SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4020-18T3

CAPITAL ONE, N.A.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LEWIS WU,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

ACE GAMING LLC, t/a THE SANDS,

TRUMP TAJ MAHAL ASSOCIATES,

f/k/a TRUMP TAJ MAHAL 

ASSOCIATES LP, t/a TRUMP TAJ 

MAHAL CASINO RESORT, LML 

SUPERMARKETS INC., MARINA 

DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT CO.,

LLC, t/a BORGATA, ATLANTIC

CITY SHOWBOAT, INC., a/k/a 

ATLANTIC CITY SHOWBOAT, 

d/b/a SHOWBOAT CASINO HOTEL, 

SUMMIT IMPORT CORPORATION, 

CELLULAR-ONE METROPHONE, 

FIRST TRENTON, as subrogee of 

IRENE KASBARIAN, ALBERT

UJUETA, d/b/a BUSINESS 

EXCHANGE ENTERPRISES, SMS 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-4020-18T3

FINANCIAL G, LLC, STATE OF 

NEW JERSEY and HYEYEON YUN,

Defendants.

_______________________________

Argued October 28, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Sumners and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. F002400-11.

Lewis Wu, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Roger Fay argued the cause for respondents (Milstead 

& Associates, LLC, attorneys; Roger Fay, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this residential foreclosure action, defendant appeals the Chancery 

Division's March 19, 2019 order denying his fourth motion to vacate the January 

23, 2018 final judgment of foreclosure in the amount of $4,083,644.65. We 

affirm.

For the sake of brevity, we incorporate by reference the facts and 

procedural history set forth at length in our first unpublished decision involving 

the parties' dispute, wherein we denied defendant's motion for reconsideration 

of the trial court's May 1, 2018 order denying his reconsideration motion to 

vacate the January 23, 2018 final judgment of foreclosure. Capital One v. Wu, 

November 19, 2020
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No. A-5033-17 (App. Div. Feb. 7, 2020) (slip op. at 2-5). We recognized the 

judgment was entered based upon the court's "finding that plaintiff properly 

served defendant and established 'plaintiff's obligation, [m]ortgage, and 

[a]ssignment of [m]ortgage,' and accepting plaintiff's proof as to the amount due 

from defendant." Id. at 4 (alterations in original). We concluded:

[D]efendant's arguments [are] unpersuasive and affirm 

substantially for the same reasons expressed by trial 

judge in his written decision.

. . . .

. . . [A]s our courts have recognized, "motion 

practice must come to an end at some point, and if 

repetitive bites at the apple are allowed, the core will 

swiftly sour . . . ." [Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super 

374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 

242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).] 

. . . .

. . . [W]e conclude that the trial judge properly 

determined defendant's allegations of fraud are 

meritless. 

. . . .

. . . [W]e conclude that the trial judge acted 

within his discretion in denying defendant's motion for 

reconsideration. 

[Id. at 6, 8-10.] 
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While defendant's first appeal was pending, his emergent application to 

stay the February 8, 2019 sheriff's sale was denied by Judge Joan Bedrin Murray

on January 18, 2019. And on January 25, 2019, this court denied the request to 

file an emergent motion. We determined defendant's request was a "selfgenerated emergency" with "no good explanation [of his] delay in seeking 

appellate relief." We further noted:

Defendant filed his notice of appeal on June 12, 2018. 

On October 18, 2018, defendant filed a motion for a 

stay of the sale and enforcement, which this court 

denied in an order dated November 19, 2018. 

Defendant seeks to file an emergent application to 

request a stay of the same sale that this court denied in 

its order dated November 19, 2018. Defendant has 

made no showing that he should be accorded emergent 

relief to file what is in essence a motion for 

reconsideration. 

On February 15, 2019, defendant then filed a motion to vacate the 

foreclosure judgment under Rule 4:50-1(d) for improper service. Judge Bedrin 

Murray denied the motion in a March 19, 2019 order. In her oral decision, the 

judge explained:

[Defendant is] seeking multiple bites of the apple in 

contesting this foreclosure matter. None of these 

attempts ha[ve] been successful.

. . . .
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[T]he facts haven't changed . . . . The law hasn't 

changed. . . . [T]his has been going on for at least [two] 

years. And . . . [defendant has] gotten to the point 

where [he is] just making frivolous motions . . . . And 

it's not . . . appropriate. 

 . . . .

There is nothing palpably incorrect, arbitrary or --

wrong about any of the prior -- denials. And . . . this 

pattern of constant filing . . . is an attempt to just put 

off the inevitable, which is the [s]heriff's [s]ale.

. . . .

[The] argument [of insufficient service] is way too late. 

We're post-judgment.

. . . .

This is maybe the eighth [m]otion that [defendant] 

brought to vacate the judgment. 

Defendant appeals the March 19 order arguing there was no service of the 

Notice of Intent to Foreclose or the foreclosure complaint because he did not 

live at the address where service was purportedly made, therefore the foreclosure 

judgment should be vacated. In addition, defendant argues his motion was not 

time barred under Rules 4:50-1(d) and 4:50-2, and he was not granted an 

opportunity to argue before Judge Bedrin Murray as she was clearly prejudiced 

against him because he is self-represented and she has "consistently . . . 

disregarded . . . salient facts and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs." He argues he 
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did not waive his affirmative defense of lack of service. He also asserts the 

judge's order should be vacated on the ground of "voidness" as her "demeanor 

and failure to properly regard and consider the relief sought . . .was improper 

and an abuse of discretion." 

Having considered defendant's contentions, we affirm the order, 

substantially for the sound reasons expressed by Judge Bedrin Murray. Because 

defendant's contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in 

this opinion, we amplify the judge's ruling with only a few comments. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

To vacate a judgment under Rule 4:50-1(d), there must be a showing that the 

judgment is void. Rule 4:50-2 requires that motions made under any subsection of 

Rule 4:50-1 must be filed "within a reasonable time." Deutsche Bank Tr. Co.

Americas v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 319 (App. Div. 2012). Relief from 

judgment under Rule 4:50-1 "is not to be granted lightly." Bank v. Kim, 361 N.J. 

Super. 331, 336 (App. Div. 2003). An appellate court reviews a trial court's order 

denying a Rule 4:50-1 motion for relief under an abuse of discretion standard. U.S. 

Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) ("The trial court's 

determination under the rule warrants substantial deference, and should not be 

reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion."). An abuse of discretion 
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occurs "when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably 

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Id. at 467 

(quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)).

We discern no abuse of discretion by Judge Bedrin Murray's denial of 

defendant's motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment. We previously affirmed the 

judgment of foreclosure, concluding defendant's contentions of fraud and plaintiff's 

lack of standing were without merit. Capital One, N.A., slip op. at 7-9. With no 

explanation of delay, defendant did not raise his insufficient service argument before 

the trial court until almost thirteen months after entry of the judgment. Defendant 

now belatedly contends there was insufficient service, a defense that, if it had merit, 

clearly should have been raised much earlier. His motion was not filed within a 

reasonable time as required by Rule 4:50-2.

Affirmed.