The Honorable John B. Jones, United States District Judge for the District of 1 South Dakota, sitting by designation. The Honorable William G. Cambridge, Chief United States District Judge for 2 the District of Nebraska. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-3240

_____________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District * of Nebraska. Darius M. Moss, * * Appellant. *

_____________ Submitted: January 13, 1998 Filed: March 11, 1998

_____________ Before BOWMAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and JONES, 1 District Judge.

_____________ BOWMAN, Circuit Judge. Darius M oss was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent t o di stribute crack cocaine and of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, i n violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1994), after which the District Court 2-2-

sentenced Moss t o 360 months of imprisonment. Moss appeals his conviction and his sentence, and we affirm.
I.
Moss first argues that the District Court erred in admitting into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d )(2)(E) the testimony of co-conspirator Maurice Starks that de scribed the out-of-court declarations of another alleged co-conspirator. Se e United States v. Bell , 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978) (laying out procedure for the admission of co-conspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)). Starks testified during Moss's trial as to statements made by "Boot," another allege d confederate, concerning the drug conspiracy. Moss contends tha t the government failed to e stablish that "Boot" was a co-conspirator or that his declarations furthered th e conspiracy.
An out-of-court statement of a co-conspirator is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) if the trial court is convinced by a preponderance of th e evidence th at the challenged statement was made during the course and in furtherance of a conspiracy to which the declarant and the defendant were parties. See Bourjaily v. United States , 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). A statement made in furtherance of a conspiracy "must somehow advance the objectives of the con spiracy, not merely inform the listener of the declarant's activities." United States v. DeLuna , 763 F.2d 897, 909 (8th Cir .) (quoting United States v. Snider , 720 F.2d 985, 992 (8th Cir. 1983), cert
. denied , 465 U.S. 1107 ( 1984)) (alteration omitted), cert. denied , 474 U.S. 980 (1985). We review for clear error a district court's decision to admit co-conspirator testimony under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See United States v. Edwards , 994 F.2d 417, 421 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1048 (1994).
Starks te stified that he gave money to "Boot" on a number of occasions t o purchase crack cocaine in three and four gram amounts for resale, that "Boot" identified-3-

Moss as his crack cocaine source, and that Starks eventually began purchasing his crack cocaine directly from Moss for distribution. This testimony was sufficient to establish that "Boot" was a member of the conspiracy who arranged drug purch ases for Moss and who furthered the goals of the conspiracy by introducing potential distributors to Moss as a source of crack cocaine. Consequently, this testimony was properly admitted by the District Court under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See, e.g. , United States v. Guerra , 113 F.3d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Statements of a coconspirator identifying a fello w coconspirator as his source o f controlled substances is in furtherance of the conspiracy and therefore admissible.").
II.
Moss next asserts that the District Court erred in calculatin g the quantity of drugs attribut able to him for sentencing purposes. At trial, Robert Howell testified that h e purchased crack cocaine from Moss on a specific occasion and, during the co urse of this particula r transaction, observed a total of nine ounces of crack cocaine. At th e sentencing hearing, Moss attacked Howell's credibility by presenting the testimony of Roberta, Tonya, and Christine Douglas, residents of the home in which Howell testified tha t Moss displayed the nine ounces of crack cocaine, each of whom testified tha t Howell was n ever in their home and, therefore, could not have seen Moss with nin e ounces of crack cocaine in their residence. Moss contends that the District Court erred in relying on Howell's uncorroborated testimony and in discounting the Douglases ' contradictory testimony regardi ng the nine ounces of crack cocaine attributed to Moss. We review a district court's drug quantity calculations for clear error. See United States v. Scott , 91 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 1996). "Defendants who challenge th e sentencing court's determination of drug quantity face an uphi ll battle on appeal because we will reverse a determin ation of drug quantity only if the entire record definitely and firmly convinces us that a mistake has been made." United States v. S ales , 25 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the credibility of witnesses is for-4-

the district court to determine, see United States v. Karam , 37 F.3 d 1280, 1286 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1156 (1995), and its findings as to credibi lity are "virtually unrev iewable on appeal," United States v. Adipietro , 983 F.2d 1468, 1472 (8th Cir

. 1993) (quoting United States v. Candie , 974 F.2d 61, 64 (8th Cir. 1992)).
After a careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the District Court did not err, much less clearly err, in attributing to Moss the nine ounces of crack cocain e testi fied to by Howell. The District Court, faced with the conflicting testimony o f Howell and the Douglases, did not expressly make a credibility finding, but it i s apparent that the court cho se to credit Howell's testimony regarding the nine ounces of crack cocaine. Because "we do not 'pass upon the credibilityof witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony,'" United States v. Marshall , 92 F.3d 758, 760 (8th Cir

. 1996) (quo ting United States v. Witschner , 624 F.2d 840, 843 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 99 4 (1980)), we decline to reverse the District Court's drug quantity determination.
In a related argument, Moss contends that the District Court failed to follo w Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1), which directs sentencing courts to make specifi c findings resolving each controverted matter in a presentence report. Mos s argues that, because the District Court neglected to mak e an express finding reconciling the conflic ting testimony of Howell and the Douglases regarding the nine ounces o f crack coc aine attributed to Moss for sentencing purposes, his sentence cannot stand

. As noted above, it is appare nt the District Court credited the testimony of Howell over that of the Douglases in finding Moss responsible for the nine ounces of crack cocaine. Though an express credibility finding would have been preferable, in thes e cir cumstances the District Court's assessment of witness credibility is evident. W e therefore find no violation of Rule 32(c)(1).-5- III.
Finall y, Moss argues that the District Court erred in imposing a two-leve l enhancement

for obstruction of justice. At the sentencing hearing, two United States Marshals testified that, durin g a trial recess while only the two marshals, a deputy, and wi tness Howell were in the courtroom, Moss knocked on the courtroom door to ge t Howell's attention a

nd made a "cutthroat" gesture in Howell's direction by drawing his hand across his throat. Although Howell's testimony continued after this incident, the marshals testified that Howell was noticeably disturbed by the occurren ce. Moss argues that his conduct does not a mount to "threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so " as required for an obstruction of justice enhancement under the Sentencin g Guidelines. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1, comment. (n.3(a)) (1995).
We review a district court's f actual findings relative to sentencing enhancements for clear error, see United States v. Cabbell , 35 F.3d 1255, 1261 (8th Cir. 1994), and conclude that the District Court did not clear ly err in enhancing Moss's offense level by two le vels for obstruction of justice. The District Court interpreted Moss's "cutthroat" gesture as an attempt to influence or intimidate Howell, and we find no fault with this interpretation. Although Howell continued to testify after the incident, an attempt t o intimidate or threaten a witness, even if unsuccess ful, is sufficient to sustain a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1.
IV.
Mos s has submitted a pro se brief and a "Pro Se Traverse" raising additiona l arguments. We have considered these arguments and find them to be without merit.
Moss's conviction and sentence are affirmed.-6-

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.