Joint Special Operations University

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JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

Patrick Paterson’s monograph, Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, 

and Iraq, leverages the author’s vast experience in Latin American 

history to examine how U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) train 

surrogate forces. He argues that it is necessary to employ United 

States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) indirect approach 

to grow and build partnership capacity through foreign internal 

defense (FID) and to find a balance with international humanitarian 

law (IHL). Paterson also examines the legal issues and restrictions 

on training and equipping foreign forces and the impact of these 

exchanges with our partners. His research methodology includes 

extensive interviews and incorporates a historical case study 

approach, examining FID efforts in Peru, Colombia, and El Salvador 

for lessons learned, and then compares and contrasts USSOF train 

and equip efforts in Iraq.

ISBN 978-1-941715-18-5

Training Surrogate Forces in 

International Humanitarian Law: 

Lessons from Peru, Colombia, 

El Salvador, and Iraq

Patrick Paterson

JSOU Report 16-9

JSOU Report 16-9 Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law Paterson
Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Senior Research Fellow and adjunct professor, 

Middlebury Institute of International Studies at 

Monterey and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies, Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where effort centers upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Frederick Zimmerman, Master Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret., JSOU Press Editor

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs; Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 16-9

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2016

Training Surrogate Forces in 

International Humanitarian Law: 

Lessons from Peru, Colombia,

El Salvador, and Iraq

Patrick Paterson, Professor in Practice, 

National Defense University
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in August 2016.

ISBN 978-1-941715-18-5
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom. Such academic freedom 

empowers authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues.
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Terrain to Human Domain, August 2016, Robert R. Greene Sands

The Asia Pivot: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces, July 2016, Russell 

D. Howard and John P. Duvall, Jr.

Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization. A Case Study of 

Task Force 714 in Iraq, July 2016, Richard Shultz

2017 Special Operations Research Topics, June 2016

Unconventional Economics: Operational Economics in Unconventional Warfare, 

April 2016, Riley Post and Jeffrey D. Peterson

2016 Special Operations Essays, March 2016

The War Within: A Look Inside al-Qaeda’s Undoing, February 2016, Jarret Brachman

Improving the Sustainment of SOF Distributed Operations in Access-Denied 

Environments, January 2016, Robert Haddick

SOF Role in Combating Transnational Crime, January 2016

The Collapse of Iraq and Syria: The End of the Colonial Construct in the 

Greater Levant, December 2015, Roby C. Barrett

Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency Conversion, 

November 2015, Colin S. Gray

Countering Violent Extremism in Mali, November 2015, Mark Moyar

On the cover. An Army Special Forces non-commissioned officer trains a 

Senegalese soldier in Mali, Africa, during a Flintlock exercise. Flintlock is a 

biennial exercise intended to enhance African nations’ abilities to patrol and 

control their own territory and borders and to develop regional and military 

relationships. Photo by Technical Sergeant Victoria Meyer.

Back cover. A Marine with U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations 

Command, gives feedback to Commandos with a Dominican Republic counterterrorism unit known as Secretaria De Las Fuerzas Armadas Commando 

Especial Contra Terrorismo, on their combat tactics at Ciudad Del Nino, 9 

March 2009, during U.S. Special Operations Command South’s Exercise 

Fused Response. Photo by Corporal Richard Blumenstein. 
v

Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................................... vii

About the Author ..........................................................................ix

Acknowledgements .......................................................................xi

Introduction .................................................................................. 1

1. A History of Foreign Internal Defense and the 

Indirect Approach ......................................................................... 7

2. Modern Warfare and International Humanitarian Law ............ 11

3. Ethical and Legal Considerations in Training 

Surrogate Forces ......................................................................... 19

4. U.S. Special Operations Command Doctrine on 

Human Rights and IHL ............................................................... 21

5. Joint Combined Exchange Training ......................................... 27

6. The Leahy Law ........................................................................ 33

7. Peru and the Rondas Campesinas ........................................... 39

8. Colombia and the Self-Defense Forces .................................... 49

9. The U.S. Indirect Approach in El Salvador ............................... 61

10. The U.S. Experience in Iraq ................................................... 79

11. Conclusion and Recommendations ...................................... 87

Appendix A: Acronym List .......................................................... 93

Endnotes ..................................................................................... 95

vii

Foreword

Patrick Paterson’s monograph, Training Surrogate Forces in International 

Humanitarian Law: Lessons from Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, and 

Iraq, leverages the author’s vast experience in Latin American history to 

examine how U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) train surrogate forces. 

He argues that it is necessary to employ United States Special Operations 

Command’s (USSOCOM) indirect approach to grow and build partnership capacity through foreign internal defense (FID) and to find a balance 

with international humanitarian law (IHL). Paterson also examines the 

legal issues and restrictions on training and equipping foreign forces and 

the impact of these exchanges with our partners. His research methodology includes extensive interviews and incorporates a historical case study 

approach, examining FID efforts in Peru, Colombia, and El Salvador for 

lessons learned, and then compares and contrasts USSOF train-and-equip 

efforts in Iraq.

Paterson begins his monograph with a historical review of FID—an 

indirect approach. He notes three key operational benefits of the indirect 

approach: training foreign forces keeps USSOF from doing the job as part 

of a larger, costlier direct-action operation; training and educating foreign 

forces in security and defense tactics can increase USSOF military capacity; and U.S. values concerning civilian authority, human rights, and rules 

of warfare in IHL can be instilled. At the same time he captures why it’s 

critical for USSOF to know who they’re training and what their allegiances 

are. Paterson then moves into the issue of modern warfare and IHL, and 

the difficulties of navigating the complexities of those we seek to support 

and how modern warfare has evolved to include some aspects traditionally 

considered police work. 

His discussion also addresses the ethical and legal considerations of training surrogate forces in what he calls the “murky legal realm,” and the need to 

ensure a level of understanding and responsibility of IHL. In chapter 4, Paterson reviews USSOCOM’s doctrine on human rights and IHL guidance from 

the first formal policy in the late 1990s to current guidance. His next chapters 

address joint combined exchange training and how IHL is addressed during 

these training efforts, followed by an excellent discussion on the Leahy Law 
viii

and the vetting process for security assistance. Paterson then discusses the 

selected historical case studies of USSOCOM successful engagement with 

international partners. The author concludes with recommendations for the 

way ahead for USSOCOM and the Department of Defense to ensure training 

military partners and human rights go hand in hand. 

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
ix

About the Author 

Patrick J. Paterson is Professor in Practice of National Security Studies 

at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. A 1989 graduate of the 

U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, he retired from the U.S. Navy as a 

Commander in 2009. His last assignment was as the Political-Military Advisor and Senior Foreign Area Officer on the Fourth 

Fleet staff in Mayport, FL. He has a Master’s degree in 

National Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, a Master’s equivalent 

from the Argentina Naval War College in Buenos 

Aires, Argentina, and a Master’s degree in Political 

Science from the American University in Washington, DC. As part of those studies, he has researched 

and written on numerous topics about Latin America, 

including civil-military relations, U.S. foreign policy, 

democracy, rule of law, human rights, social movements, political violence, 

and counterinsurgency. He is the author of numerous defense and security 

related articles in journals such as Military Review, Armed Forces Journal, 

Proceedings Magazine, Joint Force Quarterly, Naval History, The Journal 

of International Affairs, and Security and Defense Studies Review, and has 

appeared on BBC Radio. His principal areas of expertise include civil-military relations, human rights, rule of law, counterinsurgency, and U.S. and 

Latin American history. 

xi

Acknowledgements

The author appreciates the review and constructive feedback of this 

monograph provided by Dr. Evan Ellis, Dr. Richard Downie, Adam 

Isacson, Jack Rodgers, and Mark Wilkins. 

Immense credit is due to the author’s wife, Emily Paterson, for her 

detailed editing of the entire manuscript and valuable recommendations 

on content and tone. 

Perry Center research assistants Kali Brown, Kathy Kim, and Natalie 

Muñoz Narino also were instrumental in the collection of information and 

evidence for the project. 

1

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

Introduction 

The mission of training the security forces of other countries is of growing importance to the United States Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM). This mission, commonly referred to as foreign internal defense 

(FID), or the indirect approach, offers an alternative to direct-action missions 

by U.S. forces. U.S.-led operations inside foreign countries, like the recent 

efforts to seize wanted terrorists in Syria and Somalia, are dangerous missions that put U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) at risk if things go 

awry. By successfully implementing FID, U.S. forces can train and empower 

host nation forces to conduct their own security operations to staunch the 

expansion of radical extremists—saving U.S. lives in the process.

The indirect approach represents an important operational opportunity 

with three benefits. First, training foreign forces in military tactics prevents 

USSOF from having to enter the country to do the job as part of a directaction mission or as part of a larger, costlier operation. Second, USSOF 

can improve the military capacity of partner nation forces by training and 

educating them in security and defense tactics. And third, FID training can 

help professionalize a foreign military force by instilling U.S. values of subordination to civilian authority, respect for human rights, and adherence to 

rules of warfare entailed in international humanitarian law (IHL).1 This small 

footprint approach is critical as the U.S. faces diffuse threats from numerous 

countries. It also minimizes the chances that the U.S. will have to intervene 

militarily, an expensive last resort as demonstrated by the nation-building 

experiences of the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan during the last 14 years.2

USSOCOM’s indirect approach is part of a larger U.S. Government 

effort to establish a network of partners to respond to complex 21st century 

challenges. The strategy has grown in urgency as the U.S. addresses a dispersed terrorist threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and 

al-Qaeda factions. In the global war on terror, U.S. allies in the Philippines, 

Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Nigeria are under fire from radical extremist groups.3

 As President Obama stated during his 28 May 2014 

address at the U.S. Military Academy, “We have to develop a strategy that 

matches this diffuse threat—one that expands our reach without sending 

forces that stretch our military too thin, or stir up local resentments.” In 
2

JSOU Report 16-9

support of the new strategy, President Obama announced he is seeking up 

to $5 billion to “facilitate partner countries on the front lines.” This comes 

on top of about $2.2 billion the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent 

in more than 40 countries since 2006 to train and equip foreign troops in 

counterterrorism operations.4

This strategy also involves some risk. Foreign military units, especially 

those with poor professionalism or a history of political intervention in 

their country, may use their new capacity to challenge civilian leaders or 

use excessive force that leads to human rights violations. This is particularly 

likely to occur in military forces without advanced training or in areas that 

have mixed ethnicities, tribes, or religions where there may be historical 

rivalries or animosity among groups. Training and equipping these forces 

without providing accompanying education on human rights standards and 

IHL invites the improper use of force. The shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines 

Flight 17 on 17 July 2014, allegedly by Russian surrogate forces in eastern 

Ukraine, is just one recent example of the consequences of providing arms 

and training to forces without adequate oversight or training. All 298 civilians on board the plane were killed.5

The reasons for incorporating human rights and IHL training into USSOF 

training programs are compelling. They are critical to win strategic, operational, and tactical advantages over opponents in contemporary warfare. 

First, human rights and IHL violations alienate civilian populations from 

military forces. Atrocities committed by a surrogate force will jeopardize 

the functional legitimacy of the surrogate force among the affected population.6

 The military forces may risk losing critical intelligence provided by 

cooperative civilians if they are perceived to be illegitimate forces operating 

outside IHL standards. Simultaneously, if the host nation forces lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people and consequently become militarily ineffective, U.S. forces may lose a potentially important Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) partner. Second, U.S. military forces are forbidden by law to provide 

training or education to foreign military units or individuals with a history 

of human rights violations. This inhibits U.S. interaction with a number of 

nations who may otherwise provide important assistance to the U.S. in the 

global fight against terrorism. Hundreds of potential partners in the war 

on terror are blocked from U.S. aid. In many of these cases, the reason is 

simply because the units have never received adequate training or education 

on human rights and international law. As a result, the U.S. may lose an ally 
3

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

in a strategically critical area. Consequently, this puts U.S. military service 

members in danger by necessitating U.S. involvement in costly and dangerous overseas operations. Third, the U.S. has a moral obligation to ensure 

the training it provides to foreign forces is in keeping with U.S. values on 

democracy, human rights, and civil-military relations. Providing military 

training on lethal force tactics, for example, should be accompanied by training that also describes the legal and moral constraints of using such tactics. 

Such training on the proper application of force will maximize the chances 

that our partner forces will not commit gross violations of human rights. 

Balancing the need to have access to a partner nation’s security forces and 

the need to abide by IHL presents a conundrum for U.S. operators and senior 

USSOF leaders. The United States needs the assistance of other nations to 

combat terrorism and ensure stability in those countries. But working with 

foreign military forces that do not have a well-developed culture of military 

professionalism presents a difficult predicament when foreign forces commit 

human rights violations. The majority of the countries where USSOF conduct 

training fall into the category of developing nations with autonomous militaries that frequently lack a tradition of subordination to civilian authorities. 

Many of these troops have not received formal training in the use of force or 

in aspects of IHL. They may be more loyal to familial or tribal allegiances 

than they are to the central government of the country. 

USSOF are prohibited by law from training partner nation forces suspected of committing human rights violations; specifically the 1997 Leahy 

Law forbids U.S. assistance to foreign military units that have been found to 

be credibly implicated in serious abuses of human rights. Assistance is denied 

until the host nation government takes effective steps to bring the responsible 

persons within the unit to justice. Previous breaches of this law by USSOF, 

whether intentional or accidental, have generated intensive scrutiny from 

the U.S. Congress, the press, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 

government watchdog groups.7

USSOF are composed of highly skilled professionals with extensive 

experience in the proper use of force, both in legal theory and in practice. 

Their interaction with foreign forces represents an excellent opportunity to 

demonstrate the strategic payoffs of respect for human rights and adherence to IHLs. However, the training opportunity is limited by the type of 

personal rapport USSOF develop with their host nation counterparts. As a 

result, USSOF do not adequately address human rights or IHL issues when 
4

JSOU Report 16-9

training foreign forces. When they do, the training is ad hoc, developed by 

individual USSOF units without any central coordination from USSOCOM 

headquarters or the components. In addition, USSOCOM does not have a 

doctrine or significant guidance on human rights or IHL for the 66,000 U.S. 

service members under its control. Without sufficient guidance on how to 

articulate modern rules of warfare in complex operating environments, 

many USSOF operators are unknowingly providing inadequate instruction. Operationally, such a conspicuous absence of guidance from higher 

headquarters could ultimately prove counterproductive if partner militaries 

lose the guise of legitimacy from their citizens or are legally forbidden from 

receiving U.S. assistance. 

Research Objective

This report examines how USSOF train surrogate forces. Specifically, it will 

focus on the elements of IHL training that foreign forces receive. In particular, it considers the legal and ethical challenges associated with such 

interaction. The study includes an examination of the USSOCOM and DOD 

doctrine on IHL. The analysis includes U.S. legal restrictions on training 

and equipping foreign forces and how that has affected USSOF relations 

with foreign forces. 

The indirect approach raises a number of important questions. What type 

of IHL training do USSOF provide during joint combined exercise training 

(JCET) and mobile training teams (MTT)? How does one ensure professionalism and obedience to IHL by indigenous or surrogate forces trained 

by USSOCOM personnel? How do USSOF emphasize respect for human 

rights in societies that may not have due regard for such values? What legal 

consequences may USSOF face if the surrogates they are training commit 

gross violations of human rights? What actions should be taken by USSOF 

if they witness a violation of international law? What are the constraints of 

the Leahy Law? 

This monograph uses three historical case studies from Peru, Colombia, and El Salvador to demonstrate how the U.S. and other governments 

tried to ensure the forces in those countries complied with IHL standards. 

The use of militias or self-defense forces are a common feature in each of 

these three cases. Despite those commonalities, these examples present three 

unique cases of how to manage surrogate forces. In Peru and Colombia, 
5

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

governmental armed forces enlisted the assistance of self-defense forces and 

militias in remote parts of the country where the military had little access 

or presence. The case of El Salvador offers important lessons of how the U.S. 

provided security assistance to an important ally involved in an internal 

political insurgency. 

Methodologically, the three cases are not intended to provide a comparative analysis. Rather, they demonstrate the diversity of situations that U.S. 

forces may face when applying the indirect training approach—and the lessons learned. This author uses the evidence drawn from the three case studies to examine the contemporary challenges faced by USSOF while training 

security forces in Iraq. The analysis provides important policy insights for 

USSOCOM as it develops its strategy and doctrine on the issue.

As part of the research for the three case studies and their implications for 

FID training in Iraq, the project involved extensive interviews with USSOF 

personnel at USSOCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida. It was critical to 

tie the theory of security assistance and FID to the practical experiences 

of USSOF operators. Almost 40 representatives of the USSOF community 

(including a number of very experienced operators) contributed to the content and precision of the information in this report. The author is sincerely 

appreciative of their contributions to the project. 

7

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

1. A History of Foreign Internal Defense 

and the Indirect Approach 

FID is a core mission of USSOF, and is defined by the U.S. Government 

as an operation in which an indigenous government force is trained, 

equipped, organized, and supported “to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”8

FID is often referred to in USSOF parlance as the indirect method, working 

“by, through, or with” security forces from foreign countries.9 A surrogate is 

any member of a foreign security force that receives training by U.S. forces. 

The U.S. trains at least 100,000 foreign police and soldiers from more than 

100 countries each year. In 2012 alone, that amounted to $25 billion on training and equipping foreign militaries and law enforcement agencies. USSOF 

conduct a big portion of that training. Since 1998, USSOF have conducted 

more than 2,000 training missions and trained almost 150,000 foreign troops. 

In 2014 alone, USSOF conducted 176 JCET events in nearly 70 countries and 

trained over 15,000 partner nation forces.10 By training other nations’ security 

forces, the U.S. hopes in the future to avoid the costly, large-scale military 

involvement like that in Iraq and Afghanistan.11

There is a political and financial cost to sending U.S. forces to fight overseas, and the U.S. public is weary of such long-term commitments.12 At the 

same time, a low-visibility, small footprint of USSOF is much more palatable 

for local leaders worried about the political fallout of permitting foreign 

troops on sovereign territory. For those reasons, many U.S. policymakers 

find the indirect approach a more attractive option than direct military 

involvement. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, 

Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and 

their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning 

into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States’ 

allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building 

their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the 

fighting the United States does itself.13
8

JSOU Report 16-9

USSOF’s ability to operate in remote locations with little support 

makes the indirect approach particularly suitable for USSOCOM. Former 

USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven, implemented a command-wide approach to building a “global SOF network” after his experience 

as the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Europe in 2007. 

Admiral McRaven, in testimony before Congress, explained that, “the direct 

approach ... only buys time and space for the indirect approach ... [and] 

in the end, it will be such continuous indirect operations that will prove 

decisive in the global security arena.”14 It is an idea echoed throughout other 

U.S. strategic documents. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review calls for a 

“greater emphasis on building partnership capacity.” An entire chapter of 

the 2006 Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24) is dedicated to the use of 

surrogate forces. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta called this global 

partnership “one of America’s greatest national security assets.”15

The U.S. military has a long history of relying on surrogate forces and 

the advantages they bring to the battlefield. During the U.S. Indian Wars in 

the late 19th century, the U.S. Army employed 1,000 Native American scouts 

who knew the methods of their indigenous counterparts. In the Philippines, 

U.S. Army officers organized the Macabebe Scouts, an indigenous group of 

surrogates who knew the local terrain and could move relatively unnoticed 

among the villages and communities in the Philippine countryside while 

they gathered information on insurgents. In the Vietnam War, National 

Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy advocated for the use of armed paramilitaries in other countries that would be “supported and controlled by the 

U.S.”16 During the war, the U.S. used the Hmong militia as a surrogate army 

in the fight against Vietnamese communist forces. The Hmong also helped 

rescue downed U.S. aircrews, gather intelligence, and monitor enemy supply 

chains moving along the Ho Chi Minh trail.17

However, the effort to professionalize surrogate forces or self-defense 

groups often is difficult.18 Foreign military units without professional training or a well-developed military doctrine—especially junior or conscripted 

forces—are unlikely to have the depth of training on contemporary warfare 

matters, including the use of force, and principles of IHL such as distinction, 

moderation, necessity, and proportionality. As a result, these forces may be 

more apt to use excessive force, to treat both combatants and noncombatants 

as enemies, and to abuse detainees—all of which are human rights violations 

that could jeopardize continued collaboration with USSOF.19
9

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

One example is the U.S. military’s recent efforts to bolster the military 

proficiency of its counterparts in African nations, part of a counterterror 

campaign against radical Islamic forces springing up in the region. Part of 

this effort includes millions of dollars spent on training counterterrorism 

units in Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. However, military forces in some of 

these countries may not be as subordinate to civilian elected officials as forces 

in developed Western countries. In April 2012, Malian soldiers revolted and 

overthrew the president. In that incident, members of the elite army units 

trained by USSOF reportedly also defected to Islamic extremists operating 

in the north of the country. Malian soldiers were subsequently accused of 

committing atrocities including summary executions of at least 11 people 

suspected of being insurgents as well as sexual abuse of its own conscripted 

soldiers.20 In response to the challenges faced by working with foreign forces, 

Major General Patrick J. Donahue II, the commander of United States Army 

soldiers operating in Africa, said, “You have to make sure of who you’re 

training. What are his allegiances? Is he true to the country, or is he still 

bound to his militia?”21 An international military force, led by the French, 

was required to intervene to oust the Islamic radical forces from Malian 

territory.

11

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

2. Modern Warfare and International 

Humanitarian Law 

Throughout history, civilians frequently have been caught in the middle 

of the hostilities. This has never been truer than in the recent era of civil 

and religious wars, ethnic conflicts, and the fights against powerful organized crime cartels. As modern warfare has evolved, fewer conflicts are stateon-state disputes involving conventional armies. More often, conflicts arise 

from internal disputes among competing factions within the same nation, 

as groups fight over political, economic, or religious differences. Frequently, 

one side of the conflict consists of non-state irregular forces not wearing military attire and often operating among population concentrations. Former 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified to the permanency of irregular 

warfare when he said, “we can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain 

the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time.”22 Contemporary warfare against irregular enemies is complex and often uncontrollable.

One of the principal military objectives in these conflicts is winning 

the support of the population, as civilian backing produces many valuable 

advantages. The countries that have learned this—Colombia, the Philippines, 

and Great Britain, to name a few—reap the benefits. As civilian cooperation 

with security forces increases, the maneuverability and operating space of 

the insurgents or criminals decreases, along with the likelihood of attacks on 

security forces. Meanwhile, the government gains valuable actionable intelligence on militant activities. Governments that do not adopt this strategy 

are forced to fight against a shadowy criminal or insurgent network that 

often operates with the protection or cooperation of the civilians. 

As the Center for Systemic Peace demonstrates, the numbers of formal 

combatants in modern wars have decreased substantially. At the same time, 

the number of noncombatants as a percentage of victims has increased significantly. Hence, U.S. partner-nation forces need to be prepared for a full 

spectrum of conflict scenarios in which civilians become involved: organized 

crime, drug traffickers, insurgencies, political protests, and indigenous rights 

issues. 
12

JSOU Report 16-9 Figure 1. Estimated Annual Deaths from Politi- cal Violence, 1946–2011. Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Link: 

http://www.systemicpeace.org/conflicttrends.html
13

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

In many ways, modern warfare is more like police work than a series of 

battles to be won. The enemy frequently comprises irregular forces that mix 

among the population rather than a conventional force easily distinguishable 

from civilians. For this reason, contemporary operations require a mix of law 

enforcement operations very different from conventional military training. 

Domestic law enforcement operations require a vast amount of discretion 

and diplomacy, and a practical understanding of levels of force. Conventional military warfare, on the other hand, involves frequent use of lethal 

force and very little communication or engagement with either the enemy 

or with civilians. One of the most challenging aspects of this new operating 

environment is how to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. 

The enemy does not wear regular uniforms and is often indistinguishable 

from civilians. In the words of one scholar, “discrimination becomes more 

difficult in the context of postmodern counter terror war.”23

Most militaries rely upon firepower against militants or criminals. However, using the military in law enforcement operations is a dangerous solution, one fraught with complications. Soldiers, normally trained to defeat 

an enemy using maximum lethal force, need extensive retraining to learn to 

fight an enemy that is mixed among the people. Soldiers without the proper 

training or education may commit human rights violations and jeopardize 

their legitimacy among the civilian population. Hence, the deployment of 

the military in these instances carries serious risks for civilians in crimeaffected regions as well as for the reputation of the military institutions and 

the governments that they represent. 

Young soldiers from partner nations don’t know what they don’t know. 

That is, unless they are informed of the operational benefits that come from 

respect for human rights and adherence to IHL, they will not understand 

the advantages of such doctrine. They may not be operationally experienced 

enough to recognize it for themselves. Exposing them to the complex decisions they will face on the battlefield through scenario-based training will 

help them make the right choice when they have those encounters for the 

first time.

The Geneva Conventions and numerous other international treaties 

are designed to govern internal conflicts against insurgents or organized 

criminal gangs. Internationally recognized principles of warfare designed 

to protect noncombatants during wartime also apply to these cases of ‘noninternational armed conflict.’ In formal terms, IHL that governs the use of 
14

JSOU Report 16-9

force once hostilities have begun is known as Jus in Bello, the law governing 

the actions of states once conflict has commenced. Regardless of the level of 

the conflict, principles of warfare that protect civilians and their property 

are universally accepted as customary international law. The United States 

has ratified the Geneva Conventions and most of these international treaties. In cases of treaties it has not ratified, U.S. policy is to follow the spirit 

of the laws.25

The most well-known elements of IHL include the principles of discrimination, necessity, humanity, and proportionality. Discrimination (also 

referred to as distinction) is the most important principle. It requires that 

participants only use force against combatants and military objectives. They 

must take precautions to ensure they do not target noncombatants or civilian property. Necessity requires combatants to only use the amount of force 

necessary to ensure the defeat of the enemy. Humanity requires that conflict 

participants not use excessive violence to achieve military objectives. In 

other words, tactics that cause unnecessary suffering are prohibited. Likewise, weapons that cause needless suffering—such as projectiles with glass, 

plastic, or poison—are also forbidden. Proportionality requires combatants 

to avoid excessive loss of life or property in relation to the desired military 

objectives.26

Professor Rosa Brooks, former legal counsel to the DOD and the Department of State (DOS), summarized the significant moral responsibility for 

security forces to employ the law of war conscientiously and within the 

parameters established by IHL. In 2013, in testimony before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, she said: 

Vignette: Indigenous Protests in Guatemala 

On 4 October 2012, Mayan indigenous protesters blocked roads in Totonicapán, 

Guatemala, to protest new government education reforms that required expensive 

new credentials from local teachers. Guatemalan police, in charge of security of the 

event, left the area because of the increasing hostility of the crowds toward them. 

Guatemalan soldiers, called to support the police, arrived on the scene a few minutes 

later unaware the police had fled the scene. When the protesters confronted the 

soldiers, rocking their truck and cursing at them, the Army soldiers opened fire in fear 

for their lives. Eight protesters died and 30 more were wounded. The Army colonel in 

charge and eight soldiers were arrested and put on trial for murder.24
15

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

It is important to recognize that the law of armed conflict permits 

a wide range of behaviors that would be unlawful in the absence of 

an armed conflict. Generally speaking, the intentional destruction 

of private property and severe restrictions on individual liberties 

are impermissible in peacetime, but acceptable in wartime. Even 

actions that a combatant knows will put civilians at risk of death 

or injury are legal when taken in accordance with the principles of 

necessity, humanity, proportionality, and distinction.27

Security forces follow these rules in order to avoid causing violations of 

human rights, but it becomes harder to do under the austere circumstances 

caused by fighting irregular forces. The opponent is often mixed among 

the population, and many members of the community might be colluding 

with the criminals or militants, who do not wear uniforms and cannot be 

easily distinguished from innocent civilians. In these conditions, soldiers 

have to accept additional risk to avoid harming noncombatants. When there 

is an encounter with criminals in an urban area, soldiers must often hesitate to confirm identification of their target before deciding what action is 

appropriate—and hesitancy can mean the difference between life and death. 

Undisciplined military forces, at this moment of decision, may resort to 

force protection rather than the self-restraint necessary to prevent civilian 

casualties.28

I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails risks to our troops ... But excessive use of 

force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater 

risks.—General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of U.S. Forces in 

Afghanistan, 2010–2011.29

A hostile act—the use of force against one’s unit—is relatively easy to 

distinguish. It occurs when a unit or something the unit is tasked to protect 

is taking fire from a criminal or enemy. What is far more difficult to determine in these situations is hostile intent. Hostile intent is defined as “the 

threat of the imminent use of force against one’s unit or something the unit 

is tasked to protect.”30 In contemporary warfare, a vast array of hostile intent 

scenarios is possible. Soldiers may encounter enemy actions that they would 

not normally experience during a fight against regular forces. Soldiers may 

be required to set up checkpoints and roadblocks, conduct house searches, 
16

JSOU Report 16-9

or perform direct-action operations against known enemy forces. What if 

a vehicle does not follow directions or slow at a checkpoint or roadblock? 

What actions are permissible in this situation? What if a suspect is fleeing? 

Can soldiers fire on him? What if a perpetrator flees after engaging a military unit? Can soldiers fire on him if he no longer presents a direct threat 

to the unit? Can soldiers fire at a suspected enemy if civilians are present 

and are at risk of being hit? Can soldiers fire on protesters throwing stones? 

Bricks? Molotov cocktails? What level of force is permissible under these 

circumstances? 

Another difficult challenge in these conditions is what constitutes direct 

participation in hostilities. Civilians, normally protected by international 

law from military attack, are considered lawful targets if they take a “direct 

participation in hostilities.” It is a definition that confounds lawyers and 

experts in the field.32 For example, does a civilian lookout who reports U.S. 

troop movements to and from garrisons constitute direct participation in 

hostilities and, therefore, can be considered a lawful target? What about 

the financier providing funding for weapons and explosives purchases? The 

driver transporting weapons to the insurgent stronghold? What about the 

family storing food and supplies for insurgents in their house?33

Vignette: The U.S. Investigation of No Gun Ri 

At the request of the South Korean government, the U.S. Army Inspector General 

conducted an investigation into an alleged massacre of South Korean civilians that 

occurred 50 years earlier in the South Korean hamlet of No Gun Ri. The Army’s 

report, released in January 2001, concluded that the “under-trained, under-equipped 

and unprepared” U.S. soldiers had, in fact, fired on Korean civilians. According to 

the Army, the American soldiers at No Gun Ri were “completely unprepared for the 

stark reality of dealing with the numerous, uncontrolled refugees who clogged the 

roads and complicated the battlefield to an unexpected degree.” Lieutenant General 

Bernard E. Trainor, a retired Marine, was part of the investigation. “What did surprise 

me was the allegation that the killings appeared to be deliberate; I found it difficult 

to believe that American soldiers would kill unarmed refugees,” he wrote. “In the 

months that followed, however, as one of eight outside observers asked to monitor a 

Pentagon investigation of the issue, I came full circle. The investigation confirmed the 

news report’s central charges.”31
17

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

In many Latin American countries during the Cold War, the armed forces 

were vilified for attacking civilians who were suspected of supporting communist insurgents. The counterinsurgency doctrine of the period called for 

“draining the swamp” by removing the insurgents’ popular support network. 

This, in theory, would force the insurgents to abandon the area or isolate 

them from needed supplies and arms. In some cases, Latin American armies 

declared areas in which insurgents operated as “free fire zones.” Anyone in 

this area—villager, woman, child, news reporter—was considered an ‘enemy’ 

and a legitimate military target. On a number of occasions during the 1970s 

and 1980s, the U.S. cut off military aid to partners in the region for such 

types of indiscriminate action.34

In Iraq, an estimated two-thirds of U.S. casualties were the result of roadside bombs. Most veterans of the Iraq war would argue that the owners and 

operators of an improvised explosive device factory were lawful targets. 

Would U.S. factories creating weapons also be considered fair game? What 

about the U.S. contracted truck drivers transporting the arms to the battlefield in a civilian vehicle?35

19

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

3. Ethical and Legal Considerations in 

Training Surrogate Forces 

A layer of complexity is added when the indirect approach encompasses 

unconventional forces, which often present greater legal risks than 

working with conventional troops. Unconventional indirect activities occur 

when USSOF work with rebel or insurgent forces against another government. According to U.S. doctrine, unconventional operations may include 

“advising and assisting guerrilla forces to raid, ambush, sabotage, and otherwise interdict the adversary in ways designed to drain that hostile power’s morale and resources through military activities up to and including 

combat.”36 For example, a recent Pentagon initiative involved an effort to 

train moderate Syrian rebels to fight against ISIS terrorists in Syria.37 These 

types of rebel forces may not meet the definition of legitimate or professional 

military forces because they do not represent a central government nor are 

they governed by IHL treaties of a country.38 In some cases (e.g., the Northern 

Alliance forces in Afghanistan in 2001), USSOF may 

even fight alongside these 

irregular forces. 

Actions by these irregular forces often enter 

into a murky legal realm, 

where it becomes hard to 

determine whether or not 

they constitute legal military operations according to international law. 

Militias and self-defense 

groups also operate in a 

gray area of legitimacy. There is a fine line between self-defense forces that 

provide security in remote parts of a country on behalf of a central government, and illegal armed groups whose loyalty lies with local warlords or 

regional strongmen. These groups often operate outside the law and, without 

Figure 2. U.S. Air Force Special Operations Forces 

train with irregular forces in Africa. Source: Author
20

JSOU Report 16-9

formal training on arms or the use of force, may commit abuses against the 

population. 

Despite the uncertain ethics of working with such groups, many governments rely on and even provide arms for these groups. In Peru, self-defense 

forces in remote areas of the Andes Mountains were considered a vital extension of the armed forces, instrumental in the government’s eventual success 

against violent leftist insurgents. In Michoacán, Mexico, self-defense forces 

emerged in 2014 to provide local security against violent narco-traffickers 

and cartel members. At first hesitant about operating with such forces, the 

Mexican government later announced their support of the group as a proxy 

force and conducted joint patrols between militia, police, and military forces. 

In Afghanistan, the government is desperate to extend security into remote 

areas where the Afghan police and army are under frequent attack from 

Taliban forces. In 2015, the government in Kabul wrestled with the idea of 

enlisting the aid of militias under local warlords.39

Critics of the indirect approach contend that providing tactical training 

to surrogate forces without sufficient education on IHL or the use of force is 

ethically and legally irresponsible. According to some scholars, this invites 

violations of the Geneva Conventions by the surrogate forces. Surrogate 

forces, especially irregular forces that may not represent a central government or organized group, may commit human rights violations with little 

regard for consequences. One well-respected legal scholar has even called 

for states’ use of surrogate forces to be “included in the prohibition against 

mercenarism.”40

By training foreign forces, the U.S. is inserting itself into another country’s politics. This insertion demands a level of responsibility—ethically and 

operationally—to ensure those forces comport themselves in accordance 

with IHL and standards of human rights. As USSOCOM has increased its 

reliance on the indirect approach, this issue has gained more urgency. 
21

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

4. U.S. Special Operations Command 

Doctrine on Human Rights and IHL 

USSOCOM does not have an up-to-date instruction on human rights 

and IHL. Of all the Service components to USSOCOM, only the Naval 

Special Warfare Command has an instruction detailing the requirement to 

include such training when working with foreign forces. During JCET, the 

primary means of interacting with foreign security force units, the topic is 

rarely covered in depth, instead receiving only passing reference in a manner 

that is inadequate to cover the myriad complex issues associated with the 

use of force in contemporary conflicts.41 Based on an analysis of USSOF 

publications and field manuals, IHL receives very little emphasis between 

USSOCOM and its subordinate commands. 

This inattention to the issue of human rights is particularly surprising 

considering the frequency in which foreign security forces commit human 

rights violations during operations. Partner nation forces in Latin America, 

Asia, and Africa are frequently criticized for using excessive force, abusing 

the rights of civilians and their property, torturing detainees, and committing extrajudicial killings. Consequently, USSOF are forbidden from working 

with military units in dozens of countries around the globe, significantly 

hindering USSOCOM efforts to establish a global SOF network and the U.S. 

effort to combat violent extremist organizations. In a number of important 

allies in Latin America and Africa, almost one-third of military units in 

the countries are banned from receiving U.S. military training because of 

human rights violations.42

The first formal effort to establish a USSOCOM policy on human rights 

and IHL occurred in the late 1990s. Then commander of USSOCOM, General Peter Schoomaker, issued a human rights policy memorandum in June 

1999 that placed an emphasis on human rights and IHL. “SOF understand 

the critical role of human rights in our national security strategy, in USSOCOM’s mission, and in the regional CINCs’ [commander-in-chiefs’] engagement strategies,” General Schoomaker wrote. “Human rights awareness, 

concepts, reporting requirements and themes will be integrated into all SOF 

pre-deployment training,” with the intention of preventing USSOF from 

training with forces that have committed human rights violations. General 
22

JSOU Report 16-9

Schoomaker also ordered that the “promotion of human rights will become a 

core concept in the education and instruction programs during interactions 

with the civilian population of the host nation.”43

In 2005, USSOCOM issued a terse new human rights directive. Although 

very brief—the policy and procedures section is a short 420-word summary—

the directive contains important requirements for USSOCOM’s subordinate 

commands. The policy addressed U.S. Government policy on human rights 

as an important element of foreign policy. In particular, it reiterates U.S. 

policy not to provide training to units who have committed gross violations 

of human rights. Most importantly, it directs USSOCOM units to “develop 

tailored human rights themes to be incorporated into scheduled training 

plans for host nation personnel, preferably with ‘hands-on’ application.” It 

also states that, “human rights awareness, concepts, reporting requirements, 

and themes will be an integral part of SOF training with foreign forces,” 

and that “SOF will be prepared to teach and demonstrate by word and deed 

that the protection of human rights is imperative for military success in any 

environment.”44

Despite the clear guidance from USSOCOM commanders, only the Naval 

Special Warfare Command in Coronado, California, has an instruction on 

human rights requirements. None of the other military service components 

require their units to conduct human rights or IHL training. Army Special 

Operations Command, the Air Force Special Operations Command, and 

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command have no requirement to 

train foreign forces on human rights or IHL. Few of the USSOF personnel 

interviewed for this project knew of the existence of the USSOCOM instruction. Nor do any of these commands have a program of instruction (POI) to 

provide to deploying units.45

Current USSOCOM doctrine does not provide adequate attention to these 

complex issues on the use of force and respect for human rights. USSOCOM 

has developed field manuals and instructions on a whole array of tactical 

and operational issues. A content analysis was conducted on manuals and 

publications on FID, unconventional warfare, and joint doctrine for special 

operations. Of nearly 20 USSOF-oriented manuals, few made reference to 

human rights or IHL. For example, the U.S. Army manual on Army SOF46

makes little mention of the repercussions of IHL violations by surrogate 

forces. Instead, the training agenda is devoted to tactical techniques and procedures—each important in their own right. The Joint Doctrine for Special 
23

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

Operations (JP 3-05) publication is no better, mentioning IHL training only 

once. In an astonishingly brief single sentence, the manual says that the 

staff judge advocate should “support appropriate law of war training for all 

personnel.”47

Of the 20 USSOF-centric manuals reviewed for IHL references, only the 

FID manual mentioned the importance of human rights. It describes the 

ability of the U.S. military to influence the professionalism of partner nation 

forces as “considerable.” Military success, according to the manual, is dependent on the ability of U.S. forces to help eliminate or reduce corruption and 

human rights abuses.48 Most importantly, it captures the operational benefit 

that comes with winning the support of the population.

Strict adherence to respect for human rights must be maintained. 

This includes U.S. forces as well as forces from the host nation and 

other participating multinational forces. Repression and abuses of 

the local population by the legitimate government will reduce the 

credibility and popular support for the host nation government and 

also may cause the President to consider withdrawing U.S. support; 

therefore, commanders must consistently reinforce human rights 

policies. In many FID combat situations, the moral high ground 

may be just as important as the tactical high ground.49

Figure 3. U.S. Special Operations Command and its Subordinate Commands. 

Source: Author
24

JSOU Report 16-9

Reference Title Date HR/IHL Content Amount

AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense 01 Nov 2011 None

CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/

Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces

13 June 2005 Significant

DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management 

Manual (DISAM Green Book)

Aug 2015 Significant

DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare 28 Aug 2014 None

DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities 

Relating to Security Cooperation

24 Oct 2008 None

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-15, 

Small Wars Manual

22 Dec 1990 

(republished in 1940)

Minimal

FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces 31 Aug 2012 None

FM 3-05.137, Army Special Operations Forces 

Foreign Internal Defense

30 June 2008 Moderate

FM 3-05.202, Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense 02 Feb 2007 Minimal

FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures

23 Sept 2003 Minimal

FM 3-07.10 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Training Security Force Advisor Teams

10 Sept 2009 Minimal

FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies 2 June 2014 Significant

FM 3-24.2, Tactics for Counterinsurgency 21 Apr 2009 Moderate

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States

20 Mar 2009 Minimal

JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations 16 July 2014 Minimal

JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare 15 Nov 2015 Minimal

JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense 12 July 2010 Moderate

MCWP 3-33A, Counterguerrilla Operations 29 Aug 1986 Minimal

Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-14M, The 

Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 

Operations

Oct 1995 Moderate

TC 18-01, U.S. Army Special Forces Unconventional 

Warfare

30 Nov 2010 Moderate

Methodology: Manuals were measured by the amount of human rights or international humanitarian law (HR/IHL) content that they include. “Minimal” content was considered brief mention of 

either HR or IHL but no more than two paragraphs. “Moderate” content was defined by at least one 

written page or more than two paragraphs on HR/IHL. “Significant” content was defined as more 

than two pages dedicated to HR/IHL.

Table 1. Content Analysis of Selected USSOF Manuals and Instructions
25

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

The conspicuous absence of instruction to USSOF units was noticed by 

the U.S. DOS. In late 2012, senior DOS representatives visited Tampa, Florida, 

to confer with USSOCOM senior officials. The representatives encouraged 

USSOCOM officials to develop a human rights doctrine as part of a broader 

effort to advance human rights as a core U.S. foreign policy goal.50 According 

to representatives who attended the meetings, senior USSOCOM officials 

acknowledged the benefit of an IHL doctrine and agreed to work with DOS 

to develop an instruction that would ensure that USSOCOM and its subordinate commands included human rights and IHL training during its interaction with foreign security forces. DOS and USSOCOM agreed on the need 

to develop a POI that could be distributed to its theater special operations 

commands and service components.51 As of the publication of this report, no 

instruction or guidance has been developed. According to USSOCOM and 

DOS personnel, the initiative seems to have been suspended or cancelled.

The inattention given to human rights training and IHL training at 

USSOCOM is representative of the DOD as a whole. Forces deploying for 

operations or training to other regions of the world remain under the operational control of the specific theater special operations command but, at the 

same time, abide by theater-specific directions and requirements of the geographic combatant commanders—the regional military commander in charge 

of U.S. military efforts in that part of the world. DOD instructions require 

each combatant command to “institute a comprehensive program to prevent 

law of war violations” and to “include specific law of war scenarios in exercises 

to improve lawful implementation.”52

However, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is the only 

one of six geographic combatant commands that has a dedicated human rights 

office. The Foreign Clearance Guide lists pre-deployment requirements for 

U.S. military personnel entering each geographic area. Only USSOUTHCOM 

requires U.S. military personnel traveling into the command’s area of responsibility to undergo mandatory training on human rights before they deploy.53

USSOUTHCOM’s tenant units offer significant training and education 

opportunities on human rights and IHL. The Western Hemisphere Institute 

for Security Cooperation in Fort Benning, Georgia, graduated 2,000 students 

in 2014. The school offers 15 courses that range from three weeks to 47 weeks in 

length. Each course has a mandatory human rights and IHL component that is 

at least eight hours in length. It also offers a four-week course on international 

operational law that is offered four times per year.
26

JSOU Report 16-9

The William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies is USSOUTHCOM’s regional academic center. Located in Washington, DC, it offers specialized human rights and IHL training during resident phase courses as well 

as during downrange events with nearly 35 Latin American and Caribbean 

government countries. Its two-week long residence phase course touches on 

important topics such as IHL, regional and international human rights organizations, the rule of law, and transitional justice. 

None of the other geographic combatant commanders have a human rights 

instruction or requirement for training for U.S. military personnel entering the 

region. That means there is no official DOD requirement for human rights or 

IHL awareness when conducting operations or training in over 150 countries 

in the world. 

Each of the military services is also remiss in developing updated IHL 

doctrine for its forces that address the complexity of contemporary warfare. 

Until recently, the U.S. military had very few up-to-date publications or guidance on the use of force. The Law of Land Warfare manual, the primary reference guide on the use of force by the U.S. Army, is dated from 1976. The Air 

Force’s manual on armed conflict—The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air 

Operations—is from 1980. The U.S. Navy has a more recent law guide. Its Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations is from 2007.54 In light of 

the absence of legal manuals from the military services, the judge advocate 

general (JAG) schoolhouse in Charlottesville, Virginia, produced two helpful 

reference guides for military operators that described modern warfighting 

rules. The International and Operational Law Department of the JAG produced the Law of War Deskbook in 2011, and the Operational Law Handbook

in 2014. Both are available online.55

Recent DOD initiatives seem to acknowledge the conspicuous absence 

of formal guidance on this important issue. In June 2015, the DOD Office 

of Legal Counsel published its Law of War Manual, a 1,200-page account of 

modern war-fighting rules that reportedly took a decade to develop. The new 

manual was welcomed by many who had sought clarification on contemporary 

conflicts. It covers important legal issues such as the rights of combatants, 

treatment of detainees, how to protect civilians during conflict, and noninternational armed conflict. Perhaps most importantly, it dedicates a chapter 

to each of the spheres of warfare: land warfare, naval warfare, air and space 

warfare, and cyber warfare. This provides important policy guidance to make 

up for the absence of guidance from the military services. 
27

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

5. Joint Combined Exchange Training 

USSOF’s main tool for interaction with friendly foreign forces is the 

JCET. Small units of teams deploy for a few weeks or months to train 

forces of a partner nation. The main objective of these JCETs is to improve 

USSOF training techniques, not to provide training to foreign forces. Hence, 

in the strict definition of the term, JCETs are not a form of security assistance. 

Of course, the foreign forces also benefit from the training, but improving 

the proficiency of USSOF to hone mission-critical skills (e.g., unconventional 

warfare or FID) is the primary goal. This includes enhancing their cultural 

and language proficiency, learning how to operate in diverse geographic 

conditions, and assessing the abilities of foreign forces.56

JCETs are normally conducted by a U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA), a Navy Special Warfare element, or by an 

Air Force Special Operations Command unit. Team composition may vary 

depending on the scope, purpose, and length of the JCET. For example, 

an ODA is normally composed of a 12-man team led by a junior officer 

or senior enlisted and supported by a group of noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs). Each member of the team has a specific function, ranging from 

operations and intelligence, to weapons, engineering, medical duties, and 

communications.57

JCETs also provide USSOF with an orientation that proves valuable 

during future operations in or with a foreign country. USSOF learn about 

the foreign government and its operations and do an assessment of the foreign forces, not as an adversary, but as an ally that may need to improve any 

number of tactical and operational skills. For example, USSOF may assess 

the surrogates’ level of tactical proficiency, operational knowledge, and military professionalism, details that may help assess the operating environment 

during future operations, such as the evacuation of American citizens. 

According to DOD directives, USSOF are required to conduct all operations in accordance with the law of war. U.S. law and DOD policy require 

U.S. forces to “comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.” 

This includes operations that do not rise to the level of an armed conflict.58
28

JSOU Report 16-9

USSOF are also required to report violations of human rights that they witness. The Department of Defense Law of War Program directive states, 

All reportable incidents committed by or against U.S. personnel, 

enemy persons, or any other individual are reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective 

action. The on-scene commanders shall ensure that measures are 

taken to preserve evidence of reportable incidents pending transfer 

to U.S., allied, or other appropriate authorities. 

If serious violations occur, USSOF are compelled to report the event 

and withdraw from the training. U.S. military personnel who do not report 

violations of surrogate forces that they witness may be held legally liable for 

failing to comply with their duties.59

It is unusual for USSOF to conduct surrogate training in areas where they 

may encounter enemy forces. Rather, most JCETs are conducted on military 

bases or facilities far from the front lines of a conflict. For example, Iraqi SOF 

were trained in Jordan until facilities could be constructed in Iraq. However, 

a number of USSOF personnel interviewed reported having conducted training near the combat front lines where host nation forces were deployed. In a 

number of instances, USSOF and their surrogates inadvertently had combat 

encounters with enemy forces. In these circumstances, USSOF may be drawn 

into battle. In other cases, even if prohibited from accompanying host-nation 

forces on operations, USSOF participated in these operations as a means 

of building rapport and credibility with their counterparts.60 During these 

situations, USSOF may join in the fight as part of their self-defense efforts, 

and under certain circumstances may need to direct host-nation forces in 

order to defend themselves. According to a former USSOCOM legal advisor 

who has published extensively on these conditions, USSOF may actually be 

held liable for inappropriate uses of force if a team “exercises ad hoc, limited 

tactical control over movements by the surrogates for purposes of maneuver 

and deconflicting fires.”61

The second circumstance when USSOF may be liable for surrogate actions 

occurs if U.S. forces have direct control over the host-nation forces. Direct 

control of the surrogate forces is defined as when USSOF has the ability to 

prevent and punish the commission of the alleged offenses. Hence, USSOF 

who fail to intervene in the face of violations of human rights may be criminally liable if they fail to “exert proper influence over others upon whom 
29

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

effective control already exists.” But again, under most normal JCET circumstances, these two pre-conditions only occur under exceptional circumstances. A more likely scenario is if USSOF willingly knew of the criminal 

intent of the surrogates and, despite that, continued to aid and abet the surrogates while they committed the crime. The situation would be exacerbated 

if USSOF knew the surrogates had a history of criminal violations and chose 

to continue to provide military training and equipment.62

As part of their training, USSOF undergo scenario-based exercises to capture real world examples of the nuances and complexities of modern warfare. 

For example, the U.S. Army Special Forces’ Robin Sage exercise scenario is 

a useful tool to present ethical dilemmas operators may face when working 

with surrogate forces.63 USSOF instructors role-play surrogate forces intent 

on committing violations of human rights and IHL. USSOF are tested by 

the unethical actions of the surrogates and have to decide how to respond. 

The training tests the personal honor and integrity of the USSOF team. 

U.S. personnel who have developed a deep rapport with the surrogates may 

be reluctant to intervene because of the camaraderie established up to that 

point of the training. Likewise, USSOF who may have invested months to 

gain the trust of surrogates in a strategically vital area may risk losing the 

access they have acquired. The unit leader, for example, may subtly offer to 

ignore human rights violations as he attempts to gain the confidence and 

cooperation from the surrogates. Or he may fail to intervene in the face of 

impending violations. If violations persist despite warnings to the surrogate 

forces, the team leader is required to break off contact with the surrogate 

forces and report the incident to his superiors. 

Most JCET events do not devote formal training to human rights or IHL. 

In fact, these issues were rarely a part of the hundreds of training events 

USSOCOM hosted in Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, from 

1998–2014, USSOF conducted 437 JCETs in countries in the region. Of those, 

human rights were a topic of training only 2 percent of the time. Instead, 

tactical arms and combat training received the lion’s share of the training. This included training on weapons marksmanship, demolitions, sniper 

techniques, light infantry tactics, close quarter battle, reconnaissance, land 

navigation, and breaching. It is possible that elements of human rights and 

the law of armed conflict were included in other types of training conducted 

during these JCETs. Training topics such as prisoner handling, mission planning, and troop leading procedures were also occasional topics. But in the 
30

JSOU Report 16-9

detailed reports of JCETs conducted in Latin America during this 17-year 

period, human rights and the law of armed conflict were rarely mentioned.64

Few of the USSOF personnel interviewed for this project knew of the 

existence or the requirements of the USSOCOM directive or could locate a 

copy of the memorandum. When asked about the techniques of training surrogate forces in other countries on the use of force, few of the operators could 

describe or recall any significant human rights training they conducted. In 

the opinion of many of the operators, most foreign forces are too inexperienced in even basic weapons skills or military tactics to be considered qualified to receive more advanced topics like the use of force, subordination to 

civilian authorities, detainee handling rules, and the strategic benefits that 

come from respecting human rights.65

Nearly all the USSOF operators remarked that one of their primary 

techniques was to build rapport and camaraderie with foreign soldiers. By 

modeling ethical behavior and good weapons tactics, they felt they could 

better demonstrate military professionalism. USSOF members interviewed 

for this project were reluctant to instruct their host nation counterparts on 

respect for human rights and principles of war. They considered the idea of 

lecturing foreign units on human rights and the use of force as patronizing, 

something that might jeopardize the rapport they were trying to generate. 

This was unusual in light of the poor level of military proficiency and tactical 

experience of the foreign units they were training. When asked how they 

would recognize human rights violations if they were committed by foreign 

units, many responded that they “would know it when they see it.” 

Admittedly, IHL rules are advanced and complex rules of engagement. 

Significant operational experience is required to understand them, and 

military discipline is needed to follow the rules of warfare. Some USSOF 

operators thought they should not teach IHL because the issues were so 

complex that they might “get something wrong.” Unfortunately, there are 

currently few other options to provide training on IHL to host-nation forces; 

no organic capacity exists within DOD or USSOCOM to export large numbers of training events on IHL. 

Providing tactical training on lethal force to foreign units that don’t have 

rigorous professional military standards is ethically and legally irresponsible. 

Saying nothing about the use of force during JCET training may be erroneously perceived by the partner nation forces to mean that ethical considerations are not important and that mission accomplishment—even at the cost 
31

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

Figure 4. USSOF JCETs in Latin America, 1998–2014. Graphic developed by William J. Perry Center research assistant Kathy Kim. Statistics don’t include data from 1999 or 2001, which were not cleared for public release. 
32

JSOU Report 16-9

of collateral damage—is the utmost priority. USSOF should present these 

rules of modern warfare in the same way that they would any other tactic 

or technique. A point of emphasis during such training sessions should be 

that respect for human rights and adherence to IHL standards generates 

popular support. Support from the population increases the perception of 

legitimacy, which in turn produces intelligence on insurgent and criminal 

activities. In that sense, respect for human rights and IHL is as important 

as teaching other basic military tactics such as maneuver, patrolling, and 

operational planning. 

U.S. law requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual summary of JCETs to Congress each year. The Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict collects the JCET info 

from the regional commands and submits it to Congress on behalf of the 

Secretary of Defense. The report is submitted to the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate and the Armed Services (National 

Security) and Foreign Affairs Committees of the House of Representatives. 

The requirement was generated by perceptions among some Congressional 

members of a lack of oversight by legislators and concern that the JCETs 

could generate major problems for U.S. foreign policy.66
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Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

6. The Leahy Law 

During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of instances of USSOF training 

of foreign surrogate forces brought the issue to the attention of U.S. 

lawmakers. In some well-documented instances, foreign militaries trained 

by USSOF went on to commit human rights violations. In two cases in particular, Colombia and Indonesia, the foreign forces trained by USSOF used 

the military skills they received to conduct brutal repression during internal 

civil disturbances. The issue generated significant criticism from human 

rights groups, and intense scrutiny from the press and NGOs.67

As a result of the attention, Congress passed legislation that constrained 

USSOF’s ability to work with foreign forces. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) 

introduced legislation that prohibited U.S. forces from providing assistance 

to foreign military units if they commit human rights violations. The Leahy 

Law, as it became known, was an amendment to the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. Congress approved the bill and extended an existing restriction on counter-narcotics programs that prohibited assistance to 

foreign security forces to nearly all DOD-funded training programs.68 In 

2013, the legislation was further expanded to other types of DOD assistance 

including equipment, support services, grants, loans, and exercises.69

The Leahy Law prohibits training or equipping any foreign security force 

units that are credibly believed to have committed a gross violation of human 

rights.70 The legislation is considered by many as an important element of 

U.S. foreign policy because it emphasizes human rights with partner nations, 

encourages foreign governments to bring to justice members of their security forces when they commit crimes, and prevents the U.S. from being 

associated with brutal security partners. Advocates of the law contend that 

it makes partner forces more professional and accountable because, as a 

result of the requirement, partner forces are encouraged to adopt better 

practices in human rights tactics and doctrine. Senator Leahy describes the 

law as punitive for security forces that abuse the rights of civilians but also 

declares it as an incentive “to build professional, disciplined, transparent, 

and accountable security forces who are sustainable and effective partners 

of the United States.”71
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JSOU Report 16-9

Before receiving training, the U.S. Government agency sponsoring the 

training requests the U.S. embassy to vet candidates for the event. As part of 

the vetting process, U.S. embassy personnel in the country collect information from news sources, host-nation forces, and civil society to determine 

if there is credible evidence of violations. The embassy must evaluate any 

negative reports to determine if the information is credible. Civilians are 

generally not vetted. However, nearly all members of the country’s military 

and police forces, to include prison guards, armed game wardens, coast 

guard, border patrol, and customs officials, are subject to vetting. Once the 

information collection process is completed, embassy personnel determine 

whether to approve, reject, suspend, or seek additional information. The 

information is managed through a computer software program called International Vetting and Security Tracking system. 

Each year, DOS vets about 160,000 training candidates. On average, only 

about 1 percent of all vetted individuals are denied assistance. Investigations 

into 9 percent of other training candidates are suspended until more information can be collected or because of other alleged criminal activities such 

Figure 5. Types of security force assistance covered by 

Leahy Law restrictions72
35

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

as corruption and money laundering. This might amount to denying military 

assistance to individuals or units in dozens of countries. In 2011, for example, 

1,766 individuals and units from 46 countries, out of a total of nearly 200,000 

cases, were denied assistance because of alleged human rights violations.73 

Hundreds of other units and individuals are not submitted because U.S. 

embassy personnel know they have committed human rights violations and 

will not pass vetting. Colombia and Mexico are the two countries with the 

most vetted candidates each year.74

Removing individuals or units from the list of tainted foreign groups is 

problematic, however. In order to remediate accused individuals or units, 

the host nation must take “effective steps to bring responsible members of 

the security forces units to justice.”75 ‘Effective steps’ are defined as a credible investigation and that the alleged perpetrators face disciplinary action 

or impartial prosecution if they are found guilty. In some instances, when it 

is difficult to determine which members of a unit are guilty of human rights 

violations, the entire unit may be listed as tainted. It is not enough to simply 

transfer individuals out of the unit. The military must conduct an investigation and, if the perpetrators are found guilty of gross violations of human 

rights, level the appropriate punishment. According to DOS records, prior 

to 2015, no country had ever taken sufficient remediation steps to clear units 

once they are deemed ineligible for human rights violations. In other words, 

once a unit is tainted, it was difficult to redeem their reputation.

New Leahy Law instructions and policies introduced in 2015 may help 

alleviate the problem and permit USSOF to train units that were previously 

restricted from U.S. assistance. The DOD and DOS released a joint policy 

that specified the steps required to remediate units accused of gross violations of human rights. The senior DOD official in each U.S. embassy submits 

the remediation request to DOD via the combatant command and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. The request is reviewed by both DOS and DOD personnel. If the host nation has conducted a credible investigation, adjudicated, 

and, if appropriate, punished the perpetrator, the DOS and DOD can conduct a review of case and lift sanctions against that unit or individual. The 

final decision is made by the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, 

Democracy, and Human Rights.76

In August 2015, the first remediation panel authorized a military unit 

to be eligible for military assistance after years of being on the banned list. 

During a drunken spree, a number of individuals from the military unit 
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JSOU Report 16-9

ransacked a police station and assaulted a number of police officers to free 

one of their colleagues who had been arrested for public intoxication. Once 

they freed their fellow soldier, the inebriated soldiers went into a local town 

and raped a number of prostitutes and women in a crime rampage. As a 

result, the soldiers’ unit was banned from receiving U.S. military assistance. 

Once the country tried, convicted, and sentenced the soldiers, the U.S. 

embassy officials requested the unit be eligible for military assistance again.77

The Leahy Law is not without its critics. To some, there are doubts whether 

the law actually encourages foreign partners to improve their human rights 

practices. Critics of the law contend that it blocks opportunities for USSOF to 

train important allies through FID programs. Restrictions on U.S. assistance 

over human rights issues, they say, provide an opening to competitor nations 

to provide training and material in place of the U.S. forces. Others say foreign 

policy is too multifaceted and that considering just one component above 

all others may jeopardize other more urgent issues.

Senior USSOF officials claim that foreign forces improve their military 

professionalism just by association with USSOF.78 Certainly, foreign forces 

witness USSOF expertise and advanced military proficiencies. But professionalism, according to scholars of Latin American militaries, is broadly 

defined as respect for human rights, subordination to civilian elected officials, and support for democratic institutions. In that sense, for surrogates 

to improve their professionalism, JCETs must include human rights training 

and IHL training as part of their mandated program. Under most of these 

JCETs, foreign forces don’t get to see the U.S. demonstrate human rights, 

demonstrate democratic principles, or show respect for civilian officials in a 

real-world situation. The JCETs are often remotely located, confined to military bases, and away from real-world interactions with civilians or elected 

officials. Furthermore, only a small fraction of the JCET training (less than 2 

percent by this author’s calculations) contain any elements of human rights, 

IHL, or civil-military relations training.

At least one former USSOF leader is skeptical of the rule to ban entire 

units from U.S. assistance because of the actions of a few individuals. As then 

USSOCOM commander, Admiral McRaven indicated in testimony before 

Congress that the law was somewhat counterproductive because it inhibits 

USSOCOM’s ability to train and equip partner-nation security forces needed 

to fight terrorist organizations in many parts of the world. “We absolutely 

want to ensure the forces we’re working with understand and appreciate their 
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Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

requirement to maintain appropriate human rights,” he said. “Unfortunately, 

it has restricted us in a number of countries across the globe in our ability to 

train units that we think need to be trained,” the admiral added.79

Other senior military leaders contend that the ones who are committing 

human rights abuses are the ones in most need of training and professionalization. Vice Admiral Charles Leidig, Jr., the deputy commander of U.S. 

Africa Command from 2010 to 2013, called the Leahy Law a “conundrum” 

because “the nations whose militaries have had human rights violations 

perhaps are the ones that need U.S. engagement the most.”80 General James 

Mattis, the former commander of U.S. Central Command, said that the 

Leahy Law has perhaps exceeded its original intent by preventing the U.S. 

from training foreign units that urgently require human rights training.81

Nigeria may be one of the best modern examples of the dilemmas associated with the Leahy Law. The armed forces in the African country have 

been fighting a vicious war against Boko Haram. A DOS designated terrorist organization, the group is internationally condemned for massacres, 

suicide attacks, and the April 2014 mass abduction of nearly 300 schoolgirls. 

In August 2011, the group exploded a suicide vehicle in the United Nations 

(UN) headquarters in the capital Abuja, killing or injuring nearly 100 people. 

More than 17,000 Nigerians have died in the violence and 1.5 million have fled 

the country. Portions of the northern half of the country have been under 

Figure 6. USSOF conduct training with Nigerian Army units. 

Source: Author
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JSOU Report 16-9

a state of emergency since 2012. In 2014, Boko Haram severed its ties with 

al-Qaeda and instead swore allegiance to the Islamic State. 

In the past, USSOF conducted frequent JCETs and MTTs with Nigerian 

security forces to help develop tactics and capacity to combat extremism. 

However, since 2011, when the Nigerian military went on the offensive against 

Boko Haram, the security forces have been accused of “extrajudicial killings 

and engaged in torture, rape, arbitrary detention, mistreatment of detainees, 

and destruction of property,” according to the U.S. DOS.82 In June 2015, 

Amnesty International released a scathing 133-page report that contended 

the Nigerian security forces were responsible for thousands of deaths by 

extrajudicial execution and from brutal conditions in detention facilities. At 

least 20,000 others have been arbitrarily arrested, part of the crackdown on 

crime and radicalism in the country. Nine of the country’s highest ranking 

military leaders are named in the report, some of whom should be investigated for war crimes, according to the NGO. President Muhammadu Buhari, 

a former Nigerian Army general who seized power for two years in the 1980s 

after a military coup d’état, fired all his top military officials a month after 

the Amnesty report was released. 

In late July 2015, President Buhari criticized the United States for its ban 

on military arms sales and training because of the Leahy Law. In a speech 

at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, Buhari denied the claims 

of human rights violations against his armed forces and criticized the Leahy 

Law. “The application of the Leahy Law has aided and abetted the Boko 

Haram terrorists in the prosecution of its extremist ideology and hate, the 

indiscriminate killings and maiming of civilians, the raping of women and 

girls and other heinous crimes,” he said.83 The speech caught U.S. officials 

by surprise. 
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Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

7. Peru and the Rondas Campesinas 

The next four chapters provide examples of how central governments 

have provided training or received assistance from surrogate forces 

during internal conflicts. The case studies—Peru, Colombia, El Salvador, 

and Iraq—demonstrate the challenges of training proxy forces in IHL. In 

some cases (Peru and Colombia, for example), the irregular forces were an 

instrumental part of the success in defeating violent terrorist groups in the 

country. In other cases (El Salvador and Iraq), U.S. efforts to professionalize the partner nation forces faced considerable resistance and challenges. 

The security assistance and FID investment by the U.S., and in particular 

by USSOF, resulted in minimal success at best. 

The Formation of Rondas Campesinas in Peru

Village defense forces, called Rondas Campesinas, have been a feature of the 

rural Peruvian highlands since the 1970s. The absence of state security forces 

and an ambivalence about activities in rural Andean communities by the 

central government officials in Lima created a political void that had to be 

filled by indigenous elements. 

The Rondas emerged in the North and Central Andean highlands in Peru, 

with the recorded examples emerging from Cuyumalca in the northwest 

Andean department of Cajamarca in December 1976.84 The groups were 

formed as a response to livestock thieves, later organizing themselves into 

practicing militias fighting government oppression. 

In Cajamarca, it was common for informal self-defense units normally 

to operate at night, guarding livestock from cattle rustlers and bandits that 

often operated under cover of darkness. At night, livestock (mostly cows and 

goats) in these rural areas graze in fields and pastures outside of villages, 

often shepherded overnight by members of the family that own the animals. 

Patrols of two to six men remained on guard patrolling the pastures outside 

of villages to protect livestock and property from thieves. These small groups 

would patrol the areas outside villages where cattle thieves operated. Anyone 

they encountered who did not have a legitimate explanation for why they 

were out at night would be detained until the next morning. Suspects were 
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JSOU Report 16-9

Figure 7. Provinces of Peru map shows the emergence of the village selfdefense forces and Sendero Luminoso in the country. Source: Author
41

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

then turned over to the lieutenant governor in charge of the sub-prefect who 

would decide what to do with the person.85

At first, Peruvian government officials in Cajamarca approved of the 

Rondas. In fact, the sub-prefect of the province of Chota authorized the use 

of the Rondas in Cuyamalca almost immediately after he was notified of 

their creation. Authorities welcomed the contribution of peasant vigilante 

forces to improve stability and security in these remote areas. 

The collective security effort rapidly spread to other villages in the region. 

Village leaders coordinated efforts with neighboring communities to avoid 

duplicating patrol areas and to share information of where thieves had 

struck. The program evolved into a network of village defense forces that 

ensured a security presence among a constellation of rural hamlets situated 

within a valley or along mountain plateaus. Within a few years of their 

establishment in Cuyamalca, there were an estimated 400 village self-defense 

forces operating in three provinces in the department.86

Rural Distrust of Peruvian Police Forces

The strong local enthusiasm for Rondas stemmed from an overall lack of 

security in the region, as well as a general distrust of Peruvian police forces. 

Peruvian police forces in these remote locations of the country were at best, 

ineffective, and at worst, corrupt. To many of Peru’s Indian and mixed-race 

majority living in the Andean regions, police officials were perceived as a 

tool of repression of the central government, remnants of control over rebellious peasant factions from the era of Spanish colonialism of the 17th and 

18th centuries. 

Police units in these remote areas often suppressed village and farmer 

mobilization efforts by breaking up strikes and protests and evicting squatters from latifundias (large land estates).87 Police used their authority to 

extort payoffs from locals or were in business with corrupt local officials 

who bribed the police for their support. Some police were even believed to 

operate with cattle rustlers. They accepted bribes in return for allowing the 

rustlers to transport their stolen merchandise past checkpoints en route to 

meat markets in the cities. Among peasants, these experiences generated a 

general contempt for state security officials and political leaders that represented the central government. 
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JSOU Report 16-9

The absence of state officials, combined with distrust of corrupt police 

in these areas, meant that the Rondas began doling out their own justice to 

criminals. There are some indications that government authorities in Cajamarca Department tried to get the Rondas to hand over captured thieves. 

However, the remote location of many rural hamlets on high plateaus in the 

Andean cordilleras, many only accessible by footpaths, made it difficult to 

deliver perpetrators to state authorities. Instead, suspects were frequently 

beaten and publicly paraded to humiliate and permit the community to identify the culprit. There are also reports of summary executions of suspected 

thieves by members of the Rondas during this period, but the veracity of 

such reports is questionable. 

The Sendero Luminoso Gains a Foothold in Ayachucho

A dramatic turn of events on 18 May 1980 occurred in the Peruvian countryside. The Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”), originally organized as a 

Marxist student movement in the late 1960s, made their debut on the national 

political landscape. On that day, members of the group burnt ballot boxes on 

the eve of the 1980 presidential elections in the Peruvian town of Chuschi, in 

the province of Ayacucho in south-central Peru.88 The group’s philosophical origins stemmed from Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor at San 

Cristóbal of Huamanga National University in Ayacucho. Guzmán sought 

to foment a Maoist proletariat revolution against the Peruvian government 

and to install a communist regime that would eventually spread to other 

Latin American countries. The hierarchy of the guerrilla group consisted 

of Guzmán as supreme leader (normally referred to by his nom de guerre of 

Comrade Gonzalo), student leaders as his lieutenants, and recruited peasants 

and villagers as the foot soldiers.89

The popular justice and anti-government sentiment of the Sendero Luminoso were initially welcomed by local campesinos (farmers). Guerrillas captured and punished social deviants, cattle rustlers, public drunkards, and 

spouse abusers—and the villagers approved. Guzmán’s strategy, however, 

required town-wide ‘cleansings’ of anyone who represented the central government, an effort that he claimed could require as many as one million lives. 

As a result, guerrillas began to apply revolutionary justice techniques: killing 

mayors, police officers, and peasant leaders. These actions often included 

macabre forms of torture, massacres, and assassination. Guzmán justified 
43

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

these tactics as necessary to “annihilate the imperial dominion” of the government and its representatives.90

The guerrillas also began trying to curb commerce from the villages to 

the larger cities. This was a tactical mistake. Many Peruvian peasants relied 

on markets in the larger cities to sell their goods and produce; the guerrillas were cutting off their primary source of income and livelihood. These 

actions quickly alienated many peasant groups from the nihilistic revolutionary movement and generated widespread resentment and resistance among 

peasants to the insurgents.91

By the end of 1981, Sendero Luminoso guerrillas had effectively driven 

state authorities from much of the Ayacucho. Police chiefs and mayors 

resigned their posts and fled with their families to the relative safety of the 

cities, adding to the vacuum of security that already plagued the region. At 

the same time, national authorities in Lima were slow to recognize the severity of the problem in the province, instead hoping that the uprising was an 

isolated event that could be solved by police work. When the police proved 

unable to suppress the rebellion, however, the government delayed even 

longer before calling upon the armed forces, primarily because the country 

had just returned to democracy after 12 years of military rule. State officials 

were reluctant to cede power to the armed forces again after struggling for 

so long to restore civilian representative democracy. 

The Peruvian Military Steps In

Finally, at the end of 1981, the government mobilized its military. On 29 

December 1981, the central government declared a state of emergency in 

three departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac. However, 

the Peruvian armed forces were ill equipped to launch a counterinsurgency 

campaign. Approximately 60 percent of Peru’s Army was concentrated on the 

Ecuadorian border, a result of the Paquisha War between the two countries. 

“All of our units are prepared for conventional war against our neighbors. 

We don’t even have manuals for counterinsurgency training,” said Peruvian 

Army General Juan Manuel Campos Luque.92

Faced with limited units and little familiarity of fighting irregular warfare, the Peruvian military resorted to conventional tactics that failed to differentiate between insurgents and noncombatants. In doing so, the Peruvian 

armed forces adopted the same shortsighted strategy as that of many other 
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JSOU Report 16-9

Latin American armies; peasants perceived to be active supporters of the 

insurgents were considered legitimate targets for government repression. 

Villages suspected of providing logistical support, information on military 

troop movements, or shelter to insurgents were ransacked, burnt down, and 

residents driven from their homes.93 In some instances, according to the 

Peruvian Truth Commission, the military employed brutal tactics including 

torture, forced disappearances, massacres, and arbitrary arrests.94

Some areas of the Huanta province in Ayacucho department were reportedly nearly depopulated by villagers fleeing retribution by the armed forces. 

This empty space subsequently provided the leftist guerrillas with a sanctuary in which to operate unfettered.95 In hindsight, historians believe that the 

repressive and often brutal actions of the Peruvian military against villagers during 1983 and 1984 delayed the development of a crucial alliance: the 

collaboration between the armed forces and village self-defense forces that 

consequently would limit the freedom of maneuver by the Sendero Luminoso

guerrillas and drive the insurgents from their sanctuaries in the Peruvian 

highlands. 

The Military Starts Working with Self-Defense/Paramilitary 

Groups

Despite the new initiative by the central government, military forces by 

themselves were ineffective. Forces were too scarce or were garrisoned in 

compounds within towns in the region, reluctant to conduct patrols in the 

countryside that would provoke encounters with the guerrillas.96 In the 

department of Ayacucho, rugged geography and remote location of villages 

prevented the army from providing security in the countryside. “We don’t 

have enough soldiers to patrol and control the entire countryside. We don’t 

have the capacity for it,” one Peruvian Army official reported. “For this 

reason we have to rely on the presence of the Rondas in areas where we 

cannot always be,” he said.97

In response, in August 1983, the Peruvian military started organizing 

self-defense forces into comités de defensa civil, modeled after the Rondas 

Campesinas of northwest Peru.98 However, unlike their counterparts in Cajamarca departments, the peasants in the south-central highlands did not 

have a history of forming village self-defense forces. The region historically 

relied more on agrarian revenue than livestock, the police forces were more 
45

Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

plentiful, and large estates owned by wealthy landowners could provide their 

own security.99 In contrast to the autonomy of their northwestern counterparts, the Rondas in Ayacucho were under the control of the armed forces.100 

By 1989, almost 700 self-defense groups existed in five southern Peruvian 

departments (Apurímac, Ayacucho, Junín, Huancavelica, and Pasco). By 

1991, that number had increased to 1,200. By 1997, more than 2,500 groups 

existed in Ayacucho and Huancavelica alone.101

Because the Army was so unprepared to fight in the rural south, Peruvian 

peasants were often on their own to combat the guerrillas. To complicate 

matters further, the Peruvian Army was initially reluctant to arm the Rondas 

for fear of providing weapons to a force that might later use them against 

the army. One Peruvian Army general testified: 

We are promoting the creation of a parallel army. We would provoke 

an enormous contradiction; on one hand, the state with its own 

defense mechanisms, that is the security forces, and on the other 

hand, the self-defense forces with weapons of war, a parallel state 

that is not addressed in the political constitution. The consequences 

of accepting this request would be unpredictable. To accept it would 

be to recognize the incapacity of the state to provide defense through 

the mechanisms established in the constitution.102

The reluctance of the Peruvian military to provide arms left the selfdefense forces vulnerable. Villagers were required to battle the guerrillas with 

only spears, machetes, slings, and knives, leaving them extremely outgunned 

by the guerrillas who used Kalashnikov machine guns or FAL rifles.103 The 

few firearms that did exist among the Rondas were often old, in disrepair, and 

not functional. For these reasons, many villages became reluctant to form 

self-defense groups because it would invite brutal reprisals by guerrillas. 

On 3 April 1983, guerrillas massacred 80 villagers in the Ayacucho town of 

Lucanamarca, an incident that Abimael Guzmán ironically said was necessary to defend the people’s war. In another incident in the Cochas province 

of Ayacucho, guerrillas entered a village to punish collaborators with the 

Peruvian military. They reportedly slit the throats of 18 villagers including 

a 4-year-old girl and an 82-year-old woman.104

By 1985, the military had shifted tactics and adopted an ‘integral strategy’ 

that included civic action and sociopolitical development in order to win 

support of the peasants.105 This was likely the turning point of the conflict, 
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JSOU Report 16-9

and civilian deaths at the hands of the military declined by two-thirds after 

1983–84.106 It would take three to four years to win the trust of the peasantry 

and mobilize the Rondas. However, once the peasant mobilization began, it 

spread rapidly through the entire Ayacucho department.

In 1991, after 15 years of quasi-legal operations, the Rondas were formally 

recognized by the Peruvian government. On 8 November of that year, President Alberto Fujimori introduced Legislative Decree 741 that recognized the 

official existence of Rondas Campesinas. The decree stated that every Ronda 

group would be “authorized by the Joint Command of the Armed Forces 

... and operate under the control of the respective Military Commands [in 

their region].”107 The Peruvian Army assumed direct oversight and control 

of the Rondas. The Rondas were tasked not only to provide security for their 

own villages but also to support Peruvian military and police operations. 

Fujimori would later make the Rondas a central part of his counterinsurgency campaign against the Sendero Luminoso, flying around the country to 

preside over ceremonies in which the Army delivered weapons to the Rondas 

and declaring them “Peru’s greatest patriots.”108 Fujimori also ordered better 

equipment for the Rondas. In 1991, the Peruvian Army started distributing 

more than 10,000 Winchester Model 1300 shotguns. In total, according to 

the Peruvian Ministry of Defense, the armed forces provided 15,179 arms to 

the Rondas. These consisted primarily of Winchester and Mossberg shotguns 

and MGP-43 machine guns.109

Conclusion

The arming of the Rondas and their subordination of the Rondas to the 

Peruvian military and the arming of the village defense forces marked a 

significant shift in the capacity and role of the Rondas in Peruvian culture, 

government, and military in Peru’s internal conflict, notably in two distinct 

ways. First, the Rondas proved to be a decisive paramilitary force fighting on 

behalf of the Peruvian government against the leftist guerrillas. The combined operations of military and paramilitary forces were a formidable force 

against the insurgents. The rapid expansion of the Rondas in the Ayacucho 

countryside, combined with Peruvian Army support and strategy, drove 

the Sendero Luminoso into smaller pockets of sanctuary and limited their 

ability to move freely through the area. By 1993, almost every village along 

nearly 300 miles of the central Peruvian cordillera—the heart of the Sendero 
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Luminoso insurgency—had self-defense forces. By the end of that year, the 

guerrillas were driven nearly completely out of the Ayacucho department.110 

Peruvian historian and anthropologist Carlos Ivan Degregori claimed, “The 

Rondas are the biggest triumph of the state in 12 years of war.”111 Second, the 

arming of the Rondas provided the villagers a military capacity that they had 

previously lacked. While armed with only knives, slings, and some rudimentary firearms, the Rondas were no match for the heavily armed insurgents. 

However, with rifles and shotguns, the self-defense forces were able to hold 

their own against the insurgents. 

The Peruvian army had an ethical responsibility—especially after the 

large-scale arming of the peasantry—to ensure that its paramilitary colleagues were comporting themselves in an ethical manner. Admittedly, this 

was a foreign concept in a remote region of the Peruvian highlands that 

had traditionally been ruled by intimidation and repression, rather than by 

a rule of law. Like all the participants in the war, the Rondas Campesinas 

were reported to have committed human rights violations against suspected 

guerrillas without any due process or rule of law. In one instance, captured 

guerrillas were decapitated and their heads delivered to the local army commander.112 Reports of the lynching of guerrillas were also widespread. The 

Peruvian armed forces at the time were not much better, employing their 

own harsh tactics against suspected guerrillas or sympathizers; they were 

more likely to support the Rondas’ use of intimidation and repression rather 

than principles of war such as humanity and proportionality. 

The Rondas made a critical contribution to the internal conflict in Peru, 

perhaps the most important of any participant in the war. Despite that, neither the Sendero Luminoso nor the Peruvian Army recognized the importance of winning the support and legitimacy of the citizens of Ayacucho. 

For the guerrillas, this should have been an imperative; Maoist doctrine 

preached by Abimael Guzmán required a peasant mobilization to ensure 

victory for the revolution. Yet it was the indiscriminate slaughter of villagers by Sendero guerrillas that eventually drove the peasants into an unlikely 

alliance with the Peruvian Army. Likewise, the Peruvian Army’s tactics in 

1983 and 1984—indiscriminate repression, forced relocation, and excessive 

force against suspected guerrilla sympathizers—cut off a valuable source of 

intelligence of the enemy’s movements and location. This prolonged the war 

by at least a year, perhaps longer.
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Takeaways:

• When mobilized against the Sendero Luminoso in late 1981, the Peruvian military was unprepared for a counterinsurgency campaign. 

• Without proper doctrine, training, or strategy for such counterinsurgency operations, the Peruvian armed forces resorted to repressive tactics that failed to distinguish between guerrillas and villagers 

perceived to be sympathizing with the Sendero Luminoso. 

• The Sendero Luminoso failed to recognize the strategic advantage 

of gaining the assistance of villagers, instead using harsh tactics that 

polarized villagers. At the same time, the Peruvian armed forces alienated the civilian population from the central government by using a 

strategy of repression.

• Once established and later armed, village self-defense forces proved 

a valuable strategic asset for the government in the remote Peruvian 

highlands.

• The Peruvian military’s failure to use the proper strategy (one that 

incorporated respect for human rights and moderate use of force) 

prolonged the war for one to two years. 
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8. Colombia and the Self-Defense Forces 

Like Peru, Colombia had its own version of self-defense forces that provided local security in isolated regions of the country. Similar to their 

Andean counterparts, the Colombian self-defense forces played a critical role 

in the fight against leftist insurgents during the 1980s and 1990s. However, 

unlike the Peruvian Rondas Campesinas, Colombia’s self-defense forces 

became involved in extensive criminal activity and violent actions against 

Colombian civilians. In fact, the Colombian self-defense forces are responsible for more atrocities and human rights violations than any other group in 

the long internal conflict in the country. The rogue force became so extreme 

that, in 2001, DOS declared the group to be a foreign terrorist organization. 

Introduction

Colombia suffers from the longest active insurgency in the world, a half-century long conflict that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens. 

A shifting mosaic of armed groups, including left-wing guerrillas, right-wing 

paramilitaries, drug traffickers, and criminal gangs, have consumed generations of Colombians, often in brutal, retaliatory attacks designed to terrorize 

and intimidate peasants to keep them from supporting the opposition. An 

estimated 81.5 percent of the 220,000 victims in the ongoing conflict are 

noncombatants caught in the crossfire between warring factions.113

Colombian national territory encompasses a massive region—the fifth 

largest of any Latin American country. Much of the country lies in remote 

jungle expanses or high in the Andean cordillera, areas that for most of the 

country’s 200-year history saw little presence of central government officials 

and experienced little economic development. Colombia’s rugged terrain and 

poor infrastructure in the interior of the country made it difficult to establish 

state control over large swaths of the nation’s territory. 

Without the army to defend them, wealthy landowners, cattle ranchers, 

and agro-industrialists in the Colombian countryside were vulnerable to 

leftist insurgent groups that sprang up in the 1960s, intent on overthrowing 

what they perceived to be a corrupt central government.114 To fund their 

operations, the insurgents frequently kidnapped members of the landed 

elites, extorting hefty ransoms to return family members. 
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JSOU Report 16-9

As a result, wealthy landowners began defending themselves from guerrilla groups, hiring private militias to guard their estates. Landowners, cattle 

ranchers, and regional politicians insisted that, if the state was incapable of 

protecting their lives and property, they had a right to defend themselves 

against guerrillas and criminals. This was how Colombian self-defense forces 

got their start. 

Origins of the Colombian Self-Defense Forces 

Colombia’s first self-defense forces115 emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as civil 

militias, tasked to provide security in remote parts of the country where 

there was a lack of state presence. The establishment of an organized selfdefense force was welcomed by many political leaders in Bogota who had 

grown worried about the advances of the leftist guerrillas.116 In December 

1965, the Colombian government established the legal basis for self-defense 

forces by authorizing the Ministry of Defense to arm civilians.117

Initially, the self-defense forces had difficulty competing against the 

better-trained and better-equipped Marxist insurgents who were especially 

adept at fighting in the mountains. As a result, the self-defense forces turned 

to killing insurgent supporters in the towns, targeting villagers or farmer 

they believed were providing intelligence or supplies to the insurgents, or 

December 1965 Self-defense forces established by Colombian government.

25 May 1989 Self-defense forces outlawed by state.

1994 Self Defense Forces of Cordoba and Uraba established by Carlos 

Castaño.

1994 CONVIVIRs established by Colombian government.

1997 AUC established.

1999 CONVIVIRs abolished by Colombian government.

10 September 2001 AUC declared a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S.

2003 AUC declared a drug trafficking organization by U.S.

5 July 2003 Sante Fe de Ralito agreement #1 (formal talks between AUC and 

Colombian government).

13 May 2004 Sante Fe de Ralito agreement #2 (established a AUC concentration zone in Cordoba to facilitate demobilization).

2007 Paramilitary demobilization ends.

Table 2. Timeline of Important Events for Colombian Self-Defense Forces118
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civilians who provided the guerrillas with medicine, food, alcohol, and prostitutes. The paramilitary groups used the most brutal of tactics, dismembering victims with machetes and chainsaws, decapitating, torturing, and 

burning suspected insurgents or their supporters. It was a counterinsurgency 

strategy focused on ‘draining the swamp’ by terrorizing members of the 

population who provided assistance to the guerrillas and, subsequently, 

isolating the rebels from their popular support base. 

The self-defense groups frequently drew their forces from former military 

or police officials who had quit or been kicked out of the Colombian security 

forces.119 In 2001, for example, one of the paramilitary leaders contended that 

35 retired military officers and 1,000 former soldiers had joined the ranks 

of the paramilitaries. These individuals had been trained in the use of arms 

and combat maneuver. They brought a combat expertise sorely needed by 

the local militias.120

By the end of the 1980s, self-defense force violence began to escalate dramatically. The groups grew so autonomous and brazen that they frequently 

attacked government representatives who attempted to curtail their actions 

by arresting self-defense forces leaders or who sought to establish anti-narcotic policies contrary to paramilitary interests. They had in effect become 

hired guns and mercenaries willing to serve any patron who would pay them.

One event in particular seemed to trigger a public revulsion of paramilitary actions. In the community of La Rochela, Colombia, in Caldas 

Department in January 1989, a paramilitary unit murdered 12 judicial representatives from Bogota who were conducting an investigation into an attack 

on the village. According to a U.S. embassy cable after the event, paramilitary 

groups “suddenly became more than a human rights problem. They became 

another enemy of the state, along with the narcos and the guerrillas.”121

The Colombian self-defense forces were personified by one man: Carlos 

Castaño. Born to a large but poor campesino family in the northern province 

of Antioquia, Castaño was 16 years old when his father was kidnapped by 

members of the FARC, a leftist insurgent group, who reportedly demanded 

a 50-million peso ransom for his return (about $20,000 U.S. dollars by 2015 

standards). The poor farming family had no way of raising such an amount 

and the insurgents subsequently beat his father to death. Castaño vowed 

revenge. He and two of his brothers, Fidel and Vicente, went on the offensive, helping local Colombian Army units identify and confront guerrillas 

in the area.122
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In 1994, Castaño organized the Self Defense Forces of Cordoba and Uraba 

to combat guerrillas in and around his home department of Antioquia. By 

1996, Castaño’s forces had driven the FARC out of a number of the northern 

departments. In April 1997, an inspired Carlos Castaño expanded his operations and organized the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), an 

umbrella organization that eventually spread to 20 of the country’s 32 provinces. This federation of vigilante groups permitted the self-defense forces to 

evolve from local defensive militias guarding their own towns from FARC 

intrusion, to a nationwide irregular army capable of launching offensive 

operations against FARC-friendly population centers. 

Castaño was a vocal proponent of the self-defense forces, granting frequent news interviews, campaigning to have the self-defense forces legitimized by the state, and lobbying for a seat at the peace negotiations with 

the insurgents. Castaño called the AUC a legitimate ‘pro-state’ group that 

defended the interests of civilians and, in particular, respectable business 

people from insurgent attacks and extortion. He claimed that their actions 

were justified; if the state could not protect its citizens, they had the right 

to take up arms for self-defense. According to the paramilitary leader, the 

government could not declare them illegal because the government had 

failed to provide Colombian ranchers, farmers, and landowners with their 

own inalienable right to life and security. 

The Colombian Government Bans Self-Defense and 

Paramilitary Forces

Colombian state officials, who at one time had welcomed the rural militias, grew concerned that the surrogates had grown into a serious criminal 

enterprise that was causing more harm than good. On 25 May 1989, the 

Colombian Supreme Court outlawed the self-defense forces and forbid any 

continued collaboration with them by government security forces or other 

officials. The following month, the government also declared it illegal to 

organize or establish additional self-defense groups.123

The Executive Branch followed in step with the Supreme Court. During 

his inaugural speech in 1990, President Cesar Gaviria vowed to “vigorously 

oppose the paramilitary groups channeling all the efforts of the Colombian 

state into dismantling these groups which, through drug-trafficking and 

extreme right-wing sectors, have become powerful criminal organizations 
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responsible for massacres, assassinations of political leaders and all kinds 

of atrocities.”124

Despite the official government policy, many analysts of the Colombian 

conflict contend that Colombian government authorities tolerated and tacitly 

facilitated the paramilitaries, even after they were declared illegal in 1989. 

The Colombian military remained unable to patrol all parts of the immense 

national territory, despite significantly increasing its size from 1998 to 2003 

and tripling its defense budget. Paramilitary forces remained an able and 

welcome proxy to provide security in remote areas where government security forces could not reach. As one historian assessed, “None of the institutions belonging to the state’s [security forces] engaged in any effort to contain 

the spread, prevent the emergence, or discontinue the functioning of those 

groups (paramilitaries).”125

The Self-Defense Forces Devolve into a Criminal Enterprise

By the 1990s, the paramilitary armies had become as violent as the Marxist 

insurgents they had initially been formed to combat. Castaño justified the 

terror tactics of his forces against civilians by claiming that his victims were 

guerrillas who shed their uniforms and hid among the villagers.126 His forces, 

he claimed, were only an extension of the state’s military forces, fighting a 

common enemy that threatened the country and its citizens.

In March 2000, Castaño admitted that his organizations were widely 

involved in drug trafficking and extortion of farmers as a means of funding their operations. “We are extortionists because we have to be,” he 

proclaimed.127 The paramilitaries even colluded with Pablo Escobar, the 

notorious leader of the Medellin cartel.128 In a 2001 interview with the Washington Post, the AUC leader estimated the self-defense groups earned $2 

million per year from trafficking illicit drugs.129

Colombian State Forces Struggle against the Insurgents

Despite the prohibition on self-defense forces, Colombia’s state security 

forces lacked the training, manpower, and airlift to counter the leftist insurgents that were creating so much trouble in the countryside. Myles Frechette, 

the U.S. ambassador to Colombia from 1994 to 1997, said, “The Colombian 

military is basically a barracks military, not one that is organized to go after 
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JSOU Report 16-9

guerrillas. They have some brave and capable people, but they are strictly a 

reaction force, and not a very mobile one at that.”131

In the late 1990s, the FARC achieved a number of high-profile tactical 

military victories that demonstrated their ability to launch offensive attacks 

against Colombian military bases or police garrisons. On 30 August 1996, 

FARC forces overran the military base of Las Delicias in Putumayo, killing 

54 soldiers and taking 60 others hostage. In March 1998, 700 FARC fighters 

ambushed an elite Colombian army battalion near El Billar in Caquetá, killing 62 and seizing 43 prisoners. Only one-third of the Colombian soldiers 

escaped. In November 1998, FARC units captured the city of Mitú in Vaupés 

and held it until government forces could mobilize for a counterattack. 

The situation became so dire that policymakers in Washington warned 

that the Colombian government was at risk of collapse. U.S. policymakers 

grew increasingly alarmed about not only paramilitary violence in Colombia, 

but also about the security and stability of one of the United States’ closest 

allies in the region. In the late 1990s, the U.S. ambassador cabled Washington that the Colombian Armed Forces were unable to stem the downward 

spiral of violence gripping the country. Shortly afterwards, a U.S. Defense 

Intelligence Agency report speculated that the central government could collapse within five years if the guerrilla’s rate of operations continued without 

effective opposition.132

Responsibility for Crimes (by percentage of total number of victims)130

Crime Total # of 

victims

Insurgents Paramilitaries Security 

Forces

Unknown 

assailants

Kidnapping 27,023 90.6% 9.5% N/A N/A

Massacres 11,751 17.3% 58.6% 8.0% 14.9%

Homicides 23,161 6.9% 38.4% 10.1% 27.7%

Table 3. Crimes in Colombia and responsible parties. The FARC and other leftist 

guerrilla groups were responsible for more kidnappings, but the self-defense forces 

were responsible for the vast majority of the massacres in the country. Massacres 

are defined as the death of four or more individuals in a single violent event. 

Information and graph assembled by Kathy Kim, Research Assistant, William J. 

Perry Center. Source: Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica
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Colombian Officials Endorse Self-Defense Groups 

For these reasons, and in direct opposition to the national ban on self-defense 

forces, certain Colombian politicians became determined to augment local 

security forces operating in guerrilla zones. In September 1994, President 

Ernesto Samper authorized the establishment of village self-defense forces. 

Just four years earlier, the previous government had declared all self-defense 

forces illegal and imposed criminal punishment on those who sought to 

organize them. Despite this, Samper approved the development of Community Associations of Rural Vigilance (Asociaciones Comunitarias de Vigilancia Rural or CONVIVIR). These groups were to be limited to a defense 

role that would provide Colombian Army units with information in local 

communities. Within a year, more than 500 CONVIVIR units were founded 

throughout the country with an estimated 10,000 armed members. The decision drew significant international criticism from the UN and other human 

rights groups that condemned the new groups as a return to previous paramilitary problems in Colombia. Despite that, the CONVIVIR units continued to operate until they were finally abolished in 1999.133

Carlos Castaño took this as a validation of the importance of his selfdefense forces that served as a de facto extension of the legitimate government security forces. According to Castaño, “The AUC has played an 

important role in keeping this nation from a failed government ... The AUC 

has prevented this country from falling into guerrilla hands.”134 In particular, 

he was appreciative of the support provided by the Samper administration. In 

his 2001 autobiography, Castaño wrote, “Among the self-defense forces, the 

government of Ernesto Samper will always be remembered well ... Samper 

was sending us messages that he would never prosecute us, he sent us a 

message that we would not be pursued. He stated that there would be no 

prosecution against us and he complied, we never felt any.”135

Samper’s successor in 1998, President Andres Pastrana, attempted to get 

control of the paramilitaries in the country. In February 2000, he announced 

the creation of the Coordination Center for the Fight against Self-Defense 

Groups, a government organization tasked to organize government efforts 

against paramilitaries. He also cracked down on alleged support of paramilitaries within the Colombian military. For example, in July 2000, the Office 

of the Procurator General indicted four senior Colombian Army officers for 

failing to prevent the killing of 18 villagers at Puerto Alvira, Meta, in May 
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1998.136 In October 2000, the Minister of Defense dismissed 388 officers and 

noncommissioned officers for human rights abuses, corruption, and other 

reasons, in an effort to improve the military’s performance.137

Deciphering the Ties Between the Paramilitaries and the 

Colombian Armed Forces

The relationship between the self-defense groups and the Colombian military 

is complex. Even after the self-defense forces had been declared illegal in 

1989, breaking the bonds between the Colombian military and the militias 

proved difficult. The paramilitaries had become too valuable and too efficient 

at eliminating guerrillas in the Colombian countryside, albeit at a terrible 

cost to Colombian civilians. 

According to a U.S. military assessment, the Colombian military lacked 

a long-term strategy and effective leadership; suffered from poor morale; 

had inadequate equipment, logistics, and training; and was operationally 

hindered by a lack of airlift or fast reaction forces. In addition, a number 

of senior paramilitary leaders previously served as NCOs or junior officers 

in the Colombian military. Based on numerous press reports, Colombian 

military officials only rarely participated in direct hostilities against civilians. Instead, they provided tacit support (transportation, logistical support, 

intelligence) to paramilitaries.138

One of the most profound examples of paramilitary and Colombian military collusion was the 15 July 1997 massacre at Mapiripan. The town was 

located deep inside FARC-controlled territory in the department of Guaviare. The AUC flew 200 paramilitaries on transport planes into the area. The 

vigilantes then rounded up and murdered as many as 26 suspected FARC 

sympathizers in the town. The Colombian Army controlled the airfield where 

the self-defense forces arrived and reportedly refused to respond to distress 

calls from the townspeople. Brigadier General Jaime Uscategui, commander 

of a Colombian Army Brigade responsible for security in the area, was later 

found guilty and sentenced to 40 years in jail by a military court-martial for 

failing to prevent the massacre.139

All along, the actions of the paramilitaries in Colombia had raised 

serious concerns in Washington, DC. During most of the 1990s, the State 

Department Annual Reports on Human Rights noted the close collaboration between the Colombian Army and the paramilitaries and noted that 
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the AUC changed from an organization that just took advantage of narcotics 

“taxes” and transportation, to one “involved in all of the drug trafficking 

chain.” The reports prompted some U.S. policymakers to pass legislation 

proposing a cutoff of military aid to Colombia if the problems continued.141 

In 2001, the U.S. DOS labeled the AUC a foreign terrorist organization. 

In September 2002, the U.S. Government requested the extradition of Carlos 

Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso, the co-founder of the AUC and secondin-charge under Castaño, on charges of sending more than 17 tons of drugs 

to the United States.142 In mid-2003, the AUC was declared a major drugtrafficking organization by the U.S. Government. 

Conclusion

Insurgents or paramilitary groups—not the Colombian military—committed 

the majority of the human rights violations during the 50-year Colombian 

conflict. According to the Grupo de Memoria Historica, there were 2,505 

massacres in Colombia between 1973 and 2008. Of those, the paramilitaries 

committed 58.9 percent of them.143

Paramilitaries did not abide by international norms of conflict and 

were not beholden to laws or control of the state. Quite the opposite, they 

employed acts of terror to intimidate opponents with indiscriminate violence. According to one NGO report, the AUC: 

Vignette: Indigenous Tensions in Colombia 

On 17 July 2012, in Toribio, Colombia, a small community in the southwest of the 

country, indigenous protesters from the Nasa Tribe who sought to ‘demilitarize’ 

the area from both government security forces and leftist insurgents confronted a 

Colombian Army unit assigned to guard a hillside communications station. Armed 

with only clubs, the protesters surrounded the station and demanded the Colombian 

soldiers leave the area. The Army soldier in charge of the installation, a noncommissioned officer, facing a decision to fire on the protesters in order to protect the 

installation, ordered his men not to use force to repel the protesters. Photographers 

captured the moment as the protesters physically carried the struggling soldiers from 

the installation. The event made front-page headlines in Colombia and throughout 

Latin American. Public support for the Colombian soldiers was widespread once the 

photos went public. The NCO was decorated by Colombian Army officials for showing 

restraint and avoiding a potential massacre.140
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JSOU Report 16-9

repeatedly and unequivocally flouts international standards by 

committing massacres, killing civilians and combatants hors de 

combat, and engaging in torture, the mutilation of corpses, death 

threats, forced displacement, hostage-taking, arbitrary detention, 

and looting, among other violations.144

The AUC paramilitaries under Carlos Castaño contended that they 

attempted to follow laws of war but that the normal laws of armed conflict 

didn’t fully apply to the situation in Colombia, instead insisting that they 

adhered to a ‘creole’ version of IHL, unique to Colombia’s irregular warfare. 

In particular, according to Castaño, this doctrine permitted the execution 

of combatants hors de combat.

145

The Colombian self-defense forces were supported, and in some cases 

armed by the Colombian government. Senior government officials, including the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Justice, publicly supported 

the groups. The Colombian chief national prosecutor reported in 1986 that 

the armed forces used the paramilitaries as an “armed front, as hired killers 

who could do unofficially what was not permitted officially.”146 Fidel Castaño, 

Carlos’ brother and cofounder of the AUC, admitted that he had wide support from Colombian government officials who welcomed the contributions 

his forces made. Castaño stated, “We were tolerated by the Attorney General, 

the police, the army, the DAS (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad) 

and even President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, who never ordered that we be 

pursued.”147 Salvatore Mancuso, the second-in-charge of the AUC, declared, 

“Without the action or inaction of the State, we wouldn’t have been able to 

grow the way we did.”148

In 2006, Colombia was rocked by the ‘para politics’ scandal. A number 

of senior lawmakers were accused by the attorney general’s office of colluding with the paramilitaries. Jorge Noguera, the former head of DAS, 

the Colombian domestic intelligence agency, was charged with providing 

the paramilitaries classified information so they could avoid arrest. On 15 

February 2007, six more Congressmen were arrested. By 2012, as many as 

50 members of Congress had been detained for links to paramilitaries.149

Human rights NGOs contend the Colombian self-defense forces were a 

policy of the state, and therefore the Colombian government is indirectly 

responsible for the atrocities committed by the groups. According to the 

NGOs, the Colombian government bears some responsibility, either by 
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collusion with vigilantes or by failing to provide adequate security for its 

constituents. In November 2014, a Colombian court agreed, ruling that “the 

military and the army were institutionally responsible” for paramilitary 

operations in which hundreds of civilians were killed.150

Colombian military collusion with self-defense forces was a major point 

of friction between the United States and its South American ally. The U.S. 

DOS, under pressure from numerous human rights groups, threatened to cut 

aid to Colombia, one of the biggest recipients of U.S. military assistance in 

the world, unless Colombia cleaned up its human rights problems. Amnesty 

International, for example, has called for a complete cut off of U.S. aid to 

Colombia for more than a decade because of these problems. 

Takeaways:

• Colombian self-defense forces appeared in the 1960s and 1970s because 

of the lack of government presence in remote parts of the country.

• Self-defense forces—or paramilitaries—used brutal terror tactics 

against civilians perceived to be supporting leftist insurgents. 

• The Colombian military initially welcomed the paramilitaries as an 

informal proxy surrogate force that could provide security in remote 

parts of the country. 

• The paramilitaries later became so violent that they committed more 

massacres than any actor in the conflict. They were declared a terrorist 

organization by the U.S. DOS in 2001. 

• Breaking ties between the Colombian government and the paramilitaries was very difficult. Post-conflict resolution efforts may have to 

address state responsibility for paramilitary actions. 

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9. The U.S. Indirect Approach in El 

Salvador 

In contrast to the Peru and Colombia case studies, in which the security 

forces of the country collaborated with internal self-defense groups, the El 

Salvador case study examines support provided by an external partner, the 

United States. This example resembles the scenario USSOF are more likely to 

encounter in contemporary times, when they assist the security forces of an 

important ally to combat an internal threat. The USSOF team in El Salvador 

faced a multitude of political constraints. Foremost among those obstacles 

was the fear among U.S. lawmakers of being drawn into another military 

advisory mission like Vietnam with an obstinate ally reluctant to adopt a 

population-centric counterinsurgency strategy in place of a repressive mano 

dura campaign that involved extensive human rights abuses. In spite of that, 

USSOF deployed to El Salvador in the 1980s faced a critical mission: to prevent the collapse of an important ally and avoid the establishment of another 

communist stronghold in the hemisphere like that of Cuba and Nicaragua. 

Economic and Political Inequality Generate Unrest

El Salvador, like most countries in Central America in the 1980s, was a poor 

country in which a small group of agrarian and landed elites (called the 

“Fourteen Families”) controlled the majority of the wealth. The military supported the elite landowners by suppressing popular protests, crushing labor 

strikes, and eliminating subversives.151 In return, the ruling elite provided 

the military with patronage and institutional prerogatives. For much of the 

country’s history, the Salvadoran military was directly involved in domestic 

politics. Military officers, mostly army generals and colonels, served as presidents for 74 of the 100 years before the Salvadoran civil war began in 1980.

In the 1970s, social unrest and protest increased as a result of an economic 

recession in the country. The government tried, but failed, to address the 

public discontent with socioeconomic reforms. On 20 February 1977, General Humberto Romero won the presidential election in what was widely 

perceived as a fraudulent election process. A protest eight days after the 

election was brutally suppressed by government security forces that opened 
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JSOU Report 16-9 Figure 8. El Salvador consists of 14 depart- ments. The capital, San Salvador, is located in the San Salvador department. Source: Perry-Castañeda map collection, University of Texas, Austin
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fire on the crowds, killing hundreds. The rigged elections and brutal government response drove previously ambivalent Salvadorans into the ranks of 

the revolutionaries. 

Romero was inaugurated president on 1 July 1977, but in response to 

growing unrest, nearly immediately ordered a state of emergency and the 

suspension of civil rights. Protests throughout the country continued to 

mount. Death squads ordered by elite landowners emerged in the countryside. The military soon joined in. Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, head of 

the Army intelligence branch, sent hit teams against government agitators. 

Nearly 700 were murdered in 1978 and that number jumped to nearly 1,800 

the following year.152 By 1981, there were 10,000 political murders by the 

Salvadoran military and its death squads. Salvadorans refer to this period 

as the locura, or insanity.153

The Juventud Militar and the FMLN

On 15 October 1979, Romero was overthrown in a coup by progressive army 

officers and moderate politicians. The military-civilian coalition that followed, called the Juventud Militar (Military Youth), hoped that launching 

land reforms and nationalizing some private industries would quell populist 

anger. However, the reform efforts polarized the armed forces. Far-right 

factions within the military saw the fight against leftist forces as a noble 

cause to save the country from becoming another communist enclave like 

neighboring Nicaragua. With the backing of the elites, a group of conservative military officers undermined the reform efforts of the Juventud Militar. 

On 3 January 1980, less than three months after seizing power, most of the 

civilian members of the coalition resigned in frustration. 

At the same time, the revolutionary forces intent on overthrowing the 

corrupt central regime were growing in numbers and strength. Popular 

anti-government sentiment had existed for decades in the country but it 

grew in earnest in the 1960s. The fraudulent election of 1977 provided a spark 

to the populist tinder in the countryside. After a series of minor alliances 

emerged among the rebel groups in the country, five of the revolutionary 

armed factions united under one flag on 11 October 1980. They took the name 

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (in Spanish, Frente Farabundo 

Martí de Liberación Nacional or FMLN) after the revolutionary leader who 

led a peasant uprising in 1932. Three months later, on 10 January 1981, they 
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launched what they called a “final offensive” to overthrow the government. 

The guerrillas, attacking military targets throughout the country, hoped 

their action would rally citizens to their cause and provoke a massive popular rebellion. They were able to seize control of two of the 14 departments in 

the north of the country but, disorganized and without an effective central 

command, failed to topple the government. The FMLN settled in for a prolonged conflict.

The United States had become increasingly concerned about the deterioration of the situation in El Salvador. The 1959 Cuban Revolution and 

the 1979 Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua raised concerns that another 

communist stronghold would appear in the hemisphere. When the Juventud 

Militar seized power in October of 1979, the U.S. Government offered millions of dollars of economic and military assistance to the moderate group, 

hoping the reforms the group offered would stave off a full-blown revolution. 

However, two events in 1980 almost resulted in a complete cutoff of U.S. aid. 

Military Regime Abuses

On 24 March 1980, Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated while delivering Mass in church. Romero had become a vocal opponent of the military 

regime, especially after the right-wing death squad activities increased in 

1977. The month before his death, he wrote to President Jimmy Carter pleading with him to cut off military assistance to the government. “Political 

power is in the hands of the armed forces. They know only how to repress 

the people and defend the interests of the Salvadoran oligarchy,” he wrote.154

In December 1980, another Salvadoran military atrocity horrified the 

American public. On 2 December, four Catholic nuns from the United 

States, serving as relief workers in El Salvador, were abducted, raped, and 

then murdered by members of the National Guard. U.S. Ambassador Robert 

White was present at the shallow roadside graves the next day as their bodies 

were exhumed. The Carter administration quickly cut off all military aid in 

response to the incident. 

As it often does in U.S. foreign policy, security imperatives trumped 

concerns over human rights violations by foreign governments. President 

Carter called Romero’s murder a “shocking and unconscionable act” and 

was mortified at the murder of the nuns.155 However, just weeks after the 

murder of the nuns and just before leaving office, Carter authorized the 
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restoration of military aid to the Salvadoran armed forces. The FMLN’s ‘final 

offensive’ earlier that month had rattled the confidence of his administration 

and they rushed $5 million in rifles, ammunition, grenades, and helicopters 

to bolster their Central American ally. In response to public criticism over 

providing aid to a force responsible for such atrocities against Americans, the 

DOS justified the aid by stating that the Salvadoran government was taking 

“positive steps” to investigate the murder of the four nuns. U.S. Ambassador 

Robert White disputed that claim, stating publicly that he had no evidence 

the government was conducting a serious investigation. He was relieved 

of his post by Secretary of State Alexander Haig two weeks after President 

Ronald Reagan took office.156

By 1981, many in the Salvadoran military realized that they were on the 

verge of a potential defeat. According to a series of interviews conducted with 

senior government officials during the conflict, the military had paid close 

attention to what occurred to the Somoza’s National Guard after they were 

overthrown in neighboring Nicaragua. They realized that a change of tactics 

was desperately needed to avoid the same fate. To do so, the armed forces 

would have to break from the oligarchy in the country—as their predecessors 

in the Juventud Militar had attempted in 1979.157 The military subsequently 

severed its ties with the far right supporters and aligned themselves with 

moderate political factions in a new civil-military junta. In March 1982, Dr. 

Álvaro Magaña, former head of the Central Bank and a political centrist, 

ascended to the presidency. Brigadier General Fred Woerner, the deputy 

commander for Central America at USSOUTHCOM in Panama, called the 

military’s reform efforts “the most significant reform of the decade.”158

Both the Carter and Reagan administrations were determined to prevent 

communist expansion in Central America. However, the U.S. experience in 

the Vietnam War haunted the foreign policy decisions of many of the lawmakers in Washington. Sending military advisors into a third world country 

to support a corrupt government sounded too much like the 1950 Military 

Assistance and Advisory Group that had preceded U.S. involvement in the 

Vietnam War. Hence, in 1980, the U.S. Congress authorized assistance to El 

Salvador but capped the number of DOD advisors at 55. 
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USSOF Advisory Role in El Salvador

The first USSOF advisors arrived in El Salvador in late 1980 and early 1981. 

Their arrival coincided with two major events. First, the 1981 FMLN offensive 

that had alarmed so many U.S. lawmakers was on the wane. Despite the failure of the guerrilla offensive, the insurgency remained a formidable problem 

throughout the country and was growing in strength. While the January 

1981 rebellion had not succeeded, the next one might—unless something 

changed in the country. Second, the inauguration of the President Reagan 

heralded a new strategy in the U.S. approach to its Central American ally. 

Intent on rolling back Communist advances in Central America, the Reagan 

administration increased economic aid by $12.5 million to $32.5 million.159 

Salvadoran senior military leaders recognized they had significant operational deficiencies that limited their ability to confront the FMLN. General 

Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, one of the members of the 1979 civil-military junta, 

listed the deep problems facing the Salvadoran military in 1981: 

There were three fundamental, grave deficiencies in the armed forces: 

(1) a total lack of equipment, (2) lack of training, and (3) mostly it 

was not prepared to confront the type of problems we were facing at 

the time. We also lacked an adequate intelligence system, and were 

not prepared to deal with a revolutionary war. We did not have the 

ability to command a small unit ... We did not have anyone prepared 

to train small unit commanders.160

For USSOF, respect for human rights continued to be one of the biggest 

challenges of working with the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF). USSOF 

personnel considered rapport-building a critical technique to building 

confidence and camaraderie with their ESAF counterparts. To many of the 

brigade commanders to which the operations, plans, and training teams 

(OPATTs) were assigned, human rights was an anathema. Some of the brigade commanders were notorious human rights violators and others were 

suspected to be involved in illicit activity. Yet the access and influence of the 

OPATT members was dependent in many ways on the brigade commanders. The USSOF personnel had to perform a delicate balancing act; for their 

suggestions to have any impact on the hundreds of ESAF personnel in the 

brigades, they needed to establish a professional and personal credibility 

with their counterparts. 
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Few, if any, ESAF personnel had been indoctrinated or educated on the 

operational benefits of respect for human rights. Most were conscripts or 

young soldiers who seldom questioned orders from their officers. Most had 

been led to believe that villagers who sympathized or aided and abetted the 

insurgents were legitimate military targets under the rules of engagement. 

Prior to 1985, the brigades had an unwritten rule to take no prisoners and 

few patrols into rebel strongholds brought back captives or detainees.161 One 

ESAF Brigade advisor summed up the dilemma like this:

It was very, very delicate because almost everybody had ... something 

in their closet ... I came to understand that my most important role 

was getting the ESAF to respect human rights without ever mentioning that term, because that was a real turn-off ... I approached 

it from a very practical sense, just talked about the practicality of 

observing human rights, that you would lessen the recruitment for 

the enemy, it makes your job easier and you can get to the end of 

this thing, that there’s a reason they are guerrillas and part of the 

reason is the awful performance of the ESAF.162

In 1981, the U.S. conducted its own assessment of the ESAF. Brigadier 

General Woerner chaired a group that was tasked with determining what 

was required to turn the Salvadoran armed forces into an effective fighting 

force. Brigadier General Woerner’s report, called the Report of the El Salvador Military Assistance Team, revealed the depth of the problem and the 

extent of the challenge facing U.S. advisors. The Salvadorans had no written 

or verbal strategy on how to defeat the insurgency. They were effectively a 

defensive garrison force with little aptitude for offensive operations. One U.S. 

observer called the ESAF, “a militia of 11,000 that had no mission.” Another 

claimed the Salvadoran Army passed its time, “sitting in garrisons abusing 

civilians.”163 They had a top-heavy hierarchy with officers making nearly all 

decisions and conscripts following dutifully behind. Most enlisted soldiers 

were forcibly recruited, some even reportedly pulled off the street and signed 

up for a one- or two-year tour of duty. The NCO corps, a stalwart element of 

the U.S. volunteer force, was nonexistent. What land, air, and sea weapons 

they had were in disrepair and badly in need of modernization. 

To professionalize the ESAF, the Woerner Report called for increasing 

the size of the Salvadoran Army to 25 battalions from 15. Intelligence collection, command and control, and communications systems also needed 
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to be modernized. The number of Air Force and Navy units would also be 

increased. The new forces would have a two-pronged strategy: first, protect 

the infrastructure and key cities; and second, conduct small unit, day and 

night operations against known enemy positions. The military ethos of the 

Salvadoran forces would also have to change. The armed forces should subordinate itself to elected civilian officials, respect human rights, and weed 

out corruption from its ranks.164

The USSOF arrival occurred as the ESAF were suffering a series of 

demoralizing and embarrassing defeats at the hands of the insurgents. On 

27 January 1982, the guerrillas attacked the Ilopango air base with sapper 

commandos, destroying over 20 combat and other support aircraft—nearly 

70 percent of the entire Salvadoran Air Force. Later that year, the FMLN 

engaged a number of ESAF units in the field, inflicting heavy casualties, 

taking scores of prisoners, and seizing tons of military arms. In 1983, the 

FMLN captured Berlin in the department of La Paz, just miles east of the 

capital. It was the largest city seized by the guerrillas to date. On 1 January 

1984, the guerrillas captured the 4th Brigade headquarters in El Paraíso. 

Operations, Plans, and Training Teams 

As part of the advisory effort, a team of USSOF personnel deployed to each 

of the six Salvadoran Army brigades. Each brigade was commanded by a 

Salvadoran Army Colonel who had two to three battalions assigned to his 

brigade. These teams, conceived in 1983 and then deployed in 1984, were 

called the OPATTs. The team leader, a lieutenant colonel, was accompanied 

by a captain who served as training officer. At least initially, USSOF representatives were the minority among the team members. The members were 

all from the U.S. Army but only one was SOF; the other OPATT chiefs were 

three infantry, one military police, and a U.S. Marine Corps officer. Finding 

qualified USSOF was problematic; in 1990, only 17 officers were considered 

qualified with the proper language skills, SOF training, and rank to serve as 

team advisors. Many of these had or were serving as advisors.165

The OPATT teams helped transform the Salvadoran military from an 

11,000-man Praetorian Guard into a 56,000-man fighting force by 1984.166 By 

1985, the Salvadoran forces began to produce regular offensive victories. The 

FMLN, instead of achieving impressive battlefield successes, was forced into 

a defensive posture. It resorted to small-scale hit-and-run tactics instead. It 
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Paterson: Training Surrogate Forces

was a remarkable turnaround of events from just three years earlier when 

the Salvadoran Army was on the verge of defeat.167

Much of the credit goes to the USSOF advisors on the ground who helped 

transform the ESAF into an effective counterinsurgency force, rather than 

the ponderous garrison force that it had been for most of its history. Cumbersome large-scale operations were broken down into platoon-size patrols. 

These long-range reconnaissance patrols were supported by artillery, helicopters, and combat aircraft as they went on the offensive into guerrilla 

strongholds like San Vicente, Usulután, and Morazán. At the instruction of 

USSOF, the army also incorporated economic, social, and political efforts 

to support its strategic objectives of undermining popular support for the 

guerrillas. 

Despite the fact that they were supposed to be advisors, USSOF personnel often found themselves in the midst of the action in El Salvador. Deputy 

Military Group Commander Lieutenant Albert Schaufelberger, a Navy SEAL, 

was the first U.S. military casualty. He was assassinated by leftist guerrillas while waiting in his car at the Central American University on 25 May 

1983.168 In 1987, an OPATT member assigned to the 4th Brigade headquarters 

at El Paraiso was killed when defending the base from a guerrilla attack. 

Figure 9. Brigade headquarter locations in El Salvador, 1981. Source: Author
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JSOU Report 16-9

Mixed Messages on Human Rights

Within the U.S. Government, perhaps the biggest controversy was whether 

the government should cut off assistance to El Salvador over its human rights 

abuses. DOS opposed aid “with all possible force.”169 U.S. Ambassador Robert 

White (1980–1981) argued the radical right and the military in the country 

were the problem and that revolutionary movement was “inevitable.”170 DOS 

officials were also reluctant to permit the DOD or USSOUTHCOM to get too 

involved in the day-to-day running of the war. As they saw it, the Pentagon 

would send “a bunch of conventional soldiers whose only solution would be 

to add more, make it louder, and make it bigger.”171

Senior U.S. officials carried the message to El Salvador that continued 

human rights abuses would jeopardize U.S. military assistance. In December 

1983, then Vice President George Bush personally traveled to San Salvador 

to relay the message. Bush requested several things in return for continued 

and increased security assistance: the removal of military officers involved 

in death squads, the trial of the soldiers who killed the American nuns in 

December 1980, and a repudiation of death squad activity by senior military 

officials. In 1988, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance also traveled to San Salvador 

to warn the high command about U.S. assistance being vulnerable to human 

rights reforms. In 1989, Vice President Dan Quayle made a similar trip to 

encourage the ESAF to respect human rights. Despite these warnings from 

senior U.S. officials, death squad executions continued mostly unabated. 

As one historian put it, “It proved impossible to professionalize the ESAF to 

American expectations.”172

In reality, despite the frequent demands from senior U.S. officials for 

the Salvadoran armed forces to respect human rights, eliminate its death 

squads, and adopt a much more selective use of force, the U.S. advisors had 

little idea how to actually train and educate their Salvadoran counterparts 

in these issues. According to one DOS official, the U.S. “preached democracy 

and human rights but did little to advance them in practice.”173 Direction and 

communication to USSOF advisors was spotty and inconsistent. Advisors 

went through a two-and-a-half-day orientation course but it didn’t provide 

any specific information on El Salvadoran government or military. One 

advisor who attended the training called it, “close to completely useless.”174

Another OPATT brigade advisor admitted, “I didn’t meet the MILGRP 

Commander during my first 100 days in El Salvador.” The in-briefs for new 
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arrivals at the embassy were focused on “telling me what not to do ... nothing about what to do.”175 Consequently, the Salvadoran military counterparts knew that much of their assistance from the U.S. was dependent on 

an improvement in their human rights policies but were unsure on how to 

implement it. As one U.S. official summarized it:

There are a lot of Salvadorans, including those in the military and 

security services who asked formally, on more than one occasion 

and at least once in writing, for U.S. assistance in human rights 

matters, so as to be able to figure out what to do to improve the 

relationship. And as far as I know they never got any very effective 

answer from the Department of State. I am not sure, for example, 

that the original request was even answered.176

In fact, because of the sensitivity of the human rights issues with the Salvadoran senior military leadership to the matter, Brigadier General Woerner 

was directed to not even address ‘soft power’ elements in his assessment of 

the Salvadoran military.177

Human Rights Training

The effectiveness of U.S. training of their ESAF counterparts on human 

rights issues supports the perception that U.S. representatives talked a lot 

about human rights but provided little practical training on the topic. Few 

USSOF advisors had received any formal training on human rights or IHL. 

Most learned it from their first-hand experience in Vietnam. There was no 

U.S. doctrine on the matter, and it was a secondary consideration to the 

military tactics being taught to the Central American counterparts. A list 

of courses provided to ESAF personnel reveals no training on human rights, 

the use of force, or military ethics. Instead, training focused on tactical skills 

such as armored tactics, commando operations, infantry tactics, battle staff 

operations, and sapper techniques.178

One notable exception reportedly existed. The U.S. Special Forces Group 

stationed in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, reportedly incorporated human 

rights training into their frequent deployments to El Salvador and other parts 

of Central America. In July 1990, the 7th Special Forces Group developed 

new guidelines for teaching human rights issues to foreign soldiers. For 

example, USSOF advisors emphasized the distinction between combatants 
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and civilians by teaching ambush techniques and then added a civilian to 

the scenario. If the soldiers killed the civilian during the ambush, they failed 

the exercise.179

Stopping the human rights abuses of the ESAF had, at best, mixed results. 

Despite the intensive emphasis by U.S. officials, many ESAF officers never 

accepted the idea of ‘winning hearts and minds’ and instead opted to pursue 

a strictly military solution to the insurgency.180 The ESAF’s decade-long resistance to human rights and codifying IHL in its military doctrine and strategy was epitomized by the Jesuit massacre in 1989. 

Jesuit priests at the University of Central America had grown vocal of 

the military’s actions in the conflict. On 16 November 1989 General Ponce, 

the Minister of Defense, ordered the murder of the rector, Father Ignacio 

Ellecuria, and five other priests at their residence at the University.181 The 

military vigorously denied any involvement, claiming the insurgents had 

staged the attack in order to blame the armed forces. In January 1990, President Cristiani finally acknowledged the murder had been directed by the 

senior military leadership.182 In October of that year, the U.S. Congress cut 

assistance to El Salvador by 50 percent and threatened to withhold the rest 

unless the murderers of the Jesuits were brought to justice.183

The event showed the limitations of the U.S. military efforts to indoctrinate the ESAF with a strategy that included respect for human rights and 

adherence to IHL. There are two hypotheses that explain U.S. shortcomings 

in this endeavor. First, the ESAF realized that they had to abide by some of 

the U.S. requirements in order to receive crucial military assistance. The El 

Salvadoran military listened but did not comply with U.S. recommendations 

on the issues. 

The second hypothesis, one that deserves more investigation by scholars, 

is whether the U.S. training on human rights and IHL was qualitatively and 

quantitatively sufficient to indoctrinate the ESAF on the complex topics. 

The U.S. assistance permitted the ESAF to increase its size by 400 percent 

in just over four years. Significant training was conducted on counterinsurgency tactics and a whole host of other topics. But the human rights and 

IHL training documented by the military is conspicuously absent from the 

detailed reports on the topic. Would a more concerted and organized effort 

on human rights and IHL training have helped? It is apparent that the U.S. 

effort made some progress in these areas but it wasn’t enough to change the 

mindset of the senior ESAF officials. 
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Stalemate

Despite the tactical and operational improvements of the ESAF, Salvadoran 

military culture continued to oppose the change in tactics and strategy. 

The army was nudged out of the barracks to conduct patrols but, at the 

same time, continued to devote a large portion of its forces to guarding 

bases, bridges, industrial sites, and coffee plantations. The resistance was 

a holdover from its long alliance with wealthy land owners in the country 

in return for political and budgetary autonomy for the armed forces. The 

military institutional inertia prevented the ESAF from achieving its final 

objective: the defeat of the insurgency and a restoration of the status quo in 

the country that benefited the elites and the military. By 1985, the military 

was no longer on the verge of defeat, but neither was it able to vanquish the 

FMLN. A violent stalemate ensued. 

A rigid code of military cohesion and camaraderie within the Salvadoran 

Army ranks made institutional reforms an uphill battle. Each graduating 

class from the Escuela Militar (the Salvadoran Military Academy) swore 

allegiance and loyalty to their classmates in what was called the tanda. The 

tanda was the fraternity of graduates of each class at the military academy. 

In the early 1980s, only about 25 to 40 students graduated each year from the 

academy. Tradition dictated that there was a deep and unspoken allegiance 

to the group, a philosophy inculcated in the cadets during their four years of 

training and education at the school. Following graduation, the members of 

the tanda supported one another through their ascent of the military ranks, 

effectively making them ‘untouchable’ by the civilian judicial system. One 

U.S. report called the tanda system, “the chief barrier to a competent officer 

corps.”184

In 1988, the U.S. conducted another assessment of the conditions in the 

country. A group of U.S. Army colonels at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, reported the limited effect of seven years of U.S. 

assistance and training. The report concluded that “The Salvadoran Army 

has been thoroughly trained in U.S. counterinsurgency tactics and can do 

them well—the problem is getting them to actually use these tactics.”185 The 

report concluded with a dismal assessment: “Salvadoran attempts to adopt 

small unit tactics have been ineffective.”186

On 11 November 1989, the FMLN launched another ‘final offensive’ 

against the capital. As in January 1981, the offensive failed. As a result, the 
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armed actors of the war recognized they were in a strategic stalemate. Neither side was able to defeat the other. The FMLN controlled one-third of the 

country but had been repulsed in their attacks on the capital to topple the 

government. The FMLN offensive demonstrated that, despite the ESAF’s 

strategic efforts, the insurgents could still muster sufficient forces to launch 

a sizable, multi-pronged offensive on the capital. In February 1990, General Maxwell Thurman, Commander of USSOUTHCOM from 1989–1991, 

assessed the situation as a stalemate and concluded that the ESAF could not 

defeat the insurgency. A RAND Corporation study later that year reached a 

similar conclusion: “the war in El Salvador is still a bloody, draining conflict 

with a clear victory for either side unimaginable.”187

Additionally, the collapse of the Berlin Wall foreshadowed a withdrawal 

of external assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba. The obstinacy of 

the Salvadoran military to adopt substantive human rights reforms likely 

frustrated its supporters in Washington, especially after the Jesuit murders 

in November 1989. The U.S. policy in El Salvador evolved from striving to 

defeat the FMLN to a negotiated settlement. Future military assistance would 

be dependent on reforms within the ESAF. 

Peace at Last

On 16 January 1992, President Alfredo Cristiani and five representatives of 

the FMLN signed the Chapultepec Peace Accords in Mexico City. Among 

the FMLN representatives was current Salvadoran President Salvador Sánchez Cerén. A formal ceasefire began two weeks later on 1 February 1992. 

The armed groups were separated; the FMLN were restricted to 15 sites and 

the Salvadoran military was ordered to remain at 62 barracks and bases. 

The militants demobilized their 12,000-man force by December of that year. 

The military was reduced by half, from 63,000 in 1992 to just over 30,000 in 

1994. The Treasury police, the National Guard, and the National Police were 

dissolved. In their place, a new National Civilian Police, comprised mostly 

of new applicants but also equal amounts of former National Police and 

guerrillas, was established. A National Commission for the Consolidation 

of Peace was developed to oversee all the political agreements agreed to in 

the Chapultepec Peace Accords.188

A UN Truth Commission was also established to investigate the most 

serious human rights violations. In September 1992, the Commission 
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recommended the removal or transfer of 103 officers including the Minister 

and Vice-Minister of Defense, most of the generals, and many of the colonels.189 According to scholars of the conflict, this was “the most thorough 

purge of any Latin American army not defeated in war.” President Cristiani retired all 103 officers recommended by the Commission, including 

most of military’s high command as well as the minister and vice-minister 

of defense.190 The Truth Commission report, released on 15 March 1993, 

“named sixty-two military officers, six FMLN leaders, and several civilians 

for their responsibility in committing or covering up the country’s most 

serious human rights violations.” It estimated that 85 percent of the human 

rights violations during the war that it investigated (a total of 22,000 cases) 

were committed by the military, paramilitary groups, or right-wing death 

squads. The FMLN was responsible for five percent of the cases.191

Just days after the release of the report, the Salvadoran legislature 

approved a sweeping amnesty law that effectively exonerated any criminal 

acts that took place during the conflict. At the time, the legislation was 

controlled by the right-wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista. Its founder, 

Robert D’Aubisson, was one of the most notorious death squad leaders in 

the country.192

Conclusion

The U.S. indirect approach in El Salvador is often referred to as the model 

of security assistance programs. With a small USSOF footprint, the U.S. 

tried to improve the professionalism of the ESAF, instill respect for human 

rights and IHL, and help avoid the collapse of an important hemispheric 

ally. Over the course of the war, the United States provided the Salvadoran 

government with $4.5 billion in economic and military aid, of which $1.1 

billion was military assistance.193

It is important to recognize that U.S. assistance did not enable the government of El Salvador to win the war. This is a common misconception. 

Better said, U.S. assistance prevented the defeat and collapse of the Salvadoran government. A garrison force with little functioning equipment and 

no offensive strategy was transformed into a marginally effective counterinsurgency force that staved off defeat by the insurgents. In that sense, the 

U.S. indirect approach in El Salvador was successful. The U.S. advisory effort 

helped bring an ally back from the brink of defeat. 
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However, from a democratic and human rights perspective, the USSOF 

record in El Salvador is, at best, mixed. There is little debate that the ESAF 

used a campaign of terror and repression designed to cower the populace into 

submission. According to the UN, 75,000 Salvadorans lost their lives in 12 

years of brutal violence. The majority died at the hands of government security forces and paramilitary death squads.194 A 1991 Pentagon-commissioned 

study of the situation called the human rights record of the ESAF something, 

“no truly democratic and just society could tolerate.”195 Under a combination 

of international pressure, U.S. coercion, and intense scrutiny by the press, the 

country was gradually forced to enact reforms to permit more political and 

economic inclusion, reduce corruption, eliminate extrajudicial executions 

and forced disappearances, and modernize an armed force. Perhaps the biggest endorsement for the OPATT efforts on human rights came from one of 

the guerrilla leaders. Joaquin Villalobos, a senior guerrilla leader during the 

entire war, admitted that the USSOF advisory efforts made the ESAF more 

professional and less abusive. As a result, the FMLN lost a valuable source 

of propaganda and recruiting justification.196

The professionalism gained by the ESAF had limits, however. Even after 

10 years of investment and dedicated training, the ESAF remained skeptical 

of the military policies and strategies of the U.S. The senior Salvadoran military leaders never fully accepted the soft power requirements of a modern 

counterinsurgency campaign such as civic action, protection of the populace, and developmental programs. Instead, they preferred a pure military 

response with kinetic power, large-scale combat operations, and a military 

response to guerrilla warfare. In the words of one scholar, “the ESAF never 

truly abandoned its faith in large-scale combat.”197 Despite the decade-long 

persistent presence of USSOF advisors with every ESAF brigade, the strategic and operational benefits of human rights was an idea that eluded most 

members of the ESAF. Reforms were adopted only because of the threat of 

a cutoff of U.S. military aid. 

Takeaways: 

• El Salvador represented a vital struggle between communist and capitalist forces in the Cold War. The U.S. was committed to preventing 

the collapse of the Central American nation to communist forces. 

• The ESAF enjoyed significant institutional autonomy and political 

prerogatives. 
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• Respect for human rights was a top priority for U.S. diplomats and 

decision-makers. 

• The U.S. had no established doctrine on human rights and IHL. As a 

result, the U.S. strategy as vocalized by military advisors and civilian 

politicians was ad hoc and inconsistent. 

• Despite U.S. efforts by SOF advisors and senior government officials, 

the ESAF continued to commit human rights atrocities and to sponsor 

death squads throughout much of the conflict. Efforts to professionalize the ESAF by USSOF were ineffective.

• The most persuasive leverage the U.S. had on the ESAF was the withholding of military and financial assistance. 

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10. The U.S. Experience in Iraq 

Following the initial invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003, the U.S. Army 

and Marine Corps needed less than three weeks to reach Baghdad. 

On 9 April, Marines toppled a statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square, 

symbolically marking the end of 24 years of tyranny in the country. 

Despite the rapid success of U.S. forces during the combat phases of 

the conflict, the U.S. was unprepared for the instability and internal strife 

that followed. A critical problem was that U.S. forces were not trained or 

indoctrinated in law enforcement and stability operations during the postconflict phase in the country. By early April 2003, Baghdad and other major 

cities collapsed into a wave of looting and anarchy. Security in the country 

deteriorated as rival Sunnis and Shiites maneuvered for power.198

Senior officials realized the U.S. exit strategy was dependent on building 

a capable Iraqi Army that could take over security operations after the U.S. 

departed. But L. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 

had dissolved the Iraqi army on 23 May 2003, one of the first decrees that he 

passed, just two weeks after arriving in Iraq. As the security situation in the 

country worsened, a renewed vigor went into reconstituting the Iraqi Army. 

Rebuilding the Iraqi army from scratch proved to be a monumental task. 

According to the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. sought to train a force of 

135,000 police officers by the end of 2005 and 137,000 army and other security 

forces by the end of 2006. By the end of 2004, however, only about 40 percent 

of those forces were established, and those that were had mixed results in 

combat. In October 2004, for example, Iraqi National Guard forces were 

able to seize control of Samarra from militants. However, most of the 1,100 

members of the 107th Iraqi National Guard Battalion in Mosul abandoned 

their posts and fled when they were attacked by insurgents in November 

2004. The commander of U.S. Central Command voiced his frustration. 

“They just are not there yet,” said General John Abizaid in December 2004. 

The Iraqi forces “have a long way to go” until they are ready to handle their 

own security operations.199

USSOF played a big role in the professionalization of their Iraqi counterparts. The main Iraqi SOF command was the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service. 

It consisted of two Iraqi Special Operations brigades with approximately 
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1,500 soldiers in each, as well as the Special Warfare Center and School. In 

addition, USSOF helped the Iraqis develop the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force, 

the 36th Commando Battalion, and the Counterterrorism Command, as 

well as numerous other special weapons and tactics units of the Iraqi Army 

and police forces. According to a number of reports, the Iraqi Special Forces 

units trained by USSOF are “the most capable element of the Iraqi armed 

forces.” Iraq’s elite counterterrorism force, trained at the Baghdad airport, 

was heralded as a model of efficiency and professionalism.200 One senior U.S. 

administration official called the Iraqi SOF, “one of the most capable special 

forces in the Middle East.”201

Building rapport and maintaining sustained contact with the same Iraqi 

SOF unit was considered critical to the training effort. Some USSOF units 

worked with the same Iraqi units for seven years—an important effort to 

establish continuity of training.202 While operational effectiveness was 

increasing, however, the Iraqi SOF remained deficient in other critical operational areas, such as logistics, close air support, targeting intelligence, and 

maintenance. 

IHL Deficiencies of U.S. Forces in Iraq

Despite the advances made by USSOF in Iraq, by 2005 the situation had 

become so dire that senior policymakers considered pulling out. In public 

surveys, more Iraqis blamed the U.S. forces for the violence in the country 

than those who blamed Sunni insurgents, Shiite militias, or al-Qaeda terrorists combined.203 According to public opinion polls of Iraqis, almost 50 

percent of the population approved of attacks on U.S. forces.204

The U.S. forces arrived untrained and unprepared for police enforcement 

operations and, as a result, focused on a ‘capture or kill’ strategy against 

insurgents. This enemy-centric strategy was advocated by both the first U.S. 

Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, Lieutenant General Ricardo 

Sanchez (June 2003–June 2004), and his successor, General George Casey 

(June 2004–February 2007). Led to believe the U.S. forces would redeploy 

by the fall of 2003, Sanchez never developed any cohesive strategy in his 

year in command in Iraq. According to one report on the U.S. military in 

Iraq during Sanchez’s time in charge, “not only was there no counterinsurgency plan, there was no plan of any sort: no strategy, no mission statement, 

no criteria or benchmarks for how to measure, or even define, success or 
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failure.” Casey, on the other hand, developed an enemy-centric strategy, 

one that focused on killing or capturing insurgents rather than protecting 

the population. With regard to his strategy, Casey said, “Our broad intent 

is to keep pressure on the insurgents as we head into elections. This is not 

about winning hearts and minds; we’re not going to do that here in Iraq.”205

Combat conditions in this environment required the utmost discretion. 

Prior to 2005, for example, few U.S. forces had training or doctrine on procedures to use at checkpoints or roadblocks. Hundreds of roadblocks were 

set up around Iraqi cities. Many of these inspection stations required better 

illumination, signal flares, warning signs in the local language, flashing 

lights, and barriers to force cars to slow. Few military units had methods to 

warn approaching vehicles to slow: no verbal warnings, nonlethal means, 

warning shots, spike strips on the street, or incapacitating shots at the engine 

or tires. Instead, in a number of instances, soldiers escalated directly to lethal 

force when a car approached.207

Surveys of conventional U.S. soldiers and Marines revealed that many did 

not recognize the strategic imperative of respect for human rights and laws 

of war.208 In a 2006 survey of U.S. service members who had experienced 

frequent combat exposure, only 38 percent of Marines said civilians should 

be treated with dignity and respect. One-third of soldiers and Marines said 

they would torture an enemy captive if it would save the life of a fellow soldier 

or Marine. Less than half of those surveyed said they would report a team 

Vignette: U.S. Overreacts to Mob Violence in Fallujah 

On 28 April 2003 in Fallujah, Iraq, shortly after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s 

government, U.S. forces encountered an angry mob of Iraqi citizens protesting 

the treatment of members of the Baath Party. A mob of approximately 100 to 250 

protesters chanted anti-U.S. slogans. Nearby, U.S. Army forces maintained a vigilant 

eye on the crowd. British reporters from The Guardian newspaper reported what 

happened next. One of the Iraqis, seething with anger, threw a rock at one of the 

U.S. soldiers atop his armored personnel carrier. The U.S. forces claimed they took 

fire from the crowd and opened fire. Seventeen people were reportedly killed and an 

untold number of others were injured in the attack. Human rights NGOs accused the 

U.S. of “failing to adequately train the troops for the complex law enforcement tasks 

of military occupation.” By late 2003, Fallujah had become ground zero of the Sunni 

uprising.206
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member for unethical behavior.209 The investigation into the Haditha massacre revealed that U.S. soldiers considered that protecting Iraqi civilians was 

not as important as protecting U.S. soldiers. The Marines, perhaps as a result 

of the inevitable desensitization that comes from the combat environment, 

considered that collateral damage was “the cost of doing business and that 

the Marines need to ‘get the job done’ no matter what it takes.”210 Even after 

an additional year of training and indoctrination, attitudes of U.S. service 

members showed little change. The Military Health Advisory Team survey 

of 2007 reported little improvement in the ethical behavior of soldiers and 

Marines in Iraq.211

Turning the War over to the Iraqis

In December 2005, the Bush administration unveiled its National Strategy 

for Victory in Iraq. According to the White House, one of the principal 

goals in Iraq was to “transition Iraq to security self-reliance.” President Bush 

announced the new strategy: “Our strategy can be summed up this way: As 

the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.”213 The Iraq Study Group, a seasoned 

team of policymakers, met from March to December 2006 to study the situation. Their recommendations, published on 6 December of that year, also recommended an acceleration of the training of Iraqi forces so that U.S. forces 

could redeploy in the beginning of 2008. However, they admitted, the Iraqi 

Army was in poor condition and had significant problems with leadership, 

equipment, logistics, personnel, and support. There was no effective payment 

system for Iraqi soldiers and, subsequently, desertion was a major problem. 

Sectarian rifts created loyalty and discipline problems within the ranks.214

Vignette: USSOF Commander Apologizes for Civilian Deaths 

When mistakes were made, the U.S. attempted to pay reparations to victims or their 

families. In one case, senior U.S. officials offered apologies for civilians allegedly 

killed by USSOF. Then Vice Admiral William McRaven personally apologized and 

asked forgiveness of an Afghan father who lost members of his family because of an 

error. “I am the commander of the soldiers who accidentally killed your loved ones. I 

came here today to send my condolences to you and your family and to your friends. 

I also came to ask your forgiveness for these terrible tragedies,” the admiral told the 

father. McRaven not only apologized but also offered two sheep in compensation for 

the man’s losses, a gesture consistent with local custom.212
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General Casey provided an assessment of the Iraqi Army in October 

2006. He said the Iraqi military could be expected to take over the security 

responsibilities in 12 to 18 months. His report was considered overly optimistic and was disputed by other government and independent sources. In 

September 2007, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe and 

Combatant Commander U.S. European Command Marine General James 

Jones concluded just the opposite of General Casey. According to General 

Jones, Iraqi military forces “will be unable to fulfill their essential security 

responsibilities independently over the next 12–18 months.”215 Jones called the 

Ministry of Interior “dysfunctional” and the Iraqi National Police “operationally ineffective.” He recommended that the 26,000-member national 

police force, riddled with corruption and sectarian influence, be completely 

disbanded and the training started over again from scratch.216 Another 

report, a National Intelligence Estimate from the U.S. Director of National 

Intelligence, titled “Prospects for Iraqi Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead,” 

concluded that the spiraling levels of violence were likely to worsen because 

of communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. 

Counterinsurgency Strategy and Improvement of 

IHL Standards

It was not until General David Petraeus took charge of Iraqi operations in 

early 2007 and implemented a population-centric strategy that conditions 

started to improve.217 General Petraeus’ strategy emphasized protection of 

the population, more discretionary use of force, and heavy emphasis on 

human rights. 

General Petraeus and other senior U.S. officials understood that this type 

of conflict required a new approach to use of force. Admiral Mike Mullen, 

the top military officer in the United States and principal military advisor 

to the president, said: 

In this type of war, when the objective is not the enemy’s defeat but 

the people’s success, less really is more. Each time an errant bomb 

or a bomb accurately aimed but against the wrong target kills or 

hurts civilians, we risk setting our strategy back months, if not years. 

Civilian casualty incidents ... hurt us more in the long run than any 

tactical success we may achieve against the enemy.218
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General Petraeus’ arrival coincided with the worst violence of the war—

an average of 160 insurgent attacks were occurring each day and the U.S. was 

suffering over 80 deaths per month. Under the new strategy implemented by 

General Petraeus, Iraqi civilian deaths dropped dramatically from 3,500 per 

month in July 2006 to about 600 per month by January 2008. The number 

of U.S. troop casualties also plummeted, from over 600 per month in early 

2007 to about 200 per month in January 2008.219

General Petraeus realized how important it was that all U.S. forces understood the risks associated with excessive use of force. A tactical mistake by 

a young officer or soldier could have strategic repercussions. He referred to 

young soldiers operating in these conditions as “strategic lieutenants” or 

“strategic corporals” because an error of a squad leader, platoon commander, 

or company officer could generate waves of resentment. Such actions serve 

as a catalyst for massive protests and civilian support to militants.

Under this new strategy, the U.S. started taking numerous other precautions to avoid causing collateral damages. In his 2007 article “In the Crossfire 

or the Crosshairs?,” Colin Kahl lists many of the ways the U.S. sought to 

avoid collateral damages during the war in Iraq. For example, intelligence 

planners identified 12,700 ‘no strike’ targets that were protected from attacks. 

This included schools, hospitals, water treatment facilities, electrical facilities, and other forms of infrastructure. The list, designed to comply with IHL 

that prohibits attacks on such targets, was developed with the assistance of 

international human rights NGOs and were updated occasionally by military 

lawyers. The U.S. military also began using more precision-guided munitions whenever possible. Unguided munitions with a large explosive payload 

were too risky for use in urban population concentrations. Precision-guided 

munitions with smaller explosive perimeters helped reduce the potential for 

Vignette: Excerpts from General Stanley McChrystal’s Guidance to ISAF forces 

We need to think and act very differently to be successful. Get rid of the conventional 

mindset. Focus on the people, not the militants. We will not win simply by killing 

insurgents. If we harm civilians, we sow the seeds of our own defeat. If civilians die 

in a firefight, it does not matter who shot them—we still failed to protect them from 

harm. Earn the support of the people and the war is won. In short, we don’t have to 

be stupid or ineffective to fail—just misguided in our approach.220
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collateral damage. According to one source, 97 percent of the munitions used 

in Iraq from 2007 to 2010 were precision-guided munitions, as compared to 

68 percent in 2003.

U.S. leadership also elevated principles of warfare related to human rights 

to unprecedented levels. Perseverance, legitimacy, and restraint became military objectives as important as other traditional principles of war such as 

surprise, security, unity of command, mass, and maneuver.221

Iraq Today

In February 2009, President Obama declared the U.S. would withdraw all 

combat troops in Iraq and turn security efforts over to the Iraqi forces. 

The remaining U.S. troops would have three responsibilities: (1) continuing to train, equip, and advise Iraqi security forces, (2) conducting targeted 

counterterrorism missions, and (3) protecting ongoing civilian and military 

efforts within Iraq.222 On 31 December 2011, the remainder of U.S. combat 

forces withdrew and turned responsibility for internal security in the country 

over to the Iraqis. 

Today, despite billions of dollars devoted to a massive security-assistance 

effort for Iraq forces, the military in the country is still greatly lacking in 

capacity and professionalism. The future of Iraq as a stable, violence-free 

democracy is still in question. In June 2014, militants seized control of 

Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. The same month, in a new assessment of 

the Iraqi military forces, American officials declared five of the Iraqi Army’s 

14 divisions to be “combat ineffective.” This included two divisions that were 

overrun in Mosul. Another expert on the situation reported that “60 out of 

243 Iraqi Army combat battalions cannot be accounted for, and all of their 

equipment is lost.”223

In June 2015, Iraqi Army forces retreated in the face of an advance of 

ISIS forces and surrendered the city of Ramadi, capital of the Anbar province, despite vastly outnumbering the Islamic forces. An exasperated U.S. 

Defense Secretary Ashton Carter claimed that the Iraqi forces, “showed no 

will to fight.”224 Some U.S. Government officials have encouraged Baghdad to 

enlist the assistance of Sunni militias in the Anbar province. Prime Minister 

Al-Abadi has been reluctant to do that, primarily because of Sunni-Shiite 

sectarian rivalries in the country.225
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Combat missions by conventional U.S. forces were stopped on 31 August 

2010. USSOF continued partnering with their Iraqi counterparts on counterterrorism missions until 18 December 2011 when such operations were transitioned to Iraqi forces. However, in support of combat operations against 

ISIS, U.S. combat forces deployed back to Iraq in June 2014, part of a larger 

U.S. effort to lead a coalition of allied bombing efforts against terrorist targets.226 As of the summer of 2015, the U.S. had 3,000 military trainers and 

advisors in the country. In June 2015, President Obama ordered 450 more to 

a base outside Ramadi to assist the offensive to take back that city from ISIS, 

increasing the total number of U.S. troops deployed to Iraq to over 4,800.227

Takeaways: 

• In 2003, U.S. conventional military forces were sorely unprepared for 

phase IV stability operations in the country.

• The U.S. fought the first three to five years of the Iraq War without 

a doctrine that emphasized the strategic and operational benefits of 

respect for human rights. 

• Despite billions of dollars of investment, creating a professional military force from the Iraqi armed forces has had only limited results. 

• The scope of the security assistance requirements in Iraq required 

conventional U.S. forces to conduct train-and-equip missions normally reserved for USSOF.

• Iraqi Special Forces trained by USSOF stood out as the most capable 

Iraqi armed forces.
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11. Conclusion and Recommendations 

Contemporary military leaders are facing a great challenge. They must 

train their soldiers so they understand the rules of engagement in complex security operations, protect the civilians they are charged with defending, and protect themselves at the same time. Soldiers must be aggressive 

and fierce. At the same time, they must be intellectually agile enough to 

respond to a security environment that can change in seconds. The enemy 

is elusive, adaptable, and intelligent. They operate from the shadows and 

avoid direct confrontations with security forces. They target civilians to 

undermine the authority and legitimacy of the civilian government. If they 

are driven from an area, they will wait and return when it is advantageous 

to do so. Soaring crime rates, citizen insecurity, overcrowded and violent 

prisons, and dysfunctional judicial systems have added to the security crises 

in many nations. Many of the soldiers in these situations may be young, 

inexperienced, scared, poorly trained, emotional, confused, and tired. They 

must make life and death decisions in seconds. Knowledge of human rights, 

IHL, and the rules of engagement has to be second nature so that when 

confronted with a difficult scenario, the soldiers’ training permits them to 

make a rapid and well-informed decision.

There are a number of other reasons that military forces commit human 

rights violations.228 High levels of frustration, lack of confidence in the justice system, dehumanizing the enemy, high casualty rates of friendly forces, 

lack of sleep, alcohol and drug abuse, and a poorly defined mission have 

been documented to trigger human rights abuses in military operations. 

However, the two most common reasons are lack of training and education 

programs, and an absence of support by senior leaders of a strategy that 

emphasizes respect for human rights. Operations against irregular forces are 

complex and it is difficult to prepare military forces for every contingency 

they will face. However, unless the military is trained specifically for this 

type of operation, their actions can make the situation even worse. Under 

the pretext of force protection and in the face of dangerous circumstances, 

untrained forces may resort to excessive force unnecessarily. Before they 

deploy in this type of domestic security operation, service members should 

go through rigorous training to include crowd control, rules of engagement, 
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escalation of force, maneuvers in densely populated urban areas, and civil 

affairs, among many others.229 In addition, there are many other important 

preparations military units must receive prior to deployment: communications, maneuver and patrolling, weapons, first aid, force protection, and 

checkpoint procedures. These demands compete for the limited amount of 

time available to units for preparation prior to deployment.

There are no guarantees that training foreign forces will build a global 

coalition of partners. The U.S. has had mixed success training surrogate 

forces. Successful training efforts in Colombia 

and the Philippines, for 

example, demonstrate 

the indirect approach 

works well in the right 

circumstances. However, recent headlines 

highlight the difficulties of working with 

partners from different cultural and 

political backgrounds. 

Setbacks with USSOFtrained partner forces 

in Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Syria, Yemen, and Mali 

highlight those challenges. Retired Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the head of training 

for Afghan forces from 2005 to 2007 and the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan 

from 2009 to 2011, said, “Our track record at building security forces over 

the past 15 years is miserable.”230

As the case study on El Salvador demonstrates, host nation forces will not 

always share the same level of military professionalism as USSOF. However, 

for as many disappointments the U.S. has had, FID remains a vital strategic 

effort. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “Arguably the most 

important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we 

do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend 

Figure 10. More conventional military forces in the 

U.S. are being called on to provide security assistance 

training to partner nations. In this example, a U.S. 

Army representative provides training to soldiers of 

the Ghana Army. Source: U.S. Army Africa Public 

Affairs
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and govern their own countries.”231 Building a global network of partners 

is one of three principal objectives of the 2015 National Military Strategy. 

The U.S. places a high value on respect for human rights and adherence 

to the law of armed conflict. But efforts to put the imperative into practice 

reveals a significant gap. USSOCOM needs to provide detailed guidance and 

doctrine on human rights and the law of armed conflict. The 2015 National 

Security Strategy promises that, “even where our strategic interests require 

us to engage governments that do not share all our values, we will continue 

to speak out clearly for human rights and human dignity.” USSOF should 

raise the issue more frequently than they currently do when conducting 

JCETs or MTTs with foreign units. 

Recommendations for USSOCOM

1. USSOCOM doctrine on human rights and IHL. USSOCOM needs to 

develop an instruction that articulates why U.S. forces follow standards 

of human rights and IHL. The current “Human Rights Policy” guidance 

from 2005 is too vague and brief. Ideally, the instruction should task 

each USSOCOM component to develop a POI to train units before they 

deploy for JCETs or MTTs. It should also require scenario-based IHL 

training in every JCET and MTT. Most importantly, the instruction 

should identify and emphasize the strategic and operational benefits 

that respect for human rights and adherence to IHL generate. 

2. Develop a training manual on essential components of human 

rights and IHL. Using examples drawn from the new DOD Law of 

War Manual, USSOCOM should develop a collection of training lessons that they can distribute to subordinate units. The lesson package 

should contain enough lectures on the myriad of human rights and 

IHL issues that units could tailor their training requirements for each 

partner nation. At a minimum, the lessons should include: principles 

of war, actions around civilians and noncombatants, detainee or prisoner of war treatment, protection of property, prohibited weapons, 

protected sites, and rules of non-international armed conflict. The 

training manual should contain ample scenarios that provide realworld tactical examples that USSOF and their partners may encounter. 

Scenarios should be drawn from contemporary warfare conditions such 

as combat operations in and around population centers and operations 
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against organized crime groups. Consult with the Defense Institute of 

International Legal Studies and the International Committee of the 

Red Cross for pre-existing lectures on human rights and IHL matters.

3. Require each JCET and MTT cover human rights and IHL training 

with partner surrogates. The training need not be conducted in a 

formal classroom setting but it should be more structured and organized than just passing reference to the issues. This requires that the 

USSOF operators providing the training be experts on the topic. Those 

who are adequately trained and familiar with the tenets of human 

rights and IHL can fold references into the JCET training so that it is 

not perceived as “preachy” or lecturing on the issue. Done properly, it 

can be conducted transparently to the recipients. Young soldiers from 

partner nations will accept human rights and IHL as a normal part of 

the training, indistinguishable from other weapons skills training or 

maneuver actions. Using scenarios developed from real world USSOF 

experiences, incorporate these into the JCET/MTT training and then 

follow up with an explanation of why it is done in this manner and 

what operational benefits may be attained. Explain the U.S. policy on 

human rights and IHL violations and that continued partnering with 

the host nation depends on adequate adherence to these standards. 

4. Require schoolhouse training. Require each USSOF service component to include a human rights and IHL course in its curriculum 

and to make frequent reference to the topics during other courses not 

directly related to human rights and IHL. Periodic refresher education should be required at all levels of training—from recruit to flag 

officer—to familiarize operators with the human rights/IHL requirements or bring them up to speed on recent developments. In particular, the education requirement should exist for The U.S. Army John 

F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina; the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training 

School in Stennis Space Center, Mississippi; and the Marine Special 

Operations School in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Joint Special 

Operations University in Tampa, Florida, should also include human 

rights/IHL training into the appropriate courses. 
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Recommendations for the DOD

1. Combatant command human rights offices. Ensure all combatant 

commands establish stand-alone human rights offices like that of 

USSOUTHCOM. Mimic some of the best practices of USSOUTHCOM: 

the Human Rights Initiative, required human rights and IHL training 

prior to entering the region, and creating doctrine on human rights 

and IHL with partner nations, for example.

2. Require human rights/IHL training for U.S. conventional forces.

Traditionally, the security force assistance task was one reserved 

for USSOF. However, increased attention on the indirect approach 

prompted a policy change that now permits conventional forces to 

conduct training of partner nation forces. Recent Military Health 

Advisory Team surveys of soldiers and Marines revealed that many 

do not recognize the strategic imperative of respect for human rights 

and laws of war. To ensure U.S. military personnel are adequately conveying the importance of HR and IHL, these forces need significant 

training on the topics. This is especially critical in light of previous 

surveys of U.S. military personnel that revealed a significant dearth 

of understanding and adherence to HR and IHL standards.

Respect for human rights and the principles of the law of armed conflict 

are necessary but not sufficient by themselves to assure victory in modern 

warfare. In many cases, the only option to deal with many hard-core terrorists or criminals is to capture or kill them. However, military action is only 

one of a number of tools necessary to combat security challenges. There are 

numerous other important components to a modern security strategy. A 

strategic communications plan, cutting off illicit funding, denial of sanctuary 

to militants, minimizing ungoverned spaces, reducing corruption, promoting social and economic development projects, provision of basic services 

to the public, and providing citizen security are all important components 

of a holistic security strategy.

Senior U.S. officials considered the challenges U.S. forces faced in Iraq—

nation building, a population-centric focus, and respect for human rights—

as a revolution in military affairs. Such tactics are a critical part of extremely 

complex operational requirements that demand lengthy and intense training 

prior to deployment. In this case, strategic adaptation is an imperative and 
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may make the difference between victory and defeat. As the U.S. realized in 

Vietnam, militaries may succeed tactically but fail strategically if they don’t 

develop the right strategy.232 As General John Galvin, the former commander 

of USSOUTHCOM wrote in his oft-cited article, “Uncomfortable Wars: 

Toward a New Paradigm,” an “officer’s effectiveness and chance for success, 

now and in the future, depend not only on his character, knowledge, and 

skills, but also, and more than ever before, on his ability to understand the 

changing environment of the conflict.”233

For the foreseeable future, USSOCOM will be partnered with foreign 

militaries to address complex contemporary security challenges. The command needs to develop the right doctrine on HR and IHL and then train 

partner nation forces on the necessary tactics to win the support of the population. The faster our partners understand the strategic and legal imperative 

of such a doctrine, the faster they will become professional military partners 

with USSOF. 
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Appendix A: Acronym List 

AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 

CONVIVIR Community Associations of Rural Vigilance 

DAS Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad

DOD Department of Defense

DOS Department of State 

ESAF El Salvador Armed Forces 

FID foreign internal defense

FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional

IHL international humanitarian law 

ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 

JAG judge advocate general 

JCET joint combined exercise training 

MTT mobile training teams 

NCO noncommissioned officer 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

ODA Operational Detachment-Alpha 

OPATT operations, plans, and training team 

POI program of instruction 

SOF Special Operations Forces

UN United Nations 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSOF U.S. Special Operations Forces

USSOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command 

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Endnotes 

1. International humanitarian law is synonymous with the law of armed conflict. 

The terms are interchangeable. International humanitarian law focuses on conflict between states or armed groups. In particular, it addresses the rules for the 

use of force during conflict. In contrast, international human rights law focuses 

on the rights of humans during all conditions, whether in combat or otherwise. 

For example, some of the most well-known rights laws address civil and political liberties, slavery, economic and cultural rights, and the rights of women and 

children. See: International Red Cross, “Exploring Humanitarian Law” (2009) 

for a helpful summary of the basic issues of human rights and IHL. Available 

at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0942.htm. 

2. Admiral Eric Olson, former USSOCOM commander, testified before Congress 

that during the peak of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan about 85 percent of the 

deployed SOF were in operations in those two countries. According to another 

news report, because of the high operational tempo of SOF in Iraq and Afghanistan, USSOCOM commanders have been able to meet barely half the requests 

from regional military headquarters outside the Middle East. Thom Shanker, 

“Military Sees Broader Role for Special Operations Forces, in Peace and War,” 

New York Times, 2 April 2013.

3. According to the U.S. Department of State, 59 terrorist groups are now active in 

the world. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have now spread to over a dozen countries. 

Foreign terrorist fighters in Syria and Iraq total more than 16,000 foreign terrorist fighters from more than 90 countries. This is more than the rate of foreign 

terrorist fighters who traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or 

Somalia at any point in the last 20 years. Source: Department of State Country 

Reports on Terrorism 2014, available at: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/

index.htm. 

4. “We have to develop a strategy that matches this diffuse threat; one that expands 

our reach without sending forces that stretch our military too thin, or stirs up 

local resentments. We need partners to fight terrorists alongside us,” the president said. Marl Landler, “Obama Warns U.S. Faces Diffuse Threats,” New York 

Times, 28 May 2014. See also: Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Strategy to Fight Terrorism 

Increasingly Uses Proxies,” New York Times, 29 May 2014.

5. Rick Gladstone, “Russia Blocks UN effort for Prosecution in Downing of Jetliner 

in Ukraine,” New York Times, 30 July 2015, A6. 

6. Josh White, Charles Lane, and Julie Tate, “Homicide Charges Rare in Iraq War; 

Few Troops Tried for Killing Civilians,” Washington Post, 28 August 2006.

7. Seth G. Jones, et al., “Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes,” RAND Corporation, 

2006. 

8. Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010, ix. 
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9. For the purposes of this Article, a surrogate is defined as “an entity outside of 

the Department of Defense ... that performs specific functions that assist in the 

accomplishment of U.S. military objectives by taking the place of capabilities 

that the U.S. military either does not have or does not desire to employ.” Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 June 2015, http://www.dtic.

mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. See also: Gregory Raymond Bart, “Special 

Operations Forces and Responsibility for Surrogates’ War Crimes,” Harvard 

National Security Journal, Vol. 5, 514.

10. Annual report from Under Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 

Intensity Conflict, “Report on Training of Special Operations Forces for the 

Fiscal Year ending September 30, 2012,” published 1 April of each year. See also: 

International Security Advisory Board, Report on Security Capacity Building, 7 

January 2013, 15, available at: http://www.state.gov/t/avc/isab/202710.htm); and 

“Unmatched Power, Unmet Principles: The Human Rights Dimensions of U.S. 

Training of Foreign Military and Police Forces,” Amnesty International USA 

Publications, March 2002.

11. Direct action missions are “short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive 

actions that are conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically 

sensitive environments and that employ specialized military capabilities to seize, 

destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action 

differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political 

risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of 

force to achieve specific objectives.” Thomas K. Livingston, “Building the Capacity 

of Partner States through Security Force Assistance,” Congressional Research 

Service (R41817), 5 May 2011. Also listed in Joint Publication 1-02.

12. According to a Gallup public opinion poll in 2014, 54 percent of Americans 

surveyed opposed “taking direct military action in Iraq to assist the Iraqi government in fighting militants there.” Only 39 percent were in favor of such action. 

Accessed at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx.

13. Robert Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, no. 1, January/

February 2009, 29–30.

14. Under Admiral McRaven’s instruction, SOCEUR developed a center to coordinate 

NATO Special Forces’ efforts in Afghanistan. See: “Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander, United States Special Operations 

Command, presented to the 112th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, 

6 March 2012,” accessed at: http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/

doc/McRaven%2003-06-12.pdf). See also: David Ignatius, “Can the U.S. Rely 

on SOF power?” Washington Post, 31 March 2013; and Eric Schmitt and Thom 

Shanker, “A Commander Seeks to Chart a New Path for Special Operations,” 

New York Times, 1 May 2013. 

15. DOD news briefing with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, 25 October 2012, available at: 

http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5143.
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16. National Security Action Memorandum No. 162, “Development of U.S. and 

Indigenous Police, Paramilitary and Military Resources,” 19 June 1962, Cited 

in The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Vol. 2, 681–684.

17. For an excellent analysis of the legal and operational challenges of working with 

surrogate forces, read: Todd C. Huntley and Andrew D. Levitz, “Controlling the 

Use of Power in the Shadows: Challenges in the Application of Jus in Bello to 

Clandestine and Unconventional Warfare Activities,” Harvard National Security 

Journal / Vol. 5, 2014. This summary of historical examples of surrogates was 

drawn from that account, pages 476–477, as well as other sources. See also: Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military 

Strategy and Policy (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977); Max Boot, Invisible 

Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present

(New York: Liveright, 2013); and National Security Action Memorandum No. 

162, “Development of U.S. and Indigenous Police, Paramilitary and Military 

Resources,” 19 June 1962, cited in The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Vol. 2, 

681–684.

18. Military professionalism, while subject to a variety of definitions, is broadly 

accepted to include three attributes: (1) subordination to civil authorities, (2) 

support for democratic institutions, and (3) respect for and accountability for 

human rights.

19. In Afghanistan, the U.S. was forced to halt the transfer of prisoners to Afghan 

jails and prisons because torture was common in the penal system. In October 

2011, the United Nations reported that a year-long effort to improve human 

rights standards in Afghanistan’s prisons had failed and that the frequency of 

torture had even increased. General John Allen, commander of U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan, ordered the halt of the transfer of prisoners to all 34 Afghan detention centers. A more recent scandal was the sexual exploitation of young boys 

by members the Afghan security forces, a frequent if not normal practice in the 

country. See: UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Treatment 

of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: One Year On,” January 2013; 

Azam Ahmed, “Prisoner Abuse Still Widespread in Afghanistan, UN Says,” New 

York Times, 26 February 2015, A10; Rod Nordland and Thom Shanker, “U.S. 

Military Stops Sending Detainees to Some Afghan Prisons on Rights Fears,” New 

York Times, 16 January 2013; Alissa Rubin, “Anti-Torture Efforts in Afghanistan 

Failed, U.N. Says,” New York Times, 20 January 2013; and Matthew Rosenberg, 

“U.S. Outrage and Resignation Over Afghans’ Rape of Boys,” New York Times, 

22 September 2015, A10. 

20. Lydia Polgreen, “Mali Army, Riding U.S. Hopes, Is Proving No Match for Militants,” New York Times, 24 January 2013.

21. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Training Elite Antiterror Troops in Four African Nations,” 

New York Times, 26 May 2014. 

22. Gates speech before the Association of the United States Army, 10 October 2007. 

Numerous authors have given serious study to the idea of “new wars” which are 

characterized by (1) the disappearance of wars between states, (2) the increase 
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in the number of civilian deaths, (3) the decline of high intensity wars, (4) the 

decline in the number of battle deaths, and (5) the increase in the duration or 

recurrence of war. See: Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence In 

a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012); Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: 

The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007); and 

Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington: 

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007). 

23. Neta Crawford, “Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War.” Perspectives 

on Politics, Vol. 1/1, March 2003, 17. 

24. Randal Archibold, “Guatemala Shooting Raises Questions About Military’s 

Expanded Role,” New York Times, 20 October 2012.

25. U.S. Department of Defense, “Law of War Program,” DOD Directive 2311.01E, 

9 May 2006. See also: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Implementation of 

the DOD Law of War Program,” CJCS Instruction 5810.01D, 30 April 2010.

26. This summary is drawn from Professor Rosa Brooks’ testimony to the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, “The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military 

Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force,” 16 May 2013, and 

from the U.S. Operational Law Handbook, produced by the U.S. Judge Advocate 

General’s Legal Center in Charlottesville, Virginia.

27. Rosa Brooks’ testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Law of 

Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use 

of Military Force,” 16 May 2013. 

28. In Afghanistan, under pressure to minimize collateral damage during nighttime raids, General Stanley McChrystal ordered his Special Operations Forces 

to announce their intent to enter buildings where suspected insurgents were 

hiding. SOF forces were required to “call out” before attacking a site so as to 

give the inhabitants a chance to surrender or avoid civilian casualties when the 

SOF members made a forced entry into the building. Some SOF members found 

the rule frustrating. It eliminated the important element of surprise, gave the 

suspects time to arm themselves, and at times, even created more opportunity 

for collateral casualties. “When there were more rules, it did get more difficult,” 

one experienced operator said. See: Mark Mazzetti, “SEAL Team 6: A Secret 

History of Quiet Killings and Blurred Lines,” New York Times, 6 June 2015.

29. Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), “Tactical Directive,” 6 July 2009, accessed at: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/

Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf. 

30. Definitions of hostile act and hostile intent are drawn from the U.S. Operational 

Law Handbook, produced by the U.S. Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center in 

Charlottesville, Virginia. 

31. Bernard E. Trainor, “The Anguish of Knowing What Happened at No Gun Ri,” 

Washington Post, 21 January 2001; and Department of the Army, Inspector 

General, No Gun Ri Review, January 2001, 5–6. 
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32. From 2003 to 2008, the International Committee of the Red Cross hosted a 

series of conferences with experts from governments, international NGOs, and 

academia including war colleges. At five different conferences, experts analyzed 

modern warfighting scenarios and tried to find a common definition and characteristics of what constitutes direct participation in hostilities. Participants were 

unable to reach agreement. There was such wide disagreement on the term that 

many participants requested to have their names removed from the registry of 

the conferences lest it be perceived as a form of endorsement of the event. The 

International Committee of the Red Cross hosts of the event were forced to limit 

their post-conference report to simply an informal collection of ideas titled 

“Interpretive Guidance.” See: Michael Schmitt, “The Interpretive Guidance on 

the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis,” Harvard 

National Security Journal, Vol. 1, 5 May 2010, 5–44.

33. According to legal experts, none of the examples in this paragraph constitute 

‘direct’ participation in hostilities and therefore do not represent lawful targets. 

For an excellent synopsis of the legal aspects of direct participation in hostilities, 

as well as numerous examples of what does and does not constitute direct participation in hostilities, see: Huntley and Levitz, “Controlling the Use of Power 

in the Shadows.”

34. The U.S. reduced or cut off U.S. military aid completely to about 20 countries 

during the Carter administration because of human rights violations by security 

forces in the country. Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter 

and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 

44. 

35. The International Committee of the Red Cross Interpretive Guidance attempted 

to establish criteria for what constitutes direct participation in hostilities, which 

occurs when (1) such actions will adversely affect the military by inflicting death, 

injury, or destruction on friendly forces, (2) there is a direct causal link between 

the act and the harm it causes, and (3) the act is intended to cause direct harm 

to friendly forces. Cited in: Huntley and Levitz, “Controlling the Use of Power 

in the Shadows,” 496. 

36. Unconventional warfare (UW) is defined as “activities conducted to enable a 

resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government 

or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, 

and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02.

37. Screening these candidates for criminal backgrounds has been a challenging 

process and created a backlog of nearly 7,000 recruits. According to U.S. military officials, recruits must promise not to harm civilians or prisoners. Karam 

Shoumani et al., “Abductions Hurt U.S. Bid to Train Anti-ISIS Rebels,” New 

York Times, 31 July 2015, A1. See also: Missy Ryan, “Caution to Guide Syrian 

Training,” Washington Post, 29 November 2014, A1. 

38. Surrogates are still expected to abide by international norms on the use of force and 

the protection of civilians. If they do, the surrogates enjoy “combatant immunity” 

and are protected by the Geneva Conventions. Under the Geneva Convention 
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(article 43), surrogates must satisfy four characteristics to be constituted legally 

protected groups: (1) the group possesses a “military character”; (2) the group is 

led by a “responsible command exercising effective control over the members of 

the organization”; (3) the group respects the law of armed conflict; and (4) the 

group is “subordinate to a ‘Party to the conflict’ which represents a collective entity 

which is ... a subject of international law.” The surrogates gain legal coverage by 

this fourth requirement. By operating in support of a party to the conflict, the 

surrogates are expected to comply with the “laws and customs of war.” Cited in: 

Huntley and Levitz, “Controlling the Use of Power in the Shadows,” 486.

39. The United Nations and the Afghan government make a distinction between 

militias serving as proxy fighters on behalf of the government and illegal armed 

groups. An illegal group is defined as a group of five or more armed individuals 

operating outside the law, drawing its cohesion from (1) loyalty to the commander, (2) receipt of material benefits, (3) impunity enjoyed by its members, and 

(4) shared ethnic or social background. See the United Nations’ “Disarmament 

of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Final Strategy,” 26 January 2006, available at: 

http://www.diag.gov.af/history.htm; Barbara Stapleton, “Disarming the Militias,” 

Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 2013; and Joseph Goldstein, “After U.S. Exit, 

Rough Justice of Afghan Militias,” New York Times, 8 March 2015, A1.

40. M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law 

of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 2008, 711, 773. Cited in: Huntley and Levitz, “Controlling the Use of Power 

in the Shadows,” 510. For a detailed analysis of the legal pitfalls of unconventional warfare, see: Michael Schmitt and Andru Wall, “The International Law 

of Unconventional Statecraft,” Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 5, 2014. 

The U.S. expressed reservations and eventually did not ratify the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I of 1977 because of fears that it would legitimize 

irregular armed groups. It was a common Cold War tactic of the Soviet Union 

to use surrogate factions to overthrow democratic governments in the expanse 

of communism. Ironically, the U.S. didn’t ratify Additional Protocol I because 

it feared the treaty would give Soviet surrogate forces protection as traditional 

combatants. However, this is the same indirect approach strategy that the U.S. 

employs across the globe today. The specific reservations that the U.S. cited are 

classified. See: Huntley and Levitz, “Controlling the Use of Power in the Shadows,” 486. 

41. Author’s examination of all JCET activity from 1998–2014 from the annual “Report 

on Training of Special Operations Forces, for the Period Ending September 30, 

(year).” Statistics don’t include data from 1999 or 2001 which were not cleared 

for public release.

42. Author’s discussions with U.S. security assistance officials. 

43. Amnesty International, “Unmatched Power, Unmet Principles: The Human Rights 

Dimensions of U.S. Training of Foreign Military and Police Forces,” 2002, 41, 

available at: http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/msp.pdf. 

44. U.S. Special Operations Command Directive 350-28cc, 11 May 2005, 3. 
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45. Author email and phone call conversations with the AFSOC JAG in September 

2015. ROE are developed for deploying operational AFSOC units but there is 

no lesson plan, POI, or requirement that the 6 SOS uses to train on IHL or ROE 

when conducting JCETs with foreign aviation forces.

46. FM 3-05, published 31 August 2012.

47. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, 16 July 2014, B-45. 

48. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 

2010, I-7.

49. Ibid., VI-38.

50. The State Department has four main foreign policy goals: (1) protect the United 

States and Americans; (2) advance democracy, human rights, and other global 

interests; (3) promote international understanding of American values and 

policies; and (4) support U.S. diplomats, government officials, and all other 

personnel at home and abroad who make these goals a reality. Source: U.S. State 

Department Diplomacy Handbook, 2008, 1, available at: http://www.state.gov/

documents/organization/46839.pdf. The State Department 2011–2016 Strategic 

Plan Addendum for DOS and USAID also includes respect for human rights as 

one of its seven strategic goals. See: http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/185613.

htm. 

51. Based on various interviews with anonymous State Department officials, April 

to November 2015. 

52. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Implementation of the DOD Law of War 

Program,” CJCS Instruction 5810.01D, 30 April 2010, para 6f. See also: Government Accountability Office, “International Military Education and Training: 

Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations,” 

GAO-12-123, October 2011.

53. USSOUTHCOM has had a policy on human rights since March 1990, issued by 

USSOUTHCOM Commander General Maxwell Thurman. Forces deploying into 

the region are required to complete online training on human rights and international humanitarian law. SOUTHCOM uses a five “R’s” mnemonic to remind 

U.S. personnel of their responsibilities: Recognize, Refrain, React, Record, and 

Report. If U.S. personnel in any of the 35 countries in the USSOUTHCOM AOR 

witness a violation of human rights, they are required to report it immediately 

to U.S. embassy personnel.

54. The U.S. Navy also is the only military service to offer recent guidance on the 

law of war. In January 2015, it published a new instruction that requires Fleet 

Commanders and the Naval Special Warfare Command to “ensure that realistic 

problems involving the law of war are included in the conduct of tactical training 

evolutions, command post, and fleet exercises, and other war games. Specialized 

training should emphasize, to the maximum extent possible, practical applications through the insertion of practical questions and situations into gaming 

exercises or scenarios, rather than formal instruction.” Department of the Navy, 

OPNAV Instruction 3300.52A, “Law of War Program,” 21 January 2015. 
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55. The JAG school is formally known as The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center 

and School, or TJAGLCS. Another helpful repository of legal guides is the Center 

for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). Reportedly, the U.S. Army is close 

to releasing an updated version of its Law of Land Warfare manual. The new 

guide will be called the Army Field Manual 6-27. The Law of War Handbook 

can be downloaded at: https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOWDeskbook-2011.pdf. The Operational Law Handbook is available at: https://www.

loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/operational-law-handbooks.html.

56. William C. Story, Jr., “Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human 

Rights: Background and Issues for Congress,” 26 January 1999, Congressional 

Research Service, RL30034.

57. Livingston, “Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force 

Assistance.” 

58. U.S. Department of Defense, “Law of War Program,” DOD Directive 2311.01E, 

9 May 2006. See also: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction 

5810.01D, “Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program,” 30 April 2010. 

59. As an effort to eliminate confusion about what incidents require reporting—what 

constitutes a ‘reportable incident’—the phrase is defined in catch-all terminology as a “possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the law of war, for which 

there is credible information, or conduct during military operations other than 

war that would constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an 

armed conflict.” See DOD Directive 2311.01E, paras 4.4 and 4.5. For example, 

the Marine Corps commander of the unit involved in the Haditha Massacre in 

Iraq in November 2005 was charged with a UCMJ violation for failing to report 

possible war crimes because he did not “thoroughly and accurately report and 

investigate a combat engagement that clearly needed scrutiny ... to his higher 

headquarters.” Army Major General Eldon Bargewell led the investigation into 

the circumstances of the event and concluded that Marines considered, “Iraqi 

civilian lives are not as important as U.S. lives, their deaths are just the cost of 

doing business, and that the Marines need to get ‘the job done’ no matter what 

it takes.” He found that others in the chain of command, “attempted to hide 

criminal conduct.” See Josh White, “Report on Haditha Condemns Marines,” 

Washington Post, 21 April 2007; and “Simple Failures and Disastrous Results,” 

Washington Post, 21 April 2007. See also: Charlie Savage and Elisabeth Bumiller, 

“An Iraqi Massacre, a Light Sentence, and a Question of Military Justice,” New 

York Times, 28 January 2012, A17. 

60. Cecil Bailey, “OPATT: the U.S. Army SF Advisers in El Salvador,” Special Warfare

17/2, December 2004, 24–25. 

61. In particular, USSOF may be held legally responsible for the actions of surrogate 

forces if two criteria are met: (1) the surrogate forces are following instructions of 

USSOF and (2) the surrogate forces are under the direct control of USSOF. Bart, 

“Special Operations Forces and Responsibility for Surrogates’ War Crimes,” 523. 

62. Ibid., 527–529.
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63. Robin Sage is a 19-day exercise conducted four times a year. The training occurs 

on both public and private land near the John F. Kennedy School Special Warfare 

Center in Fayetteville, North Carolina.

64. According to one recent study, by training foreign forces in military tactics and 

not simultaneously advising about the strategic blowback that results from an 

abuse of their authorities, our SOF may be empowering security forces that could 

use their skills to revolt against civilian authorities. Recent studies have shown 

there is a statistical correlation between security assistance and military coups. 

The militaries, especially those trained by U.S. forces, are the most capable and 

therefore the most likely to launch rebellions against elected officials. This author’s 

experience working with USSOF in Africa partly supports that theory. At least 

some senior African government officials are wary about the military in their 

countries because they are the most physically capable of launching a takeover. 

In a number of countries, the African heads of state assign the Special Forces in 

their country to bases far from the capital or place them under the supervision 

of a trusted subordinate or a family member whose loyalty to the president is 

unquestioned. That way, the president has time to react or gets an early warning from loyal subordinates if the military forces mobilize for a coup. In this 

author’s opinion, there are likely other intervening variables that might lead one 

to question the methodological precision of the study. In other words, military 

coups may occur in spite of rather than because of U.S. military assistance. 

See: Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan Caverley, “American Foreign Military 

Training and Coup Propensity,” available at: http://www.jonathancaverley.com/

uploads/2/9/7/2/29726853/caverleysavage_otago.pdf. 

65. For example, Lieutenant General William Caldwell IV, tasked to train Afghani 

security forces, received a surprise during a visit to a firing range to observe new 

recruits. He realized that most recruits were illiterate and innumerate. If the 

instructor wanted them to load 10 bullets in their rifles, he had to get them to 

put one bullet next to each of their fingers. See: Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Afghan 

security force’s rapid expansion comes at a cost as readiness lags, Washington 

Post, 21 October 2012; and William Caldwell IV and Nathan Finney, “Building 

the Security Force that Won’t Leave,” Joint Force Quarterly, 62:3, 2011.

66. The Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest is 

titled, “Report on Training of Special Operations Forces, 1 April (year) for the 

Period Ending 30 September (year).” 

67. Colombia and Indonesia, in particular, were singled out as partner forces with poor 

human rights records that still received significant U.S. military assistance. In 

1997, when the legislation was first proposed, the U.S. was beginning an extensive 

assistance campaign to the Colombian security forces fighting drug trafficking, 

part of what would later become a multi-billion dollar assistance package under 

Plan Colombia. However, the Colombian security forces had a poor record of 

human rights; one military representative called it “the worst in the hemisphere.” 

Colombian forces were later accused of murdering as many as 2,500 civilians 

as a means of boosting the perceived successes against leftist guerrillas. The 
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Indonesian Special Forces Command, KOPASSUS, were also accused of forced 

disappearances and kidnappings. See: Story, “Joint Combined Exchange Training 

(JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress,” 11–14, 41. See 

also: Charles Comer, “Leahy in Indonesia: Damned if you Do (and Even if You 

Don’t),” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 2010, 37: 53–70. 

68. The legislation can be found in section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 

of 1961 and in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). 

69. DOD defines training of foreign personnel as “instruction of foreign security 

forces that may result in the improvement of their capabilities.” Cited in: Nina 

Serafino et al., “Leahy Law Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: 

Issue Overview,” Congressional Research Service, RL43361, 29 January 2014, 4.

70. By definition, gross violation of human rights includes torture; cruel, inhuman, 

or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges and 

trial; the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention 

of those persons; flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of 

person; extrajudicial killings; and politically motivated rape. 

71. USIP Press release, “Human Rights Violations: U.S. Foreign Aid for Accountability and Prevention,” 29 March 2015.

72. Acronyms: FMS-Foreign Military Sales, IMET-International Military Education and Training, FMF-Foreign Military Financing, FSF-Foreign Security 

Forces, MCO-Major Combat Operations, FID-Foreign Internal Defense, COINCounterinsurgency, CT-Counterterrorism, UW-Unconventional Warfare, Stab 

Ops-Stability Operations, HA-Humanitarian Assistance, PKO-Peacekeeping 

Operations, OGA-Other Government Agencies, DOJ-Department of Justice, 

FBI-Federal Bureau of Investigation, PFP-Partnership for Peace, PEP-Personnel 

Exchange Program, JCET-Joint Combined Exchange Training, SA-Security Assistance, SC-Security Cooperation. Graph recreated from Congressional Research 

Service report R41817, “Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security 

Force Assistance,” by Thomas Livingston, 05 May 2011. See also Secretary of 

Defense Memorandum, “Implementation of Section 8057, DOD Appropriations 

Act 2014,” promulgated 18 August 2014.

73. Eric Schmitt, “Military Says Law Barring U.S. Aid to Rights Violators Hurts 

Training Mission,” New York Times, 20 June 2013.

74. Serafino, “Leahy Law Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance,” 15.

75. Ibid., 4. 

76. See Joint Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State Policy on 

Remediation and the Resumption of Assistance under the Leahy Laws, 3 February 2015. 

77. Name of country withheld by author. 

78. Based on various interviews with anonymous U.S. SOF officials, April to November 2015.
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79. Schmitt, “Military Says Law Barring U.S. Aid to Rights Violators Hurts Training 

Mission.”

80. Ibid.

81. Sydney J. Freedberg, “Reps Mac Thornberry, Adam Smith Lead House Push 

for More Foreign Military Training; Leahy Amendment Targeted,” 6 March 

2013, available at: http://breakingdefense.com/2013/03/thornberry-smith-leadbipartisan-house-push-for-more-foreign-mi/.

82. U.S. Department of State Human Rights on Nigeria, 2014. 

83. Adam Nossiter, “Nigeria Says U.S. Ban on Arms Sales Is Helping Rebels,” New 

York Times, 24 July 2015, A13. 

84. The establishment of the first Ronda is described in John S. Gitlitz and Telmo 

Rojas, “Peasant Vigilante Committees in Northern Peru,” Journal of Latin 

American Studies, Vol. 15, no. 1, May 1983, 178–180.

85. In the impoverished regions of remote Peru, cows were valuable commodities for 

families struggling to survive in subsistence-living conditions. Cattle provided 

milk, cheese, and meat, could be bred for additional livestock, and provided 

financial security in that they could be sold in an emergency. Theft of one or 

more cows from a family could be financially devastating.

86. Gitlitz and Rojas, “Peasant Vigilante Committees in Northern Peru,” 163. Peru 

is divided into 25 departments that are further sub-divided into provinces, 

districts, and annexes. The equivalent political structure in the U.S. would be 

states, counties, townships, and communities. The senior government official 

in each department was a prefect, in the provinces sub-prefects, in the district 

governors, and in the annexes lieutenant governors.

87. Mario Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War: Peasant SelfDefence Organisations in Ayacucho,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 

20, no. 4, Special Issue: Armed Actors in Latin America in the 1990s, October 

2001, 474; and Orin Starn, “To Revolt against the Revolution: War and Resistance 

in Peru’s Andes,” Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, no. 4, November 1995, 566.

88. The group draws its name (Shining Path in English) from the philosophical 

writings of José Carlos Mariátegui, founder of the Peru Communist Party in 

the 1920s, who opined that “Marxism-Leninism would open a ‘shining path’ to 

the peasant revolution.”

89. There is a frequent misperception on the behalf of some historians that Sendero 

Luminoso began as a peasant-based social mobilization seeking economic and 

political inclusion from the central government and wealthy landowners. Initially, 

Guzmán relied upon his students (middle-class youth who could afford to attend 

college) rather than disenfranchised peasant masses.

90. Reported in Starn, “To Revolt against the Revolution,” 563. 

91. Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War,” 477.

92. James Brooke, “A Lethal Army of Insurgents Lima Could Not Stamp Out,” New 

York Times, 7 April 1992, A16. 
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93. Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War,” 484.

94. Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), 28 August 2003. 

95. Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War,” 486.

96. Maoist guerrilla tactics discouraged direct confrontations against superior 

military forces. Rather, the guerrillas retreated into safety of the surrounding 

countryside at the first indication of the Peruvian Army or Marines. Instead of 

direct encounters, they relied upon hidden explosives, ambushes, and sniping 

to inflict casualties on government security forces. 

97. Some scholars contend that the Peruvian Army coerced the villagers into forming self-defense forces, conscripting locals against their will, and sending them 

unarmed against a vicious enemy. See: Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas in the 

Peruvian Civil War,” 487.

98. There are significant differences between the Rondas Campesinas in the northwest 

and the comités in the south (origins, subordination to government authorities, 

etc.) although most scholars of Peruvian history use them interchangeably. For 

the purpose of this report, the author uses Rondas Campesinas to refer to any 

Peruvian village self-defense force.

99. Starn, “To Revolt against the Revolution,” 550.

100. Fumerton, “Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War,” 485.

101. Ibid., 487.

102. Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation 

Commission), 457. Author’s translation. 

103. Fusil Automatique Leger (FAL) or Light Automatic Rifle was a semi-automatic 

Belgian weapon used widely throughout the world during the latter half of the 

20th century. 

104. Starn, “To Revolt against the Revolution,” 551.

105. In Ayacucho, this coincided with the July 1985 replacement of the Peruvian 

Marines with the Peruvian Army. According to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (456), the Peruvian Army applied a more selective level 

of repression against suspected guerrilla sympathizers and sought ways to align 

with the peasants.

106. Starn, “To Revolt against the Revolution,” 562.

107. El Peruano, Decreto Legislativo No. 741, 101687, 8 November 1991. Also reported 

in: Starn, “To Revolt against the Revolution,” 565.

108. Starn, “To Revolt against the Revolution,” 565.

109. Legislation #740 in November 1991 permitted the arming of the Rondas. Source: 

Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003, 449; and Starn, “To Revolt 

against the Revolution,” 553.

110. Starn, “To Revolt against the Revolution,” 563.

111. Brooke, “A Lethal Army of Insurgents Lima Could Not Stamp Out,” A16.
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112. James Brooke, “Peruvian Farmers Said To Kill Rebels,” New York Times, 4 March 

1990.

113. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, “Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de 

Guerra y Dignidad,” available at: http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.

co/micrositios/informeGeneral/descargas.html. 

114. The most successful of the rebel organizations was the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC), 

founded in 1964 and dedicated to rural insurgency. One year later, pro-Castro 

university students founded the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (Army of National 

Liberation or ELN). The Ejercito de Liberación Popular (Popular Liberation Army 

or EPL) appeared in July 1967 and the Movimiento de 19 de Abril (19th of April 

Movement or M-19) in 1970. These groups formed the base of the insurgent 

organizations that would wreak havoc throughout Colombia for decades.

115. Colombians refer to these autonomous militias as self-defense forces. However, 

most U.S. academics and think tanks who have followed the issue refer to them 

as paramilitaries. This creates some confusion in Colombia because the leftist 

guerrillas that first emerged in the 1960s referred to themselves as paramilitaries. For the purpose of this article, the leftist guerrilla groups like the FARC are 

referred to as insurgents. The right-wing militias are referred to as paramilitaries 

or self-defense forces. 

116. A 1962 survey of the Colombian security forces by U.S. Special Forces General 

William P. Yarborough recommended the establishment of paramilitary forces 

as part of a Colombian counter-insurgency strategy (called Plan Lazo) to combat 

leftist insurgents. 

117. Decree 3398 was passed by President Guillermo León Valencia (1962–1966). In 

1968, the government codified the previous decree into law by passing legislation that permitted the military to arm civilian defense forces with “weapons 

restricted to the exclusive use by the armed forces.” Passed by President Carlos 

Lleras (1966–1970) in 1968. See the Comisión Interamericana de Derechos 

Humanos (CIDH), “Informe Sobre el Proceso de Desmovilización en Colombia,” 

section III, Contexto: Origen y Características del Conflicto Armado Interno 

en Colombia, paragraphs 50–53, 13 December 2004, available at: http://www.

cidh.org/countryrep/Colombia04sp/indice.htm. Also cited in: Colombia, Nunca 

Más: Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad, Vol. 1, chap. 1, “Tipicidad del ciclo vigente 

de violencia – delimitación de un período,” November 2000; International Crisis 

Group (ICG), Negotiating with the Paramilitaries, 5. 

118. Information collected from various sources. Acronyms are the Spanish names 

for paramilitary units: ACCU is Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and 

Urabá; CONVIVIR is vigilance and private security cooperatives; AUC is the 

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. 

119. The Colombian security forces periodically purged its forces for corruption 

and other crimes. Between 1995 and 1997, 6,000 members of the Colombian 

police were fired. See: “Colombian Military Fires 388 in Human Rights Effort,” 
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JSOU Report 16-9

Washington Post, 17 October 2000. Also reported in Angel Rabasa and Peter 

Chalk, “Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its 

Implications for Regional Stability,” RAND Corporation, 2001, 58.

120. Scott Wilson, “Colombia’s Other Army; Growing Paramilitary Force Wields 

Power With Brutality,” Washington Post, 12 March 2001, A1. 

121. Source: “Lifting the Veil on Colombia’s ‘Emerald Czar’: Declassified Cable Links 

Víctor Carranza’s Alias to 1997 Miraflores Massacre,” National Security Archive 

Electronic Briefing Book No. 408, posted 21 December 2012. 

122. In a March 2001 interview with the Washington Post, he also alleged that guerrillas had killed four of his brothers and one of his sisters. Castaño and his 

brothers suffered the same fate as many of their victims. In 1994, Fidel was killed 

in a confrontation with the EPL. On 16 April 2004, Carlos was murdered at the 

order of his brother, Vicente, part of a power struggle for control of the AUC. 

On 11 March 2007, Vicente was murdered by rival factions who dismembered 

then burned his body and scattered the ashes in a nearby river. 

123. Decree 1194 of June 1989 declared it illegal to “recruit, train, promote, finance, 

organize, lead or belong to the armed groups, misnamed paramilitary groups, 

that have been formed into death squads, bands of hired assassins, self-defense 

groups, or groups that carry out their own justice.” It required the approval of 

the president before any type of self-defense group was established. Source: International Crisis Group (ICG), “Colombia: Negotiating with the Paramilitaries,” 

16 September 2003, 5. The decision to prohibit the establishment of self-defense 

forces was part of a series of government decrees. Decree 813 established a commission to study the paramilitary problem. Decree 814 proposed the organization 

of a special police force dedicated to the elimination of paramilitary groups. 

Decree 815 establishing criminal penalties for the formation or operation of such 

groups. Source: William Avilés, “Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity 

Democracy,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 38, no. 2, May 2006, 387, 

392; and Harvey F. Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 

1986–1994 (Birmingham, AL, 1999), 75–6. See also: Rabasa and Chalk, “Colombian Labyrinth,” 54.

124. Aviles, “Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity Democracy,” 393.

125. Ibid., 387, 396.

126. “Revealed: The secrets of Colombia’s murderous Castaño brothers,” The Telegraph, 

7 November 2008, 7.

127. Wilson, “Colombia’s Other Army,” A1.

128. Drug traffickers established alliances with paramilitary groups to combat insurgent kidnapping and extortion efforts. In the early 1980s, the 26-year-old daughter 

of Fabio Ochoa, kingpin of the Medellin Cartel, was kidnapped by M-19 guerrillas. 

The guerrillas demanded a 12 million peso ransom for her release. In response, 

Ochoa formed a paramilitary group called “Muerte a Secuestradores” (Death to 

Kidnappers or MAS), found the responsible guerrilla leader, and kidnapped 25 
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of his family members and closest friends. Ochoa’s daughter was quickly set free 

without any ransom. 

129. Scott Wilson, “Interview with Carlos Castaño, Head of the United Self-Defense 

Forces of Colombia,” Washington Post, 12 March 2001.

130. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. “Basta Ya!: Colombia: Memorias de 

Guerra y Dignidad,” 2013, available at: http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.

gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/estadisticas.html

131. Larry Rohter, “Armed Forces in Colombia Hoping to Get Fighting Fit,” New York 

Times, 5 December 1999.

132. See “Document 51,” National Security Archive, “War in Colombia; Guerrillas, Drugs, and Human Rights in U.S.–Colombia Policy, 1988–2002,” George 

Washington University, 3 May 2002, available at: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/

NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col51.pdf; and DOD News Briefing, 14 April 1998, Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, 

ASD (PA). 

133. Aviles, “Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity Democracy,” 397–398.

134. Wilson, “Interview with Carlos Castaño.”

135. Aviles, “Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity Democracy,” 399; Mauricio Aranguren Molina, Mi Confesión. Revelaciones de un Criminal de Guerra 

(Bogotá: Brújula, 2001), 175–176.

136. “Cargos contra 4 generales por masacre de Puerto Alvira,” El Tiempo, 28 July 

2000; and Rabasa and Chalk, “Colombian Labyrinth,” 58.

137. The officers and NCOs were dismissed pursuant to a decree signed by President 

Pastrana allowing the Minister of Defense to dismiss officers deemed unfit for 

duty; they were not charged with specific abuses. 

138. Doug Farah, “Colombian Rebels Seen Winning War,” Washington Post, 10 April 

1998, A17.

139. Semana, “General condenado,” 19–25 February 2001; and Rabasa and Chalk, 

“Colombian Labyrinth,” 58.

140. See: The Guardian, “Nasa Indians Clash with Soldiers in the Colombia – in 

pictures,” available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2012/jul/19/

colombia-nasa-indians. 

141. Human rights violations in Colombia were partly the impetus for the 1996 Leahy 

Act that proposed cutting off aid to foreign military units if there was credible 

evidence they were involved in human rights violations.

142. U.S. Department of State, “Colombia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002,” Washington, 31 March 2003. See also: U.S. Department of State, 

“2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Washington, 5 October 

2001; U.S. Department of State, Press Conference, 24 September 2002; and U.S. 

Department of State, “Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act,” Washington, 

29 May 2003.
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143. While paramilitaries committed the most massacres, extra-judicial executions, 

and forced displacement, the guerrillas dominated kidnappings and indiscriminate attacks on populations. The Colombian government defines a massacre as 

an event in which more than 4 people died in the same act. Centro Nacional de 

Memoria Histórica, “Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad,” available at: http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/descargas.html. 

144. Human Rights Watch, “War without Quarter: Colombia and International 

Humanitarian Law,” 1998, 4.

145. The drafters of the Geneva Conventions expected states to classify conflict 

according to such subjectivity and to develop their own interpretation of the 

laws of armed conflict. According to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the application of laws of war does not depend on the discretion of any 

one of the parties to the conflict. The rules of war and its inherent protection of 

combatants and noncombatants applies automatically once a situation of armed 

conflict exists objectively. Protocol II is applicable when opposing forces in an 

internal conflict are under a responsible command, exercise enough control over 

territory to mount sustained and coordinated military operations, and are able 

to implement Protocol II. Source: Human Rights Watch, “War without Quarter,” 

27.

146. Aviles, “Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity Democracy,” 387.

147. Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) was the domestic intelligence 

agency in Colombia, the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

See: Aviles, “Paramilitarism and Colombia’s Low-Intensity Democracy,” 395.

148. Adriaan Alsema, “Paramilitary Killing Spree was Colombia ‘state policy:’ Judge,” 

Colombia Reports, 1 November 2014.

149. Jorge Noguera was also accused of passing lists of human rights activists and labor 

leaders to paramilitaries so they could be targeted. In 2011, he was sentenced to 

25 years in prison. Juan Forero, “Colombian Government Shaken by Lawmakers’ 

Paramilitary Ties,” Washington Post, 18 November 2006. See also: El Pais, “Los 

delitos de Jorge Noguera, exDirector del DAS,” available at: http://www.elpais.

com.co/elpais/colombia/delitos-jorge-noguera-ex-director-del-das; and http://

www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Parapolitica-27-abril-2012.pdf.

150. Alsema, “Paramilitary Killing Spree was Colombia ‘state policy.’”

151. The most infamous of these instances of repression was La Matanza in 1932. 

Government forces on behalf of landed elite responded to a protest organized 

by labor and indigenous leaders by indiscriminately slaughtering an estimated 

8,000 to 30,000 peasants and workers. The president at the time was General 

Maximiliano Martinez Hernandez, an Army officer.

152. Michael Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense 

and Development (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995), xiv.
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153. Benjamin Schwarz, “American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The 

Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building,” RAND Corporation, 1991, 23.

154. During the Archbishop’s funeral on 30 March, military forces allegedly fired 

into the crowd of 250,000 mourners, killing 30–50 people. The event, captured 

on film and broadcast in the U.S., generated revulsion among American viewers. 

See: “El Salvador Massacre during Oscar Romero’s Funeral Caught on Film,” 

on YouTube, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DLvkXj1zGpU. 

According to the UN Truth Commission that followed the war, Salvadoran Air 

Force Captain Alvaro Saravia was believed to have been ordered by Major Roberto 

D’Aubuisson to assassinate Romero. Both U.S. Ambassador Robert White and 

the UN Truth Commission concluded there was sufficient evidence to convict 

D’Aubuisson. Saravia was able to migrate to the United States in 1987 and lived 

in Modesto, California, until 2003 when human rights NGOs sought to have 

him arrested for the crime. He went into hiding and is now believed to be living 

anonymously in a Latin American country. Archbishop Romero was declared a 

martyr by Pope Francis on 3 February 2015 and then beatified on 23 May 2015. 

He is one of 10 20th century martyrs depicted in statues above the Great West 

Door of Westminster Abbey in London. 

155. Jimmy Carter, “Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero Statement on the Death of 

the Archbishop of San Salvador,” 25 March 1980, available online by Gerhard 

Peters and John T. Woolley, “The American Presidency Project” at: http://www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33182. 

156. Milt Freudenheim and Barbara Slavin, “Guerrillas Regroup As Carter Switches 

On Salvador Arms,” New York Times, 25 January 1981.

157. Max Manwaring and Court Prisk, “A Strategic Insight of Insurgencies: Insights 

from El Salvador,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 4, no. 1, Spring/Summer 

1993, 56–57. 

158. Ibid., 177.

159. Freudenheim and Slavin, “Guerrillas Regroup As Carter Switches On Salvador 

Arms.”

160. Max Manwaring and Court Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 60.

161. Bailey, “OPATT: the U.S. Army SF Advisers in El Salvador,” 24–26.

162. Ibid., 10.

163. A.J. Bacevich, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador

(Washington: Pergamon & Brasseys, 1988), commonly referred to as the “Colonels’ Report,” 24. 

164. Robert D. Ramsey III, “Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, 

Vietnam, and El Salvador,” Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, 2006, 85; and Bacevich, American Military Policy in Small Wars, 24–25.
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165. In 1984, friction between the senior U.S. OPATT officers and the Salvadoran 

brigade commanders led to a suspension of the advisory effort. It was reactivated 

in 1985 with different personnel. Instead of a lieutenant colonel, a Special Forces 

major and two SOF warrant officers or NCOs were assigned to each brigade to 

advise on combat operations and intelligence processing. The new SOF teams 

also advised on civil defense, civic action, and psychological operations. In all, 

over 140 individual SOF officers and NCOs served as advisors to 40 battalions 

during the conflict. The advisory effort dwindled in the early 1990s and, by 

mid-summer 1993, no U.S. advisors were left in the brigades. For an excellent 

summary of the OPATTS and the personal and professional challenges they 

encountered, see: Bailey, “OPATT: the U.S. Army SF Advisers in El Salvador,” 

21; and Ramsey, “Advising Indigenous Forces,” 88–89.

166. David H. Ucko, “Counterinsurgency in El Salvador: the lessons and limits of the 

indirect approach,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24:4, 2013, 671.

167. The fall of 1983 may have been the low point for the ESAF. They surrendered a 

number of important strategic positions to the guerrillas, lost entire battalions 

in combat, and sustained heavy combat casualties in the field. See Manwaring 

and Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History, 148–151. 

168. Commander Schaufelberger was waiting for his girlfriend at the University when 

a van full of gunmen approached and fired into his vehicle. Schaufelberger was in 

an armored embassy vehicle but had reportedly removed the bulletproof driverside window for ventilation because the car’s air conditioner wasn’t working. 

Overall, the U.S. suffered 30 combat-related military fatalities in a decade of 

indirect approach operations.

169. Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History, 35.

170. Ibid., 71.

171. Ibid., 105.

172. Ramsey, “Advising Indigenous Forces,” 87.

173. Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History, 21.

174. Ramsey, “Advising Indigenous Forces,” 91. 

175. Interview with OPATT officer, 16 May 2003, cited in: Bailey, “OPATT: the U.S. 

Army SF Advisers in El Salvador.” 

176. Manwaring and Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History, 22.

177. Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense and 

Development, 4, fn 18.

178. Most of this training was provided in courses at the School of the Americas in 

Fort Benning, Georgia. The U.S. flew students to the states to attend the courses. 

See: Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense and 

Development, 22–23, 25; Colonels’ Report, 14–15; and Manwaring and Prisk, El 

Salvador at War: An Oral History, 280. 
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179. The 7th Special Forces Group is assigned the geographic responsibility for USSOF 

efforts in Central and South America. See: Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. 

Training Efforts in Internal Defense and Development, 27.

180. Ibid., 28.

181. The UN Truth Commission report, released in March 1983, concluded there was 

“substantial proof that five high ranking officers, including General Ponce, the 

Minister of Defense, ordered the murder of Father Ignacio Ellecuria, and five 

other priests.”

182. Terry Lynn Karl, “Expert Report of Professor Terry Lynn Karl, Stanford University, in the matter of Inocente Orlando Montano,” Center for Justice and 

Accountability, available at: http://www.cja.org. 

183. Terry Lynn Karl, “El Salvador’s Negotiated Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, 71/2, 

152. 

184. Bacevich, American Military Policy in Small Wars, 26; and James LeMoyne, 

“Salvadoran Army’s Abuses Continue,” Washington Post, 19 August 1986. 

185. Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense and 

Development, 31.

186. Colonel’s Report, 37; and Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in 

Internal Defense and Development, 30.

187. Michael R. Gordon, “General Says Salvador Can’t Defeat Guerrillas,” The New 

York Times, 9 February 1990; and Ben Schwarz, RAND Corporation, cited in 

Ucko, “Counterinsurgency in El Salvador,” 676.

188. Information assembled from various sources including the United Nations Truth 

Commission in El Salvador, “De La Locura a la Esperanza,” (San Salvador, 1993); 

and Charles Call, “Democratization, War, and State-Building: Constructing the 

Rule of Law in El Salvador,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 2003, Vol. 35, 

827–862. 

189. Call, “Democratization, War, and State-Building,” 835.

190. Ucko, “Counterinsurgency in El Salvador,” 682; and Call, “Democratization, 

War, and State-Building,” 835–836.

191. The autonomy and obstinacy of the military would have likely resulted in the 

armed forces ignoring the recommendations, but the Clinton administration 

threatened to withhold $11 million in aid if the military did not comply with 

the Commission’s recommendations. In 2012, a U.S. NGO, the Center for Justice 

and Accountability, rallied legal action in the U.S. Congress to deport former 

Ministers of Defense Jose Guillermo Garcia and Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova 

from the United States. Casanova moved to the United States and settled in Palm 

Coast, Florida, in 1989. Casanova was ordered to be deported in 2012, and on 

8 April 2015 he was returned to El Salvador. Garcia moved to the U.S. in 1991. 

In 2014, he was ordered to be deported by a U.S. immigration court in Miami. 

Garcia was deported on 8 January 2016. Sources: United Nations Truth Commission in El Salvador, “De La Locura a la Esperanza,” (San Salvador, 1993); and 
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Clyde Haberman, “Laying Out a Case for Deporting Human Rights Abusers,” 

New York Times, 9 November 2014.

192. The 1993 amnesty law was a complement to a 1987 amnesty law that effectively 

ensured impunity for the military. A number of serious violations were exempt 

from the two amnesties.

193. James Dunkerly, The Pacification of Central America: Political Change in the 

Isthmus, 1987–1993 (London: 1994), Appendix 7, reported in: Call, “Democratization, War, and State-Building,” fn 12; and Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. 

Training Efforts in Internal Defense and Development, xiv. 

194. United Nations Truth Commission in El Salvador, “De La Locura a la Esperanza,” 

San Salvador, 1993.

195. Schwarz, “American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador,” 23.

196. Bailey, “OPATT: the U.S. Army SF Advisers in El Salvador,” 16. 

197. David Ucko, “‘Small is Beautiful’: El Salvador’s Lessons and Non-Lessons for the 

Indirect Approach,” from warontherocks.com, available at: http://warontherocks.

com/2014/05/small-is-beautiful-el-salvadors-lessons-and-non-lessons-for-theindirect-approach/#_.

198. Sunnis were the minority in the country but retained the majority of the power 

under Saddam Hussein’s reign from 1979 to 2003. When Hussein and his forces 

were routed, the Shiite majority quickly filled the power vacuum left behind. In 

many cases, they sought revenge against Sunni officials for the tyranny inflicted 

during three decades of Hussein rule. Sunnis, in turn, began an insurgency 

against the central government. Shiites formed militias to protect themselves 

against insurgent attacks. The situation quickly devolved into sectarian fighting. 

Sunnis accounted for about 20 percent of the population, Kurds for 20 percent, 

and Shiites for the remaining 60 percent.

199. Tom Squitieri, “‘Long Way to Go’ Before Iraqis Take Over Security,” USA Today, 

14 December 2004; and Eric Schmitt, “Iraqis Not Ready to Fight Rebels on Their 

Own, U.S. Says,” New York Times, 21 July 2005.

200. See, for example: “The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security 

Forces of Iraq,” Chairman, General James L. Jones, USMC (retired), 8; Thom 

Shanker, “Special Operations Step Up in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 15 May 

2013; and Matthew Rosenberg and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Is Escalating a Secretive 

War in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 1 February 2015, A1. See also: Alissa J. 

Rubin and Michael Gordon, “Iraq’s Military Seen as Unlikely to Turn the Tide,” 

New York Times, 22 June 2014.

201. “The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” 

General Jones, 55.

202. Interview with 5th Special Forces Group at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 5 March 

2013, cited in: Austin Long, et al., Building Special Operations Partnerships in 

Afghanistan and Beyond (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 54.

203. Iraq Index, Brookings Institution, 21 December 2007, 46.
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204. Ibid., 40. 

205. The U.S. had been prepared to fight a war against regular forces such as the 

Iraqi Republican Guard, an enemy who was readily identifiable and a type of 

conflict that permitted the use of maximum force to annihilate the opponent. 

Instead the U.S. faced an enemy who was wholly indistinguishable from the 

civilian population and who remained hidden using roadside explosives, car 

bombs, and sniper fire to attack coalition forces. As lawlessness and violence 

increased, Iraqis saw the Americans as part of the problem rather than the solution. Attacks against U.S. and coalition forces quickly escalated. See, for example: 

Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” 

Military Review, October–November 2005. General Casey attempted to develop 

a counterinsurgency strategy upon his arrival in Baghdad in August 2004. However, he faced institutional resistance in the Pentagon and his own unfamiliarity 

with the concept. A team of experts was finally convened in February 2006 to 

write the new Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24). It wasn’t published until 

December 2006. See: “When Deadly Force Bumps into Hearts and Minds,” The 

Economist, 29 December 2004; and Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents (New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 2013), 96. 

206. Alice Hills, “Fear and Loathing in Falluja,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 32, no. 

4, July 2006, 623–639; and Human Rights Watch, “Violent Response: The U.S. 

Army in Al-Falluja,” June 2003, available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/

iraqfalluja/iraqfalluja.pdf.

207. On 4 March 2005, U.S. forces fired on a car carrying an Italian Army general who 

was transporting a recently released hostage to the Iraqi international airport. 

Major General Nicola Calipari was killed in the incident. U.S. soldiers said the 

vehicle failed to abide by traffic signals as it approached the U.S. checkpoint. 

The car was hit by over two dozen rounds of automatic rifle fire. Italian officials 

claimed that the soldiers used excessive force. The incident created an international imbroglio and damaged U.S.–Italian relations.

208. Criticism of U.S. military tactics also came from surprising corners. One senior 

British military official, dismayed by the apparent lack of regard for human 

rights among the U.S. soldiers, wrote, “The use of force by the Americans is not 

proportional and is in excess of the threat that we face. They are not worried 

about the loss of Iraqi lives. Their attitude toward the Iraqis is tragic. It’s awful.” 

Source: Sean Rayment, “U.S. Tactics in Iraq Condemned by Top British Officers,” 

The Telegraph, 12 April 2004. 

209. Military Health Advisory Team V survey, 2008, available at: http://armymedicine.

mil/Documents/Redacted1-MHATV-OIF-4-FEB-2008Report.pdf. 

210. The Haditha Massacre was the murder of 24 civilians by U.S. Marines in Haditha, 

Iraq, in November 2005. See: “‘Simple Failures’ and ‘Disastrous Results’: Excerpts 

from Major General Eldon A. Bargewell’s Report,” Washington Post, 21 April 

2007, page A13. See also: James W. Hammond, “Legitimacy and Military Operations.” Military Review, 2010, 68–79; and White, “Report on Haditha Condemns 

Marines.”
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211. Military Health Advisory Team V survey, 14 February 2008, 12. 

212. Nick Schifrin, “U.S. Vice Admiral Apologizes for Afghan Deaths,” ABC News, 

10 April 2010.

213. White House archives, President Bush speech in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 28 

June 2005, available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/. 

214. Iraq Study Group Report, pages 8–9, 70–75. See also: Michael Gordon, “Iraq’s 

Military: When Will It Take the Lead?” International Herald Tribune, 25 October 

2006, 5.

215. “The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” 

General Jones, 8. See also: David Cloud, “Panel Sees More than a Year Before 

Iraq Can Handle Security.” New York Times, 5 September 2007.

216. “The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” 

General Jones, 17–20.

217. Petraeus first arrived in Iraq on 10 March 2003 as a major general in command 

of the 101st Airborne Division. After fierce fighting south of Baghdad, his forces 

were assigned responsibility for Mosul and surrounding areas in northern Iraq. 

He was widely credited for implementing one of the best counterinsurgency 

plans in Iraq during 2003 and 2004. Newsweek magazine reported that “no force 

worked harder to win Iraqi hearts and minds than the 101st Air Assault Division led by Petraeus,” in a 2004 cover story on him. See: Brian Mosely, “Can This 

Man Save Iraq?” Newsweek, 27 June 2004. After a second tour in Iraq in 2004, 

he was selected to succeed General George Casey as Commanding General of 

Multi-National Forces-Iraq. He took over on 10 February 2007. 

218. For Admiral Mullen’s remarks, see: the Landon Lecture Series, Admiral Mike 

Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kansas State University, Manhattan, 

Kansas, 3 March 2010. Mullen also added that the use of force can be counterproductive if used recklessly. He advised U.S. troops to “not try to use force only 

in an overwhelming capacity, but in the proper capacity, and in a precise and 

principled manner.” Also reported in: Thom Shanker, “Joint Chiefs Chairman 

Readjusts Principles on the Use of Force,” Washington Post, 3 March 2010; and 

Colin Kahl, “In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs?” 

219. White, Lane, and Tate, “Homicide Charges Rare in Iraq War.” See also: Iraq 

Index, Brookings Institution, 18 December 2008.

220. Memorandum, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” August 2009; and Headquarters, U.S. 

Forces-Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), “COMISAF/

USFOR-A Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance,” 10 November 2009, 

available at: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/. 

221. Joint Publications 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011.

222. Livingston, “Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force 

Assistance,” 18. 
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223. Rubin and Gordon, “Iraq’s Military Seen as Unlikely to Turn the Tide.” See also: 

Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised 

Iraqi Force,” New York Times, 13 July 2014.

224. Emmarie Huetteman, “Iraqi Forces Are Blamed in ISIS Rout,” New York Times, 

25 May 2015, A4; and “Who’s Willing to Fight for Iraq?” New York Times, 1 June 

2015.

225. The Sunni-Shia sectarian rivalry has been an obstacle to stability in the country 

since nearly the first days of the conflict in 2003. Much of the current ethnic 

violence was instigated by former Nouri al-Maliki, Iraqi Prime Minister from 

2006–2014, a Shia leader. Bush’s National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley’s 

leaked report revealed Maliki’s true colors, “Reports of nondelivery of services 

to Sunni areas, intervention by the prime minister’s office to stop military 

action against Shia targets and to encourage them against Sunni ones, removal 

of Iraq’s most effective commanders on a sectarian basis and efforts to insure 

Shia majorities in all ministries—when combined with the escalation of Jaish 

al-Mahdi (JAM) killings—all suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in 

Baghdad.” See: Michael Gordon “Bush Advisor’s Memo Cites Doubts About Iraqi 

Leader,” New York Times, 29 November 2006, 1. The rivalry was considered so 

fierce that United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon was compelled to 

warn the Iraqi government (predominantly Shiite) of reprisals against Sunnis 

in areas liberated from ISIS terrorists. See: Rod Nordland, “UN Leader Warns 

Iraq Not to Mistreat Civilians After Liberation from ISIS,” New York Times, 30 

March 2015.

226. As of August 2015, the air campaign has conducted almost 4,500 strikes with 

15,000 bombs and other weapons. It has killed an estimated 13,000 ISIS fighters 

and helped Iraq reclaim 25 percent of the territory it lost.

227. Eric Schmitt, “With ISIS in Cross Hairs, U.S. Holds Back To Avoid Civilians,” 

New York Times, 27 May 2015, A4; Michael Gordon, “Trainers Intended as Lift, 

But Quick Turnaround Unlikely,” New York Times, 11 June 2015, A8; and Eric 

Schmitt, “Officials Split on Bigger Risk: Al Qaeda or ISIS,” New York Times, 5 

August 2015, A1.

228. The official military investigation into the My Lai massacre in Vietnam identified 

nine factors that contributed to the incident: lack of proper training, attitude 

toward the Vietnamese, permissive attitude, psychological factors, organizational 

problems, nature of the enemy, plans and orders, attitude of government officials 

and leaders, and leadership. Another military investigation determined that “the 

American troops did not fully understand the Geneva Conventions.” W. R. Peers, 

The My Lai Inquiry (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1979), 

3. See also: Robert Rielly, “The Inclination for War Crimes,” Military Review, 

2010, 52–58. 

229. There are a number of guidelines on the use of force produced by international 

organizations. For example, in 1990, the UN published “Basic Principles on the 

Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.” In 1998, Amnesty 

International published “Ten Basic Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcement 
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Officials.” In 2004, the UN published “Human Rights Standards and Practice 

for the Police.” The International Committee of the Red Cross published, “To 

Serve and Protect,” a lengthy summary of human rights considerations for police 

and security forces. The document is available on the ICRC homepage. See the 

United Nations Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights webpage 

for an excellent list of training and education material, available at: http://www.

ohchr.org/EN/PublicationsResources/Pages/TrainingEducationthree.aspx.

230. Eric Schmitt, “Billions From U.S. Fail to Sustain Foreign Forces” New York Times, 

4 October 2015, A1; and Rosa Brooks, “The Hard Lessons of Kunduz and Syria: 

Why U.S. efforts to train and equip friendly fighters around the world so often 

fail,” Foreign Policy, 2 October 2015.

231. Remarks at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 10 October 2007, available at: http://archive.defense.gov/

Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1181. 

232. Thomas Ricks, “Dissension Grows in Senior Ranks on War Strategy,” Washington 

Post, 9 May 2004, 1. 

233. John R. Galvin, “Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm,” Parameters, 

1986, 2–7.