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Computer Crime and

Intellectual Property Section

(CCIPS) 

Searching

and Seizing Computers 

and Obtaining Electronic Evidence 

in Criminal Investigations

Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section

Criminal Division

United States Department of Justice

January 2001

PREFACE

 This publication supersedes Federal Guidelines for Searching and Seizing Computers (1994), as well as the

Guidelines’ 1997 and 1999 Supplements. Although the interagency group that produced the Guidelines achieved its

goal of offering “systematic guidance to all federal agents and attorneys” in the law of computer search and seizure,

intervening changes in law and the dramatic expansion of the Internet since 1994 have fostered the need for fresh

guidance. This manual is designed to combine an updated version of the Guidelines’ advice on searching and seizing

computers with guidance on the statutes that govern obtaining electronic evidence in cases involving computer

networks and the Internet. Of course, this manual is intended to offer assistance, not authority. Its analysis and

conclusions reflect current thinking on difficult areas of law, and do not represent the official position of the

Department of Justice or any other agency. It has no regulatory effect, and confers no rights or remedies.

 This publication was written by Orin S. Kerr of the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the

U.S. Department of Justice, under the supervision of Martha Stansell-Gamm, Chief of the Computer Crime and

Intellectual Property Section. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mark Eckenwiler, Scott

Charney, David Green, Jennifer Martin, Chris Painter, the members of the 1999 CTC Working Group (especially

Stephen Heymann), Jeff Singdahlsen, Mark Pollitt, Thos. Gregory Motta, Joanne Pasquerelli, and summer interns

Dan Jackson and Avi Ionescu. Electronic copies of this document are available from the Computer Crime and

Intellectual Property Section’s web site, www.cybercrime.gov. Inquiries, comments, and corrections should be

directed to Orin S. Kerr at (202) 514-1026. Requests for paper copies or written correspondence should be sent to

the following address:

Attn: Search and Seizure Manual

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Computer Crime and

Intellectual Property Section

United States Department of Justice

P.O. Box 887

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044-0887

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I. SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS WITHOUT A WARRANT

 A. Introduction

 B. The Fourth Amendment’s “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” in Cases Involving Computers

 1. General Principles

 2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Computers as Storage Devices

 3. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Third-Party Possession

 4. Private Searches

 C. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement in Cases Involving Computers

 1. Consent

 a) Scope of Consent

 b) Third-Party Consent

 c) Implied Consent

 2. Exigent Circumstances

 3. Plain View

 4. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest

 5. Inventory Searches

 6. Border Searches

 7. International Issues

 D. Special Case: Workplace Searches

 1. Private Sector Workplace Searches

 a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Private-Sector Workplaces

 b) Consent in Private Sector-Workplaces

 c) Employer Searches in Private-Sector Workplaces

 2. Public-Sector Workplace Searches

 a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Public Workplaces

 b) “Reasonable” Workplace Searches Under O’Connor v. Ortega

 c) Consent in Public-Sector Workplaces

 II. SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS WITH A WARRANT

 A. Introduction

 B. Planning the Search

 1. Basic Strategies for Executing Computer Searches

 a) When Hardware Is Itself Contraband, Evidence, or an Instrumentality or Fruit of Crime

 b) When Hardware is Merely a Storage Device for Evidence of Crime

 2. The Privacy Protection Act

 a) A Brief History of the Privacy Protection Act

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 b) The Terms of the Privacy Protection Act

 c) Application of the PPA to Computer Searches and Seizures

 3. Civil Liability Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act

 4. Considering the Need for Multiple Warrants in Network Searches

 5. No-Knock Warrants

 6. Sneak-and-Peek Warrants

 7. Privileged Documents

 a) The Attorney General's Regulations Relating to Searches of Disinterested Lawyers, Physicians, and

Clergymen

 b) Strategies for Reviewing Privileged Computer Files

 C. Drafting the Warrant and Affidavit

 Step 1: Accurately and Particularly Describe the Property to be Seized in the Warrant and/or Attachments

 to the Warrant

 Step 2: Establish Probable Cause in the Affidavit

 Step 3: In the Affidavit Supporting the Warrant, Include an Explanation of the Search Strategy

 (Such as the Need to Conduct an Off-site Search) as Well as the Practical and Legal Considerations

 That Will Govern the Execution of the Search

 D. Post-Seizure Issues

 1. Searching Computers Already in Law Enforcement Custody

 2. The Permissible Time Period For Examining Seized Computers

 3. Rule 41(e) Motions for Return of Property

III. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT

 A. Introduction

 B. Providers of Electronic Communication Service vs. Remote Computing Service

 “Electronic communication service”

 “Electronic storage”

 “Remote computing service”

 C. Classifying Types of Information Held by Service Providers

 1. Basic Subscriber Information Listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C)

 2. Records or Other Information Pertaining to a Customer or Subscriber

 3. Contents

 D. Compelled Disclosure Under ECPA

 1. Subpoena

 2. Subpoena with Prior Notice to the Subscriber or Customer

 3. Section 2703(d) Order

 4. § 2703(d) Order with Prior Notice to the Subscriber or Customer

 5. Search Warrant

 E. Voluntary Disclosure

 1. Contents

 2. Records Other than Contents

 F. Quick Reference Guide

 G. Working with Network Providers: Preservation of Evidence, Preventing Disclosure to Subjects, and

 Cable Act Issues

 1. Preservation of Evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)

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 2. Orders Not to Disclose the Existence of a Warrant, Subpoena, or Court Order

 3. Possible Conflicts with the Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551

 H. Remedies

 1. Suppression

 2. Civil Actions

IV. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS

 A. Introduction

 B. The Pen/Trap Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27

 C. The Wiretap Statute, Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22

 1. Introduction: The General Prohibition

 2. Key Phrases

 “Wire communication”

 “Electronic communication”

 “Intercept”

 3. Exceptions to Title III

 a) Interception Authorized by a Title III Order, 18 U.S.C. § 2518

 b) Consent of a Party to the Communication, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d)

 c) The Provider Exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i)

 d) The Extension Telephone Exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)

 e) The ‘Inadvertently Obtained Criminal Evidence’ Exception 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(iv)

 f) The ‘Accessible to the Public’ Exception,18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i)

 D. Remedies For Violations of Title III and the Pen/Trap Statute

 1. Suppression Remedies

 a) Statutory Suppression Remedies

 b) Constitutional Suppression Remedies

 2. Defenses to Civil and Criminal Actions

 a) Good-Faith Defense

 b) Qualified Immunity

V. EVIDENCE

 A. Introduction

 B. Authentication

 1. Authenticity and the Alteration of Computer Records

 2. Establishing the Reliability of Computer Programs

 3. Identifying the Author of Computer-Stored Records

 C. Hearsay

 1. Inapplicability of the Hearsay Rules to Computer-Generated Records

 2. Applicability of the Hearsay Rules to Computer-Stored Records

 D. Other Issues

 1. The Best Evidence Rule

 2. Computer Printouts as “Summaries”

VI. APPENDICES

 Appendix A: Sample Network Banner Language

 Appendix B: Sample 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) Application and Order

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 Appendix C: Sample Language for Preservation Request Letters under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)

 Appendix D: Sample Pen Register /Trap and Trace Application and Order

 Appendix E: Sample Subpoena Language

 Appendix F: Sample Language for Search Warrants and Accompanying Affidavits

 to Search and Seize Computers

 Appendix G: Sample Letter for Provider Monitoring

 INDEX

INTRODUCTION

 In the last decade, computers and the Internet have entered the mainstream of American life. Millions of

Americans spend several hours every day in front of computers, where they send and receive e-mail, surf the Web,

maintain databases, and participate in countless other activities.

 Unfortunately, those who commit crime have not missed the computer revolution. An increasing number of

criminals use pagers, cellular phones, laptop computers and network servers in the course of committing their

crimes. In some cases, computers provide the means of committing crime. For example, the Internet can be used to

deliver a death threat via e-mail; to launch hacker attacks against a vulnerable computer network; to disseminate

computer viruses; or to transmit images of child pornography. In other cases, computers merely serve as convenient

storage devices for evidence of crime. For example, a drug kingpin might keep a list of who owes him money in a

file stored in his desktop computer at home, or a money laundering operation might retain false financial records in a

file on a network server.

 The dramatic increase in computer-related crime requires prosecutors and law enforcement agents to

understand how to obtain electronic evidence stored in computers. Electronic records such as computer network

logs, e-mails, word processing files, and “.jpg” picture files increasingly provide the government with important

(and sometimes essential) evidence in criminal cases. The purpose of this publication is to provide Federal law

enforcement agents and prosecutors with systematic guidance that can help them understand the legal issues that

arise when they seek electronic evidence in criminal investigations.

 The law governing electronic evidence in criminal investigations has two primary sources: the Fourth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the statutory privacy laws codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 18 U.S.C. §§

2701-11, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27. Although constitutional and statutory issues overlap in some cases, most

situations present either a constitutional issue under the Fourth Amendment or a statutory issue under these three

statutes. This manual reflects that division: Chapters 1 and 2 address the Fourth Amendment law of search and

seizure, and Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the statutory issues, which arise mostly in cases involving computer networks

and the Internet.

 Chapter 1 explains the restrictions that the Fourth Amendment places on the warrantless search and seizure of

computers and computer data. The chapter begins by explaining how the courts apply the “reasonable expectation

of privacy” test to computers; turns next to how the exceptions to the warrant requirement apply in cases involving

computers; and concludes with a comprehensive discussion of the difficult Fourth Amendment issues raised by

warrantless workplace searches of computers. Questions addressed in this chapter include: When does the

government need a search warrant to search and seize a suspect's computer? Can an investigator search without a

warrant through a suspect's pager found incident to arrest? Does the government need a warrant to search a

government employee's desktop computer located in the employee’s office?

 Chapter 2 discusses the law that governs the search and seizure of computers pursuant to search warrants. 

The chapter begins by reviewing the steps that investigators should follow when planning and executing searches to

seize computer hardware and computer data with a warrant. In particular, the chapter focuses on two issues: first,

how investigators should plan to execute computer searches, and second, how they should draft the proposed search

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warrants and their accompanying affidavits. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of post-search issues. 

Questions addressed in the chapter include: When should investigators plan to search computers on the premises,

and when should they remove the computer hardware and search it later off-site? How should investigators plan

their searches to avoid civil liability under the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa? How should prosecutors

draft search warrant language so that it complies with the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and

Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure? What is the law governing when the government must search

and return seized computers?

 The focus of Chapter 3 is the stored communications portion of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,

18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (“ECPA”). ECPA governs how investigators can obtain stored account records and contents

from network service providers, including Internet service providers (ISPs), telephone companies, cell phone service

providers, and satellite services. ECPA issues arise often in cases involving the Internet: any time investigators seek

stored information concerning Internet accounts from providers of Internet service, they must comply with the

statute. Topics covered in this section include: How can the government obtain e-mails and network account logs

from ISPs? When does the government need to obtain a search warrant, as opposed to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) order or

a subpoena? When can providers disclose e-mails and records to the government voluntarily? What remedies will

courts impose when ECPA has been violated?

 Chapter 4 reviews the legal framework that governs electronic surveillance, with particular emphasis on how

the statutes apply to surveillance on the communications networks. In particular, the chapter discusses Title III as

modified by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (referred to here as “Title III”)1, as

well as the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27. These statutes govern when

and how the government can conduct real-time surveillance, such as monitoring a computer hacker's activity as he

breaks into a government computer network. Topics addressed in this chapter include: When can victims of

computer crime monitor unauthorized intrusions into their networks and disclose that information to law

enforcement? Can network “banners” generate implied consent to monitoring? How can the government obtain a

pen register/trap and trace order that permits the government to collect packet header information from Internet

communications? What remedies will courts impose when the electronic surveillance statutes have been violated?

 Of course, the issues discussed in Chapters 1 through 4 can overlap in actual cases. An investigation into

computer hacking may begin with obtaining stored records from an ISP according to Chapter 3, move next to an

electronic surveillance phase implicating Chapter 4, and then conclude with a search of the suspect's residence and a

seizure of his computers according to Chapters 1 and 2. In other cases, agents and prosecutors must understand

issues raised in multiple chapters not just in the same case, but at the same time. For example, an investigation into

workplace misconduct by a government employee may implicate all of Chapters 1 through 4. Investigators may

want to obtain the employee's e-mails from the government network server (implicating ECPA, discussed in Chapter

3); may wish to monitor the employee's use of the telephone or Internet in real-time (raising surveillance issues from

Chapter 4); and at the same time, may need to search the employee's desktop computer in his office for clues of the

misconduct (raising search and seizure issues from Chapters 1 and 2). Because the constitutional and statutory

regimes can overlap in certain cases, agents and prosecutors will need to understand not only all of the legal issues

covered in Chapters 1 through 4, but will also need to understand the precise nature of the information to be

gathered in their particular cases.

 Chapters 1 through 4 are followed by a short Chapter 5, which discusses evidentiary issues that arise

frequently in computer-related cases. The publication concludes with appendices that offer sample forms, language,

and orders.

 Computer crime investigations raise many novel issues, and the courts have only begun to interpret how the

Fourth Amendment and federal statutory laws apply to computer-related cases. Agents and prosecutors who need

more detailed advice can rely on several resources for further assistance. At the federal district level, every U.S.

Attorney’s Office has at least one Assistant U.S. Attorney who has been designated as a Computer and

Telecommunications Coordinator (“CTC”). Every CTC receives extensive training in computer-related crime, and

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is primarily responsible for providing expertise relating to the topics covered in this manual within his or her

district. CTCs may be reached in their district offices. Further, several sections within the Criminal Division of the

U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., have expertise in computer-related fields. The Office of

International Affairs ((202) 514-0000) provides expertise in the many computer crime investigations that raise

international issues. The Office of Enforcement Operations ((202) 514-6809) provides expertise in the wiretapping

laws and other privacy statutes discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Also, the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section

((202) 514-5780) provides expertise in computer-related cases involving child pornography and child exploitation.

 Finally, agents and prosecutors are always welcome to contact the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property

Section (“CCIPS”) directly both for general advice and specific case-related assistance. During regular business

hours, at least two CCIPS attorneys are on duty to answer questions and provide assistance to agents and prosecutors

on the topics covered in this document, as well as other matters that arise in computer crime cases. The main

number for CCIPS is (202) 514-1026.

I. SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS WITHOUT A WARRANT

A. Introduction

 The Fourth Amendment limits the ability of government agents to search for evidence without a warrant. This

chapter explains the constitutional limits of warrantless searches in cases involving computers.

 The Fourth Amendment states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.

 According to the Supreme Court, a warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if one of two

conditions is satisfied. First, if the government’s conduct does not violate a person’s “reasonable expectation of

privacy,” then formally it does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search” and no warrant is required. See Illinois

v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). Second, a warrantless search that violates a person’s reasonable expectation

of privacy will nonetheless be “reasonable” (and therefore constitutional) if it falls within an established exception

to the warrant requirement. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990). Accordingly, investigators must

consider two issues when asking whether a government search of a computer requires a warrant. First, does the

search violate a reasonable expectation of privacy? And if so, is the search nonetheless reasonable because it falls

within an exception to the warrant requirement?

B. The Fourth Amendment’s “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” in Cases Involving Computers

1. General Principles

 A search is constitutional if it does not violate a person’s “reasonable” or “legitimate” expectation of privacy. 

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). This inquiry embraces two discrete

questions: first, whether the individual’s conduct reflects “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and

second, whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as

‘reasonable.’” Id. at 361. In most cases, the difficulty of contesting a defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy

focuses the analysis on the objective aspect of the Katz test, i.e., whether the individual’s expectation of privacy was

reasonable.

 No bright line rule indicates whether an expectation of privacy is constitutionally reasonable. See O’Connor v.

Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987). For example, the Supreme Court has held that a person has a reasonable

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expectation of privacy in property located inside a person’s home, see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90

(1980); in conversations taking place in an enclosed phone booth, see Katz, 389 U.S. at 358; and in the contents of

opaque containers, see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982). In contrast, a person does not have a

reasonable expectation of privacy in activities conducted in open fields, see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,

177 (1984); in garbage deposited at the outskirts of real property, see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41

(1988); or in a stranger’s house that the person has entered without the owner’s consent in order to commit a theft,

see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).

2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Computers as Storage Devices

To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information stored in a

computer, it helps to treat the computer like a closed container such as a briefcase or file cabinet. The

Fourth Amendment generally prohibits law enforcement from accessing and viewing information stored in a

computer without a warrant if it would be prohibited from opening a closed container and examining its

contents in the same situation.

● 

 The most basic Fourth Amendment question in computer cases asks whether an individual enjoys a reasonable

expectation of privacy in electronic information stored within computers (or other electronic storage devices) under

the individual’s control. For example, do individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of

their laptop computers, floppy disks or pagers? If the answer is ‘yes,’ then the government ordinarily must obtain a

warrant before it accesses the information stored inside.

 When confronted with this issue, courts have analogized electronic storage devices to closed containers, and

have reasoned that accessing the information stored within an electronic storage device is akin to opening a closed

container. Because individuals generally retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of closed

containers, see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982), they also generally retain a reasonable

expectation of privacy in data held within electronic storage devices. Accordingly, accessing information stored in a

computer ordinarily will implicate the owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. See United

States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d 929, 936-37 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in files

stored on hard drive of personal computer); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 832-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

(finding reasonable expectation of privacy in data stored in a pager); United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 287

(D.V.I. 1995) (same); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (same); United States v. Blas,

1990 WL 265179, at *21 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (“[A]n individual has the same expectation of privacy in a pager,

computer, or other electronic data storage and retrieval device as in a closed container.”). But see United States v.

Carey,172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (dicta) (analogizing a computer hard drive to a file cabinet in the

context of a search pursuant to a warrant, but then stating without explanation that “the file cabinet analogy may be

inadequate”).

 Although individuals generally retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in computers under their control,

special circumstances may eliminate that expectation. For example, an individual will not retain a reasonable

expectation of privacy in information from a computer that the person has made openly available. In United States

v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Nev. 1991), agents looking over the defendant’s shoulder read the defendant’s

password from the screen as the defendant typed his password into a handheld computer. The court found no Fourth

Amendment violation in obtaining the password, because the defendant did not enjoy a reasonable expectation of

privacy “in the display that appeared on the screen.” Id. at 1389. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351

(1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth

Amendment protection.”). Nor will individuals generally enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents

of computers they have stolen. See United States v. Lyons, 992 F.2d 1029, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 1993).

3. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Third-Party Possession

 Individuals who retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in stored electronic information under their control

may lose Fourth Amendment protections when they relinquish that control to third parties. For example, an

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individual may offer a container of electronic information to a third party by bringing a malfunctioning computer to

a repair shop, or by shipping a floppy diskette in the mail to a friend. Alternatively, a user may transmit information

to third parties electronically, such as by sending data across the Internet. When law enforcement agents learn of

information possessed by third parties that may provide evidence of a crime, they may wish to inspect it. Whether

the Fourth Amendment requires them to obtain a warrant before examining the information depends first upon

whether the third-party possession has eliminated the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

 To analyze third-party possession issues, it helps first to distinguish between possession by a carrier in the

course of transmission to an intended recipient, and subsequent possession by the intended recipient. For example,

if A hires B to carry a package to C, A’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the package during the

time that B carries the package on its way to C may be different than A’s reasonable expectation of privacy after C

has received the package. During transmission, contents generally retain Fourth Amendment protection. The

government ordinarily may not examine the contents of a package in the course of transmission without a warrant. 

Government intrusion and examination of the contents ordinarily violates the reasonable expectation of privacy of

both the sender and receiver. See United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1992); but see United

States v. Walker, 20 F. Supp.2d 971, 973-74 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (concluding that packages sent to an alias in

furtherance of a criminal scheme do not support a reasonable expectation of privacy). This rule applies regardless of

whether the carrier is owned by the government or a private company. Compare Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. (6 Otto)

727, 733 (1877) (public carrier) with Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651 (1980) (private carrier).

 A government “search” of an intangible electronic signal in the course of transmission may also implicate the

Fourth Amendment. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967) (applying the Fourth Amendment to a

wire communication in the context of a wiretap). The boundaries of the Fourth Amendment in such cases remain

hazy, however, because Congress addressed the Fourth Amendment concerns identified in Berger by passing Title

III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22. Title III, which

is discussed fully in Chapter 4, provides a comprehensive statutory framework that regulates real-time monitoring of

wire and electronic communications. Its scope encompasses, and in many significant ways exceeds, the protection

offered by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 884 (7th Cir. 1985). As a practical

matter, then, the monitoring of wire and electronic communications in the course of transmission generally raises

many statutory questions, but few constitutional ones. See generally Chapter 4.

● Individuals may lose Fourth Amendment protection in their computer files if they lose control of the files.

 Once an item has been received by the intended recipient, the sender’s reasonable expectation of privacy

generally depends upon whether the sender can reasonably expect to retain control over the item and its contents. 

When a person leaves a package with a third party for temporary safekeeping, for example, he usually retains

control of the package, and thus retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. See, e.g., United States

v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of plastic bag

left with grocery store clerk); United States v. Barry, 853 F.2d 1479, 1481-83 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding reasonable

expectation of privacy in locked suitcase stored at airport baggage counter); United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206,

1213-14 (4th Cir. 1979) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in locked briefcases stored with defendant’s

friend for safekeeping). See also United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d 929, 936-37 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that

defendant retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in computer files contained in hard drive left with computer

technician for limited purpose of repairing computer).

 If the sender cannot reasonably expect to retain control over the item in the third party’s possession, however,

the sender no longer retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. For example, in United States v.

Horowitz, 806 F.2d 1222 (4th Cir. 1986), the defendant e-mailed confidential pricing information relating to his

employer to his employer’s competitor. After the FBI searched the competitor’s computers and found the pricing

information, the defendant claimed that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Circuit

disagreed, holding that the defendant relinquished his interest in and control over the information by sending it to

the competitor for the competitor’s future use. See id. at 1225-26. See also United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F.

Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that defendant does not retain reasonable expectation of privacy in

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contents of e-mail message sent to America Online chat room after the message has been received by chat room

participants) (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)). In some cases, the sender may initially

retain a right to control the third party’s possession, but may lose that right over time. The general rule is that the

sender’s Fourth Amendment rights dissipate along with the sender’s right to control the third party’s possession. 

For example, in United States v. Poulsen, 41 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1994), computer hacker Kevin Poulsen left

computer tapes in a locker at a commercial storage facility but neglected to pay rent for the locker. Following a

warrantless search of the facility, the government sought to use the tapes against Poulsen. The Ninth Circuit held

that the search did not violate Poulsen’s reasonable expectation of privacy because under state law Poulsen’s failure

to pay rent extinguished his right to access the tapes. See id. at 1337.

 An important line of Supreme Court cases states that individuals generally cannot reasonably expect to retain

control over mere information revealed to third parties, even if the senders have a subjective expectation that the

third parties will keep the information confidential. For example, in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443

(1976), the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect bank account information that account holders

divulge to their banks. By placing information under the control of a third party, the Court stated, an account holder

assumes the risk that the information will be conveyed to the government. Id. According to the Court, “the Fourth

Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to

Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited

purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” Id. (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385

U.S. 293, 302 (1966)). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (finding no reasonable expectation

of privacy in phone numbers dialed by owner of a telephone because act of dialing the number effectively tells the

number to the phone company); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (holding that government may

subpoena accountant for client information given to accountant by client, because client retains no reasonable

expectation of privacy in information given to accountant).

 Because computer data is “information,” this line of cases suggests that individuals who send data over

communications networks may lose Fourth Amendment protection in the data once it reaches the intended

recipient. See United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that an electronic

message sent via a pager is “information” under the Smith/Miller line of cases); Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184

(“[A]n e-mail message . . . cannot be afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy once that message is received.”). 

But see C. Ryan Reetz, Note, Warrant Requirement for Searches of Computerized Information, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 179,

200-06 (1987) (arguing that certain kinds of remotely stored computer files should retain Fourth Amendment

protection, and attempting to distinguish United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland). Of course, the absence of

constitutional protections does not necessarily mean that the government can access the data without a warrant or

court order. Statutory protections exist that generally protect the privacy of electronic communications stored

remotely with service providers, and can protect the privacy of Internet users when the Fourth Amendment may not.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (discussed in Chapter 3, infra).

 Defendants will occasionally raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to the acquisition of account records and

subscriber information held by Internet service providers using less process than a full search warrant. As discussed

in a later chapter, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act permits the government to obtain transactional

records with an “articulable facts” court order, and basic subscriber information with a subpoena. See 18 U.S.C. §§

2701-11 (discussed in Chapter 3, infra). These statutory procedures comply with the Fourth Amendment because

customers of Internet service providers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in customer account records

maintained by and for the provider’s business. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp.2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va.

1999), aff’d, 225 F.3d 656, 2000 WL 1062039 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion) (finding no Fourth

Amendment protection for network account holder’s basic subscriber information obtained from Internet service

provider); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1110) (D. Kan. 2000) (same). This rule accords with

prior cases considering the scope of Fourth Amendment protection in customer account records. See, e.g., United

States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1321 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a telephone company customer has no

reasonable expectation of privacy in account information disclosed to the telephone company); In re Grand Jury

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Proceedings, 827 F.2d 301, 302-03 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that customer account records maintained and held by

Western Union are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection).

4. Private Searches

The Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches conducted by private parties who are not acting as agents

of the government.

● 

 The Fourth Amendment “is wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a

private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any

governmental official.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). As a result, no violation of the Fourth

Amendment occurs when a private individual acting on his own accord conducts a search and makes the results

available to law enforcement. See id. For example, in United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 1998), the

defendant took his computer to a private computer specialist for repairs. In the course of evaluating the defendant’s

computer, the repairman observed that many files stored on the computer had filenames characteristic of child

pornography. The repairman accessed the files, saw that they did in fact contain child pornography, and then

contacted the state police. The tip led to a warrant, the defendant’s arrest, and his conviction for child pornography

offenses. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s claim that the repairman’s warrantless search

through the computer violated the Fourth Amendment. Because the repairman’s search was conducted on his own,

the court held, the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search or his later description of the evidence to the state

police. See id. at 993. See also United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1112 (D. Kan. 2000) (concluding

that searches of defendant’s computer over the Internet by an anonymous caller and employees of a private ISP did

not violate Fourth Amendment because there was no evidence that the government was involved in the search).

 In United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), the Supreme Court presented the framework that should

guide agents seeking to uncover evidence as a result of a private search. According to Jacobsen, agents who learn

of evidence via a private search can reenact the original private search without violating any reasonable expectation

of privacy. What the agents cannot do without a warrant is “exceed[] the scope of the private search.” Id. at 115. 

See also United States v. Miller, 152 F.3d 813, 815-16 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430,

1434 (10th Cir. 1991). But see United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1999) (dicta) (stating that

Jacobsen does not permit law enforcement to reenact a private search of a private home or residence). This standard

requires agents to limit their investigation to the precise scope of the private search when searching without a

warrant after a private search has occurred. So long as the agents limit themselves to the scope of the private search,

the agents’ search will not violate the Fourth Amendment. However, as soon as agents exceed the scope of the

private warrantless search, any evidence uncovered may be suppressed. See United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d

929, 937 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (suppressing evidence of child pornography found on computer hard drive after agents

viewed more files than private technician had initially viewed during repair of defendant’s computer). In computer

cases, this aspect of Jacobsen means that private searches will often be useful partly as opportunities to provide the

probable cause needed to obtain a warrant for a further search. The fact that a private person has uncovered

evidence of a crime on another person’s computer does not permit agents to search the entire computer. Instead, the

private search permits the agents to view the evidence that the private search revealed, and, if necessary, to use that

evidence as a basis for procuring a warrant to search the rest of the computer.2

 Although most private search issues arise when private third parties intentionally examine property and offer

evidence of a crime to law enforcement, the same framework applies when third parties inadvertently expose

evidence of a crime to plain view. For example, in United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1996), a

defendant stored incriminating files in his brother’s safe. Later, thieves stole the safe, opened it, and abandoned it in

a public park. Police investigating the theft of the safe found the files scattered on the ground nearby, gathered

them, and then used them against the defendant in an unrelated case. The First Circuit held that the use of the files

did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because the files were made openly available by the thieves’ private search. 

See id. at 26-27 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113).

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 Importantly, the fact that the person conducting a search is not a government employee does not necessarily

mean that the search is “private” for Fourth Amendment purposes. A search by a private party will be considered a

Fourth Amendment government search “if the private party act[s] as an instrument or agent of the Government.”

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). The Supreme Court has offered little

guidance on when private conduct can be attributed to the government; the Court has merely stated that this question

“necessarily turns on the degree of the Government’s participation in the private party’s activities, . . . a question

that can only be resolved ‘in light of all the circumstances.’” Id. at 614-15 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971)). In the absence of a more definitive standard, the various federal Courts of Appeals have

adopted a range of approaches for distinguishing between private and government searches. About half of the

circuits apply a ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach that examines three factors: whether the government knows

of or acquiesces in the intrusive conduct; whether the party performing the search intends to assist law enforcement

efforts at the time of the search; and whether the government affirmatively encourages, initiates or instigates the

private action. See, e.g., United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d

1240, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417-18 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1990). Other circuits have adopted more rule-like formulations that focus

on only two of these factors. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that

private action counts as government conduct if, at the time of the search, the government knew of or acquiesced in

the intrusive conduct, and the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts); United States

v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir. 1985)

(holding that a private individual is a state actor for Fourth Amendment purposes if the police instigated, encouraged

or participated in the search, and the individual engaged in the search with the intent of assisting the police in their

investigative efforts).

C. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement in Cases Involving Computers

 Warrantless searches that violate a reasonable expectation of privacy will comply with the Fourth Amendment

if they fall within an established exception to the warrant requirement. Cases involving computers often raise

questions relating to how these “established” exceptions apply to new technologies.

1. Consent

 Agents may search a place or object without a warrant or even probable cause if a person with authority has

voluntarily consented to the search. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). This consent may

be explicit or implicit. See United States v. Milian-Rodriguez, 759 F.2d 1558, 1563-64 (11th Cir. 1985). Whether

consent was voluntarily given is a question of fact that the court must decide by considering the totality of the

circumstances. While no single aspect controls the result, the Supreme Court has identified the following important

factors: the age, education, intelligence, physical and mental condition of the person giving consent; whether the

person was under arrest; and whether the person had been advised of his right to refuse consent. See Schneckloth,

412 U.S. at 226. The government carries the burden of proving that consent was voluntary. See United States v.

Price, 599 F.2d 494, 503 (2d Cir. 1979).

 In computer crime cases, two consent issues arise particularly often. First, when does a search exceed the

scope of consent? For example, when a target consents to the search of a machine, to what extent does the consent

authorize the retrieval of information stored in the machine? Second, who is the proper party to consent to a

search? Do roommates, friends, and parents have the authority to consent to a search of another person’s computer

files?3

a) Scope of Consent

 “The scope of a consent to search is generally defined by its expressed object, and is limited by the breadth of

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the consent given.” United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363, 1368 (10th Cir. 1998). The standard for measuring the

scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is objective reasonableness: “What would the typical reasonable

person have understood by the exchange between the [agent] and the [person granting consent]?” Florida v. Jimeno,

500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). This requires a fact-intensive inquiry into whether it was reasonable for the agent to

believe that the scope of consent included the items searched. Id. Of course, when the limits of the consent are

clearly given, either before or during the search, agents must respect these bounds. See Vaughn v. Baldwin, 950

F.2d 331, 333 (6th Cir. 1991).

● The permitted scope of consent searches depends on the facts of each case.

 Computer cases often raise the question of whether consent to search a location or item implicitly includes

consent to access the memory of electronic storage devices encountered during the search. In such cases, courts

look to whether the particular circumstances of the agents’ request for consent implicitly or explicitly limited the

scope of the search to a particular type, scope, or duration. Because this approach ultimately relies on fact-driven

notions of common sense, results reached in published opinions have hinged upon subtle (if not entirely inscrutable)

distinctions. Compare United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that consent to “look

inside” a car included consent to retrieve numbers stored inside pagers found in car’s back seat) with United States

v. Blas, 1990 WL 265179, at *20 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (holding that consent to “look at” a pager did not include consent

to activate pager and retrieve numbers, because looking at pager could be construed to mean “what the device is, or

how small it is, or what brand of pager it may be”). See alsoUnited States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir.

1999) (reading written consent form extremely narrowly, so that consent to seizure of “any property” under the

defendant’s control and to “a complete search of the premises and property” at the defendant’s address merely

permitted the agents to seize the defendant’s computer from his apartment, but did not permit them to search the

computer off-site because it was no longer located at the defendant’s address). Prosecutors can strengthen their

argument that the scope of consent included consent to search electronic storage devices by relying on analogous

cases involving closed containers. See, e.g., United States v. Galante, 1995 WL 507249, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

(holding that general consent to search car included consent to have officer access memory of cellular telephone

found in the car, relying on circuit precedent involving closed containers); Reyes, 922 F. Supp. at 834.

 Agents should be especially careful about relying on consent as the basis for a search of a computer when they

obtain consent for one reason but then wish to conduct a search for another reason. In two recent cases, the Courts

of Appeals suppressed images of child pornography found on computers after agents procured the defendant’s

consent to search his property for other evidence. In United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 1999), detectives

searching for physical evidence of an attempted sexual assault obtained written consent from the victim’s neighbor

to search the neighbor’s “premises” and “personal property.” Before the neighbor signed the consent form, the

detectives discovered a large knife and blood stains in his apartment, and explained to him that they were looking

for more evidence of the assault that the suspect might have left behind. See id. at 86. While several agents

searched for physical evidence, one detective searched the contents of the neighbor’s personal computer and

discovered stored images of child pornography. The neighbor was charged with possessing child pornography. On

interlocutory appeal, the First Circuit held that the search of the computer exceeded the scope of consent and

suppressed the evidence. According to the Court, the detectives’ statements that they were looking for signs of the

assault limited the scope of consent to the kind of physical evidence that an intruder might have left behind. See id. 

at 88. By transforming the search for physical evidence into a search for computer files, the detective had exceeded

the scope of consent. See id. See alsoCarey, 172 F.3d at 1277 (Baldock, J., concurring) (concluding that agents

exceeded scope of consent by searching computer after defendant signed broadly-worded written consent form,

because agents told defendant

that they were looking for drugs and drug-related items rather than computer files containing child pornography)

(citing Turner).

It is a good practice for agents to use written consent forms that state explicitly that the scope of consent

includes consent to search computers and other electronic storage devices.

● 

 Because the decisions evaluating the scope of consent to search computers have reached sometimes

unpredictable results, investigators should indicate the scope of the search explicitly when obtaining a suspect’s

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consent to search a computer.

b) Third-Party Consent

 i) General Rules

 It is common for several people to use or own the same computer equipment. If any one of those people gives

permission to search for data, agents may generally rely on that consent, so long as the person has authority over the

computer. In such cases, all users have assumed the risk that a co-user might discover everything in the computer,

and might also permit law enforcement to search this “common area” as well.

 The watershed case in this area is United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). In Matlock, the Supreme

Court stated that one who has “common authority” over premises or effects may consent to a search even if an

absent co-user objects. Id. at 171. According to the Court, the common authority that establishes the right of

third-party consent requires

mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so

that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in

his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the

common area to be searched.

Id. at 171 n.7.

 Under the Matlock approach, a private third party may consent to a search of property under the third party’s

joint access or control. Agents may view what the third party may see without violating any reasonable expectation

of privacy so long as they limit the search to the zone of the consenting third party’s common authority. See United

States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119 (1984) (noting that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when a private third

party invites the government to view the contents of a package under the third party’s control). This rule often

requires agents to inquire into third parties’s rights of access before conducting a consent search, and to draw lines

between those areas that fall within the third party’s common authority and those areas outside of the third party’s

control. See United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that a mother could consent to a

general search of her 23-year-old son’s room, but could not consent to a search of a locked footlocker found in the

room). Because the joint access test does not require a unity of interests between the suspect and the third party,

however, Matlock permits third-party consent even when the target of the search is present and refuses to consent to

the search. See United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that woman had authority to

consent to search of apartment she shared with her boyfriend even though boyfriend refused consent).

 Courts have not squarely addressed whether a suspect’s decision to password-protect or encrypt files stored in

a jointly-used computer denies co-users the right to consent to a search of the files under Matlock. However, it

appears likely that encryption and password-protection would in most cases indicate the absence of common

authority to consent to a search among co-users who do not know the password or possess the encryption key. 

Compare United States v. Smith, 27 F. Supp.2d 1111, 1115-16 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (concluding that a woman could

consent to a search of her boyfriend’s computer located in their house, and noting that the boyfriend had not

password-protected his files) with Block, 590 F.2d at 541 (concluding that a mother could not consent to search of a

locked footlocker in her son’s room where she did not possess the key). Conversely, if the co-user has been given

the password or encryption key by the suspect, then she probably has the requisite common authority to consent to a

search of the files under Matlock. See United States v. Murphy, 506 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)

(concluding that an employee could consent to a search of an employer’s locked warehouse because the employee

possessed the key, and finding “special significance” in the fact that the employer had himself delivered the key to

the employee).

 As a practical matter, agents may have little way of knowing the precise bounds of a third party’s common

authority when the agents obtain third-party consent to conduct a search. When queried, consenting third parties

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may falsely claim that they have common authority over property. In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), the

Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not automatically require suppression of evidence discovered

during a consent search when it later comes to light that the third party who consented to the search lacked the

authority to do so. See id. at 188-89. Instead, the Court held that agents can rely on a claim of authority to consent

if based on “the facts available to the officer at the moment, . . . a man of reasonable caution . . . [would believe] that

the consenting party had authority” to consent to a search of the premises. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). When agents reasonably rely on apparent authority to consent, the

resulting search does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

ii) Spouses and Domestic Partners

● Most spousal consent searches are valid.

 Absent an affirmative showing that the consenting spouse has no access to the property searched, the courts

generally hold that either spouse may consent to search all of the couple’s property. See, e.g., United States v.

Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 504-05 (7th Cir. 1992) (concluding that wife could consent to search of barn she did not use

because husband had not denied her the right to enter barn); United States v. Long, 524 F.2d 660, 661 (9th Cir.

1975) (holding that wife who had left her husband could consent to search of jointly-owned home even though

husband had changed the locks). For example, in United States v. Smith, 27 F. Supp.2d 1111 (C.D. Ill. 1998), a

man named Smith was living with a woman named Ushman and her two daughters. When allegations of child

molestation were raised against Smith, Ushman consented to the search of his computer, which was located in the

house in an alcove connected to the master bedroom. Although Ushman used Smith’s computer only rarely, the

district court held that she could consent to the search of Smith’s computer. Because Ushman was not prohibited

from entering the alcove and Smith had not password-protected the computer, the court reasoned, she had authority

to consent to the search. See id. at 1115-16. Even if she lacked actual authority to consent, the court added, she had

apparent authority to consent. See id. at 1116 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez).

 iii) Parents

Parents can consent to searches of their children’s rooms when the children are under 18 years old. If the

children are 18 or older, the parents may or may not be able to consent, depending on the facts.

● 

 In some computer crime cases, the perpetrators are relatively young and reside with their parents. When the

perpetrator is a minor, parental consent to search the perpetrator’s property and living space will almost always be

valid. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 8.4(b) at 283 (2d ed. 1987)

(noting that courts have rejected “even rather extraordinary efforts by [minor] child[ren] to establish exclusive

use.”).

 When the sons and daughters who reside with their parents are legal adults, however, the issue is more

complicated. Under Matlock, it is clear that parents may consent to a search of common areas in the family home

regardless of the perpetrator’s age. See, e.g., United States v. Lavin, 1992 WL 373486, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)

(recognizing right of parents to consent to search of basement room where son kept his computer and files). When

agents would like to search an adult child’s room or other private areas, however, agents cannot assume that the

adult’s parents have authority to consent. Although courts have offered divergent approaches, they have paid

particular attention to three factors: the suspect’s age; whether the suspect pays rent; and whether the suspect has

taken affirmative steps to deny his or her parents access to the suspect’s room or private area. When suspects are

older, pay rent, and/or deny access to parents, courts have generally held that parents may not consent. See United

States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding “cursory questioning” of suspect’s mother

insufficient to establish right to consent to search of 29-year-old son’s room); United States v. Durham, 1998 WL

684241, at *4 (D. Kan. 1998) (mother had neither apparent nor actual authority to consent to search of 24-year-old

son’s room, because son had changed the locks to the room without telling his mother, and son also paid rent for the

room). In contrast, parents usually may consent if their adult children do not pay rent, are fairly young, and have

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taken no steps to deny their parents access to the space to be searched. See United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323,

1331 (10th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that parents are presumed to have authority to consent to a search of their

18-year-old son’s room because he did not pay rent); United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978)

(mother could consent to police search of 23-year-old son’s room when son did not pay rent).

 iv) System Administrators

 Every computer network is managed by a “system administrator” or “system operator” whose job is to keep

the network running smoothly, monitor security, and repair the network when problems arise. System operators

have “root level” access to the systems they administer, which effectively grants them master keys to open any

account and read any file on their systems. When investigators suspect that a network account contains relevant

evidence, they may feel inclined to seek the system administrator’s consent to search the contents of that account.

 As a practical matter, the primary barrier to searching a network account pursuant to a system administrator’s

consent is statutory, not constitutional. System administrators typically serve as agents of “provider[s] of electronic

communication service” under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11. 

ECPA regulates law enforcement efforts to obtain the consent of a system administrator to search an individual’s 

account. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702-03. Accordingly, any attempt to obtain a system administrator’s consent to search

an account must comply with ECPA. See generally Chapter 3, “The Electronic Communications Privacy Act,”

infra.

 To the extent that ECPA authorizes system administrators to consent to searches, the resulting consent

searches will in most cases comply with the Fourth Amendment. The first reason is that individuals may not retain a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the remotely stored files and records that their network accounts contain. See

generally Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Third Party Possession, supra. If an individual does not retain a

constitutionally reasonable expectation of privacy in his remotely stored files, it will not matter whether the system

administrator has the necessary joint control over the account needed to satisfy the Matlock test because a

subsequent search will not violate the Fourth Amendment.

 In the event that a court holds that an individual does possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in remotely

stored account files, whether a system administrator’s consent would satisfy Matlock should depend on the

circumstances. Clearly, the system administrator’s access to all network files does not by itself provide the common

authority that triggers authority to consent. In the pre-Matlock case of Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), the

Supreme Court held that a hotel clerk lacked the authority to consent to the search of a hotel room. Although the

clerk was permitted to enter the room to perform his duties, and the guest had left his room key with the clerk, the

Court concluded that the clerk could not consent to the search. If the hotel guest’s protection from unreasonable

searches and seizures “were left to depend on the unfettered discretion of an employee of the hotel,” Justice Stewart

reasoned, it would “disappear.” Id. at 490. See also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (holding that a

landlord lacks authority to consent to search of premises used by tenant); United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191,

199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that store clerk lacks authority to consent to search of packages left with clerk for

safekeeping). To the extent that the access of a system operator to a network account is analogous to the access of a

hotel clerk to a hotel room, the claim that a system operator may consent to a search of Fourth

Amendment-protected files is weak. Cf. Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d at 938 (holding that computer repairman’s right to

access files for limited purpose of repairing computer did not create authority to consent to government search

through files).

 Of course, the hotel clerk analogy may be inadequate in some circumstances. For example, an employee

generally does not have the same relationship with the system administrator of his company’s network as a customer

of a private ISP such as AOL might have with the ISP’s system administrator. The company may grant the system

administrator of the company network full rights to access employee accounts for any work-related reason, and the

employees may know that the system administrator has such access. In circumstances such as this, the system

administrator would likely have sufficient common authority over the accounts to be able to consent to a search. 

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See generally Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: Establishing Fourth Amendment Protection for Internet

Communication, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1591, 1602-03 (1997). See also United States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 85 (4th Cir.

1993) (holding that a drug courier hired to transport the defendant’s locked toolbox containing drugs had common

authority under Matlock to consent to a search of the toolbox stored in the courier’s trunk). Further, in the case of a

government network, the Fourth Amendment rules would likely differ dramatically from the rules that apply to

private networks. See generally O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (explaining how the Fourth Amendment

applies within government workplaces) (discussed infra).

c) Implied Consent

 Individuals often enter into agreements with the government in which they waive some of their Fourth

Amendment rights. For example, prison guards may agree to be searched for drugs as a condition of employment,

and visitors to government buildings may agree to a limited search of their person and property as a condition of

entrance. Similarly, users of computer systems may waive their rights to privacy as a condition of using the

systems. When individuals who have waived their rights are then searched and challenge the searches on Fourth

Amendment grounds, courts typically focus on whether the waiver eliminated the individual’s reasonable

expectation of privacy against the search. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union, Columbus Area Local

AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service, 871 F.2d 556, 56-61 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that postal employees

retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in government lockers after signing waivers).

 A few courts have approached the same problem from a slightly different direction and have asked whether the

waiver established implied consent to the search. According to the doctrine of implied consent, consent to a search

may be inferred from an individual’s conduct. For example, in United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1977),

a civilian visiting a naval air station agreed to post a visitor’s pass on the windshield of his car as a condition of

bringing the car on the base. The pass stated that “[a]cceptance of this pass gives your consent to search this vehicle

while entering, aboard, or leaving this station.” Id. at 865 n.1. During the visitor’s stay on the base, a station

investigator who suspected that the visitor had stored marijuana in the car approached the visitor and asked him if he

had read the pass. After the visitor admitted that he had, the investigator searched the car and found 20 plastic bags

containing marijuana. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the warrantless search of the car was permissible, because the

visitor had impliedly consented to the search when he knowingly and voluntarily entered the base with full

knowledge of the terms of the visitor’s pass. See id. at 866-67.

 Ellis notwithstanding, it must be noted that several circuits have been critical of the implied consent doctrine in

the Fourth Amendment context. Despite the Fifth Circuit’s broad construction, other courts have proven reluctant to

apply the doctrine absent evidence that the suspect actually knew of the search and voluntarily consented to it at the

time the search occurred. See McGann v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 8 F.3d 1174, 1179 (7th

Cir. 1993) (“Courts confronted with claims of implied consent have been reluctant to uphold a warrantless search

based simply on actions taken in the light of a posted notice.”); Securities and Law Enforcement Employees, District

Council 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 202 n.23 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting argument that prison guards impliedly

consented to search by accepting employment at prison where consent to search was a condition of employment). 

Absent such evidence, these courts have preferred to examine general waivers of Fourth Amendment rights solely

under the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. See id.

2. Exigent Circumstances

 Under the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement, agents can search without a warrant

if the circumstances “would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical

harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other

consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.” See United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d

728, 742 (9th Cir. 1985). In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, agents should consider: (1) the

degree of urgency involved, (2) the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant, (3) whether the evidence is about

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to be removed or destroyed, (4) the possibility of danger at the site, (5) information indicating the possessors of the

contraband know the police are on their trail, and (6) the ready destructibility of the contraband. See United States

v. Reed, 935 F.2d 641, 642 (4th Cir. 1991).

 Exigent circumstances often arise in computer cases because electronic data is perishable. Computer

commands can destroy data in a matter of seconds, as can humidity, temperature, physical mutilation, or magnetic

fields created, for example, by passing a strong magnet over a disk. For example, in United States v. David, 756 F.

Supp. 1385 (D. Nev. 1991), agents saw the defendant deleting files on his computer memo book, and seized the

computer immediately. The district court held that the agents did not need a warrant to seize the memo book

because the defendant’s acts had created exigent circumstances. See id. at 1392. Similarly, in United States v.

Romero-Garcia, 991 F. Supp. 1223, 1225 (D. Or. 1997), aff’d on other grounds 168 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 1999), a

district court held that agents had properly accessed the information in an electronic pager in their possession

because they had reasonably believed that it was necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. The information

stored in pagers is readily destroyed, the court noted: incoming messages can delete stored information, and batteries

can die, erasing the information. Accordingly, the agents were justified in accessing the pager without first

acquiring a warrant. See id. See also United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (in conducting search

incident to arrest, agents were justified in retrieving numbers from pager because pager information is easily

destroyed). Of course, in computer cases, as in all others, the existence of exigent circumstances is absolutely tied

to the facts. Compare Romero-Garcia, 911 F. Supp. at 1225 with David, 756 F. Supp at 1392 n.2 (dismissing as

“lame” the government’s argument that exigent circumstances supported search of a battery-operated computer

because the agent did not know how much longer the computer’s batteries would live) and United States v. Reyes,

922 F. Supp. 818, 835-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that exigent circumstances could not justify search of a

pager because the government agent unlawfully created the exigency by turning on the pager).

 Importantly, the existence of exigent circumstances does not permit agents to search or seize beyond what is

necessary to prevent the destruction of the evidence. When the exigency ends, the right to conduct warrantless

searches does as well: the need to take certain steps to prevent the destruction of evidence does not authorize agents

to take further steps without a warrant. See United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 110-11 (1st Cir. 1995). Accordingly,

the seizure of computer hardware to prevent the destruction of information it contains will not ordinarily support a

subsequent search of that information without a warrant. See David, 756 F. Supp. at 1392.

3. Plain View

 Evidence of a crime may be seized without a warrant under the plain view exception to the warrant

requirement. To rely on this exception, the agent must be in a lawful position to observe and access the evidence,

and its incriminating character must be immediately apparent. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). For

example, if an agent conducts a valid search of a hard drive and comes across evidence of an unrelated crime while

conducting the search, the agent may seize the evidence under the plain view doctrine.

The plain view doctrine does not authorize agents to open a computer file and view its contents. The contents

of an unopened computer file are not in plain view.

● 

 Importantly, the plain view exception cannot justify violations of an individual’s reasonable expectation of

privacy. The exception merely permits the seizure of evidence that has already been viewed in accordance with the

Fourth Amendment. In computer cases, this means that the government cannot rely on the plain view exception to

justify opening a closed computer file.4 The contents of a file that must be opened to be viewed are not in ‘plain

view.’ See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 422 (C.A.A.F. 1996). This rule accords with decisions applying

the plain view exception to closed containers. See, e.g., United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir.

1992) (concluding that labels fixed to opaque 55-gallon drums do not expose the contents of the drums to plain

view). (“[A] label on a container is not an invitation to search it. If the government seeks to learn more than the

label reveals by opening the container, it generally must obtain a search warrant.”).

 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999), provides a useful example. In Carey, a police

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detective searching a hard drive with a warrant for drug trafficking evidence opened a “jpg” file and instead

discovered child pornography. At that point, the detective abandoned the search for drug trafficking evidence and

spent five hours accessing and downloading several hundred “jpg” files in a search for more child pornography. 

When the defendant moved to exclude the child pornography files on the ground that they were seized beyond the

scope of the warrant, the government argued that the detective had seized the “jpg” files properly because the

contents of the contraband files were in plain view. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument with respect to all of

the files except for the first “jpg” file the detective discovered. See id. at 1273, 1273 n.4. Although the court’s

reasoning is somewhat opaque, this aspect of Carey seems sensible. The plain view exception permits agents to

seize property found in plain view, not to infringe a suspect’s right to privacy until his property comes into plain

view. As a result, the detective could seize the first “jpg” file that came into plain view when the detective was

executing the search warrant, but could not rely on the plain view exception to justify the search for additional “jpg”

files on the defendant’s computers that were beyond the scope of the warrant.

4. Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest

 Pursuant to a lawful arrest, agents may conduct a “full search” of the arrested person, and a more limited

search of his surrounding area, without a warrant. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Chimel

v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). For example, in Robinson, a police officer conducting a patdown search

incident to an arrest for a traffic offense discovered a crumpled cigarette package in the suspect’s left breast pocket. 

Not knowing what the package contained, the officer opened the package and discovered fourteen capsules of

heroin. The Supreme Court held that the search of the package was permissible, even though the officer had no

articulable reason to open the package. See id. at 234-35. In light of the general need to preserve evidence and

prevent harm to the arresting officer, the Court reasoned, it was perse reasonable for an officer to conduct a “full

search of the person” pursuant to a lawful arrest. Id. at 235.

 Due to the increasing use of handheld and portable computers and other electronic storage devices, agents

often encounter computers when conducting searches incident to lawful arrests. Suspects may be carrying pagers,

Personal Digital Assistants (such as Palm Pilots), or even laptop computers when they are arrested. Does the

search-incident-to-arrest exception permit an agent to access the memory of an electronic storage device found on

the arrestee’s person during a warrantless search incident to arrest? In the case of electronic pagers, the answer

clearly is “yes.” Relying on Robinson, courts have uniformly permitted agents to access electronic pagers carried by

the arrested person at the time of arrest. See United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

(holding that accessing numbers in a pager found in bag attached to defendant’s wheelchair within twenty minutes

of arrest falls within search-incident-to-arrest exception); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Cal.

1993); United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 287 (D.V.I. 1995); Yu v. United States, 1997 WL 423070

(S.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 404 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997) (dicta). See also United States v.

Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (same holding, but relying on an exigency theory).

 Courts have not yet addressed whether Robinson will permit warrantless searches of electronic storage devices

that contain more information than pagers. In the paper world, certainly, cases have allowed extensive searches of

written materials discovered incident to lawful arrests. For example, courts have uniformly held that agents may

inspect the entire contents of a suspect’s wallet found on his person. See, e.g., United States v. Castro, 596 F.2d

674, 676 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing cases). Similarly,

one court has held that agents could photocopy the entire contents of an address book found on the defendant’s

person during the arrest, see United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993), and others have

permitted the search of a defendant’s briefcase that was at his side at the time of arrest. See, e.g., United States v.

Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lam Muk Chiu, 522 F.2d 330, 332 (2d Cir. 1975). 

If agents can examine the contents of wallets, address books, and briefcases without a warrant, it could be argued

that they should be able to search their electronic counterparts (such as electronic organizers, floppy disks, and Palm

Pilots) as well. Cf. United v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that agents searching a car incident

to a valid arrest properly seized a Zip disk found in the car, but failing to discuss whether the agents obtained a

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warrant before searching the disk for images of child pornography).

 The limit on this argument is that any search incident to an arrest must be reasonable. See Swain v. Spinney,

117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997). While a search of physical items found on the arrestee’s person may always be

reasonable, more invasive searches in different circumstances may violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g. Mary

Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1269-71 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that Robinson does not permit strip

searches incident to arrest because such searches are not reasonable in context). For example, the increasing storage

capacity of handheld computers suggests that Robinson’s bright line rule may not always apply in the case of

electronic searches. Courts may conclude that a quick search through a pager that stores a few phone numbers is

reasonable incident to an arrest, but that a very time-consuming search through a handheld computer that contains an

entire warehouse of information presents a different case. Cf. United States v. O’Razvi, 1998 WL 405048, at *7 n.7

(S.D.N.Y. 1998). When in doubt, agents should obtain a search warrant before examining the contents of electronic

storage devices that might contain large amounts of information.

5. Inventory Searches

 Law enforcement officers routinely inventory the items they have seized. Such “inventory searches” are

reasonable — and therefore fall under an exception to the warrant requirement — when two conditions are met. 

First, the search must serve a legitimate, non-investigatory purpose (e.g., to protect an owner’s property while in

custody; to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property; or to guard the police from danger) that

outweighs the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644

(1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). Second, the search must follow standardized

procedures. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 n.6 (1987); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990).

 It is unlikely that the inventory-search exception to the warrant requirement would support a search through

seized computer files. See O’Razvi, 1998 WL 405048, at *6-7 (noting the difficulties of applying the

inventory-search requirements to computer disks). Even assuming that standard procedures authorized such a

search, the legitimate purposes served by inventory searches in the physical world do not translate well into the

intangible realm. Information does not generally need to be reviewed to be protected, and does not pose a risk of

physical danger. Although an owner could claim that his computer files were altered or deleted while in police

custody, examining the contents of the files would offer little protection from tampering. Accordingly, agents will

generally need to obtain a search warrant in order to examine seized computer files held in custody.

6. Border Searches

 In order to protect the government’s ability to monitor contraband and other property that may enter or exit the

United States illegally, the Supreme Court has recognized a special exception to the warrant requirement for

searches that occur at the border of the United States. According to the Court, “routine searches” at the border or its

functional equivalent do not require a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion that the search may

uncover contraband or evidence. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985). Searches that

are especially intrusive require at least reasonable suspicion, however. See id.. at 541. These rules apply to people

and property both entering and exiting the United States. See United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1297 (4th Cir.

1995).

 At least one court has interpreted the border search exception to permit a warrantless search of a computer disk

for contraband computer files. In United States v. Roberts, 86 F. Supp.2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 2000), United States

Customs Agents learned that William Roberts, a suspect believed to be carrying computerized images of child

pornography, was scheduled to fly from Houston, Texas to Paris, France on a particular day. On the day of the

flight, the agents set up an inspection area in the jetway at the Houston airport with the sole purpose of searching

Roberts. Roberts arrived at the inspection area and was told by the agents that they were searching for “currency”

and “high technology or other data” that could not be exported legally. Id. at 681. After the agents searched

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Roberts’ property and found a laptop computer and six Zip diskettes, Roberts agreed to sign a consent form

permitting the agents to search his property. A subsequent search revealed several thousand images of child

pornography. See id. at 682. When charges were brought, Roberts moved for suppression of the computer files, but

the district court ruled that the search had not violated the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the search of

Roberts’ luggage had been a “routine search” for which no suspicion was required, even though the justification for

the search offered by the agents merely had been a pretext. See id. at 686 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.

806 (1996)). The court also concluded that Roberts’ consent justified the search of the laptop and diskettes, and

indicated that even if Roberts had not consented to the search, “[t]he search of the defendant’s computer and

diskettes would have been a routine export search, valid under the Fourth Amendment.” See Roberts, 98 F. Supp.2d

at 688.

 Importantly, agents and prosecutors should not interpret Roberts as permitting the interception of data

transmitted electronically to and from the United States. Any real-time interception of electronically transmitted

data in the United States must comply strictly with the requirements of Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22. See

generally Chapter 4. Further, once electronically transferred data from outside the United States arrives at its

destination within the United States, the government ordinarily cannot rely on the border search exception to search

for and seize the data because the data is no longer at the border or its functional equivalent. Cf.Almeida-Sanchez v.

United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1973) (concluding that a search that occurred 25 miles from the United States

border did not qualify for the border search exception, even though the search occurred on a highway known as a

common route for illegal aliens, because it did not occur at the border or its functional equivalent).

7. International Issues

 Outside the United States border, searching and seizing electronic evidence raises difficult questions of both

law and policy. Because the Internet is a global network, international issues may arise in many cases; even a

domestic investigation may involve a computer system, data, witness or subject located in a foreign jurisdiction. In

such cases, the Fourth Amendment may or may not apply, depending on the circumstances. See generally United

States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (considering the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to

searches outside of the United States). However, international policies regarding sovereignty and privacy may

require the United States to take actions ranging from informal notice to a formal request for assistance to the

country concerned.

 This manual will not attempt to provide detailed guidance on how to resolve international issues that arise in

such cases. Investigators and prosecutors should contact the Office of International Affairs at (202) 514-0000 for

assistance. However, a few basic principles can be stated here. The United States maintains approximately 40

bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty relationships and many other relationships pursuant to letters rogatory or

other longstanding means of cooperation. While cooperation with respect to computer and electronic evidence is

under further development internationally, these treaty structures and ongoing relationships continue to provide the

legal and practical means by which the United States both seeks and provides legal assistance. When agents learn

prior to a search that some of all of the data to be searched is located in a foreign jurisdiction, they should seek

advice from the Office of International Affairs as to the need for and appropriate means to seek assistance from that

country.

 When immediate international assistance is required, the international network of 24-hour Points of Contact

established by the High-tech Crime Subgroup of the G-8 countries can provide assistance, such as preserving data

and assisting in real-time tracing of cross-border communications. See generally Michael A. Sussmann, The

Critical Challenges from International High-Tech and Computer-Related Crime at the Millennium, 9 Duke J.

Comp. & Int’l L. 451, 484 (1999). The network is available twenty-four hours a day to respond to urgent requests

for assistance in international high-tech crime investigations, or cases involving electronic evidence. The

membership currently includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Russia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States, and continues to

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grow. The Point of Contact for the United States is CCIPS, which can be contacted at (202) 514-1026 during

regular business hours, or, after hours, through the DOJ Command Center at (202) 514-5000. CCIPS also has

computer crime law enforcement contacts in countries beyond members of the network; agents and prosecutors can

call CCIPS for assistance.

 Finally, international issues may also arise when the United States responds to foreign requests for

international legal assistance for computer and electronic evidence. Investigators and prosecutors can the Office of

International Affairs ((202) 514-0000) or CCIPS for additional advice.

D. Special Case: Workplace Searches

 Warrantless workplace searches deserve a separate analysis because they occur often in computer cases and

raise unusually complicated legal issues. The primary cause of the analytical difficulty is the Supreme Court’s

complex decision in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). Under O’Connor, the legality of warrantless

workplace searches depends on often-subtle factual distinctions such as whether the workplace is public sector or

private sector, whether employment policies exist that authorize a search, and whether the search is work-related.

 Every warrantless workplace search must be evaluated carefully on its facts. In general, however, law

enforcement officers can conduct a warrantless search of private (i.e., non-government) workplaces only if the

officers obtain the consent of either the employer or another employee with common authority over the area

searched. In public (i.e., government) workplaces, officers cannot rely on an employer’s consent, but can conduct

searches if written employment policies or office practices establish that the government employees targeted by the

search cannot reasonably expect privacy in their workspace. Further, government employers and supervisors can

conduct reasonable work-related searches of employee workspaces without a warrant even if the searches violate

employees’ reasonable expectation of privacy.

 One cautionary note is in order before we proceed. This discussion evaluates the legality of warrantless

workplace searches of computers under the Fourth Amendment. In many cases, however, workplace searches will

implicate federal privacy statutes in addition to the Fourth Amendment. For example, efforts to obtain an

employee’s files and e-mail from the employer’s network server raise issues under the Electronic Communications

Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (discussed in Chapter 3), and workplace monitoring of an employee’s Internet

use implicates Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (discussed in Chapter 4). Before conducting a workplace search,

investigators must make sure that their search will not violate either the Fourth Amendment or relevant federal

privacy statutes. Investigators should contact CCIPS at (202) 514-1026 or the CTC in their district for further

assistance.

1. Private Sector Workplace Searches

 The rules for conducting warrantless searches and seizures in private-sector workplaces generally mirror the

rules for conducting warrantless searches in homes and other personal residences. Private company employees

generally retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their workplaces. As a result, private-workplace searches by

law enforcement will usually require a warrant unless the agents can obtain the consent of an employer or a

co-worker with common authority.

a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Private-Sector Workplaces

 Private-sector employees will usually retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their office space. In

Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), police officers conducted a warrantless search of an office at a local

union headquarters that defendant Frank DeForte shared with several other union officials. In response to DeForte’s

claim that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the police officers argued that the joint use of the space

by DeForte’s co-workers made his expectation of privacy unreasonable. The Court disagreed, stating that DeForte

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“still could reasonably have expected that only [his officemates] and their personal or business guests would enter

the office, and that records would not be touched except with their permission or that of union higher-ups.” Id. at

369. Because only a specific group of people actually enjoyed joint access and use of DeForte’s office, the officers’

presence violated DeForte’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. See also United States v. Most, 876 F.2d

191, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[A]n individual need not shut himself off from the world in order to retain his fourth

amendment rights. He may invite his friends into his home but exclude the police; he may share his office with

co-workers without consenting to an official search.”); United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

(“One may freely admit guests of one’s choosing — or be legally obligated to admit specific persons — without

sacrificing one’s right to expect that a space will remain secure against all others.”). As a practical matter, then,

private employees will generally retain an expectation of privacy in their work space unless that space is “open to

the world at large.” Id. at 326.

b) Consent in Private Sector-Workplaces

 Although most non-government workplaces will support a reasonable expectation of privacy from a law

enforcement search, agents can defeat this expectation by obtaining the consent of a party who exercises common

authority over the area searched. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171. In practice, this means that agents can often

overcome the warrant requirement by obtaining the consent of the target’s employer or supervisor. Depending on

the facts, a co-worker’s consent may suffice as well.

 Private-sector employers and supervisors generally enjoy a broad authority to consent to searches in the

workplace. For example, in United States v. Gargiso, 456 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1972), a pre-Matlock case, agents

conducting a criminal investigation of an employee of a private company sought access to a locked, wired-off area

in the employer’s basement. The agents explained their needs to the company’s vice-president, who took the agents

to the basement and opened the basement with his key. When the employee attempted to suppress the evidence that

the agents discovered in the basement, the court held that the vice-president’s consent was effective. Because the

vice-president shared supervisory power over the basement with the employee, the court reasoned, he could consent

to the agents’ search of that area. Id. at 586-87. See also United States v. Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 296-97 (7th Cir.

1985) (holding that the owner of a hotel could consent to search of locked room used by hotel employee to store

records, even though owner did not carry a key, because employee worked at owner’s bidding); J.L. Foti Constr. Co.

v. Donovan, 786 F.2d 714, 716-17 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (holding that a general contractor’s superintendent

could consent to an inspection of an entire construction site, including subcontractor’s work area). In a close case,

an employment policy or computer network banner that establishes the employer’s right to consent to a workplace

search can help establish the employer’s common authority to consent under Matlock. See Appendix A.

 Agents should be careful about relying on a co-worker’s consent to conduct a workplace search. While

employers generally retain the right to access their employees’ work spaces, co-workers may or may not, depending

on the facts. When co-workers do exercise common authority over a workspace, however, investigators can rely on

a co-worker’s consent to search that space. For example, in United States v. Buettner-Janusch, 646 F.2d 759 (2d

Cir. 1981), a professor and an undergraduate research assistant at New York University consented to a search of an

NYU laboratory managed by a second professor suspected of using his laboratory to manufacture LSD and other

drugs. Although the search involved opening vials and several other closed containers, the Second Circuit held that

Matlock authorized the search because both consenting co-workers had been authorized to make full use of the lab

for their research. See id. at 765-66. See also United States v. Jenkins, 46 F.3d 447, 455-58 (5th Cir. 1995)

(allowing an employee to consent to a search of the employer’s property); United States v. Murphy, 506 F.2d 529,

530 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Longo, 70 F. Supp.2d 225, 256 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)

(allowing secretary to consent to search of employer’s computer). But see United States v. Buitrago Pelaez, 961 F.

Supp. 64, 67-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a receptionist could consent to a general search of the office, but not

of a locked safe to which receptionist did not know the combination).

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c) Employer Searches in Private-Sector Workplaces

 Warrantless workplace searches by private employers rarely violate the Fourth Amendment. So long as the

employer is not acting as an instrument or agent of the Government at the time of the search, the search is a private

search and the Fourth Amendment does not apply. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,

614 (1989).

2. Public-Sector Workplace Searches

 Although warrantless computer searches in private-sector workplaces follow familiar Fourth Amendment

rules, the application of the Fourth Amendment to public-sector workplace searches of computers presents a

different matter. In O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Supreme Court introduced a distinct framework

for evaluating warrantless searches in government workplaces that applies to computer searches. According to

O’Connor, a government employee can enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in his workplace. See id. at 717

(O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); Id. at 721 (Scalia, J., concurring). However, an expectation of privacy becomes

unreasonable if “actual office practices and procedures, or . . . legitimate regulation” permit the employee’s

supervisor, co-workers, or the public to enter the employee’s workspace. Id. at 717 (O’Connor, J., plurality

opinion). Further, employers can conduct “reasonable” warrantless searches even if the searches violate an

employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Such searches include work-related, noninvestigatory intrusions

(e.g., entering an employee’s locked office to retrieve a file) and reasonable investigations into work-related

misconduct. See id. at 725-26 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).

a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Public Workplaces

 The reasonable expectation of privacy test formulated by the O’Connor plurality asks whether a government

employee’s workspace is “so open to fellow employees or to the public that no expectation of privacy is

reasonable.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718 (plurality opinion). This standard differs significantly from the standard

analysis applied in private workplaces. Whereas private-sector employees enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy

in their workspace unless the space is “open to the world at large,” Lyons, 706 F.2d at 326, government employees

retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace only if a case-by-case inquiry into “actual office

practices and procedures” shows that it is reasonable for employees to expect that others will not enter their space. 

See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (plurality opinion); Rossi v. Town of Pelham, 35 F. Supp.2d. 58, 63 (D.N.H. 1997). 

See also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 730-31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the difference between the

expectation-of-privacy analysis offered by the O’Connor plurality and that traditionally applied in private workplace

searches). From a practical standpoint, then, public employees are less likely to retain a reasonable expectation of

privacy against government searches at work than are private employees.

 Courts evaluating public employees’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the wake of O’Connor have

considered the following factors: whether the work area in question is assigned solely to the employee; whether

others have access to the space; whether the nature of the employment requires a close working relationship with

others; whether office regulations place employees on notice that certain areas are subject to search; and whether the

property searched is public or private. See Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 179-80 (1st Cir.

1997) (summarizing cases); United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1993). In general, the courts have

rejected claims of an expectation of privacy in an office when the employee knew or should have known that others

could access the employee’s workspace. See e.g., Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding

that judge’s search through his law clerk’s desk and file cabinets did not violate the clerk’s reasonable expectation of

privacy because of the clerk’s close working relationship with the judge); Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d

483, 488 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that civilian engineer employed by the Navy who worked with classified

documents at an ordinance plant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office because investigators were

known to search employees’ offices for evidence of misconduct on a regular basis). But see United States v. Taketa,

923 F.2d 665, 673 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding in dicta that public employee retained expectation of privacy in office

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shared with several co-workers). In contrast, the courts have found that a search violates a public employee’s

reasonable expectation of privacy when the employee had no reason to expect that others would access the space

searched. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718-19 (plurality) (holding that physician at state hospital retained expectation

of privacy in his desk and file cabinets where there was no evidence that other employees could enter his office and

access its contents); Rossi, 35 F. Supp.2d at 64 (holding that town clerk enjoyed reasonable expectation of privacy

in 8' x 8' office that the public could not access and other town employees did not enter).

 While agents must evaluate whether a public employee retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

workplace on a case-by-case basis, official written employment policies can simplify the task dramatically. See

O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (plurality) (noting that “legitimate regulation” of the work place can reduce public

employees’ Fourth Amendment protections). Courts have uniformly deferred to public employers’ official policies

that expressly authorize access to the employee’s workspace, and have relied on such policies when ruling that the

employee cannot retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace. See American Postal Workers Union,

Columbus Area Local AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 871 F.2d 556, 56-61 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that

postal employees retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of government lockers after signing

waivers stating that lockers were subject to inspection at any time, even though lockers contained personal items);

United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217, 1219-1220 (9th Cir. 1975) (same, noting language in postal manual stating

that locker is “subject to search by supervisors and postal inspectors”). Of course, whether a specific policy

eliminates a reasonable expectation of privacy is a factual question. Employment policies that do not explicitly

address employee privacy may prove insufficient to eliminate Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Taketa, 923

F.2d at 672-73 (concluding that regulation requiring DEA employees to “maintain clean desks” did not defeat

workplace expectation of privacy of non-DEA employee assigned to DEA office).

When planning to search a government computer in a government workplace, agents should look for official

employment policies or “banners” that can eliminate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the computer.

● 

 Written employment policies and “banners” are particularly important in cases that consider whether

government employees enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in government computers. Banners are written

notices that greet users before they log on to a computer or computer network, and can inform users of the privacy

rights that they do or do not retain in their use of the computer or network. See generally Appendix A.

 In general, government employees who are notified that their employer has retained rights to access or inspect

information stored on the employer’s computers can have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information

stored there. For example, in United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000), computer specialists at a

division of the Central Intelligence Agency learned that an employee named Mark Simons had been using his

desktop computer at work to obtain pornography available on the Internet, in violation of CIA policy. The computer

specialists accessed Simons’ computer remotely without a warrant, and obtained copies of over a thousands picture

files that Simons had stored on his hard drive. Many of these picture files contained child pornography, which were

turned over to law enforcement. When Simons filed a motion to suppress the fruits of the remote search of his hard

drive, the Fourth Circuit held that the CIA division’s official Internet usage policy eliminated any reasonable

expectation of privacy that Simons might otherwise have in the copied files. See id. at 398. The policy stated that

the CIA division would “periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor [each] user’s Internet access as deemed

appropriate,” and that such auditing would be implemented “to support identification, termination, and prosecution

of unauthorized activity.” Id. at 395-96. Simons did not deny that he was aware of the policy. See id.v at 398 n.8. 

In light of the policy, the Fourth Circuit held, Simons did not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy “with regard

to the record or fruits of his Internet use,” including the files he had downloaded. Id. at 398.

 Other courts have agreed with the approach articulated in Simons and have held that banners and policies

generally eliminate a reasonable expectation of privacy in contents stored in a government employee’s network

account. See Wasson v. Sonoma County Junior College, 4 F. Supp.2d 893, 905-06 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that

public employer’s computer policy giving the employer “the right to access all information stored on [the

employer’s] computers” defeats an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy in files stored on employer’s

computers); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1235 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that police officers did not

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retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their use of a pager system, in part because the Chief of Police had

issued an order announcing that all messages would be logged); United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F.

2000) (holding that Air Force sergeant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his government e-mail

account because e-mail use was reserved for official business and network banner informed each user upon logging

on to the network that use was subject to monitoring). But see DeMaine v. Samuels, 2000 WL 1658586, at *7 (D.

Conn. 2000) (suggesting that the existence of an employment manual explicitly authorizing searches “weighs

heavily” in the determination of whether a government employee retained a reasonable expectation of privacy at

work, but “does not, on its own, dispose of the question”).

 Of course, whether a specific policy eliminates a reasonable expectation of privacy is a factual question. 

Agents and prosecutors must consider whether a given policy is sufficiently broad that it reasonably contemplates

the search to be conducted. If the policy is narrow, it may not waive the government employee’s reasonable

expectation of privacy against the search that the government plans to execute. For example, in Simons, the Fourth

Circuit concluded that although the CIA division’s Internet usage policy eliminated Simons’ reasonable expectation

of privacy in the fruits of his Internet use, it did not eliminate his reasonable expectation of privacy in the physical

confines of his office. See Simons, 206 F.3d at 399 n.10. Accordingly, the policy by itself was insufficient to

justify a physical entry into Simons’ office. See id. at 399. See also Taketa, 923 F.2d at 672-73 (concluding that

regulation requiring DEA employees to “maintain clean desks” did not defeat workplace expectation of privacy of

non-DEA employee assigned to DEA office). Sample banners appear in Appendix A.

b) “Reasonable” Workplace Searches Under O’Connor v. Ortega

Government employers and their agents can conduct “reasonable” work-related searches even if those

searches violate an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

● 

 In most circumstances, a warrant must be obtained before a government actor can conduct a search that

violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. In the context of government employment, however, the

government’s role as an employer (as opposed to its role as a law-enforcer) presents a special case. In O’Connor,

the Supreme Court held that a public employer or the employer’s agent can conduct a workplace search that violates

a public employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy so long as the search is “reasonable.” See O’Connor, 480

U.S. at 722-23 (plurality); Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court’s decision adds public workplace searches

by employers to the list of “special needs” exceptions to the warrant requirement. The “special needs” exceptions

permit the government to dispense with the usual warrant requirement when its officials infringe upon protected

privacy rights in the course of acting in a non-law enforcement capacity. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.

325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (applying the “special needs” exception to permit public school officials

to search student property without a warrant in an effort to maintain discipline and order in public schools); National

Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989) (applying the “special needs” exception to

permit warrantless drug testing of Customs employees who seek promotions to positions where they would handle

sensitive information). In these cases, the Court has held that the need for government officials to pursue legitimate

non-law-enforcement aims justifies a relaxing of the warrant requirement because “the burden of obtaining a

warrant is likely to frustrate the [non-law-enforcement] governmental purpose behind the search.” O’Connor, 480

U.S. at 720 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967)).

 According to O’Connor, a warrantless search must satisfy two requirements to qualify as “reasonable.” First,

the employer or his agents must participate in the search for a work-related reason, rather than merely to obtain

evidence for use in criminal proceedings. Second, the search must be justified at its inception and permissible in its

scope.

 i) The Search Must Be Work-Related

 The first element of O’Connor’s reasonableness test requires that the employer or his agents must participate

in the search for a work-related reason, rather than merely to obtain evidence for use in criminal proceedings. See

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O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 721. This element limits the O’Connor exception to circumstances in which the government

actors who conduct the search act in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers. The O’Connor Court

specified two such circumstances. First, the Court concluded that public employers can conduct reasonable

work-related noninvestigatory intrusions, such as entering an employee’s office to retrieve a file or report while the

employee is out. See id. at 722 (plurality); Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring). Second, the Court concluded that

employers can conduct reasonable investigations into an employee’s work-related misconduct, such as entering an

employee’s office to investigate employee misfeasance that threatens the efficient and proper operation of the office.

See id. at 724 (plurality); Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).

 The line between a legitimate work-related search and an illegitimate search for criminal evidence is clear in

theory, but often blurry in fact. Public employers who learn of misconduct at work may investigate it with dual

motives: they may seek evidence both to root out “inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other

work-related misfeasance,” id. at 724, and also to collect evidence for a criminal prosecution. Indeed, the two

categories may merge altogether. For example, government officials who have criminal investigators under their

command may respond to allegations of work-related misconduct by directing the investigators to search employee

offices for evidence of a crime.

 The courts have adopted fairly generous interpretations of O’Connor when confronted with mixed-motive

searches. In general, the presence and involvement of law enforcement officers will not invalidate the search so

long as the employer or his agent participates in the search for legitimate work-related reasons. See, e.g., Gossmeyer

v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 492 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that presence of law enforcement officers in a search

team looking for evidence of work-related misconduct does not transform search into an illegitimate law

enforcement search); Taketa, 923 F.2d at 674 (concluding that search of DEA office space by DEA agents

investigating allegations of illegal wiretapping “was an internal investigation directed at uncovering work-related

employee misconduct.”). Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201, 1202-05 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying the O’Connor

exception to an internal affairs investigation of a police sergeant that paralleled a criminal investigation); Ross v.

Hinton, 740 F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (concluding that a public employer’s discussions with law

enforcement officer concerning employee’s alleged criminal misconduct, culminating in officer’s advice to “secure”

the employee’s files, did not transform employer’s subsequent search of employee’s office into a law enforcement

search).

 Although the presence of law enforcement officers ordinarily will not invalidate a work-related search, a few

courts have indicated that whether O’Connor applies depends as much on the identity of the personnel who conduct

the search as whether the purpose of the search is work-related. For example, in United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d

392, 400 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit concluded that O’Connor authorized the search of a government

employee’s office by his supervisor even though the dominant purpose of the search was to uncover evidence of a

crime. Because the search was conducted by the employee’s supervisor, the Court indicated, it fell within the scope

of O’Connor. See id. (“[The employer] did not lose its special need for the efficient and proper operation of the

workplace merely because the evidence obtained was evidence of a crime.”) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). Conversely, one district court has held that the O’Connor exception did not apply when a government

employer sent a uniformed police officer to an employee’s office, even though the purpose of the police officer’s

presence was entirely work-related. See Rossi v. Town of Pelham, 35 F. Supp.2d 58, 65-66 (D.N.H. 1997) (civil

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (concluding that O’Connor exception did not apply when town officials sent a

single police officer to town clerk’s office to ensure that clerk did not remove public records from her office before a

scheduled audit could occur; the resulting search was a “police intrusion” rather than an “employer intrusion”).

 Of course, courts will invalidate warrantless workplace searches when the facts establish that law enforcement

provided the true impetus for the search, and the search violated an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 

See United States v. Hagarty, 388 F.2d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that surveillance installed by criminal

investigators violated the Fourth Amendment where purpose of surveillance was “to detect criminal activity” rather

than “to supervise and investigate” a government employee); United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784, 791

(S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev’d in part on other grounds, 479 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1973), rev’d with directions to reinstate the

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district court judgment, 415 U.S. 239 (1974) (invalidating warrantless search of INS employee’s wastebasket by INS

criminal investigator who searched the employee’s wastebasket for evidence of a crime every day after work with

the employer’s consent).

 ii) The Search Must Be Justified At Its Inception And Permissible In Its Scope

 To be “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, a work-related employer search of the type endorsed in

O’Connor must also be both “justified at its inception,” and “permissible in its scope.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726

(plurality). A search will be justified at its inception “when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the

search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary

for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose.” Id. See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 401 (holding that entrance into

employee’s office to seize his computer was justified at its inception because employer knew that employee had

used the computer to download child pornography); Gossmeyer, 128 F.3d at 491 (holding that co-worker’s specific

allegations of serious misconduct made Sheriff’s search of Child Protective Investigator’s locked desk and file

cabinets justified at its inception); Taketa, 923 F.2d at 674 (concluding that report of misconduct justified initial

search of employee’s office); Shields, 874 F.2d at 1204 (suggesting in dicta that search of police officer’s desk for

narcotics pursuant to internal affairs investigation might be reasonable following an anonymous tip); DeMaine v.

Samuels, 2000 WL 1658586, at * 10 (D. Conn. 2000) (holding that search of police officer’s day planner was

justified by information from two reliable sources that the officer kept detailed attendance notes relevant to overtime

investigation involving other officers); Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 826 F. Supp. 952, 954 (E.D. Pa.

1993) (concluding that employee’s search for a computer disk in employee’s office was justified at its inception

because employer needed contents of disk for official purposes). CompareOrtega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1162

(9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that vague, uncorroborated and stale complaints of misconduct do not justify a decision

to search an employee’s office).

 A search will be “permissible in its scope” when “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the

objectives of the search and [are] not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.” O’Connor, 480

U.S. at 726 (plurality) (internal quotations omitted). This standard requires employers and their agents to tailor

work-related searches to the alleged misfeasance. See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 401 (holding that search for child

pornography believed to be stored in employee’s computer was permissible in scope because individual who

conducted the search “simply crossed the floor of [the defendant’s] office, switched hard drives, and exited”);

Gossmeyer, 128 F.3d at 491 (concluding that workplace search for images of child pornography was permissible in

scope because it was limited to places where such images would likely be stored); Samuels, 2000 WL 1658586, at

*10 (holding that search through police officer’s day planner was reasonable because Internal Affairs investigators

had reason to believe day planner contained information relevant to investigation of overtime abuse). If employers

conduct a search that unreasonably exceeds the scope necessary to pursue the employer’s legitimate work-related

objectives, the search will be “unreasonable” and will violate the Fourth Amendment. See O’Connor, 146 F.3d at

1163 (concluding that “a general and unbounded” search of an employee’s desk, cabinets, and personal papers was

impermissible in scope where the search team did not attempt to limit their investigation to evidence of alleged

misconduct).

c) Consent in Public-Sector Workplaces

 Although public employers may search employees’ workplaces without a warrant for work-related reasons,

public workplaces offer a more restrictive milieu in one respect. In government workplaces, employers acting in

their official capacity generally cannot consent to a law enforcement search of their employees’ offices. See United

States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (concluding that a government supervisor cannot consent to a

law enforcement search of a government employee’s desk); Taketa, 923 F.2d at 673; Kahan, 350 F. Supp. at 791. 

The rationale for this result is that the Fourth Amendment cannot permit one government official to consent to a

search by another. See Blok, 188 F.2d at 1021 (“Operation of a government agency and enforcement of criminal

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law do not amalgamate to give a right of search beyond the scope of either.”). Accordingly, law enforcement

searches conducted pursuant to a public employer’s consent must be evaluated under O’Connor rather than the

third-party consent rules of Matlock. The question in such cases is not whether the public employer had common

authority to consent to the search, but rather whether the combined law enforcement and employer search satisfied

the Fourth Amendment standards of O’Connor v. Ortega.

II. SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS WITH A WARRANT

A. Introduction

 The legal framework for searching and seizing computers with a warrant largely mirrors the legal framework

for more traditional types of searches and seizures. As with any kind of search pursuant to a warrant, law

enforcement must establish “probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,” and must “particularly describ[e]

the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. Amend. 4.

 Despite the common legal framework, computer searches differ from other searches because computer

technologies frequently force agents to execute computer searches in nontraditional ways. Consider the traditional

case of a warrant to seize a stolen car from a private parking lot. Agents generally can assume that the lot will still

exist in its prior location when the agents execute the search, and can assume they will be able to identify the stolen

car quickly based on the car’s model, make, license plate, or Vehicle Identification Number. As a result, the process

of drafting the warrant and executing the search is relatively simple. After the agents establish probable cause and

describe the car and lot to the magistrate judge, the magistrate judge can issue the warrant authorizing the agents to

go to the lot and retrieve the car.

 Searches for computer files tend to be more complicated. Because computer files consist of electrical impulses

that can be stored on the head of a pin and moved around the world in an instant, agents may not know where

computer files are stored, or in what form. Files may be stored on a floppy diskette, on a hidden directory in a

suspect’s laptop, or on a remote server located thousands of miles away. The files may be encrypted, misleadingly

titled, stored in unusual file formats, or commingled with millions of unrelated, innocuous, and even statutorily

protected files. As a result of these uncertainties, agents cannot simply establish probable cause, describe the files

they need, and then “go” and “retrieve” the data. Instead, they must understand the technical limits of different

search techniques, plan the search carefully, and then draft the warrant in a manner that authorizes the agents to take

necessary steps to obtain the evidence they need.

 Searching and seizing computers with a warrant is as much an art as a science. In general, however, agents

and prosecutors have found that they can maximize the likelihood of a successful search and seizure by following

these four steps:

1) Assemble a team consisting of the case agent, the prosecutor,

 and a technical expert as far in advance of the search as possible.

 Although the lead investigating agent is the central figure in most searches, computer searches generally

require a team with three important players: the agent, the prosecutor, and a technical specialist with expertise in

computers and computer forensics. In most computer searches, the case agent organizes and directs the search,

learns as much as possible about the computers to be searched, and writes the affidavit establishing probable cause. 

The technical specialist explains the technical limitations that govern the search to the case agent and prosecutor,

creates the plan for executing the search, and in many cases takes the lead role in executing the search itself. Finally,

the prosecutor reviews the affidavit and warrant and makes sure that the entire process complies with the Fourth

Amendment and Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Of course, each member of the team should

collaborate with the others to help ensure an effective search.

 There are many sources of technical expertise in the federal government. Most agencies that have law

enforcement investigators also have technical specialists trained in computer forensics. For example, the FBI has

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Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) examiners, the Internal Revenue Service has Seized Computer

Evidence Recovery (SCER) specialists, and the Secret Service has the Electronic Crime Special Agent Program

(ESCAP). Investigating agents should contact the technical experts within their own agency. Further, some

agencies offer case agents sufficient technical training that they may also be able to act as technical specialists. In

such cases, the case agents normally do not need to consult with technical experts and can serve as technical

specialists and case agents simultaneously.

2) Learn as much as possible about the computer system that will be searched

 before devising a search strategy or drafting the warrant.

 After assembling the team, the case agent should begin acquiring as much information as possible about the

computer system targeted by the search. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this step. For the most part, the

need for detailed and accurate information about the targeted computer results from practical considerations. Until

the agent has learned what kinds of computers and operating systems the target uses, it is impossible to know how

the information the system contains can be retrieved, or even where the information may be located. Every

computer and computer network is different, and subtle differences in hardware, software, operating systems, and

system configuration can alter the search plan dramatically. For example, a particular search strategy may work

well if a targeted network runs the Linux operating system, but might not work if the network runs Windows NT

instead.

 These concerns are particularly important when searches involve complicated computer networks (as opposed

to stand-alone PCs). For example, the mere fact that a business uses computers in its offices does not mean that the

computers’ terminals found there actually contain any useful information. Businesses may contract with network

service providers that store the business’s information on remote network servers located miles (or even thousands

of miles) away. As a result of these considerations, a technical specialist cannot advise the case agent on the

practical aspects of different search strategies without knowing the nature of the computer system to be searched. 

Agents need to learn as much as possible about the targeted computer before drafting the warrant, including (if

possible) the hardware, the software, the operating system, and the configuration of the network.

 Obtaining detailed and accurate information about the targeted computer also has important legal

implications. For example, the incidental seizure of First Amendment materials such as drafts of newsletters or web

pages may implicate the Privacy Protection Act (“PPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, and the incidental seizure and

subsequent search through network accounts may raise issues under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act

(“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (see generally Parts B.2 and B.3, infra). To minimize liability under these

statutes, agents should conduct a careful investigation into whether and where First Amendment materials and

network accounts may be stored on the computer system targeted by the search. At least one court has suggested

that a failure to conduct such an investigation can help deprive the government of a good faith defense against

liability under these statutes. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432

(W.D. Tex. 1993), aff’d, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).

 On a practical level, agents may take various approaches to learning about a targeted computer network. In

some cases, agents can interview the system administrator of the targeted network (sometimes in an undercover

capacity), and obtain all or most of the information the technical specialist needs to plan and execute the search. 

When this is impossible or dangerous, more piecemeal strategies may prove effective. For example, agents

sometimes conduct on-site visits (often undercover) that at least reveal some elements of the hardware involved. A

useful source of information for networks connected to the Internet is the Internet itself. For example, the “host”

command in a UNIX environment often reveals the operating system, machines, and general layout of a targeted

network connected to the Internet (although it may set off alarms at the target network).

3) Formulate a strategy for conducting the search (including a backup plan)

 based on the known information about the targeted computer system.

 With a team in place and the targeted system researched, the next step is to formulate a strategy for

conducting the search. For example, will the agents search through the targeted computer(s) on the premises, or will

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they simply enter the premises and remove all of the hardware? Will the agents make copies of individual files, or

will they make exact copies of entire hard drives? What will the agents do if their original plan fails, or if the

computer hardware or software turns out to be significantly different from what they expected? These decisions

hinge on a series of practical and legal considerations. In most cases, the search team should decide on a preferred

search strategy, and then plan a series of backup strategies if the preferred strategy proves impractical.

 The issues that must be considered when formulating a strategy to search and seize a computer are discussed in

depth in Part B of this chapter. In general, however, the issues group into four questions: First, what is the most

effective search strategy that will comply with Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment? Second, does the search

strategy need to be modified to minimize the possibility of violating either the PPA or ECPA? Third, will the search

require multiple warrants? And fourth, should agents ask for special permission to conduct a no-knock or

sneak-and-peek search?

4) Draft the warrant, taking special care to describe the object of the search and the property to

be seized accurately and particularly, and explain the search strategy (as well as the practical and

legal issues that helped shape it) in the supporting affidavit.

 The essential ingredients for drafting a successful search warrant are covered in Section C, and a practical

guide to drafting warrants and affidavits appears in Appendix F. In general, however, the keys to drafting successful

computer search warrants are first to describe carefully and particularly the object of the warrant that investigators

have probable cause to seize, and second to explain adequately the search strategy in the supporting affidavit. On a

practical level, these steps help focus and guide the investigators as they execute the search. As a legal matter, the

first step helps to overcome particularity challenges, and the latter helps to thwart claims that the agents executed the

search in “flagrant disregard” of the warrant.

B. Planning the Search

1. Basic Strategies for Executing Computer Searches

 Computer searches may be executed in a variety of ways. For the most part, there are four possibilities:

1) Search the computer and print out a hard copy of particular files at that time;

2) Search the computer and make an electronic copy of particular files at that time;

3) Create a mirror-image electronic copy of the entire storage device on-site, and then later recreate a

working copy of the storage device off-site for review;5 and

4) Seize the equipment, remove it from the premises, and review its contents off-site.

 Which option is best for any particular search depends on many factors. The single most important

consideration is the role of the computer hardware in the offense.

Although every computer search is unique, search strategies often depend on the role of the hardware in the

offense. If the hardware is itself evidence, an instrumentality, contraband, or a fruit of crime, agents will

usually plan to seize the hardware and search its contents off-site. If the hardware is merely a storage device

for evidence, agents generally will only seize the hardware if less disruptive alternatives are not feasible.

● 

 In general, computer hardware can serve one of two roles in a criminal case. First, the computer hardware can

be a storage device for evidence of crime. For example, if a suspect keeps evidence of his fraud schemes stored in

his personal computer, the hardware itself is merely a container for evidence. The purpose of searching the suspect's

computer will be to recover the evidence the computer hardware happens to contain.

 In other cases, however, computer hardware can itself be contraband, evidence, an instrumentality, or a fruit of

crime. For example, a computer used to transmit child pornography is an instrumentality of crime, and stolen

computers are contraband. In such cases, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 grants agents the right to seize the

computer itself, independently from the materials that the hardware happens to contain. See generally Appendix F

(explaining the scope of materials that may be seized according to Rule 41). Because Rule 41 authorizes agents to

seize hardware in the latter case but not the former, the search strategy for a particular computer search hinges first

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on the role of the hardware in the offense.6

a) When Hardware Is Itself Contraband, Evidence, or an Instrumentality or Fruit of Crime

 Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b), agents may obtain search warrants to seize computer hardware if the hardware is

contraband, evidence, or an instrumentality or fruit of crime. See Rule 41(b); Appendix F. When the hardware

itself may be seized according to Rule 41, agents will usually conduct the search by seizing the computer and

searching it off-site. For example, a home personal computer used to store and transmit contraband images is itself

an instrumentality of the crime. See Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1997) (computer used to store

obscene images); United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441, 462 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (computer used to store child

pornography). Accordingly, Rule 41 permits agents to obtain a warrant authorizing the seizure of the computer

hardware. In most cases, investigators will simply obtain a warrant to seize the computer, seize the hardware during

the search, and then search through the defendant's computer for the contraband files back at the police station or

computer forensics laboratory. In such cases, the agents should explain in the supporting affidavit that they plan to

search the computer for evidence and/or contraband after the computer has been seized and removed from the site of

the search.

 Notably, exceptions exist when agents will not want to seize computer hardware even when the hardware is

used as an instrumentality, evidence, contraband, or a fruit of crime. When the “computer” involved is not a

stand-alone PC but rather part of a complicated network, the collateral damage and practical headaches that would

arise from seizing the entire network generally counsels against a wholesale seizure. For example, if a system

administrator of a computer network stores stolen proprietary information somewhere in the network, the network

becomes an instrumentality of the system administrator's crime. Technically, agents could obtain a warrant to seize

the entire network. However, carting off the entire network might cripple a functioning business and disrupt the

lives of hundreds of people, as well as subject the government to civil suits under the Privacy Protection Act, 42

U.S.C. § 2000aa and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11. See generally Steve

Jackson Games, Inc. v. Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432, 440, 443 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (discussed infra). In such

circumstances, agents will want to take a more nuanced approach to obtain the evidence they need. Agents faced

with such a situation can call the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section at (202) 514-1026 or the

Assistant U.S. Attorney designated as a Computer-Telecommunications Coordinator (CTC) in their district for more

specific advice.

b) When Hardware is Merely a Storage Device for Evidence of Crime

 The strategy for conducting a computer search is significantly different if the computer hardware is merely a

storage device for evidence of a crime. In such cases, Rule 41(b) authorizes agents to obtain a warrant to seize the

electronic evidence, but arguably does not authorize the agents to seize the hardware that happens to contain that

evidence. Cf. United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that probable cause to seize

specific paper files enumerated in warrant technically does permit the seizure of commingled innocent files). The

hardware is merely a storage container for evidence, not evidence itself. This does not mean that the government

cannot seize the equipment: rather, it means that the government generally should only seize the equipment if a less

intrusive alternative that permits the effective recovery of the evidence is infeasible in the particular circumstances

of the case. Cf. id. at 596.

 As a practical matter, circumstances will often require investigators to seize equipment and search its contents

off-site. First, it may take days or weeks to find the specific information described in the warrant because computer

storage devices can contain extraordinary amounts of information. Agents cannot reasonably be expected to spend

more than a few hours searching for materials on-site, and in some circumstances (such as executing a search at a

suspect's home) even a few hours may be unreasonable. See United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 615-16 (11th

Cir. 1985). Given that personal computers sold in the year 2000 usually can store the equivalent of ten million

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pages of information and networks can store hundreds of times that (and these capacities double nearly every year),

it may be practically impossible for agents to search quickly through a computer for specific data, a particular file,

or a broad set of files while on-site. Even if the agents know specific information about the files they seek, the data

may be mislabeled, encrypted, stored in hidden directories, or embedded in “slack space” that a simple file listing

will ignore. Recovering the evidence may require painstaking analysis by an expert in the controlled environment of

a forensics laboratory.

 Attempting to search files on-site may even risk damaging the evidence itself in some cases. Agents executing

a search may learn on-site that the computer employs an uncommon operating system that the on-site technical

specialist does not fully understand. Because an inartful attempt to conduct a search may destroy evidence, the best

strategy may be to remove the hardware so that a government expert in that particular operating system can examine

the computer later. Off-site searches also may be necessary if agents have reason to believe that the computer has

been “booby trapped” by a savvy criminal. Technically adept users may know how to trip-wire their computers

with self-destruct programs that could erase vital evidence if the system were examined by anyone other than an

expert. For example, a criminal could write a very short program that would cause the computer to demand a

password periodically, and if the correct password is not entered within ten seconds, would trigger the automatic

destruction of the computer's files. In these cases, it is best to seize the equipment and permit an off-site expert to

disarm the program before any search occurs.

 In light of these uncertainties, agents often plan to try to search on-site, with the understanding that they will

seize the equipment if circumstances discovered on-site make an on-site search infeasible. Once on-site to execute

the search, the agents will assess the hardware, software, and resources available to determine whether an on-site

search is possible. In many cases, the search strategy will depend on the sensitivity of the environment in which the

search occurs. For example, agents seeking to obtain information stored on the computer network of a functioning

business will in most circumstances want to make every effort to obtain the information without seizing the

business’s computers, if possible. In such situations, a tiered search strategy designed to use the least intrusive

approach that will recover the information is generally appropriate. Such approaches are discussed in Appendix F. 

Whatever search strategy is chosen, it should be explained fully in the affidavit supporting the warrant application.

 Sometimes, conducting a search on-site will be possible. A friendly employee or system administrator may

agree to pinpoint a file or record or may have a recent backup, permitting the agents to obtain a hard copy of the

files they seek while on-site. See, e.g., United States v. Longo, 70 F. Supp.2d 225 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (upholding

pinpoint search aided by suspect’s secretary for two particular computer files). Alternatively, agents may be able to

locate the set of files targeted and make electronic copies, or may be able to mirror a segment of the storage drive

based on knowledge that the information exists somewhere within that segment of the drive. In other cases, of

course, such strategies will fail. If the agents cannot learn where the information is stored or cannot create a

working mirror image for technical reasons, they may have no choice but to seize the computer and remove it. 

Because personal computers are easily moved and can be searched effectively off-site using special forensics tools,

agents are particularly likely to seize personal computers absent unusual circumstances.

 The general strategy is to pursue the quickest, least intrusive, and most direct search strategy that is consistent

with securing the evidence described in the warrant. This strategy will permit agents to search on-site in some

cases, and will permit them to seize the computers for off-site review in others. Flexibility is the key.

2. The Privacy Protection Act

When agents have reason to believe that a search may result in a seizure of materials relating to First

Amendment activities such as publishing or posting materials on the World Wide Web, they must consider the

effect of the Privacy Protection Act (“PPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa. Every federal computer search that

implicates the PPA must be approved by the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division,

coordinated through CCIPS at (202) 514-1026.

● 

 Under the Privacy Protection Act (“PPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, law enforcement must take special steps when

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planning a search that agents have reason to believe may result in the seizure of certain First Amendment materials. 

Federal law enforcement searches that implicate the PPA must be pre-approved by the Justice Department in

Washington, D.C. The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section serves as the contact point for all such

searches involving computers, and should be contacted directly at (202) 514-1026.

a) A Brief History of the Privacy Protection Act

 Before the Supreme Court decided Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309 (1967), law enforcement officers

could not obtain search warrants to search for and seize “mere evidence” of crime. Warrants were permitted only to

seize contraband, instrumentalities, or fruits of crime. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Hayden,

the Court reversed course and held that the Fourth Amendment permitted the government to obtain search warrants

to seize mere evidence. This ruling set the stage for a collision between law enforcement and the press. Because

journalists and reporters often collect evidence of criminal activity in the course of developing news stories, they

frequently possess “mere evidence” of crime that may prove useful to law enforcement investigations. By freeing

the Fourth Amendment from Boyd's restrictive regime, Hayden created the possibility that law enforcement could

use search warrants to target the press for evidence of crime it had collected in the course of investigating and

reporting news stories.

 It did not take long for such a search to occur. On April 12, 1971, the District Attorney's Office in Santa Clara

County, California obtained a search warrant to search the offices of The Stanford Daily, a Stanford University

student newspaper. The DA's office was investigating a violent clash between the police and demonstrators that had

occurred at the Stanford University Hospital three days earlier. The Stanford Daily had covered the incident, and

published a special edition featuring photographs of the clash. Believing that the newspaper probably had more

photographs of the clash that could help the police identify the demonstrators, the police obtained a warrant and sent

four police officers to search the newspaper's office for further evidence that could assist the investigation. The

officers found nothing. A month later, however, the Stanford Daily and its editors brought a civil suit against the

police claiming that the search had violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights. The case ultimately reached

the Supreme Court, and in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), the Court rejected the newspaper’s

claims. Although the Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment does not prevent or advise against legislative or

executive efforts to establish nonconstitutional protections” for searches of the press, it held that neither the Fourth

nor First Amendment prohibited such searches. Id. at 567.

 Congress passed the PPA in 1980 in response to Stanford Daily. According to the Senate Report, the PPA

protected “the press and certain other persons not suspected of committing a crime with protections not provided

currently by the Fourth Amendment.” S. Rep. No. 96-874, at 4 (1980). The statute was intended to grant publishers

certain statutory rights to discourage law enforcement officers from targeting publishers simply because they often

gathered “mere evidence” of crime. As the legislative history indicates,

the purpose of this statute is to limit searches for materials held by persons involved in First

Amendment activities who are themselves not suspected of participation in the criminal activity for

which the materials are sought, and not to limit the ability of law enforcement officers to search for and

seize materials held by those suspected of committing the crime under investigation.

Id. at 11.

b) The Terms of the Privacy Protection Act

 Subject to certain exceptions, the PPA makes it unlawful for a government officer “to search for or seize”

materials when

(a) the materials are “work product materials” prepared, produced, authored, or created “in anticipation

of communicating such materials to the public,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(b)(1);

(b) the materials include “mental impressions, conclusions, or theories” of its creator, 42 U.S.C. §

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2000aa-7(b)(3); and

(c) the materials are possessed for the purpose of communicating the material to the public by a person

“reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public” some form of “public

communication,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(b)(3), § 2000aa(a).

 or

(a) the materials are “documentary materials” that contain “information,”

§ 2000aa-7(a); and

(b) the materials are possessed by a person “in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public”

some form of “public communication.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b), § 2000aa-7(a).

 Although the language of the PPA is broad, the statute contains several exceptions. Searches will not violate

the PPA when

1) the only materials searched for or seized are contraband, instrumentalities, or fruits of crime, see §

2000aa-7(a),(b);

2) there is reason to believe that the immediate seizure of such materials is necessary to prevent death

or serious bodily injury, see § 2000aa(a)(2), § 2000aa(b);

3) there is probable cause to believe that the person possessing such materials has committed or is

committing the criminal offense to which the materials relate (an exception which is itself subject to

several exceptions), see § 2000aa(a)(1), § 2000aa(b)(1); and

4) in a search for or seizure of “documentary materials” as defined by § 2000aa-7(a), a subpoena has

proven inadequate or there is reason to believe that a subpoena would not result in the production of the

materials, see § 2000aa(b)(3)-(4).

 Violations of the PPA do not result in suppression of the evidence, but can result in civil damages against the

sovereign whose officers or employees execute the search. See § 2000aa-6(a),(d),(e); Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d

1472, 1482 (10th Cir. 1997) (dismissing PPA suit against municipal officers in their personal capacities because

such suits must be filed only against the “government entity”). If State officers or employees violate the PPA and

the state does not waive its sovereign immunity and is thus immune from suit, see Barnes v. State of Missouri, 960

F.2d 63, 65 (8th Cir. 1992), individual State officers or employees may be held liable for acts within the scope or

under the color of their employment subject to a reasonable good faith defense. See § 2000aa-6(a)(2),(b).

c) Application of the PPA to Computer Searches and Seizures

 PPA issues frequently arise in computer cases for two reasons that Congress could not have foreseen in 1980. 

First, the use of personal computers for publishing and the World Wide Web has dramatically expanded the scope of

who is “involved in First Amendment activities.” Today, anyone with a computer and access to the Internet may be

a publisher who possesses PPA-protected materials on his or her computer.

 The second reason that PPA issues arise frequently in computer cases is that the language of the statute does

not explicitly rule out liability following incidental seizures of PPA-protected materials, and such seizures may

inevitably result when agents search for and seize computer-stored contraband or evidence of crime that is

commingled with PPA-protected materials. For example, investigations into illegal businesses that publish images

of child pornography over the Internet have revealed that such businesses frequently support other publishing

materials (such as drafts of adult pornography) that may be PPA-protected. Agents may find that the PPA interferes

with their ability to seize the contraband child pornography because the contraband may be commingled with

PPA-protected materials on the business's computers. Seizing the computer for the contraband would necessarily

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result in the seizure of the PPA-protected materials. Under this interpretation of the PPA, the statute does not

merely deter law enforcement from targeting innocent publishers for their evidence, but also affirmatively protects

individuals from the incidental seizure of property that may be used in part for First Amendment activities.

 As a formal matter, the legislative history and text of the PPA indicate that Congress probably intended the

PPA to apply only when law enforcement intentionally targeted First Amendment material that related to a crime, as

in Stanford Daily. For example, the so-called “suspect exception” eliminates PPA liability when “there is probable

cause to believe that the person possessing such materials has committed or is committing the criminal offense to

which the materials relate,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a)(1), § 2000aa(b)(1) (emphasis added). This text indicates that

Congress believed that PPA-protected materials would necessarily relate to a criminal offense, as when investigators

target the materials as evidence.

 When agents collaterally seize PPA-protected materials because they are commingled on a computer with

other materials properly targeted by law enforcement, however, the PPA-protected materials will not necessarily

relate to any crime at all. For example, the PPA-protected materials might be drafts of a horticulture newsletter that

just happen to sit on the same hard drive as images of child pornography or records of a fraud scheme. At least one

court has responded to this difficulty by reading the phrase “to which the materials relate” quite broadly when an

inadvertent seizure of commingled matter occurs. See United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp.2d 574, 582 (D. Vt.

1998) (concluding that materials for weekly legal newsletter published by the defendant from his law office “relate”

to the defendant's alleged involvement in his client's drug crimes when the former was inadvertently seized in a

search for evidence of the latter). This reading effectively restores the suspect exception to its intended purpose:

limiting the scope of PPA protection to “the press and certain other persons not suspected of committing a crime.” S.

Rep. No. 96-874, at 4 (1980). See also Carpa v. Smith, 208 F.3d 220, 2000 WL 189678, at *1 (9th Cir. 2000)

(unpublished opinion) (“[T]he Privacy Protection Act . . . does not apply to criminal suspects.”).

 Although Congress probably intended the PPA to apply only when law enforcement intentionally targets

PPA-protected materials in search of evidence, at least one court has held law enforcement liable under the PPA for

the incidental seizure of (and more particularly, failure to return) PPA-protected materials stored on a seized

computer. In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993), aff’d on other

grounds, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994)7, a district court held the United States Secret Service liable for the inadvertent

seizure of PPA-protected materials possessed by Steve Jackson Games, Inc. (“SJG”). Although SJG was primarily a

publisher of role-playing games, it also operated a network of thirteen computers that provided its customers with

e-mail, published information about SJG products, and stored drafts of upcoming publications. The Secret Service

executed a search of SJG's computers on March 1, 1990, after learning that a system administrator of SJG's

computers had been linked to a computer hacking incident under Secret Service investigation. Believing that the

system administrator had stored evidence of the crime on SJG's computers, the Secret Service obtained a warrant

and seized two of the thirteen computers connected to SJG's network, in addition to other materials. The Secret

Service did not know that SJG's computers contained publishing materials until the day after the search, on March 2,

1990. However, the Secret Service did not return the computers it seized until months later. At no time did the

Secret Service believe that SJG itself was involved in the crime under investigation.

 The district court in Steve Jackson Games ruled that the Secret Service violated the PPA by continuing to hold

SJG's seized property after it learned that the property included materials that SJG intended to disseminate to the

public, including drafts of a book and magazine articles. Although the Secret Service had executed the search to

find evidence of computer hacking, the incidental seizure and then retention of PPA-protected material constituted a

prohibited seizure of “work product materials” and “documentary materials” according to 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa. See

id. at 440-41. The court set the damage award at just over $50,000, plus attorney’s fees to be determined later.

 Unfortunately, the district court’s precise reasoning in Steve Jackson Games is difficult to discern. For

example, the court did not explain exactly which of the materials the Secret Service seized were covered by the

PPA; instead, the court merely recited the property that had been seized, and concluded that some PPA-protected

materials “were obtained” during the search. Id. at 440. Similarly, the court indicated that the search of SJG and the

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initial seizure of its property did not violate the PPA, but that the Secret Service’s continued retention of SJG’s

property despite a request by SJG for its return was the true source of the PPA violation – something that the statute

itself does not appear to contemplate. See id. at 441. The court also suggested that it might have ruled differently if

the Secret Service had made “copies of all information seized” and returned the hardware as soon as possible, but

did not answer whether in fact it would have reached a different result in such case. Id. Finally, the court set

damages equal to the company's lost profits resulting from the search, seizure, and retention of SJG’s property, quite

irrespective of how much of the company’s lost profits were derived specifically from the seizure and retention of

the PPA-protected materials. See id.

 The boundaries of the PPA remain quite uncertain in the wake of Steve Jackson Games. See, e.g., State of

Oklahoma v. One (1) Pioneer CD-ROM Changer, 891 P.2d 600, 607 (Okla. App. 1995) (rejecting the apparent

premise of Steve Jackson Games that the seizure of computer equipment could violate the PPA merely because the

equipment “also contained or was used to disseminate potential 'documentary materials'”). The handful of federal

courts that have resolved civil suits filed under the PPA since the district court opinion in Steve Jackson Games have

ruled against the plaintiffs with little substantive analysis. See, e.g., Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1482 (10th

Cir. 1997) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction PPA suit improperly filed against municipal employees in their

personal capacities); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp.2d 574, 582 (D. Vt. 1998) (rejecting PPA claim when

search of attorney's office for evidence of a crime arising from law practice led to seizure of materials relating to

legal newsletter “because the government had reason to believe that [the defendant] had committed a criminal

offense . . . to which the seized materials related”); DePugh v. Sutton, 917 F. Supp. 690, 696-97 (W.D. Mo. 1996)

(rejecting pro se PPA challenge to seizure of materials relating to child pornography because there was probable

cause to believe that the person possessing the materials committed the criminal offense to which the materials

related), aff'd, 104 F.3d 363 (8th Cir. 1996); Powell v. Tordoff, 911 F. Supp. 1184, 1189-90 (N.D. Iowa 1995)

(dismissing PPA claim because plaintiff did not have standing to challenge search and seizure under the Fourth

Amendment). See also Lambert v. Polk County, 723 F. Supp. 128, 132 (S.D. Iowa 1989) (rejecting PPA claim after

police seized videotape because officers could not reasonably believe that the owner of the tape had a purpose to

disseminate the material to the public).

 Agents and prosecutors who have reason to believe that a search may implicate the PPA should contact the

Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section at (202) 514-1026 or the Assistant U.S. Attorney designated as a

Computer-Telecommunications Coordinator (CTC) in each district for more specific guidance.

3. Civil Liability Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act

When a search may result in the incidental seizure of network accounts belonging to innocent third parties,

agents should take every step to protect the integrity of the third party accounts to avoid potential ECPA

liability.

● 

 When law enforcement executes a search of an Internet service provider and seizes the accounts of customers

and subscribers, those customers and subscribers may bring civil actions claiming that the search violated the

Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). ECPA governs law enforcement access to the contents of

electronic communications stored by third-party service providers. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703; Chapter 3, infra

(discussing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act). In addition, ECPA has a criminal provision that prohibits

unauthorized access to electronic or wire communications in “electronic storage.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2701; Chapter 3,

infra (discussing the definition of “electronic storage”).

 The concern that a search executed pursuant to a valid warrant might violate ECPA derives from Steve

Jackson Games, Inc. v. Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993), discussed supra. In Steve Jackson

Games, the district court held the Secret Service liable under ECPA after it seized, reviewed, and (in some cases)

deleted stored electronic communications seized pursuant to a valid search warrant. See id. at 443. The court's

holding appears to be rooted in the mistaken belief that ECPA requires that search warrants also comply with 18

U.S.C. § 2703(d) and the various notice requirements of § 2703. See id. In fact, ECPA makes quite clear that §

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2703(d) and the notice requirements § 2703 are implicated only when law enforcement does not obtain a search

warrant. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A), § 2703(c)(1)(B)(i) with 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B), §

2703(c)(1)(B)(ii). See generally Chapter 3, infra. Indeed, the text of ECPA does not appear to contemplate civil

liability for searches and seizures authorized by valid Rule 41 search warrants: ECPA expressly authorizes

government access to stored communications pursuant to a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, see 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b), (c)(1)(B); Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1483 (10th Cir. 1997), and the

criminal prohibition of § 2701 does not apply when access is authorized under § 2703. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(3)8. 

Further, objectively reasonable good faith reliance on a warrant, court order, or statutory authorization is a complete

defense to an ECPA violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e); Gracey, 111 F.3d at 1484 (applying good faith defense

because seizure of stored communications incidental to a valid search was objectively reasonable). Compare Steve

Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 443 (stating without explanation that the court “declines to find this defense”).

 The best way to square the result in Steve Jackson Games with the plain language of ECPA is to exercise great

caution when agents need to execute searches of Internet service providers and other third-parties holding stored

wire or electronic communications. In most cases, investigators will want to avoid a wholesale search and seizure of

the provider’s computers. When investigators have no choice but to execute the search, they must take special care. 

For example, if agents have reason to believe that they may seize customer accounts belonging to innocent persons

but have no reason to believe that the evidence sought will be stored there, they should inform the magistrate judge

in the search warrant affidavit that they will not search those accounts and should take steps to ensure the

confidentiality of the accounts in light of the privacy concerns expressed by 18 U.S.C. § 2703. Safeguarding the

accounts of innocent persons absent specific reasons to believe that evidence may be stored in the persons' accounts

should satisfy the concerns expressed in Steve Jackson Games. CompareSteve Jackson Games, 816 F. Supp. at 441

(finding ECPA liability where agents read the private communications of customers not involved in the crime “and

thereafter deleted or destroyed some communications either intentionally or accidentally”) with Gracey, 111 F.3d at

1483 (declining to find ECPA liability in seizure where “[p]laintiffs have not alleged that the officers attempted to

access or read the seized e-mail, and the officers disclaimed any interest in doing so”).

 If agents believe that a hacker or system administrator might have hidden evidence of a crime in the account of

an innocent customer or subscriber, agents should proceed carefully. For example, agents should inform the

magistrate judge of their need to search the account in the affidavit, and should attempt to obtain the consent of the

customer or subscriber if feasible. In such cases, agents should contact the Computer Crime and Intellectual

Property Section at (202) 514-1026 or the CTC designated in their district for more specific guidance.

4. Considering the Need for Multiple Warrants in Network Searches

Agents should obtain multiple warrants if they have reason to believe that a network search will retrieve data

stored in multiple locations.

● 

 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a) states that a magistrate judge located in one judicial district may issue a search warrant

for “a search of property . . . within the district,” or “a search of property . . . outside the district if the property . . . is

within the district when the warrant is sought but might move outside the district before the warrant is executed.” 

The Supreme Court has held that “property” as described in Rule 41 includes intangible property such as computer

data. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 170 (1977). Although the courts have not directly

addressed the matter, the language of Rule 41 combined with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “property” may

limit searches of computer data to data that resides in the district in which the warrant was issued. Cf. United States

v. Walters, 558 F. Supp. 726, 730 (D. Md. 1980) (suggesting such a limit in a case involving telephone records).

 A territorial limit on searches of computer data poses problems for law enforcement because computer data

stored in a computer network can be located anywhere in the world. For example, agents searching an office in

Manhattan pursuant to a warrant from the Southern District of New York may sit down at a terminal and access

information stored remotely on a computer located in New Jersey, California, or even a foreign country. A single

file described by the warrant could be located anywhere on the planet, or could be divided up into several locations

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in different districts or countries. Even worse, it may be impossible for agents to know when they execute their

search whether the data they are seizing has been stored within the district or outside of the district. Agents may in

some cases be able to learn where the data is located before the search, but in others they will be unable to know the

storage site of the data until after the search has been completed.

 When agents can learn prior to the search that some or all of the data described by the warrant is stored

remotely from where the agents will execute the search, the best course of action depends upon where the remotely

stored data is located. When the data is stored remotely in two or more different places within the United States

and its territories, agents should obtain additional warrants for each location where the data resides to ensure

compliance with a strict reading of Rule 41(a). For example, if the data is stored in two different districts, agents

should obtain separate warrants from the two districts. Agents should also include a thorough explanation of the

location of the data and the proposed means of conducting the search in the affidavits accompanying the warrants.

 When agents learn before a search that some or all of the data is stored remotely outside of the United States,

matters become more complicated. The United States may be required to take actions ranging from informal notice

to a formal request for assistance to the country concerned. Further, some countries may object to attempts by U.S.

law enforcement to access computers located within their borders. Although the search may seem domestic to a

U.S. law enforcement officer executing the search in the United States pursuant to a valid warrant, other countries

may view matters differently. Agents and prosecutors should contact the Office of International Affairs at (202)

514-0000 for assistance with these difficult questions.

 When agents do not and even cannot know that data searched from one district is actually located outside the

district, evidence seized remotely from another district ordinarily should not lead to suppression of the evidence

obtained. The reasons for this are twofold. First, courts may conclude that agents sitting in one district who search

a computer in that district and unintentionally cause intangible information to be sent from a second district into the

first have complied with Rule 41(a). Compare United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner,

C.J.) (adopting a permissive construction of the territoriality provisions of Title III); United States v. Denman, 100

F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1992) (same).

 Second, even if courts conclude that the search violates Rule 41(a), the violation will not lead to suppression of

the evidence unless the agents intentionally and deliberately disregarded the Rule, or the violation leads to

“prejudice” in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so “abrasive” if the Rule

had been followed. See United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.); United States v.

Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d 122, 136 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing cases). Under the widely-adopted Burke test, courts

generally deny motions to suppress when agents executing the search cannot know whether it violates Rule 41 either

legally or factually. See Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d at 136 (concluding that a search passed the Burke test “[g]iven

the uncertain state of the law” concerning whether the conduct violated Rule 41(a)). Accordingly, evidence

acquired from a network search that accessed data stored in multiple districts should not lead to suppression unless

the agents intentionally and deliberately disregarded Rule 41(a) or prejudice resulted. See generally United States v.

Trost, 152 F.3d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is difficult to anticipate any violation of Rule 41, short of a defect that

also offends the Warrant Clause of the fourth amendment, that would call for suppression.”).

5. No-Knock Warrants

 As a general matter, agents must announce their presence and authority prior to executing a search warrant. 

See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995); 18 U.S.C. § 3109. This so-called “knock and announce” rule

reduces the risk of violence and destruction of property when agents execute a search. The rule is not absolute,

however. In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), the Supreme Court held that agents can dispense with the

knock-and-announce requirement if they have

a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular

circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the

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crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.

Id. at 394. The Court stated that this showing was “not high, but the police should be required to make it whenever

the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged.” Id. at 394-95. Such a showing satisfies both the Fourth

Amendment and the statutory knock-and-announce rule of 18 U.S.C. § 3109. See United States v. Ramirez, 118 S.

Ct. 992, 997-98 (1998).

 Agents may need to conduct no-knock searches in computer crime cases because technically adept suspects

may “hot wire” their computers in an effort to destroy evidence. For example, technically adept computer hackers

have been known to use “hot keys,” computer programs that destroy evidence when a special button is pressed. If

agents knock at the door to announce their search, the suspect can simply press the button and activate the program

to destroy the evidence.

 When agents have reason to believe that knocking and announcing their presence would allow the destruction

of evidence, would be dangerous, or would be futile, agents should request that the magistrate judge issue a

no-knock warrant. The failure to obtain judicial authorization to dispense with the knock-and-announce rule does

not preclude the agents from conducting a no-knock search, however. In some cases, agents may neglect to request

a no-knock warrant, or may not have reasonable suspicion that evidence will be destroyed until they execute the

search. In Richards, the Supreme Court made clear that “the reasonableness of the officers' decision [to dispense

with the knock-and-announce rule] . . . must be evaluated as of the time they entered” the area to be searched. 

Richards, 510 U.S. at 395. Accordingly, agents may “exercise independent judgment” and decide to conduct a

no-knock search when they execute the search, even if they did not request such authority or the magistrate judge

specifically refused to authorize a no-knock search. Id. at 396 n.7. The question in all such cases is whether the

agents had “a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances,

would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example,

allowing the destruction of evidence.” Id. at 394.

6. Sneak-and-Peek Warrants

 Despite Rule 41(d), courts have authorized “sneak-and-peek” warrants in a few narrow situations. Sometimes

called “surreptitious search warrants,” sneak-and-peek warrants are warrants that excuse agents from having to

notify the person whose premises are searched that the search has occurred at the time of the search. See Paul V.

Konovalov, Note, On a Quest for Reason: A New Look at Surreptitious Search Warrants, 48 Hastings L.J. 435, 443

(1997); United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing magistrate judge's creation of a

sneak and peek warrant by “cross[ing] off . . . the requirement [on the warrant form] that copies of the warrant and

an inventory of the property taken were to be left at the residence”). Because notice furthers important

constitutional values, it is important that agents who wish to obtain sneak-and-peek warrants should do so sparingly,

and only in special circumstances. However, sneak-and-peek searches may prove useful in searches for intangible

computer data. For example, agents executing a sneak-and-peek warrant to search a computer may be able to enter

a business after hours, search the computer, and then exit the business without leaving any sign that the search

occurred.

 The circuits that have considered the legality of sneak-and-peek warrants have struggled to reconcile them

with Rule 41(d) and the Fourth Amendment. The Second and Ninth Circuits each set forth two requirements that

must be met in the absence of explicit statutory authority before a sneak-and-peek warrant may be authorized. First,

the officers must make a showing of “reasonable necessity” as to why the officers should be able to delay notice of

the search. United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990). See also Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456. 

Second, the warrant must require notice to the target of the search within seven days of the surreptitious search

unless a “strong showing of necessity” for further delay has been made. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456; See also

Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337. Although other circuits may take a less restrictive approach, see United States v.

Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a 45-day delay in notice was permissible under the

Fourth Amendment), these two requirements provide a useful standard that agents should follow when they seek

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judicial authorization to conduct a sneak-and-peek search.

 If these two requirements are met, a court will permit evidence obtained in violation of Rule 41 to be used in

court so long as 1) the covert nature of the search did not prejudice the target, in the sense that the search might not

have occurred if notice had been given, and 2) the agents did not intentionally and deliberately disregard Rule 41 in

executing the search. See Simons, 206 F.3d at 403; United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 455 (2d Cir. 1993);

United States v. Johns, 948 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1991). Agents executing a sneak-and-peek search will not be

deemed to have intentionally and deliberately disregarded Rule 41 if the warrant authorized the sneak-and-peek

search, or the executing agents believed that the warrant authorized such a search. See United States v. Simons, 107

F. Supp.2d 703, 705 (E.D. Va. 2000) (concluding that agents who mistakenly believed that a warrant authorized a

sneak-and-peek warrant were “at most, negligent,” and that the resulting search was therefore not executed with

intentional disregard of Rule 41). Finally, a showing of good faith reliance on a sneak-and-peek warrant will defeat

a suppression motion. See Johns, 948 F.2d at 605; Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456. See generally United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897 (1984).

7. Privileged Documents

 Agents must exercise special care when planning a computer search that may result in the seizure of legally

privileged documents such as medical records or attorney-client communications. Two issues must be considered. 

First, agents should make sure that the search will not violate the Attorney General's regulations relating to obtaining

confidential information from disinterested third parties. Second, agents should devise a strategy for reviewing the

seized computer files following the search so that no breach of a privilege occurs.

a) The Attorney General's Regulations Relating to Searches of Disinterested Lawyers, Physicians, and

Clergymen

 Agents should be very careful if they plan to search the office of a doctor, lawyer, or member of the clergy

who is not implicated in the crime under investigation. At Congress's direction, the Attorney General has issued

guidelines for federal officers who want to obtain documentary materials from such disinterested third parties. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11(a); 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(b). Under these rules, federal law enforcement officers should not use a

search warrant to obtain documentary materials believed to be in the private possession of a disinterested third party

physician, lawyer, or clergyman where the material sought or likely to be reviewed during the execution of the

warrant contains confidential information on patients, clients, or parishioners. 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(b). The regulation

does contain a narrow exception. A search warrant can be used if using less intrusive means would substantially

jeopardize the availability or usefulness of the materials sought; access to the documentary materials appears to be

of substantial importance to the investigation; and the application for the warrant has been recommended by the U.S.

Attorney and approved by the appropriate Deputy Assistant Attorney General. See 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(b)(1) and (2).

 When planning to search the offices of a lawyer under investigation, agents should follow the guidelines

offered in the United States Attorney's Manual, and should consult the Office of Enforcement Operations at (202)

514-3684. See generally United States Attorney's Manual, § 9-13.420 (1997).

b) Strategies for Reviewing Privileged Computer Files

Agents contemplating a search that may result in the seizure of legally privileged computer files should devise

a post-seizure strategy for screening out the privileged files and should describe that strategy in the affidavit.

● 

 When agents seize a computer that contains legally privileged files, a trustworthy third party must comb

through the files to separate those files within the scope of the warrant from files that contain privileged material. 

After reviewing the files, the third party will offer those files within the scope of the warrant to the prosecution

team. Preferred practices for determining who will comb through the files vary widely among different courts. In

general, however, there are three options. First, the court itself may review the files in camera. Second, the

presiding judge may appoint a neutral third party known as a “special master” to the task of reviewing the files. 

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Third, a team of prosecutors who are not working on the case may form a “taint team” or “privilege team” to help

execute the search and review the files afterwards. The taint team sets up a so-called “Chinese Wall” between the

evidence and the prosecution team, permitting only unprivileged files that are within the scope of the warrant to slip

through the wall.

 Because a single computer can store millions of files, judges will undertake in camera review of computer files

only rarely. See Black v. United States, 172 F.R.D. 511, 516-17 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (accepting in camera review given

unusual circumstances); United States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp. 890, 893 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (declining in camera

review). Instead, the typical choice is between using a taint team and a special master. Most prosecutors will prefer

to use a taint team if the court consents. A taint team can usually screen through the seized computer files fairly

quickly, whereas special masters often take several years to complete their review. See Black, 172 F.R.D. at 514

n.4. On the other hand, some courts have expressed discomfort with taint teams. See United States v. Neill, 952 F.

Supp. 834, 841 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp.2d 574, 583 n.2 (D. Vt. 1998) (stating that

review by a magistrate judge or special master “may be preferable” to reliance on a taint team) (citing In re Search

Warrant, 153 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). Although no single standard has emerged, these courts have

generally indicated that evidence screened by a taint team will be admissible only if the government shows that its

procedures adequately protected the defendants' rights and no prejudice occurred. See, e.g., Neill, 952 F. Supp. at

840-42; Hunter, 13 F. Supp.2d at 583. In unusual circumstances, the court may conclude that a taint team would be

inadequate and may appoint a special master to review the files. See, e.g., United States v. Abbell, 914 F. Supp. 519

(S.D. Fla. 1995); DeMassa v. Nunez, 747 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1984). In any event, the reviewing authority will

almost certainly need a skilled and neutral technical expert to assist in sorting, identifying, and analyzing digital

evidence for the reviewing process.

C. Drafting the Warrant and Affidavit

 Law enforcement officers must draft two documents to obtain a search warrant from a magistrate judge. The

first document is the affidavit, a sworn statement that (at a minimum) explains the basis for the affiant's belief that

the search is justified by probable cause. The second document is the proposed warrant itself. The proposed

warrant typically is a one-page form, plus attachments incorporated by reference, that describes the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized. If the magistrate judge agrees that the affidavit establishes probable

cause, and that the proposed warrant's descriptions of the place to be searched and things to be seized are adequately

particular, the magistrate judge will sign the warrant. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, officers must

execute the warrant within ten days after the warrant has been signed. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b).

Step 1: Accurately and Particularly Describe the Property to be Seized in the Warrant and/or Attachments to

the Warrant

a. General

 Agents must take special care when describing the computer files or hardware to be seized, either in the

warrant itself or (more likely) in an attachment to the warrant incorporated into the warrant by reference. The Fourth

Amendment requires that every warrant must “particularly describ[e] . . . the . . . things to be seized.” U.S. Const.

Amend. IV. The particularity requirement prevents law enforcement from executing “general warrants” that permit

“exploratory rummaging” through a person's belongings in search of evidence of a crime. Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).

 The particularity requirement has two distinct elements. See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st

Cir. 1999). First, the warrant must describe the things to be seized with sufficiently precise language so that it tells

the officers how to separate the items properly subject to seizure from irrelevant items. See Davis v. Gracey, 111

F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 296 (1925) (“As to what is to be taken,

nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”). Second, the description of the things to be

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seized must not be so broad that it encompasses items that should not be seized. See Upham, 168 F.3d at 535. Put

another way, the description in the warrant of the things to be seized should be limited to the scope of the probable

cause established in the warrant. See In re Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Solid State Devices, 130 F.3d 853,

857 (9th Cir. 1997). Considered together, the elements forbid agents from obtaining “general warrants” and instead

require agents to conduct narrow seizures that attempt to “minimize[] unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.”

Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).

b. Warrants to Seize Hardware Compared to Warrants to Seize Information

If computer hardware is contraband, evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime, the warrant should

describe the hardware itself. If the probable cause relates only to information, however, the warrant should

describe the information, rather than the physical storage devices which happen to contain it.

● 

 The most important decision agents must make when describing the property in the warrant is whether the

seizable property according to Rule 41 is the computer hardware itself, or merely the information that the hardware

contains. If the computer hardware is itself contraband, an instrumentality of crime, or evidence, the focus of the

warrant should be on the computer hardware itself and not on the information it contains. The warrant should

describe the hardware and indicate that the hardware will be seized. See, e.g., Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1480

(10th Cir. 1997) (seizure of computer “equipment” used to store obscene pornography was proper because the

equipment was an instrumentality). However, if the probable cause relates only to information stored on the

computer, the warrant should focus on the content of the relevant files rather than on the storage devices which may

happen to contain them. See, e.g., United States v. Gawrysiak, 972 F. Supp. 853, 860 (D.N.J. 1997), aff'd, 178 F.3d

1281 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding seizure of “records [that] include information and/or data stored in the form of

magnetic or electronic coding on computer media . . . which constitute evidence” of enumerated federal crimes). 

The warrant should describe the information based on its content (e.g., gambling records, evidence of a fraud

scheme), and then request the authority to seize the information in whatever form the information may be stored. 

To determine whether the warrant should describe the computer hardware itself or the information it contains,

agents should consult Appendix F and determine whether the hardware constitutes evidence, contraband, or an

instrumentality that may itself be seizable according to Rule 41(a).

When conducting a search for information, agents need to consider carefully exactly what information they

need. The information may be very narrow (e.g., a specific record or report), or quite broad (e.g., thousands

of records relating to an elaborate fraud scheme). Agents should tailor each warrant to the needs of each

search. The warrant should describe the information to be seized, and then request the authority to seize the

information in whatever form it may be stored (whether electronic or not).

● 

 Agents should be particularly careful when seeking authority to seize a broad class of information. This often

occurs when agents plan to search computers at a business. See, e.g., United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 594

(10th Cir. 1988). Agents cannot simply request permission to seize “all records” from an operating business unless

agents have probable cause to believe that the criminal activity under investigation pervades the entire business. See

United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing cases); In re Grand Jury Investigation Concerning

Solid State Devices, 130 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1997). Instead, the description of the files to be seized should

include limiting phrases that can modify and limit the “all records” search. For example, agents may specify the

crime under investigation, the target of the investigation if known, and the time frame of the records involved. See,

e.g., United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995) (invalidating warrant for failure to name crime or limit

seizure to documents authored during time frame under investigation ); Ford, 184 F.3d at 576 (“Failure to limit

broad descriptive terms by relevant dates, when such dates are available to the police, will render a warrant

overbroad.”); In the Matter of the Application of Lafayette Academy, 610 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.

Hunter, 13 F. Supp.2d 574, 584 (D. Vt. 1998) (concluding that warrant to seize “[a]ll computers” not sufficiently

particular where description “did not indicate the specific crimes for which the equipment was sought, nor were the

supporting affidavits or the limits contained in the searching instructions incorporated by reference.”).

 In light of these cases, agents should narrow “all records” searches with limiting language where necessary and

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appropriate. One effective approach is to begin with an “all records” description; add limiting language stating the

crime, the suspects, and relevant time period if applicable; include explicit examples of the records to be seized; and

then indicate that the records may be seized in any form, whether electronic or non-electronic. For example, when

drafting a warrant to search a computer at a business for evidence of a drug trafficking crime, agents might describe

the property to be seized in the following way:

All records relating to violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (drug trafficking) and/or 21 U.S.C. § 846

(conspiracy to traffic drugs) involving [the suspect] since January 1, 1996, including lists of customers

and related identifying information; types, amounts, and prices of drugs trafficked as well as dates,

places, and amounts of specific transactions; any information related to sources of narcotic drugs

(including names, addresses, phone numbers, or any other identifying information); any information

recording [the suspect's] schedule or travel from 1995 to the present; all bank records, checks, credit

card bills, account information, and other financial records.

The terms “records” and “information” include all of the foregoing items of evidence in whatever form

and by whatever means they may have been created or stored, including any electrical, electronic, or

magnetic form (such as any information on an electronic or magnetic storage device, including floppy

diskettes, hard disks, ZIP disks, CD-ROMs, optical discs, backup tapes, printer buffers, smart cards,

memory calculators, pagers, personal digital assistants such as Palm Pilot computers, as well as

printouts or readouts from any magnetic storage device); any handmade form (such as writing,

drawing, painting); any mechanical form (such as printing or typing); and any photographic form

(such as microfilm, microfiche, prints, slides, negatives, videotapes, motion pictures, photocopies).

 This language describes the general class of information to be seized (“all records”); narrows it to the extent

possible (only those records involving the defendant's drug trafficking activities since 1995); offers examples of the

types of records sought (such as customer lists and bank records); and then explains the various forms that the

records may take (including electronic and non-electronic forms).

 Of course, agents do not need to follow this approach in every case; judicial review of search warrants is

“commonsensical” and “practical,” rather than “overly technical.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108

(1965). When agents cannot know the precise form that records will take before the search occurs, a generic

description must suffice. See Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Even a warrant that

describes the items to be seized in broad or generic terms may be valid when the description is as specific as the

circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.”) (internal quotations omitted); United

States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1238 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that where the defendant “operated a complex criminal

enterprise where he mingled ‘innocent’ documents with apparently-innocent documents which, in fact,

memorialized illegal transactions, . . . . [it] would have been difficult for the magistrate judge to be more limiting in

phrasing the warrant's language, and for the executing officers to have been more discerning in determining what to

seize.”); United States v. Sharfman, 448 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (2d Cir. 1971); Gawrysiak, 972 F. Supp. at 861. Even

an “all records” search seeking evidence of a particular criminal activity may be appropriate in certain

circumstances. See also United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding seizure of

“any and all records relating to the business” under investigation for mail fraud and money laundering); London, 66

F.3d at 1238 (upholding search for “books and records . . . and any other documents. . . which reflect unlawful

gambling”); United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding seizure of “items that constitute

evidence of the offenses of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances”); United States v. Wayne, 903 F.2d 1188,

1195 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding search for “documents and materials which may be associated with . . contraband

[narcotics]”).

 c. Defending Computer Search Warrants Against Challenges Based on the Description of the “Things to be Seized”

 Search warrants may be subject to challenge when the description of the “things to be seized” does not comply

fully with the best practices described above. Two challenges to the scope of warrants arise particularly often. First,

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defendants may claim that a warrant is insufficiently particular when the warrant authorizes the seizure of hardware

but the affidavit only establishes probable cause to seize information. Second, defendants may claim that agents

exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing computer equipment if the warrant failed to state explicitly that the

information to be seized might be in electronic form. The former challenge argues that the description of the

property to be seized was too broad, and the latter argues that the description was not broad enough.

1) When the warrant authorizes the seizure of hardware but the affidavit only establishes

 probable cause to seize information

 Computer search warrants sometimes authorize the seizure of hardware when the probable cause in the

affidavit relates solely to the computer files the hardware contains. For example, agents may have probable cause to

believe that a suspect possesses evidence of a fraud scheme, and may draft the warrant to authorize the seizure of the

defendant's computer equipment rather than the data stored within it. On a practical level, such a description makes

sense because it accurately and precisely describes what the agents will do when they execute the warrant (i.e., seize

the computer equipment). From a legal standpoint, however, the description is less than ideal: the equipment itself

is not evidence of a crime, an instrumentality or contraband that may be seized according to Rule 41(a). See

Appendix F; cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 846 F. Supp. 11, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that a

subpoena demanding production of computer hardware instead of the information it contained was unreasonably

broad pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)). The physical equipment merely stores the information that the agents

have probable cause to seize. Although the agents may need to seize the equipment in order to obtain the files it

contains, the better practice is to describe the information rather than the equipment in the warrant itself. When

agents obtain a warrant authorizing the seizure of equipment, defendants may claim that the description of the

property to be seized is fatally overbroad. See, e.g., Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1479 (10th Cir. 1997).9

 To date, the courts have adopted a forgiving stance when faced with this challenge. The courts have generally

held that descriptions of hardware can satisfy the particularity requirement so long as the subsequent searches of the

seized computer hardware appear reasonably likely to yield evidence of crime. See, e.g., United States v. Hay, 231

F.3d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding seizure of “computer hardware” in search for materials containing child

pornography); United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding seizure of “computer

equipment which may be, or is used to visually depict child pornography,” and noting that the affidavit

accompanying the warrant explained why it would be necessary to seize the hardware and search it off-site for the

images it contained); United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding seizure of “[a]ny and all

computer software and hardware, . . . computer disks, disk drives” in a child pornography case because “[a]s a

practical matter, the seizure and subsequent off-premises search of the computer and all available disks was about

the narrowest definable search and seizure reasonably likely to obtain the [sought after] images”); United States v.

Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) (warrant permitting “blanket seizure” of computer equipment from

defendant’s apartment not insufficiently particular when there was probable cause to believe that computer would

contain evidence of child pornography offenses); United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir. 1988)

(permitting seizure of “computer[s], computer terminals, ... cables, printers, discs, floppy discs, [and] tapes” that

could hold evidence of the defendants' odometer-tampering scheme because such language “is directed toward items

likely to provide information concerning the [defendants'] involvement in the . . . scheme and therefore did not

authorize the officers to seize more than what was reasonable under the circumstances”); United States v. Hersch,

1994 WL 568728, at *1 (D. Mass. 1994). Cf. United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441, 458-59 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)

(not insufficiently particular to ask for “[a]ll stored files” in AOL network account when searching account for

obscene pornography, because as a practical matter all files need to be reviewed to determine which files contain the

pornography).

 Despite these decisions, agents should comply with the technical requirements of Rule 41 when describing the

“property to be seized” in a search warrant. If the property to be seized is information, the warrant should describe

the information to be seized, rather than its container. Of course, when the information to be seized is contraband

(such as child pornography), the container itself may be independently seized as an instrumentality. See Gracey,

111 F.3d at 1480 (seizure of computer “equipment” was proper in case involving obscenity because the hardware

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was an instrumentality of the crime).

2) When agents seize computer data and computer hardware but the warrant does not expressly authorize their

seizure

 Search warrants sometimes fail to mention that information described in the warrant may appear in electronic

form. For example, a search for “all records” relating to a conspiracy may list paper-world examples of record

documents but neglect to state that the records may be stored within a computer. Agents executing the search who

come across computer equipment may not know whether the warrant authorizes the seizure of the computers. If the

agents do seize the computers, defense counsel may file a motion to suppress the evidence arguing that the

computers seized were beyond the scope of the warrant.

 The courts have generally permitted agents to seize computer equipment when agents reasonably believe that

the content described in the warrant may be stored there, regardless of whether the warrant states expressly that the

information may be stored in electronic form. See, e.g., United States v. Musson, 650 F. Supp. 525, 532 (D. Colo.

1986). As the Tenth Circuit explained in United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1986), “in the age of

modern technology and commercial availability of various forms of items, the warrant c[an] not be expected to

describe with exactitude the precise form the records would take.” Accordingly, what matters is the substance of the

evidence, not its form, and the courts will defer to an executing agent's reasonable construction of what property

must be seized to obtain the evidence described in the warrant. See United States v. Hill, 19 F.3d 984, 987-89 (5th

Cir. 1994); Hessel v. O'Hearn, 977 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 661 (6th Cir.

1986); United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 655 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The failure of the warrant to anticipate the

precise container in which the material sought might be found is not fatal.”). See also United States v. Abbell, 963 F.

Supp. 1178, 1997 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (noting that agents may legitimately seize “[a] document which is implicitly

within the scope of the warrant -- even if it is not specifically identified”).

 3) General defenses to challenges of computer search warrants based on the description of the “things to be

seized”

 Prosecutors facing challenges to the particularity of computer search warrants have a number of additional

arguments that may save inartfully drawn warrants. First, prosecutors can argue that the agents who executed the

search had an objectively reasonable good faith belief that the warrant was sufficiently particular. See generally

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984); Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. 981, 990-91 (1984). If true,

the court will not order suppression of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp.2d 574, 584-85

(D. Vt. 1998) (holding that good faith exception applied even though computer search warrant was insufficiently

particular). Second, prosecutors may argue that the broad description in the warrant must be read in conjunction

with a more particular description contained in the supporting affidavit. Although the legal standards vary widely

among the circuits, see Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.6(a)

(1994), most circuits permit the warrant to be construed with reference to the affidavit for purposes of satisfying the

particularity requirement in certain circumstances. Finally, several circuits have held that courts can redact

overbroad language and admit evidence from overbroad seizures if the evidence admitted was seized pursuant to

sufficiently particular language. See United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 759 (3d Cir. 1982); Gomez-Soto, 723

F.2d at 654.

Step 2: Establish Probable Cause in the Affidavit

 The second step in preparing a warrant to search and seize a computer is to write a sworn affidavit

establishing probable cause to believe that contraband, evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime exist in the

location to be searched. See U.S. Const. Amend. IV (“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported

by Oath or affirmation”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b),(c). According to the Supreme Court, the affidavit must establish

“a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462

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U.S. 213, 238 (1983). This requires a practical, common-sense determination of the probabilities, based on a totality

of the circumstances. See id. Of course, probable cause will not exist if the agent can only point to a “bare

suspicion” that criminal evidence will be found in the place searched. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,

175 (1949). Once a magistrate judge finds probable cause and issues the warrant, the magistrate's determination that

probable cause existed is entitled to “great deference,” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, and will be upheld so long as there is

a “substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. at 238-39 (internal quotations omitted).

 Importantly, the probable cause requirement does not require agents to be clairvoyant in their knowledge of the

precise forms of evidence or contraband that will exist in the location to be searched. For example, agents do not

need probable cause to believe that the evidence sought will be found in computerized (as opposed to paper) form. 

See United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that “in the age of modern technology . . . ,

the warrant could not be expected to describe with exactitude the precise forms the records would take”). Similarly,

agents do not need to know exactly what statutory violation the evidence will help reveal, see United States v.

Prandy-Binett, 995 F.2d 1069, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and do not need to know who owns the property to be

searched and seized, see United States v. McNally, 473 F.2d 934, 942 (3d Cir. 1973). The probable cause standard

simply requires agents to establish a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the

particular place to be searched. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Of course, agents who have particular knowledge as to

the form of evidence or contraband that exists at the place to be searched should articulate that knowledge fully in

the affidavit.

 Probable cause challenges to computer search warrants arise particularly often in cases involving the

possession and transmission of child pornography images.10 For example, defendants often claim that the passage

of time between the warrant application and the occurrence of the incriminating facts alleged in the affidavit left the

magistrate judge without sufficient reason to believe that images of child pornography would be found in the

defendant's computers. The courts have generally found little merit in these “staleness” arguments, in part because

the courts have taken judicial notice of the fact that collectors of child pornography rarely dispose of such material. 

See, e.g., United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sassani, 139 F.3d 895, 1998

WL 89875, at *4-5 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (citing cases).

 Probable cause challenges may also arise when supporting evidence in an affidavit derives heavily from

records of a particular Internet account or Internet Protocol (“IP”) address. The problem is a practical one: generally

speaking, the fact that an account or address was used does not establish conclusively the identity or location of the

particular person who used it. As a result, an affidavit based heavily on account or IP address logs must demonstrate

a sufficient connection between the logs and the location to be searched to establish “a fair probability that

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in [the] particular place” to be searched. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 

See, e.g., United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 2000) (evidence that child pornography images were

sent to an IP address associated with the defendant’s apartment, combined with other evidence of the defendant’s

interest in young children, created probable cause to search the defendant’s apartment for child pornography);

United States v. Grant, 218 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2000) (evidence that an Internet account belonging to the defendant

was involved in criminal activity on several occasions, and that the defendant’s car was parked at his residence

during at least one such occasion, created probable cause to search the defendant’s residence).

Step 3: In the Affidavit Supporting the Warrant, Include an Explanation of the Search Strategy (Such as the

Need to Conduct an Off-site Search) as Well as the Practical and Legal Considerations That Will Govern the

Execution of the Search

 The third step in drafting a successful computer search warrant is to explain both the search strategy and the

practical considerations underlying the strategy in the affidavit. For example, if agents expect that they may need to

seize a personal computer and search it off-site to recover the relevant evidence, the affidavit should explain this

expectation and its basis to the magistrate judge. The affidavit should inform the court of the practical limitations of

conducting an on-site search, and should articulate the plan to remove the entire computer from the site if it becomes

necessary. The affidavit should also explain what techniques the agents expect to use to search the computer for the

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specific files that represent evidence of crime and may be intermingled with entirely innocuous documents. If the

search strategy has been influenced by legal considerations such as potential PPA liability, the affidavit should

explain how and why in the affidavit. If the agents have authority to seize hardware because the hardware itself is

evidence, contraband, or an instrumentality of crime, the affidavit should explain whether the agents intend to search

the hardware following the seizure, and, if so, for what. In sum, the affidavit should address all of the relevant

practical and legal issues that the agents have considered in the course of planning the search, and should explain the

course of conduct that the agents will follow as a result. Although no particular language is required, Appendix F

offers sample language that agents may find useful in many situations. Finally, when the search strategy is

complicated or the affidavit is under seal, it is a good practice for agents to reproduce the explanation of the search

strategy contained in the affidavit as an attachment to the warrant itself.

 The reasons for articulating the search strategy in the affidavit are both practical and legal. On a practical

level, explaining the search strategy in the affidavit creates a document that both the court and the agents can read

and refer to as a guide to the execution of the search. See Nat’l City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020,

1026 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[W]e note with approval the care taken by the Government in the search involved here. . . .

Such self-regulatory care [in executing a warrant] is conduct highly becoming to the Government.”). Similarly, if

the explanation of the search strategy is reproduced as an attachment to the warrant and given to the subject of the

search pursuant to Rule 41(d), the explanation permits the owner of the searched property to satisfy himself during

the search that the agents’ conduct is within the scope of the warrant. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508

(1978) (noting that “a major function of the warrant is to provide the property owner with sufficient information to

reassure him of the entry's legality”). Finally, as a legal matter, explaining the search strategy in the affidavit helps

to counter defense counsel motions to suppress based on the agents’ alleged “flagrant disregard” of the warrant

during the execution of the search.

 To understand motions to suppress based on the “flagrant disregard” standard, agents and prosecutors should

recall the limitations on search and seizure imposed by Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment. In general, the Fourth

Amendment and Rule 41 limit agents to searching for and seizing property described in the warrant that is itself

evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime. See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir.

1982); see also Appendix F (describing property that may be seized according to Rule 41). If agents execute a

warrant and seize additional property not described in the warrant, defense counsel can file a motion to suppress the

additional evidence. Motions to suppress such additional evidence are filed relatively rarely because, if granted,

they result only in the suppression of the property not named in the warrant. See United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d

1358, 1363 (10th Cir. 1997). On the other hand, defense counsel will often attempt to use the seizure of additional

property as the basis for a motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained in a search. To be entitled to the extreme

remedy of blanket suppression, the defendant must establish that the seizure of additional materials proves that the

agents executed the warrant in “flagrant disregard” of its terms. See, e.g., United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1269

(10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Matias, 836 F.2d 744, 747-48 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing cases). A search is executed

in “flagrant disregard” of its terms when the officers so grossly exceed the scope of the warrant during execution

that the authorized search appears to be merely a pretext for a ‘fishing expedition’ through the target’s private

property. See, e.g., United States v. Liu, – F.3d –, 2000 WL 1876779 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Foster, 100

F.3d 846, 851 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1105-06 (1st Cir. 1989).

 Motions to suppress alleging “flagrant disregard” are common in computer searches because, for practical and

technical reasons, agents executing computer searches frequently must seize hardware or files that are not described

in the warrant. For example, agents who have probable cause to believe that evidence of a defendant's fraud scheme

is stored on the defendant's home computer may have to seize the entire computer and search it off-site. See

discussion supra. Defense lawyers often argue that by seizing more than the specific computer files named in the

warrant, the agents “flagrantly disregarded” the seizure authority granted by the warrant. See, e.g., United States v.

Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp.2d 574, 585 (D. Vt. 1998); United

States v. Gawryisiak, 972 F. Supp. 853, 865 (D.N.J. 1997), aff'd, 178 F.3d 1281 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v.

Sissler, 1991 WL 239000, at *3 (W.D. Mich. 1991), aff'd, 966 F.2d 1455 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v.

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Schwimmer, 692 F. Supp. 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).

 Prosecutors can best respond to “flagrant disregard” motions by showing that any seizure of property not

named in the warrant resulted from a good faith response to inherent practical difficulties, rather than a wish to

conduct a general search of the defendant's property under the guise of a narrow warrant. The courts have

recognized the practical difficulties that agents face in conducting computer searches for specific files, and have

approved off-site searches despite the incidental seizure of additional property. See, e.g., Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d

1472, 1280 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting “the obvious difficulties attendant in separating the contents of electronic

storage [sought as evidence] from the computer hardware [seized] during the course of a search”); United States v.

Schandl, 947 F.2d 462, 465-466 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that an on-site search “might have been far more

disruptive” than the off-site search conducted); Henson, 848 F.2d at 1383-84 (“We do not think it is reasonable to

have required the officers to sift through the large mass of documents and computer files found in the [defendant's]

office, in an effort to segregate those few papers that were outside the warrant.”); United States v. Scott-Emuakpor,

2000 WL 288443, at *7 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (noting “the specific problems associated with conducting a search for

computerized records” that justify an off-site search); Gawrysiak, 972 F. Supp. at 866 (“The Fourth Amendment's

mandate of reasonableness does not require the agent to spend days at the site viewing the computer screens to

determine precisely which documents may be copied within the scope of the warrant.”); Sissler, 1991 WL 239000,

at *4 (“The police . . . were not obligated to inspect the computer and disks at the . . . residence because passwords

and other security devices are often used to protect the information stored in them. Obviously, the police were

permitted to remove them from the . . . residence so that a computer expert could attempt to 'crack' these security

measures, a process that takes some time and effort. Like the seizure of documents, the seizure of the computer

hardware and software was motivated by considerations of practicality. Therefore, the alleged carte blanche seizure

of them was not a 'flagrant disregard' for the limitations of a search warrant.”). See also United States v. Upham,

168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (“It is no easy task to search a well-laden hard drive by going through all of the

information it contains . . . . The record shows that the mechanics of the search for images later performed [off-site]

could not readily have been done on the spot.”); United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 4414, 62 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)

(“[I]f some of the image files are stored on the internal hard drive of the computer, removing the computer to an FBI

office or lab is likely to be the only practical way of examining its contents.”).

 The decisions permitting off-site computer searches are bolstered by analogous ‘physical-world’ cases that

have authorized agents to remove file cabinets and boxes of paper documents so that agents can review the contents

off-site for the documents named in the warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir.

1997) (concluding that “wholesale seizure of file cabinets and miscellaneous papers” did not establish flagrant

disregard because the seizure “was motivated by the impracticability of on-site sorting and the time constraints of

executing a daytime search warrant”); Crooker v. Mulligan, 788 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting cases

“upholding the seizure of documents, both incriminating and innocuous, which are not specified in a warrant but are

intermingled, in a single unit, with relevant documents”); United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir.

1982) (ruling that the district court properly denied suppression motion “where the Government's wholesale seizures

were motivated by considerations of practicality rather than by a desire to engage in indiscriminate 'fishing'”);

United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1982) (“If commingling prevents on-site inspection, and no

other practicable alternative exists, the entire property may be seizable, at least temporarily.”).

 Explaining the agent's search strategy and the practical considerations underlying the strategy in the affidavit

can help ensure that the execution of the search will not be deemed in “flagrant disregard” of the warrant. Cf.United

States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that a magistrate judge’s authorization of a search

supported by an affidavit that explained the need for an off-site search of a computer constituted “the magistrate

judge’s authorization” of the off-site search); United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000)

(relying on the explanation of the search strategy contained in the affidavit in the course of holding that a computer

warrant was not overbroad). A careful explanation of the search strategy illustrates the agent's good faith and due

care, articulates the practical concerns driving the search, and permits the judge to authorize the strategy described

in the affidavit. A search that complies with the strategy explained in the supporting affidavit will not be in flagrant

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disregard of the warrant. See, e.g., Gawrysiak, 973 F. Supp. at 866 (commending agents for conducting a computer

search with “considerable care” based on the submission of a “detail-rich” supporting affidavit and a written search

plan).

When agents expect that the files described in the warrant will be commingled with innocent files outside of

the warrant’s scope, it is a good practice, if technically possible, to explain in the affidavit how the agents

plan to search the computer for the targeted files.

● 

 When agents conduct a search for computer files and other electronic evidence stored in a hard drive or other

storage device, the evidence may be commingled with data and files that have no relation to the crime under

investigation. Figuring out how best to locate and retrieve the evidence amidst the unrelated data is more of an art

than a science, and often requires significant technical expertise and careful attention to the facts. As a result, agents

may or may not know at the time the warrant is obtained how the storage device should be searched, and, in

beginning the search, may or may not know whether it will be possible to locate the evidence without conducting an

extensive search through unrelated files.

 When agents have a factual basis for believing that they can locate the evidence using a specific set of

techniques, the affidavit should explain the techniques that the agents plan to use to distinguish incriminating

documents from commingled documents. Depending on the circumstances, it may be helpful to consult with experts

in computer forensics to determine what kind of search can be conducted to locate the particular files described in

the warrant. In some cases, a “key word” search or similar surgical approach may be possible. Such an approach

may permit law enforcement to locate the incriminating files without conducting an extensive search through

innocent files that happen to be mixed together with the incriminating files that are the target of the search. Notably,

the Fourth Amendment does not generally require such an approach. See United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp.2d

574, 584 (D. Vt. 1998) (“Computer records searches are no less constitutional than searches of physical records,

where innocuous documents may be scanned to ascertain their relevancy.”); United States v. Lloyd, 1998 WL

846822, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). However, in extensive dicta, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that it favors such a

narrow approach because it minimizes the possibility that the government will be able to use a narrow warrant to

justify a broader search. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275-76, 1275 n.8. (10th Cir. 1999) (citing

Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 Harv. J. L. &. Tech. 75, 108 (1994));

Campos, 221 F.3d at 1148. See also Gawrysiak, 972 F. Supp. at 866 (suggesting in dicta that agents executing a

search for computer files “could have at the least checked the date on which each file was created, and avoided

copying those files that were created before the time period covered by the warrant”).

 Of course, in many cases a narrow approach will be technically impossible. The targeted files may be

mislabeled, hidden, oddly configured, written using code words to escape detection, encrypted, or otherwise

impossible to find using a simple technique such as a “key word” search. Because some judges may fail to

appreciate such technical difficulties, it is a good practice as a matter of policy for agents to discuss these issues in

the affidavit if it appears that a narrow search will not be effective. In such cases, a more extensive search through

innocent files will be necessary to determine which files fall within the scope of the warrant. Explaining these

practical needs in the affidavit can make clear at the outset why an extensive search will not be in “flagrant

disregard” of the warrant, and why the extensive search complies fully with traditional Fourth Amendment

principles. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (“In searches for papers, it is certain that some

innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among

those papers authorized to be seized.”); United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that records

searches permit agents to search through many papers because “few people keep documents of their criminal

transactions in a folder marked ‘[crime] records.’”); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp.2d 524, 530 (E.D. Va. 1999)

(noting that agents executing a search for computer files “are not required to accept as accurate any file name or

suffix and [to] limit [their] search accordingly,” because criminals may “intentionally mislabel files, or attempt to

bury incriminating files within innocuously named directories.”); Hunter, 13 F. Supp.2d at 584; United States v.

Sissler, 1991 WL 239000, at *4 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (“[T]he police were not obligated to give deference to the

descriptive labels placed on the discs by [the defendant]. Otherwise, records of illicit activity could be shielded

from seizure by simply placing an innocuous label on the computer disk containing them.”).

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When agents obtain a warrant to seize hardware that is itself evidence, contraband, or an instrumentality of

crime, they should explain in the affidavit whether and how they plan to search the hardware following the

seizure.

● 

 When agents have probable cause to seize hardware because it is evidence, contraband, or an instrumentality

of crime, the warrant will ordinarily describe the property to be seized as the hardware itself. In many of these

cases, however, the agents will plan to search the hardware after it is seized for electronic data stored inside the

hardware that also constitute evidence or contraband. It is a good practice for agents to inform the magistrate of this

plan in the supporting affidavit. Although the courts have upheld searches when agents did not explain this

expectation in the affidavit, see, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussed

infra), the better practice is to inform the magistrate in the affidavit of the agents’ plan to search the hardware

following the seizure.

D. Post-Seizure Issues

 In many cases, computer equipment that has been seized will be sent to a laboratory for forensic examination. 

The time that may elapse before a technical specialist completes the forensic examination varies widely, depending

on the hardware itself, the evidence sought, and the urgency of the search. In most cases, however, the elapsed time

is a matter of months. Several legal issues may arise during the post-seizure period that implicate the government's

right to retain and search the computers in their custody.

1. Searching Computers Already in Law Enforcement Custody

In general, agents should obtain a second warrant to search a computer seized pursuant to a valid warrant if

the property targeted by the proposed search is different from that underlying the first warrant.

● 

 Agents often seize a computer pursuant to a warrant, and then ask whether they need a second warrant to

search the computer. Whether a second warrant is needed depends on the purpose of the search. If agents plan to

search the computer for the information that was the target of the original seizure, no second warrant is required. 

For example, in United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998), investigators obtained a warrant to seize

the defendant's “computer diskettes . . . and the defendant's computer” based on probable cause to believe it

contained child pornography. The investigators seized the computer and then searched it in police custody, finding

child pornography images. On appeal following conviction, the defendant claimed that the investigators lacked the

authority to search the computer because the warrant merely authorized the seizure of equipment. The Tenth Circuit

rejected the argument, concluding that a warrant to seize computer equipment permitted agents to search the

equipment. See id. at 1248. See also United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp.2d 524, 530-31 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding

that initial warrant authorizing search for evidence of computer hacking justified a subsequent search for such

evidence, even though agents uncovered incriminating evidence beyond the scope of the warrant in the course of

executing the search).

 If investigators seize computer equipment for the evidence it contains and later decide to search the equipment

for different evidence, however, they should obtain a second warrant. In United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268

(10th Cir. 1999), detectives obtained a warrant to search the defendant's computer for records of narcotics sales. 

Searching the computer back at the police station, a detective discovered images of child pornography. At that

point, the detective “abandoned the search for drug-related evidence” and instead searched the entire hard drive for

evidence of child pornography. Id. at 1277-78. The Tenth Circuit suppressed the child pornography, holding that

the subsequent search for child pornography was “impermissible general rummaging” that exceeded the scope of the

original warrant. Id. at 1276 (Baldock, J., concurring); Id. at 1273. CompareGray, 78 F. Supp.2d at 530-31

(upholding search where agent discovered child pornography in the course of looking for evidence of computer

hacking pursuant to a warrant, and then obtained a second warrant before searching the computer for child

pornography).

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 Notably, Carey’s focus on the agent’s subjective intent may reflect a somewhat outdated view of the Fourth

Amendment. The Supreme Court’s recent Fourth Amendment cases generally have declined to examine an agent’s

subjective intent, and instead have focused on whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justified the agent’s

conduct. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138

(1990). Relying on these precedents, several courts have indicated that an agent’s subjective intent during the

execution of a warrant no longer determines whether the search exceeded the scope of the warrant and violated the

Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Van Dreel, 155 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[U]nder Whren, . . . once

probable cause exists, and a valid warrant has been issued, the officer’s subjective intent in conducting the search is

irrelevant.”); United States v. Ewain, 88 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Using a subjective criterion would be

inconsistent with Horton, and would make suppression depend too much on how the police tell their story, rather

than on what they did.”). According to these cases, the proper inquiry is whether, from an objective perspective, the

search that the agents actually conducted was consistent with the warrant obtained. See Ewain, 88 F.3d at 694. The

agent’s subjective intent is either “irrelevant,” Van Dreel, 155 F.3d at 905, or else merely one factor in the overall

determination of “whether the police confined their search to what was permitted by the search warrant.” Ewain, 88

F.3d at 694.

2. The Permissible Time Period For Examining Seized Computers

Neither Rule 41 nor the Fourth Amendment creates any specific time limits on the government's forensic

examination of seized computers. Some magistrate judges have begun imposing such limitations, however.

● 

 Despite the best efforts of the government to analyze seized computers quickly, the forensic examination of

seized computers often takes months to complete because computers can store enormous amounts of data. As a

result, suspects whose computers have been seized may be deprived of their computer hardware for an extended

period of time. Neither Rule 41 nor the Fourth Amendment imposes any specific limitation on the time period of

the government's forensic examination. The government ordinarily may retain the seized computer and examine its

contents in a careful and deliberate manner without legal restrictions, subject only to Rule 41(e)'s authorization that

a “person aggrieved” by the seizure of property may bring a motion for the return of the property (see “Rule 41(e)

Motions for Return of Property,” infra).11

 A few magistrate judges have taken a different view, however. Several magistrate judges have refused to sign

search warrants authorizing the seizure of computers unless the government conducts the forensic examination in a

short period of time, such as thirty days. Some magistrate judges have imposed time limits as short as seven days,

and several have imposed specific time limits when agents apply for a warrant to seize computers from operating

businesses. In support of these limitations, a few magistrate judges have expressed their concern that it might be

constitutionally “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment for the government to deprive individuals of their

computers for more than a short period of time. Other magistrates have suggested that Rule 41's requirement that

agents execute a “search” within 10 days of obtaining the warrant might apply to the forensic analysis of the

computer as well as the initial search and seizure. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(1).

 The law does not expressly authorize magistrate judges to issue warrants that impose time limits on law

enforcement’s examination of seized evidence. Although the relevant case law is sparse, it suggests that magistrate

judges lack the legal authority to refuse to issue search warrants on the ground that they believe that the agents may,

in the future, execute the warrants in an unconstitutional fashion. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search Warrant,

the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173, 1196 (1987) (“The few cases on [whether a

magistrate judge can refuse to issue a warrant on the ground that the search may be executed unconstitutionally]

hold that a judge has a ‘ministerial’ duty to issue a warrant after ‘probable cause’ has been established.”); In re

Worksite Inspection of Quality Products, Inc., 592 F.2d 611, 613 (1st Cir. 1979) (noting the limited role of

magistrate judges in issuing search warrants). As the Supreme Court suggested in one early case, the proper course

is for the magistrate to issue the warrant so long as probable cause exists, and then to permit the parties to litigate the

constitutional issues afterwards. See Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932) (“The refusal of the trial court

to issue a warrant . . . is, in reality and effect, a refusal to permit the case to come to a hearing upon either questions

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of law or fact, and falls a little short of a refusal to permit the enforcement of the law.”).

 Prosecutors should also be prepared to explain to magistrate judges why a forensic search for files stored in a

seized computer need not occur within 10 days of obtaining the warrant. Rule 41(c)(1) requires that the agents who

obtain a warrant must “search, within a specified period of time not to exceed 10 days, the person or place named

for the property or person specified.” This rule directs agents to search the place named in the warrant and seize the

property specified within 10 days so that the warrant does not become ‘stale’ before it is executed. See United

States v. Sanchez, 689 F.2d 508, 512 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982). This rule does not apply to the forensic analysis of

evidence that has already been seized, however; even if such analysis involves a Fourth Amendment “search” in

some cases, it plainly does not occur in “the place . . . named” in the warrant. An analogy to paper documents may

be helpful. A Rule 41 warrant that authorizes the seizure of a book requires that the book must be seized from the

place described in the warrant within 10 days. However, neither the warrant nor Rule 41 requires law enforcement

to examine the book and complete any forensic analysis of its pages within the same 10-day period. Cf.

Commonwealth v. Ellis, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 429, 1999 WL 815818, at *8-9 (Mass. Super. 1999) (interpreting

analogous state law provision) (“The ongoing search of the computer's memory need not have been accomplished

within the . . . period required for return of the warrant.”).

 Although the legal basis for imposing time limits on forensic analysis is unclear, a magistrate judge’s refusal to

issue a computer search warrant absent time limitations can create significant headaches for prosecutors. As a

practical matter, prosecutors often have little choice but to go along with the magistrate judge's wishes. A judge's

refusal to sign a search warrant generally is not an appealable final order, and the prosecutor's only recourse is to

turn to another judge, who will want to know why the first judge refused to sign the warrant. See United States v.

Savides, 658 F. Supp. 1399, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd in relevantpartsub. nom. United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d

1218, 1230 (7th Cir. 1990). As a practical matter, then, prosecutors will often have little choice but to try to

convince the judge not to impose a time limit, and if that fails, to request extensions when the time period proves

impossible to follow.

 At least one court has adopted the severe position that suppression is appropriate when the government fails to

comply with court-imposed limits on the time period for reviewing seized computers. In United States v. Brunette,

76 F. Supp.2d 30 (D. Me. 1999), a magistrate judge permitted agents to seize the computers of a child pornography

suspect on the condition that the agents searched through the computers for evidence “within 30 days.” The agents

executed the search five days later, and seized several computers. A few days before the thirty-day period elapsed,

the government applied for and obtained a thirty-day extension of the time for review. The agents then reviewed all

but one of the seized computers within the thirty-day extension period, and found hundreds of images of child

pornography. However, the agents did not begin reviewing the last of the computers until two days after the

extension period had elapsed. The defendant moved for suppression of the child pornography images found in the

last computer, on the ground that the search outside of the sixty-day period violated the terms of the warrant and

subsequent extension order. The court agreed, stating that “because the Government failed to adhere to the

requirements of the search warrant and subsequent order, any evidence gathered from the . . . computer is

suppressed.” Id. at 42.

 The result in Brunette makes little sense either under Rule 41 or the Fourth Amendment. Even assuming that a

magistrate judge has the authority to impose time constraints on forensic testing in the first place, it seems

incongruous to impose suppression for violations of such conditions when analogous violations of Rule 41 itself

would not result in suppression. CompareBrunettewith United States v. Twenty-Two Thousand, Two Hundred

Eighty Seven Dollars ($22,287.00), U.S. Currency, 709 F.2d 442, 448 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting suppression when

agents began search “shortly after” 10 p.m., even though Rule 41 states that all searches must be conducted between

6:00 a.m. and 10 p.m.). This is especially true when the hardware to be searched was a container of contraband

child pornography, and therefore was itself an instrumentality of crime that was not subject to return.

3. Rule 41(e) Motions for Return of Property

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 Rule 41(e) states:

A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the

district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the

ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. The court shall receive

evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted, the

property shall be returned to the movant, although reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect

access and use of the property in subsequent proceedings. If a motion for return of property is made or

comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is filed, it shall be treated

also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e).

 Rule 41(e) has particular importance in computer search cases because it permits owners of seized computer

equipment to move for the return of the equipment before an indictment is filed. In some cases, defendants will file

such motions because they believe that the seizure of their equipment violated the Fourth Amendment. If they are

correct, the equipment must be returned. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Solid States Devices,

Inc., 130 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1997). Rule 41(e) also permits owners to move for a return of their property when the

seizure was lawful, but the movant is “aggrieved by the government's continued possession of the seized property.”

Id. at 856. The multi-functionality of computer equipment occasionally leads to Rule 41(e) motions on this basis. 

For example, a suspect under investigation for computer hacking may file a motion claiming that he must have his

computer back to calculate his taxes or check his e-mail. Similarly, a business suspected of fraud may file a motion

for the return of its equipment claiming that it needs the equipment returned or else the business will suffer.

 Owners of properly seized computer equipment must overcome several formidable barriers before a court will

order the government to return the equipment. First, the owner must convince the court that it should exercise

equitable jurisdiction over the owner's claim. See Floyd v. United States, 860 F.2d 999, 1003 (10th Cir. 1988)

(“Rule 41(e) jurisdiction should be exercised with caution and restraint.”). Although the jurisdictional standards vary

widely among different courts, most courts will assert jurisdiction over a Rule 41(e) motion only if the movant

establishes: 1) that being deprived of possession of the property causes 'irreparable injury', and 2) that the movant is

otherwise without a remedy at law. See In re the Matter of the Search of Kitty's East, 905 F.2d 1367, 13770-71

(10th Cir. 1990). Compare Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1993) (articulating four-factor

jurisdictional test from pre-1989 version of Rule 41(e)). If the movant established these elements, the court will

move to the merits of the claim. On the merits, seized property will be returned only if the government's continued

possession is unreasonable. See Ramsden, 2 F.3d at 326. This test requires the court to weigh the government's

interest in continued possession of the property with the owner's interest in the property's return. See United States

v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297, 1304 (3d Cir. 1978). In particular:

If the United States has a need for the property in an investigation or prosecution, its retention of the

property generally is reasonable. But, if the United States' legitimate interests can be satisfied even if

the property is returned, continued retention of the property would be unreasonable.

Advisory Committee Notes to the 1989 Amendment of Rule 41(e) (quoted in Ramsden, 2 F.3d at 326; Kitty's East,

905 F.2d at 1375).

 Rule 41(e) motions requesting the return of properly seized computer equipment succeed only rarely. First,

courts will usually decline to exercise jurisdiction over the motion if the government has offered the property owner

an electronic copy of the seized computer files. See In re Search Warrant Executed February 1, 1995, 1995 WL

406276, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding that owner of seized laptop computer did not show irreparable harm

where government offered to allow owner to copy files it contained); United States v. East Side Ophthalmology,

1996 WL 384891, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also Standard Drywall, Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d 156, 157 n.2.

(2d Cir. 1982) (“We seriously question whether, in the absence of seizure of some unique property or privileged

documents, a party could ever demonstrate irreparable harm [justifying jurisdiction] when the Government either

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provides the party with copies of the items seized or returns the originals to the party and presents the copies to the

jury.”).

 Second, courts that reach the merits generally find that the government's interest in the computer equipment

outweighs the defendant's so long as a criminal prosecution or forfeiture proceeding is in the works. See United

States v. Stowe, 1996 WL 467238 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (continued retention of computer equipment is reasonable after

18 months where government claimed that investigation was ongoing and defendant failed to articulate his need for

the equipment's return); In the Matter of Search Warrant for K-Sports Imports, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 594, 597 (C.D. Cal.

1995) (denying motion for return of computer records relating to pending forfeiture proceedings). See alsoJohnson

v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 862, 868 (D.N.J. 1997) (denying Rule 41(e) motion to return bank's computer tapes

because bank was no longer an operating business). If the government does not plan to use the computers in further

proceedings, however, the computer equipment must be returned. See United States v. Moore, 188 F.3d 516, 1999

WL 650568, at *6 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (ordering return of computer where “the government's need for

retention of the computer for use in another proceeding now appears . . . remote”) ; K-Sports Imports, Inc., 163

F.R.D. at 597. Further, a court may grant a Rule 41(e) motion if the defendant cannot operate his business without

the seized computer equipment and the government can work equally well from a copy of the seized files. See

United States v. Bryant, 1995 WL 555700, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (referring to magistrate judge's prior unpublished

ruling ordering the return of computer equipment, and stating that “the Magistrate Judge found that defendant

needed this machinery to operate his business”).

III. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT

A. Introduction

ECPA regulates how the government can obtain stored account information from network service providers

such as ISPs. Whenever agents or prosecutors seek stored e-mail, account records, or subscriber information

from a network service provider, they must comply with ECPA. The practical effect of ECPA’s classifications

can be understood most easily using a chart such as the one that appears in Part F of this chapter.

● 

 The stored communication portion of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§

2701-11, creates statutory privacy rights for customers and subscribers of computer network service providers.

 In a broad sense, ECPA exists largely to “fill in the gaps” left by the uncertain application of Fourth

Amendment protections to cyberspace. To understand these gaps, consider the legal protections we have in our

homes. The Fourth Amendment clearly protects our homes in the physical world: absent special circumstances, the

government must first obtain a warrant before it searches there. When we use a computer network such as the

Internet, however, we do not have a physical “home.” Instead, the closest most users have to a “home” is a network

account consisting of a block of computer memory allocated to them but owned by a network service provider such

as America Online. If law enforcement investigators need the contents of a network account or information about

how it is used, they do not need to go to the user to get that information. Instead, the government can go to the

network provider and obtain the information directly from the provider. Although the Fourth Amendment generally

requires the government to obtain a warrant to search a home, it does not require the government to obtain a warrant

to obtain the stored contents of a network account. Instead, the Fourth Amendment generally permits the

government to issue a subpoena to a network provider ordering the provider to divulge the contents of an account.12

ECPA addresses this inequality by offering network account holders a range of statutory privacy rights against

access to stored account information held by network service providers.

 Because ECPA is an unusually complicated statute, it can be helpful when approaching the statute for the first

time to understand the intent of its drafters. The structure of ECPA reflects a series of classifications that indicate

the drafters’ judgments about what kinds of information implicate greater or lesser privacy interests. For example,

the drafters saw different privacy interests at stake in stored e-mails than in subscriber account information. 

Similarly, the drafters believed that computing services available “to the public” required more strict regulation than

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services that are not available to the public. Perhaps this judgment reflects the reality that providers available to the

public are not likely to have close relationships with their customers, and therefore might have less incentive to

protect their customers’ privacy. To protect the array of privacy interests identified by its drafters, ECPA offers

varying degrees of legal protection depending on the perceived seriousness of the privacy interest involved. Some

information can be obtained from providers with a mere subpoena; other information requires a special court order;

and still other information requires a search warrant. In theory, the greater the privacy interest, the greater the

privacy protection.

 Navigating through ECPA requires agents and prosecutors to apply the various classifications devised by

ECPA's drafters to the facts of each case before they can figure out the proper procedure for obtaining the

information sought. First, they must classify the network services provider (e.g., does the provider provide

“electronic communication service,” “remote computing service,” or neither). Next, they must classify the

information sought (e.g., is the information content “in electronic storage,” content held by a remote computing

service, “a record . . . pertaining to a subscriber,” or basic subscriber information). Third, they must determine

whether they are seeking to compel disclosure, or seeking to accept information disclosed voluntarily by the

provider. If they seek compelled disclosure, they need to determine whether they need a search warrant, a 2703(d)

court order, or a subpoena to compel the disclosure. If they are seeking to accept information voluntarily disclosed,

they must determine whether the statute permits the disclosure. The chart contained in Part F of this chapter

provides a useful way to apply these distinctions in practice.

 The organization of this chapter will follow ECPA’s various classifications. Part B explains how agents and

prosecutors can classify providers, so as to distinguish providers of “electronic communications service” from

providers of “remote computing service.” Part C explains the different kinds of information that providers can

divulge, such as content “in electronic storage” and “records . . . pertaining to a subscriber.” Part D explains the

legal process that agents and prosecutors must follow to compel a provider to disclose information. Part E looks at

the flip side of this problem, and explains when providers may voluntarily disclose account information. A

summary chart appears in Part F. The chapter ends with two additional sections. Part G discusses three important

issues that may arise when agents obtain records from network providers: steps to preserve evidence, steps to

prevent disclosure to subjects, and possible conflicts between ECPA and the Cable Act. Finally, Part H discusses

the remedies that courts may impose following violations of ECPA.

B. Providers of Electronic Communication Service vs. Remote Computing Service

 ECPA classifies providers covered by the statute into “provider[s] of electronic communication service” and

“provider[s] of remote computing service.” To understand these terms, it helps to recall the era in which ECPA was

drafted. In the mid 1980s, network account holders generally used third-party network service providers for two

reasons. First, account holders used their accounts to send and receive communications such as e-mail. The use of

computer networks to communicate prompted privacy concerns because in the course of sending and retrieving

messages, it was common for several computers to copy the messages and store them temporarily. Copies that were

created by these providers of “electronic communications service” and placed in a temporary “electronic storage” in

the course of transmission sometimes stayed on a provider’s computer for several months. See H.R. Rep. No.

99-647, at 22 (1986).

 The second reason account holders used network service providers was to outsource tasks. For example, users

paid to have remote computers store extra files, or process large amounts of data. When users hired such

commercial “remote computing services” to perform tasks for them, they would send a copy of their private

communications to a third-party computing service, which retained the data for later reference. Remote computing

services raised privacy concerns because the service providers often retained copies of their customers' files. See S.

Rep. No. 99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.

 ECPA protects communications held by providers of electronic communication service when those

communications are in “electronic storage,” as well as communications held by providers of remote computing

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service. To that end, the statute defines “electronic communication service,” “electronic storage,” and “remote

computing service” in the following way:

“Electronic communication service”

 An electronic communication service (“ECS”) is “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to

send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). For example, “telephone companies and

electronic mail companies” generally act as providers of electronic communication services. See S. Rep. No. 99-541

(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568. See Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d

1105, 1108 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (America Online); FTC v. Netscape Communications Corp., 196 F.R.D. 559 (N.D.

Cal. 2000) (Netscape).

 The legislative history and case law construing the definition of ECS indicate that whether a company provides

ECS is highly contextual. The central issue is the company’s role in providing the ability to send or receive the

precise communication at issue, regardless of the company’s primary business. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 65

(1986). Any company or government entity that provides others with means of communicating electronically can be

a “provider of electronic communications service” relating to the communications it provides, even if providing

communications service is merely incidental to the provider’s primary function. See Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F.

Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996) (city that provided pager service to its police officers can be a provider of

electronic communication service); Lopez v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 129 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (bank that

provides electronic funds transfers can be a provider of electronic communication service). Cf. United States v.

Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1993) (airline that provides travel agents with computerized travel

reservation system accessed through separate computer terminals can be a provider of electronic communication

service).

 Conversely, a service cannot provide ECS with respect to a communication if the service did not provide the

ability to send or receive that communication. See Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 930-31

(N.D. Cal. 1996) (video game manufacturer that accessed private e-mail stored on another company’s bulletin board

service in order to expose copyright infringement was not a provider of electronic communication service); State

Wide Photocopy v. Tokai Fin. Servs. Inc, 909 F. Supp. 137, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (financing company that used fax

machines and computers but did not provide the ability to send or receive communications was not provider of

electronic communication service).

“Electronic storage”

 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) defines “electronic storage” as “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or

electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof,” and “any storage of such

communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” 

The mismatch between the common sense meaning of “electronic storage” and its very particular definition has been

a source of considerable confusion. It cannot be overemphasized that “electronic storage” refers only to temporary

storage, made in the course of transmission, by a provider of electronic communication service.

 To determine whether a communication is in “electronic storage,” it helps to identify the communication’s

final destination. A copy of a communication is in “electronic storage” only if it is a copy of a communication

created at an intermediate point that is designed to be sent on to its final destination. For example, e-mail that has

been received by a recipient’s service provider but has not yet been accessed by the recipient is in electronic storage.

See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 1994). At that stage, the

copy of the stored communication exists only as a temporary and intermediate measure, pending the recipient’s

retrieval of the communication from the service provider. Once the recipient accesses and retrieves the e-mail,

however, the communication reaches its final destination. If a recipient then chooses to retain a copy of the

accessed communication on the provider’s network, the copy stored on the network is no longer in “electronic

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storage” because the retained copy is no longer in “temporary, intermediate storage . . . incidental to . . . electronic

transmission.” § 2510(17). Because the process of transmission to the intended recipient has been completed, the

copy is simply a remotely stored file. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 64-65 (1986) (noting Congressional intent to

treat opened e-mail stored on a server under provisions relating to remote computing services, rather than provisions

relating to services holding communications in “electronic storage”).

 As a practical matter, whether a communication is held in “electronic storage” by a provider governs whether

that service provides ECS with respect to the communication. The two concepts are coextensive. Only a provider

that holds a communication in “electronic storage” can provide ECS with respect to that communication. 

Conversely, any stored file held by a provider of ECS must be in “electronic storage.” If a communication is not in

“electronic storage,” the service cannot provide ECS for that communication. Instead, the service must provide

either “remote computing service” (also known as “RCS,”discussed below), or else neither ECS nor RCS. See

discussion infra.

“Remote computing service”

 The term “remote computing service” (“RCS”) is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) as “provision to the public of

computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.” An “electronic

communications system” is “any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the

transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the

electronic storage of such communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14).

 Roughly speaking, a remote computing service is provided by an off-site computer that stores or processes

data for a customer. See 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564-65. For example, a service provider that processes data in

a time-sharing arrangement provides an RCS. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 23 (1986). A mainframe computer that

stores data for future retrieval also provides an RCS. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service,

816 F. Supp. 432, 443 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that provider of bulletin board services was a remote computing

service). In contrast with a provider of ECS, a provider of RCS acts in a two-way capacity with the customer. Files

held by a provider of RCS are not on their way to a third intended destination; instead, they are stored or processed

by the provider for the convenience of the account holder. Accordingly, files held by a provider acting as an RCS

cannot be in “electronic storage” according to § 2510(17).

 Under the definition provided by § 2711(2), a service can only be a “remote computing service” if it is

available “to the public.” Services are available to the public if they may be accessed by any user who complies

with the requisite procedures and pays any requisite fees. For example, America Online is a provider to the public:

anyone can obtain an AOL account. (It may seem odd at first that a service can charge a fee but still be considered

available “to the public,” but this mirrors commercial relationships in the physical world. For example, movie

theaters are open “to the public” because anyone can buy a ticket and see a show, even though tickets are not free.) 

In contrast, providers whose services are open only to those with a special relationship with the provider are not

available to the public. For example, employers may offer network accounts only to employees. See Andersen

Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (interpreting the “providing . . . to the public”

clause in § 2702(a) to exclude an internal e-mail system that was provided to a hired contractor but was not available

to “any member of the community at large”). Such providers cannot provide remote computing service because

their network services are not available to the public.

Whether a provider is a provider of “electronic communication service,” a provider of “remote computing

service,” or neither depends on the nature of the particular communication sought. For example, a single

provider can simultaneously provide “electronic communication service” with respect to one communication

and “remote computing service” with respect to another communication.

● 

 An example can illustrate how these principles work in practice. Imagine that Joe sends an e-mail from his

account at work (“joe@goodcompany.com”) to the personal account of his friend Jane (“jane@localisp.com”). The

e-mail will stream across the Internet until it reaches the servers of Jane's Internet service provider, here the fictional

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LocalISP. When the message first arrives at LocalISP, LocalISP is a provider of ECS with respect to that message. 

Before Jane accesses LocalISP and retrieves the message, Joe's e-mail is in “electronic storage.” See Steve Jackson

Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 1994). Once Jane retrieves Joe's e-mail, she

can either delete the message from LocalISP’s server, or else leave the message stored there. If Jane chooses to

store the e-mail with LocalISP, LocalISP is now a provider of RCS with respect to the e-mail sent by Joe, not a

provider of ECS. The role of LocalISP has changed from a transmitter of Joe’s e-mail to a storage facility for the

file on LocalISP’s server. Joe's e-mail is now simply a file stored remotely for Jane by an RCS, in this case

LocalISP. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 64-65 (1986) (noting Congressional intent to treat opened e-mail stored on a

server under provisions relating to remote computing services, rather than services holding communications in

“electronic storage”).

 Next imagine that Jane responds to Joe's e-mail. Jane's return e-mail to Joe will stream across the Internet to

the servers of Joe's employer, Good Company. Before Joe retrieves the e-mail from Good Company's servers, Good

Company is a provider of ECS with respect to Jane's e-mail (just like LocalISP was with respect to Joe's original

e-mail before Jane accessed it). When Joe accesses Jane's e-mail message and the communication reaches its

destination (Joe), Good Company ceases to be a provider of ECS with respect to that e-mail (just like LocalISP

ceased to be a provider of ECS with respect to Joe’s original e-mail when Jane accessed it). Now for a more

difficult question: what is the status of Good Company if Joe decides to store the opened e-mail on Good Company's

server? The correct answer is that Good Company is now a provider of neither ECS nor RCS. Good Company does

not provide RCS because unlike LocalISP, Good Company does not provide services to the public. See 18 U.S.C. §

2711(2) (“[T]he term ‘remote computing service’ means the provision to the public of computer storage or

processing services by means of an electronic communications system.”) (emphasis added); Andersen Consulting,

991 F. Supp. at 1043. Because Good Company provides neither ECS nor RCS with respect to the opened return

e-mail in Joe's account, ECPA no longer regulates access to this e-mail, and such access is governed solely by the

Fourth Amendment. Functionally speaking, Good Company has 'dropped out' of ECPA with respect to the opened

return e-mail in Joe's account.

 Finally, imagine that both Joe and Jane decide to download copies of each other’s e-mails. Jane downloads a

copy of Joe’s e-mail from LocalISP’s server to her personal computer at home, and Joe downloads a copy of Jane’s

e-mail from Good Company’s server to his office desktop computer at work. At this point, ECPA’s treatment of the

copies of the e-mails that remain on the servers is unchanged: LocalISP continues to provide RCS with respect to

the copy of Joe’s e-mail stored in Jane’s account on LocalISP’s server, and Good Company still provides neither

RCS nor ECS with respect to Jane’s e-mail stored in Joe’s account on Good Company’s server. But what about the

copies of the e-mails now stored on Jane’s computer at home and Joe’s desktop computer at work? ECPA governs

neither. Although these computers contain copies of e-mails, these copies are not stored on the server of a

third-party provider of RCS or ECS, and therefore ECPA does not apply. Access to the copies of the

communications stored in Jane’s personal computer at home and Joe’s office computer at work is governed solely

by the Fourth Amendment. See generally Chapters 1 and 2.

 As this example indicates, a single provider can simultaneously provide RCS with regards to some

communications, ECS with regard to others, and neither ECS nor RCS with regard to others. As a practical matter,

however, agents do not need to grapple with these difficult issues in most cases. Instead, agents can simply draft the

appropriate order based on the information they seek. For example, if the police suspect that Jane and Joe have

conspired to commit a crime, the police might seek an order compelling LocalISP to divulge all files in Jane's

account except for those in “electronic storage.” In plain English, this is equivalent to asking for all of Jane's opened

e-mails and stored files. Alternatively, the police might seek an order compelling Good Company to disclose files in

“electronic storage” in Joe's account. This is equivalent to asking for unopened e-mails in Joe's account. A helpful

chart appears in Part F of this chapter. Sample language that may be used appears in Appendices B, E, and F.

C. Classifying Types of Information Held by Service Providers

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 Network service providers can store different kinds of information relating to an individual customer or

subscriber. Consider the case of the e-mail exchange between Joe and Jane discussed above. Jane's service

provider, LocalISP, probably has access to a range of information about Jane and her account. For example,

LocalISP may have opened and unopened e-mails; account logs that reveal when Jane logged on and off LocalISP;

Jane's credit card information for billing purposes; and Jane's name and address. When agents and prosecutors wish

to obtain such records, they must be able to classify these types of information using the language of ECPA. ECPA

breaks the information down into three categories: basic subscriber information listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C);

“record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [the] service;” and “contents.”

1. Basic Subscriber Information Listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C)

 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C) lists the types of information in the first category:

the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other

subscriber number or identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and

the types of services the subscriber or customer utilized[.]

 With the exception of “name” and “address,” the categories listed in § 2703(c)(1)(C) can be difficult to

translate into the present world of computer network accounts. The form and substance of the information that

providers retain can change rapidly as technology advances. In general, however, investigators should resist the

temptation to adopt overly broad interpretations of the ambiguous terms in § 2703(c)(1)(C). With one exception, all

of the items in this list relate solely to the identity of the subscriber and his relationship with the provider. See

Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 1105, 1108 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (describing § 2703(c)(1)(C)

information as “information identifying an . . . account customer”). The exception, telephone toll billing records,

appears on the list of basic subscriber information mostly for historical reasons: the items listed in § 2703(c)(1)(C)

may be obtained with a subpoena, and telephone toll billing records have traditionally been obtained using a

subpoena. See, e.g, United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). While the exact contours of §

2703(c)(1)(C) will remain ambiguous until the courts begin interpreting its language, investigators should not use

this ambiguity to avoid obtaining more rigorous court orders required by ECPA to obtain most transactional

information.

2. Records or Other Information Pertaining to a Customer or Subscriber

 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(B) covers a second type of information: “a record or other information pertaining

to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications . . . . ).” This is a

catch-all category that includes all records that are not contents, including basic subscriber information.

 Common examples of “record[s] . . . pertaining to a subscriber” include transactional records, such as account

logs that record account usage; cell-site data for cellular telephone calls; and e-mail addresses of other individuals

with whom the account holder has corresponded. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 10, 17, 31 (1994), reprinted in

1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, at 3490, 3497, 3511; United States v. Allen, 53 M.J. 402, 409 (C.A.A.F. 2000)

(concluding that “a log identifying the date, time, user, and detailed internet address of sites accessed” by a user

constituted “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of such service” under ECPA). See

also Hill v. MCI Worldcom, 120 F. Supp.2d 1194, 1196 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (concluding that “invoice/billing

information and the names, addresses, and phone numbers of parties . . . called” constituted “a record or other

information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of such service” under § 2703(c)(1)(A) for a telephone account). 

According to the legislative history that accompanied § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(B), the purpose of separating the information

listed in § 2703(c)(1)(C) from other records described in § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(B) was to distinguish basic subscriber

information from more revealing transactional information that could contain a “person’s entire on-line profile.” 

1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3497, 3511.

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3. Contents

 The contents of a network account are the actual files stored in the account. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8)

(“‘contents,’ when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any information

concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication”). For example, stored e-mails are “contents,”

as are word processing files stored in employee network accounts. The subject headers of e-mails are also contents,

as they often include messages. Cf. Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that numerical

pager messages provide “an unlimited range of number-coded substantive messages” in the course of holding that

the interception of pager messages requires compliance with Title III).

 Contents can be further divided into three subcategories: contents stored “in electronic storage” by providers of

electronic communication service; contents stored by providers of remote computing services; and contents stored

by providers who provide neither electronic communications service nor remote computing service. The

distinctions among these types of content are discussed in Part B, supra.

D. Compelled Disclosure Under ECPA

 The compelled disclosure provisions of ECPA appear in 18 U.S.C. § 2703. Section 2703 articulates the steps

that the government must take to compel providers to disclose the contents of stored electronic communications

such as e-mail, as well as other information such as account records and basic subscriber information. (Notably, §

2703 does not regulate the compelled disclosure of stored wire communications, such as stored voicemail. Instead,

the compelled disclosure of stored wire communications held by a provider is governed by Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§

2510-22. The distinction between wire communications and electronic communications, as well as the reason for

treating stored wire communications differently than stored electronic communications, is discussed in Chapter 4,

Part C, Section 2, infra.)

 Section 2703 offers five mechanisms that a “government entity” can use to compel a provider to disclose

certain kinds of information. Each mechanism requires a different threshold showing. The five mechanisms,

ranking in ascending order of the threshold showing required, are as follows:

 1) Subpoena

 2) Subpoena with prior notice to the subscriber or customer

 3) § 2703(d) court order

 4) § 2703(d) court order with prior notice to the subscriber or customer

 5) Search warrant

 One feature of the compelled disclosure provisions of ECPA is that greater process generally includes access

to information that can be obtained with lesser process. Thus, a § 2703(d) court order can compel everything that a

subpoena can compel (plus additional information), and a search warrant can compel the production of everything

that a § 2703(d) order can compel (and then some). As a result, agents generally can opt to pursue a higher

threshold instead of a lower one. The additional work required to satisfy a higher threshold will often be justified,

both because it can authorize a broader disclosure and because pursuing a higher threshold provides extra insurance

that the process complies fully with the statute.

1. Subpoena

● Investigators can subpoena basic subscriber information.

 ECPA permits the government to compel two kinds of information using a subpoena. First, the government

may compel the disclosure of the basic subscriber information listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C):

the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other

subscriber number or identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of such service and

the types of services the subscriber or customer utilized[.]

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See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C).

 Agents can also use a subpoena to obtain information that is outside the scope of ECPA. The hypothetical

e-mail exchange between Jane and Joe discussed in Part B of this chapter provides a useful example. In that

example, Joe retrieved Jane’s e-mail from the server of his employer Good Company, and opted to retain a copy of

the communication on Good Company’s server. At that point, Good Company provided neither “remote computing

service” nor “electronic communication service” with respect to that communication, because the communication

had reached its destination and Good Company did not provide services to the public. See Part B, supra. 

Accordingly, § 2703 does not impose any requirements on its disclosure, and investigators can issue a subpoena

compelling Good Company to divulge the communication just as they would if ECPA did not exist. Similarly,

information relating or belonging to a person who is neither a “customer” nor a “subscriber” is not protected by

ECPA, and may be obtained using a subpoena according to the same rationale. Cf. Organizacion JD Ltda. v.

United States Department of Justice, 124 F.3d 354, 359-61 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing the scope of the word

“customer” as used in ECPA).

 The legal threshold for issuing a subpoena is low. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43

(1950). Of course, evidence obtained in response to a federal grand jury subpoena must be protected from

disclosure pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e). Other types of subpoenas other than federal grand jury subpoenas may

be used to obtain disclosure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C): any federal or state grand jury or trial subpoena

will suffice, as will an administrative subpoena authorized by a federal or state statute. See 18 U.S.C. §

2703(c)(1)(C). For example, subpoenas authorized by § 6(a)(4) of the Inspector General Act may be used. See 5

U.S.C. app. However, at least one court has held that a pre-trial discovery subpoena issued in a civil case pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 is inadequate. See FTC v. Netscape Communications Corp., 196 F.R.D. 559 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 

Sample subpoena language appears in Appendix E.

2. Subpoena with Prior Notice to the Subscriber or Customer

Investigators can subpoena opened e-mail from a provider if they comply with the notice provisions of §

2703(b)(1)(B) and § 2705.

● 

 Agents who obtain a subpoena, and either give prior notice to the subscriber or else comply with the delayed

notice provisions of § 2705, may obtain:

 1) everything that can be obtained using a subpoena without notice;

 2) “the contents of any electronic communication” held by a provider of remote computing service “on

behalf of . . . a customer or subscriber of such remote computing service.” 18 U.S.C. §

2703(b)(1)(B)(i), § 2703(b)(2); and

 3) “the contents of any electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic

communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).

 As a practical matter, this means that agents can obtain opened e-mail and other stored electronic

communications not in electronic storage 180 days or less using a subpoena, so long as they comply with ECPA's

notice provisions. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 64-65 (1986).

 In general, the notice provisions can be satisfied by giving the customer or subscriber “prior notice” of the

disclosure. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B). However, 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1)(B) and § 2705(a)(4) permit notice to

be delayed for successive 90-day periods “upon the execution of a written certification of a supervisory official that

there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the subpoena may have an adverse result.” 18 U.S.C. §

2705(a)(1)(B). Both “supervisory official” and “adverse result” are specifically defined terms for the purpose of

delaying notice. See § 2705(a)(2) (defining “adverse result”); § 2705(a)(6) (defining “supervisory official”). 

Although prior notice serves important constitutional values, this provision of ECPA provides a permissible way for

agents to delay notice when notice would jeopardize a pending investigation or endanger the life or physical safety

of an individual. Cf. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n. 19 (1977) (noting that delayed notice

provisions of Title III “satisfy constitutional requirements.”) Upon expiration of the delayed notice period, the

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statute requires the government to send a copy of the request or process along with a letter explaining the delayed

notice to the customer or subscriber. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(5).

 ECPA’s provision allowing for opened e-mail to be obtained using a subpoena combined with prior notice to

the subscriber appears to derive from Supreme Court case law interpreting the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See

Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping § 26:9, at 26-12 (2d ed. 1995). When an

individual gives paper documents to a third-party such as an accountant, the government may subpoena the paper

documents from the third party without running afoul of either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. See United States v.

Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (rejecting Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges to subpoena served on defendant’s

accountant for the accountant’s business records stored with the accountant). In allowing the government to

subpoena opened e-mail, “Congress seems to have concluded that by ‘renting’ computer storage space with a

remote computing service, a customer places himself in the same situation as one who gives business records to an

accountant or attorney.” Fishman & McKenna, §26:9, at 26-13.

3. Section 2703(d) Order

● Agents need a § 2703(d) court order to obtain account logs and other transactional records.

 Agents who obtain a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) may obtain:

 1) anything that can be obtained using a subpoena without notice; and

 2) all “record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not

including the contents of communications [held by providers of electronic communications service and

remote computing service]).” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B).

 A court order authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) may be issued by any federal magistrate, district court or

equivalent state court judge. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). To obtain such an order, known as an “articulable facts”

court order or simply a “d” order,

the governmental entity [must] offer[] specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable

grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other

information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.

 This standard does not permit law enforcement merely to certify that it has specific and articulable facts that

would satisfy such a showing. Rather, the government must actually offer those facts to the court in the application

for the order. See United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1109-11 (D. Kan. 2000) (concluding that a

conclusory application for a § 2703(d) order “did not meet the requirements of the statute.”). The House Report that

accompanied the passage of § 2703(d) included the following analysis:

This section imposes an intermediate standard to protect on-line transactional records. It is a standard

higher than a subpoena, but not a probable cause warrant. The intent of raising the standard for access

to transactional data is to guard against “fishing expeditions” by law enforcement. Under the

intermediate standard, the court must find, based on law enforcement's showing of facts, that there are

specific and articulable grounds to believe that the records are relevant and material to an ongoing

criminal investigation.

 H.R. Rep. No. 102-827, at 31 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3511 (quoted in full in Kennedy,

81 F. Supp.2d at 1109 n.8). As a practical matter, a one- to three-page factual summary of the investigation and the

role that the records will serve in advancing the investigation usually satisfies this criterion. A more in-depth

explanation may be necessary in particularly complex cases. A sample § 2703(d) application and order appears in

Appendix B.

 Section 2703(d) orders are nationwide in scope, much like subpoenas. ECPA permits judges to enter §

2703(d) orders compelling providers to disclose information even if the judges do not sit in the district in which the

information is stored. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (stating that “any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction

described in [18 U.S.C.] section 3127(2)(A)” may issue a § 2703(d) order) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. §

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3127(2)(A) (defining “court of competent jurisdiction” as “a district court of the United States (including a

magistrate of such a court) or a United States Court of Appeals”). In contrast, the statutes and rules governing

search warrants, Title III orders, and pen/trap orders contain express geographical limitations. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

41(a) (permitting magistrate judges to issue search warrants “for a search of property . . . within the district”); 18

U.S.C. § 2518(3) (authorizing judges to enter a Title III order permitting the interception of communications “within

the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting”); 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (authorizing courts to

permit the installation of pen/trap devices “within the jurisdiction of the court”).

4. § 2703(d) Order with Prior Notice to the Subscriber or Customer

Investigators can obtain everything in an account except for unopened e-mail stored with the ISP for 180 days

or less and voicemail using a § 2703(d) court order that complies with the notice provisions.

● 

 Agents who obtain a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), and either give prior notice to the subscriber or

else comply with the delayed notice provisions of § 2705, may obtain:

 1) everything that can be obtained using a § 2703(d) court order without notice; and

 2) “the contents of any electronic communication” held by a provider of remote computing service “on

behalf of . . . a customer or subscriber of such remote computing service.” 18 U.S.C. §

2703(b)(1)(B)(ii), § 2703(b)(2).

 As a practical matter, this means that the government can obtain the full contents of a subscriber's account

except unopened e-mail (which has been in “electronic storage” 180 days or less) using a § 2703(d) order that

complies with the prior notice provisions of § 2703(b)(1)(B).

 Although prior notice serves important constitutional values, agents can obtain an order delaying notice for up

to ninety days when notice would seriously jeopardize the investigation. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a). In such cases,

agents generally will obtain this order by including an appropriate request in the agents’ 2703(d) application and

proposed order; sample language appears in Appendix B. Agents may also apply for successive renewals of the

delayed notice, but must apply to the court for extensions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1)(A), § 2705(a)(4). The legal

standards for obtaining a court order delaying notice mirror the standards for certified delayed notice by a

supervisory official. The applicant must satisfy the court that “there is reason to believe that notification of the

existence of the court order may . . . endanger[] the life or physical safety of an individual; [lead to] flight from

prosecution; [lead to] destruction of or tampering with evidence; [lead to] intimidation of potential witnesses; or . . .

otherwise seriously jeopardiz[e] an investigation or unduly delay[] a trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1)(A), §

2705(a)(2). Importantly, the applicant must satisfy this standard anew every time the applicant seeks an extension

of the delayed notice.

5. Search Warrant

Investigators can obtain the full contents of an account (except for voicemail in “electronic storage”) with a

search warrant. ECPA does not require the government to notify the customer or subscriber when it obtains

information from a provider using a search warrant.

● 

 Agents who obtain a search warrant under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or an equivalent

state warrant may obtain:

 1) everything that can be obtained using a § 2703(d) court order with notice; and

 2) “the contents of an electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic

communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).

 In other words, agents can obtain every record and all of the contents of an account (except for voicemail in

“electronic storage,” see Chapter 4, Part C, Section 2, infra.) by obtaining a search warrant based on probable cause

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pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. The search warrant can then be served on the service provider and compels the

provider to divulge the information described in the search warrant to law enforcement. Notably, obtaining a search

warrant obviates the need to comply with the notice provisions of § 2705. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A). 

Moreover, because the warrant is issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause, obtaining a search warrant

effectively insulates the process from challenge under the Fourth Amendment.

 As a practical matter, § 2703(a) search warrants are obtained just like Rule 41 search warrants, but are usually

served like subpoenas. As with a typical Rule 41 warrant, investigators must draft an affidavit and a proposed

warrant that complies with Rule 41. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). Once a magistrate judge signs the warrant, however,

investigators ordinarily do not themselves search through the provider’s computers in search of the materials

described in the warrant. Instead, investigators bring the warrant to the provider, and the provider produces the

material described in the warrant.

E. Voluntary Disclosure

 The voluntary disclosure provisions of ECPA appear in 18 U.S.C. § 2702 and § 2703(c). These statutes

govern when a provider of RCS or ECS can disclose contents and other information voluntarily, both to the

government and non-government entities. If the provider may disclose the information to the government and is

willing to do so voluntarily, law enforcement ordinarily does not need to obtain a legal order to compel the

disclosure. If the provider either may not or will not disclose the information, agents must comply with the

compelled disclosure provisions and obtain the appropriate legal orders.

1. Contents

Providers of services not available “to the public” may freely disclose the contents of stored

communications. Providers of services to the public may disclose the contents of stored communications only

in certain situations.

● 

 When considering whether a provider of RCS or ECS can disclose contents, the first question agents must ask

is whether the services offered by the provider are available “to the public.” If the provider does not provide

services “to the public,” then ECPA does not place any restrictions on the disclosure of contents. See 18 U.S.C. §

2702(a). For example, in Andersen Consulting v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1998), the petroleum company

UOP hired the consulting firm Andersen Consulting and gave Andersen employees accounts on UOP's computer

network. After the relationship between UOP and Andersen soured, UOP disclosed to the Wall Street Journal

e-mails that Andersen employees had left on the UOP . Andersen sued, claiming that the disclosure of its contents

by the provider UOP had violated ECPA. The district court rejected the suit on the ground that UOP did not provide

an electronic communications service to the public:

[G]iving Andersen access to [UOP's] e-mail system is not equivalent to providing e-mail to the public. 

Andersen was hired by UOP to do a project and as such, was given access to UOP's e-mail system

similar to UOP employees. Andersen was not any member of the community at large, but a hired

contractor.

Id. at 1043. Because UOP did not provide services to the public, ECPA did not prohibit disclosure of contents.

 If the services offered by the provider are available to the public, then ECPA forbids the disclosure of contents

unless:

1) the disclosure “may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the

rights or property of the provider of that service,” § 2702(b)(5);

2) the disclosure is made “to a law enforcement agency . . . if the contents . . . were inadvertently

obtained by the service provider . . .[and] appear to pertain to the commission of a crime,” §

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2702(b)(6)(A);

3) the Child Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. § 13032, mandates the

disclosure, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6)(B); or

4) the disclosure is made to the intended recipient of the communication, with the consent of the

intended recipient, to a forwarding address, or pursuant to a court order. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)-(4). 

See 18 U.S.C. § 2702.

 In general, these exceptions permit disclosure by a provider to the public when the needs of public safety and

service providers outweigh privacy concerns of customers, or else when disclosure is unlikely to pose a serious

threat to privacy interests.

2. Records Other than Contents

● The rules for disclosure of non-content records to the government remain hazy.

 Whether a provider of RCS or ECS can disclose non-content records depends first on who will receive the

disclosure. ECPA permits providers to disclose “record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or

customer of such service” voluntarily to anyone outside of the government for any reason. 18 U.S.C. §

2703(c)(1)(A). The rules permitting the disclosure of non-content records to a government entity are considerably

more narrow, however. For this reason, agents should be extremely careful when communicating with network

service providers in an undercover capacity so as not to violate ECPA. Likewise, when they are not in an

undercover capacity, agents should clearly identify themselves as law enforcement agents.

 On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) authorizes the disclosure of “record[s] or other information pertaining

to a subscriber to or customer of such service” to a government entity only when the government obtains a warrant

or § 2703(d) order, the customer or subscriber consents, or the government submits a formal written request in a

telemarketing fraud investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B). Read broadly, this might appear to prohibit service

providers from disclosing account logs and basic subscriber information voluntarily. Such a result would defy

common sense in many recurring situations, however. For example, a network provider that is being defrauded by a

customer or subscriber often contacts law enforcement seeking to disclose records of the misuse. This is true both

for government providers such as NASA and DoD and for private providers such as corporations and universities. A

broad reading of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B)'s prohibition could prohibit these providers from taking the natural step

of disclosing records of the abuse when they are victims. Under this reading, the provider would be forced to

contact law enforcement, and then law enforcement would have to obtain a § 2703(d) order to “compel” the

provider to disclose the records.

 There are several reasons to believe that courts will not adopt such a broad reading of § 2703(c)(1)(B), and

will permit providers to disclose non-content records when necessary to protect the rights and property of the

provider. First, courts may rule that the “protection of the rights or property of the provider” exception that

expressly permits providers to disclose stored contents and intercept communications in transit impliedly covers the

disclosure of less sensitive non-content records. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5), § 2511(2)(a)(i). The courts have made

similar rulings in the context of Title III and its predecessor statute in order to recognize providers’ “fundamental

right to take reasonable measures to protect themselves and their properties against the illegal acts of a trespasser.”

Bubis v. United States, 384 F.2d 643, 647-648 (9th Cir. 1967) (rejecting a literal interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 605,

the predecessor to Title III, that would have left communications system providers “powerless to take reasonable

measures to protect themselves and their properties against the improper and illegal use of their facilities.”); United

States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642, 646 n.9 (7th Cir. 1976) (stating that when intercepting the contents of a

communication is permitted under Title III, then recording mere pen register/ trap and trace information relating to

the same communication is “surely permissible”) (citing United States v. Freeman, 524 F.2d 337, 341 (7th

Cir.1975)).

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 Provider disclosure of non-content records may also be justified in specific situations. For example, a

computer hacker who does not have a legitimate account is not a “customer” or “subscriber” of the provider, so that

the provider should be able to disclose records “pertaining to” the intruder's activity without running afoul of

ECPA. Cf. Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States Department of Justice, 124 F.3d 354, 359-61 (2d Cir. 1997)

(concluding that a recipient of an electronic funds transfer is not a “customer” of the bank who provided the transfer

according to ECPA, where the recipient did not have a legitimate account with the bank). Similarly, the structure of 

§ 2703(c)(1)(A)-(B) suggests that the prohibition on disclosure of non-contents to “a government entity” might not

apply to disclosures among government entities. Finally, if the provider does not offer services “to the public,” the

provider cannot be a provider of RCS. If the records do not pertain to communications in “electronic storage,”

ECPA may not regulate the provider's disclosure of the records.

 The rules for voluntary disclosure of records to the government will remain hazy until the courts begin

interpreting § 2703(c), or until Congress changes the language of the statute. Until that time, agents should be aware

that some courts might rule that voluntary disclosure of records to the government will violate ECPA even when

there are weighty concerns supporting the disclosure. Of course, agents can avoid this defect by obtaining a §

2703(d) order, search warrant, or the consent of the customer or subscriber.

F. Quick Reference Guide

Quick Reference Guide

Voluntary Disclosure 

Allowed?

Mechanisms to Compel

Disclosure

Public 

Provider

Non-Public

Provider PublicProvider Non-Public Provider

Unopened 

e-mail 

(in electronic storage 180

days or less)

No, unless 

§ 2702(b)

exception

applies 

[§ 2702(a)(1)] 

Yes 

[§ 2702(a)(1)] 

Search warrant 

[§ 2703(a)] 

Search warrant 

[§ 2703(a)] 

Unopened 

e-mail 

(in electronic storage

more than 180 days)

No, unless 

§ 2702(b)

exception

applies 

[§ 2702(a)(1)] 

Yes 

[§ 2702(a)(1)] 

Subpoena with

notice; 2703(d)

order with notice;

or search warrant 

[§ 2703(a,b)] 

Subpoena with

notice; 2703(d)

order with

notice; or search

warrant 

[§ 2703(a,b)] 

Opened e-mail, and other

stored files

No, unless 

§ 2702(b)

exception

applies 

[§ 2702(a)(2)] 

Yes 

[§ 2702(a)(2)

and 

§ 2711(2)] 

Subpoena with

notice; 2703(d)

order with notice;

or search warrant 

[§ 2703(b)] 

Subpoena; 

 ECPA doesn’t

apply[§

2711(2)] 

Basic subscriber

information

No, 

although

exceptions may

exist* [§

2703(c)] 

No, 

although

exceptions may

exist* 

[§ 2703(c)] 

Subpoena; 

2703(d) order; or

search warrant 

[§

2703(c)(1)(C)] 

Subpoena; 

2703(d) order;

or search

warrant 

[§

2703(c)(1)(C)] 

[§ 2711(2)] 

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Transactional and other

account records

No, 

although

exceptions may

exist* 

[§ 2703(c)] 

No, 

although

exceptions may

exist* 

[§ 2703(c)] 

2703(d) order or

search warrant[§

2703(c)(1)(B)] 

2703(d) order or

search warrant 

[§

2703(c)(1)(B)] 

* See the discussion in Part E(2) above.

G. Working with Network Providers: Preservation of Evidence, Preventing Disclosure to Subjects, and Cable

Act Issues

In general, investigators should communicate with network service providers before issuing subpoenas or

obtaining court orders that compel the providers to disclose information.

● 

 Law enforcement officials who procure records under ECPA quickly learn the importance of communicating

with network service providers. This is true because every network provider works differently. Some providers

retain very complete records for a long period of time; others retain few records, or even none. Some providers can

comply easily with law enforcement requests for information; others struggle to comply with even simple requests. 

These differences are due to varied philosophies, resources, hardware and software among network service

providers. Because of these differences, agents often will want to communicate with network providers to learn

how the provider operates before obtaining a legal order that compels the provider to act.

 ECPA contains two provisions designed to aid law enforcement officials working with network service

providers. When used properly, these provisions help ensure that providers will not delete needed records or notify

others about the investigation.

1. Preservation of Evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)

Agents may make binding requests to providers that they preserve existing records pending the issuance of

more formal legal process. Such requests have no prospective effect, however.

● 

 In general, no law regulates how long network service providers must retain account records in the United

States. Some providers retain records for months, others for hours, and others not at all. As a practical matter, this

means that evidence may be destroyed or lost before law enforcement can obtain the appropriate legal order

compelling disclosure. For example, agents may learn of a child pornography case on Day 1, begin work on a

search warrant on Day 2, obtain the warrant on Day 5, and then learn that the network service provider deleted the

records in the ordinary course of business on Day 3. To minimize this risk, ECPA permits the government to direct

providers to “freeze” stored records and communications pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f). Specifically, § 2703(f)(1)

states:

A provider of wire or electronic communication service or a remote computing service, upon the

request of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in

its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process.

 Section 2703(f) permits law enforcement agents to contact providers and make a binding request directing the

provider to preserve records they have in their possession. While a simple phone call should be adequate, a fax or

an e-mail is better because it both provides a paper record and guards against miscommunication. Upon receipt of

the government’s request, the provider must retain the records for 90 days, renewable for another 90-day period

upon a renewed government request. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(2). A sample 2703(f) letter appears in Appendix C.

 Agents who send 2703(f) letters to network service providers should be aware of two limitations. First, the

authority to direct providers to preserve records and other evidence is not prospective. That is, § 2703(f) letters can

order a provider to preserve records that have already been created, but cannot order providers to preserve records

not yet made. Agents cannot use § 2703(f) prospectively as an “end run” around the electronic surveillance

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statutes. If agents want providers to record information about future electronic communications, they must comply

with the electronic surveillance statutes discussed in Chapter 4.

 A second limitation of § 2703(f) is that some providers may be unable to comply effectively with § 2703(f)

requests. As of the time of this writing, for example, the software used by America Online generally requires AOL

to reset the password of an account when it attempts to comply with a § 2703(f) request to preserve stored e-mail. A

reset password may well tip off the suspect. As a result, agents may or may not want to issue 2703(f) letters to AOL

or other providers who use similar software, depending on the facts. The key here is effective communication:

agents should communicate with the network provider before ordering the provider to take steps that may have

unintended adverse effects. Agents simply cannot make informed investigative choices without knowing the

provider's particular practices, strengths, and limitations.

2. Orders Not to Disclose the Existence of a Warrant, Subpoena, or Court Order

 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) states:

A governmental entity acting under section 2703, when it is not required to notify the subscriber or

customer under section 2703(b)(1), or to the extent that it may delay such notice pursuant to subsection

(a) of this section, may apply to a court for an order commanding a provider of electronic

communications service or remote computing service to whom a warrant, subpoena, or court order is

directed, for such period as the court deems appropriate, not to notify any other person of the existence

of the warrant, subpoena, or court order. The court shall enter such an order if it determines that there

is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or court order will result

in--

 (1) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;

 (2) flight from prosecution;

 (3) destruction of or tampering with evidence;

 (4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or

 (5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.

18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).

 This language permits agents to apply for a court order directing network service providers not to disclose the

existence of compelled process whenever the government itself has no legal duty to notify the customer or

subscriber of the process. If the relevant process is a § 2703(d) order or warrant, agents can simply include

appropriate language in the application and proposed § 2703(d) order or warrant. If agents instead seek to compel

information using a subpoena, they must apply separately for this order.

3. Possible Conflicts with the Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551

 Prosecutors and agents should be aware of the potential conflict between § 2703(c)(1) and the Cable

Subscriber Privacy Act (“the Cable Act”), 47 U.S.C. § 551, when seeking records from a network service provider

that happens also to be a cable television provider. When Congress passed the Cable Act in 1984 and ECPA in

1986, the two statutory regimes coexisted peacefully. The Cable Act offered privacy rights for cable television

subscribers relating to their cable television service, and ECPA offered privacy rights to Internet users relating to

their Internet service. Today these two services often converge: many cable providers deliver high-speed Internet

access over cable lines. These providers occasionally have expressed the belief that their provision of Internet

service is governed by the Cable Act rather than ECPA. See, e.g., In Re Application of the United States for an

Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), 36 F. Supp.2d 430 (D. Mass. 1999). This can prove troublesome for law

enforcement, because the Cable Act permits the government to obtain “personally identifiable information

concerning a cable subscriber” only by overcoming a heavy burden of proof at an in-court adversary proceeding. 47

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U.S.C. § 551(h). Such an adversary proceeding would not only tip-off the suspect of the investigation, but would

require the government to inform the suspect of the evidence the government has linking the suspect to the criminal

activity. See id. Needless to say, such a rule would block government investigations in most if not all cases.

 Properly construed, the Cable Act should not conflict with ECPA because the two statutes regulate different

services. The Cable Act regulates the provision of cable television service, see H.R. Rep. 98-934, at 2 (1984),

reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4656, and ECPA regulates the provision of Internet service. When a cable

company provides Internet service, it should be bound by the rules that apply to the provision of Internet service, not

the rules that apply to cable television. Cable providers should not be exempt from ECPA merely because they

happen to provide their Internet service over cable lines. A contrary result would permit privacy rights to hinge

upon the corporate identity of the provider and the means by which it provided the service. This approach would

frustrate the design of both the Cable Act and ECPA to establish uniform national standards for each type of

service. Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) governs compelled access to records belonging to cable Internet

providers, rather than 47 U.S.C. § 551(h).

 Prosecutors and agents who encounter this issue can contact the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property

Section at (202) 514-1026 or their local CTC for additional advice.

H. Remedies

1. Suppression

 ECPA does not provide a suppression remedy. See 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (“The [damages] remedies and sanctions

described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this

chapter.”). Accordingly, nonconstitutional violations of ECPA do not result in suppression of the evidence. See

United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Stored Communications Act expressly rules out

exclusion as a remedy”); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (“[S]uppression is not

a remedy contemplated under the ECPA.”); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp.2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 1999)

(“Congress did not provide for suppression where a party obtains stored data or transactional records in violation of

the Act.”), aff’d, 225 F.3d 656, 2000 WL 1062039 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Charles, 1998 WL 204696, at

*21 (D. Mass. 1998) (“ECPA provides only a civil remedy for a violation of § 2703"); United States v. Reyes, 922

F. Supp. 818, 837-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Exclusion of the evidence is not an available remedy for this violation of

the ECPA. . . . The remedy for violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2701-11] lies in a civil action.”).13

 Defense counsel seeking suppression of evidence obtained in violation of ECPA are likely to rely on McVeigh

v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998). In this unusual case, Judge Sporkin enjoined the United States Navy

from dismissing 17-year Navy veteran Timothy R. McVeigh after the Navy learned that McVeigh was gay. The

Navy learned of McVeigh's sexual orientation after McVeigh sent an e-mail signed “Tim” from his AOL account

“boysrch” to the AOL account of a civilian Navy volunteer. When the volunteer examined AOL's “member profile

directory,” she learned that “boysrch” belonged to a man in the military stationed in Honolulu who listed his marital

status as “gay.” Suspecting that the message was from McVeigh, the volunteer forwarded the e-mail and directory

profile to officers aboard McVeigh's submarine. The officers then began investigating McVeigh's sexual

orientation. To confirm McVeigh's identity, a Navy paralegal telephoned AOL and offered a false story for why he

needed the real name of “boysrch.” The paralegal did not disclose that he was a Naval serviceman. After the AOL

representative confirmed that “boysrch” belonged to McVeigh’s account, the Navy began a discharge proceeding

against McVeigh. Shortly before McVeigh's discharge was to occur, McVeigh filed suit and asked for a preliminary

injunction blocking the discharge. Judge Sporkin granted McVeigh's motion the day before the discharge.

 Judge Sporkin's opinion reflects both the case's highly charged political atmosphere and the press of events

surrounding the issuance of the opinion.14 In the course of criticizing the Navy for substituting subterfuge for

ECPA's legal process to obtain McVeigh's basic subscriber information from AOL, Judge Sporkin made statements

that could be interpreted as reading a suppression remedy into ECPA for flagrant violations of the statute:

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[I]t is elementary that information obtained improperly can be suppressed where an individual's rights

have been violated. In these days of 'big brother,' where through technology and otherwise the privacy

interests of individuals from all walks of life are being ignored or marginalized, it is imperative that

statutes explicitly protecting these rights be strictly observed.

Id. at 220. While ECPA should be strictly observed, the statement that suppression is appropriate when information

is obtained in violation of “an individual's rights” is somewhat perplexing. Both the case law and the text of ECPA

itself make clear that ECPA does not offer a suppression remedy for nonconstitutional violations. Accordingly, this

statement must be construed to refer only to constitutional rights.

2. Civil Actions

 Although ECPA does not provide a suppression remedy for statutory violations, it does provide for civil

damages (including, in some cases, punitive damages), as well as the prospect of disciplinary actions against officers

and employees of the United States who may have engaged in willful violations. 18 U.S.C. § 2707 permits a

“person aggrieved” by an ECPA violation to bring a civil action against the “person or entity which engaged in that

violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a). Relief can include money damages no less than $1,000 per person, equitable or

declaratory relief, and a reasonable attorney's fee plus other reasonable litigation costs. Willful or intentional

violations can also result in punitive damages, see § 2707(b)-(c), and employees of the United States may be subject

to disciplinary action for willful or intentional violations. See § 2707(d). A good faith reliance on a court order or

warrant, grand jury subpoena, legislative authorization, or statutory authorization provides a complete defense to

any ECPA civil or criminal action. See § 2707(e). Qualified immunity may also be available. See Chapter 4, Part

D, Sec. 2.

 At least one court has held that a government entity cannot be held liable for obtaining information from a

network service provider in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). In Tucker v. Waddell, 83 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1996),

Durham, North Carolina police officers obtained a subscriber's account records using an unauthorized subpoena in

violation of § 2703(c)(1)(C). The subscriber sued the City of Durham and the officers, seeking damages. The

Fourth Circuit rejected the suit, reasoning that § 2703(c) imposed duties on providers of ECS and RCS, but not

government entities seeking information from such providers. See id. at 691-93. Accordingly, the government

could not be sued for violating § 2703(c) unless it aided and abetted or conspired in the provider's violation. See id.

at 693, 693 n.6. Notably, however, even the Tucker court agreed that the government could be held liable for

violating § 2703(a) or § 2703(b). See id. at 693.

IV. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS

A. Introduction

 Computer crime investigations often involve electronic surveillance. Agents may want to monitor a hacker as

he breaks into a victim computer system, or set up a “cloned” e-mail box to monitor a suspect sending or receiving

child pornography over the Internet. In a more traditional context, agents may wish to wiretap a suspect’s

telephone, or learn whom the suspect has called, and when. This chapter explains how the electronic surveillance

statutes work in criminal investigations involving computers.

 Two federal statutes govern real-time electronic surveillance in federal criminal investigations. The first and

most important is the wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, first passed as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control

and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (and generally known as “Title III”). The second statute is the Pen Registers and Trap

and Trace Devices chapter of Title 18 (“the Pen/Trap statute”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27, which governs pen registers

and trap and trace devices. Failure to comply with these statutes may result in civil and criminal liability, and in the

case of Title III, may also result in suppression of evidence.

In general, the Pen/Trap statute regulates the collection of addressing information for wire and electronic

communications. Title III regulates the collection of actual content for wire and electronic communications.

● 

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 Title III and the Pen/Trap statute coexist because they regulate access to different types of information. Title

III permits the government to obtain the contents of wire and electronic communications in transmission. In

contrast, the Pen/Trap statute concerns the collection of mere addressing information relating to those

communications. See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Brown v. Waddell,

50 F.3d 285, 289-93 (4th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing pen registers from Title III intercept devices). The difference

between addressing information and content is clear in the case of traditional communications such as telephone

calls. The addressing information for a telephone call is the phone number dialed for an outgoing call, and the

originating number (the caller ID information) for an incoming call. In contrast, the content of the communication is

the actual conversation between the two parties to the call.

 The distinction between addressing information and content also applies to Internet communications. For

example, when computers attached to the Internet communicate with each other, they break down messages into

discrete chunks known as “packets,” and then send each packet out to its intended destination. Every packet

contains addressing information in the “header” of the packet (much like the “to” and “from” addresses on an

envelope), followed by the content of the message (much like a letter inside an envelope). The Pen/Trap statute

permits law enforcement to obtain the addressing information of Internet communications much as it would

addressing information for traditional phone calls. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (defining “trap and trace device”

broadly as “a device which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number

of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted”). However, reading the

entire packet ordinarily implicates Title III. The primary difference between an Internet pen/trap device and an

Internet Title III intercept device (sometimes known as a “sniffer”) is that the former is programmed to capture and

retain only addressing information, while the latter is programmed to read the entire packet.

 The same distinction applies to Internet e-mail. Every Internet e-mail message consists of a header that

contains addressing and routing information generated by the mail program, followed by the actual contents of the

message authored by the sender. The addressing and routing information includes the e-mail address of the sender

and recipient, as well as information about when and where the message was sent on its way (roughly analogous to

the postmark on a letter). The Pen/Trap statute permits law enforcement to obtain the addressing information of

Internet e-mails (minus the subject line, which can contain contents, cf. Brown, 50 F.3d at 292) using a court order,

just like it permits law enforcement to obtain addressing information for phone calls and individual Internet

“packets” using a court order. Conversely, the interception of e-mail contents, including the subject line, requires

careful compliance with the strict dictates of Title III.

B. The Pen/Trap Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27

 The Pen/Trap statute authorizes a government attorney to apply to a court for an order authorizing the

installation of a pen register and/or trap and trace device so long as “the information likely to be obtained is relevant

to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2). A pen register records outgoing addressing

information (such as a number dialed from a monitored telephone), and a trap and trace device records incoming

addressing information (such as caller ID information). See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4). In Internet cases, however,

the historical distinction between pen registers and trap and trace devices carries less importance. Because Internet

headers contain both “to” and “from” information, a device that reads the entire header (minus the subject line in the

case of e-mail headers) is known simply as a pen/trap device.

 To obtain an order, applicants must identify themselves, identify the law enforcement agency conducting the

investigation, and then certify their belief that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing

criminal investigation being conducted by the agency. See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(1)-(2). So long as the application

contains these elements, the court will authorize the installation of the pen/trap device. The court will not conduct an

“independent judicial inquiry into the veracity of the attested facts.” In re Application of the United States, 846 F.

Supp. 1555, 1558-59 (M.D. Fla. 1994). See also United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The

judicial role in approving use of trap and trace devices is ministerial in nature.”).

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 Importantly, this limited judicial review coexists with a strong enforcement mechanism for violations of the

statute. As one court has explained,

[t]he salient purpose of requiring the application to the court for an order is to affix personal

responsibility for the veracity of the application (i.e., to ensure that the attesting United States Attorney

is readily identifiable and legally qualified) and to confirm that the United States Attorney has sworn

that the required investigation is in progress. . . . As a form of deterrence and as a guarantee of

compliance, the statute provides . . . for a term of imprisonment and a fine as punishment for a violation

[of the statute].

In re Application of the United States, 846 F. Supp. at 1559.

 The resulting order may authorize use of a pen/trap device for up to sixty days, and may be extended for

additional sixty-day periods. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(c). The court order also orders the provider not to disclose the

existence of the pen/trap “to any . . . person, unless or until otherwise ordered by the court,” 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d)(2),

and may order providers of wire or electronic communications service, landlords, or custodians to “furnish . . .

forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary” to install pen/trap devices. See 18 U.S.C. §

3124(a), (b). Providers who are ordered to assist with the installation of pen/trap devices under § 3124 can receive

reasonable compensation for reasonable expenses incurred in providing facilities or technical assistance to law

enforcement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3124(c). A provider’s good faith reliance on a court order provides a complete

defense to any civil or criminal action arising from its assistance in accordance with the order. See 18 U.S.C. §

3124(d), (e).

 The Pen/Trap statute also grants providers of electronic or wire communication service broad authority to use

pen/trap devices on their own networks without a court order. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(b) states that providers may use

pen/trap devices without a court order

 (1) relating to the operation, maintenance, and testing of a wire or electronic communication service or

to the protection of the rights or property of such provider, or to the protection of users of that service

from abuse of service or unlawful use of service; or

 (2) to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to

protect such provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire

communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of service; or

 (3) where the consent of the user of that service has been obtained.

18 U.S.C. § 3121(b).

C. The Wiretap Statute, Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22

1. Introduction: The General Prohibition

 Since its enactment in 1968 and amendment in 1986, Title III has provided the statutory framework that

governs real-time electronic surveillance of the contents of communications. When agents want to wiretap a

suspect’s phone, ‘keystroke’ a hacker breaking into a computer system, or accept the fruits of wiretapping by a

private citizen who has discovered evidence of a crime, the agents first must consider the implications of Title III.

 The structure of Title III is surprisingly simple. The statute’s drafters assumed that every private

communication could be modeled as a two-way connection between two participating parties, such as a telephone

call between A and B. At a fundamental level, the statute prohibits a third party (such as the government) who is not

a participating party to the communication from intercepting private communications between the parties using an

“electronic, mechanical, or other device,” unless one of several statutory exceptions applies. See 18 U.S.C. §

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2511(1). Importantly, this prohibition is quite broad. Unlike some privacy laws that regulate only certain cases or

specific places, Title III expansively prohibits eavesdropping (subject to certain exceptions and interstate

requirements) essentially everywhere by anyone in the United States. Whether investigators want to conduct

surveillance at home, at work, in government offices, in prison, or on the Internet, they must make sure that the

monitoring complies with Title III’s prohibitions.

 The questions that agents and prosecutors must ask to ensure compliance with Title III are straightforward, at

least in form: 1) Is the communication to be monitored one of the protected communications defined in 18 U.S.C. §

2510?, 2) Will the proposed surveillance lead to an “interception” of the communications?, and 3) If the answer to

the first two questions is ‘yes,’ does a statutory exception apply that permits the interception?

2. Key Phrases

 Title III broadly prohibits the “interception” of “oral communications,” “wire communications,” and

“electronic communications.” These phrases are defined by the statute. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2510. In

computer crime cases, agents and prosecutors planning electronic surveillance must understand the definition of

“wire communication,” “electronic communication,” and “intercept.” (Surveillance of oral communications rarely

arises in computer crime cases, and will not be addressed directly here. Agents and prosecutors requiring assistance

in cases involving oral communications should contact the Justice Department's Office of Enforcement Operations

at (202) 514-6809.)

“Wire communication”

● In general, telephone conversations are wire communications.

According to § 2510(1), “wire communication” means

any aural transfer made in whole or in part though the use of facilities for the transmission of

communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the

point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by

any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign

communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes

any electronic storage of such communication.

 Within this complicated definition, the most important requirement is that the content of the communication

must include the human voice. See § 2510(18) (defining “aural transfer” as “a transfer containing the human voice

at any point between and including the point of origin and point of reception”). If a communication does not contain

a genuine human voice, either alone or in a group conversation, then it cannot be a wire communication. See S. Rep.

No. 99-541, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885-86 (7th

Cir. 1984) (concluding that “silent television surveillance” cannot lead to an interception of wire communications

under Title III because no aural acquisition occurs).

 The additional requirement that wire communications must be sent “in whole or in part . . . by the aid of wire,

cable, or other like connection . . .” presents a fairly low hurdle. So long as the signal travels through wire at some

point along its route between the point of origin and the point of reception, the requirement is satisfied. For

example, all voice telephone transmissions, including those from satellite signals and cellular phones, qualify as

wire communications. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 35 (1986). Because such transmissions are carried by wire

within switching stations, they are expressly included in the definition of wire communication. Importantly, the

presence of wire inside equipment at the sending or receiving end of a communication (such as an individual cellular

phone) does not satisfy the requirement that a communication be sent “in part” by wire. The wire must transmit the

communication “to a significant extent” along the path of transmission, outside of the equipment that sends or

receives the communication. Id.

 The final phrase of § 2510(1), relating to wire communications in “electronic storage,” has been a source of

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considerable confusion. Congress added this phrase to the definition of wire communication to ensure that stored

voice mail would in some circumstances be protected by the wiretap laws. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986),

reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555 (explaining that final phrase was designed “to specify that wire

communications in storage like voice mail, remain wire communications, and are protected accordingly”). By using

the phrase “electronic storage,” however, Congress invoked a term of art that has a particular and limited meaning: a

“temporary, intermediate storage . . . incidental to . . . electronic transmission.” § 2510(17) . See generally Chapter

3, Part B (discussing the meaning of “electronic storage” as defined in § 2510(17)). Thus, the final phrase of §

2510(17) appears to add unopened voice mail to the definition of wire communications. The practical effect of this

phrase is to require a Title III court order as a condition of government access to voice mail in “electronic storage.”

See also Chapter 3, Part D (discussing the treatment of voicemail under ECPA).

“Electronic communication”

● Most Internet communications (including e-mail) are electronic communications.

 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) defines “electronic communication” as

any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature, transmitted in whole or in

part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign

commerce, but does not include

(A) any wire or oral communication;

(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device;

(C) any communication from a tracking device . . . ; or

(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system

used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds;

 As the definition suggests, electronic communication is a broad, catch-all category. See United States v.

Herring, 993 F.2d 784, 787 (11th Cir. 1993). “As a rule, a communication is an electronic communication if it is

neither carried by sound waves nor can fairly be characterized as one containing the human voice (carried in part by

wire).” H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 35 (1986). Most electric or electronic signals that do not fit the definition of wire

communications qualify as electronic communications. For example, almost all Internet communications (including

e-mail) qualify as electronic communications.

“Intercept”

Most courts have held that communications are intercepted only when they are acquired contemporaneously

with their transmission (in “real time”). The Ninth Circuit has taken a different approach, however.

● 

 Section 2510(4) defines “intercept” as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or

oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” The word “acquisition” is

notably ambiguous in this definition. For example, when law enforcement surveillance equipment records the

contents of a communication, the communication might be “acquired” at three distinct points: first, when the

equipment records the communication; second, when law enforcement later obtains the recording; or third, when

law enforcement plays the recording and either hears or sees the contents of the communication. The text of §

2510(4) does not specify which of these events constitutes an “acquisition” for the purposes of ECPA. See United

States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1976).

 Courts confronted with this ambiguity have rendered inconsistent rulings. Many courts have held that both

wire and electronic communications are intercepted only when they are acquired contemporaneously with their

transmission. In other words, interception of the communications refers only to their real-time acquisition at the

time of transmission between the parties to the communication. Subsequent access to a stored copy of the

communication does not “intercept” the communication. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States

Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 460-63 (5th Cir. 1994) (access to stored e-mail communications) ; Wesley College v.

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Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 386 (D. Del. 1997) (same); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 1990)

(access to stored pager communications); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same);

Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1235-36 (D. Nev. 1996) (same); United States v. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp.

217, 220-21 (D. Mass. 1997) (access to stored wire communications) ; In re State Police Litigation, 888 F. Supp

1235, 1264 (D. Conn. 1995) (same); Payne v. Norwest Corp., 911 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Mont. 1995), aff’d in

part and rev’d in part, 113 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997) (same).

 The Ninth Circuit has taken a very different approach. First, in United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051,

1058-59 (9th Cir. 1998), the court held that a party can intercept a wire communication by obtaining a copy of the

communication in “electronic storage,” which is specifically defined in § 2510(17). The court reasoned that wire

communications should be treated differently than electronic communications because the definition of wire

communication expressly included “any electronic storage of such communication,” but the definition of electronic

communication did not include this phrase. See id. at 1057. Then, in a pro se civil case, Konop v. Hawaiian

Airlines, 2001 WL 13232 , – F.3d. – (9th Cir. 2001), the court reversed course and concluded that it would be

“senseless” to treat wire communications and electronic communications differently. Id. at *6-*7. Accordingly, the

court held that obtaining a copy of an electronic communication in “electronic storage” can constitute an

interception of the communication, just as it can for wire communications. See id.

 The most coherent interpretation of “intercept” in the context of wire communications lies between these two

poles. The best evidence suggests that Congress intended for “intercept” to mean only real-time acquisition. 

However, in recognition of the fact that Congress also intended to protect voicemail in “electronic storage” by

including it in the definition of wire communication, see S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 12 (1986) reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, agents should obtain a Title III order to access stored voicemail if the voicemail falls within the

statutory definition of “electronic storage” articulated in § 2510(17). See Chapter 3, Part B. In contrast, the

decision in Konop is plainly incorrect: government access to electronic communications in “electronic storage” is

governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2703, not 18 U.S.C. § 2518.

3. Exceptions to Title III

 Title III broadly prohibits the intentional interception, use, or disclosure15 of wire and electronic

communications unless a statutory exception applies. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). In general, this prohibitions bars

third parties (including the government) from wiretapping telephones and installing electronic “sniffers” that read

Internet traffic.

 The breadth of Title III's prohibition means that the legality of most surveillance techniques under Title III

depends upon whether a statutory exception to the rule applies. Title III contains dozens of exceptions, which may

or may not apply in hundreds of different situations. In computer crime cases, however, six exceptions apply most

often:

A) interception pursuant to a § 2518 court order;

B) the ‘consent’ exception, § 2511(2)(c)-(d);

C) the ‘provider’ exception, § 2511(2)(a)(i);

D) the ‘extension telephone’ exception, § 2510(5)(a);

E) the ‘inadvertently obtained criminal evidence’ exception, § 2511(3)(b)(iv); and

F) the ‘accessible to the public’ exception, § 2511(2)(g)(i).

Prosecutors and agents need to understand the scope of these six exceptions in order to determine whether different

surveillance strategies will comply with Title III.

a) Interception Authorized by a Title III Order, 18 U.S.C. § 2518.

 Title III permits law enforcement to intercept wire and electronic communications pursuant to a 18 U.S.C. §

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2518 court order (“Title III order”). High-level Justice Department approval is required for federal Title III

applications, by statute in the case of wire communications, and by Justice Department policy in the case of

electronic communications (with exceptions to cover numeric pagers). When authorized by the Justice Department

and signed by a United States District Court or Court of Appeals judge, a Title III order permits law enforcement to

intercept communications for up to thirty days. See § 2518.

 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-18 imposes several formidable requirements that must be satisfied before investigators can

obtain a Title III order. Most importantly, the application for the order must show probable cause to believe that the

interception will reveal evidence of a predicate felony offense listed in § 2516. See § 2518(3)(a)-(b). For federal

agents, the predicate felony offense must be one of the crimes specifically enumerated in § 2516(1)(a)-(p) to

intercept wire communications, or any felony to intercept electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3). 

The predicate crimes for state investigations are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). The application for a Title III order

must also show that normal investigative procedures have been tried and failed, or that they reasonably appear to be

unlikely to succeed or to be too dangerous, see § 2518(1)(c); must establish probable cause that the communication

facility is being used in a crime; and must show that the surveillance will be conducted in a way that minimizes the

interception of communications that do not provide evidence of a crime. See § 2518(5). For comprehensive

guidance on the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2518, agents and prosecutors should consult the Justice Department’s

Office of Enforcement Operations at (202) 514-6809.

b) Consent of a Party to the Communication, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d)

 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) and (d) state:

(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire,

oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the

parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.

 (d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a

wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where

one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such

communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.

 This language authorizes the interception of communications when one of the parties to the communication

consents to the interception.16 For example, if an undercover government agent or informant records a telephone

conversation between himself and a suspect, his consent to the recording authorizes the interception. See, e.g.,

Obron Atlantic Corp. v. Barr, 990 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1993) (relying on 2511(2)(c)). Similarly, if a private person

records his own telephone conversations with others, his consent authorizes the interception unless the commission

of a criminal, tortious, or other injurious act was at least a determinative factor in the person’s motivation for

intercepting the communication. See United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1021 (1st Cir. 1993) (interpreting

2511(2)(d)).

 In computer cases, two questions relating to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d) arise particularly often. First, to what

extent can a posted notice or a “banner” generate implied consent and permit monitoring? Second, who is a “party

to the communication” when a hacker routes an attack across a computer network?

 i) “Bannering” and Implied Consent

Monitoring use of a computer network does not violate Title III after users view an appropriate “network

banner” informing them that use of the network constitutes consent to monitoring.

● 

 Consent to Title III monitoring may be express or implied. See United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d

Cir. 1987). Implied consent exists when circumstances indicate that a party to a communication was “in fact aware”

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of monitoring, and nevertheless proceeded to use the monitored system. United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688,

693 (2d Cir. 1996) See also Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[I]mplied consent is consent

in fact which is inferred from surrounding circumstances indicating that the party knowingly agreed to the

surveillance.”) (internal quotations omitted). In most cases, the key to establishing implied consent is showing that

the consenting party received notice of the monitoring, and used the monitored system despite the notice. See Berry

v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Proof of notice to the party generally supports the conclusion that

the party knew of the monitoring. See Workman, 80 F.3d. at 693. Absent proof of notice, the government must

“convincingly” show that the party knew about the interception based on surrounding circumstances in order to

support a finding of implied consent. United States v. Lanoue, 71 F.3d 966, 981 (1st Cir. 1995).

 In computer cases, the implied consent doctrine permits monitoring of a computer network that has been

properly “bannered.” A banner is a posted notice informing users as they log on to a network that their use may be

monitored, and that subsequent use of the system will constitute consent to the monitoring. Every user who sees the

banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring: by using the network in light of the

notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). See, e.g., Workman, 80

F.3d. at 693-94 (holding that explicit notices that prison telephones would be monitored generated implied consent

to monitoring among inmates who subsequently used the telephones); United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 379 (2d

Cir. 1987) (same). But see United States v. Thomas, 902 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990) (dicta) (questioning the

reasoning of Amen).

 The scope of consent generated by a banner generally depends on the banner’s language: network banners are

not “one size fits all.” A narrowly worded banner may authorize only some kinds of monitoring; a broadly worded

banner may permit monitoring in many circumstances for many reasons. In deciding what kind of banner is right

for a given computer network, system providers look at the network’s purpose, the system administrator’s needs,

and the users’ culture. For example, a sensitive Department of Defense computer network might require a broad

banner, while a state university network used by professors and students could use a narrow one. Appendix A

contains several sample banners that reflect a range of approaches to network monitoring.

 ii) Who is a “Party to the Communication” in a Network Intrusion?

 Sections 2511(2)(c) and (d) permit any “person” who is a “party to the communication” to consent to

monitoring of that communication. In the case of wire communications, a “party to the communication” is usually

easy to identify. For example, either conversant in a two-way telephone conversation is a party to the

communication. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 1014, 1015 (10th Cir. 1993). In a computer network

environment, in contrast, the simple framework of a two-way communication between two parties breaks down. 

When a hacker launches an attack against a computer network, for example, he may route the attack through a

handful of compromised computer systems before directing the attack at a final victim. At the victim’s computer,

the hacker may direct the attack at a user’s network account, at the system administrator’s “root” account, or at

common files. Finding a “person” who is a “party to the communication” — other than the hacker himself, of

course — can be a difficult (if not entirely metaphysical) task.

 Because of these difficulties, agents and prosecutors should adopt a cautious approach to the “party to the

communication” consent exception. A few courts have suggested that the owner of a computer system may satisfy

the “party to the communication” language when a user sends a communication to the owner’s system. See United

States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 158 (4th Cir. 1978) (concluding in dicta that a company that leased and maintained

a compromised computer system was “for all intents and purposes a party to the communications” when company

employees intercepted intrusions into the system from an unauthorized user using a supervisor’s hijacked account);

United States v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating as an alternate holding that the consent

exception of § 2511(2)(d) authorizes monitoring of computer system misuse because the owner of the computer

system is a party to the communication). Even accepting this interpretation, however, adhering to it may pose

serious practical difficulties. Because hackers often loop from one victim computer through to another, creating a

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“daisy chain” of systems carrying the traffic, agents have no way of knowing ahead of time which computer will be

the ultimate destination for any future communication. If a mere pass-through victim cannot be considered a “party

to the communication” -- an issue unaddressed by the courts -- a hacker's decision to loop from one victim to

another could change who can consent to monitoring. In that case, agents trying to monitor with the victim's

consent would have no way of knowing whether that victim will be a “party to the communication” for any future

communication.

c) The Provider Exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i)

Employees or agents of communications service providers may intercept and disclose communications in

self-defense to protect the providers’ rights or property. For example, system administrators of computer

networks generally may monitor hackers intruding into their networks and then disclose the fruits of

monitoring to law enforcement without violating Title III. This privilege belongs to the provider alone,

however, and cannot be exercised by law enforcement.

● 

18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) permits

an operator of a switchboard, or [a]n officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic

communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic

communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his

employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service

or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of

wire communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring

except for mechanical or service quality control checks.

 The “protection of the rights or property of the provider” clause of § 2511(2)(a)(i) grants providers the right

“to intercept and monitor [communications] placed over their facilities in order to combat fraud and theft of

service.” United States v. Villanueva, 32 F. Supp.2d 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). For example, employees of a

cellular phone company may intercept communications from an illegally “cloned” cell phone in the course of

locating its source. See United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997). The exception also permits providers

to monitor misuse of a system in order to protect the system from damage, theft, or invasions of privacy. For

example, system administrators can track hackers within their networks in order to prevent further damage. Cf.

Mullins, 992 F.2d at 1478 (concluding that need to monitor misuse of computer system justified interception of

electronic communications according to § 2511(2)(a)(i)).

 Importantly, the provider exception of § 2511(2)(a)(i) does not permit providers to conduct unlimited

monitoring. See United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 1976) (“This authority of the telephone

company to intercept and disclose wire communications is not unlimited.”). Instead, the exception permits

providers and their agents to conduct reasonable monitoring that balances the providers’ needs to protect their rights

and property with their subscribers’ right to privacy in their communications. See United States v. Harvey, 540 F.2d

1345, 1350 (8th Cir. 1976) (“The federal courts . . . have construed the statute to impose a standard of

reasonableness upon the investigating communication carrier.”). Providers investigating unauthorized use of their

systems have broad authority to monitor and then disclose evidence of unauthorized use under § 2511(2)(a)(i), but

should attempt to tailor their monitoring and disclosure so as to minimize the interception and disclosure of private

communications unrelated to the investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 524 F.2d 337, 340 (7th Cir.

1975) (concluding that phone company investigating use of illegal “blue boxes” designed to steal long-distance

service acted permissibly under § 2511(2)(a)(i) when it intercepted the first two minutes of every conversation

authorized by a “blue box,” but did not intercept legitimately authorized communications). In particular, there must

be a “substantial nexus” between the monitoring and the threat to the provider’s rights or property. United States v.

McLaren, 957 F. Supp. 215, 219 (M.D. Fla. 1997). Further, although providers legitimately may protect their rights

or property by gathering evidence of wrongdoing for criminal prosecution, see United States v. Harvey, 540 F.2d

1345, 1352 (8th Cir. 1976), they cannot use the rights or property exception to gather evidence of crime unrelated to

their rights or property. See Bubis v. United States, 384 F.2d 643, 648 (9th Cir. 1967) (provider monitoring to

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convict blue box user of interstate transmission of wagering information impermissible) (interpreting Title III’s

predecessor statute, 47 U.S.C. § 605).

 Agents and prosecutors must resist the urge to use the provider exception to satisfy law enforcement needs. 

Although the exception permits providers to intercept and disclose communications to law enforcement to protect

their rights or property, see Harvey, 540 F.2d at 1352, it does not permit law enforcement officers to direct or ask

system administrators to monitor for law enforcement purposes. For example, in McClelland v. McGrath, 31 F.

Supp.2d 616 (N.D. Ill. 1998), police officers investigating a kidnaping traced the kidnaper's calls to an unauthorized

“cloned” cellular phone. Eager to learn more about the kidnaper’s identity and location, the police asked the cellular

provider to intercept the kidnaper’s communications and relay any information to the officers that might assist them

in locating the kidnaper. The provider agreed, listened to the kidnaper’s calls, and then passed on the information to

the police, leading to the kidnaper’s arrest. Later, the kidnaper sued the officers for intercepting his phone calls, and

the officers argued that § 2511(2)(a)(i) authorized the interceptions because the provider could monitor the cloned

phone to protect its rights against theft. Although the court noted that the suit “might seem the very definition of

chutzpah,” it held that § 2511(2)(a)(i) did not authorize the interception to the extent that the police had directed the

provider to monitor for law enforcement purposes unrelated to the provider’s rights or property:

What the officers do not seem to understand . . . is that they are not free to ask or direct [the provider]

to intercept any phone calls or disclose their contents, at least not without complying with the judicial

authorization provisions of the Wiretap Act, regardless of whether [the provider] would have been

entitled to intercept those calls on its own initiative.

Id. at 619. Because the purpose of the monitoring appeared to be to locate and identify the kidnaper (a law

enforcement interest), rather than to combat telephone fraud (a provider interest), the court refused to grant summary

judgment for the officers on the basis of § 2511(2)(a)(i). See id; see also United States v. Savage, 564 F.2d 728, 731

(5th Cir. 1977) (agreeing with district court ruling that a police officer exceeded the provider exception by

commandeering a telephone operator’s monitoring).

 In light of such difficulties, agents and prosecutors should adopt a cautious approach to accepting the fruits of

monitoring conducted by providers under the provider exception. Law enforcement agents generally should feel

free to accept the fruits of monitoring that a provider collected pursuant to § 2511(2)(a)(i) prior to communicating

with law enforcement about the suspected criminal activity. After law enforcement and the provider have

communicated with each other, however, law enforcement should only accept the fruits of a provider’s monitoring if

certain requirements have been met that indicate that the provider is monitoring and disclosing to protect its rights or

property. In the common case of a computer intrusion into a privately owned computer network, for example, law

enforcement generally should accept the fruits of provider monitoring only when: 1) the provider is a victim of the

crime and affirmatively wishes both to intercept and to disclose to protect the provider’s rights or property, 2) law

enforcement verifies that the provider’s intercepting and disclosure was motivated by the provider’s wish to protect

its rights or property, rather than to assist law enforcement, 3) law enforcement has not tasked, directed, requested,

or coached the monitoring or disclosure for law enforcement purposes, and 4) law enforcement does not participate

in or control the actual monitoring that occurs. Although not required by law, CCIPS strongly recommends that

agents should obtain a written document from the private provider indicating the provider’s understanding of its

rights and its desire to monitor and disclose to protect its rights or property. Review by a CTC in the relevant

district or CCIPS at (202) 514-1026 is also recommended. By following these procedures, agents can greatly reduce

the risk that any provider monitoring and disclosure will exceed the acceptable limits of § 2511(2)(a)(i). A sample

provider letter appears in Appendix G.

Law enforcement involvement in provider monitoring of government networks creates special problems. 

Because the lines of authority often blur, law enforcement agents should exercise extreme care.

● 

 The rationale of the provider exception presupposes that a sharp line exists between providers and law

enforcement officers. Under this scheme, providers are concerned with protecting their networks from abuse, and

law enforcement officers are concerned with investigating crime and prosecuting wrongdoers. This line can seem to

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break down, however, when the network to be protected belongs to an agency or branch of the government. For

example, federal government entities such as NASA, the Postal Service, and the military services have both massive

computer networks and considerable law enforcement presences (within Inspectors General offices in the case of

civilian agencies, and military criminal investigative services). Because law enforcement officers and system

administrators within the government generally consider themselves to be ‘on the same team,’ it is all too easy in

that context for law enforcement agents to feel comfortable commandeering provider monitoring and justifying it

under a broad interpretation of the protection of the provider’s “rights or property.” Although the courts have not

addressed the viability of this theory of provider monitoring, such an interpretation, at least in its broadest form, may

be difficult to reconcile with some of the cases interpreting the provider exception. See, e.g., McLaren, 957 F. Supp.

at 219. CCIPS strongly recommends a cautious approach: agents and prosecutors should assume that the courts

interpreting § 2511(2)(a)(i) in the government network context will enforce the same strict line between law

enforcement and provider interests that they have enforced in the case of private networks. See, e.g., Savage, 564

F.2d at 731; McClelland, 31 F. Supp.2d at 619. Accordingly, CCIPS urges law enforcement agents to exercise a

high degree of caution when agents wish to accept the fruits of monitoring under the provider exception from a

government provider. Agents and prosecutors should call CCIPS at (202) 514-1026 for additional guidance in

specific cases.

 The “necessary to the rendition of his service” clause of § 2511(2)(a)(i) provides the second context in which

the provider exception applies. This language permits providers to intercept, use, or disclose communications in the

ordinary course of business when the interception is unavoidable. SeeUnited States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S.

159, 168 n.13 (1977) (noting that § 2511(2)(a)(i) “excludes all normal telephone company business practices” from

the prohibition of Title III). For example, a switchboard operator may briefly overhear conversations when

connecting calls. See, e.g., United States v. Savage, 564 F.2d 728, 731-32 (5th Cir. 1977); Adams v. Sumner, 39

F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1994). Similarly, repairmen may overhear snippets of conversations when tapping phone

lines in the course of repairs. See United States v. Ross, 713 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1983). Although the “necessary

incident to the rendition of his service” language has not been interpreted in the context of electronic

communications, these cases suggest that this phrase would permit a system administrator to intercept

communications in the course of repairing or maintaining a network.17

d) The Extension Telephone Exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)

 According to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a), the use of

any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to

the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course

of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or

furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the

ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication

service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the

ordinary course of his duties

does not violate Title III.18 As originally drafted, Congress intended this exception to have a fairly narrow purpose:

the exception primarily was designed to permit businesses to monitor by way of an “extension telephone” the

performance of their employees who spoke on the phone to customers. The “extension telephone” exception makes

clear that when a phone company furnishes an employer with an extension telephone for a legitimate work-related

purpose, the employer’s monitoring of employees using the extension phone for legitimate work-related purposes

does not violate Title III. See Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1980) (reviewing

legislative history of Title III); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 582 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying

exception to permit monitoring of sales representatives); James v. Newspaper Agency Corp. 591 F.2d 579, 581

(10th Cir. 1979) (applying exception to permit monitoring of newspaper employees’ conversations with customers).

 The case law interpreting the extension telephone exception is notably erratic, largely owing to the ambiguity

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of the phrase ‘ordinary course of business.’ Some courts have interpreted ‘ordinary course of business’ broadly to

mean ‘within the scope of a person’s legitimate concern,’ and have applied the extension telephone exception to

contexts such as intra-family disputes. See, e.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding

that husband did not violate Title III by recording wife’s phone calls); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677,

678-79 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that husband did not violate Title III in recording wife’s conversations with their

daughter in his custody). Other courts have rejected this broad reading, and have implicitly or explicitly excluded

surreptitious activity from conduct within the ‘ordinary course of business.’ See United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d

346, 351 (10th Cir. 1974) (“We hold as a matter of law that a telephone extension used without authorization or

consent to surreptitiously record a private telephone conversation is not used in the ordinary course of business.”);

Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting view that § 2510(5)(a) exempts interspousal

wiretapping from Title III liability); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 668-670 (6th Cir. 1976) (same). Some of

the courts that have embraced the narrower construction of the extension telephone exception have stressed that it

permits only limited work-related monitoring by employers. See, e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir.

1992) (holding that employer monitoring of employee was not authorized by the extension telephone exception in

part because the scope of the interception was broader than that normally required in the ordinary course of

business).

 The exception in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii) that permits the use of “any telephone or telegraph instrument,

equipment or facility, or any component thereof” by “an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary

course of his duties” is a common source of confusion. This language does not permit agents to intercept private

communications on the theory that a law enforcement agent may need to intercept communications “in the ordinary

course of his duties.” As Chief Judge Posner has explained:

Investigation is within the ordinary course of law enforcement, so if ‘ordinary’ were read literally

warrants would rarely if ever be required for electronic eavesdropping, which was surely not Congress's

intent. Since the purpose of the statute was primarily to regulate the use of wiretapping and other

electronic surveillance for investigatory purposes, "ordinary" should not be read so broadly; it is more

reasonably interpreted to refer to routine noninvestigative recording of telephone conversations. . . .

Such recording will rarely be very invasive of privacy, and for a reason that does after all bring the

ordinary-course exclusion rather close to the consent exclusion: what is ordinary is apt to be known; it

imports implicit notice.

 Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 1999). For example, routine taping of all telephone

calls made to and from a police station may fall within this exception, but nonroutine taping designed to target a

particular suspect ordinarily would not. See id. Accord United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir.

1996) (concluding that routine recording of calls made from prison fall within law enforcement exception).

e) The ‘Inadvertently Obtained Criminal Evidence’ Exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(iv)

 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b) lists several narrow contexts in which a provider of electronic communication service

to the public can divulge the contents of communications. The most important of these exceptions permits a public

provider to divulge the contents of any communications that

were inadvertently obtained by the service provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a

crime, if such divulgence is made to a law enforcement agency.

 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(iv). Although this exception has not yet been applied by the courts in any published

cases involving computers, its language appears to permit providers to report criminal conduct (e.g., child

pornography or evidence of a fraud scheme) in certain circumstances without violating Title III. Compare 18 U.S.C.

§ 2702(b)(6)(A) (creating an analogous rule for stored communications).

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f) The ‘Accessible to the Public’ Exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i)

 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) permits “any person” to intercept an electronic communication made through a

system “that is configured so that . . . [the] communication is readily accessible to the general public.” Although

this exception has not yet been applied by the courts in any published cases involving computers, its language

appears to permit the interception of an electronic communication that has been posted to a public bulletin board or

a Usenet newsgroup.

D. Remedies For Violations of Title III and the Pen/Trap Statute

 Agents and prosecutors must adhere strictly to the dictates of Title III and the Pen/Trap statute when planning

electronic surveillance, as violations can result in civil penalties, criminal penalties, and suppression of the evidence

obtained. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (criminal penalties for Title III violations); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (civil damages for

Title III violation); 18 U.S.C. § 3121(d) (criminal penalties for pen/trap violations); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)

(suppression for Title III violations). As a practical matter, however, courts may conclude that the electronic

surveillance statutes were violated even after agents and prosecutors have acted in good faith and with full regard for

the law. For example, a private citizen may sometimes wiretap his neighbor and later turn over the evidence to the

police, or agents may intercept communications using a court order that the agents later learn is defective. 

Similarly, a court may construe an ambiguous portion of Title III differently than did the investigators, leading the

court to find that a violation of Title III occurred. In these circumstances, prosecutors and agents must understand

not only what conduct the surveillance statutes prohibit, but also what the ramifications might be if a court finds that

the statutes have been violated.

1. Suppression Remedies

Title III provides for statutory suppression of wrongfully intercepted oral and wire communications, but not

electronic communications. The Pen/Trap statute does not provide a statutory suppression remedy. Of

course, constitutional violations ordinarily will result in suppression of the evidence wrongfully obtained.

● 

a) Statutory Suppression Remedies

 i) General: Interception of Wire Communications Only

 The statutes that govern electronic surveillance grant statutory suppression remedies to defendants only in a

specific set of cases. In particular, a defendant may only move for suppression on statutory grounds when the

defendant was a party to an oral or wire communication that was intercepted in violation of Title III. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 2518(10)(a). See alsoUnited States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524 (1974) (stating that “[w]hat disclosures are

forbidden [under § 2515], and are subject to motions to suppress, is . . . governed by § 2518(10)(a)”); United States

v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 426 (3d Cir. 1997). Section 2518(10)(a) states:

[A]ny aggrieved person . . . may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication

intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that--

(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;

(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on

its face; or

(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or

approval.

 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). Notably, Title III does not provide a statutory suppression remedy for unlawful

interceptions of electronic communications. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d

457, 461 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 1990). Similarly, the

Pen/Trap statute does not provide a statutory suppression remedy for violations. See United States v. Fregoso, 60

F.3d 1314, 1320-21 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 1991).

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 ii) Unauthorized Parties

 The plain language of Title III appears to offer a suppression remedy to any party to an unlawfully intercepted

wire communication, regardless of whether the party was authorized or unauthorized to use the communication

system. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (defining an “aggrieved person” who may move to suppress under § 2518(10)(a)

as “a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom

the interception was directed”). Despite this broad definition, it is unclear whether a computer hacker could move

for suppression of evidence that recorded the hacker’s unauthorized activity within the victim’s computer network. 

The one court that has evaluated this question expressed serious doubts. See United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152,

160 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating in dicta that “we seriously doubt that [a hacker whose communications were monitored

by the system administrator of a victim network] is entitled to raise . . . objections to the evidence [under Title III]”).

 The Fourth Circuit’s suggestion in Seidlitz is consistent with other decisions interpreting the definition of

“aggrieved person” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11). Relying on the legislative history of Title III, the Supreme Court has

stressed that Title III’s suppression remedy was not intended “generally to press the scope of the suppression role

beyond present search and seizure law.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (quoting S. Rep. No.

90-1097, at 96 (1968), and citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1969)). If monitoring does not

violate a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the cases suggest, the suspect

cannot be an “aggrieved” person who can move for suppression under Title III. See United States v. King, 478

F.2d 494, 506 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[A] defendant may move to suppress the fruits of a wire-tap [under Title III] only if

his privacy was actually invaded.”); United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[We] do not

accept defendant’s contention that fourth amendment law is not involved in the resolution of Title III suppression

issues . . . . Where, as here, we have a case with a factual situation clearly not contemplated by the statute, we find it

helpful on the suppression issue . . . to look to fourth amendment law.”).

 Because monitoring a hacker’s attack ordinarily does not violate the hacker’s reasonable expectation of

privacy, see “Constitutional Suppression Remedies,” infra, it is unclear whether a hacker can be an “aggrieved

person” entitled to move for suppression of such monitoring under § 2518(10)(a). No court has addressed this

question directly. Of course, civil and criminal penalties for unlawful monitoring continue to exist, even if the

unlawful monitoring itself targets unauthorized use. See, e.g., McClelland v. McGrath, 31 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ill.

1998) (civil suit brought by a kidnaper against police officers for unlawful monitoring of the kidnaper’s

unauthorized use of a cloned cellular phone).

 iii) Suppression Following Interception with a Defective Title III Order

 Under § 2518(10)(a), the courts generally will suppress evidence resulting from any unlawful interception of

an aggrieved party’s wire communication that takes place without a court order. However, when investigators

procure a Title III order that later turns out to be defective, the courts will suppress the evidence obtained with the

order only if the defective order “fail[ed] to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially

implement the congressional intention [in enacting Title III] to limit the use of intercept procedures to those

situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device.” United States v. Giordano,

416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974).

 This standard requires the courts to distinguish technical defects from substantive ones. If the defect in the

Title III order concerns only technical aspects of Title III, the fruits of the interception will not be suppressed. In

contrast, courts will suppress the evidence if the defect reflects a failure to comply with a significant requirement of

Title III. CompareGiordano, 416 U.S. at 527-28 (holding that failure to receive authorization from Justice

Department official listed in § 2516(1) for order authorizing interception of wire communications requires

suppression in light of importance of such authorization to statutory scheme) with United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d

370, 375 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing district court’s suppression order on ground that judge’s failure to sign the Title

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III order in the correct place was merely a technical defect). Defects that directly implicate constitutional concerns

such as probable cause and particularity, see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967), will generally be

considered substantive defects that require suppression. See United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 173 (D.C. Cir.

1977).

 iv) The “Clean Hands” Exception in the Sixth Circuit

 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i) states that an aggrieved person may move to suppress the contents of wire

communications when “the communication was unlawfully intercepted.” The plain language of this statute suggests

that the government cannot use the fruits of an illegally intercepted wire communication as evidence in court, even

if the government itself did not intercept the communication. For example, if a private citizen wiretaps another

private citizen and then hands over the results to the government, the general rule is that the government cannot use

the evidence in court. See United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 481 (1st Cir. 1987).

 Despite this general rule, the Sixth Circuit has fashioned a “clean hands” exception that permits the

government to use any illegally intercepted communication so long as the government “played no part in the

unlawful interception.” United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1404 (6th Cir. 1995). In Murdock, Mrs. Harold

Murdock surreptitiously recorded her estranged husband’s phone conversations at their family-run funeral home. 

When she later listened to the recordings, she heard evidence that her husband had accepted a $90,000 bribe to

award a government contract to a local dairy while serving as president of the Detroit School Board. Mrs. Murdock

sent an anonymous copy of the recording to a competing bidder for the contract, who offered the copy to law

enforcement. The government then brought tax evasion charges against Mr. Murdock on the theory that Mr.

Murdock had not reported the $90,000 bribe as taxable income.

 Following a trial in which the recording was admitted in evidence against him, the jury convicted Mr.

Murdock, and he appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that although Mrs. Murdock had violated Title III by

recording her husband’s phone calls, this violation did not bar the admission of the recordings in a subsequent

criminal trial. The court reasoned that Mrs. Murdock’s illegal interception could be analogized to a Fourth

Amendment private search, and concluded that Title III did not preclude the government “from using evidence that

literally falls into its hands” because it would have no deterrent effect on the government’s conduct. Id. at 1404.

 Since the Sixth Circuit decided Murdock, three circuits have rejected the “clean hands” exception, and instead

have embraced the First Circuit’s Vest rule that the government cannot use the fruits of unlawful interception even if

the government was not involved in the initial interception. See Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1013 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (dicta); Chandler v. United States Army, 125 F.3d 1296, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d

1066, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1997). The remaining circuits have not addressed whether they will recognize a “clean

hands” exception to Title III.

b) Constitutional Suppression Remedies

 Defendants may move to suppress evidence from electronic surveillance of communications networks on

either statutory or Fourth Amendment constitutional grounds. Although Fourth Amendment violations generally

lead to suppression of evidence, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), defendants move to suppress the fruits

of electronic surveillance on constitutional grounds only rarely. This is true for two related reasons. First,

Congress’s statutory suppression remedies tend to be as broad or broader in scope than their constitutional

counterparts. See, e.g., Chandler, 125 F.3d at 1298; Ford, 553 F.2d at 173. Cf. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d

875, 884 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that Title III is a “carefully thought out, and constitutionally valid . . . effort to

implement the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”). Second, electronic surveillance statutes often regulate

government access to evidence that is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d

193, 198 (9th Cir. 1973) (“Every electronic surveillance is not constitutionally proscribed and whether the

interception is to be suppressed must turn upon the facts of each case.”). For example, the Supreme Court has held

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that the use and installation of pen registers does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search.” See Smith v.

Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). As a result, use of a pen/trap device in violation of the pen/trap statute

ordinarily does not lead to suppression of evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. See United States v. Thompson,

936 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1991).

 It is likely that the scope of Fourth Amendment doctrine would also preclude a hacker from enjoying a

constitutional entitlement to the suppression of unlawful monitoring of his unauthorized activity. As the Fourth

Circuit noted in Seidlitz, a computer hacker who breaks into a victim computer “intrude[s] or trespasse[s] upon the

physical property of [the victim] as effectively as if he had broken into the . . . facility and instructed the computers

from one of the terminals directly wired to the machines.” Seidlitz, 589 F.2d at 160. See also Compuserve, Inc. v.

Cyber Promotions, Inc. 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (noting cases analogizing computer hacking to

trespassing). A trespasser does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy where his presence is unlawful. See

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that “[a] burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during

the off season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law

recognizes as ‘legitimate’”); Amezquita v. Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that squatters had no

reasonable expectation of privacy on government land where the squatters had no colorable claim to occupy the

land). Accordingly, a computer hacker would have no reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized

activities that were monitored from within a victim computer. “[H]aving been ‘caught with his hand in the cookie

jar’,” the hacker has no constitutional right to the suppression of evidence of his unauthorized activities. Seidlitz,

589 F.2d at 160.

2. Defenses to Civil and Criminal Actions

Agents and prosecutors are generally protected from liability under Title III for reasonable decisions made in

good faith in the course of their official duties.

● 

 Civil and criminal actions may result when law enforcement officers violate the electronic surveillance

statutes. In general, the law permits such actions when law enforcement officers abuse their authority, but protects

officers from suit for reasonable good-faith mistakes made in the course of their official duties. The basic approach

was articulated over a half century ago by Judge Learned Hand:

There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but that

is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has

suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the

evils inevitable in either alternative.

Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580 (2d Cir. 1949). When agents and prosecutors are subject to civil or criminal

suits for electronic surveillance, the balance of evils has been struck by both a statutory good-faith defense and a

widely (but not uniformly) recognized judge-made qualified-immunity defense.

a) Good-Faith Defense

 Both Title III and the Pen/Trap statute offer a statutory good-faith defense. According to these statutes,

a good faith reliance on . . . a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization,

or a statutory authorization . . . is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under

this chapter or any other law.

18 U.S.C. § 2520(d) (good-faith defense for Title III violations). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3123(e) (good-faith defense

for pen/trap violations).

 The relatively few cases interpreting the good-faith defense are notably erratic. In general, however, the courts

have permitted law enforcement officers to rely on the good-faith defense when they make honest mistakes in the

course of their official duties. See, e.g., Kilgore v. Mitchell, 623 F.2d 631, 663 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Officials charged

with violation of Title III may invoke the defense of good faith under § 2520 if they can demonstrate: (1) that they

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had a subjective good faith belief that they were acting in compliance with the statute; and (2) that this belief was

itself reasonable.”); Hallinan v. Mitchell, 418 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (good-faith exception protects

Attorney General from civil suit after Supreme Court rejects Attorney General's interpretation of Title III). In

contrast, the courts have not permitted private parties to rely on good-faith 'mistake of law' defenses in civil

wiretapping cases. See e.g., Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 285 (1st Cir. 1993); Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537,

1541 (10th Cir. 1991).

b) Qualified Immunity

 The courts have generally recognized a qualified immunity defense to Title III civil suits in addition to the

statutory good-faith defense. See Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that public

officials sued under Title III may invoke qualified immunity in addition to the good faith defense); Blake v. Wright,

179 F.3d 1003, 1013 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that qualified immunity protects police chief from suit by employees

who were monitored where “the dearth of law surrounding the . . . statute fails to clearly establish whether [the

defendant's] activities violated the law."); Davis v. Zirkelbach, 149 F.3d 614, 618, 620 (7th Cir. 1998) (qualified

immunity defense applies to police officers and prosecutors in civil wiretapping case); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720

F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But see Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (distinguishing

Zweibon, and concluding that qualified immunity does not apply to Title III violations because the statutory

good-faith defense exists). Under the doctrine of qualified immunity,

government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.

 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In general, qualified immunity protects government officials

from suit when “[t]he contours of the right” violated were not so clear that a reasonable official would understand

that his conduct violated the law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,

496 (1991) (prosecutors receive qualified immunity for legal advice to police).

 Of course, whether a statutory right under Title III is “clearly established” is in the eye of the beholder. The

sensitive privacy interests implicated by Title III may lead some courts to rule that a Title III privacy right is “clearly

established” even if no courts have recognized the right in analogous circumstances. See, e.g., McClelland v.

McGrath, 31 F. Supp. 616, 619-20 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that police violated the “clearly established” rights of a

kidnaper who used a cloned cellular phone when the police asked the cellular provider to intercept the kidnaper’s

unauthorized communications to help locate the kidnaper, and adding that the kidnaper’s right to be free from

monitoring was “crystal clear” despite § 2511(2)(a)(i)).

V. EVIDENCE

A. Introduction

 Although the primary concern of this manual is obtaining computer records in criminal investigations, the

ultimate goal is to obtain evidence admissible in court. A complete guide to offering computer records in evidence

is beyond the scope of this manual. However, this chapter explains some of the more important issues that can arise

when the government seeks the admission of computer records under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

 Most federal courts that have evaluated the admissibility of computer records have focused on computer

records as potential hearsay. The courts generally have admitted computer records upon a showing that the records

fall within the business records exception, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6):

Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any

form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from

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information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted

business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,

report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified

witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting

certification, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate

lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,

association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.

 See, e.g., United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910,

914 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Catabran, 836

F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1988); Capital Marine Supply v. M/V Roland Thomas II, 719 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1983).

Applying this test, the courts have indicated that computer records generally can be admitted as business records if

they were kept pursuant to a routine procedure for motives that tend to assure their accuracy.

 However, the federal courts are likely to move away from this “one size fits all” approach as they become

more comfortable and familiar with computer records. Like paper records, computer records are not monolithic: the

evidentiary issues raised by their admission should depend on what kind of computer records a proponent seeks to

have admitted. For example, computer records that contain text often can be divided into two categories:

computer-generated records, and records that are merely computer-stored. See People v. Holowko, 486 N.E.2d 877,

878-79 (Ill. 1985). The difference hinges upon whether a person or a machine created the records' contents. 

Computer-stored records refer to documents that contain the writings of some person or persons and happen to be in

electronic form. E-mail messages, word processing files, and Internet chat room messages provide common

examples. As with any other testimony or documentary evidence containing human statements, computer-stored

records must comply with the hearsay rule. If the records are admitted to prove the truth of the matter they assert,

the offeror of the records must show circumstances indicating that the human statements contained in the record are

reliable and trustworthy, see Advisory Committee Notes to Proposed Rule 801 (1972), and the records must be

authentic.

 In contrast, computer-generated records contain the output of computer programs, untouched by human hands. 

Log-in records from Internet service providers, telephone records, and ATM receipts tend to be computer-generated

records. Unlike computer-stored records, computer-generated records do not contain human “statements,” but only

the output of a computer program designed to process input following a defined algorithm. Of course, a computer

program can direct a computer to generate a record that mimics a human statement: an e-mail program can

announce “You've got mail!” when mail arrives in an inbox, and an ATM receipt can state that $100 was deposited

in an account at 2:25 pm. However, the fact that a computer rather than a human being has created the record alters

the evidentiary issues that the computer-generated records present. See, e.g., 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §

294, at 286 (4th ed. 1992). The evidentiary issue is no longer whether a human's out-of-court statement was

truthful and accurate (a question of hearsay), but instead whether the computer program that generated the record

was functioning properly (a question of authenticity). See id.; Richard O. Lempert & Steven A. Saltzburg, A

Modern Approach to Evidence 370 (2d ed. 1983); Holowko, 486 N.E.2d at 878-79.

 Finally, a third category of computer records exists: some computer records are both computer-generated and

computer-stored. For example, a suspect in a fraud case might use a spreadsheet program to process financial

figures relating to the fraudulent scheme. A computer record containing the output of the program would derive

from both human statements (the suspect's input to the spreadsheet program) and computer processing (the

mathematical operations of the spreadsheet program). Accordingly, the record combines the evidentiary concerns

raised by computer-stored and computer-generated records. The party seeking the admission of the record should

address both the hearsay issues implicated by the original input and the authenticity issues raised by the computer

processing.

 As the federal courts develop a more nuanced appreciation of the distinctions to be made between different

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kinds of computer records, they are likely to see that the admission of computer records generally raises two distinct

issues. First, the government must establish the authenticity of all computer records by providing “evidence

sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). 

Second, if the computer records are computer-stored records that contain human statements, the government must

show that those human statements are not inadmissible hearsay.

B. Authentication

 Before a party may move for admission of a computer record or any other evidence, the proponent must show

that it is authentic. That is, the government must offer evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the [computer

record or other evidence] in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). See United States v.

Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998).

 The standard for authenticating computer records is the same for authenticating other records. The degree of 

authentication does not vary simply because a record happens to be (or has been at one point) in electronic form. 

See United States v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889, 893 n.11 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (5th

Cir. 1982). But see United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating in dicta that “the complex

nature of computer storage calls for a more comprehensive foundation”). For example, witnesses who testify to the

authenticity of computer records need not have special qualifications. The witness does not need to have

programmed the computer himself, or even need to understand the maintenance and technical operation of the

computer. See United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 915 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing cases). Instead, the witness simply

must have first-hand knowledge of the relevant facts to which she testifies. See generally United States v. Whitaker,

127 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 1997) (FBI agent who was present when the defendant's computer was seized can

authenticate seized files) ; United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (telephone company billing

supervisor can authenticate phone company records); Moore, 923 F.2d at 915 (head of bank's consumer loan

department can authenticate computerized loan data).

 Challenges to the authenticity of computer records often take on one of three forms. First, parties may

challenge the authenticity of both computer-generated and computer-stored records by questioning whether the

records were altered, manipulated, or damaged after they were created. Second, parties may question the

authenticity of computer-generated records by challenging the reliability of the computer program that generated the

records. Third, parties may challenge the authenticity of computer-stored records by questioning the identity of their

author.

1. Authenticity and the Alteration of Computer Records

 Computer records can be altered easily, and opposing parties often allege that computer records lack

authenticity because they have been tampered with or changed after they were created. For example, in United

States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1997), the government retrieved computer files from the computer of

a narcotics dealer named Frost. The files from Frost's computer included detailed records of narcotics sales by three

aliases: “Me” (Frost himself, presumably), “Gator” (the nickname of Frost's co-defendant Whitaker), and “Cruz”

(the nickname of another dealer). After the government permitted Frost to help retrieve the evidence from his

computer and declined to establish a formal chain of custody for the computer at trial, Whitaker argued that the files

implicating him through his alias were not properly authenticated. Whitaker argued that “with a few rapid

keystrokes, Frost could have easily added Whitaker's alias, 'Gator' to the printouts in order to finger Whitaker and to

appear more helpful to the government.” Id. at 602.

 The courts have responded with considerable skepticism to such unsupported claims that computer records

have been altered. Absent specific evidence that tampering occurred, the mere possibility of tampering does not

affect the authenticity of a computer record. See Whitaker, 127 F.3d at 602 (declining to disturb trial judge's ruling

that computer records were admissible because allegation of tampering was “almost wild-eyed speculation . . .

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[without] evidence to support such a scenario”); United States v. Bonallo, 858 F.2d 1427, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988)

(“The fact that it is possible to alter data contained in a computer is plainly insufficient to establish

untrustworthiness.”); United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The existence of an air-tight

security system [to prevent tampering] is not, however, a prerequisite to the admissibility of computer printouts. If

such a prerequisite did exist, it would become virtually impossible to admit computer-generated records; the party

opposing admission would have to show only that a better security system was feasible.”). This is consistent with

the rule used to establish the authenticity of other evidence such as narcotics. See United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d

695, 700 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Merely raising the possibility of tampering is insufficient to render evidence

inadmissible.”). Absent specific evidence of tampering, allegations that computer records have been altered go to

their weight, not their admissibility. See Bonallo, 858 F.2d at 1436.

2. Establishing the Reliability of Computer Programs

 The authenticity of computer-generated records sometimes implicates the reliability of the computer programs

that create the records. For example, a computer-generated record might not be authentic if the program that creates

the record contains serious programming errors. If the program's output is inaccurate, the record may not be “what

its proponent claims” according to Fed. R. Evid. 901.

 Defendants in criminal trials often attempt to challenge the authenticity of computer -generated records by

challenging the reliability of the programs. See, e.g., United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir.

1970); United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542, 547-48 (3d Cir. 1975). The courts have indicated that the

government can overcome this challenge so long as

the government provides sufficient facts to warrant a finding that the records are trustworthy and the

opposing party is afforded an opportunity to inquire into the accuracy thereof[.]

 United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 (7th Cir. 1990). See also Liebert, 519 F.2d at 547; DeGeorgia,

420 F.2d. at 893 n.11. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9) (indicating that matters created according to a process or

system can be authenticated with “[e]vidence describing a process or system used . . . and showing that the process

or system produces an accurate result”). In most cases, the reliability of a computer program can be established by

showing that users of the program actually do rely on it on a regular basis, such as in the ordinary course of

business. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 915 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he ordinary business

circumstances described suggest trustworthiness, . . . at least where absolutely nothing in the record in any way

implies the lack thereof.”) (computerized tax records held by the I.R.S.); Briscoe, 896 F.2d at 1494 (computerized

telephone records held by Illinois Bell). When the computer program is not used on a regular basis and the

government cannot establish reliability based on reliance in the ordinary course of business, the government may

need to disclose “what operations the computer had been instructed to perform [as well as] the precise instruction

that had been given” if the opposing party requests. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d at 1038. Notably, once a minimum

standard of trustworthiness has been established, questions as to the accuracy of computer records “resulting from . .

. the operation of the computer program” affect only the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. United States

v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988).

 Prosecutors may note the conceptual overlap between establishing the authenticity of a computer-generated

record and establishing the trustworthiness of a computer record for the business record exception to the hearsay

rule. In fact, federal courts that evaluate the authenticity of computer-generated records often assume that the

records contain hearsay, and then apply the business records exception. See, e.g., United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d

209, 216 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying business records exception to telephone records generated “automatically” by a

computer); United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 89-90 (5th Cir. 1982) (same). As discussed later in this chapter, this

analysis is technically incorrect in many cases: computer records generated entirely by computers cannot contain

hearsay and cannot qualify for the business records exception because they do not contain human “statements.” See

Part C, infra. As a practical matter, however, prosecutors who lay a foundation to establish a computer-generated

record as a business record will also lay the foundation to establish the record's authenticity. Evidence that a

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computer program is sufficiently trustworthy so that its results qualify as business records according to Fed. R. Evid.

803(6) also establishes the authenticity of the record. Compare United States v. Saputski, 496 F.2d 140, 142 (9th

Cir. 1974).

3. Identifying the Author of Computer-Stored Records

 Although handwritten records may be penned in a distinctive handwriting style, computer-stored records

consist of a long string of zeros and ones that do not necessarily identify their author. This is a particular problem

with Internet communications, which offer their authors an unusual degree of anonymity. For example, Internet

technologies permit users to send effectively anonymous e-mails, and Internet Relay Chat channels permit users to

communicate without disclosing their real names. When prosecutors seek the admission of such computer-stored

records against a defendant, the defendant may challenge the authenticity of the record by challenging the identity of

its author.

 Circumstantial evidence generally provides the key to establishing the authorship and authenticity of a

computer record. For example, in United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998), prosecutors sought to

show that the defendant had conversed with an undercover FBI agent in an Internet chat room devoted to child

pornography. The government offered a printout of an Internet chat conversation between the agent and an

individual identified as “Stavron,” and sought to show that “Stavron” was the defendant. The district court admitted

the printout in evidence at trial. On appeal following his conviction, Simpson argued that “because the government

could not identify that the statements attributed to [him] were in his handwriting, his writing style, or his voice,” the

printout had not been authenticated and should have been excluded. Id. at 1249.

 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, noting the considerable circumstantial evidence that “Stavron” was

the defendant. See id. at 1250. For example, “Stavron” had told the undercover agent that his real name was 'B.

Simpson,' gave a home address that matched Simpson's, and appeared to be accessing the Internet from an account

registered to Simpson. Further, the police found records in Simpson's home that listed the name, address, and

phone number that the undercover agent had sent to “Stavron.” Accordingly, the government had provided evidence

sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was “Stavron,” and the printout was properly authenticated. See id.

at 1250. See alsoUnited States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that district court

properly admitted chat room log printouts in circumstances similar to those in Simpson). But see United States v.

Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that web postings purporting to be statements made by white

supremacist groups were properly excluded on authentication grounds absent evidence that the postings were

actually posted by the groups).

C. Hearsay

 Federal courts have often assumed that all computer records contain hearsay. A more nuanced view suggests

that in fact only a portion of computer records contain hearsay. When a computer record contains the assertions of

a person, whether or not processed by a computer, and is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the record

can contain hearsay. In such cases, the government must fit the record within a hearsay exception such as the

business records exception, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). When a computer record contains only computer-generated data

untouched by human hands, however, the record cannot contain hearsay. In such cases, the government must

establish the authenticity of the record, but does not need to establish that a hearsay exception applies for the records

to be admissible in court.

1. Inapplicability of the Hearsay Rules to Computer-Generated Records

 The hearsay rules exist to prevent unreliable out-of-court statements by human declarants from improperly

influencing the outcomes of trials. Because people can misinterpret or misrepresent their experiences, the hearsay

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rules express a strong preference for testing human assertions in court, where the declarant can be placed on the

stand and subjected to cross-examination. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-66 (1980). This rationale does not

apply when an animal or a machine makes an assertion: beeping machines and barking dogs cannot be called to the

witness stand for cross-examination at trial. The Federal Rules have adopted this logic. By definition, an assertion

cannot contain hearsay if it was not made by a human person. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(a) (“A 'statement' is (1) an oral

or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.”) (emphasis

added) ; Fed. R. Evid. 801(b) (“A declarant is a person who makes a statement.”) (emphasis added).

 As several courts and commentators have noted, this limitation on the hearsay rules necessarily means that

computer-generated records untouched by human hands cannot contain hearsay. One state supreme court articulated

the distinction in an early case involving the use of automated telephone records:

The printout of the results of the computer’s internal operations is not hearsay evidence. It does not

represent the output of statements placed into the computer by out of court declarants. Nor can we say

that this printout itself is a “statement” constituting hearsay evidence. The underlying rationale of the

hearsay rule is that such statements are made without an oath and their truth cannot be tested by

cross-examination. Of concern is the possibility that a witness may consciously or unconsciously

misrepresent what the declarant told him or that the declarant may consciously or unconsciously

misrepresent a fact or occurrence. With a machine, however, there is no possibility of a conscious

misrepresentation, and the possibility of inaccurate or misleading data only materializes if the machine

is not functioning properly.

 State v. Armstead, 432 So.2d 837, 840 (La. 1983). See also People v. Holowko, 486 N.E.2d 877, 878-79 (Ill.

1985) (automated trap and trace records); United States v. Duncan, 30 M.J. 1284, 1287-89 (N-M.C.M.R. 1990)

(computerized records of ATM transactions); 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 294, at 286 (4th ed.1992);

Richard O. Lempert & Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 370 (2d ed. 1983). Cf. United States

v. Fernandez-Roque, 703 F.2d 808, 812 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting hearsay objection to admission of automated

telephone records because “the fact that these calls occurred is not a hearsay statement”). Accordingly, a properly

authenticated computer-generated record is admissible. See Lempert & Saltzburg, at 370.

 The insight that computer-generated records cannot contain hearsay is important because courts that assume

the existence of hearsay may wrongfully exclude computer-generated evidence if a hearsay exception does not

apply. For example, in United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1993), a bank robber left his eyeglasses

behind in an abandoned stolen car. The prosecution's evidence against the defendant included a computer printout

from a machine that tests the curvature of eyeglass lenses; the printout revealed that the prescription of the

eyeglasses found in the stolen car exactly matched the defendant's. At trial, the district court assumed that the

computer printout was hearsay, but concluded that the printout was an admissible business record according to Fed.

R. Evid. 803(6). On appeal following conviction, the Seventh Circuit also assumed that the printout contained

hearsay, but agreed with the defendant that the printout could not be admitted as a business record:

the [computer-generated] report in this case was not kept in the course of a regularly conducted

business activity, but rather was specially prepared at the behest of the FBI and with the knowledge that

any information it supplied would be used in an ongoing criminal investigation. . . . In finding this

report inadmissible under Rule 803(6), we adhere to the well-established rule that documents made in

anticipation of litigation are inadmissible under the business records exception.

Id. at 670. See also Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (stating that business records must be “made . . . by, or transmitted by, a

person”).

 Fortunately, the Blackburn court ultimately affirmed the conviction, concluding that the computer printout was

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sufficiently reliable that it could have been admitted under the residual hearsay exception, Rule 803(24). See id. at

672. However, instead of considering a reversal of the conviction because Rule 803(6) did not apply, the court

should have asked whether the computer printout from the lens-testing machine contained hearsay at all. This

question would have revealed that the computer-generated printout could not be excluded properly on hearsay

grounds because it contained no human “statements.”

2. Applicability of the Hearsay Rules to Computer-Stored Records

 Computer-stored records that contain human statements must satisfy an exception to the hearsay rule if they

are offered for the truth of the manner asserted. Before a court will admit the records, the court must establish that

the statements contained in the record were made in circumstances that tend to ensure their trustworthiness. See,

e.g., Jackson, 208 F.3d at 637 (concluding that postings from the websites of white supremacist groups contained

hearsay, and rejecting the argument that the postings were the business records of the ISPs that hosted the sites).

 As discussed in the Introduction to this chapter, courts generally permit computer-stored records to be

admitted as business records according to Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Different circuits have articulated slightly different

standards for the admissibility of computer-stored business records. Some courts simply apply the direct language

of Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), which appears in the beginning of this chapter. See e.g.,United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d

910, 914 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1988). Other circuits have

articulated doctrinal tests specifically for computer records that largely (but not exactly) track the requirements of

Rule 803(6). See, e.g., United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Computer business records

are admissible if (1) they are kept pursuant to a routine procedure designed to assure their accuracy, (2) they are

created for motives that tend to assure accuracy (e.g., not including those prepared for litigation), and (3) they are

not themselves mere accumulations of hearsay.”) (quoting Capital Marine Supply v. M/V Roland Thomas II, 719

F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1983)); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 (7th Cir. 1990) (computer-stored

records are admissible business records if they “are kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity, and

[that it] was the regular practice of that business activity to make records, as shown by the testimony of the

custodian or other qualified witness.”) (quoting United States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d 308, 311 (7th Cir. 1983)). 

Notably, the printout itself may be produced in anticipation of litigation without running afoul of the business

records exception. The requirement that the record be kept “in the course of a regularly conducted business

activity” refers to the underlying data, not the actual printout of that data. See United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d

195, 198 (5th Cir. 1984).

 From a practical perspective, the procedure for admitting a computer-stored record pursuant to the business

records exception is the same as admitting any other business record. Consider an e-mail harassment case. To help

establish that the defendant was the sender of the harassing messages, the prosecution may seek the introduction of

records from the sender’s ISP showing that the defendant was the registered owner of the account from which the

e-mails were sent. Ordinarily, this will require testimony from an employee of the ISP (“the custodian or other

qualified witness”) that the ISP regularly maintains customer account records for billing and other purposes, and that

the records to be offered for admission are such records that were made at or near the time of the events they

describe in the regular course of the ISP’s business. Again, the key is establishing that the computer system from

which the record was obtained is maintained in the ordinary course of business, and that it is a regular practice of the

business to rely upon those records for their accuracy.

 The business record exception is the most common hearsay exception applied to computer records. Of course,

other hearsay exceptions may be applicable in appropriate cases. See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531,

540 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that computerized IRS forms are admissible as public records under Fed. R. Evid. 

803(8)).

D. Other Issues

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 The authentication requirement and the hearsay rule usually provide the most significant hurdles that

prosecutors will encounter when seeking the admission of computer records. However, some agents and

prosecutors have occasionally considered two additional issues: the application of the best evidence rule to computer

records, and whether computer printouts are “summaries” that must comply with Fed. R. Evid. 1006.

1. The Best Evidence Rule

 The best evidence rule states that to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the “original”

writing, recording, or photograph is ordinarily required. See Fed. R. Evid. 1002. Agents and prosecutors

occasionally express concern that a mere printout of a computer-stored electronic file may not be an “original” for

the purpose of the best evidence rule. After all, the original file is merely a collection of 0's and 1's; in contrast, the

printout is the result of manipulating the file through a complicated series of electronic and mechanical processes.

 Fortunately, the Federal Rules of Evidence have expressly addressed this concern. The Federal Rules state

that

[i]f data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight,

shown to reflect the data accurately, is an “original”.

 Fed. R. Evid. 1001(3). Thus, an accurate printout of computer data always satisfies the best evidence rule. See

Doe v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 1513, 1517 (D. Hawaii. 1992). According to the Advisory Committee Notes

that accompanied this rule when it was first proposed, this standard was adopted for reasons of practicality:

While strictly speaking the original of a photograph might be thought to be only the negative,

practicality and common usage require that any print from the negative be regarded as an original. 

Similarly, practicality and usage confer the status of original upon any computer printout.

Advisory Committee Notes, Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 1001(3) (1972).

2. Computer Printouts as “Summaries”

 Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 permits parties to offer summaries of voluminous evidence in the form of “a

chart, summary, or calculation” subject to certain restrictions. Agents and prosecutors occasionally ask whether a

computer printout is necessarily a “summary” of evidence that must comply with Fed. R. Evid. 1006. In general, the

answer is no. See Sanders, 749 F.2d at 199; Catabran, 836 F.2d at 456-57; United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228,

1240-41 (6th Cir. 1973). Of course, if the computer printout is merely a summary of other admissible evidence,

Rule 1006 will apply just as it does to other summaries of evidence. 

VI. APPENDICES

Appendix A: Sample Network Banner Language

 Network banners are electronic messages that provide notice of legal rights to users of computer networks. 

From a legal standpoint, banners have four primary functions. First, banners may be used to generate consent to

real-time monitoring under Title III. Second, banners may be used to generate consent to the retrieval of stored files

and records pursuant to ECPA. Third, in the case of government networks, banners may eliminate any Fourth

Amendment “reasonable expectation of privacy” that government employees or other users might otherwise retain

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in their use of the government’s network under O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). Fourth, in the case of a

non-government network, banners may establish a system administrator’s “common authority” to consent to a law

enforcement search pursuant to United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).

 CCIPS does not take any position on whether providers of network services should use network banners, and,

if so, what types of banners they should use. Further, there is no formal “magic language” that is necessary. 

However, it is important to realize that banners may be worded narrowly or broadly, and the scope of consent and

waiver triggered by a particular banner will in general depend on the scope of its language. Here is a checklist of

issues that may be considered when drafting a banner:

 a) Does the banner state that use of the network constitutes consent to monitoring? Such a statement

helps establish the user’s consent to real-time interception pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).

 b) Does the banner state that use of the network constitutes consent to the retrieval and disclosure of

information stored on the network? Such a statement helps establish the user’s consent to the retrieval

and disclosure of stored information pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) and § 2703(c)(1)(B)(iii).

 c) In the case of a government network, does the banner state that a user of the network shall have no

reasonable expectation of privacy in the network? Such a statement helps establish that the user lacks a

reasonable expectation of privacy pursuant to O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).

 d) In the case of a non-government network, does the banner make clear that the network system

administrator(s) may consent to a law enforcement search? Such a statement helps establish the system

administrator’s common authority to consent to a search under United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164

(1974).

 e) Does the banner contain express or implied limitations or authorizations relating to the purpose of

any monitoring, who may conduct the monitoring, and what will be done with the fruits of any

monitoring?

 f) Does the banner require users to “click through” or otherwise acknowledge the banner before using

the network? Such a step may make it easier to establish that the network user actually received the

notice that the banner is designed to provide.

 Network providers who decide to banner all or part of their network should consider their needs and the needs of

their users carefully before selecting particular language. For example, a sensitive government computer network

may require a broadly worded banner that permits access to all types of electronic information. Here are three

examples of broad banners:

(1) WARNING! This computer system is the property of the United States Department of Justice. The

Department may monitor any activity on the system and retrieve any information stored within the

system. By accessing and using this computer, you are consenting to such monitoring and information

retrieval for law enforcement and other purposes. Users should have no expectation of privacy as to

any communication on or information stored within the system, including information stored locally on

the hard drive or other media in use with this unit (e.g., floppy disks, tapes, CD-ROMs, etc.).

(2) This is a Department of Defense (DoD) computer system. DoD computer systems are provided for

the processing of Official U.S. Government information only. All data contained within DoD computer

systems is owned by the Department of Defense, and may be monitored, intercepted, recorded, read,

copied, or captured in any manner and disclosed in any manner, by authorized personnel. THERE IS

NO RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THIS SYSTEM. System personnel may disclose any potential evidence of

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crime found on DoD computer systems for any reason. USE OF THIS SYSTEM BY ANY USER,

AUTHORIZED OR UNAUTHORIZED, CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO THIS MONITORING,

INTERCEPTION, RECORDING, READING, COPYING, or CAPTURING and DISCLOSURE.

(3) You are about to access a United States government computer network that is intended for

authorized users only. You should have no expectation of privacy in your use of this network. Use of

this network constitutes consent to monitoring, retrieval, and disclosure of any information stored

within the network for any purpose including criminal prosecution.

 In other cases, network providers may wish to establish a more limited monitoring policy. Here are three

examples of relatively narrow banners that will generate consent to monitoring in some situations but not others:

(4) This computer network belongs to the Grommie Corporation and may be used only by Grommie

Corporation employees and only for work-related purposes. The Grommie Corporation reserves the

right to monitor use of this network to ensure network security and to respond to specific allegations of

employee misuse. Use of this network shall constitute consent to monitoring for such purposes. In

addition, the Grommie Corporation reserves the right to consent to a valid law enforcement request to

search the network for evidence of a crime stored within the network.

(5) Warning: Patrons of the Cyber-Fun Internet Café may not use its computers to access, view, or

obtain obscene materials. To ensure compliance with this policy, the Cyber-Fun Internet Café reserves

the right to record the names and addresses of World Wide Web sites that patrons visit using

Cyber-Fun Internet Café computers.

(6) It is the policy of the law firm of Rowley & Yzaguirre to monitor the Internet access of its employees

to ensure compliance with law firm policies. Accordingly, your use of the Internet may be monitored. 

The firm reserves the right to disclose the fruits of any monitoring to law enforcement if it deems such

disclosure to be appropriate.

Appendix B: Sample 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)

Application and Order

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE _______ DISTRICT OF _________

IN RE APPLICATION OF

THEUNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR

AN ORDER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)

)

)

) MISC. NO. ____ 

) 

) Filed Under Seal 

APPLICATION [Name], an Assistant United States Attorney for the _______ District of ________, hereby files

under seal this ex parte application for an order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d) to require [Internet Service

Provider], [mailing address], to provide records and other information pertaining to the [Internet Service Provider]

network account that was assigned Internet Protocol address [xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx] on [date] and [time].

 The records and other information requested are set forth as Attachment 1 to the Application and to the proposed

Order. In support of this Application, the United States offers the following:

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 1. The United States Government, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice, is

investigating intrusions into a number of computers in the United States and abroad that occurred on [date], and

which may be continuing. These computer intrusions are being investigated as possible violations of 18 U.S.C. §

1030 (damage and unauthorized access to a protected computer) and § 2511 (unlawful interception of electronic

communications). Investigation to date of these incidents provides reasonable grounds to believe that [Internet

Service Provider] has records and other information pertaining to certain of its subscribers that are relevant and

material to an ongoing criminal investigation.

 2. In particular, on [date], [victim] discovered an unauthorized intrusion into its computer system, and, specifically,

into the following computers: __________. Investigation into this incident revealed that the intruder had obtained

so-called “root” or system administrator level access into the _______ computer, effectively giving the intruder

complete control of the system. The _______ computer is a “protected computer” according to 18 U.S.C. §

1030(e)(2). Accordingly, this unauthorized intrusion constitutes a criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).

 3. On [date], the intruder(s) again connected to the ________ computer, and again obtained unauthorized “root”

access. During that intrusion, investigators recorded the unique Internet Protocol address of the source of the

intrusion, [xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx]. Investigators later determined that this address belongs to [Internet Service Provider]. 

[Internet Service Provider] provides both electronic communications services (access to e-mail and the Internet) and

remote computing services (access to computers for the storage and processing of data) to its customers and

subscribers using a range of assigned Internet Protocol addresses that include the address of the intrusion.

 4. Obtaining the records of customer and subscriber information relating to the [Internet Service Provider] account

that was assigned address [xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx] on [date] and [time], as well as the contents of electronic

communications (not in electronic storage) associated with that account, will help government investigators identify

the individual(s) who are responsible for the unauthorized access of the computer systems described above and to

determine the nature and scope of the intruder’s activities. In particular, the [Internet Service Provider] customer

who was assigned this Internet Protocol address at that particular time may be the person responsible for the

unauthorized intrusion. Alternatively, records of the customer’s account may offer clues that will permit

investigators to “trace back” the intrusion to its source.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

 5. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 sets out particular requirements that the government must meet in order to obtain access to the

records and other information in the possession of providers of “electronic communications services” and/or

“remote computing services.” [Internet Service Provider] functions both as an electronic communications service

provider -- that is, it provides its subscribers access to electronic communication services, including e-mail and the

Internet -- and as a remote computing service provider -- it provides computer facilities for the storage and

processing of electronic communications -- as those terms are used in 18 U.S.C. § 2703. [Note that because a

“remote computing service” is public by definition, this statement must be modified if you are seeking

information from a service provider who is not a provider to the public, such as, for example, a university.]

 6. Here, the government seeks to obtain three categories of records: (1) basic subscriber information; (2) records

and other information, including connection logs, pertaining to certain subscribers; and [Add only if the

application seeks to obtain the contents of communications (such as e-mails) pursuant to § 2703(b), as

opposed to mere records pursuant to § 2703(c).] (3) the content of electronic communications in a remote

computing service (but not communications in electronic storage).1

 7. To obtain basic subscriber information, such as the subscriber’s name, address, billing information, and other

identifying records, the government needs only a subpoena; however, the government may also compel such

information through an order issued pursuant to section 2703(d). See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C). To obtain other

types of records and information pertaining to the subscribers or customers of service providers, including

connection logs and other audit information, the government must comply with the dictates of sections

2703(c)(1)(B) and 2703(d). Section § 2703(c)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part:

 A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall disclose a record or other

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information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications

covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section) to a governmental entity only when the governmental entity . . .

obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section;

 8. [Add only if the application seeks to obtain the contents of communications (such as e-mails) pursuant

to § 2703(b), as opposed to mere records pursuant to § 2703(c).] To obtain the contents of electronic

communications held by a remote computing service (but not the contents in “electronic storage,” see n.1), the

government must comply with 2703(b)(1)(B), which provides, in pertinent part:

 A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents of

any electronic communication to which this paragraph is made applicable by paragraph 2 of this

subsection . . . with prior notice from the government entity to the subscriber or customer if the

governmental entity . . . obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section . . .

. except that delayed notice may be given pursuant to section 2705 of this title.

 Paragraph 2 of subsection 2703(b) applies with respect to any electronic communication that is held or

maintained on a remote computing service–

 (A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or created by means of

computer processing of communications received by means of electronic transmission from), a

subscriber or customer of such remote computing service; and

 (B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or

customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the contents of any such communications for

purposes of providing any services other than storage or computer processing.

 Therefore, communications described by paragraph 2 of subsection 2703(b) include the content of electronic mail

that has been opened, viewed, downloaded, or otherwise accessed by the recipient and is held remotely by the

service provider on its computers.

 9. All of the information the government seeks from [Internet Service Provider] through this application may be

compelled through an order that complies with section 2703(d). Section 2703(d) provides in pertinent part:

A court order for disclosure under subsection . . . (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of

competent jurisdiction described in section 3127(2)(A)2 and shall issue only if the governmental entity

offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the . . .

records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. . . .

A court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider,

may quash or modify such order, if the information or records requested are unusually voluminous in

nature or compliance with such order otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.

 Accordingly, this application sets forth facts showing there are reasonable grounds to believe that the materials

sought are relevant and material to the ongoing criminal investigation.

GOVERNMENT’S REQUEST

 10. The government requests that [Internet Service Provider] be directed to produce all records described in

Attachment 1 to this Application. This information is directly relevant to identifying the individual(s) responsible

for the crime under investigation. The information requested should be readily accessible to [Internet Service

Provider] by computer search, and its production should not prove to be unduly burdensome. [Undersigned should

check with the ISP before filing this document to ensure the accuracy of this statement.]

 11. The United States requests that this Application and Order be sealed by the Court until such time as the

court directs otherwise.

 12. The United States further requests that pursuant to the preclusion of notice provisions of 18 U.S.C. §

2705(b), that [Internet Service Provider] be ordered not to notify any person (including the subscriber or customer to

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which the materials relate) of the existence of this order for such period as the court deems appropriate. The United

States submits that such an order is justified because notification of the existence of this order could seriously

jeopardize the ongoing investigation. Such a disclosure could give the subscriber an opportunity to destroy

evidence, notify confederates, or flee or continue his flight from prosecution.

 13. [Add only if the application seeks to obtain the contents of communications pursuant to § 2703(b),

as opposed to mere records pursuant to § 2703(c):] The United States further requests, pursuant to the delayed

notice provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a), an order delaying any notification to the subscriber or customer that may

be required by § 2703(b) to obtain the contents of communications, for a period of 90 days. Providing prior notice

to the subscriber or customer could seriously jeopardize the ongoing investigation, as such a disclosure would give

the subscriber an opportunity to destroy evidence, change patterns of behavior, notify confederates, or flee or

continue his flight from prosecution. [Optional Baker Act language to use if the ISP is a university: The United

States further requests that [Internet Service Provider]’s compliance with the delayed notification provisions

of this Order shall be deemed authorized under 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(j)(ii) (the “Baker Act”). See 34 CFR

§ 99.31 (a)(9)(i) (exempting requirement of prior notice for disclosures made to comply with a judicial order

or lawfully issued subpoena where the disclosure is made pursuant to “any other subpoena issued for a law

enforcement purpose and the court or other issuing agency has ordered that the existence or the contents of

the subpoena or the information furnished in response to the subpoena not be disclosed”)].

 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the Court grant the attached Order, (1) directing [Internet

Service Provider] to provide the United States with the records and information described in Attachment 1; (2)

directing that the Application and Order be sealed; (3) directing [Internet Service Provider] not to disclose the

existence or content of the Order, except to the extent necessary to carry out the Orders; and [Use only if the

application seeks to obtain the contents of communications pursuant to § 2703(b)] (4) directing that the

notification by the government otherwise required by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) be delayed for ninety days.

 Respectfully Submitted,

 ___________________________

 Assistant United States Attorney

ATTACHMENT 1

You are to provide the following information as printouts and as ASCII data files (on 8 mm helical scan tape for

Unix host), if available:

 A. All customer or subscriber account information for any accounts registered to __________, or associated

with __________ . For each such account, the information shall include:

 1. The subscriber's account and login name(s);

 2. The subscriber's address;

 3. The subscriber's telephone number or numbers;

 4. The subscriber's e-mail address;

 5. Any other information pertaining to the identity of the subscriber, including, but not

limited to billing information (including type and number of credit cards, student

identification number, or other identifying information).

 B. User connection logs for:

 (1) all accounts identified in Part A, above,

 (2) the IP address [xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx],

for the time period beginning ________ through and including the date of this order, for any connections to or from

___.

User connection logs should contain the following:

 1. Connection time and date;

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 2. Disconnect time and date;

 3. Method of connection to system (e.g., SLIP, PPP, Shell);

 4. Data transfer volume (e.g., bytes);

 5. Connection information for other systems to which user connected via , including:

 a. Connection destination;

 b. Connection time and date;

 c. Disconnect time and date;

 d. Method of connection to system (e.g., telnet, ftp, http);

 e. Data transfer volume (e.g., bytes);

C. [Add only if the application seeks to obtain the contents of communications (such as e-mails) pursuant to §

2703(b), as opposed to mere records pursuant to § 2703(c).] The contents of electronic communications (not in

electronic storage)1 that were placed or stored in directories or files owned or controlled by the accounts identified

in Part A at any time after [date] up through and including the date of this Order.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE__________ DISTRICT OF _________

IN RE APPLICATION OF

THEUNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR

AN ORDER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)

)

)

) MISC. NO. ____ 

) 

) Filed Under Seal 

ORDER

 This matter having come before the court pursuant to an application under Title 18, United States Code,

Section 2703(b) and (c), which application requests the issuance of an order under Title 18, United States Code,

Section 2703(d) directing [Internet Service Provider], an electronic communications service provider and a remote

computing service, located at [mailing address], to disclose certain records and other information, as set forth in

Attachment 1 to the Application, the court finds that the applicant has offered specific and articulable facts showing

that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the records or other information sought are relevant and material to

an ongoing criminal investigation.

 IT APPEARING that the information sought is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation,

and that prior notice of this Order to any person of this investigation or this application and order by the government

or [Internet Service Provider] would seriously jeopardize the investigation;

 IT IS ORDERED pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2703(d) that [Internet Service Provider]

will, within [three] days of the date of this Order, turn over to agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the

records and other information as set forth in Attachment 1 to this Order.

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the application and this Order are sealed until otherwise ordered by the

Court, and that [Internet Service Provider] shall not disclose the existence of the Application or this Order of the

Court, or the existence of the investigation, to the listed subscriber or to any other person unless and until authorized

to do so by the Court.

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[Add only if the application seeks to obtain the contents of communications (such as e-mails) pursuant to §

2703(b), as opposed to mere records pursuant to § 2703(c).]

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the notification by the government otherwise required under 18 U.S.C. §

2703(b)(1)(B) be delayed for ninety days. [Optional Baker Act language if the ISP is a university: Furthermore,

[Internet Service Provider]’s compliance with the non-disclosure provision of this Order shall be deemed

authorized under 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(j)(ii).]

 ____________________________

 United States Magistrate Judge

___________

Date

1“Electronic Storage” is a term of art, specifically defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) as “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a

wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and any storage of such communication by an

electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” The government does not seek access to

any such materials. Communications not in “electronic storage” include any e-mail communications received by the specified accounts

that the owner or user of the account has already accessed, viewed, or downloaded.

218 U.S.C. § 3127(2)(A) defines the term “court of competent jurisdiction” as including “a district court of the United States (including

a magistrate of such a court) or a United States Court of Appeals.” Because 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) expressly permits “any” such court to

issue an order, this Court may enter an order directing the disclosure of such information even if the information is stored outside of this

judicial District.

Appendix C: Sample Language for Preservation

Request Letters under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)

[Internet Service Provider]

[Address]

VIA FAX to (xxx) xxx-xxxx

Dear Mr. []:

 I am writing to confirm our telephone conversation earlier today and to make a formal request for the

preservation of records and other evidence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) pending further legal process.

 You are hereby requested to preserve, for a period of 90 days, the records described below currently in your

possession, including records stored on backup media, in a form that includes the complete record. You also are

requested not to disclose the existence of this request to the subscriber or any other person, other than as necessary

to comply with this request. If compliance with this request may result in a permanent or temporary

termination of service to the accounts described below, or otherwise alert the subscriber or user of these

accounts as to your actions to preserve the referenced files and records, please contact me before taking such

actions.

 This request applies only retrospectively. It does not in any way obligate you to capture and preserve new

information that arises after the date of this request.

 This preservation request applies to the following records and evidence:

[In a case involving an e-mail account]

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 A. All stored electronic communications and other files reflecting communications to or from the

following electronic mail address: [JDoe@isp.com];

 B. All records and other evidence relating to the subscriber(s), customer(s), account holder(s), or other

entity(ies) associated with the e-mail address [JDoe@isp.com] or user name “Jdoe,” including, without

limitation, subscriber names, user names, screen names or other identities, mailing addresses,

residential addresses, business addresses, e-mail addresses and other contact information, telephone

numbers or other subscriber number or identity, billing records, information about the length of service

and the types of services the subscriber or customer utilized, and any other identifying information,

whether such records or other evidence are in electronic or other form; and

 C. Any other records and other evidence relating to the e-mail address [JDoe@isp.com] or user name

“Jdoe.” Such records and other evidence include, without limitation, correspondence and other records

of contact by any person or entity about the above-referenced account, the content and connection logs

associated with user activity or relating to communications and any other activities to, through or from

[JDoe@isp.com] or user name “Jdoe,” whether such records or other evidence are in electronic or other

form.

[In a case involving use of a specific I.P. address]

 All electronic records and other evidence relating to the use of the IP address 222.222.222.2 or domain name

abc.wcom.net on September 5, 1999 at 4:28 and 04:32 GMT +02:00, and on September 7, 1999 at 00:19 GMT

+02:00.

[In a case involving activity of a user account]

 All connection logs and records of user activity for the user name Jdoe or address [JDoe@isp.com], including:

 1. Connection date and time;

 2. Disconnect date and time;

 3. Method of connection (e.g., telnet, ftp, http);

 4. Data transfer volume;

 5. User name associated with the connection and other connection information, including the Internet

Protocol address of the source of the connection;

 6. Telephone caller identification records; and

 7. Connection information for other computers to which the user of the above-referenced accounts

connected, by any means, during the connection period, including the destination IP address,

connection time and date, disconnect time and date, method of connection to the destination computer,

the identities (account and screen names) and subscriber information, if known, for any person or entity

to which such connection information relates, and all other information related to the connection from

ISP or its subsidiaries.

 All records and other evidence relating to the subscriber(s), customer(s), account

holder(s), or other entity(ies) associated with [JDoe@isp.com], including, without limitation, subscriber names, user

names, screen names or other identities, mailing addresses, residential addresses, business addresses, e-mail

addresses and other contact information, telephone numbers or other subscriber number or identifier number, billing

records, information about the length of service and the types of services the subscriber or customer utilized, and

any other identifying information, whether such records or other evidence are in electronic or other form.

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 Any other records and other evidence relating to [JDoe@isp.com]. Such records and other evidence include,

without limitation, correspondence and other records of contact by any person or entity about the above-referenced

account, the content and connection logs associated with or relating to postings, communications and any other

activities to or through [JDoe@isp.com], whether such records or other evidence are in electronic or other form.

 Very truly yours,

 __________________________

 Assistant United States Attorney

Appendix D: Sample Pen Register /Trap

and Trace Application and Order

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE _______ DISTRICT OF _________

IN RE APPLICATION OF THEUNITED

STATES OF AMERICA FORAN ORDER

AUTHORIZING THE USE

OF A PEN REGISTER AND TRAP

ANDTRACE DEVICE

)

)

) MISC. NO. ____

)

) Filed Under Seal

)

APPLICATION

 [Name], an Assistant United States Attorney for the _______ District of ________, hereby files under seal

this ex parte application for an Order under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3123, authorizing the installation

and use of a pen/trap device on a computer operated by [Internet Service Provider]. This computer is named

[computer name], has an IP address of [IP address], and is believed to be located at [physical address]. In support of

this application, the undersigned states the following:

 1. Applicant is an “attorney for the government” as defined in Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure and, therefore, pursuant to Section 3122 of Title 18, United States Code, may apply for an order

authorizing the installation and use of a pen/trap device.

 2. Applicant certifies that the Federal Bureau of Investigations is conducting a criminal investigation of

[suspect] and others yet unknown in connection with possible violations of Title 18 United States Code, Section [ ],

to wit, [statutory description of offense]. It is believed the subject(s) of the investigation may be using the electronic

mail address [JDoe@isp.com], in furtherance of the specified offense, and that the information likely to be obtained

from the pen/trap device is relevant to the ongoing criminal investigation. [Although not required by law, CCIPS

recommends the inclusion within the application of specific and articulable facts that support this

conclusion.]

 3. A trap and trace device, as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3127, is “a device which

captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of an instrument or device

from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted.” A pen register collects destination information

for electronic transmissions. In the traditional telephone context, a pen register and trap and trace device collects

origin and destination information such as the telephone numbers dialed for a telephone call. The same principles

apply in the context of Internet communications: a pen register and trap and trace device collects addressing

information contained in “packet headers,” and, in the case of e-mails, “mail headers.” Both “packet headers” and

“mail headers” are portions of Internet communications that contain addressing information, analogous to “to” and

“from” addresses for traditional letters and origin and destination telephone numbers for telephone calls. 

Importantly, “packet headers” and “mail headers” (minus the subject lines of e-mails, which contain the e-mails’

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titles and can include messages) do not contain the contents of electronic communications. Accordingly, this

application does not seek authority to intercept the contents of any electronic communications. To obtain the

contents of electronic communications in transmission (including the subject lines of e-mails), the government

ordinarily must apply for and receive a Title III order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22. Because the “to” and

“from” information contained within packet headers and mail headers can be obtained through the same

combination of software and hardware, this application and order refers to means of obtaining both the origination

and destination information as simply a “pen/trap” device.

 4. Applicant requests that the Court issue an Order authorizing the installation and use of a pen/trap device

to capture the packet header and mail header information (but not the subject lines of e-mails) associated with the

transmission of communications and other data (including transfers of information via the World Wide Web,

electronic mail, telnet, and the file transfer protocol) to and from the account [Jdoe@isp.com]; to record the date

and time of the initiation and receipt of such transmissions; and to record the length of time the transmissions took

place, all for a period of sixty (60) days following installation.

 5. The Applicant further requests that the Order direct the furnishings of information, facilities, and

technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen/trap device unobtrusively by [Internet

Service Provider], with reasonable compensation to be paid by the applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in

providing such facilities and assistance.

 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the Court grant an Order for a period of sixty (60) days (1)

authorizing the installation and use of a pen/trap device to capture the packet header and mail header information

(but not the subject lines of e-mails) associated with all communications and other data transmitted to or from the

account [JDoe@isp.com]; to record the date and time of such transmissions; and to record the length of time the

transmission took; (2) directing [Internet Service Provider] to furnish the Federal Bureau of Investigations,

forthwith, all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation and use of the

device unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference to the service presently accorded persons whose

transmissions are the subject of the pen/trap device; and (3) that this Application and Order be placed under seal and

further direct that [Internet Service Provider], and its agents and employees, not disclose to the listed subscriber, or

to any other person, the existence of the pen/trap device or of this investigation unless or until otherwise ordered by

the Court.

 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

 Executed on _________.

 Respectfully Submitted,

 ___________________________

 Assistant United States Attorney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE _______ DISTRICT OF _________

IN RE APPLICATION OF THEUNITED

STATES OF AMERICA FOR

AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE USE

OF A PEN REGISTER AND TRAP

ANDTRACE DEVICE

)

)

) MISC. NO. ____

)

) Filed Under Seal

)

O R D E R

 This matter having come before the Court pursuant to an Application under Title 18, United States Code,

Section 3122, by [Name], Assistant United States Attorney, ______ District of _________, which Application

requests an Order under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3123, authorizing the installation and use of a pen/trap

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device on the account [JDoe@isp.com], the Court finds that the applicant has certified that the information likely

to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation into possible violations of

Title 18, United States Code, Section ____, to wit, [statutory description of offense] by [suspect], and others yet

unknown.

 IT APPEARING that the packet header and mail header information associated with communications and

other data transmitted to and from the account [JDoe@isp.com] are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation of

the specified offense;

 IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3123, that agents of the Federal Bureau

of Investigations may install and use a pen/trap device to capture the packet header and mail header information (but

not the subject lines of e-mails) for all communications and other data transmitted to and from the account

[Jdoe@isp.com]; to record the date and time of such transmissions; and to record the length of time the

transmissions took, for a period of sixty (60) days from the date of this Order;

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3123(b)(2), that [Internet

Service Provider] shall furnish agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, forthwith, all information, facilities,

and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation and use of the pen/trap device unobtrusively and

with minimum interference to the services that are accorded persons with respect to whom the installation and use is

to take place;

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3123(d), that this Order and

the Application be sealed until otherwise ordered by the Court, and that copies of such order may be furnished to the

Federal Bureau of Investigations, United States Attorney's Office, and [Internet Service Provider], and further that

[Internet Service Provider] shall not disclose the existence of the pen/trap device or the existence of the investigation

to the listed subscriber or to any other person unless or until otherwise ordered by the Court.

 ____________________________

 United States Magistrate Judge

___________

Date

Appendix E: Sample Subpoena Language

 The following is sample language for obtaining basic subscriber information with a subpoena pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 2703(c)(1)(C):

All customer or subscriber account information for any accounts registered to __________, or

associated with __________. For each such account, the information shall include:

 1. The subscriber’s name;

 2. The subscriber’s address;

 3. The subscriber’s local and long distance telephone toll billing records

 4. The subscriber’s telephone number or numbers, the e-mail address or addresses, account or login

name or names, or any other information pertaining to the identity of the subscriber, including, type

and number of credit cards, student identification number, or other identifying information; and

 5. The types of services subscribed to or utilized by the subscriber and the lengths of such services.

 The following is sample language for obtaining the content of communications when permitted by ECPA pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) and (b):

A. The contents of electronic communications not in “electronic storage” (i.e., electronic mail that has

already been opened by the user) currently held or maintained in the account associated with the

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address “____@_____” (registered to ________________) sent from or to the above account during

the period _____________ through __________ (inclusive).

 B. The content of all electronic communications in “electronic storage” for more than 180 days

associated with the accounts identified in Part A, that were placed or stored in ___________ computer

systems in directories or files owned or controlled by such accounts at any time up through and

including the date of this subpoena.

 [ISP] should NOT produce any unopened incoming electronic communications (i.e., electronic

communications in “electronic storage”) less than 181 days old.

 For purposes of this request, “electronic storage” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) as “(A) any

temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic

transmission thereof; and any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service

for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” The government does not seek access to

any such materials, unless it has been in storage for more than 180 days.

Appendix F: Sample Language for Search Warrants

and Accompanying Affidavits to Search and Seize Computers

 This appendix provides sample language for agents and prosecutors who wish to obtain a warrant authorizing the

search and seizure of computers. The discussion focuses first on the proper way to describe the property to be seized

in the warrant itself, which in turn requires consideration of the role of the computer in the offense. The discussion

then turns to drafting an accompanying affidavit that establishes probable cause, describes the agent’s search

strategy, and addresses any additional statutory or constitutional concerns.

I. DESCRIBING THE PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED FOR THE WARRANT

 The first step in drafting a warrant to search and seize computers or computer data is to describe the property

to be seized for the warrant itself. This requires a particularized description of the evidence, contraband, fruits, or

instrumentality of crime that the agents hope to obtain by conducting the search.

 Whether the ‘property to be seized’ should contain a description of information (such as computer files) or

physical computer hardware depends on the role of the computer in the offense. In some cases, the computer

hardware is itself contraband, evidence of crime, or a fruit or instrumentality of crime. In these situations, Fed. R.

Crim. P. 41 expressly authorizes the seizure of the hardware, and the warrant will ordinarily request its seizure. In

other cases, however, the computer hardware is merely a storage device for electronic files that are themselves

contraband, evidence, or instrumentalities of crime. In these cases, the warrant should request authority to search

for and seize the information itself, not the storage devices that the agents believe they must seize to recover the

information. Although the agents may need to seize the storage devices for practical reasons, such practical

considerations are best addressed in the accompanying affidavit. The ‘property to be seized’ described in the

warrant should fall within one or more of the categories listed in Rule 41(b):

 (1) “property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense”

 This authorization is a broad one, covering any item that an investigator “reasonably could . . . believe” would

reveal information that would aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,

483 (1976). Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (noting that restrictions on what evidence may be

seized result mostly from the probable cause requirement). The word “property” in Rule 41(b)(1) includes both

tangible and intangible property. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169 (1977) (“Rule 41 is

not limited to tangible items but is sufficiently flexible to include within its scope electronic intrusions authorized

upon a finding of probable cause.”); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 509-10 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the

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fruits of video surveillance are “property” that may be seized using a Rule 41 search warrant). Accordingly, data

stored in electronic form is “property” that may properly be searched and seized using a Rule 41 warrant. See

United States v. Hall, 583 F. Supp. 717, 718-19 (E.D. Va. 1984).

 (2) “contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed”

 Property is contraband “when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the property by the

accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken.” Hayden, 387 U.S. at 302 (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255

U.S. 298, 309 (1921)). Common examples of items that fall within this definition include child pornography, see

United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 731 (5th Cir. 1995), pirated software and other copyrighted materials, see

United States v. Vastola, 670 F. Supp. 1244, 1273 (D.N.J. 1987), counterfeit money, narcotics, and illegal weapons. 

The phrase “fruits of crime” refers to property that criminals have acquired as a result of their criminal activities. 

Common examples include money obtained from illegal transactions, see United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949,

951 (2d Cir. 1958) (cash obtained in drug transaction), and stolen goods. See United States v. Burkeen, 350 F.2d

261, 264 (6th Cir. 1965) (currency removed from bank during bank robbery).

 (3) “property designed or intended for use or which is or had been used as a means of committing a criminal

offense”

 Rule 41(b)(3) authorizes the search and seizure of “property designed or intended for use or which is or had

been used as a means of committing a criminal offense.” This language permits courts to issue warrants to search

and seize instrumentalities of crime. See United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Computers

may serve as instrumentalities of crime in many ways. For example, Rule 41 authorizes the seizure of computer

equipment as an instrumentality when a suspect uses a computer to view, acquire, and transmit images of child

pornography. See Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating in an obscenity case that “the

computer equipment was more than merely a ‘container’ for the files; it was an instrumentality of the crime.”);

United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441, 462 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). Similarly, a hacker's computer may be used as an

instrumentality of crime, and a computer used to run an illegal Internet gambling business would also be an

instrumentality of the crime.

 Here are examples of how to describe property to be seized when the computer hardware is merely a storage

container for electronic evidence:

(A) All records relating to violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (drug trafficking) and/or 21 U.S.C. § 846

(conspiracy to traffic drugs) involving [the suspect] since January 1, 1996, including lists of customers

and related identifying information; types, amounts, and prices of drugs trafficked as well as dates,

places, and amounts of specific transactions; any information related to sources of narcotic drugs

(including names, addresses, phone numbers, or any other identifying information); any information

recording [the suspect's] schedule or travel from 1995 to the present; all bank records, checks, credit

card bills, account information, and other financial records.

 The terms “records” and “information” include all of the foregoing items of evidence in

whatever form and by whatever means they may have been created or stored, including any electrical,

electronic, or magnetic form (such as any information on an electronic or magnetic storage device,

including floppy diskettes, hard disks, ZIP disks, CD-ROMs, optical discs, backup tapes, printer

buffers, smart cards, memory calculators, pagers, personal digital assistants such as Palm Pilot

computers, as well as printouts or readouts from any magnetic storage device); any handmade form

(such as writing, drawing, painting); any mechanical form (such as printing or typing); and any

photographic form (such as microfilm, microfiche, prints, slides, negatives, videotapes, motion

pictures, photocopies).

(B) Any copy of the X Company’s confidential May 17, 1998 report, in electronic or other form,

including any recognizable portion or summary of the contents of that report.

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(C) [For a warrant to obtain records stored with an ISP pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(a)] All

stored electronic mail of any kind sent to, from and through the e-mail address [JDoe@isp.com], or

associated with the user name “John Doe,” or account holder [suspect]. Content and connection log

files of all account activity from January 1, 2000, through March 31, 2000, by the user associated with

the e-mail address [JDoe@isp.com], including dates, times, methods of connecting (e.g., telnet, ftp,

http), ports used, telephone dial-up caller identification records, and any other connection information

or traffic data. All business records, in any form kept, in the possession of [Internet Service Provider],

that pertain to the subscriber(s) and account(s) associated with the e-mail address [JDoe@isp.com],

including records showing the subscriber’s full name, all screen names associated with that subscriber

and account, all account names associated with that subscriber, methods of payment, phone numbers,

all residential, business, mailing, and e-mail addresses, detailed billing records, types and lengths of

service, and any other identifying information.

 Here are examples of how to describe the property to be seized when the computer hardware itself is evidence,

contraband, or an instrumentality of crime:

(A) Any computers (including file servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, mainframe computers,

and storage devices such as hard drives, Zip disks, and floppy disks) that were or may have been used

as a means to provide images of child pornography over the Internet in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A

that were accessible via the World Wide Website address www.[xxxxxxxx].com.

(B) IBM Thinkpad Model 760ED laptop computer with a black case

II. DRAFTING AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF WARRANTS TO SEARCH AND SEIZE COMPUTERS

 An affidavit to justify the search and seizure of computer hardware and/or files should include, at a minimum,

the following sections: (1) definitions of any technical terms used in the affidavit or warrant; (2) a summary of the

offense, and, if known, the role that a targeted computer plays in the offense; and (3) an explanation of the agents’

search strategy. In addition, warrants that raise special issues (such as sneak-and-peek warrants, or warrants that

may implicate the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa) require thorough discussion of those issues in the

affidavit. Agents and prosecutors with questions about how to tailor an affidavit and warrant for a computer-related

search may contact either the local CTC, or the Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section at (202) 514-1026.

A. Background Technical Information

 It may be helpful to include a section near the beginning of the affidavit explaining any technical terms that the

affiant may use. Although many judges are computer literate, judges generally appreciate a clear, jargon-free

explanation of technical terms that may help them understand the merits of the warrant application. At the same

time, agents and prosecutors should resist the urge to pad affidavits with long, boilerplate descriptions of

well-known technical phrases. As a rule, affidavits should only include the definitions of terms that are likely to be

unknown by a generalist judge and are used in the remainder of the affidavit. Here are several sample definitions:

Encryption

Encryption refers to the practice of mathematically scrambling computer data as a communications

security measure. The encrypted information is called “ciphertext.” “Decryption” is the process of

converting the ciphertext back into the original, readable information (known as “plaintext”). The

word, number or other value used to encrypt/decrypt a message is called the “key.”

Data Compression

A process of reducing the number of bits required to represent some information, usually to reduce the

time or cost of storing or transmitting it. Some methods can be reversed to reconstruct the original

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data exactly; these are used for faxes, programs and most computer data. Other methods do not

exactly reproduce the original data, but this may be acceptable (for example, for a video conference).

Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG)

JPEG is the name of a standard for compressing digitized images that can be stored on computers. 

JPEG is often used to compress photographic images, including pornography. Such files are often

identified by the “.jpg” extension (such that a JPEG file might have the title “picture.jpg”) but can

easily be renamed without the “.jpg” extension.

Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”)

Many individuals and businesses obtain their access to the Internet through businesses known as

Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”). ISPs provide their customers with access to the Internet using

telephone or other telecommunications lines; provide Internet e-mail accounts that allow users to

communicate with other Internet users by sending and receiving electronic messages through the ISPs’

servers; remotely store electronic files on their customers’ behalf; and may provide other services

unique to each particular ISP.

ISPs maintain records pertaining to the individuals or companies that have subscriber accounts with

it. Those records could include identifying and billing information, account access information in the

form of log files, e-mail transaction information, posting information, account application information,

and other information both in computer data format and in written record format.

ISPs reserve and/or maintain computer disk storage space on their computer system for the use of the

Internet service subscriber for both temporary and long-term storage of electronic communications

with other parties and other types of electronic data and files. E-mail that has not been opened is

stored temporarily by an ISP incident to the transmission of the e-mail to the intended recipient, usually

within an area known as the home directory. Such temporary, incidental storage is defined by statute

as “electronic storage,” and the provider of such a service is an “electronic communications service”

provider. A service provider that is available to the public and provides storage facilities after an

electronic communication has been transmitted and opened by the recipient, or provides other long

term storage services to the public for electronic data and files, is providing a “remote computing

service.”

Server

A server is a centralized computer that provides services for other computers connected to it via a

network. The other computers attached to a server are sometimes called “clients.” In a large

company, it is common for individual employees to have client computers at their desktops. When the

employees access their e-mail, or access files stored on the network itself, those files are pulled

electronically from the server, where they are stored, and are sent to the client’s computer via the

network. Notably, server computers can be physically stored in any location: it is common for a

network’s server to be located hundreds (and even thousands) of miles away from the client computers.

In larger networks, it is common for servers to be dedicated to a single task. For example, a server that

is configured so that its sole task is to support a World Wide Web site is known simply as a “web

server.” Similarly, a server that only stores and processes e-mail is known as a “mail server.”

IP Address

The Internet Protocol address (or simply “IP” address) is a unique numeric address used by computers

on the Internet. An IP address looks like a series of four numbers, each in the range 0-255, separated

by periods (e.g., 121.56.97.178). Every computer attached to the Internet computer must be assigned

an IP address so that Internet traffic sent from and directed to that computer may be directed properly

from its source to its destination. Most Internet service providers control a range of IP addresses.

dynamic IP address When an ISP or other provider uses dynamic IP addresses, the ISP

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randomly assigns one of the available IP addresses in the range of IP addresses controlled

by the ISP each time a user dials into the ISP to connect to the Internet. The customer's

computer retains that IP address for the duration of that session (i.e., until the user

disconnects), and the IP address cannot be assigned to another user during that period. 

Once the user disconnects, however, that IP address becomes available to other customers

who dial in at a later time. Thus, an individual customer's IP address normally differs

each time he dials into the ISP.

static IP address A static IP address is an IP address that is assigned permanently to a

given user or computer on a network. A customer of an ISP that assigns static IP

addresses will have the same IP address every time.

B. Describe the Role of the Computer in the Offense

 The next step is to describe the role of the computer in the offense, to the extent it is known. For example, is

the computer hardware itself evidence of a crime or contraband? Is the computer hardware merely a storage device

that may or may not contain electronic files that constitute evidence of a crime? To introduce this topic, it may be

helpful to explain at the outset why the role of the computer is important for defining the scope of your warrant

request.

Your affiant knows that computer hardware, software, and electronic files may be important to a

criminal investigation in two distinct ways: (1) the objects themselves may be contraband, evidence,

instrumentalities, or fruits of crime, and/or (2) the objects may be used as storage devices that contain

contraband, evidence, instrumentalities, or fruits of crime in the form of electronic data. Rule 41 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the government to search for and seize computer

hardware, software, and electronic files that are evidence of crime, contraband, instrumentalities of

crime, and/or fruits of crime. In this case, the warrant application requests permission to search and

seize [images of child pornography, including those that may be stored on a computer]. These

[images] constitute both evidence of crime and contraband. This affidavit also requests permission to

seize the computer hardware that may contain [the images of child pornography] if it becomes

necessary for reasons of practicality to remove the hardware and conduct a search off-site. Your

affiant believes that, in this case, the computer hardware is a container for evidence, a container for

contraband, and also itself an instrumentality of the crime under investigation.

 1. When the Computer Hardware Is Itself Contraband, Evidence, And/or an Instrumentality or Fruit of

Crime

 If applicable, the affidavit should explain why probable cause exists to believe that the tangible computer items

are themselves contraband, evidence, instrumentalities, or fruits of the crime, independent of the information they

may hold.

 Computer Used to Obtain Unauthorized Access to a Computer (“Hacking”)

Your affiant knows that when an individual uses a computer to obtain unauthorized access to a victim

computer over the Internet, the individual's computer will generally serve both as an instrumentality for

committing the crime, and also as a storage device for evidence of the crime. The computer is an

instrumentality of the crime because it is "used as a means of committing [the] criminal offense" 

according to Rule 41(b )(3). In particular, the individual's computer is the primary means for

accessing the Internet, communicating with the victim computer, and ultimately obtaining the

unauthorized access that is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The computer is also likely to be a storage

device for evidence of crime because computer hackers generally maintain records and evidence

relating to their crimes on their computers. Those records and evidence may include files that

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recorded the unauthorized access, stolen passwords and other information downloaded from the victim

computer, the individual's notes as to how the access was achieved, records of Internet chat discussions

about the crime, and other records that indicate the scope of the individual's unauthorized access.

 Computers Used to Produce Child Pornography

It is common for child pornographers to use personal computers to produce both still and moving

images. For example, a computer can be connected to a common video camera using a device called a

video capture board: the device turns the video output into a form that is usable by computer

programs. Alternatively, the pornographer can use a digital camera to take photographs or videos and

load them directly onto the computer. The output of the camera can be stored, transferred or printed

out directly from the computer. The producers of child pornography can also use a device known as a

scanner to transfer photographs into a computer-readable format. All of these devices, as well as the

computer, constitute instrumentalities of the crime.

 2. When the Computer Is Merely a Storage Device for Contraband, Evidence,

 And/or an Instrumentality or Fruit of Crime

 When the computer is merely a storage device for electronic evidence, the affidavit should explain this

clearly. The affidavit should explain why there is probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime may be found

in the location to be searched. This does not require the affidavit to establish probable cause that the evidence may

be stored specifically within a computer. However, the affidavit should explain why the agents believe that the

information may in fact be stored as an electronic file stored in a computer.

Child Pornography

Your affiant knows that child pornographers generally prefer to store images of child pornography in

electronic form as computer files. The computer’s ability to store images in digital form makes a

computer an ideal repository for pornography. A small portable disk can contain hundreds or

thousands of images of child pornography, and a computer hard drive can contain tens of thousands of

such images at very high resolution. The images can be easily sent to or received from other computer

users over the Internet. Further, both individual files of child pornography and the disks that contain

the files can be mislabeled or hidden to evade detection.

Illegal Business Operations

Based on actual inspection of [spreadsheets, financial records, invoices], your affiant is aware that

computer equipment was used to generate, store, and print documents used in [suspect’s] [tax evasion,

money laundering, drug trafficking, etc.] scheme. There is reason to believe that the computer system

currently located on [suspect’s] premises is the same system used to produce and store the

[spreadsheets, financial records, invoices], and that both the [spreadsheets, financial records,

invoices] and other records relating to [suspect's] criminal enterprise will be stored on [suspect's

computer].

C. The Search Strategy

 The affidavit should also contain a careful explanation of the agents’ search strategy, as well as a discussion of

any practical or legal concerns that govern how the search will be executed. Such an explanation is particularly

important when practical considerations may require that agents seize computer hardware and search it off-site when

that hardware is only a storage device for evidence of crime. Similarly, searches for computer evidence in sensitive

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environments (such as functioning businesses) may require that the agents adopt an incremental approach designed

to minimize the intrusiveness of the search. The affidavit should explain the agents’ approach in sufficient detail

that the explanation provides a useful guide for the search team and any reviewing court. It is a good practice to

include a copy of the search strategy as an attachment to the warrant, especially when the affidavit is placed under

seal. Here is sample language that can apply recurring situations:

 1. Sample Language to Justify Seizing Hardware and Conducting a Subsequent

 Off-site Search

Based upon your affiant’s knowledge, training and experience, your affiant knows that searching and

seizing information from computers often requires agents to seize most or all electronic storage devices

(along with related peripherals) to be searched later by a qualified computer expert in a laboratory or

other controlled environment. This is true because of the following:

(1) The volume of evidence. Computer storage devices (like hard disks, diskettes, tapes,

laser disks) can store the equivalent of millions of information. Additionally, a suspect

may try to conceal criminal evidence; he or she might store it in random order with

deceptive file names. This may require searching authorities to examine all the stored

data to determine which particular files are evidence or instrumentalities of crime. This

sorting process can take weeks or months, depending on the volume of data stored, and it

would be impractical and invasive to attempt this kind of data search on-site.

(2) Technical Requirements. Searching computer systems for criminal evidence is a highly

technical process requiring expert skill and a properly controlled environment. The vast

array of computer hardware and software available requires even computer experts to

specialize in some systems and applications, so it is difficult to know before a search which

expert is qualified to analyze the system and its data. In any event, however, data search

protocols are exacting scientific procedures designed to protect the integrity of the

evidence and to recover even “hidden,” erased, compressed, password-protected, or

encrypted files. Because computer evidence is vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional

modification or destruction (both from external sources or from destructive code imbedded

in the system as a “booby trap”), a controlled environment may be necessary to complete

an accurate analysis. Further, such searches often require the seizure of most or all of a

computer system’s input/output peripheral devices, related software, documentation, and

data security devices (including passwords) so that a qualified computer expert can

accurately retrieve the system’s data in a laboratory or other controlled environment.

In light of these concerns, your affiant hereby requests the Court’s permission to seize the computer

hardware (and associated peripherals) that are believed to contain some or all of the evidence

described in the warrant, and to conduct an off-site search of the hardware for the evidence described,

if, upon arriving at the scene, the agents executing the search conclude that it would be impractical to

search the computer hardware on-site for this evidence.

 2. Sample Language to Justify an Incremental Search

Your affiant recognizes that the [Suspect] Corporation is a functioning company with approximately

[number] employees, and that a seizure of the [Suspect] Corporation's computer network may have the

unintended and undesired effect of limiting the company's ability to provide service to its legitimate

customers who are not engaged in [the criminal activity under investigation]. In response to these

concerns, the agents who execute the search will take an incremental approach to minimize the

inconvenience to [Suspect Corporation]'s legitimate customers and to minimize the need to seize

equipment and data. This incremental approach, which will be explained to all of the agents on the

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search team before the search is executed, will proceed as follows:

A. Upon arriving at the [Suspect Corporation's] headquarters on the morning of the

search, the agents will attempt to identify a system administrator of the network (or other

knowledgeable employee) who will be willing to assist law enforcement by identifying,

copying, and printing out paper [and electronic] copies of [the computer files described in

the warrant.] If the agents succeed at locating such an employee and are able to obtain

copies of the [the computer files described in the warrant] in that way, the agents will not

conduct any additional search or seizure of the [Suspect Corporation's] computers.

B. If the employees choose not to assist the agents and the agents cannot execute the

warrant successfully without themselves examining the [Suspect Corporation's] computers

, primary responsibility for the search will transfer from the case agent to a designated

computer expert. The computer expert will attempt to locate [the computer files described

in the warrant], and will attempt to make electronic copies of those files. This analysis

will focus on particular programs, directories, and files that are most likely to contain the

evidence and information of the violations under investigation. The computer expert will

make every effort to review and copy only those programs, directories, files, and materials

that are evidence of the offenses described herein, and provide only those items to the case

agent. If the computer expert succeeds at locating [the computer files described in the

warrant] in that way, the agents will not conduct any additional search or seizure of the

[Suspect Corporation's] computers.

C. If the computer expert is not able to locate the files on-site, or an on-site search proves

infeasible for technical reasons, the computer expert will attempt to create an electronic

“image” of those parts of the computer that are likely to store [the computer files

described in the warrant]. Generally speaking, imaging is the taking of a complete

electronic picture of the computer’s data, including all hidden sectors and deleted files. 

Imaging a computer permits the agents to obtain an exact copy of the computer's stored

data without actually seizing the computer hardware. The computer expert or another

technical expert will then conduct an off-site search for [the computer files described in

the warrant] from the "mirror image" copy at a later date. If the computer expert

successfully images the [Suspect Corporation's] computers, the agents will not conduct

any additional search or seizure of the [Suspect Corporation's] computers.

D. If “imaging” proves impractical, or even impossible for technical reasons, then the

agents will seize those components of the [Suspect Corporation's] computer system that

the computer expert believes must be seized to permit the agents to locate [the computer

files described in the warrant] at an off-site location. The components will be seized and

taken in to the custody of the FBI. If employees of [Suspect Corporation] so request, the

computer expert will, to the extent practicable, attempt to provide the employees with

copies of any files [not within the scope of the warrant] that may be necessary or

important to the continuing function of the [Suspect Corporation’s] legitimate business. 

If, after inspecting the computers, the analyst determines that some or all of this equipment

is no longer necessary to retrieve and preserve the evidence, the government will return it

within a reasonable time.

 3. Sample Language to Justify the Use of Comprehensive Data Analysis Techniques

Searching [the suspect’s] computer system for the evidence described in [Attachment A] may require a

range of data analysis techniques. In some cases, it is possible for agents to conduct carefully targeted

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searches that can locate evidence without requiring a time-consuming manual search through

unrelated materials that may be commingled with criminal evidence. For example, agents may be able

to execute a “keyword” search that searches through the files stored in a computer for special words

that are likely to appear only in the materials covered by a warrant. Similarly, agents may be able to

locate the materials covered in the warrant by looking for particular directory or file names. In other

cases, however, such techniques may not yield the evidence described in the warrant. Criminals can

mislabel or hide files and directories; encode communications to avoid using key words; attempt to

delete files to evade detection; or take other steps designed to frustrate law enforcement searches for

information. These steps may require agents to conduct more extensive searches, such as scanning

areas of the disk not allocated to listed files, or opening every file and scanning its contents briefly to

determine whether it falls within the scope of the warrant. In light of these difficulties, your affiant

requests permission to use whatever data analysis techniques appear necessary to locate and retrieve

the evidence described in [Attachment A].

D. Special Considerations

 The affidavit should also contain discussions of any special legal considerations that may factor into the search

or how it will be conducted. These considerations are discussed at length in Chapter 2. Agents can use this

checklist to determine whether a particular computer-related search raises such issues:

1. Is the search likely to result in the seizure of any drafts of publications (such as books,

newsletters, Web site postings, etc.) that are unrelated to the search and are stored on the target

computer? If so, the search may implicate the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa.

2. Is the target of the search an ISP, or will the search result in the seizure of a mail server? If so,

the search may implicate the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11.

3. Does the target store electronic files or e-mail on a server maintained in a remote location? If

so, the agents may need to obtain more than one warrant.

4. Will the search result in the seizure of privileged files, such as attorney-client

communications? If so, special precautions may be in order.

5. Are the agents requesting authority to execute a sneak-and-peek search?

6. Are the agents requesting authority to dispense with the “knock and announce” rule?

Appendix G: Sample Letter for Provider Monitoring

 This letter is intended to inform [law enforcement agency] of [Provider’s] decision to conduct monitoring of

unauthorized activity within its computer network pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i), and to disclose some or all

of the fruits of this monitoring to law enforcement if [Provider] deems it will assist in protecting its rights or

property. On or about [date], [Provider] became aware that it was the victim of unauthorized intrusions into its

computer network. [Provider] understands that 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) authorizes

an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose

facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or

use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is

a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the

provider of that service[.]

 This statutory authority permits [Provider] to engage in reasonable monitoring of unauthorized use of its

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network to protect its rights or property, and also to disclose intercepted communications to [law enforcement] to

further the protection of [Provider]’s rights or property.

 To protect its rights and property, [Provider] plans to [continue to] conduct reasonable monitoring of the

unauthorized use in an effort to evaluate the scope of the unauthorized activity and attempt to discover the identity

of the person or persons responsible. [Provider] may then wish to disclose some or all of the fruits of its interception

to law enforcement to help support a criminal investigation concerning the unauthorized use and criminal

prosecution for the unauthorized activity of the person(s) responsible.

 [Provider] understands that it is under absolutely no obligation to conduct any monitoring whatsoever, or to

disclose the fruits of any monitoring, and that 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) does not permit [law enforcement] to direct

or request [Provider] to intercept, disclose, or use monitored communications for law enforcement purposes. 

Accordingly, [law enforcement] will under no circumstances initiate, encourage, order, request, or solicit [Provider]

to conduct nonconsensual monitoring without first obtaining an appropriate court order, and [Provider] will not

engage in monitoring solely or primarily to assist law enforcement absent an appropriate court order. Any

monitoring and/or disclosure will be at [Provider’s] initiative. [Provider] also recognizes that the interception of

wire and electronic communications beyond the permissible scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) potentially may

subject it to civil and criminal penalties.

 Sincerely,

 [Provider] General Counsel

I NDEX

Topic Chapter

(1)(d)(2)(a) 

(4)(c)(3)(b)(i) 

(1)(c)(6)

(1)(c)(1)

(1)(c)(1)(c)

(1)(c)(1)(a)

(1)(c)(1)(b)

(1)(c)(1)(b)(iii)

(1)(d)(1)(b)

(1)(d)(2)(c)

(1)(c)(1)(b)(ii)

(1)(c)(1)(b)(iv)

(3)(e)

(4)(c)(3)(b)

(3)

(3)(d)(3)(d)(iv)

(3)(g)(1)

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Banners 

 and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 

 and Title III 

 Sample Language Appendix A 

Border Searches 

Consent, Fourth Amendment 

 Generally 

 Implied Consent 

 Scope of Consent 

 Third Party 

 Generally 

 Parents 

 Private Sector Workplaces 

 Public Sector Workplaces 

 Spouses and Domestic Partners 

 System Administrators 

Consent, Statutory 

 ECPA 

 Title III 

Drafting Warrants, see Warrants 

ECPA (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711) 

 Generally 

 2703(d) Orders 

 2703(f) Letters 

 and The Cable Act 

 Basic Subscriber Information 

 Consent of System Administrator 

 Contents 

 Electronic Communication Service 

 Electronic Storage 

 Non-Disclosure Letters 

 Remote Computing Service 

 Quick Reference Guide 

 Remedies 

 Sample Applications and Orders 

 Search Warrants 

 and Search and Seizure 

 Subpoenas 

 Transactional Records 

Exceptions to Warrant Requirement 

 see Border Searches; Consent; 

 Exigent Circumstances; 

 Inventory Searches; Plain View; 

 Search Incident to Lawful Arrest; 

 O’Connor v. Ortega Workplace Searches 

(3)(g)(3)

(3)(c)(1)(e)(ii)

(1)(c)(1)(b)(iv) 

(3)(c)(3)(e)(i)

(3)(b) 

(3)(b)

(3)(g)(2)

(3)(b)

(3)(f)

(3)(h) 

Appendices

(3)(d)(5)

(2)(a)(2)(b)(iii)

(3)(d)(1),

(3)(d)(2)

(3)(c)(2)

(1)(c)

(1)(c)(2)

(5)

(5)(b)

(5)(a)

(5)(c)(2)

(5)(c)

(2)(c)(3)

(1)

(2)

(2)(c)(3)

(4)(d)(2)(a)

(1)(c)(7)

(2)(b)(4)

(1)(c)(5)

(1)(d)(2)(b)

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Exigent Circumstances 

Evidence 

 Generally 

 Authentication 

 Business Records 

 Hearsay 

“Flagrant Disregard” Test 

Fourth Amendment 

 Warrantless Searches 

 Warrant Searches, see also Warrants 

Good Faith Defense 

 Execution of Search Warrants 

 Violations of Title III 

International Issues 

 Generally 

 Remote Searches and Rule 41 

Inventory Searches 

Multiple Warrants, see Warrants 

No-Knock Warrants, see Warrants 

O’Connor v. Ortega Workplace Searches 

Off-site vs. On-site Searches 

Pagers 

 Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 

 Exigent Circumstances 

 Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest 

Particularity, Search Warrant 

Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices (18 U.S.C. §§

3121-3127) 

 Generally 

 Remedies 

 and Title III 

 Sample Application and Order 

Planning a Search 

Plain View 

Privacy Protection Act (“PPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa 

 Application to Computer Cases 

 Generally 

 History 

(2)(b)(1)

(1)(b)(2)

(1)(c)(2)

(1)(c)(4)

(2)(c)(3)

(4)(b)

(4)(d)

(4)(a)

Appendix D

(2)(b)

(1)(c)(3)

(2)(b)(2)(c)

(2)(b)(1)(a)

(2)(b)(2)(a)

(2)(a)(2)

(2)(b)(2)(b)

(1)(b)(4)

(1)(d)(1)(c)

(2)(b)(7)

(2)(b)(7)(a)

(2)(b)(7)(b)

(2)(c)(1)

(1)(b)(1)

(1)(b)(2)

(3)(a) 

(1)(d)(1)(a)

(1)(d)(2)(a)

(1)(b)(3)

(4)(d)(1)(b)

(4)(d)(1)(a)(ii)

(3)(h)

(4)(d)

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 And Planning a Search 

 Statutory Language 

Private Searches 

 Generally 

 Private Employers 

Privileged Documents 

 Generally 

 Regulations 

 Reviewing Privileged Materials 

Probable Cause 

Qualified Immunity, see Title III 

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 

 Generally 

 Computers as Storage Devices 

 and ECPA 

 in Private Sector Workplaces 

 in Public Sector Workplaces 

 and Third Party Possession 

 and Title III 

 for Computer Hackers 

Remedies 

 ECPA 

 Pen/Trap Devices 

 Rule 41 

 Title III (4)(d) 

Rule 41 

 Generally 

 and “Flagrant Disregard” 

 Rule 41(a) 

 Rule 41(d) 

 Rule 41(e) 

Seizure 

 Temporary 

 of Hardware, vs. Searching On-site 

Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest 

Search Warrants, see Warrants 

Sneak and Peek Warrants, see Warrants 

Subpoenas 

 and ECPA 

 Sample language 

Suppression, see Remedies 

(2)(b)(4), (2)(b)(6)

(2)(b)(1) 

(2)(c)(2)

(2)(b)(4)

(2)(b)(6)

(2)(d)(2), (2)(d)(3)

(1)(b)(4)

(2)(b)(1)

(1)(c)(4)

(3)(d)(1)

(3)(d)(2) 

Appendix E

(4)(c)

(4)(c)(3)(b)(i)

(4)(c)(3)(b)

(4)(c)(2)

(4)(c)(3)(d)

(4)(c)(2)

(4)(c)(3)(c)

(4)(d)

(4)(d)(2)(a)

(4)(d)(2)(b)

(4)(d)(1)

(4)(c)(2)

(3)(d)(3) 

Appendix B

(3)(d)

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Surveillance, see Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices, Title

III 

Title III (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522) 

 Generally 

 Banners 

 Consent Exception 

 Electronic Communication 

 Extension Telephone Exception 

 Intercept 

 Provider Exception 

 Remedies 

 Good Faith Defense 

 Qualified Immunity 

 Suppression 

 Wire Communication 

Trap and Trace Devices, see Pen Registers and Trap and Trace

Devices 

2703(d) Orders 

 Legal Requirements 

 Sample Application and Order 

Voice Mail 

Warrants 

 Generally 

 for Computers in Law Enforcement Custody 

 Drafting 

 under ECPA 

 General Strategies 

 Multiple 

 No-Knock 

 Planning a Search 

 Sample Language 

 Sneak and Peek Warrants 

Workplace Searches 

 Generally 

 Private Sector 

 Public Sector 

(2)

(2)(d)(1)

(2)(c)

(3)(d)(5)

(2)(a)

(2)(b)(4)

(2)(b)(5)

(2)(a), (b)

Appendix F

(2)(b)(6)

(1)(d)

(1)(d)(1)

(1)(d)(2) 

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Footnotes:

1Technically, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 amended Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, codified at 18

U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, and created Chapter 121 of Title 18, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11. As a result, some courts and commentators

use the term "ECPA" to refer collectively to both §§ 2510-22 and §§ 2701-11. This manual adopts a simpler convention for the sake of

clarity: §§ 2510-22 will be referred to by its original name, "Title III," (as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,

passed in 1968), and §§ 2701-11 as "ECPA."

2After viewing evidence of a crime stored on a computer, agents may need to seize the computer temporarily to ensure the integrity and

availability of the evidence before they can obtain a warrant to search the contents of the computer. See, e.g., Hall, 142 F.3d at 994-95;

United States v. Grosenheider, 200 F.3d 321, 330 n.10 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fourth Amendment permits agents to seize a computer

temporarily so long as they have probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of a crime, the agents seek a warrant expeditiously,

and the duration of the warrantless seizure is not “unreasonable” given the totality of the circumstances. See UnitedStates v. Place, 462

U.S. 696, 700 (1983); United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Licata, 761 F.2d 537, 540-42 (9th Cir.

1985).

3Consent by employers and co-employees is discussed separately in the workplace search section of this chapter. See Part D.

4Of course, agents executing a search pursuant to a valid warrant need not rely on the plain view doctrine to justify the search. The

warrant itself justifies the search. See generally Chapter 2, Part D, “Searching Computers Already in Law Enforcement Custody.”

5Creating a mirror-image copy of an entire drive (often known simply as “imaging”) is different from making an electronic copy of

individual files. When a computer file is saved to a storage disk, it is saved in randomly scattered sectors on the disk rather than in

contiguous, consolidated blocks; when the file is retrieved, the scattered pieces are reassembled from the disk in the computer’s

memory and presented as a single file. Imaging the disk copies the entire disk exactly as it is, including all the scattered pieces of

various files. The image allows a computer technician to recreate (or “mount”) the entire storage disk and have an exact copy just like

the original. In contrast, an electronic copy (also known as a “logical file copy”) merely creates a copy of an individual file by

reassembling and then copying the scattered sectors of data associated with the particular file.

6Such distinctions may also be important from the perspective of asset forfeiture. Property used to commit or promote an offense

involving obscene material may be forfeited criminally pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1467. Property used to commit or promote an offense

involving child pornography may be forfeited criminally pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2253 and civilly pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2254. Agents

and prosecutors can contact the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section at (202) 514-1263 for additional assistance.

7The Steve Jackson Games litigation raised many important issues involving the PPA and ECPA before the district court. On appeal,

however, the only issue raised was “a very narrow one: whether the seizure of a computer on which is stored private E-mail that has

been sent to an electronic bulletin board, but not yet read (retrieved) by the recipients, constitutes an ‘intercept’ proscribed by 18 U.S.C.

§ 2511(1)(a).” Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 460. This issue is discussed in the electronic surveillance chapter. See Chapter 4,

infra.

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8This raises a fundamental distinction overlooked in Steve Jackson Games: the difference between a Rule 41 search warrant that

authorizes law enforcement to execute a search, and an ECPA search warrant that compels a provider of electronic communication

service or remote computing service to disclose the contents of a subscriber’s network account to law enforcement. Although both are

called “search warrants,” they are very different in practice. ECPA search warrants required by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) are court orders

that are served much like subpoenas: ordinarily, the investigators bring the warrant to the provider, and the provider then divulges the

information described in the warrant to the investigators within a certain period of time. In contrast, Rule 41 search warrants typically

authorize agents to enter onto private property, search for and then seize the evidence described in the warrant. Compare Chapter 2

(discussing search and seizure with a Rule 41 warrant) with Chapter 3 (discussing electronic evidence that can be obtained under

ECPA). This distinction is especially important when a court concludes that ECPA was violated and then must determine the remedy. 

Because the warrant requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) is only a statutory standard, a non-constitutional violation of § 2703(a) should

not result in suppression of the evidence obtained. See Chapter 3, Part H (discussing remedies for violations of ECPA).

9Focusing on the computers rather than the information may also lead to a warrant that is too narrow. If relevant information is in paper

or photographic form, agents may miss it altogether.

10An unusual number of computer search and seizure decisions involve child pornography. This is true for two reasons. First,

computer networks provide an easy means of possessing and transmitting contraband images of child pornography. Second, the fact

that possession of child pornography transmitted over state lines is a felony often leaves defendants with little recourse but to challenge

the procedure by which law enforcement obtained the contraband images. Investigators and prosecutors should contact the Child

Exploitation and Obscenity Section at (202) 514-5780 or an Assistant U.S. Attorney designated as a Child Exploitation and Obscenity

Coordinator for further assistance with child exploitation investigations and cases.

11Of course, the reality that agents legally may retain hardware for an extended period of time does not preclude agents from agreeing

to requests from defense counsel for return of seized hardware and files. In several cases, agents have offered suspects electronic copies

of innocent files with financial or personal value that were stored on seized computers. If suspects can show a legitimate need for

access to seized files or hardware and the agents can comply with suspects' requests without either jeopardizing the investigation or

imposing prohibitive costs on the government, agents should not hesitate to offer their assistance as a courtesy.

12This is true for two reasons. First, account holders may not retain a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in information sent to

network providers because sending the information to the providers may constitute a disclosure under the principles of United States v.

Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). See Chapter 1, Part B, Section 3 (“Reasonable Expectation

of Privacy and Third Party Possession”). Second, the Fourth Amendment generally permits the government to issue a subpoena

compelling the disclosure of information and property even if it is protected by a Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation of

privacy.” When the government does not actually conduct the search for evidence, but instead merely obtains a court order that

requires the recipient of the order to turn over evidence to the government within a specified period of time, the order complies with the

Fourth Amendment so long as it is not overbroad, seeks relevant information, and is served in a legal manner. See United States v.

Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1973); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 75-80 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.). This analysis also applies when a

suspect has stored materials remotely with a third party, and the government serves the third party with the subpoena. The cases

indicate that so long as the third party is in possession of the target’s materials, the government may subpoena the materials from the

third party without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause, even if it would need a warrant to execute a search directly. See

United States v. Barr, 605 F. Supp. 114, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (subpoena served on private third-party mail service for the defendant’s

undelivered mail in the third party’s possession); United States v. Schwimmer, 232 F.2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956) (subpoena served on

third-party storage facility for the defendant’s private papers in the third party’s possession); Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700, 702-05

(5th Cir. 1937) (subpoena served on telegraph company for copies of defendants’ telegrams in the telegraph company’s possession).

13In this regard, as in several others, ECPA mirrors the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq. (“RFPA”). See

generally Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States Department of Justice, 124 F.3d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that “Congress

modeled . . . ECPA after the RFPA,” and looking to the RFPA for guidance on how to interpret “customer and subscriber” as used in

ECPA); Tucker v. Waddell, 83 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir.1996) (examining the RFPA in order to construe ECPA). The courts have

uniformly refused to read a statutory suppression remedy into the analogous provision of the RFPA. See United States v. Kington, 801

F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir.1986) (“Had Congress intended to authorize a

suppression remedy [for violations of the RFPA], it surely would have included it among the remedies it expressly authorized.”).

14For example, the opinion contains several statements about ECPA’s requirements that are inconsistent with each other and

individually incorrect. At one point, the opinion states that ECPA required the Navy either to obtain a search warrant ordering AOL to

disclose McVeigh’s identity, or else give prior notice to McVeigh and then use a subpoena or a § 2703(d) court order. See 983 F. Supp.

at 219. On the next page, the opinion states that the Navy needed to obtain a search warrant to obtain McVeigh’s name from AOL. See

id. at 220. Both statements are incorrect. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C), the Navy could have obtained McVeigh’s name

properly with a subpoena, and did not need to give notice of the subpoena to McVeigh.

15Prohibited “use” and “disclosure” are beyond the scope of this manual.

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16State surveillance laws may differ. Some states forbid the interception of communications unless all parties consent.

17The final clause of § 2511(2)(a)(i), which prohibits public telephone companies from conducting “service observing or random

monitoring” unrelated to quality control, limits random monitoring by phone companies to interception designed to ensure that the

company’s equipment is in good working order. See 1 James G. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance, § 3.3(f), at 3-75. This

clause has no application to non-voice computer network transmissions.

18Unlike other Title III exceptions, the extension telephone exception is technically a limit on the statutory definition of “intercept.” 

See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)-(5). However, the provision acts just like other exceptions to Title III monitoring that authorize interception in

certain circumstances.

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