REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

 

Because this report contains information classified as “Secret” by the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), we had to redact (white out) certain tables and

graphs. Many of these exhibits include information about the number of FBI 

personnel assigned to national security matters for fiscal years 1996 through 

2001. According to the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency, this 

information must be classified under guidelines issued by the Director of

Central Intelligence. 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

CASEWORK AND 

HUMAN RESOURCE ALLOCATION

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Audit Division 

Audit Report 03-37 

September 2003

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

CASEWORK AND HUMAN RESOURCE ALLOCATION 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the principal investigative 

arm of the Department of Justice (Department). The agency’s mission is to 

investigate violations of federal criminal law, protect the U.S. from foreign 

intelligence and terrorist activities, and provide leadership and assistance to 

other law enforcement agencies. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001 (hereafter referred to as 9/11), the FBI reallocated its 

resources to focus more on international and domestic terrorism in order to 

detect and deter future terrorist acts. 

The FBI Director issued a memorandum to all employees in May 2002 

reprioritizing the agency’s mission, indicating that the FBI would emphasize 

prevention rather than prosecution by shifting its organizational focus from 

traditional reactive law enforcement operations to prioritizing intelligence 

gathering and analysis. The Director noted that counterterrorism is the top 

priority of every FBI field office. Subsequent to this memorandum, the 

Director reprogrammed agents assigned in various other law enforcement 

areas into terrorism-related programs. 

This Office of the Inspector General (OIG) review examined the FBI’s 

use of personnel resources in its investigative programs over an almost 

7-year period, six years before the 9/11 terrorist attacks and nine months 

after the attacks.1

 In addition, we reviewed the FBI’s planned allocation of 

resources during this same October 1995 to June 2002 time period. We also 

examined the types and numbers of cases the FBI investigated during this 

period. 

Perhaps as important as the results of this review is the fact that this 

type of detailed statistical analysis of FBI planning, resource usage, and 

casework had never been undertaken by the FBI. While much of the data 

examined in this review concerns the period pre-9/11, we believe this review

provides helpful information into how the FBI allocated its agent and support

resources before, during, and shortly after the 9/11 attacks. We also believe 

that this analysis, and the techniques used in this analysis, will prove helpful 

to the FBI as it continues to revisit the balance between its terrorism and 

non-terrorism-related responsibilities. Details of our audit objectives, scope, 

and methodology can be found in Appendix I. 

 1

 As of June 1, 2002, the FBI employed 26,735 people, of which 11,267 were special 

agents. 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

FBI Priorities

According to the FBI’s 5-year strategic plan issued in May 1998, the 

Bureau’s highest priority is national and economic security. This is defined as 

“foreign intelligence, terrorist, and criminal activities that directly threaten the 

national or economic security of the United States.” The strategic plan further 

states that as a national organization, the FBI must first address those issues

that are national in scope and those crimes that threaten the security of the 

nation. The FBI’s plan identified three general functional areas that describe 

and prioritize the variety of threats that it must address to realize the goal of

enhanced national and individual security. 

 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

- ii -
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

TIER ONE: National and Economic Security

Foreign intelligence, terrorist, and criminal activities that directly 

threaten the national or economic security of the United States.

STRATEGIC GOALS

• Identify, prevent, defeat intelligence operations that constitute a 

threat to U.S. national security. 

• Prevent, disrupt, defeat terrorist operations before they occur. 

• Deter and prevent criminal conspiracies from defrauding major 

U.S. industries and the U.S. government. 

• Deter the unlawful exploitation of emerging technologies by foreign 

powers, terrorists, and criminal elements. 

TIER TWO: Criminal Enterprises and Public Integrity 

Crimes that affect public safety or undermine the integrity of American 

society. 

STRATEGIC GOALS

• Identify, disrupt, and dismantle organized criminal enterprises. 

• Identify, disrupt, and dismantle targeted international and national

drug trafficking organizations. 

• Reduce public corruption at all levels of government. 

• Deter civil rights violations. 

TIER THREE: Individuals and Property 

Crimes that affect individuals and crimes against property. 

STRATEGIC GOAL

• Reduce the impact of the most significant crimes that affect 

individuals and property. 

Source: FBI Strategic Plan 1998 – 2003 

FBI Programs 

As of June 2002, the FBI classified its investigative activities into ten 

programs according to the nature of the work. Within each of these 

programs, the activities are further categorized by an investigative 

- iii – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

classification and, if appropriate, a sub-program. The programs and their 

areas of responsibility, as illustrated by the sub-program and investigative 

classification examples listed, are as follows: 

 

ACRONYM PROGRAM NAME SUB-PROGRAM AND 

CLASSIFICATION EXAMPLES 

NFIP National Foreign Intelligence 

Foreign Counterintelligence 

FBI Security 

International Terrorism 

NIPCIP National Infrastructure

Protection/Computer Intrusion 

Computer Intrusion Criminal Matters 

Protection of Transportation Facilities 

DT Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Preparedness 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

WCC White Collar Crime

Bankruptcy Fraud 

Health Care Fraud 

Wire and Mail Fraud 

OC/D Organized Crime/Drugs Mexican/Criminal Syndicates 

Asian Criminal Enterprise 

VCMO Violent Crimes & 

Major Offenders 

Fugitives 

Violent Gangs 

Crimes Against Children 

CR Civil Rights Racial Discrimination 

Involuntary Servitude and Slavery 

APP Applicant Matters 

Background Investigations 

Recruitment and Processing 

Investigations of White House Staff & 

Visitors 

TRAIN Training Federal Training 

State and Local Training 

MISC Miscellaneous Matters

Freedom of Information Act Issues 

Public Relations Matters 

Source: FBI Finance Division and FY 2002 Investigative Classifications booklet 

The FBI’s Utilization of Personnel Resources 

Although the strategic plan consistently identified national security 

issues as the FBI’s highest priority, prior to 9/11 the Bureau devoted 

significantly more special agent resources to traditional law enforcement 

- iv – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

activities such as white collar crime, organized crime, drug, and violent 

crime investigations than to domestic and international terrorism issues. 

In fact, as shown in 

the table to the 

right,2

 in fiscal year

(FY) 2000 (the last 

full fiscal year prior 

to 9/11) the FBI 

utilized 6,815 agents 

in non terrorismrelated criminal 

investigative 

programs: 2,426 in

White Collar Crime 

(WCC), 2,172 in 

Organized 

Crime/Drugs (OC/D), 

2,055 in Violent 

Crimes and Major 

Offenders (VCMO), 

and 162 in Civil 

Rights (CR). In 

comparison, a total of 2,126 agents worked in the FBI’s three programs 

related to terrorism. 

AGENT USAGE IN TERRORISM-RELATED AND 

NON TERRORISM-RELATED PROGRAMS

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

2000 2001 Jun-02

FISCAL YEAR

Source: FBI TURK System

AVERAGE AGENTS O

N BOARD (AO

B)

Terrorism Non-Terrorism

Similarly, in FY 2001 the FBI’s non-terrorism programs continued to 

dominate agent utilization. This situation changed dramatically in FY 2002 

when the number of FBI special agents working on terrorism-related matters 

more than doubled from the previous year, to 4,680, while the number 

dedicated to non-terrorism matters fell from 6,449 to 3,976. 

In comparison to agent utilization, an analysis of the FBI’s utilization of 

its support personnel over the same period revealed that the Bureau’s use of

these resources has been in line with its strategic plan since the beginning of 

our review period in FY 1996; NFIP3

 has consistently utilized more 

 2

 Our analyses of resource utilization are based upon information contained in the FBI’s 

Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system, a module of the payroll system. The 

TURK system contains data on non-supervisory, non-Headquarters personnel utilization

(Average On Board) and work hours expended. The data is captured in 13 TURK periods in 

each fiscal year, with each TURK period consisting of two, two-week pay periods. 

3

 The FBI’s international terrorism efforts are consolidated in the National Foreign 

Intelligence Program (NFIP). 

- v – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

support personnel resources than any other program. In fact, when all other

programs are combined, NFIP continues to lead in the utilization of support 

SUPPORT PERSONNEL UTILIZATION 

NFIP vs. ALL OTHER PROGRAMS 

FY 1996 THROUGH 2001

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED 

 Source: FBI TURK System

personnel resources. 

However, even when 

support personnel are 

added to special agents, 

the FBI’s terrorism-related 

programs utilized 

significantly fewer 

personnel resources in 

FYs 2000 and 2001 than 

those not related to 

terrorism. However, the 

increase in agents working 

terrorism matters in 

FY 2002, combined with 

the already significant 

number of support staff 

related to these programs, brought the Bureau’s resource utilization more in

line with its strategic plan. 

FBI Response to 9/11 

After 9/11, a large number of FBI personnel were immediately 

assigned to investigate the attacks. In addition, the newly-appointed FBI 

Director4

 announced that the agency would be undergoing a restructuring, 

national security would be the agency’s top priority, additional agents would 

be assigned to international and domestic terrorism issues, and the FBI’s 

investigative efforts would be reprioritized. 

The FBI’s investigation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, called 

PENTTBOMB, used enormous personnel resources – as of June 1, 2002, 

Bureau personnel had charged almost four million work hours to this case, 

consisting of approximately 3.6 million hours charged by special agents and 

over 400,000 hours charged by support personnel. The majority of these 

hours were charged in the weeks immediately following 9/11; after this 

initial burst of investigative activity the number of work hours expended on 

terrorism-related matters began decreasing. However, the level of effort

expended in the FBI’s National Foreign Intelligence Program as of June 1, 

2002, remained dramatically higher than the level of effort put forth prior to 

9/11. In fact, while most other programs experienced a decrease in agent 

work hours, NFIP saw an increase of 62 percent from August 2001 to June 1, 

2002. 

 4

 Robert S. Mueller, III was sworn in as FBI Director on September 4, 2001. 

- vi – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

AGENT HOURS BY FBI PROGRAM AREA

SEPTEMBER 2000 TO JUNE 1, 2002

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

1,600,000

SEP-OCT 00

OCT-NOV 00

NOV-DEC 00

DEC 00-JAN 01

JAN-FEB 01

FEB-MAR 01

MAR-APR 01

APR-MAY 01

MAY-JUNE 01

JUNE 01

JULY 01

JULY-AUG 01

AUG-SEP 01

SEP-OCT 01

OCT-NOV 01

NOV-DEC 01

DEC 01-JAN 02

JAN-FEB 02

FEB-MAR 02

MAR-APR 02

APR-MAY 02

MAY-JUNE 02

TURK PERIOD

AGENT HOURS

NFIP NIPCIP DT WCC OC/D VCMO CR APP TRAIN

Source: FBI TURK System 

Following 9/11, the FBI also took steps to devote additional resources 

to international and domestic terrorism matters in general, not just to the 

investigation of the terrorist 

attacks. In December 2001 the 

FBI Director announced a 

reorganization of the Bureau and 

created Executive Assistant 

Director positions to minimize the 

supervisory span of control of 

executive management. 

Following this, the Director 

released a list in May 2002 that 

reprioritized the Bureau’s activities. 

Although making anti-terrorism 

work its main priority was 

reflective of strategic priorities

already in place, the ranking of 

other FBI work was new. For 

example, combating white collar 

crime, parts of which were 

formerly a top strategic priority, fell below that of work related to terrorism, 

computer security, public corruption, civil rights, and organize

FBI PRIORITIES 

May 2002

1. Protect the U.S. from terrorist attack 

2. Protect the U.S. against foreign

intelligence operations and espionage 

3. Protect the U.S. against cyber-based 

attacks and high-technology crimes

4. Combat public corruption at all levels 

5. Protect civil rights

6. Combat transnational and national 

criminal organizations and enterprises 

7. Combat major white collar crime 

8. Combat significant violent crime

9. Support federal, state, local, and 

international partners 

10. Upgrade technology to successfully 

perform the FBI’s mission 

Source: http://www.fbi.gov 

d crime.

- vii – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

In support of these new priorities, the Director adjusted staffing 

numbers for each of the investigative program areas, moving agent positions 

into its NFIP and Domestic Terrorism (DT) programs. This realignment of 

agent resources, along with new agent positions provided in the FY 2002 

budget, resulted in the FBI dedicating 685 additional agents to terrorismrelated matters in FY 2002. Primarily, these agents were moved from drug 

investigations within the FBI’s Organized Crime/Drugs program; however, 

agent positions also were reassigned from its Violent Crimes and Major 

Offenders (VCMO) and White Collar Crime (WCC) programs. 

As shown in the graph on the previous page, the increases in NFIP 

began in the TURK period in which 9/11 occurred. The increases in agent 

hours dedicated to terrorism-related matters were a direct result of the 

catastrophic events of that day. Had 9/11 not occurred, the data indicates 

that agent utilization in NFIP would have remained unchanged in FY 2001. 

Consequently, without this major terrorist event, Bureau-wide agent 

utilization would have remained the same and would not have begun to 

come into alignment with the strategic plan. 

A Program-by-Program Look at the FBI 

Before 9/11 and the related FBI restructuring, not only did NFIP utilize a 

smaller number of agent resources than the WCC and VCMO programs, it also 

utilized a smaller percentage of its allocated personnel than these other 

programs. The FBI’s Resource Management and Allocation (RMA) office

allocates the Bureau’s human resources and establishes Funded Staffing Levels 

(FSLs) for agents and support. Under this system, each FSL equals one 

person. Program Managers then monitor human resource utilization by 

comparing Average On Board (AOB) numbers to the number of allocated FSLs. 

If the AOB number is less than the FSL, the FBI is using fewer human 

resources than it was allocated, thus underutilizing. If the AOB is greater than 

the FSL, the FBI is using more human resources than allocated for a particular 

program area, or overutilizing. 

Using data from the FBI’s TURK system, we calculated annual AOB 

totals for special agent personnel5 for the FBI as a whole and for the 

individual FBI programs. We then compared the annualized AOB data to the 

annual FSL data for FYs 1996 through 2001. We found that the FBI 

generally underutilized its agent resources in FYs 1996 through 2001; an 

occurrence that most FBI officials we interviewed attributed to vacancies. 

The following matrix provides a summary of our program-level analysis. The

 5

 We did not perform this analysis for support personnel because support personnel are 

allocated by type (clerical/administrative, investigative, and technical), not by investigative 

programs. 

- viii – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

yellow shading indicates underutilization while the blue shading indicates 

overutilization. 

FBI SPECIAL AGENT UTILIZATION 

PROGRAM 

 FY 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Utilization 

Rate6

FBI-WIDE U U U U U O 97.8%

NFIP U U U U U O 89.8%

NIPCIP7 NA NA NA U O O 91.6%

DT O U U U O U 90.5%

WCC U U U U U U 95.5%

OC/D U U U U U U 91.2%

VCMO O O O O O O 105.6% 

CR U U O O O U 103.6% 

APPLICANTS O O O O O O 245.2% 

TRAINING O O O O O O 146.7% 

 Source: FBI TURK system and FSL data 

 

Our comparison of agent resource utilization at the program level 

revealed that although utilization varied among criminal investigative 

programs, only the VCMO program lacked a period of underutilization that 

reflected the trend for the Bureau as a whole. Instead, the VCMO program 

overutilized its agent resources for each year in the reviewed timeframe. In 

addition, the terrorism-related programs (NFIP, NIPCIP, and DT) and the 

Organized Crime/Drugs (OC/D) program underutilized its agent resources at 

a rate much greater than the overall Bureau-wide underutilization. 

Further, the non-criminal investigative programs of Applicant Matters 

and Training utilized considerably more resources than allocated on a 

consistent basis.8

 According to FBI officials, this occurred because these 

programs support all other programs. For example, the officials advised that 

much of the work in the Applicant program was dedicated to the recruitment 

and hiring of new personnel for all areas, and personnel in all programs 

charged time to Training, regardless of the program to which they were 

dedicated. We have recommended that the FBI examine the planning factors 

 6

 We calculated the utilization rate by dividing the total AOB by the total FSL for the review period. 

7

 The National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion Program was created in FY 1999. 

8

 Examples of the work performed within these programs are provided in the table on page iv. 

- ix – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

and processes for these programs and make necessary adjustments to more

closely approximate the agent resources they need. 

FBI Field Offices: Investigative Programs Receiving the Most 

Resources 

The historical trend of low agent resource utilization in the FBI’s 

terrorism-related programs also is evident in the results of our analysis of 

FBI field office data. To determine how the FBI’s program-specific work has

been distributed throughout the FBI’s field structure, we conducted an 

annual (by fiscal year) analysis of resource utilization by program for each of 

the FBI’s 56 field offices. For each office, we determined the program that 

utilized the most agent resources for the most fiscal years during the seven 

fiscal year periods reviewed, and characterized the office by that program 

designation. For example, we designated the Albany Field Office as a WCC 

office, and the Washington, D.C., Field Office as an NFIP office because of 

the programs in which the predominance of its agent resources were utilized 

from FY 1996 through June 1, 2002. 

Of the 56 FBI field offices, 25 offices expended the most special agent 

resources in WCC; 16 offices focused on VCMO; 10 offices worked more in 

OC/D; and the predominant program in 4 offices was NFIP. In the remaining 

office, agent utilization was distributed evenly between the VCMO and WCC 

programs. As shown in the following chart, the predominant program in 

75 percent of the FBI’s field offices was either WCC or VCMO. 

 PREDOMINANT PROGRAMS FOR FBI FIELD OFFICES 

OCTOBER 1, 1995 through JUNE 1, 2002 

NFIP

OC/D 7%

18%

WCC &

VCMO

2%

WCC

45%

VCMO

28%

 Source: FBI TURK System 

- x – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Universe of FBI Cases 

In addition to our analysis of the FBI’s human resource allocation and 

utilization, we also obtained, from the Bureau’s Automated Case Support 

(ACS) system,9

 data of all cases recorded between October 1, 1995, and 

June 14, 2002. This reflected all cases that were opened during our review 

period, as well as those that were opened prior to the start of the review 

period but remained open as of October 1, 1995. 

Our analysis of FBI casework revealed that the VCMO program 

accounted for the most cases worked10 during this timeframe. In fact, one 

quarter of all the cases the FBI worked during that period were in VCMO. 

NFIP accounted for 17 percent of the cases while the Domestic Terrorism (DT) 

program made up only one percent during the same time period. This 

distribution of cases is shown in the following chart. 

BREAKDOWN OF FBI CASES 

OCTOBER 1995 through JUNE 2002

APP

21%

NFIP

17%

MISC

16% WCC

13%

VCMO

25%

OC/D

3%

NIPCIP

0%

DT

1%

TRAIN

1%

CR

3%

Source: FBI ACS System

 9

 ACS is a centralized electronic case management system used by the FBI. It contains both 

historical and current case data for all FBI cases, except those that have been destroyed or archived. 

10 We defined a case as “worked” if it was open at any time during our review period. 

- xi – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Following 9/11 and the FBI’s increased attention to national 

security-related matters, the FBI began opening more terrorism-related 

investigations. While the average number of case openings per month in the 

VCMO, WCC, OC/D, and Civil Rights (CR) programs decreased in FY 2002, 

the average monthly case opening rate in the NFIP and DT programs 

increased. 

Our review of FBI casework also revealed trends in case openings and 

closings unrelated to 9/11. In general, we identified a downward trend in 

both the number of cases opened and closed per month. Specifically, 

between FYs 1997 and 2001 we identified a one-third reduction in case 

openings, from an average of just over 12,000 cases opened per month in 

FY 1997 to a little more than 8,000 in FY 2001. This trend reversed in the 

first eight months of FY 2002 when about 2,000 additional cases per month 

were opened, many of which were in the NFIP and DT programs. 

Our review of case closings revealed a similar trend. Excluding FY 1999, 

the FBI consistently closed fewer cases per month in each successive fiscal 

year from 1998 to June 2002. We excluded the FY 1999 data because in 

April 1999 the FBI administratively closed a large number of inactive cases in 

preparation for its Year 2000 computer systems conversion. 

 

In reviewing FBI casework, it is important to note that cases in 

different programs vary significantly in importance and resource 

commitment. We reviewed the time FBI personnel spent investigating 

certain significant investigations designated as major cases.11 These are 

investigations, which, at their outset, are of national importance and/or 

indicate the potential for a massive commitment of manpower throughout 

FBI field offices. 

Using data from the TURK system, we calculated the hours charged by 

FBI personnel from October 1995 through June 2002 to all major cases. As 

detailed in the following table, we found that, by a large margin, the major 

case utilizing the most combined agent and support resources during that 

time period has been the investigation of the attacks on 9/11. Further review

revealed that 11 of the top 15 major cases, in terms of total FBI personnel 

hours worked (special agent and support personnel), from October 1995 

through June 2002 are related to terrorism. 

 11 The FBI designates major cases to track the time spent on large, national investigations. Aside from 

these major cases, the FBI does not track time by individual cases. 

- xii – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 15 FBI MAJOR CASES12

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 200213

RANK MAJOR CASE HOURS14

1 PENTTBOMB 3,994,968

2 INNOCENT IMAGES 628,255

3 CAMPCON 332,378

4 2002 OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES 297,075

5 OKBOMB 294,157

6 SW BORDER PROJECT/PUBLIC CORRUPTION 274,450

7 UNABOM 223,586

8 SANDBOMB 213,145

9 CENTBOM 179,265

10 THUNDER ROLL 166,682

11 AMADO CARRILLO FUENTES INITIATIVE 147,429

12 KENBOM 145,645

13 1996 SUMMER OLYMPICS 143,163

14 AMERITHRAX 116,575

15 USAMA BIN LADEN15 92,569 

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

Conclusions and Recommendations 

The FBI’s 1998 5-year strategic plan stated that preventing and 

defeating foreign intelligence, terrorist, and criminal activities that directly 

threaten the national security of the United States were the Bureau’s highest 

priorities. However, prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks the FBI utilized more 

of its agent resources in the White Collar Crime (WCC), Violent Crimes and 

Major Offenders (VCMO), and Organized Crime/Drugs (OC/D) programs than 

in programs related to terrorism. To its credit, the Bureau responded to the 

9/11 tragedy with an unprecedented level of effort. Additionally, as time 

progressed and the amount of resources dedicated to the PENTTBOMB 

investigation decreased, FBI personnel continued to devote more time to 

terrorism-related matters in general than any other single area, thus bringing 

the Bureau’s operations into closer alignment with its strategic plan. 

We believe the FBI needs to ensure that its operational priorities, in 

terms of human resource utilization and investigations, consistently coincide 

with the priorities that are established through the strategic planning 

 12 A description of these major cases appears in Appendix II. 

13 Terrorism-related cases are identified in bolded italics. 

14 The hours shown do not necessarily represent total hours charged to these cases. Instead, the 

number reflects the hours charged during our review period of October 1, 1995, through June 1, 2002.

15 This case was opened on May 14, 1999.

- xiii – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

process. Based on the issues we identified in this report, we offer seven 

recommendations to improve the FBI’s management of human resources 

and casework. Our recommendations focus on encouraging the FBI to 

review systematically its personnel allocation process and its methods for 

evaluating human resource utilization. The FBI should also examine the 

decreasing rate of case openings and closings and the increasing population 

of open cases to identify the causes of these recent trends. We believe it is 

important that the FBI closely review the information we have provided and 

address weaknesses in its human resource allocation and utilization 

processes as well as the recent trends in its casework, to help ensure that 

Bureau activities do not differ widely from its strategic plan. 

- xiv – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CASEWORK AND 

HUMAN RESOURCE ALLOCATION 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 1 

Jurisdiction and Span of Control ..................................... 1 

FBI Reorganization ....................................................... 2 

FBI Reprioritization....................................................... 6 

Audit Approach ............................................................ 8 

Prior Reviews............................................................... 9 

CHAPTER 2: RESOURCE ALLOCATION, TIME UTILIZATION, AND 

CASEWORK DATA....................................................... 10 

 Resource Allocation .................................................... 10 

 Resource Utilization Data............................................. 12 

FBI Casework Data..................................................... 15 

CHAPTER 3: TRENDS IN RESOURCE UTILIZATION 

FY 1996 THROUGH FY 2001 ......................................... 19 

FBI Strategic Priorities ................................................ 21 

Special Agents ........................................................... 23 

Support Personnel...................................................... 25 

Conclusion ................................................................ 27 

CHAPTER 4: RESOURCE IMPACT OF TERRORIST EVENTS 

 OF 9/11/01 ............................................................... 28 

Changes in Hours Worked............................................ 29 

Changes in Personnel Distribution................................. 32 

Ratio of Agents to Support Before and After 9/11............ 35 

Conclusion ................................................................ 37 

CHAPTER 5: COMPARISON OF RESOURCE PLANNING 

 TO UTILIZATION ........................................................ 38 

FBI Resource Planning ................................................ 38 

National Foreign Intelligence Program ........................... 40 

National Infrastructure Protection/ 

Computer Intrusion Program........................................ 41 

Domestic Terrorism Program........................................ 42 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

White Collar Crime Program......................................... 43 

Organized Crime/Drugs Program .................................. 44 

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Program ................. 45 

Civil Rights Program ................................................... 46 

Applicant Matters Program........................................... 48 

Training Program ....................................................... 49 

Conclusion ................................................................ 50 

CHAPTER 6: FIELD OFFICE AGENT RESOURCE SPECIALIZATION......... 52 

CHAPTER 7: TRENDS IN RESOURCE UTILIZATION ON 

 MAJOR CASES............................................................ 57 

Overall FBI Largest Major Cases ................................... 57 

Major Case Activities: Agents vs. Support Personnel....... 58 

System Improvements................................................ 59 

CHAPTER 8: FBI CASEWORK.......................................................... 60 

Data Analysis............................................................. 61 

Cases Worked............................................................ 62 

Case Openings........................................................... 64 

Case Closings ............................................................ 65 

Cases Opened and Closed in the Same Fiscal Year .......... 67 

CHAPTER 9: OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........ 70 

STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT CONTROLS .................... 75 

APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY .................... 76 

APPENDIX II: EXAMPLES OF MAJOR CASES ....................................... 82 

APPENDIX III: LIST OF TURK PERIODS IN REVIEW TIMEFRAME............. 87 

APPENDIX IV: CROSSWALK OF FBI PROGRAMS AND SUB-PROGRAMS.... 91 

APPENDIX V: DEFINITIONS OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ........ 94 

APPENDIX VI: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE .......... 95 

APPENDIX VII: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

AUDIT DIVISION ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF 

ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT...............109 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) mission is to protect the 

U.S. from foreign intelligence and terrorist activities, investigate violations of 

federal criminal law, and provide leadership and assistance to other law 

enforcement agencies. It is the principal investigative arm of the 

Department of Justice (Department) and has the broadest jurisdiction of any 

federal criminal justice agency. It is authorized to investigate more than 

200 categories of federal crimes. The FBI’s criminal investigative functions 

fall into the categories of counterterrorism, including cyber crime; foreign 

counterintelligence; organized crime/drugs; violent crimes and major 

offenders; white collar crime; and civil rights.16 

As of June 1, 2002, the FBI employed 26,735 people, of which 

11,267 were special agents. The remaining employees are professional and 

administrative personnel such as translators, intelligence specialists, 

mechanics, and administrative assistants. 

Our audit objectives were to: 1) review the FBI’s allocation and 

utilization of human resources in its investigative programs from FY 1996 

through June 2002, and 2) determine the types and number of cases 

investigated over the same time period. Additional information on our audit 

objectives, scope, and methodology is contained in Appendix I. 

Jurisdiction and Span of Control 

The FBI does not have one specific statutory charter. The agency 

derives its authority primarily from Title 28 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) and Titles 18 and 28 of the U.S. Code. Title 28 of the CFR 

grants the FBI Director the authority to investigate violations of laws, 

including criminal drug laws, except in cases in which such responsibility is 

by statute or otherwise specifically assigned to another investigative agency. 

It also makes the FBI Director’s authority regarding criminal drug laws 

concurrent to that of the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA). Title 28 of the CFR also mandates that the FBI 

exercise lead agency responsibility when investigating crimes in its 

jurisdiction that involve terrorist activities or acts in preparation of terrorist 

activities within U.S. jurisdiction. This includes the collection, coordination, 

analysis, management, and dissemination of intelligence and criminal 

information. 

 16 These categories, and other non-criminal investigative activities, are described in more 

detail in the section entitled Investigative Programs, Sub-Programs, and Classifications on 

page 15. 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Many of the FBI’s other functions, including much of its national security 

and counterintelligence activities, are authorized by Executive Order or 

Congressional mandate. Congressional directives sometimes result in the FBI 

having the authority to investigate crimes for which other federal agencies also 

have jurisdiction. For example, the FBI and Internal Revenue Service both 

have the authority to conduct investigations of federal gambling violations. In 

addition, the FBI, the United States Marshals Service (USMS), and the Federal 

Bureau of Prisons each have jurisdiction over violations of federal escape and 

rescue statutes. The FBI has entered into agreements with other federal 

agencies to reduce duplication of effort by sharing information, defining 

jurisdictional issues, and delineating agency responsibilities. 

Because federal and state laws address similar criminal activity, FBI 

investigative activities overlap with those of state and local law enforcement 

agencies. For example, there are similar state and federal laws related to 

carjacking, fraud, child support matters, automobile theft, and drug crimes. 

FBI Reorganization 

On November 8, 2001, the Attorney General responded to the 

September 11, 2001 attacks (hereafter referred to as 9/11) by announcing 

reforms and restructuring within the Department of Justice. Specifically, he 

stated that the Department’s first and overriding priority was now defending 

the nation against terrorist attacks. He further directed that the FBI be 

reformed to put prevention of terrorism at the center of its law enforcement 

and national security efforts. 

In December 2001, the FBI announced a restructuring of its 

organization. Recognizing new areas of importance, it created a Chief 

Information Officer position, Cyber Division, Security Division, Office of 

Intelligence, Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, and Records 

Management Division. In May 2002, the FBI created a new Investigative 

Technologies Division and transferred to it some technical investigative 

functions from the Laboratory Division. In addition, to reduce the bottleneck 

of information and work flowing into the Deputy Director’s office, the Director 

created Executive Assistant Director positions that oversee 13 divisions and 

4 offices, most of which are located at FBI Headquarters. 

 

Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Branch – Consisting of the 

Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions, this branch is 

responsible for national security initiatives. The Counterintelligence Division

investigates violations of espionage statutes. The Counterterrorism 

Division’s activities include threat assessments, investigations, and 

responses to threats and attacks against critical infrastructure, as well as the 

coordination of federal efforts to assist state and local first responders. 

- 2 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Law Enforcement Services Branch – This branch includes FBI activities 

that support its investigative functions, such as the forensic laboratory, 

criminal justice information services (e.g., National Crime Information Center, 

Fingerprint Identification Program, and Uniform Crime Reporting), and the 

training academy. In addition, this branch is responsible for facilitating 

coordination and information sharing with other law enforcement agencies, 

both foreign and domestic. 

Administration Branch – FBI functions related to budgetary and fiscal 

matters, information resources and management, personnel, and internal 

security are housed in this branch. 

Cyber and Criminal Investigative Divisions – The Cyber Division 

addresses criminal investigations where information technology is the principal 

instrument of criminal activity. The Criminal Investigative Division includes 

the programs related to the FBI’s traditional law enforcement activities, 

namely: financial/white collar crime (e.g., public corruption; economic crimes; 

and health care, internet, and government fraud); organized crime (e.g., drug 

matters, racketeering, and money laundering); violent crimes and major 

offenders (e.g., fugitive apprehension, gangs, kidnappings, bank robberies, 

and serial murders); and civil rights violations. 

In addition to the reorganization of FBI activities described above, in 

FY 2003 the FBI Director announced that he had proposed the creation of a

new Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence position. This proposal 

places the Office of Intelligence under the supervision of this new Executive 

Assistant Director and includes a plan to elevate intelligence work within the 

FBI to a status comparable to that currently given to national security and 

criminal investigative matters. The Attorney General approved this proposal 

on May 21, 2003. 

These branches and their respective divisions and offices provide 

guidance for 56 field offices, approximately 400 satellite offices (called 

resident agencies), and four specialized field installations located throughout 

the U.S., as well as more than 40 foreign liaison posts known as Legal 

Attachés. Within these branches are the investigative programs under which 

all of the FBI’s cases are classified. As of June 2002, the FBI categorized 

each of its investigations under one of the following ten programs: 

• National Foreign Intelligence • White Collar Crime 

• Domestic Terrorism • Civil Rights 

• National Infrastructure/Computer Intrusion • Applicant Matters 

• Organized Crime/Drugs • Training 

• Violent Crimes & Major Offenders • Miscellaneous 

- 3 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

The FBI’s international terrorism efforts are combined in the National 

Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). The FBI’s reorganization resulted in 

this program no longer being consolidated into one area of responsibility on 

the organizational chart. Instead, portions of NFIP are housed in the 

Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and Cyber Divisions. The FBI’s recent 

reorganization is depicted in the organizational chart (Exhibit 1-1) on the 

following page. Additional information on the FBI’s investigative programs is 

found in Chapter 2. 

- 4 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

- 5 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Executive Assistant Director

for Law Enforcement Services

Executive Assistant Director

for Administration

DIRECTOR

SAC Advisory

Committee

Criminal

Investigative

Division

Deputy

Director Office of General Counsel

Office of Law Enforcement

Coordination

Office of International

Operations

Critical Incident Response

Group

Training

Division

Laboratory

Division

Investigative

Technologies

Division

Office of Strategic

Planning

Cyber

Division

Counterterrorism

Division

Security

Division

Administrative

Services

Division

Information

Resources

Division

Office of Equal Employment Opportunity

Chief Information Officer

Office of Professional Responsibility

Office of the Ombudsman

Congressional Affairs Office

EXHIBIT 1-1:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ORGANIZATION CHART

as of 05/21/2003

Source: FBI Finance Division

= component existing

 prior to reorganization

= component created in

 reorganization

Chief of Staff

Office of

Intelligence

Inspection Division

Office of Public Affairs

Criminal Justice

Information

Services

Division

Counterintelligence

Division

Executive Assistant Director

for Intelligence

Records

Management

Division

Finance

Division

Executive Assistant Director

for Counterterrorism/

Counterintelligence
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

FBI Reprioritization 

The FBI Director announced in December 2001 that he was taking 

steps to reprioritize the work performed by the agency. On May 21, 2002, 

he issued a memorandum to all FBI employees emphasizing the following list 

of organizational priorities: 

1. Protect the United States from terrorist attack. 

2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations 

and espionage. 

3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high 

technology crimes.

4. Combat public corruption at all levels.

5. Protect civil rights. 

6. Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and 

enterprises. 

7. Combat major white collar crime. 

8. Combat significant violent crime. 

9. Support federal, state, county, municipal, and international 

partners. 

10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission. 

In the memorandum, the Director also emphasized that the FBI would 

focus on a new goal of prevention rather than prosecution. He added that the 

FBI would shift its focus from traditional reactive law enforcement operations 

and increase its emphasis and resources in the intelligence and analysis 

areas, although it would continue to foster partnerships with other federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies. The Director noted that 

counterterrorism is the top priority of every field office, as well as FBI 

Headquarters, and that this will require a constant reassessment and shifting 

of resources to address counterterrorism. 

 

The Director also stated in his announcement that within the FBI’s 

traditional areas of responsibility (i.e., white collar crime, organized crime, 

and violent crime investigations), the agency would focus its resources on 

major crimes where it could make unique law enforcement contributions. In 

late May 2002, the Director formally moved, or reprogrammed, agents 

assigned to several other law enforcement areas into terrorism-related 

programs. As shown in the following table, the Drugs component suffered 

the largest loss of dedicated agent personnel. 

- 6 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 1-2

ALLOCATION OF FBI SPECIAL AGENTS AS OF

MAY 29, 2002 

ALLOCATED 

AGENTS17

INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAM BEFORE AFTER CHANGE 

Foreign Counterintelligence18

Security18

International Terrorism18

Domestic Terrorism 

TERRO

RISM 

RELATED 

National Infrastructure 

Protection/Computer Intrusion 

CLASSIFIED

INFORMATION 

REDACTED

SUBTOTAL 2,212 2,897 685

Civil Rights 153 153 0

Organized Crime19 700 698 -2

Drugs19 890 490 -400

OCDETF20 488 488 0

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders 1,821 1,762 -59

White Collar Crime 2,405 2,360 -45

Applicant Matters 121 80 -41

NON-TERRORISM 

RELATED 

Training 91 91 0

SUBTOTAL 6,669 6,122 -547

OVERALL TOTALS21 8,881 9,019 138

Source: FBI Resource Management and Allocation office 

 17 Reflects the Director’s proposal to reorganize the FBI, as well as other changes, as of 

May 29, 2002. A discussion of the process of allocating special agent resources can be 

found in Chapter 2. 

18 This is a component of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. 

19 This is a component of the Organized Crime/Drugs (OC/D) Program. 

20 The Organized Crime/Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program is a coordinated 

effort of the following nine federal agencies: DEA; FBI; the former Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (now a part of the Department of Homeland Security); USMS; 

U.S. Attorneys; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; U.S. Customs; Internal Revenue 

Service; and U.S. Coast Guard. The FBI’s budget specifically earmarks positions for this

purpose and identifies them as reimbursable resources. Although both the OC/D and 

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders programs contribute to the overall FBI OCDETF effort, 

this component is considered part of the OC/D program. 

21 The totals do not reflect the FBI’s full contingent of special agents; they represent only 

non-supervisory special agents assigned to field offices. 

- 7 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Prior to the shift, the Drugs component accounted for 890 agent 

positions; however, the Director’s mandate moved 400 of these agents out 

of Drugs, reducing the program by 45 percent. In addition, the Organized 

Crime, Violent Crimes and Major Offenders, White Collar Crime, and 

Applicant Matters programs saw decreases in their dedicated agent

resources. The reprogramming, in concert with the creation of additional 

agent positions in the FBI budget, resulted in 685 additional agents 

dedicated to terrorism-related matters. 

Audit Approach 

This audit sought to review the FBI’s pattern of utilizing resources to

investigate the various crimes under its jurisdiction, both before and 

immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. To accomplish this, we 

interviewed more than 50 FBI officials and employees to gain an 

understanding of its automated systems and its resource allocation process. 

We then obtained data from the FBI’s Time Utilization and Recordkeeping 

(TURK) system for the period of October 1, 1995, through June 1, 2002. 

Using this data, we performed an analysis of trends in overall resource 

utilization between FYs 1996 and 2001 (Chapter 3), an analysis of the 

impact of 9/11 on FBI resource utilization (Chapter 4), a comparative trend 

analysis of resource planning and utilization on a program-by-program basis 

(Chapter 5), a review of predominant investigative programs in each of the 

56 field offices (Chapter 6), and a review of resource utilization on the top 

15 major cases22 (Chapter 7). 

Additionally, we examined the types and number of cases the FBI 

investigated both before and after 9/11. To that end, we obtained data from

the FBI’s Automated Case Support (ACS) system for each case that was 

active between October 1, 1995, and June 14, 2002. We summarized this 

data by investigative program and analyzed trends in the FBI’s casework 

related to the average number of active cases per month, average number 

of cases opened per month, and the average number of cases closed per 

month. In addition, we identified trends in the average number of “shortterm” cases – cases that opened and closed in the same fiscal year. We 

performed these analyses on both an overall and program-by-program 

basis. The results of these analyses can be found in Chapter 8. 

 22 Major cases are investigative matters, which, at their outset, are of national importance 

and/or indicate the potential for a massive commitment of manpower throughout the field. 

For examples of major cases, see Appendix II. 

- 8 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Prior Reviews 

We did not identify any prior Office of the Inspector General (OIG) or 

General Accounting Office reviews of trends in FBI resource allocation, 

utilization, or case activity. According to the FBI, it has not performed any 

comprehensive reviews or trend analyses on an agency-wide basis; 

however, individual FBI program managers do receive resource utilization 

reports and perform ad-hoc reviews of activities for which they are 

responsible.23 

 23 For more information on these reviews, see the sections entitled FBI Programmatic Use

of TURK Data and FBI Programmatic Use of ACS Data on pages 14 and 17, respectively. 

- 9 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CHAPTER 2: RESOURCE ALLOCATION, TIME UTILIZATION, 

AND CASEWORK DATA 

Before discussing the results of our analyses of the FBI’s resource

utilization and casework, we first discuss the Bureau’s resource allocation 

process and the systems in which the utilization and casework data are 

maintained. We then describe the terminology and evaluative instruments 

the agency uses. 

Resource Allocation 

The FBI allocates its human resources by establishing Funded Staffing 

Levels (FSLs) within each of its investigative program areas. For example, 

Exhibit 1-2 shows that the Violent Crimes and Major Offenders program was 

allocated 1,762 special agents in 2002. This means that the FBI manager in 

charge of the program had that many agents to divide among the 56 field 

offices. The FBI Resource Management and Allocation (RMA) office is

responsible for establishing the allocations annually as part of the budget 

planning and execution process. 

Process – The process for setting agent and support FSLs begins when 

the FBI Finance office directs the Headquarters program managers to submit 

resource requests. Each manager reviews annual reports submitted by the 

field offices, develops a consolidated request for resources dedicated to the 

specific program area, and submits it to the Finance office. The Finance 

office reviews each request to ensure it supports the FBI’s strategic plan and 

is sufficiently justified. The resource requests are then incorporated into the

budget request that is submitted to the Department’s Justice Management 

Division. A flowchart of the FBI budget process is on the following page. 

Using the approved budget figures and in consideration of the FBI’s 

priorities and historical use of resources, the RMA office sets the FSLs, by 

program, for the fiscal year. Based on a needs analysis completed by each 

field office, which includes the Annual Field Office Reports (AFORs), crime 

surveys, statistical accomplishments, how the offices have utilized resources 

in the past, and direct consultation with field office management, 

Headquarters program managers and the RMA office determine the personnel 

to be allocated to each field office and submit the information to the Director 

for approval.24 After the Director approves the annual FSLs, the RMA office 

may make minor adjustments to reflect the occasional transfer of positions 

between programs or offices.

 24 Because the FSLs cannot be established until after Congress approves the budget, the allocations 

are not finalized until after the start of the fiscal year. For example, the FY 2003 budget was not 

approved until February 2003, and the FSLs were not established and sent to field offices until

May 7, 2003.

- 10 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

 EXHIBIT 2-1

FBI Finance Division

FBI Executive

Managers

Attorney General (AG)

Office of Management & Budget (OMB)

Justice Management Division (JMD)

Congress

Meets with Executive

Managers to formulate

budget requests for the

upcoming year

Discusses budget request

extensively with FBI

Director.

May

supplement

budget

May amend

budget

JMD reviews

& approves

budget request

OMB reviews

& approves

budget request

AG reviews &

approves

budget request

Develops budget requests

based on AFORs &

consultation with field offices

Reviews recommendations &

makes priority rankings for

budget requests

Reviews budget requests

& makes

recommendations

Meets with Strategic

Planning Office

Revises budget requests

to comply with current

AG & OMB guidelines

Coordinates with JMD to

produce final budget

request

Develops budget planning

requests

Start/End Action Decision Flow Flow Direction chart

Legend

Approves

budget

FBI BUDGET PROCESS

- 11 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Special agent FSLs reflect only non-supervisory agents in the field 

offices; Headquarters and supervisory personnel are not included. Similarly, 

FSLs are established for support personnel in FBI field offices only. 

However, the FBI does not allocate support FSLs by investigative program. 

Instead, field offices are allocated a total number of support personnel in 

each of three categories: clerical/administrative, investigative, and 

technical. 

OIG Data Collection – We obtained annual special agent and support 

FSL information for each fiscal year in the review period. The annual agent 

FSL data was broken down by field office and by program and/or subprogram. We also obtained annual support FSLs for each field office. In our 

analyses using FSL data, we utilized the final allocations for each fiscal year 

that reflected any mid-year adjustments. 

Resource Utilization Data 

Automated System – The FBI uses the Time Utilization and 

Recordkeeping (TURK) system to track time spent by most investigative 

personnel. Because TURK is used to track investigative efforts, only certain 

personnel are required to record their time in the system. According to FBI 

guidelines, TURK data input is limited to the following field office

personnel:25 

SPECIAL AGENTS SUPPORT

• investigative specialists 

• language specialists 

• non-supervisory special 

agents grade GS-13 

and below

• financial assistants/analysts 

• grade GS-14 Chief 

Division Counsels • information technology 

specialists-forensic examiners 

• grade GS-14 Assistant 

Division Counsels 

• intelligence research specialists 

• surveillance specialists 

 

These agents and support personnel are referred to as “TURKing” 

personnel. These TURKing personnel physically record their time on a paper 

form called the FD-420a. Rather than recording the actual number of hours

 25 FBI Headquarters personnel are not required to record their time in TURK because, 

generally, they do not work on investigative matters. 

- 12 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

they spend working on a particular matter, they record the percentage of 

time they work by investigative classification.26 For example, if an agent 

spent an entire day working on bank robberies, he would record that 

100 percent of his time was expended in the “91” classification, which falls in 

the Violent Crimes and Major Offenders (VCMO) program. If, however, that 

agent evenly divided his time between bank robbery matters and financial 

institution fraud, he would record 50 percent of his time in the VCMO 

program and the remaining 50 percent in the “29” classification, found in the 

White Collar Crime program. While it is possible to work on several 

classifications in a single day, all the percentages listed on the timesheet 

must equal 100 percent for each day (these percentages are based on a 

10-hour day for agents27 and an 8-hour day for support personnel). 

In general, the TURK system tracks time by investigative program or 

sub-program, not by individual case.28 However, the FBI has designated a 

small number of investigations as “major cases” and TURKing personnel 

working on these investigations record the appropriate major case number 

on their TURK forms in addition to all normal data.29 This enables the FBI to 

capture the total time expended on its highest profile investigations while 

still capturing investigative time by classification. 

The FBI Finance Division maintains the TURK system, which is a 

module of the FBI’s payroll system called the Administrative Time Capture 

(ATC) system. Although the information is entered into the system 

biweekly along with time and attendance data, TURK data collection is 

divided into 13 TURK periods per fiscal year, making each TURK period 

consist of 2 pay periods. For example, September 11, 2001, occurred in 

TURK period 13 of FY 2001, which ran from August 26, 2001, through 

September 22, 2001.30 

Data Elements - TURK data is presented in the form of straight work 

hours, Direct Agent Work Years (DAWYs), Direct Support Work Years 

(DSWYs), and Average On Board (AOB). The ATC system calculates DAWYs 

 26 As of FY 2002, the FBI had 311 separate investigative classifications. 

27 Generally, federal law enforcement officers are not granted overtime pay. Instead, they 

receive Law Enforcement Availability Pay amounting to 10 hours above a standard 

workweek. 

28 For a more detailed discussion of FBI programs and sub-programs, see page 15. 

29 See Appendix II for examples of major cases. 

30 A list of dates for each TURK period in the review timeframe appears in Appendix III. 

- 13 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

and DSWYs to provide an idea of work effort in FBI programs and subprograms for each TURK period. In general, one DAWY equals 2,600 work 

hours (10 hours per day times 260 work days per year) and one DSWY 

equals 2,080 work hours (8 hours per day times 260 work days per year).31 

DAWYs and DSWYs are based upon total hours and are indicators of overall 

work effort, but they actually reflect a larger number of people than are 

actually working at a particular time because the calculations allow for a 

level of effort beyond the standard workday. Further, prior to calculating 

DAWYs and DSWYs, the ATC system prorates all recorded leave and 

miscellaneous time back into the TURK record of each employee. This is 

accomplished through use of an automated Investigative Program Allocator, 

which prorates the data back into the TURK record of each employee based 

on investigative activity in that employee’s previous six pay periods. 

The ATC system also calculates AOB at the end of each TURK period to 

approximate the equivalent number of actual agents that achieved the 

DAWY expended in a particular program and/or sub-program. Unlike with 

DAWYs and DSWYs, though, it does not prorate leave and miscellaneous 

time back into TURK prior to performing the calculation. The ATC system 

computes AOB directly from the percentages entered on the FD-420a, and 

no matter how many hours an individual employee works, he or she can 

never be counted as more than one person. Over the course of a year, this 

number should closely approximate the average number of TURKing agents 

that were on-board during the year. Thus, AOB is the best indication the FBI 

has of estimating the actual number of personnel that are working at any 

particular time. In general, we performed our analyses using this AOB data. 

FBI Programmatic Use of TURK Data – The FBI refers to the rate at

which personnel resources are expended as the “burn rate.” It uses the 

term “underburn” to indicate when resource usage is less than resource 

allocation, and the term “overburn” when resource usage is greater than 

resource allocation. TURK program officials prepare quarterly reports of

TURK resource utilization data for distribution to all Headquarters program 

managers, which includes resource allocation figures and burn rates. 

Therefore, each Headquarters program manager is aware of the rate at 

which their program is using the resources allocated. 

In addition to these quarterly reports, the FBI Inspection Division 

obtains resource utilization and allocation data, as well as burn rates, from 

TURK program officials, which it uses during its triennial reviews of FBI field 

offices. Field office management, including Special Agents in Charge, 

Assistant Special Agents in Charge, and Supervisory Special Agents

 31 The actual calculation of DAWYs and DSWYs can change slightly each year, depending 

on the exact number of workdays in the year. The formulae appear in Appendix I. 

- 14 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

responsible for investigative squads, are evaluated in part on their utilization 

of allocated resources and resulting burn rates. 

OIG Data Collection - We obtained TURK work hour information for 

both agent and support personnel from October 1, 1995, through June 1, 

2002. This universe included 559,661 records consisting of TURK work 

hours, captured for each field office at the program and sub-program levels, 

for each TURK period in the reviewed timeframe.32 The data included hourly 

miscellaneous and leave time, as well as hours captured, when appropriate, 

in FBI major cases. 

In addition to work hour data, we also obtained AOB data for both 

agent and support personnel from October 1, 1995, through June 1, 2002. 

This accounted for a total of 36,588 records representing the AOB for each 

field office (captured at the program and sub-program level) for each fiscal 

year in the review period.32 

FBI Casework Data 

Automated System - The Automated Case Support (ACS) system is the 

centralized electronic case management system used by the FBI. It contains 

both historical and current case data for all FBI cases, except those that 

have been destroyed or archived. All FBI facilities, including field offices, 

resident agencies, Headquarters, and Legal Attaché offices, have access to 

ACS. The system, which came on-line on October 16, 1995, consists of the 

following three components: 

• Investigative Case Management - used to open a case and assign a 

unique 9-digit case number, called the Universal Case File Number, 

which consists of the FBI crime classification number; a two-letter 

alpha code designating the field office that opened the case; and a 

consecutive, numerical designator generated by the system. 

• Electronic Case File - used to maintain investigative 

documentation, such as interview transcripts. 

• Universal Index - used to maintain index records for a case and 

allows the searching of records in a variety of ways. 

Investigative Programs, Sub-Programs, and Classifications – The FBI 

assigns each of its cases to an investigative classification according to the 

nature of the case. Each of these classifications fall into one FBI program, 

 32 In addition to data from the field offices, our universes included resource utilization data for three 

special, non-field office units (related to campaign finance investigations, independent counsels, and 

the Critical Incident Response Group) that operated out of Headquarters during our review period. 

Individuals in these units were required to record their time in the TURK system.

- 15 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

and, if appropriate, a sub-program. As of June 2002, the FBI had 

10 programs, 48 sub-programs, and 311 investigative classifications.33 The 

programs and their areas of responsibility, as illustrated by the 

accompanying sub-program and investigative classification examples, are as

follows: 

EXHIBIT 2-2

FBI PROGRAMS, SUB-PROGRAMS, AND CLASSIFICATIONS 

ACRONYM PROGRAM NAME SUB-PROGRAM AND 

CLASSIFICATION EXAMPLES

NFIP National Foreign Intelligence 

Foreign Counterintelligence 

FBI Security 

International Terrorism 

NIPCIP National Infrastructure 

Protection/Computer Intrusion 

Computer Intrusion Criminal Matters 

Protection of Transportation Facilities 

DT Domestic Terrorism Counterterrorism Preparedness 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

WCC White Collar Crime

Bankruptcy Fraud 

Health Care Fraud 

Wire and Mail Fraud 

OC/D Organized Crime/Drugs

Mexican/Criminal Syndicates 

Asian Criminal Enterprise 

OCDETF 

VCMO Violent Crimes & Major Offenders 

Fugitives 

Violent Gangs 

Crimes Against Children 

CR Civil Rights

Racial Discrimination 

Involuntary Servitude and Slavery

APP Applicant Matters 

Background Investigations 

Recruitment and Processing 

Investigations of White House Staff & Visitors 

TRAIN Training

Federal Training 

State and Local Training 

MISC Miscellaneous Matters Freedom of Information Act Issues 

Public Relations Matters 

Source: FBI Finance Division and FY 2002 Investigative Classifications booklet 

 

These programs and sub-programs are not static; during our review

period, the FBI created one new program (the National Infrastructure 

Protection/Computer Intrusion Program) and several sub-programs, 

eliminated certain sub-programs, and transferred some classifications and 

sub-programs into other programs. Generally, when a program ceases to 

exist the FBI re-classifies the cases in that program in order to have them 

 33 A crosswalk of FBI programs and sub-programs appears in Appendix IV.

- 16 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

assigned to the most appropriate current program. The elimination of 

programs does not affect the resource data we collected from the TURK 

system because TURK data is captured by investigative classifications, which 

are updated each year and always assigned to current FBI programs. 

ACS officials said that the FBI has analyzed a variety of methods for 

classifying cases. Currently, once a case is accepted, the FBI classifies it 

according to the nature of the criminal violation and the program area that 

has the greatest expertise involving the investigation of that particular 

crime. The FBI will, though, reclassify a case if it discovers the case more 

appropriately belongs in a different classification than the one in which it was 

first placed. For example, officials in the Organized Crime/Drugs (OC/D) 

program described a recent investigation that began as a small White Collar 

Crime program stock fraud case until it was discovered there were ties to 

organized crime. When that occurred, the field office converted the case to

an OC/D case. 

Case Acceptance – As noted in Chapter 1, the FBI has the authority to 

investigate any federal crime not specifically assigned to any other federal 

agency. Individual FBI field offices decide if they will investigate a particular 

matter, basing their decision on priorities set by Headquarters, knowledge of 

the local criminal environment, the interest of other federal agencies in the 

jurisdiction, and the prosecution threshold of the local U.S. Attorney’s Office. 

While field office managers usually make this determination, they 

occasionally elevate the decision to program managers in Headquarters. 

FBI Programmatic Use of ACS Data – Supervisors in field offices are 

required to periodically review all open cases with their agents. To 

accomplish this, the supervisor can print a report from ACS of all cases 

assigned to the agent. In addition, field offices complete Monthly 

Administrative Reports that detail activity in each investigative program. 

Included in these reports are the numbers of previously open cases, case 

openings, and case closings by type (e.g., U.S. Attorney declinations). 

These reports are electronically submitted to Headquarters and distributed to

the program managers. Some program managers considered the reports to

be helpful and used them in managing their programs, but others thought 

their utility was negligible. Further, the FBI does not currently use ACS data 

to perform any long-term reviews of case-related activity for the Bureau as a 

whole. 

OIG Data Collection – We obtained ACS data consisting of all cases 

recorded in the system between October 1, 1995, and June 14, 2002. This 

reflected all cases that were opened during our review period, as well as 

those that were opened prior to the start of the review period but remained 

- 17 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

open as of October 1, 1995. The file contained 1,799,198 records, and 

provided, among other things, the case number, open date, close date, and 

investigative program for each case. 

- 18 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CHAPTER 3: TRENDS IN RESOURCE UTILIZATION 

FY 1996 THROUGH FY 2001 

Following the 9/11 attacks, the FBI announced that it planned to shift 

a large number of resources to work on counterterrorism efforts in its 

National Foreign Intelligence, Domestic Terrorism, and National 

Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion programs. To address where 

the FBI’s resources were allocated prior to 9/11, we conducted a trend 

analysis of FBI resource utilization from October 1995 to FY 2001.34 

 

As noted in Exhibit 3-1, in FY 1996 through FY 2001, the FBI utilized 

the bulk of its human resources in four primary areas: White Collar Crime 

(WCC), Organized Crime/Drugs (OC/D), National Foreign Intelligence (NFIP), 

and Violent Crimes and Major Offenders (VCMO). During that timeframe, 

there were at least 1,400 more personnel on board for each of these four 

programs in each fiscal year than for any other program. As seen on the 

bottom portion of the following chart, the remaining programs incurred 

much lower amounts of human resource usage. This bottom cluster consists 

of the National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion (NIPCIP), 

Domestic Terrorism (DT), Civil Rights (CR), Applicant Matters (APP), and 

Training (TRAIN) programs. 

 34 Resource utilization is displayed in terms of Average On Board, as defined in Chapter 2. 

- 19 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

- 20 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 3-1

COMBINED AGENT AND SUPPORT UTILIZATION 

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001 

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED 

Source: FBI TURK System 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

In each of the six fiscal years reviewed, the FBI utilized the most human 

resources in the White Collar Crime program, at an average of 2,591 agent 

and support personnel per year. Further, this program experienced a general 

increase over the time period reviewed. Similarly, the trend in resource usage 

in the National Foreign Intelligence Program showed a general increase in 

utilization during the period studied. The other two programs in the top 

cluster, Organized Crime/Drugs and Violent Crimes and Major Offenders, also 

received a great deal of resources, with averages of 2,311 and 2,183 

personnel, respectively. The highest annual number of human resource 

utilization in the bottom cluster of FBI programs came from Domestic 

Terrorism, at 428. 

FBI Strategic Priorities 

We also reviewed the FBI’s strategic plan for 1998 through 2003 to 

determine the types of activities on which the FBI stated it was most 

important to focus its efforts.35 The strategic plan sets the agenda for the 

Bureau by establishing specific 5-year strategic goals and broad strategies for 

achieving those goals. It also divides FBI priorities into three levels (or “tiers”) 

of importance, with tier one activities being the most important and tier three 

being the least important. However, FBI investigative programs are not 

clearly assigned within the tier structure. Some programs have activities that 

relate to more than one tier; for example, the White Collar Crime program 

includes activities that can be classified within each of the tiers. 

Tier One: National and Economic Security – Tier one represents the 

area of highest priority for the FBI and focuses on national and economic 

security, including foreign intelligence, terrorism, and criminal activity of such 

importance to the U.S. that the FBI must be at full capacity to respond. 

These are also crimes over which the FBI holds exclusive jurisdiction. 

Strategic goals for tier one include preventing and defeating foreign 

intelligence operations and terrorist activities before they occur, as well as 

preventing criminal conspiracies from defrauding major U.S. industries and 

the federal government. The strategic plan refers to the National Foreign 

 35 As identified in OIG report number 02-38 entitled “A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management,’’ the 

FBI’s strategic plan has not been updated since 1998. As a result, we recommended that the FBI 

update its strategic planning process and close the gap between planning and operations by 

establishing an effective system of performance measures and standards and holding managers at all

levels accountable for achieving the goals and objectives stated in FBI strategic plans. As a result of 

our strategic planning recommendations, the FBI is updating its strategic plan. Further, according to 

the FBI, as part of the 2003 strategic planning process, all programs will be required to develop 

performance measures for assessing national program performance and for evaluating individual field 

office performance. In addition, the FBI’s inspection process is being re-engineered to focus on 

outcome/results-based performance measures and to hold managers accountable for individual and 

program performance.

- 21 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Intelligence, Domestic Terrorism, and National Infrastructure Protection/ 

Computer Intrusion programs in the tier one section. In addition, significant 

investigations under the White Collar Crime program address issues related 

to economic security. 

Tier Two: Criminal Enterprises and Public Integrity – Tier two priorities 

rank second in importance, and are predominately characterized by 

investigations of criminal organizations that exploit social, economic, or 

political circumstances. 

Tier two strategic goals focus on disrupting and dismantling organized 

criminal enterprises, violent multi-jurisdictional gangs, and drug-trafficking 

organizations, and on reducing public corruption and civil rights violations. 

These goals apply to the Organized Crime/Drugs, Civil Rights, and White 

Collar Crime programs.

Tier Three: Individuals and Property – As priorities for the FBI, tier 

three criminal activities rank lowest. Crimes that fall into tier three are those 

where the FBI is expected to respond quickly and efficiently, but the FBI’s 

role in these cases is to supplement the activities of state and local law 

enforcement. 

The primary goal of tier three is to reduce the impact of the most 

significant crimes affecting individuals and property. According to the 

strategic plan, these goals apply to the Violent Crimes and Major Offenders 

program and some lower-level White Collar Crime program activities. 

As noted in Chapter 1 of this report, the FBI Director released a new 

set of top priorities for the Bureau in May 2002. These priorities reiterated 

the place of terrorism-related work at the top of the list. Prior to the 

Director’s memorandum, significant white collar crime involving economic 

security was a tier one priority. The new set of priorities, however, moved 

white collar crime to the bottom half of the list, where it was ranked in 

importance behind terrorism-related work, computer security, public 

corruption, civil rights, and organized crime. 

Although the tier structure outlining strategic priorities has been in 

place since at least 1998, our analyses showed that the FBI’s utilization of 

human resources between FY 1996 and 2001 had not supported its priorities. 

Two tier one programs, White Collar Crime and National Foreign Intelligence, 

are among the top four programs in terms of human resource usage, as 

evidenced in Exhibit 3-1. The other tier one programs (Domestic Terrorism 

and National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion), however, utilized 

comparatively little of the FBI’s human resources between FY 1996 and 2001. 

- 22 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

At the same time, the other two programs using significant amounts of 

personnel resources, Organized Crime/Drugs and Violent Crimes and Major 

Offenders, are not tier one programs; rather, they are tier two and tier three 

programs, respectively. 

Although looking at the FBI as a whole illustrates that the Bureau did 

not utilize its resources in line with its strategic priorities, an even more 

important trend is identified when the Bureau’s utilization of special agent 

resources is separated from its utilization of support personnel. 

Special Agents 

When separated from support personnel, FBI agents worked 

predominantly in the White Collar Crime program from FY 1996 through 

2001, while large numbers of agent resources also were devoted to the 

Organized Crime/Drugs, Violent Crimes and Major Offenders, and National 

Foreign Intelligence programs. Reflective of the overall combined trend, 

there were significantly more agents on board for these four programs in 

each fiscal year than for any other program. In contrast to the combined 

data, though, far fewer agents worked in National Foreign Intelligence than in 

the other three programs in the top cluster. In fact, in each fiscal year until 

FY 2001, at least 500 fewer agents worked on NFIP matters than on those in 

the next highest program, as shown in Exhibit 3-2. 

EXHIBIT 3-2

AGENT UTILIZATION

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001 

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED 

 

Source: FBI TURK System 

- 23 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

As shown in Exhibit 3-2, in FY 2001 agent utilization increased in the 

National Foreign Intelligence Program and generally decreased in all other 

programs. This increase in NFIP agent usage is directly attributable to the 

events of 9/11, which occurred during the final month of FY 2001. 

Exhibit 3-3 shows that the number of NFIP agent hours worked was generally 

consistent at around 300,000 for the first 12 TURK periods of the year. This 

changed dramatically in the final TURK period of FY 2001 (during which 9/11 

occurred), when agent hours rose more than 250 percent to more than 

one million. Thus, the data indicates that agent utilization in NFIP would 

have remained unchanged absent the events of 9/11. In turn, without this 

major terrorist event, Bureau-wide agent utilization would have remained the 

same in FY 2001 and would not have begun to come into alignment with the 

strategic plan. 

EXHIBIT 3-3

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM 

FISCAL YEAR 2001

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

800,000

900,000

1,000,000

1,100,000

1 234 567 8 9 10 11 12 13

TURK PERIOD

AGENT WORK

HOURS Source: FBI TURK System 

 

In summary, prior to 9/11 more agents worked on White Collar Crime, 

Organized Crime/Drugs, and Violent Crimes and Major Offenders matters 

than in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. This resource utilization is 

not in line with the goals stated in the FBI’s strategic plan because, while 

portions of the FBI’s WCC program fall into tier one and relate to the FBI’s 

strategic goal to ensure economic security, OC/D and VCMO program 

activities generally do not. Instead, they fall into tiers two and three, 

respectively. Although NFIP clearly is a tier one priority, it exhibited the 

fourth highest usage of agent resources from FY 1996 through most of 

FY 2001. 

- 24 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Support Personnel 

In contrast to the utilization of agent personnel, the National Foreign 

Intelligence Program utilized the most support personnel between FYs 1996 

and 2001. As evidenced in the following graph of support utilization, more 

than twice the number of support personnel worked in NFIP than in any other 

program in each fiscal year of our review period. According to NFIP officials,

this is because the program utilizes many different types of specialized 

support personnel (e.g., language specialists and surveillance specialists) that 

other FBI programs do not use extensively. Aside from NFIP, the White 

Collar Crime, Organized Crime/Drugs, and Violent Crimes and Major 

Offenders programs utilized the largest number of support personnel during 

the timeframe covered in our analysis. 

 

EXHIBIT 3-4

SUPPORT PERSONNEL UTILIZATION 

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001 

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED 

 

Source: FBI TURK System 

 

In fact, not only did more FBI support personnel work on National 

Foreign Intelligence Program matters than in any other single program, but 

as shown in the following graph, more support personnel worked on NFIP 

matters than in all other programs combined. 

- 25 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 3-5

COMPARISON OF SUPPORT PERSONNEL UTILIZATION 

NFIP vs. ALL OTHER PROGRAMS COMBINED 

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001 

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED 

Source: FBI TURK System 

According to FBI Resource Management and Allocation (RMA) officials, 

field office management directs support resources where they are needed the 

most. The FBI does not allocate or budget support staff to specific 

investigative program areas; support resources are requested in the budget by 

using pre-determined formulas based on the number of agents. Specifically, 

the FBI uses different formulas to determine the number of investigative 

support staff, administrative/clerical staff, technical support staff, computer 

forensic specialists, and electronics technicians it needs. RMA officials also 

said that, although many requests have been made, the formulas have 

remained unchanged since FY 1996. Reflecting these formulas, the ratio 

between agents and support personnel has remained generally consistent at 

about five to one since FY 1998, as shown in Exhibit 3-6. 

- 26 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 3-6

OVERALL COMPARISON OF AGENT TO SUPPORT PERSONNEL

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001

8,268 8,773 9,182 9,264 9,301 9,049

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FISCAL YEAR

AVERAGE ON BOARD

AGENTS SUPPORT

1,144

1,760 1,813 1,885 1,849

900

Source: FBI TURK System 

Conclusion 

Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI did not devote a significant

portion of its special agent resources to domestic and international terrorism 

issues. In comparison, the FBI consistently devoted the majority of its 

support personnel resources to terrorism-related matters because of the 

specialized nature of the work. However, even when agent and support 

personnel are combined, the FBI was not utilizing its collective personnel 

resources in line with its strategic priorities, which named national and 

economic security as the FBI’s primary concerns. 

Between FYs 1996 and 2001, the Bureau’s White Collar Crime program 

was the leader in human resource usage and the Organized Crime/Drugs and 

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders programs utilized more special agent 

resources than its National Foreign Intelligence Program. Further, human

resource usage in the FBI’s Domestic Terrorism and National Infrastructure 

Protection/Computer Intrusion programs was far below that in the White 

Collar Crime, Organized Crime/Drugs, Violent Crimes and Major Offenders, 

and National Foreign Intelligence programs. 

- 27 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CHAPTER 4: RESOURCE IMPACT OF TERRORIST EVENTS 

OF 9/11/01 

In immediate response to 9/11, the Bureau shifted a large amount of 

its work effort into the counterterrorism area. As shown in Exhibit 4-1, 

between late July and October 2001, agent work effort in the National 

Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) increased dramatically while all other 

programs experienced decreases. 

EXHIBIT 4-1

IMMEDIATE AGENT RESPONSE TO9/11

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

1,600,000

07/29/2001 – 08/25/2001 08/26/2001– 09/22/2001 09/23/2001 – 10/20/2001

TURK PERIODS

AGENT HOURS

NFIP NIPCIP DT WCC OC/D VCMO CR APP TRAIN

Source: FBI TURK System 

Subsequent to this shift in agent work effort, in December 2001 the 

FBI Director announced his plan for reorganizing the Bureau and his intent to 

formally transfer additional resources to terrorism-related work. As noted in 

the schedule of agent allocations for FY 2002 found in Exhibit 1-2, the 

Director increased the special agent allocation in terrorism-related programs 

from 2,212 to 2,897 in May 2002. 

- 28 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Changes in Hours Worked 

Overall Increase – The dramatic increase in work hours dedicated to 

NFIP in the weeks following 9/11 did not come solely at the expense of other 

programs. Much of the immediate increase in both agent and support work 

hours was due to the large amounts of overtime worked in the initial weeks 

following the 9/11 attacks. This can be seen by looking at the total number

of work hours expended by FBI special agents and support personnel both 

before and after 9/11. 

As shown in the following graph, the terrorist attacks, which occurred 

during TURK period 13 of FY 2001, resulted in a large increase in total agent 

work hours in all programs combined. On average, FBI agents were working 

1.89 million hours per TURK period in the year prior to 9/11. In TURK 

period 13, this work effort increased to almost 2.12 million hours, an 

increase of about 12 percent. 

EXHIBIT 4-2

TOTAL AGENT HOURS

SEPTEMBER 2000 TO JUNE 2002

1,650,000

1,700,000

1,750,000

1,800,000

1,850,000

1,900,000

1,950,000

2,000,000

2,050,000

2,100,000

2,150,000

SEP-OCT 00

OCT-NOV 00

NOV-DEC 00

DEC 00-JAN 01

JAN-FEB 01

FEB-MAR 01

MAR-APR 01APR-MAY 01

MAY-JUNE 01

JUNE 01

JULY 01

JULY-AUG 01

AUG-SEP 01

SEP-OCT 01

OCT-NOV 01

NOV-DEC 01

DEC 01-JAN 02

JAN-FEB 02

FEB-MAR 02

MAR-APR 02APR-MAY 02

MAY-JUNE 02

TURK PERIOD

AGEN

T HO

U

RS Source: FBI TURK System 

- 29 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

 

Similar to agents, FBI support personnel worked significantly more 

hours than normal in response to 9/11. As shown in the following graph, 

support work hours progressed from an average of about 315,000 in the year 

just prior to 9/11, to about 340,000 immediately after (in TURK period 1 of 

FY 2002), reflecting an 8 percent increase. 

EXHIBIT 4-3

TOTAL SUPPORT HOURS

SEPTEMBER 2000 TO JUNE 2002

280,000

290,000

300,000

310,000

320,000

330,000

340,000

350,000

SEP-OCT 00

OCT-NOV 00

NOV-DEC 00

DEC 00-JAN 01

JAN-FEB 01

FEB-MAR 01

MAR-APR 01APR-MAY 01

MAY-JUNE 01

JUNE 01

JULY 01

JULY-AUG 01

AUG-SEP 01

SEP-OCT 01

OCT-NOV 01NOV-DEC 01

DEC 01-JAN 02

JAN-FEB 02

FEB-MAR 02

MAR-APR 02

APR-MAY 02

MAY-JUNE 02

TURK PERIOD

SUPPORT HOU

R

S

Source: FBI TURK System

 

Changes Within FBI Programs – The changes in FBI resource utilization 

can be seen within its investigative program areas. The following graphs 

(Exhibits 4-4 and 4-5) of special agent and support personnel work hours in 

these program areas highlight three distinct time periods: the time prior to 

9/11, the immediate response to 9/11, and the stabilization of work hours 

after 9/11. 

- 30 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 4-4

AGENT HOURS BY FBI PROGRAM AREA

SEPTEMBER 2000 TO JUNE 2002

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

1,600,000

SEP-OCT 00

OCT-NOV 00

NOV-DEC 00

DEC 00-JAN 01

JAN-FEB 01

FEB-MAR 01

MAR-APR 01

APR-MAY 01

MAY-JUNE 01

JUNE 01

JULY 01

JULY-AUG 01

AUG-SEP 01

SEP-OCT 01

OCT-NOV 01

NOV-DEC 01

DEC 01-JAN 02

JAN-FEB 02

FEB-MAR 02

MAR-APR 02APR-MAY 02

MAY-JUNE 02

TURK PERIOD

A

GENT HOURS

NFIP NIPCIP DT WCC OC/D VCMO CR APP TRAIN

Source: FBI TURK System 

Between September 2000 and August 2001, the FBI consistently 

utilized most of its agent resources in its White Collar Crime, Organized 

Crime/Drugs, and Violent Crimes and Major Offenders programs. This 

changed dramatically after 9/11, when agent hours in NFIP increased by 

almost 400 percent, from just over 300,000 hours to almost 1.5 million 

hours. At the same time, agent hours in all other programs decreased. 

After NFIP agent work hours reached their post-9/11 peak, the level of effort 

gradually declined and stabilized, leveling out between February and March 

of 2002. However, although the NFIP agent work hours decreased as time

went on, the stabilized level of effort was at a rate higher than prior to 

9/11. NFIP agent work hours increased by about 62 percent per TURK 

period, from just over 300,000 in TURK period 12 of FY 2001 to over 

485,000 in TURK period 9 of FY 2002. 

- 31 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

For the same timeframe, work hours expended by support personnel in 

the National Foreign Intelligence Program rose from about 157,000 to more 

than 175,000, an increase of about 12 percent. This increase is displayed in 

Exhibit 4-5. 

EXHIBIT 4-5

SUPPORT PERSONNEL HOURS BY FBI PROGRAM AREA

SEPTEMBER 2000 TO JUNE 2002

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

SEP-OCT 00

OCT-NOV 00

NOV-DEC 00

DEC 00-JAN 01

JAN-FEB 01

FEB-MAR 01

MAR-APR 01

APR-MAY 01

MAY-JUNE 01

JUNE 01

JULY 01

JULY-AUG 01

AUG-SEP 01

SEP-OCT 01

OCT-NOV 01

NOV-DEC 01

DEC 01-JAN 02

JAN-FEB 02

FEB-MAR 02

MAR-APR 02

APR-MAY 02

MAY-JUNE 02

TURK PERIOD

SUPPORT HOURS

NFIP NIPCIP DT WCC OC/D VCMO CR APP TRAIN

 

Source: FBI TURK System 

In summary, in the weeks immediately following the 9/11 attacks, FBI 

personnel in general worked significantly more hours than usual. This 

increase in work effort was directed to NFIP, while all other programs 

experienced decreases in work hours. In the months after 9/11, NFIP 

stabilized and replaced White Collar Crime as the program expending the 

largest amount of agent work hours. 

Changes in Personnel Distribution 

In addition to reviewing the hours worked in each program before and 

after 9/11, we compared the level of effort in the program, in terms of 

personnel on board, as percentages of total FBI investigative activity. In 

this analysis we averaged, for each investigative program, the annual fiscal 

year personnel totals for FYs 1996 through 2001 and compared these to the 

personnel totals for FY 2002.36 

- 32 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

 36 Personnel totals are computed using Average On Board figures, as defined in Chapter 2. 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

The following chart highlights the changes in the percentages of total 

personnel (agents and support combined) working in each investigative 

program. The blue bars show pre-9/11 data, while the maroon bars provide 

post-9/11 data.37 

EXHIBIT 4-6

PERCENTAGE OF OVERALL WORK FORCE IN FBI PROGRAMS 

BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11

 Source: FBI TURK System

 

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

NFIP NIPCIP DT WCC OC/D VCMO CR APP TRAIN

FBI PROGRAMS

PERCENTAGE OF PERSONNEL

PRE-9/11 POST 9/11

Exhibit 4-6 demonstrates that the percentage of combined agent and 

support personnel working in the FBI’s National Foreign Intelligence Program 

more than doubled, from approximately 22 percent prior to FY 2002 to over 

48 percent in the eight months of FY 2002 in our review. In addition, the 

percentage in the Domestic Terrorism program also rose, from four percent 

to six percent. At the same time, the percentage of FBI personnel working 

on both White Collar Crime and Organized Crime/Drugs matters dropped 

nine percent, and the percentage working on Violent Crimes and Major 

Offenders activities dropped eight percent. 

 

We also separately analyzed personnel percentages for special agents 

and support personnel. Exhibit 4-7 compares the percentages of agents 

37 We have defined the pre-9/11 period in our review as October 1, 1995, through 

September 22, 2001, which was the last day of TURK period 13 of FY 2001. For the 

purposes of our review, the post-9/11 period began on September 23, 2001. 

- 33 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

working in FBI programs for the two time periods (i.e., October 1, 1995, 

through September 22, 2001, and September 23, 2001, through June 1, 

2002). 

EXHIBIT 4-7

PERCENTAGE OF AGENTS IN FBI PROGRAMS

BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11

 Source: FBI TURK System 

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

NFIP NIPCIP DT WCC OC/D VCMO CR APP TRAIN

FBI PROGRAMS

PERCENTAGE OF AGENTS

PRE-9/11 POST-9/11

As in the analysis of the overall workforce displayed in Exhibit 4-6, the 

percentage of agents increased in the National Foreign Intelligence and 

Domestic Terrorism programs, while percentages for all other programs 

decreased. In the case of agents, though, instead of doubling, the 

percentage in NFIP almost tripled, from 16 percent to 45 percent. 

The following chart shows the same breakdown of data for support 

personnel. Similar to the changes experienced in the agent work force, the 

percentage of support personnel working in NFIP also increased, although 

not by as large a margin. Prior to FY 2002, NFIP already accounted for more 

than half (56 percent) of all support personnel; by June 2002, it had 

increased by an additional 10 percent. Analogous with the trend for agents, 

the percentage of support personnel in DT also increased and the percentage 

in all other programs decreased. 

- 34 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 4-8

PERCENTAGE OF SUPPORT PERSONNEL IN FBI PROGRAMS 

 BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11

 

 Source: FBI TURK System

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

NFIP NIPCIP DT WCC OC/D VCMO CR APP TRAIN

FBI PROGRAMS

PERCE

NTAGE OF SUPPORT

PRE-9/11 POST-9/11

 

The higher percentages of both agents and support personnel working 

in the FBI’s terrorism-related programs after 9/11 are in accord with the FBI 

Director’s mandate to make counterterrorism the FBI’s top priority. NFIP 

had the largest percentage of support personnel prior to 9/11, and its share 

grew even larger afterwards. In the case of agents, the increase in NFIP 

personnel moved it past other programs to become the largest FBI program 

in terms of agent utilization. 

Ratio of Agents to Support Before and After 9/11 

In our previous analyses, we noted significant changes in the 

percentages of agents working in different FBI investigative programs before

and after 9/11. Since the changes in support personnel percentages were 

not as significant, the ratio of support personnel to special agents within FBI 

programs also was altered. 

- 35 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

 Source: FBI TURK System 

Exhibit 4-9 to the left 

highlights the 

changes in the ratio 

of agent and support 

personnel in NFIP 

before and after 

9/11. It shows that 

prior to 9/11, 

63 percent of the 

personnel working in 

NFIP were agents. In 

FY 2002, however, 

agents accounted for 

77 percent of all 

personnel working in 

the program. 

EXHIBIT 4-9

RATIO OF AGENTS AND SUPPORT IN NFIP

63%

77%

37%

23%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Pre-9/11 Average Post-9/11 Average TIME PERIODS

PERCE

NTAGE OF PERSONNEL

AGENTS SUPPORT

nd

ed

Exhibit 4-10 to the 

right shows how 

little the ratio of 

agent to support 

personnel in nonNFIP programs 

changed between 

the two time 

periods. Unlike in 

NFIP, the ratio 

between agents a

support in all other

programs combin

remained relatively 

constant, changing 

by only 2 percent. 

 Source: FBI TURK System 

EXHIBIT 4-10

RATIO OF AGENTS AND SUPPORT IN

NON-NFIP PROGRAMS

91% 89%

9% 11%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Pre-9/11 Average Post-9/11 Average

TIME PERIODS

PERCENTAGE OF PERSONNEL

AGENTS SUPPORT

- 36 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Conclusion 

Prior to 9/11, the FBI consistently utilized most of its agent resources 

in its White Collar Crime, Organized Crime/Drugs, and Violent Crimes and 

Major Offenders programs. This changed dramatically in the immediate 

aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, when the average number of NFIP 

agent hours worked in the year prior to 9/11 increased by almost 

400 percent in the TURK period immediately following 9/11. The National 

Foreign Intelligence Program, which had accounted for only 22 percent of 

combined agent and support work effort prior to 9/11, grew to over 

48 percent of the combined work effort for the 8 months of our review 

period in FY 2002. Much of the immediate increase in both agent and 

support work effort was due to the large amounts of overtime worked in the 

initial weeks following the 9/11 attacks. However, as the work effort 

stabilized, leveling off between February and March 2002, NFIP replaced 

White Collar Crime as the program expending the largest amount of agent 

work hours. 

- 37 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CHAPTER 5: COMPARISON OF RESOURCE PLANNING TO 

UTILIZATION 

In general, the FBI utilized fewer agent resources than it allocated 

from FY 1996 through FY 2000. Some, but not all, of this difference is 

attributable to vacancies. The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) 

consistently utilized fewer agent resources than it was allocated from 

FY 1996 through FY 2000; this trend did not change until FY 2001 and the 

events of 9/11. In contrast, the Violent Crimes and Major Offenders (VCMO) 

program utilized more agent resources than it was allocated for each fiscal 

year between 1996 and 2001. 

FBI Resource Planning 

As previously discussed, the FBI’s Resource Management and 

Allocation (RMA) office uses the budget approved by Congress to allocate 

personnel resources and establish Funded Staffing Levels (FSLs) where each 

FSL equals one person.38 The following chart provides agent FSLs, by 

program, from FY 1996 through 2001. 

EXHIBIT 5-1

FBI FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS 

FY NFIP NIPCIP39 DT WCC OC/D VCMO CR APP TRAIN TOTALS 

1996 205 2,346 2,262 2,058 159 76 127

1997 548 2,394 2,265 1,981 156 79 131

1998 538 2,423 2,337 1,988 156 79 131

1999 449 2,419 2,304 2,011 155 134 131

2000 435 2,457 2,275 2,003 153 131 131

2001 

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED

435 2,405 2,078 1,821 153 121 91

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION

REDACTED 

Source: FBI Finance Division and Resource Management and Allocation office

 

 

Using data from the FBI’s TURK system, we computed annual special 

agent personnel Average On Board (AOB)40 totals for the Bureau as a whole 

38 FSLs and the resource allocation process are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 

39 NIPCIP did not exist as a program until FY 1999. 

40 The TURK system and Average on Board are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 

- 38 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

and for the individual FBI programs.41 We then compared the annualized 

AOB data (resource utilization) to the annual Funded Staffing Level (FSL) 

data (resource allocation) for FYs 1996 through 2001.42 

The following chart highlights the general underutilization of agent 

resources in the FBI as a whole for the reviewed timeframe. Prior to 

FY 2001, the FBI utilized fewer agent resources than allocated in each fiscal 

year, although the gap between the two narrowed as time progressed. By 

FY 2001, the Bureau utilized more agent resources than allocated. 

EXHIBIT 5-2

COMPARISON OF AGENTS TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL

ALL PROGRAMS COMBINED

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001

9,264

9,340 9,406

8,268

9,301

8,773

9,182

9,049

9,264

8,757

8,881

9,379

7,600

7,800

8,000

8,200

8,400

8,600

8,800

9,000

9,200

9,400

9,600

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FISCAL YEAR

AGENTS

AOB FSLs

 

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

 

In order to gain insight into the aggregate differences between 

utilization and allocation reflected in Exhibit 5-2, we reviewed each program 

individually. We found that some programs consistently used fewer or more 

resources than allocated, while the rate varied in other programs. We then 

interviewed various FBI officials regarding discrepancies between resource 

allocation and usage in their particular programs. 

 41 We did not perform this analysis for support personnel because, as previously noted, 

support personnel are not allocated to investigative programs. 

42 For this analysis, we excluded data we collected for a portion of FY 2002 because the 

events of 9/11 caused the numbers to be skewed. 

- 39 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) 

Prior to 9/11, the FBI consistently underutilized its NFIP agent 

resources. This trend did not change until FY 2001, when agent utilization 

actually exceeded allocation. 

EXHIBIT 5-3

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AGENTS ON BOARD TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL 

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM 

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

NFIP officials said the consistent underburn in NFIP could be traced to 

changing priorities and hiring issues. Currently, counterterrorism issues are 

clearly the highest priority for the Department and the FBI. For the time 

period in question, however, NFIP officials stated that priorities were focused 

on reducing gun violence and illegal drug trafficking. In addressing these 

priorities, the FBI directed resources to its Organized Crime/Drugs and 

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders programs and this came, in part, at the 

expense of NFIP. 

- 40 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

As to why FBI activities are not always consistent with or do not 

always correspond to the priorities laid out in the FBI’s strategic plan, NFIP 

officials reported that the priorities from the strategic plan were established 

based on offenses for which the FBI, by statute, had sole jurisdiction, 

followed by crimes other federal agencies could investigate, followed by 

crimes state and local agencies could investigate. This categorization did not 

take into account large events of national significance, which is what often 

drives the FBI’s activities. They said that when major national criminal 

issues arise, or changes in priorities occur, field offices pull people off of 

other programs and direct them towards these matters, causing staff 

resources in the other priority programs to suffer. 

NFIP officials also attributed the underburn to hiring issues. They 

explained that after Congress provides funding for additional positions, it can 

take more than a year to bring new agents on board. Also, between 

FY 1996 and 2001, the FBI went through several hiring freezes. They added 

that while they are always ready to replace personnel lost by attrition (about 

500 people per year), they find it more difficult to gear up to hire after a 

hiring freeze. Further, hiring efforts are sometimes hampered by significant 

investigations because agents working on background investigations must 

shift their efforts to the more pressing matters and the hiring process is 

delayed. 

National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion Program 

(NIPCIP) 

In FY 1999, its first year as an FBI program, NIPCIP utilized fewer 

agents than allocated. In the next two fiscal years, the utilization and 

allocation figures were closer with NIPCIP utilizing slightly more agent 

resources than allocated. 

- 41 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 5-4

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AGENTS ON BOARD TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL

NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE/COMPUTER INTRUSION PROGRAM

FISCAL YEARS 1999 THROUGH 2001

198

214

193 191

129

207

0

50

100

150

200

250

1999 2000 2001

FISCAL YEAR

AGENTS

AOB FSLs

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division 

Domestic Terrorism (DT) Program 

Like NFIP, for much of the analyzed timeframe DT utilized fewer agent 

resources than allocated. The exceptions occurred in FY 1996, when DT 

utilized 119 agent resources more than it was allocated, and in FY 2000, 

when utilization within the program outpaced its allocation by 5 agents. 

EXHIBIT 5-5

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AGENTS ON BOARD TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL

DOMESTIC TERRORISM PROGRAM

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001

360

399 419

548 538

449 435

324 419

440

205

435

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FISCAL YEAR

AGENTS

AOB FSLs

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division 

- 42 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

DT officials explained that in FY 1996, the FBI was in the midst of a 

variety of significant investigations, including cases involving the Mountain 

Militia; the Freemen group; the Centennial Park bombing in Atlanta, Georgia 

during the 1996 Summer Olympics; and the bombing of the Murrah Federal 

Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in April 1995. Additionally, increased 

activity of many domestic militia groups during this period resulted in the 

increased workload. 

As for the underutilization in FY 1997, officials noted an enhancement 

of 350 agents from a mid-year supplemental appropriation that did not 

provide the FBI with sufficient time to fill all of these positions. They further 

stated that in FY 1998 the FBI diverted agents to background investigations 

so that the Bureau could more quickly bring new agents on board. 

Additionally, the FBI diverted agent resources from the DT program to the 

Safe Streets Task Forces (located within the Violent Crimes and Major 

Offenders program) and firearms training. Officials added that in FY 1999 

the FBI did not hire to its hiring plan, resulting in an agent underburn in 

most programs. 

White Collar Crime (WCC) Program 

As shown in Exhibit 5-6, WCC underutilized its agent resources 

between FY 1996 and FY 2001 by a total of 655 agents (4.5 percent); the 

average underutilization was 109 agents per year. WCC officials attributed 

this, in part, to the general field office understaffing during the same time 

period. They also said that increased allocations to counterterrorism matters 

began during the same time period, particularly with implementation of the 

new Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Like NFIP and DT, officials in WCC also 

pointed to hiring issues as a reason for their agent resource underutilization, 

explaining that in some years the FBI did not meet its hiring goals. 

- 43 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 5-6

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AGENTS ON BOARD TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL

WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROGRAM

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001

2,094

2,330

2,394 2,423 2,419 2,457 2,405

2,348 2,426

2,217

2,374

2,346

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FISCAL YEAR

AGENTS

AOB FSLs

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

Organized Crime/Drugs (OC/D) Program 

As with NFIP and WCC, OC/D consistently utilized fewer agents than 

allocated for each fiscal year between 1996 and 2001. In total, the program 

utilized 91.2 percent of its allocated agent resources during this period.43 

EXHIBIT 5-7

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AGENTS ON BOARD TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL

ORGANIZED CRIME/DRUGS PROGRAM

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001

1,812

1,995 2,106 2,061

2,262 2,265 2,337 2,304 2,275

2,078

2,183 2,172

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FISCAL YEAR

AGENTS

AOB FSLs

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division 

- 44 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

 43 We calculated the overall utilization rate by dividing the total AOB by the total FSL for the review 

period. Utilization rates for all programs are found in Exhibit 5-12. 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Officials in OC/D stated that this underutilization was caused by a 

variety of factors. 

• From FY 1996 through 2000, there was a general understaffing 

of agents throughout the FBI, a portion of which the OC/D 

program had to absorb. 

• The FBI instituted aggressive hiring programs to address 

understaffing, which resulted in a significant overutilization of 

agent resources in both the Applicant Matters and Training 

programs. These two programs took resources from FBI 

investigative programs, including OC/D, causing an 

underutilization of agents in the investigative programs.44 

• In both FY 1996 and FY 1998, although the OC/D program was 

granted increases in agent allocations from previous fiscal year 

levels, these positions were not filled and therefore were not 

available for assignment. 

• OC/D positions were used to support terrorism investigations, 

namely the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal building in 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and the 1998 bombings of 

U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 

• Although the OC/D program is allocated all of the reimbursed 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) 

positions, some OCDETF-related time is utilized within the violent 

crime program’s Safe Streets Task Forces. 

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders (VCMO) Program 

In contrast to most other FBI programs, the VCMO program 

consistently utilized more agent resources than allocated in each fiscal year 

of the reviewed time period, for an overall utilization rate of 105.6 percent. 

VCMO officials attributed this, in part, to changes in resource allocations 

without corresponding changes in operational responsibility. 

 44 This is corroborated by the results of our resource allocation and utilization comparative 

trend analysis for these programs, as reported on pages 48 and 49. 

- 45 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 5-8

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AGENTS ON BOARD TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL

VIOLENT CRIME AND MAJOR OFFENDERS PROGRAM

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001

2,077 2,178 2,192 2,108 2,055

2,058 1,981 1,988 2,011 2,003

1,821

1,917

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FISCAL YEAR

AGENTS

AOB FSLs

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

VCMO officials also said the increases in resource utilization between 

FY 1996 and FY 1999, the years with the largest disparity between utilization 

and allocation, occurred within the Violent Incident Crime sub-program. This 

sub-program includes major reactive violent crimes, such as kidnapping, 

extortion, bank/armored car robberies, and major fugitive cases. Officials 

noted that these cases often require intensive multi-divisional investigation, 

as well as deployment of the Special Weapons and Tactics team (SWAT), 

Hostage Rescue Team, Hostage Negotiation, Special Operations Group, and 

other manpower-related resources, all of which are charged to the VCMO 

program. 

Civil Rights (CR) Program 

Although the allocation of resources to the Civil Rights program 

generally remained consistent during the analyzed time period, the program 

varied in its utilization of agent resources, underutilizing in FYs 1996 and 

1997, overutilizing from FY 1998 through FY 2000, and then underutilizing 

again in FY 2001. These statistics are displayed in Exhibit 5-9. 

- 46 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 5-9

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AGENTS ON BOARD TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL

CIVIL RIGHTS PROGRAM

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001

182

156 155 153

162

141

190

155

135

153 159 156

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FISCAL YEAR

AGENTS

AOB FSLs

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

Program officials noted that while FSLs were relatively static (varying 

by no more than three from year-to-year), program initiatives, as well as 

legislative and Department mandates, varied greatly from year-to-year. 

They explained the overutilization in FYs 1998 and 1999 by noting that 

several new initiatives were implemented during this time, including the 

National Church Arson Initiative, the National Task Force on Reproductive 

Health Providers, and the National Workers Exploitation Task Force. They 

also noted that on average from FY 1996 through 2002 the program utilized 

99.9 percent of its allocated resources. 

Officials also explained that FBI and Department policy require that all 

civil rights-related work be addressed, rendering them unable to manage the 

program by FSLs. Supervisors do not have discretion to prioritize work in 

other programs over existing CR cases. They added that this policy is 

unique to CR. Officials also expressed their belief that given this lack of 

flexibility, CR will remain subject to fluctuations. They also pointed out that 

civil rights is fifth in the FBI Director’s new list of agency priorities (as shown 

on page 6), the highest priority ranking it has ever held. 

- 47 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Applicant Matters (APP) Program 

The Applicant Matters program overburned its agent resources during 

each fiscal year of the period studied, from a high of almost 300 agents in 

FY 1996 to a low of 40 agents in FY 2000. Overall, the Applicant program 

averaged a utilization rate of 245 percent. 

EXHIBIT 5-10

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AGENTS ON BOARD TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL

APPLICANT MATTERS PROGRAM

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001

255

205

171

196

76 79 79

134 131 121

326

367

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FISCAL YEAR

AGENTS

AOB FSLs

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

Program officials stated that while Applicant Matters is considered a 

separate program, much of its work is to recruit, test, process, and hire 

special agents to staff all investigative programs. Officials also noted that 

agent utilization steadily decreased in the program over the years because 

the FBI began contracting with a private company to conduct applicant 

background checks. 

Additionally, officials attributed the significant agent overutilization in 

FY 1996 to the large amount of applicant work when the FBI lifted a 3-year 

hiring freeze in 1995. In addressing the spike in utilization from 171 to 

196 agents between FY 2000 and FY 2001, officials explained that because 

this period included the presidential election, the program was occupied with 

background checks on new presidential appointees, federal judges, and 

White House staff. According to program officials, contractors are not 

permitted to conduct these types of background checks. 

- 48 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Training (TRAIN) Program 

The FBI significantly overutilized its agent resources in the Training 

program from FY 1996 through FY 2001. 

EXHIBIT 5-11

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE AGENTS ON BOARD TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL

TRAINING PROGRAM

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2001

172

189 195

217

190

125

127 131 131 131 131

91

0

50

100

150

200

250

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

FISCAL YEAR

AGENTS

AOB FSLs

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

Program officials explained that prior to FY 2001, training for all

investigative programs was captured under the Training Program and was 

reflected in the utilization rate. In FY 2001, the FBI added subclassifications 

to capture training hours within the specific program supported by the 

training rather than within the overall Training Program. Program officials 

further explained that in March 2001, executive management declared that 

overutilization in the Training Program would no longer be acceptable and 

ordered that the training provided to state and local police officers be 

reduced. 

- 49 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Conclusion 

Overall, our comparative trend analysis revealed that the FBI’s 

utilization of agent resources did not match its allocation of agent resources. 

Between FY 1996 and FY 2000, the Bureau as whole used fewer agent 

resources than it was allocated. It was not until FY 2001 that this trend 

shifted and agent usage surpassed agent allocation. 

At the investigative program level, most programs experienced both 

under and overutilization. The matrix below summarizes our analyses; 

yellow shading illustrates underutilization and blue shading illustrates 

overutilization. 

EXHIBIT 5-12

UTILIZATION MATRIX 

FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 2002 

PROGRAM

 FY 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Utilization 

Rate 

Percentage 

FBI-WIDE U U U U U O 97.8%

NFIP U U U U U O 89.8%

NIPCIP45 NA NA NA U O O 91.6%

DT O U U U O U 90.5%

WCC U U U U U U 95.5%

OC/D U U U U U U 91.2%

VCMO O O O O O O 105.6% 

CR U U O O O U 103.6% 

APPLICANTS O O O O O O 245.2% 

TRAINING O O O O O O 146.7% 

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division 

 

The FBI’s terrorism-related programs (National Foreign Intelligence, 

National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion, and Domestic 

Terrorism) and the Organized Crime/Drugs program underutilized agent 

resources at a rate much lower than that of the Bureau overall. The Violent 

Crimes and Major Offenders program was the only criminal investigative 

program that overutilized its agent resources in each year of our review 

 45 The National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion Program was created in

FY 1999. 

- 50 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

period. All other FBI criminal investigative programs, including National 

Foreign Intelligence, Domestic Terrorism, White Collar Crime, Civil Rights, 

and Organized Crime/Drugs, experienced periods where agent utilization 

was below agent allocation. In contrast, the two non-criminal investigative 

FBI programs, Applicant Matters and Training, overutilized their resources in

every fiscal year of the analyzed timeframe. 

- 51 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CHAPTER 6: FIELD OFFICE AGENT RESOURCE 

SPECIALIZATION 

We conducted an analysis of agent and support resource utilization in 

each of the FBI’s 56 field offices to determine the predominant programs for 

each office. To do so, we calculated agent and support resource utilization46

in each field office, by program, for each fiscal year of our review period, 

October 1, 1995, through June 1, 2002.47 We defined the “predominant” 

program as the program that utilized the most agent resources for the most 

fiscal years during the sample timeframe. 

For many field offices, the predominant program varied from year to

year. For example, in the seven years from FY 1996 through June 2002, the 

Chicago Field Office utilized the largest number of its agent resources in the 

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders program (VCMO) for one fiscal year 

(1996), the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) for one fiscal year 

(2002), and White Collar Crime (WCC) program for five years. Thus, the 

predominant program for Chicago agents is WCC. 

EXHIBIT 6-1

SPECIAL AGENT UTILIZATION 

CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED

Source: FBI TURK System 

 46 This is calculated using Average On Board (AOB), as previously defined.

47 As part of this analysis, we created resource utilization graphs by criminal investigative program 

for both agent and support personnel for each of the FBI’s field offices. The FBI considers the data 

presented in the graphs to be classified information. Therefore, all 112 graphs were provided to the 

FBI under separate cover.

- 52 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

The Chicago Field Office utilized its support resources differently than 

its agent resources. As shown in the following graph, Chicago utilized most 

of its support resources in NFIP by a large margin, whereas the WCC 

program is either second or third in terms of resource usage. This reflects 

the overall trend of support in NFIP being greater than in all other programs 

combined (as shown in Exhibit 3-5). 

EXHIBIT 6-2

SUPPORT PERSONNEL UTILIZATION 

CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED

Source: FBI TURK System 

Unlike Chicago, agent resource trends in some field offices were very 

clear and remained consistent throughout the duration of our review period. 

For example, in the El Paso Field Office, the largest number of agent 

resources were utilized in the Organized Crime/Drugs program (OC/D) for 

each of the seven fiscal years. 

- 53 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 6-3

SPECIAL AGENT UTILIZATION 

EL PASO FIELD OFFICE

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED

Source: FBI TURK System

Our review also revealed that the majority of other field offices utilized 

most of their agent resources in NFIP in FY 2002. This correlates to the 

FBI’s shift in workload in the wake of 9/11. In El Paso, however, although 

agent usage in NFIP moved ahead of both the Violent Crimes and Major 

Offenders and White Collar Crime programs in FY 2002, it remained below 

that of OC/D. 

Only 10 other field offices utilized more of their agent resources in 

programs other than NFIP in FY 2002: Albuquerque, Anchorage, Cleveland, 

Jackson, Minneapolis, Mobile, New Orleans, Salt Lake City, San Antonio, and 

San Juan. Each of these, except Salt Lake City, continued to expend more 

of its agent resources in that field office’s predominant program from 

FY 1996 through FY 2001. As the lone exception, Salt Lake City expended 

the majority of its agent resources in the Domestic Terrorism program due 

to the 2002 Winter Olympics. The following list groups the FBI field offices 

by predominant program. 

- 54 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

 EXHIBIT 6-4

Predominant Field Office Agent Programs48

October 1, 1995 through June 1, 2002

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED 

Source: FBI TURK System 

Only seven field offices experienced no change in their predominant 

agent programs during the timeframe we reviewed. These offices are 

printed in blue and italicized in Exhibit 6-4. We also have incorporated the 

information from the previous list onto the following map, which 

geographically illustrates the jurisdictional boundaries of each FBI field office.

As illustrated on Exhibit 6-5, although NFIP is a tier one program in the FBI’s 

strategic plan, only four field offices allocated enough agent resources to 

make it their predominant program.

 48 None of the other FBI criminal investigative programs (Civil Rights, Domestic Terrorism,

or National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion) were predominant for any of the 56

field offices.

- 55 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

- 56 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 6-5

PREDOMINANT PROGRAMS WORKED IN FBI FIELD OFFICES 

FY 1996 – JUNE 2002 

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED

Source: FBI TURK System, FBI Field Office Map, and OIG analysis. 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CHAPTER 7: TRENDS IN RESOURCE UTILIZATION ON 

MAJOR CASES 

Major cases are investigative matters, which, at their outset, are of 

national importance or require a massive commitment of resources 

throughout the FBI field offices. The Bureau began using major case 

designators in 1987. Examples of major cases include investigations of the 

9/11 attacks; the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma; and the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa. In addition, the 

FBI has opened major cases related to preparation for the 2002 Winter 

Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah, and the 1996 Summer Olympic 

Games in Atlanta, Georgia. 

Overall FBI Largest Major Cases 

We obtained data for the total hours charged by FBI personnel to all 

major cases from FY 1996 through June 1, 2002, and we identified the top 

15 cases in terms of combined agent and support personnel hours worked.49 

We discovered that 11 of these cases were related to terrorism. 

EXHIBIT 7-150

TOP 15 FBI MAJOR CASES 

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002

RANK MAJOR CASE HOURS51

1 PENTTBOMB 3,994,968

2 INNOCENT IMAGES 628,255

3 CAMPCON 332,378

4 2002 OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES 297,075

5 OKBOMB 294,157

6 SW BORDER PROJECT/PUBLIC CORRUPTION 274,451

7 UNABOM 223,586

8 SANDBOMB 213,145

9 CENTBOM 179,265

10 THUNDER ROLL 166,682

11 AMADO CARRILLO FUENTES INITIATIVE 147,429

12 KENBOM 145,645

13 1996 SUMMER OLYMPICS 143,163

14 AMERITHRAX 116,575

15 USAMA BIN LADEN52 92,570

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

 49 The FBI had 122 major cases open between October 1, 1995, and June 1, 2002. 

50 Each of the major cases noted in this chapter is briefly described in Appendix II. Terrorism-related 

cases in Exhibits 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3 are identified in bolded italics. 

51 The hours shown do not necessarily represent total hours charged to these cases. Instead, the number 

reflects the hours charged during our review period of October 1, 1995, to June 1, 2002. 

52 This case was opened on May 14, 1999. 

- 57 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

By far, the case utilizing the most FBI human resources (special agent 

and support personnel combined) has been the investigation into the 9/11 

attacks (PENTTBOMB). Through June 1, 2002, the FBI had expended almost 

4 million work hours on this investigation, which opened on September 12, 

2001. In comparison, the second largest major case, INNOCENT IMAGES, has 

been open since 1994 and has consumed about 628,000 work hours.53 

Major Case Activities: Agents vs. Support Personnel 

The major case data also highlights that different types of cases require 

different levels of effort from agents and support personnel. As noted in 

Exhibit 7-1, CAMPCON was the third largest major case for the FBI as a whole. 

However, this investigation into campaign contribution violations in the 1996 

federal elections ranked seventh for agents and second for support personnel. 

Conversely, the case related to the 2002 Winter Olympics ranked third for 

agents and fifth for support, resulting in an overall rank of fourth. 

Special Agents – The top 15 cases for agents were generally the same 

as the top 15 cases worked overall, with a few exceptions. The 15th largest 

case overall, USAMA BIN LADEN, failed to rank in the top 15 for agents (it 

was 16th with 82,967 hours). Instead, the 15th largest case for agents was 

SPLITRAIL, an investigation into a train derailment in Arizona. The following 

table presents the top 15 major cases worked by FBI special agents. 

EXHIBIT 7-2

TOP 15 FBI MAJOR CASES FOR SPECIAL AGENTS

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002

RANK MAJOR CASE HOURS

1 PENTTBOMB 3,558,813

2 INNOCENT IMAGES 509,874

3 2002 OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES 268,139

4 OKBOMB 264,728

5 SW BORDER PROJECT/PUBLIC CORRUPTION 260,237

6 UNABOM 210,034

7 CAMPCON 201,549

8 SANDBOMB 192,025

9 CENTBOM 166,331

10 THUNDER ROLL 149,419

11 AMADO CARRILLO FUENTES INITIATIVE 142,385

12 1996 SUMMER OLYMPICS 140,534

13 KENBOM 138,319

14 AMERITHRAX 97,569

15 SPLITRAIL 84,476

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

 53 This case is an undercover operation related to internet-based child pornography. See Appendix II

for a more detailed description.

- 58 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Support Personnel – The top 15 cases for support personnel include 

four cases that do not appear on either the overall or the agent lists. They 

are MOZARK, MAJOR CASE 143, AT NORTHSIDE FAMILY PLANNING SERV – 

VICTIM, and COLUMBIA/HCA. Also, the investigation into the anthrax 

incidents following 9/11 (AMERITHRAX), which began in October 2001, ranks 

much higher on the support chart (8th), than on either the agent or 

combined charts (14th). The following table presents the top 15 major cases 

worked by FBI support personnel. 

EXHIBIT 7-3

TOP 15 FBI MAJOR CASES FOR SUPPORT PERSONNEL 

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002 

RANK MAJOR CASE HOURS 

1 PENTTBOMB 436,155

2 CAMPCON 130,829

3 INNOCENT IMAGES 118,381

4 OKBOMB 29,429

5 2002 OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES 28,936

6 SANDBOMB 21,120

7 MOZARK 20,627

8 AMERITHRAX 19,006

9 MAJOR CASE 143 17,635

10 AT NORTHSIDE FAMILY PLANNING SERV - VICTIM 17,263

11 SW BORDER PROJECT/PUBLIC CORRUPTION 14,214

12 UNABOM 13,552

13 CENTBOM 12,934

14 COLUMBIA/HCA 11,327

15 USAMA BIN LADEN 9,603

Source: FBI TURK System and FBI Finance Division

 

System Improvements 

During our audit, we identified errors related to major case hours 

recorded in the FBI’s TURK system. Although these errors were minor, we 

brought them to the attention of FBI officials. Specifically, we identified work 

hours captured for major cases that did not exist. We also identified 

Los Angeles as the FBI field office in which most of these errors occurred. 

Because of our identification of these issues, a change was made to 

the TURK system. Now, when time is charged to a major case, the system 

automatically checks that case number against a current master list of major 

case numbers. The system will not accept invalid case numbers, preventing 

hours from being captured in non-existent major cases. Further, FBI 

officials agreed to review the circumstances surrounding the one field office 

with the majority of the errors. 

- 59 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CHAPTER 8: FBI CASEWORK 

The Violent Crimes and Major Offenders (VCMO) program accounted 

for the most cases worked in the FBI from October 1, 1995, through 

June 14, 2002.54 In fact, one quarter of all the cases the FBI worked during 

that period were in VCMO. The FBI’s National Foreign Intelligence Program 

(NFIP) accounted for 17 percent of the cases worked during the same time 

period, while the Domestic Terrorism (DT) program made up only one 

percent. Additionally, the Miscellaneous Matters (MISC) program accounted 

for 16 percent of the cases in the sample timeframe.55 The distribution of 

cases worked by the FBI between October 1, 1995, and June 14, 2002, is 

shown in Exhibit 8-1. 

EXHIBIT 8-1

BREAKDOWN OF FBI CASES 

OCTOBER 1995 through JUNE 2002 

APP

21%

NFIP

17%

MISC

16%

WCC

13%

VCMO

25%

OC/D

3%

NIPCIP

0%

DT

1%

TRAIN

1%

CR

3%

Source: FBI ACS System

In reviewing our analysis of the FBI’s casework found in this chapter, it 

is important to note that individual cases vary significantly in terms of 

importance and manpower commitment. For example, large-scale criminal 

 54 The universe of cases discussed in this chapter includes those opened in FBI field offices as well as 

FBI Headquarters. 

55 Cases in the Miscellaneous Matters program are generally administrative in nature. Examples 

include FBI automobile accidents, Equal Employment Opportunity counseling, and Freedom of 

Information Act inquiries.

- 60 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

enterprise investigations require the FBI to devote years of effort, while 

others, such as an immediate response to a bank robbery, can be short-term 

in nature. 

Data Analysis 

For our examination of cases worked, we obtained data from the 

Automated Case Support (ACS) system consisting of all FBI cases recorded 

from October 1, 1995, through June 14, 2002, a set of 1,799,198 individual 

records. This data generally included the case number, opening and closing 

dates, program, and investigative classification for each case.56 

We observed cases in the data set that were either assigned to FBI 

programs no longer in existence or contained no program designation. 

These cases accounted for less than one percent of the entire data set, so 

we excluded them and focused our analyses on cases from current FBI 

programs. 

Another factor to note when viewing our analyses is that in April 1999, 

as part of its preparation for the Year 2000 (Y2K) conversion effort, the FBI 

closed a large number of cases that originated at FBI Headquarters, and had 

been unaddressed for long periods. The FBI did this to reduce the amount 

of data that would go through the Y2K conversion process. Although there 

was no way for us to determine exactly how many cases were closed for this

reason because some investigations were undoubtedly closed at the same 

time for routine reasons, we approximated the number by identifying the 

number of Headquarters cases that were opened prior to FY 1996 and were 

closed in April 1999. This totaled 675,056 cases and reflected approximately 

38 percent of the original data set. 

In addition, we found 59,037 cases in the data set that were designated 

as having been destroyed. These destroyed cases, representing about three 

percent of the original data set, generally contained only the case number, 

the program designation, and a “D” designation for “destroyed.” Because 

they contained no opening or closing dates, we counted the destroyed cases 

as part of the total case count (and included them in Exhibit 8-1), but we 

eliminated them from all subsequent analyses. 

 56 Our data download included other fields, as noted in Appendix I; however, this 

information was not used in our analysis. 

- 61 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Cases Worked 

To determine if there were any evident trends in the FBI’s case 

workload during our review period, we calculated the number of cases 

worked57 per month, in all programs combined, for each fiscal year. We 

then computed the average number of cases worked per month and used 

this data in our analyses because we were only able to obtain data in 

FY 2002 through June 14, 2002. If we had presented the total number of 

cases worked per year, our results for 2002 would have been skewed 

because we did not have data for the full fiscal year. 

Source: FBI ACS System

 

Exhibit 8-2 presents the average number of cases worked per month, 

in all programs combined, for each fiscal year of the review period. The 

largest number of cases worked per month peaked in FY 1999 at over 

94,000, before dropping significantly to just under 40,000 in FY 2000. This 

significant drop-off, though, can be attributed to the aforementioned large 

number of cases closed in the Y2K cleanup in April 1999. Additionally, the 

average number of cases worked per month decreased slightly between 

FY 2000 and FY 2001, before increasing by about 18,000 per month in 

FY 2002. 

EXHIBIT 8-2

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES WORKED PER MONTH

ALL PROGRAMS COMBINED

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

100,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

FISCAL YEAR

CASES

- 62 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

57 For our analysis, we considered a case to be “worked” during a fiscal year if it was open

at any time during the year. 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Exhibit 8-3 breaks down the overall information and highlights the 

ear.

e period,

As displayed in Exhibit 8-3, following the Y2K cleanup in April 1999, the 

Source: FBI ACS System

nally, the Y2K cleanup seems to have affected various programs 

differently. The average number of cases worked per month in the MISC, 

average number of cases worked per month, by program, for each fiscal y

For all but FY 1996, the FBI worked more cases per month in the Applicant 

Matters (APP) program than in any other program, with the number ranging

from about 17,500 to almost 29,000 cases worked per month. In FY 1996, 

Miscellaneous Matters (MISC) cases and Violent Crimes and Major Offenders

(VCMO) cases accounted for the largest number of cases worked per month, 

with almost 19,000 cases. Further, between FY 1996 and FY 1999, the 

average number of National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) cases 

worked per month remained somewhat steady, varying between 

approximately 13,700 and 14,600 worked per month. For the sam

White Collar Crime (WCC) cases also held relatively constant, averaging 

between approximately 8,500 and 9,000 cases worked per month. 

APP program continued to lead all other programs in the average number of 

cases worked per month. At the same time, the number of VCMO, WCC, and

NFIP cases surpassed the number of MISC cases. By FY 2002, the number of 

NFIP cases worked per month had increased enough to place it second in the

average number of cases worked per month. This increase in NFIP work can 

most likely be attributed to the FBI’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 

which occurred at the end of FY 2001. 

EXHIBIT 8-3

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES WORKED PER MONTH - BY PROGRAM

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002

NFIP

WCC

OC/D

VCMO

CR

APP

MISC

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

FISCAL YEAR

CASES

NFIP NIPCIP DT WCC OC/D VCMO CR APP TRAIN MISC

Additio

- 63 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

VCMO, NFIP, WCC, and Civil Rights (CR) programs dropped significantly 

from FY 1999 to 2000. However, the number in other programs (Applicant

Matters, Organized Crime/Drugs, Domestic Terrorism, and National

Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion) decreased at a much smaller 

rate. Also, between FY 2001 and FY 2002, the number of cases wor

month in the APP, MISC, VCMO, NFIP, WCC, OC/D, and DT programs 

increased. The average number of APP cases increased by 64 percent, the 

largest amount of any program. 

According to the FBI, Applica

ked per

nt Matters accounts for a large portion of 

e active cases because of the types of cases worked in this program. 

this

d and analyzed the average number of FBI cases opened 

er month for each fiscal year between October 1, 1995, and June 14, 2002,

BI

th

Background investigation cases are opened for all FBI applicants, some of 

which remain open throughout an employee’s entire career. In addition,

program is responsible for performing background checks on presidential 

appointees, as well as White House staff and visitors. 

Case Openings 

We calculate

p

and identified a general downward trend. The FBI opened fewer cases per 

month in each successive fiscal year between 1997 and 2001, reflecting a 

one-third reduction in case openings, from just over an average of 12,000 

cases opened per month in FY 1997 to just over 8,000 in FY 2001.58 The F

reversed this trend in the portion of FY 2002 examined in our analysis by 

opening almost 2,000 cases per month more than in FY 2001. 

EXHIBIT 8-4

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES OPENED PER MONTH

Source: FBI ACS System

 

ALL PROGRAMS COMBINED

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

FISCAL YEAR

CASES

58 This analysis is not affected by the Y2K cleanup in April 1999 because that exercise 

involved only case closings, not case openings. 

- 64 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

We also looked at case openings in each FBI program as an annual

month

ffenders

Case Closings 

e also calculated and analyzed the average number of cases closed

s

ly average. We found that prior to FY 2002, the FBI opened 

significantly more cases per month in its Violent Crimes and Major O

program than in any other program, followed by Applicant Matters, White 

Collar Crime, National Foreign Intelligence, and Miscellaneous Matters. In

contrast, in the portion of FY 2002 in our review, the number of APP, NFIP,

and Domestic Terrorism cases opened per month increased, while the 

number opened per month in all other programs decreased. 

ource: FBI ACS System

EXHIBIT 8-5

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES OPENED PER MONTH - BY PROGRAM

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002

APP

CR

DT

MISC

NFIP

VCMO

W

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

199 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

FISCAL YEAR

CASES

APP CR DT MISC NFIP NIPCIP OC/D TRAIN VCMO WCC

CC

OC/D

6

S

W

per month for each fiscal year of the data set. Of all the graphs found in thi

chapter, the following one in particular is distorted by the inordinate number 

of cases closed in FY 1999 as part of the Y2K cleanup. Exhibit 8-6 shows 

that excluding FY 1999, the FBI consistently has closed fewer cases per 

month in each successive fiscal year since 1998. 

- 65 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 8-6

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES CLOSED PER MONTH

ALL PROGRAMS COMBINED

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

FISCAL YEAR

CASES Source: FBI ACS System

 

To provide a more easily observable view of this downward trend in 

case closings, we developed Exhibit 8-7, which contains the same 

information as Exhibit 8-6 but removes all data from FY 1999. 

EXHIBIT 8-7

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES CLOSED PER MONTH IN ALL PROGRAMS

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002 (EXCLUDING FY 1999)

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002

FISCAL YEAR

CASES

Source: FBI ACS System

Exhibit 8-7 clearly shows that the average number of cases closed per 

month is declining, from a high of approximately 9,000 in FY 1998, to a low 

of just under 7,000 in FY 2002, a reduction of more than 2,000 cases per 

month. 

- 66 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

We also analyzed case closings at the program level. As with 

xhibit 8-7, we removed FY 1999 data that distorts the case closing figures. 

r

002,

Ca sed in the Same Fiscal Year 

BI case in our data

et was open. In doing so, we observed that the FBI had investigated a 

ns.

E

The FBI closed the most cases per month in Violent Crimes and Majo

Offenders, followed by White Collar Crime, National Foreign Intelligence and 

Applicant Matters programs. These trends remained consistent in FY 2

after 9/11. 

EXHIBIT 8-8

Source: FBI ACS System

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES CLOSED PER MONTH - BY PROGRAM

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002 (EXCLUDING FY 1999)

APP

NFIP

WCC

VCMO

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002

FISCAL YEAR

CASES

TRAIN DT CR OC/D MISC APP NFIP WCC VCMO NIPCIP

ses Opened and Clo

We also calculated the length (in days) that each F

s

significant number of cases that both opened and closed in the same fiscal 

year. For the purposes of further analysis, we designated these cases as

“short-term,” and analyzed them at the program level to determine which 

programs tended to conduct the largest number of short-term investigatio

- 67 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

As with the other analyses in this chapter, to obtain the most accurate 

information possible, we computed the data as a monthly average for each

fiscal year period. 

Even with FY 1999 data included, we identified the same downward

trend in this analysis that we observed for both case openings and case 

gram-level analysis of short-term cases is noted in the 

xhibit 8-10. In general, the FBI worked most of its short-term cases in the 

VCMO

closings. In all programs combined, the FBI opened and closed individual 

cases in the same fiscal year with much less frequency from FY 1998 

onward. For example, in FY 1997, the FBI was working on an average of 

almost 5,000 short-term cases per month. By FY 2002, though, this 

average had dropped by more than 50 percent, to just over 2,200 per 

month. 

EXHIBIT 8-9

 Source: FBI ACS System 

 

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES PER MONTH

OPENED AND CLOSED IN THE SAME FISCAL YEAR

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

FISCAL YEAR

CASES

Our pro

E

program, followed by WCC, APP, and NFIP. 

- 68 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXHIBIT 8-10

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES PER MONTH - BY PROGRAM

OPENED AND CLOSED IN THE SAME FISCAL YEAR

OCTOBER 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2002

NFIP

WCC

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

FISCAL YEAR

CASES

APP CR DT MISC NFIP NIPCIP OC/D TRAIN VCMO WCC

APP

VCMO

MISC

Source: FBI ACS System 

- 69 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CHAPTER 9: OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Since 1998, according to the FBI’s strategic plan, its top priority has 

been addressing foreign intelligence, terrorist, and criminal activities that 

directly threaten the national security of the United States. In May 2002, 

the FBI Director announced a realignment of the Bureau’s top ten priorities 

that again placed terrorism-related matters at the top. Despite these stated 

priorities, we found that prior to 9/11: 

• The FBI utilized more of its agent resources in the White Collar 

Crime (WCC), Violent Crimes and Major Offenders (VCMO), and 

Organized Crime/Drugs (OC/D) programs than in those related 

to terrorism. 

• The terrorism-related programs consistently underutilized their 

allocated personnel resources at a rate greater than the Bureau 

as a whole. In comparison, agent utilization rates in VCMO, Civil 

Rights (CR), and WCC were significantly higher. 

• Only 4 of the 56 field offices expended more of their agent 

resources in a terrorism-related program than in any other 

program. The remaining 52 field offices predominantly used 

agent resources in WCC, VCMO, or OC/D. 

• Terrorism-related cases accounted for only 18 percent of those 

open any time between October 1995 and June 2002. In 

contrast, the VCMO program accounted for 25 percent of this 

universe of cases. 

The FBI responded to the 9/11 tragedy with a level of effort 

unprecedented in its history. In a comparatively short period of time, the 

investigation into the attacks became the FBI’s largest major case in the 

past seven years. Additionally, since 9/11, the FBI has continued to devote 

more of its time to terrorism-related work than any other single area. 

 We believe the FBI needs to create an environment in which its 

operational priorities, in terms of human resource utilization and 

investigations, consistently coincide with the priorities that it has identified in 

its strategic plan. Without such a sustained and systemic effort, there is a 

possibility that the FBI’s priorities and resource allocation could diverge as 

they did before September 11, 2001. 

- 70 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Based on the issues we observed during our review, we offer the 

following recommendations to help improve the FBI’s management of human 

resources and casework. 

Bureau-wide Comparative Analyses of Human Resource Utilization 

FBI program managers currently conduct comparative analyses of

human resource utilization to allocations at the program and sub-program 

level. This information is used as a tool for monitoring programs, as well as

for requesting and allocating resources for field offices. However, according 

to FBI officials, the Bureau had never undertaken an overall analysis 

involving all programs over a period of time. We believe that the FBI should 

conduct a review similar to ours on a recurring basis. 

1. We recommend that the Director of the FBI regularly review resource 

utilization reports for the Bureau as a whole, as well as for the individual 

investigative programs, and explore additional means of analyzing the 

Bureau’s resource utilization among the various programs. 

Level of Effort in the Violent Crimes and Major Offenders (VCMO) 

Program 

The criminal investigations in the VCMO program fall primarily into the 

third, and lowest, tier of the strategic plan. Despite this, the FBI 

consistently overutilized its agent resources in the VCMO program during our 

review period. Also, the FBI opened more VCMO cases than in any other 

program. Since the Director stressed in May 2002 that the Bureau needed 

to shift from a reactive force to a proactive one, and this program has 

consistently been allocated a significant number of agent resources, its 

resource utilization should be further scrutinized. 

2. We recommend that the Director of the FBI research and implement 

methods for addressing the overutilization and high allocation of agent 

resources in the VCMO program. 

Rate of Case Openings and Closings Between 1998 and 2001 

Generally, the FBI opened and closed fewer cases per month, from 

FY 1998 through 2001. Our audit was not designed to identify the cause for 

these trends. Considering that the FBI’s financial resources have increased 

over this timeframe and the fewer case openings and closings could be 

construed as a reduction in productivity, the FBI should examine its overall 

case activity to identify trends and address matters impacting its productivity. 

Further, we found that the rate at which the cases are being closed is falling 

- 71 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

behind the rate of case openings, resulting in an increasing population of 

open cases. 

3. We recommend that the FBI perform research to determine why the 

rate of case openings and closings is decreasing and the population of 

open cases is increasing. 

Timing of Funded Staffing Levels 

Funded Staffing Levels (FSL) are set after the budget has been 

approved by Congress and the Resource Management and Allocation office 

has performed its analysis and allocated the positions. Often, this occurs 

late in the fiscal year. For example, in FY 2002 the FSLs were not finalized 

until June 2002, even though the actual realignment of resources in 

response to 9/11 occurred immediately following the terrorist attacks. 

Further, the 2003 FSLs were not established and sent to field offices until 

May 7, 2003. However, during the reviews of FBI field offices performed by 

the Inspection Division, field office management is evaluated on the official 

FSLs in place, which may be outdated and present a false view of the actual 

field office utilization rate. For example, an office that may have been 

inspected in May 2002 would have been judged on pre-9/11 FSLs that did 

not reflect the shift in personnel devoted to terrorism-related programs. 

4. We recommend that the Director of the FBI review the current 

resource management and allocation process and make necessary

changes to ensure that FSL allocations are made in a more timely 

manner. 

Utilization in the Applicant Matters and Training Programs 

 

The FBI’s Applicant Matters and Training programs utilized significantly 

more agent resources than they were allocated during the timeframe we 

reviewed. This consistent disparity between planned and actual resource 

usage exposes an inherent problem in the planning process for these 

programs. Further, overutilization in these programs logically results in 

underutilization in other programs. The FBI needs to determine the actual 

resources that these programs require by evaluating the planning factors 

(e.g., election years, hiring surges) and remedy the process that has 

resulted in significant differences between resource allocation and utilization. 

5. We recommend that the Director of the FBI review the current 

planning factors and processes for the Applicant Matters and Training 

programs to more closely approximate the agent resources they 

actually need. 

- 72 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Data Errors and Omissions in the ACS System 

During our review of data extracted from the ACS system, we 

identified some errors and omissions in individual case records. Specifically, 

some records did not have a program designator or the designator was for a 

program no longer in existence. In addition, we found errors related to 

Preliminary Inquiry (PI) dates, as well as case opening and closing dates. 

For example, we discovered cases in which opening dates preceded PI dates, 

even though case opening dates should follow the date the associated PI 

was initiated. ACS officials explained that this sometimes occurred in cases 

originally opened under the legacy system to ACS, the Field Office 

Information Management System (FOIMS). Cases that were closed in 

FOIMS and then subsequently re-opened in ACS had their case opening 

dates overwritten by the case re-opening date. ACS officials also said some 

of these inconsistencies between case opening dates and PI dates could be 

attributed to user error or program conversion problems where ACS did not 

edit the date correctly. Additionally, officials said that when the system 

went on line, it converted some case opening dates to the default date of 

October 1, 1995; they advised that they corrected this problem between 

three and four years ago. 

The FBI is planning to bring a new case management system on line in 

the near future to replace ACS. In light of the errors we found in the data 

and the problems the FBI encountered when switching from FOIMS to ACS, 

the possibility exists for conversion errors when switching from ACS to the 

new system. Therefore, management should take action to ensure that the 

data is as complete and accurate as possible prior to the implementation of 

the new system in order to reduce any conversion errors. 

6. We recommend that the Director of the FBI ensure that the data in

ACS is complete and accurate prior to converting to a new case 

management system. 

Usefulness of Monthly Administrative Reports from the Automated 

Case Support (ACS) System 

The FBI Headquarters program managers are the primary users of the 

ACS Monthly Administrative Reports that contain investigative case

statistics. These individuals are also the most knowledgeable about their 

programs and the tools they find useful in managing their resources and 

responsibilities. Our discussions with program managers revealed that 

several question the utility of the information they receive from the reports. 

Further, some stated that the information did not help them in performing 

- 73 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

their program management duties. We suggest that the FBI form a 

committee of program managers to share information and opinions and 

develop ideas for improving the reports from ACS or the forthcoming case 

management system. 

7. We recommend that the Director of the FBI revamp the current 

Monthly Administrative Report format and determine if more useful 

information can be extracted from the ACS system and be provided to 

program managers to help them in performing their duties. 

- 74 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT CONTROLS 

In planning and performing our audit of the FBI’s management of 

casework and human resources, we considered the FBI’s control structure 

for the purpose of determining our audit procedures. This evaluation was 

not made for the purpose of providing assurance on the FBI management 

control structure as a whole. However, we noted certain matters involving 

management controls that we consider to be reportable conditions under 

government auditing standards. 

Reportable conditions involve matters coming to our attention relating 

to significant deficiencies in the design or operations of the management 

control structure that, in our judgment, could adversely affect the FBI’s 

ability to effectively manage its case workload and human resources. We 

identified weaknesses in the following areas: 

• senior management actions to review human resource allocation 

and utilization, as well as casework distribution, for the Bureau 

as whole, among and between programs, and for compliance 

with the strategic plan; 

• timing of the human resource allocations developed by the 

Resource Management and Allocation office; and 

• quality of specific data in the Automated Case Support (ACS) 

system and the utility of the reports containing ACS data. 

Because we are not expressing an opinion on the FBI’s management 

control structure as a whole, this statement is intended solely for the 

information and use of the FBI in managing its casework and resource 

management processes. 

- 75 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX I 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Audit Objectives 

The objectives of this audit were to: 1) review the FBI’s allocation and 

utilization of human resources in its investigative programs from FY 1996 

through June 2002, and 2) determine the types and number of cases 

investigated over the same time period. 

Scope and Methodology 

We performed our audit in accordance with Government Auditing 

Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and 

included such tests of the records and procedures that we considered 

necessary to accomplish the audit objectives. The informational nature of 

our audit objectives did not require that we perform testing of the FBI’s 

compliance with laws and regulations. 

We conducted work at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at

the FBI Chicago Field Office in Chicago, Illinois. We interviewed over 

50 officials from the FBI, including the Director, the Assistant Director and 

Chief Technology Officer, the Chief of Staff, the Special Assistants to the 

Director for both Strategic Planning and Resource Management and

Allocation, and several Assistant Directors. We also interviewed FBI 

Headquarters officials from the Finance Division and Resource Management 

and Allocation office, as well as numerous Section Chiefs and Unit Chiefs 

representing all FBI programs. Through these interviews and review of 

documents and records pertaining to the audit objectives, we obtained an 

understanding of the control environment for strategic and program 

planning, requirements determination, and the resource allocation and 

management processes. Further, we worked extensively with management 

and support personnel responsible for the Time Utilization and 

Recordkeeping (TURK) and Automated Case Support (ACS) systems to gain 

an understanding of the systems, the data contained therein, the ways in 

which the systems support the investigative work of the Bureau, and the 

management controls over the systems. 

To achieve the audit objectives, we used computer-processed data 

maintained in FBI information systems. To examine the FBI’s human 

resource utilization, we reviewed data from the TURK system, a module of 

the FBI’s payroll system, for the period of October 1, 1995, through June 1, 

2002. The TURK system contains work hour and Average On Board data for 

most FBI agents and support involved with investigative matters. To 

examine the numbers and types of cases in its various criminal programs, 

- 76 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX I 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

we reviewed data from the Automated Case Support (ACS) system, which 

assigns unique case identifiers to all investigations and contains case-related 

material, for the period of October 1, 1995, through June 14, 2002. 

We assessed the reliability of the computer-processed data provided 

by the FBI by obtaining information from FBI officials and performing various 

tests. For data from the TURK and ACS systems, we performed tests to 

establish reliability and obtained confirmation from FBI officials as to the 

data’s reliability. For both systems, we reviewed management controls and 

we performed data validity tests at the FBI Chicago Field Office in Chicago, 

Illinois. Based on our test results and the information we obtained, we 

concluded the data was sufficiently reliable to achieve our audit objectives. 

Data Analysis 

We performed analyses of FBI resource allocation and utilization data, 

as well as casework data, to identify trends in the FBI’s operations from 

October 1995 through June 2002. In total, this data amounted to 2,407,108 

records. 

Average On Board (AOB) - We received two runs of Average On Board 

(AOB) data,59 for both agents and support personnel, covering the period 

from October 1, 1995, through June 1, 2002. The first data run was 

provided in a text file, which we then exported to a database file, and 

contained 34,944 records broken into the following fields: 

• COST CODE: Four-digit office identifier 

• EMPLOYEE INDICATOR: Agent or Support 

• FISCAL YEAR: 1996 through 2002 

• PROGRAM: Numeric Indicator - See Appendix IV

• SUB-PROGRAM: Alpha Indicator - See Appendix IV 

• AVERAGE ON BOARD: AOB for the program/sub-program designated 

We provided the annual AOB figures from our analyses to FBI 

Headquarters program managers for verification and explanation of the data. 

In doing so, we discovered that we had not been provided with data for the 

entire universe of FBI personnel who are captured in the TURK system. We 

then received a second data run containing AOB data in the same format as 

the original sample for three cost codes that were not captured in the first 

 59 The definition of AOB can be found on page 14. 

- 77 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX I 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

run: Critical Incident Response Group; Independent Counsels; and 

CAMPCON, a major case related to the investigation of campaign finance 

irregularities in the 1996 presidential election. We received this data in a text 

file containing 1,644 records and imported it into a database file for testing. 

We exported the data from both the original and new data runs into a 

spreadsheet program and calculated a new grand total. We then used this 

total for our trend analyses of AOB data found in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. 

 

TURK Work Hours – We obtained work hour data from the FBI’s TURK

system as a measurement of resource utilization. We received a total of 

four data runs for both agent and support personnel covering the period 

from October 1, 1995, through June 1, 2002. The first two runs had to be 

discarded due to data omissions and organization errors; the third data run 

appeared complete and organized in the manner we requested. We received 

the data in a text file and imported it into a database file for testing. The 

data consisted of 550,486 records, each containing the following fields: 

• COST CODE: Four-digit office identifier 

• FISCAL YEAR: 1996 through 2002 

• TURK PERIOD: See Appendix III 

• EMPLOYEE INDICATOR: Agent or Support 

• PROGRAM: Numeric Indicator - See Appendix IV 

• SUB-PROGRAM: Alpha Indicator - See Appendix IV 

• MAJOR CASE: Only if appropriate, see Appendix II for examples 

• HOURS: Hours expended in the program/sub-program designated 

• LEAVE: Hours charged to any type of leave, such as annual or sick leave 

• MISCELLANEOUS: Time expended on matters such as firearms training 

or automotive accidents that are not directly related to an investigative 

program 

The data universe the FBI provided included subtotals by program and 

sub-program. For us to perform the required analyses, we removed all 

subtotals and calculated the TURK work hours, miscellaneous, and leave 

amounts for each TURK period to obtain the total time TURKed for that time 

period. With these totals, we were able to compute the Direct Agent Work 

Years (DAWYs) and Direct Support Work Years (DSWYs). As previously 

explained, DAWYs and DSWYs are an estimation of work effort (not people), 

calculated based on a 10-hour day for a special agents and an 8-hour day 

- 78 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX I 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

for support personnel. The formulae to calculate the DAWYs or DSWYs are

as follows: 

 

DAWYs = ((Hours / number of payperiods) * 26) / 2600 

DSWYs = ((Hours / number of payperiods) * 26) / 2080 

As with the AOB data, we discovered that we had not been provided 

TURK work hour data for all TURKing FBI personnel. Therefore, we had to 

request a fourth data run, containing agent and support work hour data for 

the same three cost codes that were not captured in the initial AOB run. We 

received the data in a text file consisting of 9,175 records in the same 

format as the initial data and imported it into a database file for testing. We 

exported the data from both the third and fourth data runs into a 

spreadsheet program and combined it for a new grand total. We used this 

total for our analyses of TURK work hour data found in Chapters 4 and 7. 

Funded Staffing Levels – In our comparative trend analyses of agent 

resource utilization to allocation, we used the Bureau’s Funded Staffing 

Levels (FSLs) that are established by the Resource Management and 

Allocation (RMA) office. We obtained two sets of FSLs for each program and 

fiscal year. The first set we obtained from the RMA office represented the 

initial allocations set for each fiscal year. We also obtained FSLs from TURK 

program officials that represented the final allocation for the fiscal year, 

which reflected any mid-year adjustments. The two sets of data amounted 

to 11,661 records. We used the final FSLs in our comparative trend 

analyses discussed in Chapter 5. 

Casework - For our analyses of the FBI’s casework, we received a total 

of five data runs from the Automated Case Support (ACS) system containing 

all FBI cases worked from October 1, 1995, through June 14, 2002. We had 

to discard the first four runs due to omissions and data organization errors 

before receiving a fifth and final one. The information was provided in a 

database file containing 1,799,198 records, separated into the following 

fields: 

• CASE ID: Universal Case File Number 

• SOURCE: Source of information that resulted in the opening of a 

case 

• PRELIMINARY DATE: Date the Preliminary Inquiry (PI) began 

• FULL DATE: Date the full investigation began 

• CASE OPEN DATE: Date the case was officially opened 

- 79 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX I 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

• CASE CLOSE DATE: Date the case was officially closed 

• PROGRAM: Full name of FBI program 

• PREV CLASS 1-30: Previous FBI classification for any case that 

was classified under two or more investigative classifications 

during its tenure 

• CLASS LEVEL: National security classification of the case 

(e.g., Secret) 

• DESTROYED CASE: Indicator ("D") that case was destroyed 

The ACS data did not contain all of the fields we requested in our initial 

data request memorandum. ACS officials advised that they were unable to 

provide the following three fields we had requested because ACS does not 

track them: 1) the source organization requesting assistance or referring a 

case, 2) the lead agency on a multi-agency case, and 3) a field showing the 

disposition of a Preliminary Inquiry (PI) or Suitability Inquiry. 

In reviewing the final data run, we identified cases that were 

designated as belonging to FBI programs no longer in existence or in which 

no program was listed. Without a current program identifier for these cases,

we were required to eliminate them from our analyses. In total, this 

accounted for 12,641 cases, or less than three quarters of one percent of the 

original universe. As a result, our universe consisted of 1,786,557 cases on 

which we performed our initial breakdown of FBI cases from October 1995 

through June 2002, found in Exhibit 8-1. 

In addition, we discovered 59,037 cases in the database that were 

designated as having been destroyed (59 of these destroyed cases also had 

no program listed and were removed as part of those noted in the preceding 

paragraph). These destroyed cases, representing 3.28 percent of the 

original data set, did not contain any case opening or closing dates. ACS 

officials advised that they are sometimes directed to destroy cases, and if 

this is done it is impossible to extract any information from them except for 

the case number (which remains in ACS to maintain the sequential 

numbering system). Without case opening or closing dates, we were unable 

to include these cases in our subsequent analyses, which were dependent 

upon these dates. This reduction of 58,978 cases (the 59,037 destroyed 

cases, less the 59 cases already captured as having no program and having 

already been excluded) left a sample of 1,727,579 cases, on which we 

performed the remainder of our testing in Chapter 8. 

- 80 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX I 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

As previously discussed, we discovered a significant number of cases 

that were closed in FY 1999 (761,406, compared to 106,958 in FY 1998). 

Upon our inquiry, ACS officials explained that in April 1999, as part of its 

preparation for Y2K on January 1, 2000, the FBI closed a large number of 

Headquarters cases that had been unaddressed for long periods of time to 

reduce the amount of data that would go through the Y2K conversion 

process. Although there was no way for us to determine exactly how many 

cases were closed for this reason, because some investigations were closed 

at the same time for routine reasons, we approximated the number by 

identifying the number of Headquarters cases that were opened prior to 

FY 1996 and were closed in April 1999. This totaled 675,056 cases and 

reflected approximately 38 percent of the original data set. 

- 81 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX II 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

EXAMPLES OF MAJOR CASES 

AMADO CARRILLO FUENTES INITIATIVE 

According to the FBI, the Amado Carrillo Fuentes Organization is a 

core level Mexican drug trafficking organization. It has evolved its role 

in drug trafficking into a brokerage, directing multi-ton quantities of 

Medellin and Cali cocaine toward established Mexican importation and 

distribution organizations. 

Rank:Overall 11 

 Agents 11 

 Support N/A 

 

AMERITHRAX 

In October 2001, members of Congress and the media received 

letters, through the postal service, containing anthrax, a deadly 

chemical. 

Rank:Overall 14 

 Agents 14 

 Support 8

AT NORTHSIDE FAMILY PLANNING SERV – VICTIM 

This investigation related to an explosive device that was detonated 

outside the Atlanta Northside Family Planning Center, fatally injuring

an individual employed at the facility. 

Rank:Overall N/A 

 Agents N/A 

 Support 10 

 

CAMPCON 

The CAMPCON investigation involves illegal campaign contributions by 

foreign nationals and corporations to the Democratic National 

Committee during the 1996 Federal elections. 

Rank:Overall 3 

 Agents 7 

 Support 2

 

- 82 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX II 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CENTBOM 

CENTBOM refers to the investigation of the bombing in Centennial Park 

during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia, which 

killed one individual. 

Rank:Overall 9 

 Agents 9 

 Support 13 

COLUMBIA/HCA 

COLUMBIA/HCA involves a criminal investigation into whether the 

nation’s largest hospital chain over billed government health insurance 

programs. 

Rank:Overall N/A 

 Agents N/A 

 Support 14 

 

INNOCENT IMAGES 

The INNOCENT IMAGES investigation is an undercover operation 

designed to identify and develop sufficient evidence to support the 

prosecution of individuals utilizing computer telecommunications 

facilities to receive and/or distribute child pornography, as well as 

those who use this technology to lure minors into illicit sexual 

relationships. 

Rank:Overall 2 

 Agents 2 

 Support 3

 

KENBOM 

This investigation related to the bombing at the U.S. Embassy in 

Nairobi, Kenya. 

Rank:Overall 12 

 Agents 13 

 Support N/A 

- 83 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX II 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

MOZARK 

MOZARK involves the investigation of allegations of fraud against the 

Small Business Administration as well as the investigation of a failed 

financial institution. 

Rank:Overall N/A 

 Agents N/A 

 Support 7

OKBOMB 

On April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma exploded following the detonation of a bomb, killing 

168 people. 

Rank:Overall 5 

 Agents 4 

 Support 4

PENTTBOMB 

PENTTBOMB refers to the investigation into the terrorist events on 

September 11, 2001, in which commercial airplanes were crashed into 

the Pentagon, the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York 

City, and a field in rural Pennsylvania. 

Rank:Overall 1 

 Agents 1 

 Support 1

MAJOR CASE 143 

Due to the sensitivity of this investigation, this major case cannot be 

described and can be referred to only by case number. 

Rank:Overall N/A 

 Agents N/A 

 Support 9

 

- 84 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX II 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

SANDBOMB 

In February 1998, an explosive device detonated outside the New 

Woman and All Women Health Care Clinic in Birmingham, Alabama, 

fatally injuring an off-duty policeman and severely injuring a nurse 

employed at the facility. According to the FBI, the investigation 

indicates that this bombing may be related to two other bombings

claimed by the Army of God, which occurred in Atlanta, Georgia during 

1997. 

Rank:Overall 8 

 Agents 8 

 Support 6

 

SPLITRAIL 

The SPLITRAIL investigation involves allegations that an Amtrak train 

was intentionally derailed at a remote site approximately 60 miles 

southwest of Phoenix, Arizona in October 1995. One passenger was 

killed, 12 were injured critically, and another 100 sustained other 

injuries. 

Rank:Overall N/A 

 Agents 15 

 Support N/A 

SW BORDER PROJECT/PUBLIC CORRUPTION 

This investigation involves crime along the Southwest Border of the 

U.S., especially drug trafficking, corruption, and auto/cargo theft. 

Rank:Overall 6 

 Agents 5 

 Support 11 

 

THUNDER ROLL 

The THUNDER ROLL investigation related to the arresting of 2 suspects 

and seizing approximately 45 bags of evidence in August 1997, 

including a suicide note and a 2-page letter in Arabic containing bombmaking instructions. 

Rank:Overall 10 

 Agents 10 

 Support N/A 

- 85 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
 APPENDIX II 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

UNABOM 

Over a 17-year period, Theodore Kaczynski constructed bombs that 

killed 3 and injured 22 people. He was arrested in April 1995 and 

pleaded guilty in January 1998. 

Rank:Overall 7 

 Agents 6 

 Support 12 

USAMA BIN LADEN 

The investigation, opened on May 14, 1999, focused on foreign acts of 

terrorism around the globe, including the bombings of the U.S. 

embassies in Africa in 1998, attributable to Bin Laden. 

Rank:Overall 15 

 Agents N/A 

 Support 15 

1996 SUMMER OLYMPICS 

This major case designator was used to consolidate time charged in 

preparation of the summer games held in Atlanta, Georgia in 1996. 

Rank:Overall 13 

 Agents 12 

 Support N/A 

2002 OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES 

The 2002 Winter Olympic Games were held in Salt Lake City, Utah. As 

this large, international event took place just months after the 9/11 

attacks, the FBI made extensive security preparations. 

Rank:Overall 4 

 Agents 3 

 Support 5

- 86 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX III 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

LIST OF TURK PERIODS IN REVIEW TIMEFRAME 

Fiscal 

Year 

Turk

Period Date Range Pay Period Range 

1996 1 10/01/1995 - 10/28/1995 22 - 23 

2 10/29/1995 - 11/25/1995 24 - 25 

3 11/26/1995 - 12/23/1995 26 - 01 

4 12/24/1995 - 01/20/1996 02 - 03 

5 01/21/1996 - 02/17/1996 04 - 05 

6 02/18/1996 - 03/16/1996 06 - 07 

7 03/17/1996 - 04/13/1996 08 - 09 

8 04/14/1996 - 05/11/1996 10 - 11 

9 05/12/1996 - 06/08/1996 12 - 13 

10 06/09/1996 - 07/06/1996 14 - 15 

11 07/07/1996 - 08/03/1996 16 - 17 

12 08/04/1996 - 08/31/1996 18 - 19 

13 09/01/1996 - 09/28/1996 20 - 21

Fiscal 

Year 

Turk

Period Date Range Pay Period Range 

1997 1 09/29/1996 - 10/26/1996 22 - 23 

2 10/27/1996 - 11/23/1996 24 - 25 

3 11/24/1996 - 12/21/1996 26 - 01 

4 12/22/1996 - 01/18/1997 02 - 03 

5 01/19/1997 - 02/15/1997 04 - 05 

6 02/16/1997 - 03/15/1997 06 - 07 

7 03/16/1997 - 04/12/1997 08 - 09 

8 04/13/1997 - 05/10/1997 10 - 11 

9 05/11/1997 - 06/07/1997 12 - 13 

10 06/08/1997 - 07/05/1997 14 - 15 

11 07/06/1997 - 08/02/1997 16 - 17 

12 08/03/1997 - 08/30/1997 18 - 19 

13 08/31/1997 - 09/27/1997 20 - 21

- 87 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX III 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Fiscal 

Year 

Turk

Period Date Range Pay Period Range 

1998 1 09/28/1997 - 10/25/1997 22 - 23 

2 10/26/1997 - 11/22/1997 24 - 25 

3 11/23/1997 - 12/20/1997 26 - 27 

4 12/21/1997 - 01/17/1998 01 - 02 

5 01/18/1998 - 02/14/1998 03 - 04 

6 02/15/1998 - 03/14/1998 05 - 06 

7 03/15/1998 - 04/11/1998 07 - 08 

8 04/12/1998 - 05/09/1998 09 - 10 

9 05/10/1998 - 06/06/1998 11 - 12 

10 06/07/1998 - 07/04/1998 13 - 14 

11 07/05/1998 - 08/01/1998 15 - 16 

12 08/02/1998 - 08/29/1998 17 - 18 

13 08/30/1998 - 09/26/1998 19 - 20

Fiscal 

Year 

Turk

Period Date Range Pay Period Range 

1999 1 09/27/1998 - 10/24/1998 21 - 22 

2 10/25/1998 - 11/21/1998 23 - 24 

3 11/22/1998 - 12/19/1998 25 - 26 

4 12/20/1998 - 01/16/1999 01 - 02 

5 01/17/1999 - 02/13/1999 03 - 04 

6 02/14/1999 - 03/13/1999 05 - 06 

7 03/14/1999 - 04/10/1999 07 - 08 

8 04/11/1999 - 05/08/1999 09 - 10 

9 05/09/1999 - 06/05/1999 11 - 12 

10 06/06/1999 - 07/03/1999 13 - 14 

11 07/04/1999 - 07/31/1999 15 - 16 

12 08/01/1999 - 08/28/1999 17 - 18 

13 08/29/1999 - 09/25/1999 19 - 20

- 88 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX III 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Fiscal 

Year 

Turk

Period Date Range Pay Period Range 

2000 1 09/26/1999 - 10/23/1999 21 - 22 

2 10/24/1999 - 11/20/1999 23 - 24 

3 11/21/1999 - 12/18/1999 25 - 26 

4 12/19/1999 - 01/15/2000 01 - 02 

5 01/16/2000 - 02/12/2000 03 - 04 

6 02/13/2000 - 03/11/2000 05 - 06 

7 03/12/2000 - 04/08/2000 07 - 08 

8 04/09/2000 - 05/06/2000 09 - 10 

9 05/07/2000 - 06/03/2000 11 - 12 

10 06/04/2000 - 07/01/2000 13 - 14 

11 07/02/2000 - 07/29/2000 15 - 16 

12 07/30/2000 - 08/26/2000 17 - 18 

13 08/27/2000 - 09/23/2000 19 - 20

Fiscal 

Year 

Turk

Period Date Range Pay Period Range 

2001 1 09/24/2000 - 10/21/2000 21 - 22 

2 10/22/2000 - 11/18/2000 23 - 24 

3 11/19/2000 - 12/16/2000 25 - 26 

4 12/17/2000 - 01/13/2001 01 - 02 

5 01/14/2001 - 02/10/2001 03 - 04 

6 02/11/2001 - 03/10/2001 05 - 06 

7 03/11/2001 - 04/07/2001 07 - 08 

8 04/08/2001 - 05/05/2001 09 - 10 

9 05/06/2001 - 06/02/2001 11 - 12 

10 06/03/2001 - 06/30/2001 13 - 14 

11 07/01/2001 - 07/28/2001 15 - 16 

12 07/29/2001 - 08/25/2001 17 - 18 

13 08/26/2001 - 09/22/2001 19 - 20

 

- 89 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX III 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Fiscal

Year 

Turk

Period Date Range Pay Period Range 

2002 1 09/23/2001 - 10/20/2001 21 - 22 

2 10/21/2001 - 11/17/2001 23 - 24 

3 11/18/2001 - 12/15/2001 25 - 26 

4 12/16/2001 - 01/12/2002 01 - 02 

5 01/13/2002 - 02/09/2002 03 - 04 

6 02/10/2002 - 03/09/2002 05 - 06 

7 03/10/2002 - 04/06/2002 07 - 08 

8 04/07/2002 - 05/04/2002 09 - 10 

9 05/05/2002 - 06/01/2002 11 - 12

- 90 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

CROSSWALK OF FBI PROGRAMS AND SUB-PROGRAMS 

PROGRAM SUB-PROGRAM AND FISCAL YEAR START

# NAME 1996 & PRIOR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 

Foreign Counterintelligence (CI) 

02 FBI Security (SC) 

NFIP International Terrorism (TI) 

03 NIPCIP No program in existence No Sub-programs 

Counterterrorism 

04 

DT Domestic Terroris

Weapons of Mass De

Economic Crimes (EC)Financial Institution Fraud (FI)Governmental Fraud (GF) Public Corruption (PC) Other Matters (ZZ) 

Antitrust (AT) Bankruptcy Fraud (BF) Computer Investigations/ Threat Assessment (CC) Environmental Crimes (EN) Health Care Fraud (HF) Insurance Fraud (IF) Money Laundering (ML) Public Corruption (PC) Securities/Commodities Fraud (SF) Telemarketing Fraud (TM) 

Intellectual Property Rights (IP)

05 

WCC 

Other Wire and M

- 91 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

PROGRAM SUB-PROGRAM AND FISCAL YEAR START

# NAME 1996 & PRIOR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 

Drug Demand Reduction Program/Community Outreach (DD) Organized Crime (OC) Drug Enforcement Task Force (DE)Organized Crime/Drugs Program (DP) 

Asian Criminal Enterprise (ACColumbian/Caribbean (CO) La Costra Nostra/Italian OC/LabMexican/Criminal Syndicates Other Matters-OC (OM) Russian/East Europe/Eurasian Cri

07 

OC/D 

Other Matters-D

Violent Crime-Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (DF)Financial Crimes (FU) Government Reservation Crimes (GR) Interstate Theft (IT) Violent Crimes/Violent Incident Crimes (VC) 

Victim Witness Assistance (VW) 

Crimes Against Children (CA)Fugitives (FU) Crimes in Indian Country (IC)Innocent Images National InitMajor Theft (MT) Special Jurisdiction Matters (STransportation Crimes (TC) Violent Gangs (VG) 

08 

VCMO 

Other Matters (ZV) 

- 92 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

PROGRAM SUB-PROGRAM AND FISCAL YEAR START

# NAME 1996 & PRIOR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 

09 

CEI The Criminal Enterprise Investigations program was created in FY 2003. 

10 

CCP The Cyber Crime Program was created in FY 2003. 

11 

CR No Sub-programs 

Other Reimbursable (OR) Other Non-Reimbursable (ON) Background Investigations (BP) 

14 

APP 

Recruitment and Processing (RP) 

16 Federal Training (FE)

TRAIN 

State and Local Training (ST) 

17 

MISC No Sub-programs 

- 93 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX V 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

DEFINITIONS OF 

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

ACS Automated Case Support 

AFOR Annual Field Office Report 

AG Attorney General

AOB Average On Board

APP Applicant Matters Program 

ATC Administrative Time Capture 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CR Civil Rights Program 

DAWY Direct Agent Work Year 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DSWY Direct Support Work Year 

DT Domestic Terrorism Program 

FSL Funded Staffing Level

FY Fiscal Year

MISC Miscellaneous Matters Program

NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program 

9/11 September 11, 2001

NIPCIP National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion Program 

OC/D Organized Crime/Drugs Program 

OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force 

OIG Office of the Inspector General 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PI Preliminary Inquiry

RMA Resource Management and Allocation 

SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics 

TRAIN Training Program

TURK Time Utilization and Recordkeeping 

USMS United States Marshals Service 

VCMO Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Program 

WCC White Collar Crime Program 

- 94 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE 

- 95 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

- 96 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

FBI Response 

to 

DOJ OIG Draft Audit Report 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Casework and Human Resource Allocation

Bureau-wide Comparative Analyses of Human Resource Utilization 

Recommendation Number 1, Page 72: We recommend that the Director 

of the FBI regularly review resource utilization reports for the 

Bureau as a whole, as well as for the individual investigative 

programs, and explore additional means of analyzing the Bureau’s 

resource utilization among the various programs. 

Response: The FBI agrees with the recommendation. The FBI is in 

the process of providing the Director with an automated resource 

utilization report function and is developing a portfolio of new 

resource utilization reports that will be provided to the 

Director each pay period. Both the automated report function and 

the hard copy reports will present resource utilization 

information across organizational programs and within each 

program. 

Level of Effort in the Violent Crimes and Major Offenders (VCMO) 

Program

Recommendation Number 2, Page 72: We recommend that the Director 

of the FBI research and implement methods for addressing the 

overutilization and high allocation of agent resources in the 

VCMO program.

 

OIG Rationale: The criminal investigations in the VCMO program 

fall into the third, and lowest, tier of the strategic plan, with 

a primary goal of assisting state and local law enforcement. 

Despite this, the FBI consistently over utilized its agent 

resources in the VCMO program during our review period. Also, 

the FBI opened more VCMO cases than in any other program. Since 

the Director stressed in May 2002 that the Bureau needed to shift 

from a reactive force to a proactive one, and this program has 

consistently been allocated a significant number of agent 

resources, its resource utilization should be further 

scrutinized. 

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APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

- 98 – 

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Response: The FBI disagrees with the statement in the OIG 

rationale that the primary goal of the VCMO Program (VCMOP) is 

assisting state and local law enforcement. The primary goal of 

the VCMOP is to combat significant violent crime in the United 

States and make the streets safe for its citizens. Assistance to 

state and local law enforcement is a component of this effort. 

The FBI also disagrees with the assumption that the VCMOP is 

entirely reactive in nature. Although part of the VCMOP mission 

will always require a reactive response to major violent crimes, 

the FBI’s VCMOP has always promoted proactive measures to address 

violent crime, particularly with regard to intelligence 

gathering, implementation of joint task forces and criminal 

enterprise investigations as a means of reducing violent crime. 

The FBI agrees with OIG’s recommendation and has made 

significant progress toward its implementation. 

Specifically, in March 2002 the Violent Crime and Major 

Offenders Section (VCMOS) instituted a measured response policy 

in bank robbery investigations in the VCMOP plan to focus 

resources on the most violent and/or serial bank robbers. 

To provide greater flexibility in prioritizing the FBI’s use 

of resources, in August 2002, the FBI established the Criminal 

Enterprise Investigative Program (CEIP) with a separate Funded 

Staffing Level. A total of 650 SA bodies were transferred from 

the VCMOP to ensure proactive criminal enterprise investigations 

of violent street gangs and major theft criminal enterprises are 

adequately addressed. In April 2003, CEIP Funded Staffing Level 

(FSL) was increased to its current level of 701. 

In June 2003, the VCMOS implemented a new VCMOP program plan 

recognizing that, while combating significant violent crime in 

the United States to protect US citizens is a lower priority, it 

is still a recognized priority of the FBI. Additionally, the 

plan recognizes VCMOP has traditionally brought ancillary 

benefits to other FBI programs through the liaison relationships 

developed with other agencies, media and private industry, and 

development of broad based investigative capabilities of FBI 

personnel. The current VCMOP program plan seeks to complement 

state and local law enforcement and focus FBI efforts in those 

investigations where the FBI is in a unique position to make a 

contribution, primarily in those instances where investigations 

are multi-jurisdictional in nature and/or FBI has unique 

resources that benefit both the FBI and other involved agencies. 

Additionally, the VCMOP and CEIP Program Plans further 

focused investigative efforts and instituted proactive
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

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initiatives to address specific crime problems in child 

prostitution, gang related crime in the most violent cities, and 

reduce bank robberies through improved security programs at 

financial institutions in the US. These plans also support the 

fight against terrorism by aggressively pursuing Crimes Aboard 

Aircraft, establishing Memorandums of Understanding with 

Department of Homeland Security to ensure coordinated responses, 

and targeting major theft groups whose proceeds are funneled back 

to countries harboring terrorist organizations. 

As a result of these efforts, the FBI enhanced other 

priority programs through an overall reduction of VCMOP and CEIP 

FSL to its current level of 1710 in FY 2003. Additionally, 

current resource utilization is beneath established FSLs with 

VCMOP AOB of 936.67 (underburn of 72.33) and CEIP AOB at 499.03 

(underburn of 201.97) through the third quarter of FY2003. 

Although these underburns have negatively impacted the CEIP, the 

underburn was considered necessary as the FBI temporarily 

diverted violent crime resources to address elevated terrorism 

threat levels as a result of the war in Iraq. 

To further ensure resources are expended within established 

parameters, the VCMOS instituted quarterly reviews of resource 

utilization, statistical and case accomplishments. VCMOS will 

also review field office strategies, and goals and objectives, 

through the Annual Field Office Report (AFOR) reviews and 

assessments of field office performance as part of the Inspection 

process. 

Rate of Case Openings and Closings Between 1998 and 2001 

Recommendation Number 3, Page 73: We recommend that the FBI 

perform research to determine why the rate of case openings and 

closings is decreasing and the population of open cases is 

increasing.

Response from the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) and 

Counterintelligence Division (CD): After September 11, the FBI 

Director refocused the FBI's traditional crime-fighting 

orientation of investigating criminal acts after-the-fact for 

prosecution to place the highest priority on preventing 

terrorism. The Director also shifted resources to meet this new 
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

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REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

priority. As such, the volume of opened International Terrorism 

(IT) and Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) cases being opened 

has increased. Additionally, IT cases are often in open and in 

pending status for years. Exhibit 1 depicts the pending and 

closed CTD cases. Exhibit 2 depicts the pending and closed FCI 

cases. 

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED

 Exhibit 1: Closed, Pending and Received IT Cases 

*FY 2003 reflects actuals as of 3/31/03 

CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION 

REDACTED 

Exhibit 2: Closed, Pending and Received FCI Cases 

 *FY 2003 reflects actuals as of June 30, 2003 
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

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REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Other explanations for the increased time requirements for IT and 

FCI cases include the following: 

• scope of FCI/IT cases is on intelligence gathering (not just 

criminal investigation) which is open-ended and not 

necessarily focused entirely on pushing the case toward the 

end goal of criminal prosecution 

• the overseas nexus of FCI/IT cases creates additional time 

burdens 

• a shift away from state sponsored terrorism to terrorism 

instigated by extremist groups which are located in various 

places all over the world 

• increased emphasis on espionage and economic espionage 

cases, which are, by nature, intricate 

• increased emphasis on priority country cases

• increased emphasis on counterproliferation cases, which are 

traditionally complex cases involving the necessity to 

coordinate with multiple agencies for a successful outcome

Response from the Criminal Investigative Division (CID): 

The Criminal Intelligence Section (CIS) has administrative 

responsibility for only one investigative classification which 

was reviewed for this response. The "92" classification, 

Racketeering Enterprise Investigations (REI), which are 

intelligence gathering investigations, are governed by the 

Attorney General Guidelines with strict guidelines which specify 

under what circumstances the REI can be opened and when the REI 

must be closed. In view of the fact that REIs cover all 

criminal programs, any shift of resources to address non 

criminal investigative matters can affect the rate of case 

openings and closings. A review of REI openings/closings for 

fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003, determined that a total of 

154 REIs were opened and 170 REIs were closed. At the beginning 

of FY 2001 there were 199 REIs pending. As of 6/30/03, there 

were 186 REIs pending. A breakdown by fiscal year for the REIs 

is listed below: 

 Opened Closed

 FY 2001 67 48 

 FY 2002 54 52 

 FY 2003 33 70 

 Totals 154 170 
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

 The FBI Drug Program (DP) reviewed the data contained in 

the DOJ/OIG report relative to the above recommendation, as it 

pertained to DP investigations. In 1998, in support of the 

FBI's 1998-2003 Strategic Plan, the DP developed its five-year 

program plan. The plan detailed the FBI's strategy for 

disrupting and dismantling the most significant Drug Trafficking 

Organizations (DTO) through application of the Enterprise Theory 

of Investigation, and was the basis for the National Priority 

Target List, created by the DP to focus the FBI's limited 

counter-drug resources on the domestic components of DTOs posing 

the greatest threat to the United States. 

Enterprise Investigations are strategically planned, longterm investigations that focus on all aspects of a defined 

criminal organization, utilizing an array of sophisticated 

investigative techniques that ultimately disrupt or dismantle 

the targeted organization. These Drug Enterprise Investigations 

require the FBI to devote years of investigative and 

prosecutorial effort in contrast to short-term investigations 

managed under other FBI criminal programs. The decrease in the 

rate of DP case openings and closings is, in part, the result of 

FBI field offices applying the Enterprise Theory of 

Investigation to DP investigations. Consequently, fewer drug 

investigations are initiated, but they remain open longer. A 

survey of 12 field offices, conducted in December 2001, revealed 

that 75% of Criminal Enterprise Investigations in the field were 

conducted within the DP. 

 Concurrent with the change in the strategic focus of DP 

investigations, the DP experienced decreases in Agent-funded 

staffing levels (FSL) since the beginning of FY 1998 (prior to 

FY 2000, the FSLs for the Organized Crime (OC) program and DP 

were combined). Using estimated figures for FY 1998 and FY 

1999, the DP experienced a 12% decrease in its FSL between FY 

1998 and the beginning of FY 2002. However, between FY 1998 and 

the end of FY 2002, the DP experienced a 51% decrease in its 

FSL. Further reductions in the DP during FY 2003 amounted to a 

decrease in the FSL of 68%. 

 Within CID, the DP's rate at which case openings and 

closing declined is commensurate with the change in strategic 

focus of the program and the reduction in Agent resources 

assigned to DP investigations. 

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APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

- 103 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

 The FBI is cognizant that the rate of case openings and 

closings is decreasing and that the population of open cases is 

increasing. During the period following 9/11, the massive 

reorganization of the FBI presented unique challenges in 

determining an appropriate distribution of existing resources 

needed to effectively address the exigent Counterterrorism (CT) 

threat, while maintaining a sufficient presence within the 

Counterintelligence, Criminal and other programs. This 

reorganization necessitated the temporary diversion of FBI 

resources at an unprecedented level. As a result of this 

diversion of resources, significant number of existing criminal 

investigations went unaddressed or were under-addressed. As a 

result, these existing cases remained open which obviously is 

reflected in the rate of case closings and in the population of 

open cases. 

Additionally, the temporary (and ultimately permanent) 

diversion of significant numbers of agents from Criminal 

programs to CT has had a corresponding reduction in the number 

of new investigations initiated within many Criminal programs. 

This is a significant factor in the declining rate of case 

openings/closings of criminal investigations. 

Lastly, a factor which impacts primarily on the population 

of open cases is the reality that the FBI is actively engaged in 

a significant number of "Intelligence" investigations within the 

CT program which by their nature tend to be long term and thus 

may remain open for extended periods of time. 

The limited analysis to date indicates a strong correlation 

between the percentage reduction in agents available to conduct 

criminal investigations, with the corresponding reduction in 

initiations of criminal investigations. It is expected that 

additional analysis will support this as the primary factor and 

will in no way support a conclusion of reduced productivity. 

Timing of Funded Staffing Levels 

Recommendation Number 4, Page 73: We recommend that the 

Director of the FBI review the current resource management and 

allocation process and make necessary changes to ensure that FSL 

allocations are made in a more timely manner. 
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Response: The FBI agrees with this recommendation and has 

already reviewed the process and determined an appropriate 

course of action. In the past, FBI executive management 

direction was to hold the FSL allocation in abeyance until a 

budget was passed. Then, once the Finance Division had

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APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

reconciled any budgetary issues and provided the final funded 

position/workyear levels, the Resource Management and Allocation 

Office, Administrative Services Division, would allocate the 

FSL. This method has resulted in FSLs not being set until late 

in the year since the budget is typically not approved by 

Congress until after the start of a new fiscal year and many 

times as late as six months into the year. 

The FBI has instituted a strategy whereby the allocation 

process will begin several months prior to the beginning of a 

fiscal year based on existing personnel resources and pending 

enhancement requests. This will be adjusted and modified as the 

Congress progresses toward a final determination of the FBI's 

budget. In this fashion, an allocation of available resources 

may occur shortly after the budget is enacted. 

Utilization in the Applicant Matters and Training Programs 

Recommendation Number 5, Page 73-74: We recommend that the 

Director of the FBI review the current planning factors and 

processes for the Applicant Matters and Training programs to 

more closely approximate the agent resources they actually need. 

Response: Applicant Program resources are used in direct 

support of hiring FBI employees and in conducting backgrounds 

for certain other agencies. The FBI utilizes the services of 

Contract Investigators to conduct pre- FBI employment 

backgrounds. This has minimized the requirement for the use of 

Special Agent resources in the Applicant Program. There are 

certain aspects of the hiring process that require Special Agent 

resources such as in the testing and processing of FBI 

applicants. During a transition of Administration in the White 

House there is a seasonal increase in the requirement for 

applicant resources. Most high level government appointments 

require that FBI backgrounds be conducted by FBI Special Agents. 

A review of allocated Applicant Program resources compared 

with actual utilization of resources shows a convergence from 

Fiscal Year 1996 through 2000. This occurred as a result of the 

use of Contract Investigators instead of FBI Special Agents. 

Although these resources are depicted as being utilized on 

applicants, they are in direct support of the FBI's most 

significant investigative priorities. These additional 

resources over the established FSL for the Applicant Program, 

are in actuality providing the human capital for the major 

investigative programs of the FBI. The temporary redirection of 

resources from the investigative programs into the Applicant 

Program is consistent and in direct support of those 

investigative programs. 

A slight increase in actual utilization of applicant

- 105 – 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

resources occurred in FY 2001 due to the backgrounds required 

during the transition of the Administration. This increase 

occurs at a change of Administration and exists for a short 

period of time. If additional resources were acquired for this 

resource need during a change of Administration, a redirection 

would occur during the several years of no Administration 

change. Many of these resources are required in areas of the 

country where the Administration had been based. The movement 

of resources into those geographic areas would be more costly 

than the temporary diversion of current resources assigned to 

those offices. 

The FBI will review the current process in allocating 

resources in the Applicant Program and determine if a method can 

be developed to more accurately project and record resource 

allocation and utilization. 

Data Errors and Omissions in the ACS System 

Recommendation Number 6, Page 74: We recommend that the 

Director of the FBI ensure that the data in ACS is complete and 

accurate prior to converting to a new case management system.

Response: The FBI agrees with the recommendation. The Virtual 

Case File (VCF) application, scheduled to be released in December 

of 2003, will replace the Automated Case Support (ACS) system. 

All case-related information will be migrated from ACS into the 

VCF and made available to all authorized users. Because VCF is 

significantly different from ACS in facilitating workflow and how 

data is viewed, there will be situations where it does not make 

sense to move certain data over. Even so, all information in ACS 

will be strictly accounted for. Any data not moved over to the 

VCF will be logged, then archived in anticipation that this 

information may still be needed at some future date. 

In preparation for the data migration, all data currently 

residing in ACS has been analyzed, looking for any anomalies or 

error conditions that could cause problems in the VCF 

environment. A Data Quality report has been produced that 

identifies areas of potential concern. Each one of these areas 

is currently being examined, prioritized, and analyzed for 

adjudication prior to migration to VCF. 

Error conditions that have been discovered include business 

rule violations (e.g., open leads in closed cases), missing data 

in required fields, and invalid data (e.g., erroneous field 

office codes.) All of these conditions have been categorized and 

are in the process of being resolved by the ACS project team,

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REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

with support from the Records Management Division. Any areas 

that need to be adjudicated will be presented to the newly formed 

Data Governance Board (DGB), made up of Data Stewards that 

represent all the operational divisions. These Data Stewards are 

charged with the responsibility to make any final decisions 

necessary to bring data error conditions or invalid data issues 

to resolution. 

 It has been determined that certain errors found in ACS must 

be fixed within ACS itself before the data can be moved over to 

the new environment (e.g., conflicting information, such as case 

open and Preliminary Inquiry dates, where it is unclear which 

information is valid.) Other errors can be handled by fixing 

them as they are moved over to VCF. These will be handled in 

parallel over the next five months in preparation for the final 

migration. Due to resource and time constraints, some lower 

priority error conditions may not be resolved prior to migration. 

However, they will continue to be tracked and resolved at a later 

date if deemed necessary. 

Task 

# 

Compliance Task Compliance Task 

Deliverable 

Due Date Compliance 

Task 

Status 

1 Analyze Quality of Data 

in ACS

Data Quality Report 6/10/03 Draft 

Completed

2 Define ACS to VCF 

Transformation Rules 

Transformation Rule set; 

Gap Analysis Report; 

coded Transformation 

routines 

9/9/03 

3 Fix Data Problems in ACS Problem Reports 11/1/03 

4 Test Migration Data Migration Dry Run 

reports

11/15/03 

5 Migrate Data Final Data Migration 12/13/03 

Usefulness of Monthly Administrative Reports (MAR) from the 

Automated Case Support (ACS) System 

Recommendation Number 7, Page 75: We recommend that the Director 

of the FBI revamp the current Monthly Administrative Report 

format and determine if more useful information can be extracted 

from the ACS system and be provided to program managers to help 

them in performing their duties.

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REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX VI 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

Response: The FBI agrees with the recommendation. The Virtual 

Case File (VCF) team’s initial mandate was to replace the current 

ACS application. Early in the project, it was decided that this 

was insufficient to support the needs of the FBI. Instead, a 

Business Process Reengineering (BPR) approach was undertaken to 

determine what business processes needed to be changed to make 

the FBI more effective. Operational and Program Management 

Subject Matter Experts (SME) have been consulted to determine 

what data is required to support their needs, including 

statistical and program management information. 

Current reports, including the MAR, have been reviewed with 

these SMEs to determine their continued utility. In addition, 

suggested changes have been incorporated into the VCF design. For 

example, case closing information has been expanded to include 

more useful categories of closings, including those that track 

with the United States Attorney’s Office. 

 Currently, the project team is validating that all 

appropriate information required to support the MAR is 

identified and captured in VCF. In addition, prior to 

implementation in December of 2003, the VCF will undergo 

acceptance testing to ensure that the application meets the 

defined requirements. This will take place starting in August of 

2003 and will include testing all pertinent reports. 

Task 

# 

Compliance Task Compliance Task 

Deliverable 

Delivery 

Date 

Compliance 

Task Status

1 Determine Program 

Management Reporting 

Requirements

Software / System 

Requirements 

Statements

11/25/02 Completed 

2 Design Program Management 

Reports

Gap Analysis; 

Report Definitions

8/15/03 

3 User Acceptance Test Test Plans, Test 

Results

11/18/03 

4 Implements Reports VCF Implementation 12/13/03 

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REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX VII 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT DIVISION 

ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY 

TO CLOSE THE REPORT 

Recommendation Number: 

1. Resolved. The FBI agreed with our recommendation and reported 

that it is in the process of providing the Director with an automated 

resource utilization report function. In order to close this 

recommendation, please provide us with documentation describing 

the new report function, and evidence that the Director has 

received reports on a regular basis. In the interim, please provide 

us with an implementation schedule that details when the system 

will be fully operational. 

2. Resolved. The FBI responded that it agreed with our 

recommendation and sought to clarify our characterization of the 

Violent Crimes and Major Offenders (VCMO) program. As a result, 

we have made an adjustment in our discussion preceding 

Recommendation Number 2 in Chapter 9. 

In response to our recommendation, the FBI stated that it has 

reduced the allocation of resources to the VCMO program and it is 

monitoring resource utilization and case activity in the program on a 

quarterly basis. This recommendation can be closed when we 

receive a copy of the FY 2003 and FY 2004 funded staffing levels 

and samples of the quarterly reviews. 

3. Resolved. In its response, the FBI provided evidence that it 

performed some research into certain aspects of its increasing 

universe of open cases. Specifically, the FBI provided detailed 

information on the reasons why the number of cases open in the 

Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions has increased 

since 9/11. In addition, the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) 

reported that since FY 2001, the universe of open Racketeering 

Enterprise Investigations has decreased. The CID further reported

that the Drug program had been allocated fewer resources since 

FY 1998 and its enterprise theory of investigations results in 

strategically planned long-term investigations. Therefore, fewer 

cases are opened, but these cases are open for longer periods of 

time. The FBI concluded that these results could not be interpreted 

as a reduction in productivity. 

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APPENDIX VII 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

However, the FBI did not address the entirety of its increasing case 

universe since 1998. Rather, much of its response points to 

increased counterterrorism work in the wake of 9/11 as a reason for 

the increase. As noted in our report, in April 1999 the FBI found it 

necessary to administratively close over 675,000 cases that had 

been unaddressed for long periods of time. The increasing volume 

of open cases invites the possibility that the FBI will have to take 

similar steps in the future and we believe that the FBI should 

further study this issue to alleviate the need for another large-scale 

administrative closure of cases. In order to close this 

recommendation, please provide us with the results of additional 

research that targets the increasing caseload between 1998 and 

2001 for the FBI as a whole. 

4. Resolved. According to the FBI, it has made changes to its 

resource allocation process so that funded staffing levels (FSLs) will 

be allocated in a more timely manner. To close this 

recommendation, please provide us with evidence that the new 

strategy has been officially implemented. In addition, please keep 

us informed of the Resource Management and Allocation office’s 

actions to establish the FY 2004 FSLs. 

5. Unresolved. In its response, the FBI provided further explanation 

for the difference between the allocated and utilized personnel 

resources in its Applicant Matters program and agreed to review its 

process for allocating resources to this program. However, the 

FBI’s response did not address the significant differences in 

resource allocation and utilization in its Training program. This 

recommendation can be resolved when the FBI provides information 

related to its efforts to address these differences. 

6. Resolved. The FBI provided us with an implementation schedule 

for its efforts to improve the quality of ACS data before its 

migration into the new Virtual Case File application. To close this 

recommendation, please provide us with a copy of the data quality 

report and evidence that the data has been improved and 

successfully migrated. In the interim, please keep us informed of 

the progress made towards the data migration. 

7. Resolved. According to the FBI, in its creation of the Virtual Case 

File application, the Bureau utilized a Business Process 

Reengineering approach to determine what business processes 

needed to be changed to make the FBI more effective. Part of this 

involved reviewing the Monthly Administrative Reports to assess 

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REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX VII 

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED 

their utility. The FBI provided us with an implementation schedule 

for its plans to design new reports and implement them as part of 

the new Virtual Case File system. This recommendation can be 

closed when we receive samples of the test reports; feedback from 

subject matter experts to confirm that the new reports are 

acceptable, provide necessary data, and are an effective program 

management tool; results of the user acceptance tests; and 

evidence that the new reports have been implemented. 

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