 

reduced proliferation risks. The IFNEC program continues the international forum established by GNEP 

that facilitates exploration among partner countries of 

alternative fuel cycle concepts.

IAEA LEU Fuel Bank. In December 2010, the 

IAEA Board of Governors approved the establishment 

of an IAEA-owned and -managed LEU fuel bank, using 

as seed money a $50 million pledge by the U.S.-based 

Nuclear Threat Initiative. Countries requesting access 

to LEU from the bank must meet eligibility criteria consistent with the IAEA Statute and approved in advance 

by the IAEA Board. In 2009, Kazakhstan informed the 

IAEA that it would be willing to host the fuel bank on its 

territory, but an agreement has yet to be finalized.

These and other concepts for multilateralizing 

the nuclear fuel cycle differ considerably in their 

objectives, scope, and timeframe required for implementation, but all recognize the need to implement 

any multilateral mechanism incrementally and without interrupting the international market for fuel 

cycle services.15 They tend, as well, to focus on the 

front end of the fuel cycle. Currently, responsibility 

for spent fuel disposal and storage lies solely with the 

state concerned. More than 50 countries store their 

spent reactor fuel in onsite storage pools and some 

reprocess spent fuel rods into mixed oxide fuel for 

further electricity generation.16 Viable multilateral 

concepts to manage spent fuel disposal services and 

interim storage could help limit the further spread 

of reprocessing technologies, but significant political, technical, and financial hurdles exist, including 

but not limited to achieving agreement to establish a 

shared multinational repository for radioactive waste.

While there have been no proposals for multilateral 

reprocessing facilities, there are a number of concepts 

for developing new reactor technologies that are claimed 

to be “proliferation resistant.” Experts differ on just 

how proliferation-resistant technologies are likely to 

be and when in the future they might become available 

on a commercially viable basis. By almost all accounts, 

this will not occur anytime soon. Should proliferationresistant technologies emerge over time as credible 

alternatives to current fuel cycle technologies, this could 

provide a way to reduce proliferation risks without limiting the access of nonnuclear weapon states to nuclear 

power technology.

In the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review 

Conference, the NPT state parties agreed to:

Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the 

auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear 

fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating 

mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with 
June 2012 CSWMD Proceedings 6

the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting 

rights under the Treaty and without prejudice 

to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the 

technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, 

the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.

17

To date, proposals to multilateralize the fuel cycle have 

originated from states that already possess ENR technologies and that see further limitations on the availability of 

these technologies as key to managing proliferation risks 

moving forward. This is precisely why current multilateral 

proposals tend to be viewed as discriminatory by states 

not in possession of sensitive nuclear technologies. The 

challenge is to make fuel cycle alternatives both economically attractive and politically palatable.

Notes 1

 Although sophisticated weapon designs require weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, a crude or improvised nuclear device can be constructed 

using high enriched uranium or reactor-grade plutonium. See Charles D. 

Ferguson and William C. Potter, Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear 

Terrorism, No. 2 (Stockholm, Sweden: The Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Commission, n.d.), available at <www.un.org/disarmament/education/wmdcommission/files/No2.pdf>.

2

 The Syrian reactor under construction was undeclared; that is, it was 

never reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

3

 World Nuclear Association, “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries,” 

February 2012, available at <www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf102.html>.

4

 Currently, 30 countries operate more than 440 commercial nuclear 

power plants that supply about 14 percent of the world’s electricity.

5

 Sharon Squassoni, Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation?

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2009). 

For additional perspectives on the prospects for nuclear energy growth, see 

Charles D. Ferguson, “Potential Strategic Consequences of the Nuclear Energy 

Revival,” Proliferation Papers, No. 35, Summer 2010; IAEA, “International 

Status and Prospects of Nuclear Power: Report by the Director General,” 

September 2, 2010; and Mary Beth Nikitin et al., Managing the Nuclear 

Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power, 

RL34234 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2, 2011).

6

 See James M. Acton et al., “After Fukushima: Early Implications 

for Nuclear Industry and Policy Makers,” A Statement from the Carnegie 

Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

March 15, 2011; Mark Hibbs, “After the Shock—Implications of the 

Japanese Nuclear Crisis,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 9, 2011; and 

Sharon Squassoni, “Nuclear Governance After Fukushima,” in Global 

Forecast 2011: International Security in a Time of Uncertainty, ed. Craig 

Cohen and Josiane Gabel (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 2011).

7

 “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of 

WMD,” Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. McNair, National Defense University, 

Washington, DC, February 11, 2004, available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html>.

8

 IAEA, “Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of the 

Netherlands Regarding Certain Member States’ Guidelines for the Export of 

Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology,” Information Circular/254/

Rev.10/Part 1a, July 26, 2011, available at <www.iaea.org/Publications/

Documents/Infcircs/2011/infcirc254r10p1.pdf>.

9

 For a more detailed discussion of multilateral proposals, see Yury 

Yudin, Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Assessing the Existing 

Proposals (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Institute for Disarmament 

Research, 2009); Tariq Rauf and Zoryana Vovchok, “Fuel for Thought,” 

IAEA Bulletin 49, no. 2 (March 2008); Nikitin, et al.; and Fred McGoldrick 

et al., Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, 

Constraints, Options (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and 

International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2011).

10 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Towards a Safer World,” The Economist, 

October 16, 2003, available at <www.economist.com/node/2137602>.

11 Multinational Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group 

Report to the Director General of the IAEA (Washington, DC: IAEA, February 

22, 2005), available at <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/mna2005_web.pdf>.

12 IAEA, “Communication Received from the Resident Representative 

of the Russian Federation to the IAEA on the Establishment, Structure and 

Operation of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre,” Information 

Circular/708, June 8, 2007, available at <www.iaea.org/Publications/

Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc708.pdf>.

13 IAEA, “Communication Dated 31 May 2006 Received from the 

Permanent Missions of France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian 

Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 

the United States of America,” GOV/INF/2006/10, June 1, 2006, available at 

<www.state.gov/documents/organization/98987.pdf>.

14 IAEA, “Communication Received from the Resident Representative 

of Germany to the IAEA with Regard to the German Proposal on the 

Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Information Circular/704, May 

4, 2007, available at <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/

infcirc704.pdf>, and expanded upon in Information Circular/727 and 

Information Circular/735.

15 Yudin, 51.

16 The United States has not adopted mixed oxide fuel for commercial 

purposes, but is constructing a facility to produce this fuel as a way to dispose of excess weapons-usable plutonium.

17 United Nations, 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, 

Volume I, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol I.) (New York: United Nations, 

2010), available at <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/

CONF.2010/50 (VOL.I)>.

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The mission of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction is to prepare U.S. national 

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