Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55527 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AWL FOR ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) ACTUATOR

INSPECTION

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–MOV ...... ALI 10 days ..............................

INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the 

airplane is not used in 

revenue service. 

Must be done before further flight if it has been 

10 or more calendar 

days since last inspection. 

Airplanes with AIMS–1 

system.

Airplanes with AIMS–2 

BlockPoint (BP) v 16 

and earlier software. 

APPLICABILITY NOTE: 

Only applies to airplanes 

with a fuel spar valve actuator having part number MA20A2027 

(S343T003–56) or 

MA30A1001 

(S343T003–66) installed 

at the engine fuel spar 

valve position. 

Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) MOV Actuator Inspection. 

Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar 

valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed 

fuel spar valve actuator would prevent fuel shutoff to 

an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the 

potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. 

Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator. 

NOTE: The fuel spar valve actuator is located behind 

latch panel 551 DB (left engine) and latch panel 651 

DB (right engine). 

1. Make sure both Engine Control Switches are in the 

CUTOFF position. 

NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 

2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the left engine 

fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that 

is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual, 28–22–02, for guidance). 

3. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the right engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that 

is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual, 28–22–02, for guidance). 

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals 

After accomplishing the maintenance or 

inspection program revision required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 

actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be 

used unless the actions or intervals are 

approved as an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the 

procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of 

this AD. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; 

email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 7, 2015. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–23121 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0194; Directorate 

Identifier 2014–NM–022–AD; Amendment 

39–18266; AD 2015–19–03] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 

Boeing Company Model 737–600, –700, 

–700C, –800, –900, and –900ER series 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by 

reports of latently failed fuel shutoff 

valves discovered during fuel filter 

replacement. This AD requires revising 

the maintenance or inspection program 

to include new airworthiness 

limitations. We are issuing this AD to 

detect and correct latent failures of the 

fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which 


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could result in the inability to shut off 

fuel to the engine and, in case of certain 

engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that 

could lead to wing failure. 

DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 

2015. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0194; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Docket Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 

425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all The Boeing Company Model 

737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, and 

–900ER series airplanes. The NPRM 

published in the Federal Register on 

April 14, 2014 (79 FR 20834). The 

NPRM was prompted by reports of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valves 

discovered during fuel filter 

replacement. The NPRM proposed to 

require revising the maintenance or 

inspection program to include new 

airworthiness limitations. We are 

issuing this AD to detect and correct 

latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve 

to the engine, which could result in the 

inability to shut off fuel to the engine 

and, in case of certain engine fires, an 

uncontrollable fire that could lead to 

wing failure. 

Record of Ex Parte Communication 

In preparation of AD actions such as 

NPRMs and immediately adopted rules, 

it is the practice of the FAA to obtain 

technical information and information 

on operational and economic impacts 

from design approval holders and 

aircraft operators. We discussed certain 

comments addressed in this final rule in 

a teleconference with Airlines for 

America (A4A) and other members of 

the aviation industry. All of the 

comments discussed during this 

teleconference are addressed in this 

final rule in response to comments 

submitted by other commenters. A 

discussion of this contact can be found 

in the rulemaking docket at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0194. 

Clarification of Certain Terminology 

Throughout the preamble of this final 

rule, commenters may have used the 

terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel 

spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms 

refer to the same part. In our responses 

to comments, we have used the term 

‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar 

valve’’ is more commonly used in 

airplane maintenance documentation 

and, therefore, we have used that term 

in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the NPRM (79 FR 20834, 

April 14, 2014) and the FAA’s response 

to each comment. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 

20834, April 14, 2014) 

American Airlines (AA) requested 

that no further regulatory action be 

taken. AA stated that it has experienced 

only a small number of fuel shutoff 

valve actuator failures. AA stated that 

the combination of failures necessary to 

produce the catastrophic event 

described in the NPRM (79 FR 20834, 

April 14, 2014) includes fuel shutoff 

valve actuator failure, an erroneous 

position indication, and a fire in the 

engine compartment. AA also stated 

that risk analysis shows the probability 

of this combination occurring is in the 

improbable range of ‘‘10E–11 to 10E– 

16.’’ 

We disagree with commenter’s 

request. We have determined that an 

unsafe condition exists that warrants an 

interim action until the manufacturer 

finishes developing a modification that 

will address the identified unsafe 

condition. We have determined that, 

without the required interim action, a 

significant number of flights with a fuel 

shutoff valve actuator that is failed in 

the open valve position will occur 

during the affected fleet life. If certain 

engine fire conditions were to occur, or 

if extreme engine damage were to occur, 

or if an engine separation event were to 

occur during flight, the crew procedures 

for such an event would not stop the 

fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle. 

The continued flow of fuel could cause 

an uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel 

exhaustion event. 

The FAA regulations require all 

transport airplanes to be fail safe with 

respect to engine fire events, and the 

risk due to severe engine damage events 

to be minimized. Therefore, we require, 

for each flight, sufficiently operative fire 

safety systems so that fires can be 

detected and contained, and that fuel to 

the engine strut and nacelle can be shut 

off in the event of an engine fire or 

severe damage. 

The FAA airworthiness standards 

require remotely controlled powerplant 

valves to provide indications that the 

valves are in the commanded position. 

These indications allow the prompt 

detection and correction of valve 

failures. We do not allow dispatch with 

a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve. 

Therefore, we are proceeding with this 

final rule—not because of the higherthan-typical failure rate of the particular 

valve actuator involved, but instead 

because the fuel shutoff valve actuator 

can fail in a manner that also defeats the 

required valve position indication 

feature. That failure can lead to a large 

number of flights occurring on an 

airplane with a fuel shutoff valve 

actuator failed in the open position 

without the operator being aware of the 

failure. An airworthiness limitation 

containing required inspections is 

intended to limit the number of flights 

following latent failure of the fuel 

shutoff valve. We have not changed this 

AD in this regard. 

Request for Inspection Relief 

AirDo, AA, All Nippon Airlines 

(ANA), Delta Airlines (DAL), Southwest 

Airlines (SWA), Transavia, and United 

Airlines (UAL) requested clarification of 

the daily check requirement. The 

commenters stated that the check 

applies to airplanes that are in 

operational revenue status. The 

commenters stated that the proposed 

AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) does 

not account for airplanes in routine 

maintenance or for an out-of-service 

condition. 

We infer the commenters are 

requesting inspection relief for airplanes 

that are not in service. We agree with 

the commenters’ request. It would be 

unnecessarily burdensome to require 

the inspections on airplanes that are not 

being used. We agree with limiting 

inspections to days when the airplane is 

in revenue service. In the Interval 

column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD, we have added a note to clarify 

that the operational check is not 


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required on days when the airplane is 

not used in revenue service, but that the 

check must be done before further flight 

once the airplane is returned to revenue 

service. 

Request To Limit the Applicability 

UAL requested that we revise the 

proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 

2014) to limit the applicability specified 

in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD to airplanes with the valve 

actuators that have the identified unsafe 

condition. UAL stated the applicability 

applies to valve actuators having part 

number (P/N) MA30A1001. UAL stated 

that the problem does not apply to other 

existing actuator designs, and will not 

apply to future designs. 

We agree with the commenter’s 

request. It would be unnecessarily 

burdensome to require the inspections 

on airplanes that do not have any of the 

susceptible valves installed. We have 

added a note to the Applicability 

column in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD to clarify that the limitations 

apply to Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, –900, and –900ER airplanes 

having actuator P/N MA20A2027 

(Boeing P/N S343T003–56) or P/N 

MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N S343T003–66) 

installed at the engine fuel spar valve 

positions. 

Request To Follow the Master 

Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) in 

Lieu of the Daily Check 

AA and Qantas Airways stated that if 

the master minimum equipment list 

(MMEL) is being used, then the daily 

check should be not required. 

AA stated that the Boeing Model 737 

MMEL item 28–22, ‘‘Fuel/Spar Valve 

Closed Lights,’’ allows for the lights to 

be inoperative, provided the associated 

valve is verified to operate normally and 

the crossfeed VALVE OPEN light 

operates normally. AA stated that this 

item allows the lights to be inoperative 

for up to 10 days, and it requested that 

a provision be added to state that if this 

MMEL is being used, the daily check is 

not required. 

Qantas Airways stated that if an 

airplane is dispatched under the MMEL 

for inoperative SPAR VALVE CLOSED 

light(s), then it is not possible to 

accomplish the proposed checks. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters’ request. We disagree with 

providing MMEL relief for an 

inoperative fuel shutoff valve indication 

because such relief could potentially 

allow the fuel shutoff valve to be 

inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue 

operation. However, we do agree to 

provide flexibility regarding verification 

that the fuel shutoff valve is operational. 

We have added item D. to figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a 

fourth option to perform daily 

inspections to verify that the fuel 

shutoff valve is closing. 

Request To Clarify Recording 

Requirements 

Air Do, Ryanair, SWA, Transavia, 

UAL, and Darryl Voss requested that the 

FAA provide a more complete 

explanation of the requirements with 

regard to recording compliance. 

Air Do stated that if the flightcrew 

performed the operational check, a 

maintenance record is usually not 

created. The commenter questioned 

whether this is acceptable, or whether 

the flightcrew should record it in the 

flight log. 

Ryanair requested that the FAA 

explicitly state in the AD that the 

proposed actions may be performed by 

maintenance and/or flight operations 

checklists, and that the AD will not 

require the retention of maintenance or 

flight operations records to show 

compliance. Ryanair stated that due to 

the high frequency of the actions in the 

NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) 

and the large number of affected 

airplanes in its fleet (approximately 

300), the creation, retention, and 

reforecasting of individual records for 

this activity is not practical. 

Because of the high frequency of 

checks resulting from the proposed AD 

(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), 

compounded with the creation, 

distribution, and retention of the 

documentation of the checks, SWA 

requested that the FAA specifically state 

in the AD that when the daily check is 

performed successfully by flightcrews, 

no documentation is required. SWA also 

requested that the FAA specifically state 

in the AD that documentation (i.e., 

logbook entry or other type of defect 

report) is required only when a failure 

is detected by the flightcrew, or when 

the check is performed by maintenance 

personnel. 

Transavia requested that, if the daily 

check remains, we revise the proposed 

AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) to 

state that the inclusion of the daily 

check requirement into a checklist is 

sufficient to show AD compliance and 

prevent unwanted paperwork, and that 

the daily check can be performed by 

either maintenance personnel or the 

flightcrew. 

UAL asked whether the flightcrews 

will be required to record compliance of 

the operational checks and document 

each inspection. Darryl Voss requested 

that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 

20834, April 14, 2014) to remove the 

option to allow flightcrews to perform 

operational checks for maintenance. Mr. 

Voss stated that showing compliance 

with ADs is almost exclusively a 

maintenance function and should 

remain a maintenance function to 

provide compliance continuity. 

We agree that clarification is 

necessary. This AD requires including 

the information in figure 1 of paragraph 

(g) of this AD in the maintenance or 

inspection program. However, this AD 

does not require accomplishing the 

actions specified in figure 1 of 

paragraph (g) of this AD. The actions 

specified in the figure in this AD are 

done, and remain enforceable, as part of 

the airworthiness limitations of the 

instructions for continued airworthiness 

(ICA). Section 14 CFR 43.11(a) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

43.11(a)) requires maintenance record 

entries for maintenance actions such as 

the required checks. If an operator elects 

to have a flightcrew member do the 

check in accordance with the applicable 

airworthiness limitation, that same 

action would be considered an 

operational task (not maintenance), and 

therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not 

apply. In that case, operators should 

follow their normal processes for 

operational activities, including 

necessary Principal Operations 

Inspector (POI) involvement. We have 

not changed this AD in this regard. 

Request To Clarify Inspection 

Procedures for Operational Checks 

Boeing requested to add a flightcrew 

inspection procedure during engine 

start and engine shutdown. Boeing 

stated that this will provide common 

flight procedures and eliminate each 

operator creating its own test. 

DAL requested that the preamble of 

the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) 

be revised to match the rest of the 

requirements in the NPRM. DAL stated 

that if POI approval is required for 

flightcrews to accomplish operational 

checks, then the preamble should 

identify that flightcrews can only 

accomplish operational checks 

approved by the inspector. DAL stated 

that the preamble should not associate 

the operational check without engine 

start to only maintenance crews, and the 

operational checks while starting the 

engine or shutting down the engine to 

only flightcrews. 

UAL requested that standardized 

procedures be established by the FAA 

aircraft certification office for the POI to 

approve on behalf of all affected 

operators. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request to add to this AD a method 

describing how maintenance actions 

and operations actions should be 


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coordinated. The operational 

requirements are specified in figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD; how these 

requirements are captured in the 

operations processes to ensure that the 

maintenance action has been completed 

is likely different for each operator. As 

the commenter stated, flightcrews can 

only accomplish operational checks 

approved by the inspector. No change 

has been made to the final rule in this 

regard. 

Request To Provide an Alternative to 

the Maintenance or Inspection Program 

Revision in Operational Documents 

DAL requested that the proposed AD 

(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) be revised 

to provide an option for revising the 

Boeing Model 737 ‘‘Airplane Normal 

Checklist’’ to specify accomplishment of 

one of the required operational checks 

(operational check during engine start, 

operational check during engine 

shutdown, or operational check without 

engine operations) as a ‘‘FIRST FLIGHT 

OF THE DAY’’ requirement as an 

alternative to the maintenance or 

inspection program revision specified in 

paragraph (g) of the proposed rule. DAL 

stated that this option would ensure that 

operational aircraft are inspected daily, 

provide clear responsibility to the 

flightcrew to accomplish the operational 

checks, and remove concern for 

accomplishing the actions during times 

when the airplane is not in service. DAL 

stated that incorporating this change to 

the ‘‘Airplane Normal Checklist’’ will 

simplify compliance procedures while 

satisfying the requirements of the 

proposed rule. 

JAL requested that the FAA 

coordinate with Boeing to revise the 

flightcrew operations manual (FCOM) to 

provide the check of the fuel spar valve 

as a normal procedure. JAL stated that 

if an operational check by the flightcrew 

is allowed, the FCOM should be revised 

to provide the normal procedure to 

perform the fuel spar valve check during 

engine start or shutdown. 

Qantas Airways suggested that a 

revision to the Boeing Model 737 

Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), Section 

1 ‘‘Certificate Limitations,’’ or Section 3 

‘‘Normal Procedures,’’ might be a more 

appropriate location to allow the 

flightcrew to monitor valve operations 

during engine start and/or engine 

shutdown. 

We find that clarification is necessary. 

Changing these documents presupposes 

that every operator will have flightcrews 

perform this task. It is not our intention 

to require flightcrews to perform this 

task. Individual operators can modify 

their normal operating procedures to 

add this requirement. 

Request To Clarify the Operational 

Check During Engine Start 

Qantas stated that it does not believe 

that paragraph B. of the Description 

column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 

the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 

14, 2014), which specifies to do an 

operational check during engine start, 

achieves the desired failure detection. 

Qantas stated that if the test fails (i.e., 

bright light fails to illuminate), the valve 

has failed to open; this is different than 

a valve that has failed to close. Qantas 

stated that the test should identify the 

failed actuator in the failure mode, 

which results in an unsafe condition. 

We infer that Qantas is requesting we 

clarify the operational check during 

engine start. We find that clarification is 

necessary. The check procedure is 

designed to make sure the fuel shutoff 

valve actuator moves to the open 

position from the closed position. 

However, if the fuel shutoff valve 

actuator had previously failed open, the 

actuator would not move the valve and 

this check would fail. If this check fails, 

the fuel shutoff valve actuator is either 

failed in the closed position or has 

failed previously in the open position. 

Either way, the failed fuel shutoff valve 

actuator must be replaced. We have not 

changed this AD in this regard. 

Request To Add Requirement To 

Provide Electrical Power Before the 

Maintenance Check 

UAL requested we add a requirement 

to provide electrical power before 

accomplishment of the maintenance 

check specified by the proposed AD (79 

FR 20834, April 14, 2014). 

We agree with the commenter’s 

request because electrical power is 

required. In item C.1. of figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added 

an instruction to supply electrical 

power to the airplane using standard 

practices when performing the 

operational check. 

Request To Reference the Fault 

Isolation Manual 

Boeing requested that figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 

20834, April 14, 2014) be revised in 

order to reference the Fault Isolation 

Manual (FIM), instead of the Boeing 

Model 737 Aircraft Maintenance 

Manual (AMM), should the operational 

check fail. Boeing stated that the faults 

are isolated to failed components using 

the FIM. The AMM provides 

instructions for removing and replacing 

identified failed components. Boeing 

stated that the light could fail to 

illuminate for reasons other than 

actuator failure. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request to reference the FIM instead of 

the AMM. If an operational check fails, 

the failed component must be replaced. 

As Boeing stated, the AMM provides 

instructions for replacing failed 

components. The FIM also refers to the 

AMM for replacement of the fuel shutoff 

valve actuator after doing some 

preliminary testing. Operators may 

consult the FIM for guidance in 

troubleshooting other reasons the light 

could fail to illuminate. We have not 

changed this AD in this regard. 

Request To Extend the Repetitive 

Interval for the Operational Checks 

ANA requested that the repetitive 

interval be revised from daily to 15,000 

flight hours or 6,000 flight hours, or a 

weekly interval. ANA stated that Boeing 

has included these repetitive intervals 

in certain maintenance documents. 

ANA commented that it has 38 

airplanes in operation and it has never 

experienced a latent failure of the MOV 

actuator. ANA also stated that the 

possibility of the unsafe condition 

happening is very low. ANA stated that 

a daily interval is a burden to operators. 

DAL requested that the operational 

checks be required at intervals not to 

exceed 90 days or 1,400 flight cycles or 

1,800 flight hours; DAL stated that this 

is similar to what is proposed by the 

original equipment manufacturer. DAL 

stated that Airworthiness Limitation 

Task 28–AWL–MOV, ‘‘Engine Fuel 

Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) 

Position Indication Operational Check,’’ 

which was introduced by the proposed 

AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), 

would require daily operational checks 

of the engine fuel shutoff valve. DAL 

stated that it finds this will be an 

onerous operational requirement as it 

does not have maintenance personnel in 

all locations where the affected 

airplanes are operated. DAL stated that 

for this reason, it will be necessary for 

its flightcrews to accomplish the 

operational checks in order to comply 

with the daily requirement specified by 

the proposed AD. 

DAL also stated that the proposed AD 

(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) does not 

provide significant information as to 

how the daily check requirement was 

determined or why it differs so 

significantly from the compliance 

recommendation established by Boeing. 

DAL stated that lacking specific details 

of the methodology used by the FAA 

and the assumptions made to arrive at 

a daily check interval hinders the 

operator’s ability to provide comments 

on the appropriateness of this interval. 

DAL stated that Boeing has indicated 

that its numeric safety analysis supports 


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a compliance period of 3,000 flight 

hours for the operational checks. DAL 

also stated that based on current DAL 

utilization, accomplishment of daily 

checks equates to accomplishing the 

check approximately 300 times more 

frequently than the interval supported 

by the Boeing safety analysis. 

JAL requested that the FAA extend 

the inspection interval to a heavy 

maintenance opportunity. For Model 

737–800 airplanes, JAL stated to set the 

heavy maintenance opportunity (such as 

‘‘C-Check’’ and ‘‘K-Check’’) at 

approximately 2-year intervals to 

efficiently accomplish the maintenance 

program. 

Qantas Airways requested an interval 

that can be effectively scheduled in 

aircraft maintenance control programs, 

such as a 7-day interval. 

Jim Way requested a monthly interval 

for the operational checks. Mr. Way 

stated that a daily check is too 

restrictive. 

Bradley Most requested that the daily 

inspection interval be revised to every 2 

calendar days to accommodate 

‘‘international operations, out of station, 

overnight, etc.’’ Mr. Most stated that the 

interval of daily lacks a clear definition. 

We disagree with the requests to 

extend the inspection interval. An 

increase in the inspection interval from 

daily to every other day, to weekly, or 

to 90 days, would result in 2, 7, or 90 

times as many flights at risk in the event 

of an engine fire. The daily inspection 

has been deemed practical because, in 

practice, it will mean the flightcrew will 

need to watch a light as they start or 

shut down the engine using normal 

procedures. An increased interval to 

6,000 flight hours would have no real 

effect on the unsafe condition since the 

fuel filter replacement currently detects 

the problem every 6,000 flight hours. In 

addition, an increased interval of 15,000 

flight hours, or 24 months, would 

similarly not improve safety. We have 

not changed this AD in this regard. 

Request To Revise the Proposed 

Compliance Time for Revising the 

Maintenance or Inspection Program 

Mr. Most requested that the 

compliance time to revise the 

maintenance or inspection program be 

changed to 120 days after the effective 

date of this AD. Mr. Most stated that 

FAA offices are typically requesting 60 

days to review an airplane maintenance 

or inspection program revision that is 

submitted for approval and, in many 

cases, are taking longer. Mr. Most stated 

that the current inspection interval 

would not allow operators enough time 

to revise the airplane maintenance or 

inspection program, submit it to FAA 

for approval, and implement the revised 

airplane maintenance or inspection 

program within 30 days of the effective 

date. 

Jim Way requested that operators be 

given 90 days after the effective date of 

the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 

14, 2014) to incorporate the actions 

specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 

the proposed AD into the maintenance 

program. Mr. Way stated that single 

aircraft operators use a vendor to 

provide support for the inspection 

program revisions. Mr. Way stated that 

a 30-day compliance time after the 

effective date of the proposed AD is not 

enough time to properly make and 

submit the changes to the FAA’s 

principal maintenance inspector for 

approval and implementation. 

We do not agree to revise the 

compliance time for revising the 

maintenance or inspection program 

beyond 30 days. The 30-day compliance 

time specified in paragraph (g) of this 

AD is consistent with other regulatory 

actions for other affected models in 

similar ADs. However, under the 

provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, 

we might consider requests for 

adjustments to the compliance time if 

data are submitted to substantiate that 

such an adjustment would provide an 

acceptable level of safety. 

Request To Change the Initial 

Compliance Time for the Operational 

Check 

AA requested that 30 days be 

provided for the initial operational 

check after the airworthiness limitation 

(AWL) has been incorporated into its 

maintenance program. AA stated that 

this will allow for publishing the new 

criteria. 

We partially agree with AA’s request 

concerning the compliance time for the 

initial operational check. We have 

changed the initial compliance time 

specified in paragraph (g) of this AD for 

accomplishing the actions specified in 

figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD from 

7 to 10 days. The compliance time of 10 

days is consistent with other regulatory 

actions for other affected models in 

similar ADs. We have determined that 

10 days for the initial inspection 

represents an appropriate time in which 

the required actions can be performed in 

a timely manner within the affected 

fleet, while still maintaining an 

adequate level of safety. 

Request To Clarify Who Must 

Accomplish the Maintenance or 

Inspection Program Revision 

DAL requested that paragraph (g) of 

the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 

14, 2014) be revised because it is not 

clear who must accomplish the action in 

this paragraph. DAL stated that 

operators do not control the AWL 

section of the ICA and, therefore, could 

not comply with the requirement. DAL 

stated that on Boeing Model 737NG 

airplanes, the AWLs are incorporated 

into Section 9 of the Maintenance 

Planning Document (MPD) by Boeing. 

DAL stated that the action in the NPRM 

would be one for the original equipment 

manufacturer to accomplish with a 

revision to the MPD, which would then 

be incorporated by the operators. DAL 

also stated that operators have control of 

their continuous airworthiness 

maintenance program (CAMP). DAL 

stated that in the NPRM, it is the intent 

of the operators to incorporate the AWL 

into their CAMP. 

We find that clarification is necessary. 

The requirement in paragraph (g) of this 

AD is to change the Airworthiness 

Limitations of the ICA for each affected 

airplane. Once that change is complete, 

operators will be compelled to change 

their maintenance program to include 

the new requirements of the revised 

Airworthiness Limitations. For Part 121 

operators, changes to the CAMP will 

become necessary; but for other 

operators, the maintenance program 

may take a different form. We have not 

changed the AD in this regard. 

Request To Remove Redundant 

Language 

DAL requested that certain language 

be removed from the proposed AD (79 

FR 20834, April 14, 2014) because it is 

redundant. DAL stated that paragraph 

(h) of the proposed AD can be excluded 

because it states that no alternative 

actions or intervals can be used unless 

approved as an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) in accordance with 

the procedures specified in paragraph 

(i)(1) of the proposed AD. (Paragraph (i) 

of the proposed AD specifies the 

procedures and requirements for an 

AMOC.) 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request. It is necessary to include 

paragraph (h) of this AD (‘‘No 

Alternative Actions or Intervals’’) 

because it ensures that changes made 

after accomplishment of the 

maintenance or inspection program 

revision, e.g., using new versions of the 

maintenance or inspection program, are 

done only when approval of an AMOC 

is obtained from the FAA. We have not 

changed this AD in this regard. 

Request To Revise the Costs of 

Compliance Paragraph 

DAL stated that the cost estimate 

provided in the NPRM (79 FR 20834, 

April 14, 2014) is inaccurate. DAL 


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55532 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

stated that the cost reflected in the 

NPRM is for incorporating the proposed 

program change into the operator’s 

program only as a revision of the 

maintenance or inspection program.’’ 

DAL stated the cost estimate presented 

is flawed in two aspects: It does not 

properly account for the cost operators 

will take on in implementing the 

program changes, and it does not 

account for the cost of actually 

performing the inspections specified by 

the proposed maintenance or inspection 

program changes. 

We infer that DAL is requesting we 

revise the Costs of Compliance 

paragraph. We acknowledge the 

commenter’s concern. In this AD, the 

required action is to revise the 

maintenance or inspection program, as 

applicable, to include a new 

airworthiness limitation. The added 

airworthiness limitation requires an 

inspection of the position of the MOV 

actuator daily. However, these repetitive 

inspections, which are expected to take 

a few seconds to complete, are required 

by section 91.403(c) of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) 

once incorporated into the maintenance 

or inspection program. 

The cost analysis in AD rulemaking 

actions typically includes only the costs 

associated with complying with the AD. 

In this AD, the required action is the 

maintenance or inspection program 

revision, as applicable, to include the 

new airworthiness limitation. 

Accomplishing repetitive actions that 

are specified in the airworthiness 

limitation are not directly required by 

this AD. The FAA, as a matter of 

practice, does not include a cost 

estimate for these repetitive actions in 

an AD because these actions are 

required as part of the operating rules. 

Therefore, we have made no change to 

this AD in this regard. 

Request To Clarify Wording for 

Operational Check Without Engine 

Operation 

UAL requested we revise the wording 

of the operational check without engine 

operation. UAL stated that in item C.3.a. 

and item C.4.a. in the Description 

column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD, either a tolerance should be 

added to the wording, or the word 

‘‘approximately’’ should be added 

before the phrase ‘‘10 seconds.’’ 

We agree with the commenter’s 

request. In item C.4.a. and item C.5.a. 

(which correspond to items C.3.a. and 

C.4.a. of the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 

14, 2014)) in the Description column of 

figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we 

have added wording that indicates to 

wait ‘‘approximately’’ 10 seconds after 

moving the ENG 1 and ENG 2 START 

LEVER on the CONTROL STAND to the 

IDLE position. We find that this change 

will allow flexibility during the 

operational check, while still 

maintaining an adequate level of safety. 

Request To Correct Typographical 

Errors 

Boeing and DAL requested that we 

correct a typographical error in the 

proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 

2014). Boeing and DAL stated that item 

A.1. in the Description column of figure 

1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD, 

which states to ‘‘do all operational 

checks . . .,’’ the word ‘‘all’’ should be 

removed because the operational check 

is a singular check. 

We agree with the commenters’ 

request. We have revised item A.1. in 

the Description column of figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD accordingly. 

Boeing also requested that certain 

other typographical errors in the 

proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 

2014) be corrected to reduce the 

possibility of confusion regarding the 

requirements. Boeing stated that the 

Description column in figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of the proposed AD 

should be revised as follows: 

• Step B.2. has been skipped, and 

needs to be renumbered. 

• In step B.1.a., the text ‘‘START 

LEVEL STAND’’ should be changed to 

‘‘START LEVER ON CONTROL 

STAND.’’ 

• Steps C.2. and C.3. should be 

combined and renumbered. 

• In step C.5.a., the text ‘‘ENG @’’ 

should be changed to ‘‘ENG 2.’’ 

We disagree with the comment. The 

stated typographical errors for step 

B.1.a., step B.2., and step C.5.a., do not 

exist in the regulatory text of the NPRM 

(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), as 

published. We disagree with combining 

steps C.2. and C.3 because the engine 

fire switches represent separate actions 

for the aft electronic panel and the 

forward overhead panel. We have not 

changed this AD in this regard. 

Effect of Winglets on This AD 

Aviation Partners Boeing stated that 

the installation of winglets per 

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 

ST00830SE (http://rgl.faa.gov/

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/

rgstc.nsf/0/

3ed73703f205e3b386257e2f0064f3b1/

$FILE/ST00830SE.pdf) does not affect 

the accomplishment of the 

manufacturer’s service instructions. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this AD 

with the changes described previously 

and minor editorial changes. We have 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 

20834, April 14, 2014) for correcting the 

unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 20834, 

April 14, 2014). 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of this AD. 

Interim Action 

We consider this AD interim action. 

The manufacturer is currently 

developing a modification that will 

address the unsafe condition identified 

in this AD. Once this modification is 

developed, approved, and available, we 

might consider additional rulemaking. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 1,244 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on 

U.S. operators 

Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............ 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $105,740 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55533 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2015–19–03 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–18266; Docket No. 

FAA–2014–0194; Directorate Identifier 

2014–NM–022–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective October 21, 2015. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all The Boeing 

Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, –900, and –900ER series airplanes, 

certificated in any category. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 2823, Fuel Selector/Shutoff Valve. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered 

during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing 

this AD to detect and correct latent failures 

of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which 

could result in the inability to shut off fuel 

to the engine and, in case of certain engine 

fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to 

wing failure. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection 

Program 

Within 30 days after the effective date of 

this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection 

program, as applicable, to add airworthiness 

limitation number 28–AWL–MOV, ‘‘Engine 

Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position 

Indication Operational Check,’’ by 

incorporating the information specified in 

figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the 

Airworthiness Limitations Section of the 

Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. 

The initial compliance time for 

accomplishing the actions specified in 28– 

AWL–MOV is within 10 days after 

accomplishing the maintenance or inspection 

program revision required by this paragraph. 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–MOV ...... ALI DAILY ................................

INTERVAL NOTE: The 

operational check is not 

required on days when 

the airplane is not used 

in revenue service. The 

check must be done before further flight once 

the airplane is returned 

to revenue service. 

737–600, –700, –700C, 

–800, –900, and –900ER 

series airplanes.

APPLICABILITY NOTE: 

Only applies to airplanes 

with a fuel spar valve actuator having part number MA20A2027 

(S343T003–56) or 

MA30A1001 

(S343T003–66) installed 

at the engine fuel spar 

valve positions. 

Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position 

Indication Operational Check. 

Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar 

valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed 

fuel spar valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to 

an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the 

potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. 

Perform one of the following checks of the engine fuel 

spar valve position (unless checked by the 

flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector): 

A. Operational Check during engine shutdown. 

1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar 

valve actuator. 

a. As the ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL 

STAND is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the 

SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the 

OVERHEAD PANEL for No.1 Engine changes from 

OFF to BRIGHT then DIM. 

b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before 

further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28–22–11). 


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55534 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued 

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel 

spar valve actuator. 

a. As the ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL 

STAND is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the 

SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the 

OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 2 Engine changes from 

OFF to BRIGHT then DIM. 

b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before 

further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

B. Operational check during engine start. 

1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar 

valve actuator. 

a. As the ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL 

STAND is moved to the IDLE position, verify the 

SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the 

OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 1 Engine changes from 

DIM to BRIGHT then OFF. 

b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before 

further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel 

spar valve actuator. 

a. As the ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL 

STAND is moved to the IDLE position, verify the 

SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the 

OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 2 Engine changes from 

DIM to BRIGHT then OFF. 

b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before 

further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

C. Operational check without engine operation. 

1. Supply electrical power to airplane using standard 

practices. 

2. Make sure No. 1 and No. 2 Engine FIRE switches 

on the Aft Electronic Panel are in the NORMAL (IN) 

position. 

3. Make sure No. 1 and No. 2 Engine Start Switches 

on the Forward Overhead Panel are in the OFF or 

AUTO position. 

4. Do an operational check to the left engine fuel spar 

valve actuator. 

a. Move ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL 

STAND to the IDLE position and wait approximately 

10 seconds. 

NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the 

ENG VALVE CLOSED indication light on the OVERHEAD PANEL to transition from DIM to BRIGHT 

and stay BRIGHT. 

b. Move ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL 

STAND to the CUTOFF position. 

c. Verify the SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light 

on the OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 1 Engine 

changes from OFF to BRIGHT then DIM. 

d. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before 

further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

5. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel 

spar valve actuator. 

a. Move ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL 

STAND to the IDLE position and wait approximately 

10 seconds. 

NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the 

ENG VALVE CLOSED indication light on the OVERHEAD PANEL to transition from DIM to BRIGHT 

and stay BRIGHT. 

b. Move ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL 

STAND to the CUTOFF position. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55535 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued 

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

c. Verify the SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light 

on the OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 2 Engine 

changes from OFF to BRIGHT then DIM. 

d. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before 

further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

D. Perform an inspection of the engine fuel spar valve 

actuator position. 

NOTE: This inspection may be used whenever the 

SPAR VALVE light does not function properly. 

1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the 

quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. 

NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 

2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. 

NOTE: The left engine fuel spar valve actuator is on 

the left wing front spar outboard of the engine strut. 

Access is through access panel 521BB on the left 

wing leading edge. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine 

fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any engine fuel spar valve actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to 

Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the 

quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. 

NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 

4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. 

NOTE: The right engine fuel spar valve actuator is on 

the right wing front spar outboard of the engine 

strut. Access is through access panel 621BB on the 

right wing leading edge. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine 

fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any engine fuel spar valve actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to 

Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals 

After accomplishment of the maintenance 

or inspection program revision required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 

actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be 

used unless the actions or intervals are 

approved as an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the 

procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of 

this AD. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; 

email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 7, 2015. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–23117 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 95 

[Docket No. 31039; Amdt. No. 522] 

IFR Altitudes; Miscellaneous 

Amendments 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule 

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts 

miscellaneous amendments to the 

required IFR (instrument flight rules) 

altitudes and changeover points for 

certain Federal airways, jet routes, or 

direct routes for which a minimum or 

maximum en route authorized IFR 

altitude is prescribed. This regulatory 

action is needed because of changes 

occurring in the National Airspace 

System. These changes are designed to 


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