DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS

Observations on 

Whether the Military 

Service Chiefs' Role 

in Managing and 

Overseeing Major 

Weapon Programs 

Should Be Expanded

Report to the Committee on

Armed Services, U.S. Senate

May 2014

GAO-14-520

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-520, a report to the 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

May 2014

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Observations on Whether the Military Service Chiefs’ 

Role in Managing and Overseeing Major Weapon 

Programs Should Be Expanded

Why GAO Did This Study

Nearly three decades ago, Congress 

enacted the Goldwater-Nichols 

Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act. As GAO has found, the act sought 

to strengthen civilian control over the 

acquisition function in DOD and 

establish a more streamlined chain of 

command for developing and procuring 

weapon systems. The reporting chain,

which remains in effect today, runs 

upward from a program manager, 

through a program executive officer, to 

a service acquisition executive, and to 

the defense acquisition executive.

Many acquisition reform studies have 

identified a need for increased 

accountability in DOD’s acquisition 

management chain of command. The 

Senate Armed Services Committee 

Report accompanying the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2014 mandated that GAO review 

DOD’s acquisition chain of command. 

This report examines (1) findings and 

recommendations made by studies 

that assessed the role of the military 

service chiefs; and (2) how current 

DOD and military department policies 

define the roles and responsibilities of 

the service chiefs in acquisition 

management.

To do this work, GAO analyzed the 

findings and recommendations of six 

studies that discuss DOD acquisition 

chain of command issues and

interviewed authors from the three 

most recently published studies. GAO 

also analyzed DOD and military 

department acquisition and 

requirements policies and guidance, 

and interviewed DOD officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations.

What GAO Found

Five of the six studies GAO reviewed recommended an expanded role for the 

military service chiefs in acquisition management, often citing this as a means to 

improve the integration of the requirements and acquisition processes that 

support a weapon system’s development. Three studies expressed concerns that 

the services have gone too far in their implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols 

Act and removed the service chiefs from the acquisition process. However, the 

studies provided little evidence or support that such a change would in fact 

improve program outcomes. Studies varied on the degree to which and ways in 

which service chiefs should be involved in the acquisition process. While two

studies advocated strengthening service chief’s roles and responsibilities within 

the current structure, three studies called for changing the current chain of 

command structure by making adjustments such as inserting the service chiefs 

above program executive officers. Authors GAO interviewed were uncertain what 

effect incorporating the chiefs of staff into the acquisition chain of command 

would have on individual programs. These authors noted that service chief 

involvement does not guarantee success for a weapon system program and, in 

fact, pointed to examples of past programs that had significant service chief 

involvement, but poor outcomes. Finally, the authors we interviewed agreed that 

strong leadership is essential to acquisition success, but all six studies identified 

other factors that need to be addressed in acquisition programs such as 

unrealistic and changing requirements, optimistic cost and schedule estimates, 

and issues with the current budgeting process. 

DOD and military department policies provide the service chiefs multiple

opportunities to be involved in the management and oversight of major defense

acquisition programs. Although responsibility and authority differ for the two 

distinct processes of requirements and acquisitions, multiple reviews, milestone 

decision points, and mechanisms are in place for these two processes to work 

together in planning and executing programs. Within each military department, 

the service chiefs and their staffs lead the development of operational 

requirements and are supported by acquisition officials to help ensure that 

requirements are feasible and affordable. Similarly, as acquisition programs 

progress through key phases of planning, development, and production, 

opportunities exist for continued chief of staff involvement beyond requirements 

development. For example, the offices of the service chiefs participate in seniorlevel acquisition review boards that assess proposed programs and advise the 

service acquisition executive at key milestone decision points. Once a program 

has been established and development has begun, additional opportunities 

remain for service chiefs to monitor progress and help resolve any issues that 

may occur. For example, military departments are required to hold annual 

configuration steering board meetings to discuss tradeoffs between requirements 

and cost and schedule delays. 

View GAO-14-520. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841

or sullivanm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

Letter 1

Background 3

Studies Recommended Expanding Service Chiefs Role in 

Acquisition to Varying Degrees, but Potential Effect on 

Improving Acquisition Outcomes Is Unclear 7

DOD and Military Department Policies Provide Service Chiefs 

Multiple Opportunities for Involvement in Oversight and 

Management of Acquisitions 13

Concluding Observations 17

Agency Comments 18

Appendix I GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 19

Table

Table 1: Summary of Six Studies Related to Acquisition 

Management and Oversight 8

Figures

Figure 1: Current DOD Acquisition Chain of Command and 

Military Department Involvement 5

Figure 2: Major Program Milestones Supporting Requirements 

Development and Acquisition 14

Contents

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Page 1 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

May 1, 2014

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Poor acquisition outcomes in major weapon system programs have been 

a recurring problem for decades in the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Programs too often have not delivered required capabilities when needed 

at expected costs. We have found that many problems can be traced to a

culture in which the military services begin programs with unrealistic 

requirements, immature technologies, overly optimistic cost and schedule 

estimates, and the absence of disciplined systems engineering. Congress 

and DOD have continually explored ways to improve acquisition 

outcomes, including actions like the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform 

Act of 20091 and the department’s own “Better Buying Power” initiatives.2

Many acquisition reform studies in the past have identified the need for 

increased accountability in the DOD acquisition management chain of 

command. Citing a recommendation made by the independent panel 

review of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review to improve DOD’s in-line 

management process for acquisition programs, the Senate Armed 

Services Committee Report to accompany the National Defense 

These and other reforms have emphasized sound management 

practices, such as realistic cost estimating, prototyping, and systems 

engineering. Our work has shown that when these practices are properly 

implemented, they have a positive effect on individual acquisition 

programs. However, all too often we have found that there is a lack of 

discipline and accountability in planning and executing acquisition 

programs, which leads to poor outcomes.

 1 Pub. L. No. 111-23.

2 Memorandum for Defense Acquisition Workforce, Subject: Better Buying Power: 

Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending, 

September 14, 2010 and Memorandum for Acquisition Professionals, Subject: Better 

Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and Productivity in 

Defense Spending, November 13, 2012.
Page 2 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated GAO to review the 

department’s acquisition chain of command.3

In order to examine the findings and recommendations made by studies 

that assessed the role of the military service chiefs in the DOD acquisition 

chain of command, we first reviewed available literature on acquisition 

reform and identified six studies published in the last decade that 

discussed acquisition chain of command issues in DOD. We reviewed the 

following six studies:

This report examines: (1) 

the findings and recommendations made by studies that assessed the

role of military service chiefs in the DOD acquisition chain of command; 

and (2) how current DOD and military department policies define the roles 

and responsibilities of the military service chiefs in the management and 

oversight of major defense acquisition programs.

• Business Executives for National Security: Getting to Best: Reforming 

the Defense Acquisition Enterprise (2009)

• Center for Strategic and International Studies: Beyond GoldwaterNichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic 

Era Phase II (2005)

• Defense Business Board: Linking and Streamlining the Defense 

Requirements, Acquisition, and Budget Processes (2012)

• Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project: 

Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report (2006)

• RAND: The Perfect Storm: The Goldwater-Nichols Act and Its Effect 

on Navy Acquisition (2010)

• United States Institute of Peace: The Final Report of the Quadrennial 

Defense Review Independent Panel (2010)

We summarized and analyzed the studies’ findings and recommendations 

to determine common themes and variations among the studies. We also 

interviewed authors from the three most recently published studies—the 

Defense Business Board, RAND, and Quadrennial Defense Review 

Independent Panel studies—to gain further insight into the basis of 

findings and recommendations.

 3 S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 143 (2013).
Page 3 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

To examine how current DOD and military department policies define the 

roles and responsibilities of the military service chiefs in acquisition 

management, we reviewed DOD and military department acquisition and 

requirements policies, guidance, and other relevant documents. In 

addition, we interviewed DOD and service level acquisition officials as 

well as officials from the service chief offices within the military 

departments to gain further insight into how these policies are carried out. 

Further, we submitted questions to each of the service’s chiefs to obtain 

their views on the current acquisition chain of command. As our focus for 

this work was on the content of DOD policy, we did not assess the extent 

to which the service chiefs are involved and able to influence individual 

programs.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2014 through May 

2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards required that we plan and perform the audit 

to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Packard Commission, tasked by President Reagan to review defense 

management and organization, made a number of recommendations to 

improve the way DOD acquires weapon systems, including the need to 

establish “unambiguous authority for overall acquisition policy, clear 

accountability for acquisition execution, and plain lines of command for 

those with program management responsibilities.”4 Following the 

commission’s recommendations, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was enacted.5

 4 Final Report to the President by the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 

Management (June 1986).

Among other things, 

the Act created the position of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, now known as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)); established the military 

departments as the force providers to the combatant commanders; and 

mandated responsibility for acquisition to each respective military 

department. In addition, the Goldwater-Nichols Act directed each 

5 Pub. L. No. 99-433.

Background
Page 4 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

secretary to establish or designate a single office or other entity within 

each department to conduct the acquisition function. Prior to the act, the 

military departments often had offices in both the secretariat and the 

service chief organizations that had responsibilities for the management 

of the acquisition function. As we previously found, the act sought to 

eliminate parallel or duplicate organizations that might have existed, and 

strengthen civilian control by placing the single acquisition office in the 

secretariats.6

 6 GAO, Acquisition Reform: Military Departments’ Response to the Reorganization Act. 

Also, the President issued a directive that directed 

implementation of another Packard Commission recommendation, to 

establish a more streamlined acquisition chain of command in DOD. The 

reporting chain, which remains in place today, runs upward from a 

program manager, through a program executive officer (PEO), to the 

service acquisition executive (SAE), and to the defense acquisition 

executive (DAE), which is USD (AT&L). Figure 1 provides an overview of 

the current acquisition chain of command in DOD and the military 

departments.

GAO/NSIAD-89-70 (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1989).
Page 5 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

Figure 1: Current DOD Acquisition Chain of Command and Military Department Involvement 

Within DOD, three key acquisition decision-support processes influence 

the planning and execution of weapon system programs—requirements 

determination, resource allocation, and the acquisition management 

system. Each process is managed and overseen by different 

organizations and leaders within DOD and the military departments. At 

the DOD level, USD(AT&L) is responsible for the acquisition function and 

is the milestone decision authority (MDA) for major defense acquisition 
Page 6 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

programs,7

Interim DOD Instruction 5000.02—the department’s primary acquisition 

policy instruction that guides the acquisition process—states that the 

acquisition, requirements, and resource processes are closely related and 

“must operate simultaneously with full cooperation and in close 

coordination.”

whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for 

implementing the requirements process, and the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller) is responsible for the resource process. Within the 

military departments, where programs are largely planned and executed, 

the service acquisition executive is responsible for the acquisition 

process, while the service chief offices have primary responsibility for the 

requirements and resourcing processes.

8 Further, this instruction states that adjustments may have 

to be made to keep these three processes aligned throughout the course 

of a program lifecycle. Similarly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction 3170.01H, the department’s primary policy guiding capability 

requirements development, emphasizes that the three processes “must 

work in concert to ensure consistent decisionmaking while delivering 

timely and cost effective capability solutions to the warfighters.”9 In recent 

years, Congress and DOD have taken steps to strengthen the integration 

of the acquisition and requirements processes. For example, the 

department has added new decision points and reviews for weapon 

programs as they progress through the acquisition process. Additionally, 

USD (AT&L) now serves as an advisor to the council that reviews 

requirements for major weapon programs. 

 7 This authority to act as the MDA may be delegated in accordance with Interim DOD 

5000.02, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” (Nov. 26, 2013), §4(a). Major 

defense acquisition programs are those identified by DOD with a dollar value for all 

increments estimated to require eventual total expenditure for research, development, 

test, and evaluation of more than $480 million, or for procurement of more than $2.79 

billion, in fiscal year 2014 constant dollars. 

8 Interim DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 

(November 26. 2013). 

9 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01H, Joint Capabilities Integration 

and Development System (January 10, 2012).
Page 7 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

Five of the six studies we reviewed recommended an expanded role for 

the service chiefs in acquisitions, often citing this as a means to improve 

the integration of the acquisition, requirements, and resourcing 

processes, as well as improve authority and accountability for DOD 

acquisition programs. Three of the studies noted that increased 

involvement of the service chiefs would help facilitate cost, schedule, and 

requirements trade-off decisions during program planning, and may result 

in more affordable and executable acquisition programs. Also, three of 

the studies expressed concerns that the service chiefs are not sufficiently 

involved because the services had gone too far in their implementation of 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act and removed the service chiefs from the 

acquisition decision process. Although the Goldwater-Nichols Act directed 

each military department secretary to establish a single office within their 

department, now known as the service acquisition executive, to conduct 

the acquisition function, the act did not preclude the service chiefs from 

actively participating in acquisitions. The same three studies stated that 

implementation of the act may have contributed to fragmentation among 

the requirements, resources, and acquisition processes. GAO has 

previously found that these processes are fragmented, making it difficult 

for the department to achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are 

affordable and feasible and provide the best military value to the 

warfighter.10 Furthermore, we found that because the processes are led 

by different organizations, it is difficult to hold any one person or 

organization accountable for saying “no” to a proposed program or for 

ensuring that the department’s portfolio of programs is balanced. The 

following table summarizes the findings and recommendations of the 

studies included in our review that are related to acquisition management 

and oversight.

 10 GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon 

System Investment Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-07-388

(Washington, DC: March 30, 2007).

Studies 

Recommended 

Expanding Service 

Chiefs Role in 

Acquisition to Varying 

Degrees, but 

Potential Effect on 

Improving Acquisition 

Outcomes Is Unclear
Page 8 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

Table 1: Summary of Six Studies Related to Acquisition Management and Oversight

Report Findings and Observations Recommendations

United States Institute of 

Peace: The Final Report 

of the Quadrennial 

Defense Review 

Independent Panel (2010)

• The current acquisition process is 

complex and fragments 

accountability and authority at all 

levels.

• Correcting deficiencies in the 

acquisition process – e.g., bolstering 

cost analysis and improving program 

execution – will be effective only if 

implemented through individuals in 

line management vested with 

authority and accountability.

• Requirements trade-offs require 

operational knowledge and domain 

credibility.

• Clearly establish lead roles for identifying capability gaps, 

defining executable solutions, resourcing solutions, and 

delivering the capability within defined cost and schedule 

ceilings.

• Delegate authority and accountability for defining and 

executing programs to an unbroken chain of line 

management within the force provider community.

• The force provider, to include the service component 

serving the Combatant Commander, is the proper source 

of credible operational experience and judgment to 

generate recommendations to USD (AT&L) for 

performance tradeoffs. 

Defense Business Board: 

Linking and Streamlining 

the Defense 

Requirements, 

Acquisition, and Budget 

Processes (2012)

• The defense acquisition process is 

divided into three stovepipes: budget, 

acquisition, and requirements and is 

too complex.

• There is inadequate coordination 

between requirements and 

acquisition communities.

• The service chief, who is a key 

decision-maker in the requirements 

and budget processes, is not 

involved in the acquisition process 

which has contributed to program 

failures. 

• Zero-base the system and realign the system with 

common documentation across all three areas.

• Create a partnership among the requirements, 

acquisition, and budget leaders to create a linked and 

streamlined process.

• Military service chiefs need to be more engaged and 

accountable in the acquisition process.

RAND: The Perfect 

Storm: The GoldwaterNichols Act and Its Effect 

on Navy Acquisition 

(2010)

• An unintended consequence of the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms is an 

impenetrable wall between a militarycontrolled requirements process and 

a civilian-driven acquisition process.

• The position of Chief of Naval 

Operations has become divorced 

from the acquisition process which 

has been detrimental to the effective 

and efficient acquisition of materiel 

for the Navy.

• Navy should include the service chief throughout the 

acquisition process.

• Navy should create an acquisition oversight body that 

includes the service chief.

Center for Strategic and 

International Studies: 

Beyond GoldwaterNichols: U.S. Government 

and Defense Reform for a 

New Strategic Era Phase 

II (2005)

• The current acquisition process is not 

integrated with the resource 

allocation process. The service 

chief’s are responsible for 

requirements and funding but not 

acquisition.

• Goldwater-Nichols Act removed the 

service chiefs from a direct role in 

acquisition management which has 

muddied accountability.

• Service chiefs should have primary responsibility for 

managing and executing acquisitions.

• Reorganize USD(AT&L) to raise the stature and span of 

control of research and engineering.
Page 9 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

Report Findings and Observations Recommendations

Business Executives for 

National Security: Getting 

to Best:

Reforming the Defense

Acquisition Enterprise 

(2009)

• Goldwater-Nichols Act removed the 

service chiefs from the acquisition 

chain-of-responsibility.

• There is a lack of coordination 

between requirements determination, 

budgeting, and the acquisition 

process.

• The acquisition workforce has 

atrophied and is understaffed and 

organizationally misaligned.

• Reconstitute a strong systems engineering capability 

within each of the military departments; i.e., within the 

service chiefs’ chain of responsibility.

• Establish an authority to conduct tradeoffs and, where 

appropriate, modify requirements as additional 

information is gained on cost, technical risk, schedule and 

external factors (e.g., threat changes) during the 

identification of a material solution.

• Assign to the service chiefs responsibility for establishing, 

managing and maintaining a highly competent acquisition 

workforce.

• Amend the Goldwater–Nichols legislation to reinstate the 

service chiefs in the chain-of-responsibility over the 

program executive officers and program managers.

Panel of the Defense 

Acquisition Performance 

Assessment Project: 

Defense Acquisition 

Performance Assessment 

Report(2006)

• The acquisition system, which is 

supposed to integrate budget, 

requirements, and acquisition 

processes, is highly complex and 

fragmented.

• An effective acquisition system 

requires stability and continuity that 

can only be developed through 

improving all of the major elements 

upon which it depends.

• Effective oversight has been diluted 

in a system where the quantity of 

reviews has replaced quality and the 

tortuous review processes have 

obliterated clean lines of 

responsibility, authority, and 

accountability.

• Create a streamlined acquisition organization with 

accountability assigned and enforced at each level.

• Direct the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, and the 

Chief of Naval Operations to establish Systems 

Commands for acquisition that report to the service chiefs 

and the service acquisition executives.

• Assign oversight of day-to-day execution and integration 

of programs to the service acquisition executives and 

through them to the Four-Star Acquisition Systems 

Commands, program executive officers and program 

managers.

• Designate USD(ATL) a full member of the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council and delegate authority to 

the USD(ATL) to budget and program for a newly created 

stable program funding account.

• Disestablish the Acquisition Integrated Product Teams in 

the USD(ATL) office, and replace the current oversight 

process with a small staff, focused on decision-making to 

support joint programs.

• Set service acquisition executives as a renewable fiveyear fixed presidential appointment to promote stability 

and continuity.

Source: GAO summary and analysis of selected studies

The studies we reviewed agree that chain of command adjustments are 

needed, but their views on the specific role for the service chiefs varied. 

For example, one study identified the need for more service chief 

involvement throughout the Navy’s acquisition process, but it did not 
Page 10 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

specify how this should occur.11 When we talked to the authors of this 

study, they stated that the current framework for the acquisition chain of 

command does not need to be changed but that the service chief’s 

involvement and authority should be enhanced throughout. One way they 

suggested doing this was to make the service chief a co-chair with the 

service acquisition executive during major program reviews. Similarly, 

another study recommended that service chiefs be more engaged and 

accountable within the current acquisition process through the 

strengthening of partnerships between requirements, acquisition, and 

resource leaders.

12 Another study recommended the need for more 

authority in an unbroken chain of line management, but provided no 

indication as to how the service chief would fit into the new line 

management.

13 The other three studies called for changing the current 

chain of command structure by making adjustments such as inserting the 

service chief over program managers and program executive officers.

14

Furthermore, GAO assessed a number of acquisition reform proposals 

several years ago, including one to modify the service chief’s role in 

acquisitions, and found in interviewing multiple experts that there was no 

consensus on whether the service chiefs should be added into the direct 

line of command for acquisitions.15

While studies have advocated for a stronger role for the service chiefs in 

the acquisition chain of command, they provide little evidence or support 

that this would in fact improve program outcomes. Study authors we 

interviewed were unsure of the effects on the acquisition process of more 

involvement from the service chiefs. Authors pointed out that the service 

 11 RAND National Defense Research Institute, The Perfect Storm: Goldwater-Nichols and 

Its Effect on Navy Acquisition. (Santa Monica, CA: 2010).

12 Defense Business Board, Linking and Streamlining Defense Requirements. Acquisition, 

and Budgeting Processes. (Washington, DC: 2012).

13 United States Institute of Peace, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review 

Independent Panel. (Washington, DC: 2010).

14 Business Executives for National Security, Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense 

Acquisition Enterprise. (July 2009); Center for Strategic and International Studies. Beyond 

Goldwater-Nichols U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase 

2 Report. (Washington, DC: July 2005); Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 

Project, Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report. (January 2006).

15 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Perspectives on Potential Changes to Department of 

Defense Acquisition Management Framework, GAO-09-295R (Washington, D.C.: 

February 27, 2009). 
Page 11 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

chiefs had significant influence on certain programs in the past, but their 

involvement did not always result in successful cost, schedule, or 

performance outcomes. For example, authors noted significant 

involvement of service chiefs in programs such as the Navy’s Littoral 

Combat Ship and the Army’s Future Combat System, but these programs 

suffered poor outcomes. In both cases, the service chiefs of these 

services viewed the programs as vital to their operational capabilities and 

needed to be fielded quickly. These programs pursued aggressive 

acquisition strategies that pushed the programs through development 

with ill-defined requirements and unstable designs, which contributed to 

significant cost and schedule increases and, in the case of the Future 

Combat System, a cancellation. Further, the authors of one study 

believed that including the service chief in the acquisition process may 

actually exacerbate current acquisition challenges by creating a break in 

the chain of command. Instead, they believe that authority of the current 

chain of command needs to be reinforced through appointing 

knowledgeable, strong leaders into management positions and limiting 

the number of people who can directly influence program managers. 

Lastly, although some studies point to acquisition problems resulting from 

a lack of service chief involvement following the implementation of the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s, DOD experienced acquisition delays 

and cost overruns for many years prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

16

We have reported on poor acquisition outcomes as far back as 1970.17

Authors we interviewed all agreed that despite uncertainty about the 

effects of an expanded service chief role in management of acquisitions, 

strong leadership is key to ensuring programs achieve positive outcomes. 

One study identified the F-15 program as an example where leadership 

helped bring about positive outcomes.

18

 16 Getting to Best (2009), Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (2005). The Perfect Storm (2010).

In this case, there was heavy 

involvement from senior leadership, including the Secretary of Defense, 

which resulted in delivering the aircraft to the warfighter on time and 

under cost. Leadership directed an incremental approach for the

development of the aircraft based on reasonable requirements and using 

relatively mature technologies versus a revolutionary approach using 

unrealistic requirements and immature technologies. GAO previously

17 GAO, Status of the Acquisition of Selected Major Weapon Systems. B-163058. 

(Washington, D.C. February 6, 1970).

18 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (2010).
Page 12 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

found that strong leadership is key to stable and successful acquisition 

programs. GAO found that stable programs, such as the Air Force’s Small 

Diameter Bomb and Navy’s P-8A Poseidon Multi-Maritime Aircraft, were 

supported by strong, disciplined leaders who helped foster the planning 

and execution of a solid business case for these programs.19

Finally, all six of the studies we reviewed suggested that changes to the 

chain of command alone will not be sufficient to address all of the 

challenges faced by major acquisitions. All of the studies presented 

additional recommendations to improve acquisition policy and processes 

at the program level to include ensuring: (1) a well trained and 

experienced acquisition workforce; (2) sufficient tenure in program 

management assignments to allow for continuity in the oversight of 

acquisitions; and (3) incentives for attracting and retaining knowledgeable 

individuals, including systems engineers. Other studies discussed the 

need to fix unrealistic and changing requirements, optimistic cost and 

schedule estimates, and issues with the current budgeting process.

20

GAO has also made similar conclusions and recommendations in all of 

these same areas.21 Together, these issues and others contribute to poor 

acquisition outcomes.

 19 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership is Key to Planning and Executing Stable 

Weapon Programs. GAO-10-522. (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2010). 

20 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (2010); Getting to Best (2009); 

Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report (2006).

21 GAO, Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed to 

Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality. GAO-08-294. 

(Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2008); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based 

Funding Approach Could Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes.

GAO-08-619. (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2008).
Page 13 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

DOD and military department requirements and acquisition policies define 

several decision points, reviews, and mechanisms in which the service 

chiefs or their supporting staff offices can participate in the management 

and oversight of acquisition programs. Generally, major defense 

acquisition programs go through a series of phases as they progress from 

the determination of the need for a new system, through initial planning of 

a solution, to system development, and finally production and deployment 

of a fielded system. An initial capability requirements document, which is 

intended to identify a capability need, drives the early phase of an 

acquisition program where potential weapon system solutions are 

assessed and then the technologies associated with the specific solution 

to be pursued are matured. These activities are intended to lead to a 

more refined set of capability requirements, which along with several 

other acquisition-related analyses and documents (e.g., acquisition 

strategy, cost estimates, and test and evaluation plan), allow for the 

formal start of system development and entrance into the engineering and 

manufacturing phase of an acquisition. When the system has completed 

development and testing, the requirements may be updated and the 

system moves into production and eventually to deployment in the field.

As major defense acquisitions programs progress through the 

requirements and acquisition processes, there are several key stages 

where DOD-level reviews and approvals are required. Capability

requirements documents for these programs are assessed and validated 

by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the advice of the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council (JROC),22 which is chaired by the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is comprised of the Vice Chiefs 

of Staff of each military service.23

 22 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the advice of the JROC assesses and 

validates joint military requirements for MDAPs and less-than-MDAP designated either as 

“JROC Interest” or “Joint Capabilities Board Interest.” Interim DODI 5000.02, (Nov. 25, 

2013), Sec. 5(b)(2). 

As major defense acquisition programs 

go through the iterative phases of the acquisition process, they are 

reviewed by the Defense Acquisition Board, which is chaired by 

USD(AT&L) and includes the secretaries of the military departments and 

other senior leaders. However, prior to these DOD-level reviews, 

programs have requisite reviews and approvals starting at the military 

service level where the service acquisition executives and service chiefs 

23 10 U.S.C. § 181(c). Military services in this context are the Army, Navy, Air Force and 

Marine Corps.

DOD and Military 

Department Policies 

Provide Service 

Chiefs Multiple 

Opportunities for 

Involvement in 

Oversight and 

Management of 

Acquisitions
Page 14 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

are involved. Military service processes for approving requirements and 

acquisitions essentially mirror the DOD process. Figure 2 below provides 

a notional depiction of the major phases, milestone decision points, and 

reviews involved at both the DOD and military department levels.

Figure 2: Major Program Milestones Supporting Requirements Development and Acquisition

Note: Acquisition milestones are points at which a recommendation is made and approval is sought 

for a program to proceed into the next acquisition phase.
Page 15 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

DOD policy states that requirements must be validated before an 

acquisition program can start system development. The service chiefs 

and their supporting staff offices lead operational requirements 

development within each military department and approve associated 

documentation prior to JROC reviews at the DOD-level. Each military 

department uses a tiered requirements development and approval 

process supported by acquisition and other functional offices. 

Requirements that are developed for major defense acquisition programs 

are reviewed and validated by a senior-level requirement review board 

usually chaired by the service or vice chief of staff.24 Each military 

department uses somewhat different approaches and mechanisms within 

this tiered process to facilitate stakeholder involvement. For instance,

according to Air Force policy, a high performance team is established at 

the outset of an identified capability need and used to develop and refine 

requirements during program development and production. The team is 

intended to provide a forum for functional stakeholders to develop and 

assess program requirements prior to validation. Similarly, Army policy 

requires a team approach to developing requirements—integrated 

capabilities development teams—which are comprised of personnel from 

different functional areas. The Navy revised its requirements and 

acquisition processes several years ago into a two-pass, six-gate review 

framework, which is intended to strengthen integration between the two 

processes. Under the framework, the service chief chairs the first “pass”

of gates which cover the requirements development and materiel solution 

analysis phases of a program, and the Navy’s acquisition executive chairs 

the second “pass” of gates which comprise system development, 

production, and sustainment. According to Navy officials we spoke with, 

the service chief and the acquisition executive are both actively involved 

in all the gate reviews for major acquisition programs.

Although responsibility and authority for major defense acquisition 

programs generally resides with the service or defense acquisition 

executives, DOD and military department acquisition policies provide 

opportunities for continued service chief involvement beyond 

requirements definition, throughout the life cycle of a program. As 

programs progress through key phases of the acquisition process, 

 24 For MDAP programs, the Air Force uses the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council, 

while the Navy uses the Resources and Requirements Review Board, and the Army has 

the Army Requirements Oversight Council.

Requirements 

Development within the 

Military Departments

Acquisition Planning and 

Execution within the 

Military Departments
Page 16 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

program managers are often supported by integrated product teams 

comprised of stakeholders from several functional areas across the 

acquisition, requirements, and resource communities. The teams are 

intended to help the program manager plan and execute an acquisition, 

as well as identify and resolve issues that may come up along the way. 

According to service officials we met with, representatives from the offices 

of the service chiefs are usually members of these teams. At milestone 

decision points, programs are subject to higher level reviews and 

approvals by service level panels and acquisition boards that also include 

representatives from the different functional areas. For example, each of 

the services has an acquisition review board comprised of senior leaders 

that assess programs and advise the service acquisition executive on 

milestone decisions. Generally, the service vice chiefs are members of 

these boards.

The military departments have all modified their acquisition processes in 

recent years, in part to improve integration of requirements and 

acquisitions, and plan more affordable and feasible programs. As 

described above, the Navy’s two-pass, six-gate framework is intended to 

facilitate greater coordination between the requirements and acquisition 

communities. Although the Navy acquisition executive chairs a series of 

gates that support program technology development and production, the 

service chief, or designee, is required to participate in these gate reviews. 

In addition, the Air Force recently revised its acquisition policy to 

incorporate an integrated life cycle management approach that, according 

to officials, has streamlined roles and responsibilities within the 

acquisition and systems commands and increased opportunities for 

collaboration between the requirements and acquisition communities as a 

weapon system is developed. Also, according to officials, the Army is 

instituting customized sets of “knowledge point” meetings for certain 

acquisition programs, which are to occur before key milestones and 

provide a forum to discuss, among other things, tradespace within the 

program. Officials believe these meetings will support better integration 

and insight needed for making milestone decisions.

Once an acquisition program has been established and enters into 

systems development, the military services conduct regular reviews to 

monitor the program’s progress in achieving cost, schedule, and 

performance targets and to resolve any issues that may occur. These 

reviews provide opportunities for stakeholders, such as the offices of the 

service chiefs, to gain visibility into programs and weigh in on changes

that may be needed. Major defense acquisition programs, for example, 

are required by DOD policy to undergo a defense acquisition executive 
Page 17 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

summary process, which includes a quarterly assessment.25 There are 

service level reviews that either coincide or supplement these DOD 

reviews. In addition, in 2008, Congress required DOD to conduct 

configuration steering board reviews of major defense acquisition 

programs, to assess requirements and configuration changes that could 

adversely affect program cost and schedule. Statute requires that the 

boards, which are chaired by the service acquisition executive and 

include senior service chief representatives and others, conduct program 

reviews at least annually.26 Should these reviews support a reduction to 

formal requirements, then the change would go through the service and 

DOD-level requirements process for approval.27 Further, when a program 

is ready to move into production, requirements are generally reviewed 

again and reaffirmed by the service chiefs and the JROC through the 

requirements process.

Poor acquisition outcomes have been a long-term problem in DOD and 

many inter-related factors contribute to this condition. As GAO and other 

acquisition experts have previously found, the array of factors include 

unrealistic requirements, lack of disciplined systems engineering, overly 

optimistic cost and schedule estimates, insufficient acquisition workforce, 

and frequent program manager turnover. Changing the culture and 

incentives in DOD that cause these factors to be prevalent has been 

difficult. The studies we reviewed provide limited evidence that acquisition 

problems in DOD are caused by the military service chiefs having too 

small a role in managing and overseeing acquisition programs, or that the 

problems would be solved by expanding the service chiefs’ role. Existing 

policies and processes for planning and executing acquisition programs 

provide multiple opportunities for the service chiefs to be involved in 

managing acquisition programs and to help ensure programs meet cost, 

schedule, and performance targets. Whether the service chiefs are 

actively involved and choose to influence programs is not clear. However, 

we agree with acquisition studies that the current acquisition process 

 25 DODI 5000.02, Encl. 1, Table 5 at 63.; Defense Acquisition Guidebook , Chapter 10

26 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 

814 (2008).

27 GAO conducted a review of DOD’s implementation of configuration steering boards and 

the extent to which they have been effective in controlling requirements of weapons 

system programs in development that will result in a report in May 2014.

Concluding 

Observations
Page 18 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

does not function efficiently or as planned, and that greater discipline and 

accountability is needed. While organizational changes can be an 

important part of the solution, at this point they should not take 

precedence over efforts to improve the acquisition process itself, build a 

more robust acquisition workforce, and foster a culture in which incentives 

are better aligned with good acquisition practices.

We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft 

of this product to DOD for comment. The department responded that it did 

not have any formal comments on the report. However, DOD provided a 

few technical comments which we incorporated into the report, as 

appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix I.

Michael J. Sullivan

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Agency Comments
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 19 GAO-14-520 Defense Acquisition Chain of Command

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact name above, individuals making key 

contributions to this statement include John Oppenheim, Assistant 

Director; Tom Twambly, Megan Porter, Claire Li, Peter Anderson, and 

Marie Ahearn.

Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(121198)
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