United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 22, 2005

Decided September 28, 2005

Before

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 05-1452

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEVIN D. JEFFERSON

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois

No. 3:03CR30214-004

David R. Herndon, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Kevin Jefferson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with

intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A), and possessing a firearm in connection with a drug offense, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c). Jefferson cooperated with the government’s investigation and was

sentenced after United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), to a total of 102

months’ imprisonment, well below the combined minimum mandatory of 180

months otherwise applicable to the counts of conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 

Jefferson filed a notice of appeal but the government moved to dismiss because his

written plea agreement includes a waiver of his right to appeal his sentence. 

Jefferson’s appointed counsel responded to the government’s motion by filing what

we construe as a motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967). See United States v. Mason, 343 F.3d 893, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2003). 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-1452 Page 2

Counsel’s submission is facially adequate, and Jefferson has not responded to our

invitation under Circuit Rule 51(b) to comment on counsel’s motion. We therefore

limit our review to potential issues identified in counsel’s submission. United

States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

Counsel first considers whether Jefferson might challenge the voluntariness

of his guilty pleas. But counsel informs us that Jefferson does not wish to take back

his pleas, and we have held that lawyers making an Anders submission should not

even explore questions about a guilty plea unless the defendant wants it set aside. 

See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2002). It follows, then,

that Jefferson is also bound by his appeal waiver. See United States v. Whitlow,

287 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that waiver of appeal “stands or falls” with

the plea); United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2001) (same). That

waiver precludes any challenge to a “sentence within the maximum provided in the

statute(s) of conviction (or the manner in which that sentence was determined) on

the grounds set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 or on any ground

whatever.” And though Jefferson agreed to that waiver before Booker was decided,

we have held that such waivers are nonetheless enforceable absent an explicit

“escape hatch” in the plea agreement. United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636-

37 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Lockwood, 416 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir.

2005); United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 362 (7th Cir. 2005). Jefferson’s

waiver allows no exception, and thus we cannot reach the other potential issues

identified by counsel.

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.