### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 29, 200 5
JONA THA N E LLIS v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Johnson County No. 4639 Lynn W. Brown , Judge

No. E2005-01445-CC A-R3- HC - F iled Fe bruary 10, 2006

The pe titioner, J onathan Ellis, appea ls pr o se from the J ohnson County Criminal Court’s dism issal of his petition for habe as cor pus relief from his convictions for thirteen counts of a g g ravated ra pe, a Clas s A felony , and re sulting sentenc es of twe nty -five y ear s on eac h conviction to be served
c on c ur re nt ly a s a Ra ng e I , s ta nd ardof

fe nd e r i n th e De pa

rt me nt o f C or

re c tio n. He c la ims his judgme nts of conviction ar e void bec ause the y classify his relea se elig ibilit y

status at thirty

perc ent in violation of statute. We conclude that f our of the se ntence s are illega l. There fore , we a ffirm the trial court’ s judgme nt in part, reve rse the judg ment in part, and r emand the c ase. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt Aff irm ed in Par t; Reve rsed in Par t; CaseRem anded

J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., delivere d the opi n i o n o f t h e court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., joined.

J onathan Ellis, Mountain City , Tenne ssee, Pro Se.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Da vid H. F ind le y , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and Joe C. C rumley , J r., District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION

This case relates to the petitioner’s c onvictions for thirteen c ounts of ag g ravated ra pe. On May 10, 1994, p u rs u an t to a plea a g ree ment, the Sullivan Count y Criminal Court acce pted the petitioner’s g uiltypleas a nd sentenc ed him t o t we nty -five y ear s on eac h count to be ser ved
concur rently . The trial court enter ed all thirteen judgments aga inst the petit ioner on one judgme nt fo rm . T he pe tit ion e r fi le d his fir st pe tit ion fo r ha be a s cor pu s r e lie f a lle g ing tha

t th e Sul liv a n Co un ty Cr imi na l Cou rt did no t ha ve jurisd ic tio n to c on vic t hi m of the of fe ns e s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

su mma ri ly dismiss ed the pe tition, and this court a ffirme d t h e t ri al co urt’s dismissal on appeal. See Ellis v. Carlton, 986 S.W .2d 600, 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). On April 25, 2005, the petit ioner filed a
se c on d pe tit ion fo r ha

be a s c or pu s re lie f a lle g ing that hi s ju dg me nts of c on vic tio n w e re vo id b e c aus e-2-

three of his sentenc es we re in dire ct contra vention of st atute, the judge failed to sign the judgme nt form, and the judgme nt did not complywith Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-35-2 0 9 ( e ) , w hich
ou tli ne s th e inf

orma tio n th e un if

orm ju dg me nt f

orm mu st c on ta in. Th e tr ia l cou rt su mma ri ly dismiss ed the pe tition, s tating, “ Nothing in the pe tition would s upport a finding by this court that petitioner’s c onviction is void or that his sentence ha s expi red.”

On app e a l, the pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th at th e tr ial court e rr e d b y su mma ri ly dis mis sin g his pe tit ionwi tho ut a

pp oin tin g him

c ou ns e l a nd that his se nte nc e s on thr e e of the a g g ra vate d r ape c ou nts are illega l under McL aney v. Be ll, 59 S.W .3d 90 (Tenn. 2 0 0 1 ). He cl aims that the Tenne ssee Depa rtment of Corre ction proce ssed his sentence in a manner that ref lects that the off

enses c omm itt e d a ft e r Jul y

1, 19 92 , a

re to b e se rv e d at on e hu nd re d p e rc e nt andth at th e pe tit ion e r i s c la ssi fi e d a s a mul tip le ra

pis t. He a lle g e s th a t hi s p le a a g re e me nt r e fl e c te d th a t hi s r e le a se e lig ibi lit y date would b eth ir

ty perc ent. He a sserts that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-523 (e ffe ctive J uly 1, 1 9 9 2 ) require s that the ag g ravated ra pe counts c ommitt ed by

petitioner in Aug ust 1992, September 1992, and October 1992, b e s er ved at one hundred pe rce nt undimini shed by sentenc e reduc tion credits. He claims there fore that his judg ments are void be cause they contain sente nces in direct c ontrave ntion of section 39-13-523.

Th e state c la ims that a lth ou g h th re e of the pe tit ion e r’ s se nte nc e s h a ve un auth orize d r e le a se elig ibilit y dates, the tria l court prope rly dismiss ed the pe titioner’s petition because the petitioner should h av e ra i s ed the issue via post-conviction. The state c oncede s that the sentenc es for the
a g g ra vate d r ape s c omm itt e d in Au g us t, Se pte mbe r, a nd Oc tob e r 1 99 2 a re ill e g a l. T he state a sse rt s that a n il le g a l se nte nc e do e s no t re nd e r a n e nti re jud g me nt vo id a s lo ng a s th e pe tit ion e r i s b e ing he ld
un de r a va lid c on vic tio n. Th e state a sse rt s that if thi s c ou rt de te rm ine s the pe tit ion e r i s e nti tle d to ha be a s r e lie f, we sh ou ld lim it ou r ho ldi ng to the thr e e c on vic tio ns fo r of fe ns e s oc c ur

ri ng a ft e r Jul y 1, 1992.

The trial c ourt may

summarily

dismiss a petition for writ of habea s corpus re lief whe n the petitioner does not state a cog nizable c laim. Hickman v. State, 153 S.W .3d 16, 20 (Tenn

. 2 004). A petition for the writ of habe as cor pus may only be broug ht if the judg ment is void or the sentenc e has expired. Arc her v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 163- 6 4 (Tenn. 1993) . Howeve r, if the c laimed illega lityrende rs the judg ment or sentenc e voidable, r ather than void, no relief c an be g rante d. I d. at 161. A sentenc e imposed in dir ect contra vention of a statute is ill eg al and void. Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W .3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000) . The de termination of whe ther re lief should be g rante d is a question of law w hich t his court re views de novo. H art v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000).

I n McL aney , our supre me court stated that a petitioner’s sentenc e could be set aside at any time as a void judgm en t i f t h e fa ce of the judg ment or underly ing pr ocee dings e stablish that the sentenc e is in direct c ontrave ntion of statute. McL aney , 59 S.W .3d at 93-94 (c iting McConnell v. State, 12 S.W .3d 795, 798 (Tenn. 2000) ). When “a void sentence is based upon a g uiltyplea, the ha be a s c or pu s c ou rt de c lare s v oida ndva c a te s th e jud g me nt b ut d e fe rs to the c on vic tio n cou rt to addre ss the petitioner’s g uiltyplea that is left pe nding in the w ake of the v ac at ed judg ment.”-3-

Coleman v. Morg an, 159 S.W .3d 887, 892 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (citing McL aney , 59 S.W .3d at 94). Upon rema nd to the conviction court, the petitioner may withdraw the plea or

the conviction may rema in. I d. (citing McL aney , 59 S.W .3d at 94-95).

In M ark L

. G r i m e s v
. F r e d R a i n e y, W ar d e n , N o
. W 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 5 8 3

- C C A

- R 3

- C O , L ak e C o u n t y, slip o p. (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug . 5, 2003), a c ase similar to the pre sent one, the pe titioner entere d g uil ty ple a s to thr e e c ou nts of ra pe a nd wa s sen te nc e d to a n e ff e c tiv e thi rty -s ix y e ar s e nte nc e wi th
a t h i rt y p er cent r elea se elig ibilit y date. Grimes, slip op. 1-2. Seven y ear s later, the trial court modified the petitioner’ s sentence to refle ct that he wa s a multiple rapist w h o m u s t s er ve one hundred pe rce nt of his thirty -six y ear sentenc e pursua nt to Tennessee Code Annot ate d section 39-13- 523. I d., slip op. 1. Rely ing on McL aney , this court conclude d that the petitioner’s origina l sentence which provide d for a thirty perc ent release eligibility date was in direc t contra vention of statute and there fore , void and illeg al. I d., slip op. 4.

The c onsol i d ated judg ment form in the pre sent ca se re flec ts thirteen convictions with the offe nse date s of Octobe r 1990, Nove mber 1 9 9 0 , Dec ember 1990, J anuary

1991, Fe bruary

1991, Marc h 1991, Apri l 1992, May 1992, J une 1992, Jul y

1992, Aug ust 1992, September 1992, and October 199 2

. A m ultiple rapist is “a per son convicted two ( 2) or more times of violating the provisions of § 39-13-502 [ aggr av ated rape] . . . .” T.C.A. § 39-13- 523(a) (2) ( 1992). Tenne ssee Code Annotate d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -5 23 be c a me e ff e c tiv e on July

1, 19 92 , a ndre qu ir e s th a t mu lti ple rapists “s hall be re quired to ser ve the e ntire sentenc e imposed by the court undimini shed by any se nte nc e re du c tio n c re dit s. ” T. C.A

. § 39 -1 3- 52 3( b) (1 99 2) . It a lso state s, “ Th e pr ov isi on s o f this
se c tio n r e qu ir ing mul tip le ra pis ts t o serve the e nti re se nte nc e imp os e d b y the c ou rt sh a ll o nly

app ly if at lea st one (1) of the required offenses occurs on or after J uly 1, 1992.” T.C.A. § 39-13-523( e) (1992) ( emphasis adde d).

There for e , f

o u r o f th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s c o n v ic ti o n s , n o t th r e e a s a ll e g e d b y th e p e ti ti o n er a nd
conce ded by

the state, a

re in dire ct contra vention of statute. The conv i cti on for a g g ravated ra pe occur ring in J uly

1992 is also subject to be ing serve d at one hundr ed per cent unde r Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ct i o n 3 9-13-523( e) ( 1992). It occur red “ on or af

ter July1, 1992" and falls under the
rea ch of the statute when c oupled with any and all of the nine convic tions for the off enses oc curring be fo re July

19 92

. We c on c lud e that the se nte nc e s impo se d f or c a se nu mbe rs S35 ,4 27 (o ff e ns e date J uly 1992), S35,428 (offe nse date Aug ust 1992), S35,429 (offe nse date September 1992) , and S35,430 (offe nse date October 1992) ar e illeg al and void.

The sente nces f

or the firs t n ine counts of a g g ravated ra pe with offe nse date s rang ing f rom October 19 9 0 to Ju n e 1 9 9 2 , a r e n o t i n d ir e c t c o n tr a v e n ti o n o f a s tatu te

. B e f

o r e Ju ly 1 , 1 992, aggr av at ed ra p e, a C l as s A f el o n y , re s u l t ed i n a s en t en ce o f f i ft ee n t o t we n t y -f

i v e y ea rs fo r a R an ge I , standard of

fende r to be served at t hirty perc ent. See T.C.A. § 40- 35-101 (1990) . There fore , the sentenc es of twe n t y -f

ive y ear s with relea se elig ibilit y at thirty perc ent for those nine counts of ag g ravated ra

pe ar e valid.-4-

We remand this ca se to the J ohnson CountyCriminal Court to vacate the pe titioner’s rape sentenc es in ca se numbers S35,427, S35,428, S35,429, and S35,430. The trial court should transfer t h e m at t ert o t h e S u l l i v an C o u n t y C ri m i n al C o u rt , as t h e c o n v i ct i n g co u rt , fo r f u rt h erp ro ce ed i n gs in acc ordanc e with McL aney
. CONCL USI ON

Ba sed on the for eg oing and the re cord a s a whole, the judgme nt of the trial court is affirme d in p art a ndre ve rs e d inpa

rt , a ndthe c a se is r e ma nd e d to the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE