79828 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 239 / Friday, December 11, 2020 / Rules and Regulations 

Commission for Aeronautics, Inc. 

(RTCA) Document DO–178C, Software 

Considerations in Airborne Systems and 

Equipment Certification, provides 

software design assurance levels most 

commonly used for the major, 

hazardous/severe-major, and 

catastrophic failure condition 

categories. The AP/SAS equipment 

must be qualified for the expected 

installation environment. The test 

procedures prescribed in RTCA 

Document DO–160G, Environmental 

Conditions and Test Procedures for 

Airborne Equipment, are recognized by 

the FAA as acceptable methodologies 

for finding compliance with the 

environmental requirements. Equivalent 

environment test standards may also be 

acceptable. 

The environmental qualification 

provides data to show that the AP/SAS 

can perform its intended function under 

the expected operating condition. Some 

considerations for environmental 

concerns are installation locations and 

the resulting exposure to environmental 

conditions for the AP/SAS equipment, 

including considerations for other 

equipment that may be environmentally 

affected by the AP/SAS equipment 

installation. The level of environmental 

qualification must be related to the 

severity of the considered failure 

conditions and effects on the rotorcraft. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the BTCL 

Model 505 helicopter. Should Garmin 

apply at a later date for a STC to modify 

any other model included on Type 

Certificate Number R00008RD to 

incorporate the same novel or unusual 

design feature, these special conditions 

would apply to that model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only a certain 

novel or unusual design feature on the 

BTCL Model 505 helicopter. It is not a 

rule of general applicability and affects 

only the applicant who applied to the 

FAA for approval of this feature on the 

helicopter. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

Authority Citation 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 

44701, 44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the 

supplemental type certification basis for 

Bell Textron Canada Limited (BTCL) 

Model 505 helicopters, as modified by 

Garmin International, Inc. 

Instead of the requirements of 14 CFR 

§ 27.1309(b) and (c), the following must 

be met for certification of the autopilot 

and stability augmentation system 

installed on BTCL Model 505 

helicopters: 

(a) The equipment and systems must 

be designed and installed so that any 

equipment and systems do not 

adversely affect the safety of the 

rotorcraft or its occupants. 

(b) The rotorcraft systems and 

associated components considered 

separately and in relation to other 

systems must be designed and installed 

so that: 

(1) The occurrence of any catastrophic 

failure condition is extremely 

improbable; 

(2) The occurrence of any hazardous 

failure condition is extremely remote; 

and 

(3) The occurrence of any major 

failure condition is remote. 

(c) Information concerning an unsafe 

system operating condition must be 

provided in a timely manner to the crew 

to enable them to take appropriate 

corrective action. An appropriate alert 

must be provided if immediate pilot 

awareness and immediate or subsequent 

corrective action is required. Systems 

and controls, including indications and 

annunciations, must be designed to 

minimize crew errors that could create 

additional hazards. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas on November 

19, 2020. 

Jorge Castillo, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, Policy 

and Innovation Division, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2020–26047 Filed 12–9–20; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2018–1077; Project 

Identifier 2018–NE–40–AD; Amendment 39– 

21354; AD 2020–25–12] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Superior Air 

Parts, Inc. Engines and Lycoming 

Engines Reciprocating Engines With a 

Certain SAP Crankshaft Assembly 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Superior Air Parts, Inc. (SAP) Model 

IO–360-series and O–360-series 

reciprocating engines and certain 

Lycoming Engines (Lycoming) Model 

AEIO–360-, IO–360-, and O–360-series 

reciprocating engines with a certain 

SAP crankshaft assembly installed. This 

SAP crankshaft assembly is installed as 

original equipment on the affected SAP 

engines and as a replacement part under 

parts manufacturer approval (PMA) on 

the affected Lycoming engines. This AD 

was prompted by three crankshaft 

assembly failures that resulted in the 

loss of engine power and immediate or 

emergency landings. This AD requires 

the removal from service of all affected 

crankshaft assemblies. The FAA is 

issuing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective January 15, 

2021. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket at 

https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2018–1077; or in person at Docket 

Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

final rule, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for 

Docket Operations is U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Justin Carter, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

Fort Worth ACO Branch, FAA, 10101 

Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 

76177; phone: (817) 222–5146; fax: (817) 

222–5245; email: justin.carter@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 239 / Friday, December 11, 2020 / Rules and Regulations 79829 

1See pp. 2–3 of BakerRisk Project No. 01–05929– 

003–17. 

2See pp. 4–5 of BakerRisk Project No. 01–05929– 

006–17, Rev. 1. 

3S

ˇtepa ́n Major, Vladimir Jakl, & Sˇtepa ́n 

Huba ́lovsky ́, Effect of carburizing on fatigue life of 

high-strength steel specimen under push-pull 

loading, Advances in Engineering Mechanics and 

Materials, 143 (2014). 

4 Yaushi Hiraoka & Akihiro Ishida, Effect of 

Compound Layer Thickness Composed of g’-Fe4N 

on Rotated-Bending Fatigue Strength in GasNitrided JIS–SCM435 Steel, 58 MATERIALS 

TRANSACTIONS 993 (2017). 

Background 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all SAP Model IO–360-series 

and O–360-series reciprocating engines 

and certain Lycoming Model AEIO–360- 

, IO–360-, and O–360-series 

reciprocating engines with a certain 

SAP crankshaft assembly installed. The 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on January 29, 2020 (85 FR 

5173). The NPRM was prompted by 

three crankshaft assembly failures that 

resulted in the loss of engine power and 

immediate or emergency landings. The 

FAA determined that the crankshaft 

assembly failures resulted from the 

manufacturing process at SAP’s 

crankshaft vendor during 2012 and 2014 

causing excessive residual white layer 

of iron nitride forming on the 

assemblies. This white layer is brittle 

and can lead to spalling or fatigue 

cracking of the crankshaft assembly as a 

result of the normal mechanical loads 

during engine operation. The FAA’s 

analysis concluded that all three SAP 

crankshaft assembly failures were the 

result of this fatigue cracking. In the 

NPRM, the FAA proposed to require the 

removal from service of all affected 

crankshaft assemblies. The unsafe 

condition, if not addressed, could result 

in failure of the engine, in-flight 

shutdown, and loss of the airplane. 

Discussion of Final Airworthiness 

Directive Comments 

The FAA received comments from 

seven commenters. The commenters 

were SAP, the Aircraft Owners and 

Pilots Association (AOPA), and five 

individual commenters. Three 

commenters requested that the FAA 

extend the comment period. One 

commenter requested the withdrawal of 

the AD. Two commenters asked the 

FAA to release more information. One 

commenter asked for the status of the 

AD and if the crankshaft assembly is 

safe to fly. The following presents the 

comments received on the NPRM and 

the FAA’s response to each comment. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM: White 

Layer Does Not Contribute to Fracture 

SAP stated that data from an 

independent laboratory test does not 

support the statement in the NPRM that 

the crankshaft failures were a result of 

residual white layer formation, also 

known as a compound layer, on certain 

crankshaft assemblies as a result of 

improper manufacturing by a thirdparty vendor. SAP stated that the 

fractured crankshafts were all within 

specifications. SAP found both the 

material and the heat treatment to be 

within all engineering requirements and 

consistent with other crankshafts in 

general aviation piston aircraft engines. 

SAP noted that these requirements were 

consistent with the engineering testing 

conducted by SAP in pursuit of FAA 

PMA certification. Additionally, SAP 

stated the fractures were not consistent 

with fatigue fractures due to excessive 

white layer, and that no manufacturing 

or material defect was found in 

independent metallurgical laboratory 

analysis. The FAA infers from this 

comment that SAP is requesting that the 

FAA withdraw the NPRM. 

The FAA disagrees with SAP’s 

analysis. BakerRisk Project No. 01– 

05929–003–17, dated August 15, 2017, 

for SAP crankshaft assembly S/N SP14– 

0202, which failed on March 6, 2017, 

found that there was a continuous white 

layer at the surface of the radius, 

extending up to the location of the 

fracture, and that the white layer may 

have contributed to early crack 

initiation. 1 The continuous white layer 

at the origin was 0.0007 inch. BakerRisk 

Project No. 01–05929–006–17, Rev. 1, 

dated May 8, 2018, for SAP crankshaft 

assembly S/N SP14–0194, which failed 

on August 3, 2017, found that the 

continuous white layer at the surface of 

the forward journal radius, extending up 

to the location of the fracture, was 

0.0006 inch. According to the report, 

this indicates that the process being 

used to remove the white layer was not 

removing the entire white layer. 

Because it found that the presence of the 

white layer can lower fatigue resistance 

and result in premature fatigue crack 

initiation, the report included 

recommendations to review the material 

and the processes that define the 

crankshaft journals, especially the 

nitride case hardening and white layer 

removal process. 2

SAP’s comment cited Hurst 

Metallurgical Research Laboratory, Inc., 

(Hurst) Report No. 73900, dated 

February 22, 2019, for SAP crankshaft 

assembly S/N SP13–0150, which failed 

on October 31, 2018. This Hurst report 

found that the continuous white layer of 

iron nitride at the surface of the forward 

journal radius was 0.0001 inch. The 

FAA, however, disagrees with the 

reported thickness of the white layer. 

The report includes two scaled 

photographs (photographs No. 11 and 

12), magnified 100 times and 500 times, 

respectively. Using the scaling bar 

provided in the photographs, the FAA 

determined that the white layer is 

0.0009 inch. Although SAP stated a 

white layer of up to 0.001 inch is 

allowed, SAP based this figure on an 

SAE Aerospace Material specification 

and not on the original equipment 

manufacturer’s (OEM) specifications. A 

white layer of 0.0009 inch exceeds the 

amount allowed by the OEM. 

As supported by the reports, the FAA 

finds that white layer contributed to the 

early crack initiation and, on all failed 

crankshaft assemblies, exceeded OEM 

specifications. Based on the foregoing, 

the FAA finds no basis to withdraw the 

NPRM. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM: White 

Layer Does Not Increase Fatigue 

Resistance 

SAP stated that the presence of a 

white layer does not reduce the fatigue 

resistance of material at the surface, but 

rather increases the fatigue resistance of 

that same material. SAP cited a study by 

Major, Jakl, and Huba ́lovsky ́ for the 

observation that the application of 

plasma carburizing can lead to about a 

25% increase in fatigue resistance.3 SAP 

stated a study by Hiraoka and Ishida 4

shows a marked increase in fatigue limit 

in a specimen with a 10 mm thick white 

layer as opposed to a specimen without 

a white layer, with a slight increase in 

the fatigue limit in a specimen with a 20 

mm thick white layer as compared to the 

specimen with a 10 mm thick white 

layer. The FAA infers from this 

comment that SAP is requesting that the 

FAA withdraw the NPRM. 

The FAA disagrees with the 

applicability of these studies to the 

unsafe condition identified in this AD. 

Although the application of plasma 

carburizing can lead to an increase in 

the fatigue resistance, the affected 

crankshaft assemblies were not plasma 

carburized. Therefore, the Major, Jakl, 

and Huba ́lovsky ́ study is not relevant 

here. Although the Hiraoka and Ishida 

study did reveal an increase in fatigue 

limit of gas nitrided steel with a white 

layer over one without a white layer, the 

study’s test environment did not 

replicate the conditions applicable to an 

engine crankshaft as identified in 

Advisory Circular No. 33.19–1, 

‘‘Guidance Material for 14 CFR § 33.19, 

Durability, for Reciprocating Engine 

Redesigned Parts,’’ dated September 27, 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES
79830 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 239 / Friday, December 11, 2020 / Rules and Regulations 

5Lycoming Service Instruction No. 1505, dated 

July 1, 2002: ‘‘The use of pre-heat will facilitate 

starting during cold weather, and is required when 

the engine has been allowed to drop to 

temperatures below +10 °F/¥12 °C.’’ 

2004 (AC 33.19–1). A crankshaft is a 

part whose primary fatigue mechanism 

is a forced vibratory response in 

combination with a resonant vibratory 

response that occurs at any engine 

speed at which the natural frequency of 

the part (or assembly that includes the 

part) coincides with the frequency of a 

combustion or inertia harmonic. AC 

33.19–1 recommends 300 hours of 

engine tests, including a vibration test at 

peak torsional resonance conditions, to 

test the fatigue strength of the 

crankshaft. 

The white layer is well-established to 

be problematic in that it is brittle. The 

OEM removes the white layer during the 

manufacturing process. As a PMA 

holder, 14 CFR 21.303 requires that SAP 

produce a part that is equivalent to the 

OEM part. Based on the foregoing, the 

FAA finds no basis to withdraw the 

NPRM. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM: 

Operation Outside of Normal 

Conditions 

SAP stated the fractures of the 

crankshaft assemblies cited in the 

NPRM were due to misuse, abuse, or 

lack of lubrication. In support, SAP 

cited Hurst Report No. 73614, Rev. 1, 

dated December 7, 2018, for SAP 

crankshaft assembly S/N SP14–0202 

and Hurst Report No. 73617, Rev. 1, 

dated December 7, 2018, for SAP 

crankshaft assembly S/N SP14–0194, 

which indicate that the fractures were 

likely initiated by abnormal service 

conditions, such as a propeller strike 

and a start-up of the engine in a lowtemperature (below optimal performing 

temperature) environment. SAP also 

cited Hurst Report No. 73900 for SAP 

crankshaft assembly S/N SP13–0150, 

which indicates that likely contributors 

of the failure include rod sliding bearing 

failure due to insufficient lubrication, 

misalignment of the crankshaft, and 

improper engine performance from 

inadequate operation procedure 

resulting in high bending moment at the 

radius locations from excessive force 

from the piston assembly. SAP stated 

that all three of these crankshafts were 

operated in a flight school environment. 

The FAA infers from this comment that 

SAP is requesting that the FAA 

withdraw the NPRM. 

The FAA disagrees that the fracture 

was initiated by the operation of the 

engines outside of ‘‘normal’’ conditions 

or parameters. With respect to Hurst 

Report No. 73614 for SAP crankshaft 

assembly S/N SP14–0202 and Hurst 

Report No. 73617 for SAP crankshaft 

assembly S/N SP14–0194, none of the 

engines exhibited evidence of propeller 

strikes, and none were started below 

optimal performance temperature. 

According to Lycoming,5 cold weather 

requiring the use of pre-heat to avoid a 

cold engine start-up is 10 degrees 

Fahrenheit or below. Two of the 

incidents occurred in August (Canada) 

and October (Florida), making cold 

engine start-up unlikely. The third 

incident occurred in March 

(Massachusetts), which had a low of 16 

degrees Fahrenheit at 6 a.m. and 

proceeded to a high of 41 degrees 

Fahrenheit in the afternoon. 

With respect to Hurst Report No. 

73900 for SAP crankshaft assembly S/N 

SP13–0150, the pilot and mechanic 

separately reported the engine had good 

oil pressure, indicating that the engine 

did not suffer from a lack of proper 

lubrication at the time of the crankshaft 

assembly failure. The report identifies 

possible contributors of single origin 

fatigue failure, including the 

misalignment of the crankshaft 

assembly or improper engine 

performance from inadequate operation 

procedure resulting in high bending 

moment at the radius locations from 

excessive force from the piston 

assembly. However, the report does not 

provide evidence to support these 

contributors. Based on the foregoing, the 

FAA declines to withdraw the NPRM. 

Request To Review National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

Reports 

An individual commenter requested 

to review the NTSB reports on the 

accidents mentioned in the NPRM. The 

commenter was unable to locate 

anything in the NTSB database 

concerning engine stoppage in aircraft 

powered by Lycoming or SAP O–360 or 

IO–360 engines. 

The NTSB did not generate reports for 

the three incidents that resulted from 

the crankshaft failures discussed in the 

NPRM. Therefore, the FAA did not rely 

on NTSB reports and is not in 

possession of any report generated as a 

result of the three incidents. 

Request To Add Metallurgical Analyses 

to the Docket 

An individual commenter requested 

that the FAA add its metallurgical 

analyses to the docket. The commenter 

stated that it was his understanding 

from discussions with the FAA that the 

FAA has shared its metallurgical 

analyses with SAP. 

The FAA agrees and has uploaded the 

BakerRisk and Hurst metallurgical 

reports provided by SAP to the AD 

docket, as SAP has agreed to release 

these reports to the public. The FAA, 

however, did not perform its own 

metallurgical testing. The FAA instead 

relied on metallurgical testing 

performed by BakerRisk and Hurst for 

SAP. 

Request To Release Pertinent 

Information 

An individual commenter requested 

that the FAA release information it has 

on this issue, including the 

circumstances of the crankshaft 

assembly failures, the cost of crankshaft 

assembly replacement, and the scope of 

the proposed action. 

The FAA agrees to provide additional 

information about the circumstances of 

the failures. In each incident, the 

crankshaft assembly broke into two 

pieces. The March 6, 2017, incident 

resulted in the crankshaft separating at 

journal #2 while the August 3, 2017, 

and October 31, 2018, incidents both 

resulted in a separation of the 

crankshaft at journal #4. All of the 

incidents involved flight-training 

aircraft. Additionally, as discussed 

previously, the FAA has uploaded the 

metallurgical reports to the AD docket. 

Both the NPRM and this final rule 

adequately explain the scope of the AD 

and contain a detailed estimate of the 

costs of compliance within this AD, 

including the cost of the crankshaft 

assembly replacement, labor cost, and 

total estimated cost to U.S. operators. 

This final rule also discusses the net 

benefit of this AD. 

Request To Consider Costs of 

Implementing This AD 

An individual commenter requested 

that the FAA consider the financial 

costs and unintended consequences of 

this AD, such as decreased aircraft 

value. The commenter estimates that the 

value of his aircraft has been reduced by 

at least $15,000 since the publication of 

the NPRM. 

The FAA disagrees. The cost analysis 

in AD rulemaking actions typically 

includes only the costs associated with 

complying with the AD and does not 

include indirect costs such as loss of 

aircraft value. The FAA acknowledges 

that the general obligation of the 

operator to maintain its aircraft in an 

airworthy condition is sometimes 

expensive. However, and as discussed 

in more detail in the Benefits section, 

the FAA estimates that the benefits of 

this AD greatly exceed its cost. 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 239 / Friday, December 11, 2020 / Rules and Regulations 79831 

6https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/ 

transportation-policy/revised-departmentalguidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-ineconomic-analysis. 

7 53 preventable fatalities will amount to $508.8 

million in benefits of this rule. (53 × $9.6 million). 

The value of 28 airplane losses is $1.4 million (28 

× $50,000). The remaining 75.6 percent of 

crankshaft failures (100 percent¥24.4 percent 

crankshaft failure destroying the airplane) will 

result in $2.6 million in engine damages. (115 × 

0.756 probability of crankshaft failure damaging an 

airplane engine × $30,000 value of 360 engine). 

Therefore, the total estimated benefits are $512.8 

million ($508.8 million preventable fatalities + $1.4 

million avoidable airplane loss + $2.6 million 

preventable engine damages). 

Request To Clarify Applicability 

An individual commenter asked if 

SAP crankshaft assemblies earlier than 

2012 are affected by this AD. 

The first affected SAP crankshaft 

assembly was shipped on July 31, 2012. 

SAP crankshaft assemblies assembled 

before July 31, 2012, are not affected by 

this AD. 

Request To Extend Comment Period 

SAP and AOPA requested that the 

FAA extend the comment period by 60 

days to enable SAP to gather more 

information. SAP asked for more time to 

research, gather, and respond 

appropriately to the NPRM. AOPA 

similarly requested an extension to 

review the costs and overall scope, and 

to gather information to respond to the 

NPRM. SAP, AOPA, and an individual 

commenter requested the FAA extend 

the comment period because of delays 

due to the COVID–19 pandemic, such as 

the closure of laboratories for further 

testing and the reduction in aircraft 

operations. 

The FAA disagrees. At SAP’s request, 

the FAA met with SAP and AOPA in 

April 2020 to discuss the NPRM. During 

that meeting, the participants discussed 

certain aspects of the NPRM, including 

the white layer and metallurgical 

reports, the three failed crankshaft 

assemblies, and SAP’s request for a 60- 

day extension to the comment period. A 

summary of the meeting is available in 

the AD docket. None of the information 

provided by SAP or AOPA justifies an 

extension of the comment period. If 

investigations by SAP or others reveal 

information that changes the FAA’s 

determination regarding the unsafe 

condition, the FAA will consider future 

rulemaking. 

Request for a Status Update 

An individual commenter requested 

information regarding the FAA’s 

progress on issuing this AD. The 

commenter stated that based on 

feedback from SAP, the crankshaft 

assembly is safe and that a metallurgy 

company inspected one of the affected 

crankshaft assemblies and did not find 

any issues. 

The FAA disagrees with the 

assessment from SAP. The FAA 

reviewed the metallurgical reports from 

the incidents of failed crankshaft 

assemblies and determined that an 

unsafe condition exists in other 

crankshaft assemblies of the same type 

design. In each incident, the crankshaft 

assembly broke into two pieces, leading 

to loss of engine power. The crankshaft 

assemblies involved in the three 

incidents were found to have excessive 

white layer. As a result, this AD requires 

removing all affected crankshaft 

assemblies from service within 25 

engine operating hours after the 

effective date of this AD. 

Conclusion 

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety requires 

adopting the AD as proposed. 

Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD 

to address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(Pub. L. 96–354, codified as amended at 

5 U.S.C. 601–612) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as 

a principle of regulatory issuance that 

agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 

the objectives of the rule and of 

applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and 

informational requirements to the scale 

of the businesses, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation. To achieve this principle, 

agencies are required to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions to assure that such proposals are 

given serious consideration.’’ Public 

Law 96–354, 2(b), September 19, 1980. 

The RFA covers a wide-range of small 

entities, including small businesses, 

not-for-profit organizations, and small 

governmental jurisdictions. Agencies 

must perform a review to determine 

whether a rule will have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. If the agency 

determines that it will, the agency must 

prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis 

as described in the RFA. 

The FAA published an Initial 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) 

in the proposed rule to aid the public in 

commenting on the potential impacts to 

small entities. The FAA considered the 

public comments in developing the final 

rule and this Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (FRFA). 

Benefits 

The FAA found that SAP, the 

manufacturer of the crankshaft 

assemblies, sold 192 SAP crankshaft 

assemblies to date: 115 of these 

crankshaft assemblies are estimated to 

be installed on type certificated 

airplanes and the remaining 77 

crankshaft assemblies are estimated to 

be installed on experimental aircraft. 

The FAA’s risk analysis indicates that 

100 percent of crankshaft assembly 

failures will destroy the engine. Using 

the historical incident data (2000–2014), 

the FAA assumes that 24.4 percent of 

crankshaft assembly failures will result 

in aircraft hull loss while 22 percent of 

crankshaft assembly failures will result 

in fatalities. There would be an average 

of 2.1 fatalities per each crankshaft 

assembly accident. Applying these 

probabilities to the estimated 115 

crankshaft assemblies installed on type 

certificated airplanes, the FAA estimates 

that if these crankshaft assemblies are 

not replaced and continue to be used in 

these airplanes, this will result in 53 

fatalities (2.1 fatalities per crankshaft 

accident × 22 percent probability of a 

crankshaft assembly failure resulting in 

fatalities × 115 crankshaft assemblies) 

and 28 aircraft losses (24.4 percent 

probability of a crankshaft assembly 

failure destroying the airplane). This AD 

will prevent all 53 fatalities and 28 

aircraft losses. 

Using an average price of $50,000 for 

a small single engine airplane, an 

average price of $30,000 for a 360-series 

engine and the Department of 

Transportation’s $9.6 million estimate 

for the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) 

from the ‘‘Revised Departmental 

Guidance on Valuation of a Statistical 

Life in Economic Analysis,’’ 6 the FAA 

estimated this AD final rule will result 

in monetized benefits of $512.8 

million. 7

Costs of Compliance 

The costs of compliance with this AD 

consist of the cost to remove and replace 

a crankshaft assembly. The FAA 

estimates that this AD will affect 115 

crankshaft assemblies installed on 

airplanes of U.S. registry. This cost 

estimate does not include 77 SAP 

crankshaft assemblies installed on 

experimental engines since this AD does 

not apply to these engines. The 

estimated compliance cost per 

crankshaft assembly is identified below. 

Labor cost = 61 hours per crankshaft 

assembly replacement × $85 Hourly 

Wage = $5,185. 

Equipment costs per crankshaft 

assembly replacement = $9,636 (Source: 

Average of the two vendors). 

$5,185 labor per crankshaft assembly 

+ $9,636 equipment costs per crankshaft 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES
79832 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 239 / Friday, December 11, 2020 / Rules and Regulations 

8The FAA recognizes that many of these affected 

airplanes are recreational. The 2016 GAMA 

Databook shows that of 141,141 active General 

Aviation piston aircraft, 104,669 are used for 

personal or recreational purposes (74 percent), 

Using this distribution, only 30 of the 115 

crankshaft assemblies would be installed in 

airplanes operated for business use. 

assembly replacement = $14,821 

compliance cost per engine. 

The total costs to U.S. operators is 

$1,704,415 ($14,821 × 115), or $119,309 

in annualized costs in perpetuity using 

a 7 percent discount rate. There are no 

additional costs after removing and 

replacing the crankshaft assembly. 

Therefore, the FAA estimates that the 

net benefit of this final rule will be 

$511.1 million ($512.8 million benefits 

¥$1.7 million costs), or $35.77 million 

in annualized net benefits using a 7 

percent discount rate in perpetuity. 

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

Under § 604(a) of the RFA, the final 

analysis must contain the following: 

(1) A statement of the need for, and 

objectives of, the rule; 

(2) A statement of the significant 

issues raised by the public comments in 

response to the IRFA, a statement of the 

assessment of the agency of such issues, 

and a statement of any changes made in 

the proposed rule as a result of such 

comments; 

(3) The response of the agency to any 

comments filed by the Chief Counsel for 

Advocacy of the Small Business 

Administration (SBA) in response to the 

proposed rule, and a detailed statement 

of any change made to the proposed rule 

in the final rule as a result of the 

comments; 

(4) A description of and an estimate 

of the number of small entities to which 

the rule will apply or an explanation of 

why no such estimate is available; 

(5) A description of the projected 

reporting, record-keeping, and other 

compliance requirements of the 

proposed rule, including an estimate of 

the classes of small entities which will 

be subject to the requirement and the 

type of professional skills necessary for 

the preparation of the report or record; 

(6) A description of the steps the 

agency has taken to minimize the 

significant economic impact on small 

entities consistent with the stated 

objectives of applicable statutes, 

including a statement of the factual, 

policy, and legal reasons for selecting 

the alternative adopted in the final rule 

and why each of the other significant 

alternatives to the rule considered by 

the agency which affect the impact on 

small entities was rejected. 

1. Need for and Objectives of the Rule 

This final rule AD was prompted by 

three crankshaft assembly failures that 

resulted in the loss of engine power and 

immediate or emergency landings. The 

FAA is issuing this AD to prevent 

failure of the crankshaft assembly by 

requiring the removal of all affected 

crankshaft assemblies from service. 

Failure of a crankshaft assembly, if not 

addressed, could result in failure of the 

engine, in-flight shutdown, and loss of 

the airplane. 

2. Significant Issues Raised in Public 

Comments 

An individual commenter noted that 

some owners of affected aircraft may not 

be in a position to absorb the $15,000 

cost of the crankshaft assembly 

replacement. The commenter proposed 

that the financial costs of this AD would 

exceed the FAA estimates in some cases 

and, therefore, the unintended 

consequences of this AD would destroy 

value out of proportion to the 

preservation of the safety of the national 

airspace system and the general public. 

The FAA estimates the cost of 

replacing a single crankshaft assembly 

at $14,821. The risk of not replacing the 

crankshaft is not insignificant, and the 

crankshaft failure could cause engine 

loss, airplane loss, or fatality valued at 

$30,000, $50,000, and $9.6 million, 

respectively. When these potentially 

substantial losses and risks of fatality to 

each airplane owner and operator are 

considered, the $14,821 compliance cost 

per airplane is minimal. Further, the 

FAA estimates the benefits of this AD to 

be $512.8 million, which greatly 

exceeds its cost of $1.7 million, 

justifying this final rule. 

Based on the risk and benefits 

analysis above, the FAA determined 

that no changes are necessary to the 

final rule as a result of this individual 

comment. 

3. Response to SBA Comments 

The Chief Counsel for Advocacy of 

the SBA did not file any comments in 

response to the proposed rule. 

4. Small Entities to Which the Rule Will 

Apply 

This AD applies to all SAP Model IO– 

360-series and O–360-series 

reciprocating engines and certain 

Lycoming Model AEIO–360-, IO–360-, 

and O–360-series reciprocating engines 

with a certain SAP crankshaft assembly 

installed. This SAP crankshaft assembly 

is installed as original equipment on the 

affected SAP engines and as a 

replacement part under PMA on the 

affected Lycoming engines. These 

engines are installed on airplanes 

performing various activities including, 

but not limited to, flight training, 

charter flights, and agriculture. 

Under the RFA, the FAA must 

determine whether a final rule 

significantly affects a substantial 

number of small entities. The FAA uses 

the SBA criteria for determining 

whether an affected entity is small. For 

aircraft and engine manufacturers, 

aviation operators, and any business 

using an aircraft, the SBA criterion is 

1,500 or fewer employees. The FAA 

estimates that this AD affects 115 

crankshaft assemblies installed on 

airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA does 

not have any information or data on 

whether these entities are small 

businesses according to the definition 

established by the SBA. Although in the 

NPRM the FAA requested comments 

and data that would allow the agency to 

more accurately assess the number of 

employees and sales revenues of the 

affected entities, no such comments or 

data was received. Accordingly, the 

FAA assumes for purposes of this final 

rule that some of the affected entities are 

small businesses.8 The FAA determines 

that the estimated $14,821 compliance 

cost per aircraft due to this rule will 

have a significant impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

5. Projected Reporting, Record-Keeping, 

and Other Compliance Requirements 

There are no record-keeping costs or 

other compliance costs associated with 

this final rule. 

6. Significant Alternatives Considered 

As part of the FRFA, the FAA is 

required to consider regulatory 

alternatives that may be less 

burdensome. The FAA considered the 

following alternatives: 

Do nothing: This option is not 

acceptable because the risk of additional 

failures of these crankshaft assemblies 

constitutes a known unsafe condition. 

The FAA estimates that this AD will 

prevent 53 fatalities and 28 aircraft 

losses, and monetized benefits of $512.8 

million. 

Periodic inspections: This option is 

not possible as the crankshaft assembly 

cannot be inspected without destroying 

it. 

There is no direct safety alternative to 

the replacement of the crankshaft 

assembly. The replacement addresses a 

safety issue aimed at preventing the 

failure of the crankshaft assembly. 

Therefore, the FAA rejected these two 

regulatory alternatives and determined 

that this rulemaking may have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 239 / Friday, December 11, 2020 / Rules and Regulations 79833 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

and 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

2020–25–12 Superior Air Parts, Inc.: 

Amendment 39–21354; Docket No. 

FAA–2018–1077; Project Identifier 

2018–NE–40–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective January 15, 2021. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to the reciprocating engine 

models identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) 

of this AD with a Superior Air Parts, Inc. 

(SAP) crankshaft assembly, part number (P/ 

N) SL36500–A20 or P/N SL36500–A31, with 

serial numbers 82976–01; 82976–02; SP12– 

0003 through SP12–0089, inclusive; SP13– 

0034 through SP13–0150, inclusive; or SP14– 

0151 through SP14–0202, inclusive; 

installed. 

(1) With SAP crankshaft assembly, P/N 

SL36500–A20, installed: 

(i) SAP Model IO–360-series and O–360- 

series reciprocating engines. 

(ii) Lycoming Engines (Lycoming) Model 

IO–360–B2F, IO–360–L2A, O–360, O–360– 

A2A, O–360–A2D, O–360–A2E, O–360–A2F, 

O–360–A2G, O–360–B2A, O–360–C2A, O– 

360–C2C, O–360–C2D, O–360–C2E, O–360– 

D2A, and O–360–D2B reciprocating engines. 

(2) With SAP crankshaft assembly, P/N 

SL36500–A31, installed: 

(i) SAP Model IO–360-series and O–360- 

series reciprocating engines. 

(ii) Lycoming Model AEIO–360–H1A, IO– 

360–B1A, IO–360–B1B, IO–360–B1D, IO– 

360–B1E, IO–360–B1F, IO–360–M1A, O–360, 

O–360–A1A, O–360–A1C, O–360–A1D, O– 

360–A2A, O–360–C1A, O–360–C1G, O–360– 

C1C, O–360–C1E, and O–360–C1F 

reciprocating engines. 

Note 1 to paragraph (c): This SAP 

crankshaft assembly may be installed as a 

replacement part under parts manufacturer 

approval on the affected Lycoming engines. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 8520, Reciprocating Engine Power 

Section. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by three crankshaft 

assembly failures that resulted in the loss of 

engine power and immediate or emergency 

landings. The FAA is issuing this AD to 

prevent failure of the crankshaft assembly. 

The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could 

result in failure of the engine, in-flight 

shutdown, and loss of the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Required Action 

Within 25 engine operating hours after the 

effective date of this AD, remove the 

crankshaft assembly from service. 

(h) Special Flight Permit 

A one-time special flight permit may be 

issued to fly the aircraft to a maintenance 

facility to perform the actions of this AD with 

the following limitations: No passengers, 

visual flight rules (VFR) day conditions only, 

and avoid areas of known turbulence. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Fort Worth ACO Branch, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 

14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 

principal inspector or local Flight Standards 

District Office, as appropriate. If sending 

information directly to the manager of the 

certification office, send it to the attention of 

the person identified in Related Information. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Justin Carter, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, Fort Worth ACO Branch, FAA, 

10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 

76177; phone: (817) 222–5146; fax: (817) 

222–5245; email: justin.carter@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued on December 3, 2020. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2020–27149 Filed 12–10–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 71 

[Docket No. FAA–2020–0726; Airspace 

Docket No. 20–AGL–28] 

RIN 2120–AA66 

Amendment of Class E Airspace; 

Cairo, IL 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This action amends Class E 

airspace extending upward from 700 

feet above the surface at Cairo Regional 

Airport, Cairo, IL. This action is the 

result of an airspace review caused by 

the decommissioning of the Cape 

Girardeau very high frequency 

omnidirectional range (VOR) 

navigational aid as part of the VOR 

Minimum Operational Network (MON) 

Program. The name and geographic 

coordinates of the airport are updated to 

coincide with the FAA’s aeronautical 

database. 

DATES: Effective 0901 UTC, February 25, 

2021. The Director of the Federal 

Register approves this incorporation by 

reference action under Title 1 Code of 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with RULES