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20–819 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–132] 

AIR DOMINANCE AND THE CRITICAL 

ROLE OF FIFTH GENERATION FIGHTERS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL 

AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 13, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

PAUL COOK, California, Vice Chair 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tsongas, Hon. Niki, a Representative from Massachusetts, Subcommittee on 

Tactical Air and Land Forces .............................................................................. 2 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces .................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Carlisle, Gen Herbert J. ‘‘Hawk,’’ USAF, Commander, Air Combat Command, 

U.S. Air Force ....................................................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Carlisle, Gen Herbert J. ‘‘Hawk’’ ..................................................................... 25 

Turner, Hon. Michael R. .................................................................................. 23 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 37 

Mr. Young ......................................................................................................... 37 

(1) 

AIR DOMINANCE AND THE CRITICAL ROLE OF FIFTH 

GENERATION FIGHTERS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 13, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:50 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. The hearing will come to order. The subcommittee 

meets today to receive testimony on the need for air dominance and 

the critical role of fifth generation strike fighters. I want to welcome our distinguished witness for today, General Herbert J. 

‘‘Hawk’’ Carlisle, Commander of Air Combat Command [ACC], 

United States Air Force. General Carlisle, we thank you for your 

service, and we look forward to hearing from you in your testimony 

today. 

This hearing is the second of two important oversight hearings 

this subcommittee has held this year on the requirement of air 

dominance and the critical importance of fifth generation fighters 

in addressing current and emerging threats. 

At our previous hearing held at the National Museum of the 

United States Air Force at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on 

June 18, the witness, Major General Jerry Harris, the Vice Commander of the Air Combat Command, showed us a striking picture 

of one-half of an F–35 Joint Strike Fighter and one-half of a Chinese J–31 fighter juxtaposed jointly, appearing together. The similarities were shocking. It looked like one aircraft and left no doubt 

in anyone’s mind that our adversaries are working very hard to 

challenge America’s continued air dominance with fifth generation 

fighter programs of their own. 

The last time the U.S. Air Force lost an aircraft in aerial combat 

was in 1972 when ‘‘DESOTO 03,’’ an F–4E supporting Operation 

Linebacker II, was shot down by a North Vietnamese MiG–21. The 

advanced aircraft now under development by Russia and China signal their objective to end our 44-year advantage. 

At the previous hearing, General Harris also noted that new surface-to-air missile systems now incorporate technologies allowing 

engagement at further ranges and in greater numbers. The sensitivity and accuracy of these new systems has also increased con-
2 

cerns regarding the unrivaled ability of our aircraft to access targets from anywhere, at any time. 

Challenges to America’s air dominance do not all originate from 

foreign shores. Some challenges are internal to the Air Force and 

the Department of Defense [DOD]. And one of the biggest challenges our Nation needs to overcome is the small size of today’s Air 

Force. 

For example, in 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, our Air 

Force had 134 fighter squadrons. Today, we are down to only 55 

fighter squadrons. While the Department of Defense is no longer 

required to be able to defeat regional adversaries in large-scale 

campaigns on two fronts, we are losing our ability to do so on just 

one. We only produced 187 fifth generation F–22 aircraft. But that 

number was 194 aircraft short of the requirements for 381 F–22s. 

Unfortunately, the decision to stop F–22 production was a strategy 

driven by budgetary goals rather than one driven by the need to 

obtain a required capacity. 

We don’t want to make that same mistake with F–35 production 

that we made with our failure to produce enough F–22s. That is 

why the House-passed National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] 

for Fiscal Year 2017 added 5 F–35As to meet last year’s Air Force 

F–35A budget plan for 48 aircraft in fiscal year 2017, an unfunded 

requirement identified by the Air Force Chief of Staff. The House 

bill also added additional F–35Bs and Cs for the Navy and Marine 

Corps, also unfunded requirements identified by the Navy and Marine Corps. 

April 15, 1953, is a significant date for the U.S. Air Force. It is 

the last time U.S. ground forces were killed as a result of enemy 

air attack when a North Korean P02 biplane strafed an Army tent 

on an island off the Korean peninsula. In the last 63 years, American air dominance has relentlessly safeguarded the lives of our Air 

Forces, provided freedom of maneuver and freedom from attack. I 

am confident we will do so now and in the future, but we must remain committed to providing the necessary resources to provide 

this capability, capacity, and readiness necessary to accomplish the 

critical mission of maintaining air dominance. 

I would like to now recognize my good friend and colleague from 

Massachusetts, Ms. Niki Tsongas, for her opening comments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MASSACHUSETTS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good afternoon to 

you, General Carlisle. I am sorry we kept you waiting a little bit. 

But thank you so much for your service to our country and for 

being here to talk with us about this very important topic. Because 

what does bring us here today is the recognition that our Nation’s 

Air Force faces a growing set of diverse and complex challenges 

around the world. To meet these threats and to maintain air dominance, the United States needs an Air Force with a range of capabilities to counter increasingly contested air environments and 

fighter advancements being developed by our adversaries. As we all 
3 

know, the Air Force is in the midst of an ambitious modernization 

program driven, in part, by the age of many of its major aircraft 

fleets. Today, four major programs are in procurement, and five 

more are in research and development. 

This is long overdue, as many airpower priorities have been deferred over the past decade in favor of ground force investments 

due to our engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Simultaneously, 

replacing such advanced programs is never easy. But this job is 

certainly made harder by the constraints placed on the Air Force 

by the Budget Control Act and a series of unpredictable budget 

deals over the past several years. In this resource-constrained environment, I look forward to hearing more today about how the Air 

Force prioritizes its major modernization programs, and how it 

aims to achieve a balanced set of capabilities to meet emerging 

threats. In addition, I hope to hear what Congress, we in Congress, 

might be able to do to help solve issues you are facing. I look forward to your testimony. Thank you for being here, and I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. General Carlisle. 

STATEMENT OF GEN HERBERT J. ‘‘HAWK’’ CARLISLE, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR COMBAT COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General CARLISLE. Chairman Turner, Ranking Members, and 

distinguished members of this subcommittee, it is a distinct pleasure to be here today with you to have this discussion. Thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss the importance of air superiority. As 

commander of Air Combat Command, I am responsible for many of 

the combat missions that our Air Force takes on. However, air superiority deserves special attention. It is the top stage setter for 

success on the battlefield; the mission that the Air Force must take 

on first and the Air Force mission that we must do right 100 percent of the time. 

I am grateful the subcommittee shares an interest. And I am certain that our concern will advance the capabilities presented to 

combatant commanders. Future U.S. Air Force air superiority demands a full-spectrum force with capability beyond opponents, capacity to defeat emergent threats, and ready for worldwide deployment any time. 

Currently, under BCA [Budget Control Act], I am unable to resource all three pillars of that mission: capability, capacity, and 

readiness. The Combat Air Force, to include air superiority, has 

been a bill payer in the last five budget cycles. For example, F–35 

combat squadrons will be reduced from a planned 32 squadrons in 

2028 to 16 in 2028. 

The U.S. Air Force is the smallest, oldest, and busiest we have 

ever been. We are successful on the backs of our airmen. We 

prioritize the current fight at the expense of preparing for high-end 

operations. Today, our fighter force is less than 50 percent combat 

ready for full-spectrum operations. Our newly appointed Chief of 

Staff stated the most pressing challenge is the rise of peer competitors with military capabilities rivaling our own. Formerly accessible 

areas to the United States are now contested as Russian S–400 

missiles and China’s J–20 and J–31 aircraft are fielded. Our main 

air-to-air missile entered service in 1991. And our fifth generation 
4 

aircraft still employ those fourth generation weapons, like the 

AMRAAM [Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile]. 

Our fifth generation fleet can only consist of F–22s until we 

reach sufficient numbers of F–35s to add to that fifth generation 

capability. Total F–35A requirement remains 1,763 aircraft, based 

on acquisition schedules on a projected fighter service life. An annual production of 60 F–35s right now strikes the right balance between cost and capability and the legacy aircraft aging out. 

Looking further, we really must start now to devise our next generation answers and our next generation capability. We recently 

completed the Air Superiority 2030 Enterprise Capabilities Collaboration Team that concluded that there is no silver bullet solution, 

but, in fact, a multi-domain family of capabilities is ultimately the 

way we need to project and the way we need to win the fight in 

the future. 

I look forward to an ongoing partnership with this subcommittee. 

And I thank all of you very much and the members of this entire 

committee for their dedication to air superiority the mission, our 

Armed Forces, and to our entire Nation. I welcome any questions 

from the committee chairman and everyone else on the committee. 

And I respectfully request my written testimony be entered into 

the record. Thank you very much for your time today. And it is an 

honor and a privilege to be here with you to answer any questions 

you might have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Carlisle can be found in the 

Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. TURNER. General, thank you. I have got a couple real quick 

questions that relate to issues that we are going to be facing in 

conference with this 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. And 

I would like your perspective to assist us in the negotiations over 

those provisions. One is that some have advocated that the F–35 

Joint Program Office [JPO] be disestablished 180 days after the 

Milestone C decision in fiscal year 2019. Would Air Combat Command be in favor of devolving the JPO responsibilities to the services after Milestone C? 

General CARLISLE. Sir, that is not something that we are in favor 

of. I truly believe that the JPO, the Joint Program Office for the 

F–35 has done a tremendous job. And they have done a very difficult job with three separate services as well as our partner nations, and FMS [foreign military sales] customers that are purchasing the aircraft. I do believe that the program office will evolve 

and change and there will be added responsibilities and added requirements on the individual services and their program offices. 

So what I believe is the right answer for the future is an evolution of the Joint Program Office to one where some of their responsibilities and some of the things that are done are done by individual—either by the U.S. DOD, or by individual services. But 

the program office, I believe, still needs to be intact. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, it certainly is a system that is currently working. And it does seem as if the risk would be too great to devolve 

that to the services. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. In addition, then some have advocated that the F– 

35 follow-on modernization program be treated as a separate major 
5 

defense acquisition program, or MDAP. We had this issue in our 

markup, and it is not included—it was offered as an amendment. 

We realize that this generates from a GAO [Government Accountability Office] study, but the information that caused the House 

side to not adopt this policy decision was that it would cost about 

$13 million and delay Block 4 capabilities to the warfighters by 6 

to 12 months. What are your thoughts and considerations concerning a major defense acquisition program for the modernization? 

General CARLISLE. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe we should 

have a separate major defense acquisition program for the Block 4 

update. It is incredibly critical that we get that capability. And delaying it only moves our capability to defeat potential threat to the 

future farther to the right. So with respect to time from an operator’s standpoint, I truly believe we need to keep that as the program as part of the overall F–35 program, mostly because of the 

time. The fact is, and the JPO is better equipped to answer that, 

but it looks like it would add money and time. And both of those 

are things that we really can’t afford to do. 

Mr. TURNER. Money and time are both elements that this program has been criticized for. To take an administrative bureaucratic step that increases those certainly would impact the overall 

program. I appreciate your comment. 

You know, General, actually my hometown newspaper in Ohio 

reported on a poll that had been done in Ohio, stating that 60 percent of the people were not in favor of the F–35. They were in 

favor, instead, of modernizing existing aircraft, pitting the F–35 

against modernization programs for our current inventory. Obviously, in our prior hearings, it has been addressed that that is an 

impossibility, that one cannot modernize the existing aircraft in 

order to accomplish what is necessary with the capability of the F– 

35. 

But clearly, we are still missing something, General, that the 

overall public in getting that phone call on the poll still does not 

understand that the leap that the F–35 is going to provide, and the 

risk of what our adversaries are developing and that the F–35 will 

face. How can you help us with that today? 

General CARLISLE. Mr. Chairman, we have to be better at telling 

the story. The fact of the matter is that our adversaries have seen 

how successful we are. They have watched what has happened over 

the past 25 years. And they know if we dominate the airspace, that 

we can win any conflict and that we can be overwhelmingly lethal 

against adversaries. They know that and they are trying to counter 

that. And that is why you see things like you mentioned in your 

opening statement about the J–31, the J–20, the PAK FA from the 

Russians, the S–400, follow-on to those missiles. People know what 

we can do when we have air dominance. And they are trying everything in their power. And if we stay at our current technology, then 

we are just ceding that ground to our adversary, and we can’t afford to do that. It would be—I mean, to take an analogy, if you took 

an old 1980s flip phone and tried to turn it into an iPhone 6, you 

can’t do that. It is just not capable. 

And if you look at the capabilities that the F–35 brings, it is 

centrifusion; it is low observable capability; it is a situational 

awareness for the pilot in the cockpit that is an order of magnitude 
6 

different than its predecessors. And that is something you can’t 

build onto or retrofit back into a previous generation airplane. You 

really need to go to the next generation. 

Mr. TURNER. General, thank you. Turning to Niki Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, General. And to follow up on Mr. 

Turner’s question and observation, I think we all appreciate, or 

have come to appreciate the difference that the Joint Strike Fighter 

will make. But conveying that to the average citizen, who really 

may not even understand what air dominance is, and how this new 

generation of airplane helps to achieve that, that is the challenge 

I think we all face here, especially in light of all the cost issues 

that have emerged, how long it has taken to develop this great capability. So, I think it is a tough one. And I think something that 

is worth considering how to better communicate the challenges we 

have and the difference it makes. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

And I will tell you that part of it is us and the United States Air 

Force. We have to be better at telling the story. And I just got back 

from the Royal International Air Tattoo where we had both an F– 

35B and an F–35A. And it really does showcase the capabilities of 

the airplane and what it can do. We could talk about it with our 

partners and our FMS customers over there. 

I think, you know, to some extent, frankly, we have been a little 

bit victims of our own success, because you see what has happened 

over the past 25 years, and we have had air dominance. But it has 

been from a lower capability threat. And we know that if you look 

at a resurgent and an increasingly aggressive Russia, you look at 

what is going on in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. 

If you look at what is going on with Iran and the weapon systems 

they are buying, all of those point to the fact that our adversaries 

know what we are capable of and they are doing everything in 

their power to counter it. We have to be better at telling that story, 

ma’am. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I think that is true. I just wanted to return, 

though, to a slightly different question, and that is that of maintaining a diverse array of capabilities as you do seek to modernize. 

So recently, General, the Congressional Research Service indicated 

that four procurement programs accounted for 99 percent of the Air 

Force’s aircraft acquisition budget in fiscal year 2016. And over the 

next several years, the Air Force plans on transitioning other important programs into procurement, including the JSTARS [Joint 

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] recapitalization program 

as well as other modernization priorities. So my question is, General, I am curious about your thoughts about the Air Force’s plans 

to invest more resources into bringing these programs online while 

continuing to acquire current programs that have proven susceptible to cost increases, as we know, higher than predicted operations and sustainment costs and other delays. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. Well, clearly, I think in the acquisition cycle and the procurement and setting requirements and 

holding requirements steady, we have to continue to get better. 

And in some of those cases, those cost increases were not necessarily a program problem, but as things changed—when program—acquisition programs get drawn out, then things change 
7 

over time with respect to adversary technology and adversary capability and our own. 

So, I think we really do have to get better at holding requirements steady and making the acquisition process more agile and 

flexible, so we can make—we can acquire programs kind of in the 

timeline we want to, on budget and on schedule, and make that 

schedule agile and flexible to make that happen. 

Clearly, I think if you look at what has happened in the past 20 

to 25 years, we kind of ended up in a position where we kind of 

stopped procuring in the 1990s. Frankly, we—in the peace dividend, the world changed drastically after—if you look at the air 

war over Serbia, our allied force combined with what happened on 

9/11, that kind of changed the focus to a large extent, and we have 

concentrated pretty significantly with respect to investment on the 

current fight we are in. 

At the same time, we see the adversary capability grow with the 

potential adversaries out there. So I believe that we have to 

prioritize. I think our nuclear enterprise has to be part of that. I 

think our space enterprise has to be part of that. I think our cyber 

enterprise has to be part of that. But we also have to modernize 

our capability to do the core function of the United States Air 

Force. And one of those is air dominance. 

So modernization of F–22, procurement of F–35 weapons, and 

new generation weapons, and the right number of weapons to complete the task we need to. We have to prioritize those and then we 

have to figure out what the Nation wants us to do and what resources we need to be able to get to that point. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, it is a daunting set of challenges in the face 

of very real fiscal constraints. And none of those things is inexpensive. 

General CARLISLE. No, ma’am. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So I don’t envy you with your challenge. With that 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As chair of the dinosaur 

caucus, some of my questions might reflect that I have been on this 

planet for a while. I am a little concerned about the F–35. And, you 

know, I am all in on it and everything like that, but I stated, as 

a dinosaur, that, you know, supportive of the A–10. I really like the 

F–22, because of its proven track record. I know there has been 

some conversation about reopening that line again, particularly if 

the F–35 has more problems. And even, you know, the U–2 and 

things like this. I am not advocating bringing back the P–51 or the 

P–47 or the P–38. But, you know, the B–52 is still flying around. 

So conversation on the F–22, there has been some talk about 

that. And I think it will come up again if the F–35 has some problems. And, as I said, in the dinosaur caucus, I support those aircraft that have a proven track record. So I really like it— you 

know, I am not a pilot. I don’t know anything about it. You know, 

I can’t even spell airplane. But can you comment on some of the 

conversations about the F–22 because—— 

General CARLISLE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOK [continuing]. I liked it. 
8 

General CARLISLE. It is a fantastic airplane. It is absolutely the 

greatest air dominance airplane in the world today by an order of 

magnitude. Sir, I will tell you, first of all, the last person in the 

world that wants to get rid of any airplane in the United States 

inventory is Hawk Carlisle. I don’t have enough capacity today. So, 

I love the fact that we are keeping airplanes around. And the fact 

of the matter is in the case of the A–10 that you talk about, it is 

a fantastic airplane. It does go a little bit to Congresswoman Tsongas’ challenge, though, is how do you fit it all underneath the top 

line. You know, when we look at what we are challenged with, we 

are challenged with capability. So we have to get to that next generation capability, i.e., F–22s and F–35s, and eventually a B–21. 

At the same time, we have to maintain capacity to meet all the 

demands around the world that are being asked from us. And I will 

tell you, with the world situation, those demands are going up. We 

average 10 fighter squadrons deployed at any given time 100 percent of the time in the United States Air Force, which is a huge 

commitment. 

And then we have to maintain readiness. Our pilots and our 

maintainers and our airplanes have to be ready if something 

should happen be it anywhere in the world. So that is the balancing act we have to get to. The F–22 is a fantastic airplane. And as 

General Welsh said before he departed, I don’t think it is a crazy 

idea to restart it. I do think that we probably would not bring an 

F–22 back in the form it is today. I think that is technology that 

is 30 years old, frankly. I think you may look at what the F–22 has 

and look at something—additive technology or things that you 

could potentially do different if you brought it back. The challenge 

with bringing it back, certainly in its current form, is the amount 

of time it would take to bring the subcontractors back on the line, 

get the tooling back up, start producing the airplane. What kind of 

cost that would be and how long it would be until you could get 

them. But I do believe that there is a potential, maybe, to look at 

what we have learned in the F–35 and what we have learned on 

the F–22. And maybe there is something in an F–22-like capability 

that we could bring that is the next generation, and the next capability and the next technology. 

And the last thing I will say and then I—obviously I have a lot 

of opinions on this—is the F–35 is a fantastic airplane. It really is 

doing well. It is actually ahead of where the F–22 was in the same 

point in development that the F–35 is today and the F–22 was 10 

or 11 years ago. 

So I will tell you, I am very confident in that airplane. I am very 

close to declaring initial operational capability in that airplane because I believe in it. And the progress we are making, and the 

progress we have made even in the last year, is really tremendous. 

So I have confidence in it and I am very confident that we are not 

going to have additional problems in that airplane. 

Mr. COOK. Well, thank you, General, for addressing that. The 

other thing, and I mentioned this before. You know, with the Canadians backing out of the F–35 buy, and who knows who would have 

predicted the U.K. [United Kingdom] and its political decision and 

everything like that. I am just a little nervous or worried about 

people that have committed as part of this buy, because it is going 
9 

to influence the price and everything like that. And I am just hoping no one else decides to—who is going to pick up the slack and 

whether we could trust them or what have you with such an exceptional aircraft, if you could briefly comment on that. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, sir. So, Congressman, I just spent the 

last week talking to many of our partners again. It was great out 

at the Royal International Air Tattoo at Fairford to have F–35Bs 

and F–35As flying there. We brought them over. We actually had 

the airplanes in country. They did fantastic. And, you know, I 

talked to the head of the Royal Canadian Air Force, and he thinks 

that decision is still open. He believes in the F–35, and from a military standpoint, he thinks his government is still potential. They 

are in a kind of competition now. Instead of a done deal, they are 

in a competition with some fourth gen [generation] airplanes. 

And I will tell you the other thing, sir, that I spent a lot of my 

career in the Pacific. And if you look at Australia and Japan and 

Korea and Singapore, I think that market for that airplane is going 

up. I believe there is more and more enthusiasm, belief in it, and 

support for it. And talking to both the outgoing air chief from the 

Royal Air Force and the incoming air chief is they are going to buy 

138, and my guess is they will buy more than that. And I think 

they will have a mix of both F–35Bs and F–35As at the end of the 

day. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, General, for your service. And thank 

you for being here today. Is there anything critical about the F– 

22 to our tactical air superiority at this—as we proceed into the future? Is there anything critical about it? 

General CARLISLE. Sir, there is. And that is, to continue the modernization. The airplane is a fantastic airplane, but as with everything, technology is evolving. We have a modernization program 

that includes some capability. We are continuously making our aircraft better. We are in a drop on the flight profile that is 3.2, that 

if you have seen what the F–22 has done in the Operation Inherent 

Resolve, it is just fantastic. We have been dropping SDBs, small diameter bombs, with great accuracy from that airplane. We have 

been able to penetrate airspace that other airplanes couldn’t penetrate. So the criticality in the F–22 program today is to continue 

to modernize it, is to continue to add that capability as things go 

along, even the things that, like, low observable maintainability. 

In the F–35, we developed this capability to rapidly take panels 

on and off and not have to do the whole low observable cure time 

in what is called a mighty boot, which is a capability to just put 

the parts back on. We are taking that from the F–35 and adapting 

that to the F–22, again, to continue those airplanes to maintain 

that, the greatest capability that we possibly can. So the one that 

I would really ask for is to maintain the modernization program. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And as we maintain that modernization program, 

would there be any need that you would see that we would need 

to take the training jets and convert them to combat capable aircraft? 

General CARLISLE. Sir, I would love to do that. I would love to 

take the 43rd Fighter Squadron’s jets down at Tyndall and upgrade 
10 

them. They were very early model airplanes. And, again, with the 

production line shut down, we have to look at what the cost is to 

that. If it was a cost that was within reason and with everything 

else that I am trying to do I could do, I would consider doing that. 

We are, right now, looking very hard at what it would take to upgrade those airplanes to be in the most latest—latest block capability. And we will look at that cost and we will come back, obviously, to this committee and the Congress and talk about what the 

cost is and then what the benefit. But the more combat capable F– 

22s I have, the much happier I will be. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. The F–35 procurement rates, are they 

sufficient to meet the requirement to reduce risks in potential combat with near-peer adversaries or in lower-risk combat environments? 

General CARLISLE. Sir, not yet. We need to get there. I believe 

that the number we need to get to is 60 a year. And I would like 

to do that as quickly as I can. We are not there yet. Some of the 

decisions to reduce the buy earlier were smart because we had— 

in the development of that program, we had a thing called concurrency where we were buying them and developing them at the 

same time. That is some of the early bad press that the F–35 got 

was we had a concurrency issue. So we slowed the buy rate to fix 

those problems, and we will go back and retrofit those early airplanes. 

I believe now we are at the point where we can increase that buy 

rate, because those problems have been fixed and we don’t see any 

coming in the future, and we have gotten through the concurrency 

part. So I believe that as soon as we can get to 60, the better. 

Again, we are not there yet. We truly appreciate this committee 

and the House adding airplanes in the current budget. I am very 

much in favor of that. And, again, I would like to get to 60. Ultimately, I would like to get to 80 a year. But again, within all the 

priorities of the Air Force, we have to find out if—how we can fit 

that in. And there is so much going on in the recapitalization that 

that is the challenge that we will face. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. As you mentioned in your testimony, 

the F–35’s weapon system is a prime example of a weapon system 

with the ability to process large amounts and multiple sources of 

data. Clearly, these capabilities would create a significant advantage over our adversaries in the way that we track, target, and engage our enemies. Could you further elaborate on how the F–35 

weapon systems work, and also, how do we ensure that the funding 

of this aircraft and its technology become a priority in the defense 

budget? 

General CARLISLE. Yes, sir. The modern airplanes, like the F–35 

and the F–22, and, in many cases, things like the next generation 

RPAs [remotely piloted aircraft] that we are going to develop over 

time, they are Hoovers for information. They just suck up tons of 

information because of the fused sensor suite and the amount of 

data they are able to collect and fuse. We need to get that information off board and take advantage of it for the entire capability 

from the tactical edge all the way back to the command and control 

and the decision makers. 
11 

In ACC, we are working very hard on what that networking and 

that off-board capability looks like in a thing called the combat 

cloud. And it is really about data to decision. So we take data. We 

use big data machine to machine, and we are able to use that in 

a security capability in a networked environment so that we can 

get that back to decision makers as well as to all the platforms in 

the tactical arena so everyone has the best information, and we can 

defeat our adversaries by knowing more sooner than they do and 

be able to react and force them into defensive mode. And we are 

very much doing that with the F–35. And, again, the F–35, F–22 

both provide that capability. And we are working hard to make 

that happen. 

With respect to the F–35, sir, we are—the place we are at in the 

program now, the Air Force is very close to initial operational capability or combat capability. And we are continuing to put that at 

the forefront of priorities to make sure we take advantage and we 

continue to develop that airplane and get to the Block 3F, which 

is ultimately the interim block we want to get to. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. And I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think—okay. Thanks. Ms. 

McSally. Did you want to go first? 

Mr. TURNER. We had a joint dueling passing of time, and so, yes, 

I took Ms. McSally’s signal to yield to Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. The dinosaur caucus here. Oh, thank you very 

much. General, thanks for your service. And, you know, as the 

chairman mentioned, you know, we are in now the beginning process of the conference. So, you know, your testimony already is very 

timely and insightful. Thank you for that. Related, later this summer, I will be going out on a trip. And, you know, we are going to 

be focusing in on the European Reassurance Initiative. Mr. Cook 

will be going on it and some others. And so I am interested in hearing from you in the same vein or the same theme of telling the 

story, help us from your vantage point, explain what a CONOP 

[concept of operation] would look like that would be responding 

to—of course, we are in an unclassified setting, but help me explaining this to my constituents on how the Air Force fifth generation, how this is all put together as part of the joint team to be able 

to deter, and then if necessary conduct an operation. So I am interested in hearing that from the—initially, the European perspective, 

but then any reinforcing that is brought to bear in the unclassified 

setting. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, sir. And I would be more than happy at 

some point to come back and talk to the committee at a classified 

level as well, if that is something that the committee would so desire. 

So the capability that those airplanes bring is the ability to penetrate airspace. It is also a great messaging tool. Recently, we did 

what was called a Rapid Raptor where we deployed unannounced 

12 F–22s to the European theater, and we moved them around the 

European theater, and they worked in coalition with fourth generation aircraft, like A–10s and F–15s and F–16s. Hugely, hugely successful deployment. It is a deployment that demonstrates a capability. A deployment that demonstrates resolve. And it is a deploy-
12 

ment that demonstrates that we can put these airplanes where we 

want them when we want them there, in order to accomplish the 

mission. 

Very much in the near future, after we are operational with the 

F–35s out of Hill Air Force Base, I would like to do that with the 

F–35s as well. One of the things that in Europe that I just talked 

to General Scaparrotti, the EUCOM [European Command] commander, and General Gorenc, the USAFE [U.S. Air Forces in Europe] commander, we would like to have F–35s, for example, do 

some Baltic air policing, where that is one of the missions that 

NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] does up in the Baltic 

regions, in Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania, in that part of the 

world and put F–35s to demonstrate. 

As I talked to the air chiefs over in Europe in this past week, 

all of them are very interested for their own countries to be able 

to see the visibility of that airplane out doing operational missions. 

Just like the F–22, getting the F–35 out there operationally conducting missions is very important. So—and the other part about 

the F–22 and the F–35, and the F–35 will be another example of 

this, it makes every other airplane on the battlefield that much 

better. It raises everybody’s game because of the situational awareness it provides, the capabilities it can bring to bear, and the ability to change the fight with not—with a combination of fifth generation and fourth generation airplanes. So as we go forward, I 

think that is what we have to continue to demonstrate and then 

talk to people about it, what we can do with that, sir. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you. And if I can just follow up on that comment, your conversations with the Supreme Allied Commander of 

Europe, and I am interested to know, in relation to some of the 

things you have done and what you are looking to do, the dynamic 

of how you think this is impacting—I mean, part of what we are 

trying to do obviously is reassure our allies, but we also want to 

see them bring more to the table here. We know we all need to step 

it up with regard to this. So in relation to the Air Force’s piece of 

this and, you know, the increased experimentation in exercises, 

have you seen any change in the dynamic of the discussion of our 

friends and allies? 

General CARLISLE. Sir, I have. And I will tell you, I will caveat 

it a little bit, because it is usually—I am usually talking to military 

members. And they love it when we come over. We put F–22s into 

Amari, Estonia, which was a tremendous, tremendous capability. 

We do the same with—we put A–10s in there. We put them into 

Romania, as well as on the—we flew with them in Germany. We 

just had a trilateral exercise at Langley Air Force Base where the 

French brought out Raphaels. The British, the RAF [Royal Air 

Force], brought out Typhoons and they flew with our F–22s. The 

more we do that, the more reassuring it will be for those nations, 

the more reassuring for their political as well their population. And 

I think if you—especially in Europe, and the same thing if you go 

to the Pacific, because what has happened in the South China Sea, 

and obviously the information that—the ruling that was just 

passed on by the International Court, all of those things, the tension that exists in the Pacific and in Europe with the things that 

are going on, the fact that we bring fifth generation capability, we 
13 

interact and they are interoperable with our friends and partners 

makes it—makes all those nations significantly more comfortable. 

And they truly, truly appreciate us being out there with this capability to interoperate with them. 

Mr. GIBSON. I thank you for this, for enlightening us with regard 

to how we go about telling the story. And then I will just have my 

staff follow up with your staff before our team goes out on the 

CODEL [congressional delegation]. We will want at least like a laydown, maybe a brief. That wouldn’t require you time—— 

General CARLISLE. Oh, no, sir. We would love to do that. Yeah, 

just let us know and we can talk about what we are doing, what 

we are doing in the future, and some things we are looking at. Be 

more than happy to do that. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, General, and thanks for your service. I 

yield back. 

General CARLISLE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Graham. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you so 

much, General. I represent Tyndall Air Force Base. 

General CARLISLE. Fantastic place. I spent a lot of time there. 

Ms. GRAHAM. You did? 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. GRAHAM. It is a phenomenal place. And I had the opportunity to go up on a training mission with the F–22. I was in a T– 

38. Don’t worry. I wasn’t flying the F–22. And it is just an incredible, incredible airplane. I mean, I just can’t even begin to describe 

what it can do in the air. It was amazing. And I am also very interested in the F–35. One of my earliest CODELs was to Eglin to 

learn about the F–35. Recently been down to Homestead Air Force 

Base in South Florida. They are potentially—I think they are in 

the running—I want to—— 

General CARLISLE. They are for one of the Guard units. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Yes. Exactly. For F–35s. And if there is anything 

our office can do to help with information to encourage the placement of the F–35s there, of course, we stand ready to do that. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. GRAHAM. That was a little plug, Mr. Chairman. He is not 

paying attention. But anyway, a question that your comments just 

brought to mind about the South China Sea, and I am actually getting ready to go on a CODEL to the RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] 

exercises. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. I participated in them many 

times. A fantastic exercise. 

Ms. GRAHAM. I can’t wait. I am very, very excited. But I am very 

concerned about—I am glad that our allies feel that we are working together well, and they are having their knowledge of what we 

are capable of doing and working together. But what are those that 

wish to do us harm, you know, what are their capabilities? China, 

Russia, Iran, what are we facing with their development of the 

technology? Because we know that they are watching us. And I 

would be curious to hear what you had to say about that. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. I could spend a lot of time, so I 

won’t go into too level of detail. They have watched our success, 

they know how good we are, and they know that when we are 
14 

going with air dominance then we pretty much can dictate the fight 

below us in a major contingency operation. They are doing everything in their power. And as the chairman mentioned, that picture 

of an F–35 and a J–31 where you have half of each, you can tell 

that they are copying us. You look at the PAK FA, which is the T– 

50, the Russian version of a stealth aircraft, you look at the missiles and what they are doing, and they are doing—all of our adversaries are doing two things. And that is where we come up with 

the term anti-access/area denial. They try to deny our ability to get 

into an area, try to keep us from being able to deploy there, and 

then once we get there, trying to restrict our ability to operate 

within that airspace. 

F–22s and F–35s, in our modern systems what will eventually be 

B–21, the B–2, those are the answer to those challenges. And they 

are going to continue to modernize, they are going to continue to, 

as we have seen from our adversaries’ cyber, they will steal technology so they avoid the challenges that we faced. And again, if you 

look at the J–31 and the F–35, it is not too hard to understand that 

they are successful at that. 

So the answer, in my opinion, and what we are working on, is 

to continue to modernize, to continue to develop technologies, it is 

the third offset strategy that Secretary Carter talks about, and to 

continue to build on our capability. Because we as a Nation, and 

I truly believe this, I think many other nations, Russia and China 

in particular, copy very well. Original thought, they are not as 

good. And I believe that if you look at what our technology, what 

our industry does, what our airmen, sailors, soldiers, marines, and 

Coast Guardsmen can do, is take what we have and make it that 

much better. The greatest thing about watching F–22s and F–35s 

is handing them to captains and tech sergeants and seeing what 

they do with that capability. It exceeds anything we ever thought 

possible. And we are seeing that today in the F–35. 

So I really believe our key to those adversaries that are continuing to try to deny us that is to continue to work that technology 

edge, experimentation, prototyping, systems engineering early to 

put technology into capability and then turn it over to our young 

men and women that are incredible when they get the opportunity 

to take advantage of what we give them and make it better than 

we ever thought possible. But our adversaries are there. You need 

only look at what the Russians are doing and what the PRC [People’s Republic of China] is doing, and the fact that both those nations are selling that capability to many other nations that would 

wish us harm throughout the world. So it is incredibly important 

that we continue to stay on that edge, ma’am. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Yes. And I really appreciate your comments. And 

I met with a great group from Eglin yesterday in my office, airmen. 

And I don’t have time for this now, but if you could help follow up 

with our team about where we are with ALIS [Autonomic Logistics 

Information System] right now—— 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. GRAHAM [continuing]. I would appreciate that. 

General CARLISLE. Be more than happy. We are successful with 

ALIS on the backs of our airmen. Again, they are making it work, 

but we have to give them the right answer. 
15 

Ms. GRAHAM. I understand. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Carlisle, good 

to see you again. 

General CARLISLE. Good to see you again, ma’am. 

Ms. MCSALLY. As an airman, I am concerned, as you stated, that 

we are a victim of our own success, and that we have had air dominance—I mean, it has been like 60 years really since the last time 

an American was attacked from the air because we have been 

showing through the amazing capabilities of our airmen that we 

can protect them. Gaining and maintaining air dominance is a 

challenging task, especially as we see our adversaries, which you 

just mentioned, closing that gap, not just in capability, but also in 

numbers. And we need this fifth generation capability, but as you 

mentioned, we have got the smallest Air Force since its inception. 

And at some point, quantity has a quality all of its own. And so, 

we did recently get a letter from a Deputy Secretary of Defense related to the numbers for F–35 staying with the total number, that 

1,763 for the Air Force, saying it could go lower for budget reasons, 

or it could go up to keep pace with the threat. When I look at the 

threats, and we have had the briefings across the globe, and you 

have mentioned some of them, and we look at them in a classified 

level, I am deeply concerned about the numbers and our ability to 

be able to address varied simultaneous threats and have air dominance in all of them, all while our allies have dwindled in their 

budgets as well. 

So, can you comment on just the number, and is there—is someone looking at, are you looking at, and is there really a move to 

potentially increase the requirement in that number for the future? 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. So I think that that is a great 

point. And the Air Force number is 1,763. And we believe that is 

the right number now. We are doing an analysis—and there is two 

different analyses going on. One was, initially the number was predominantly driven by replacement for aircraft that we’re aging out. 

That number of aircraft that have aged out has shrunk with the 

reduction in the size of our force. As the chairman said, we went 

from 134 squadrons, combat coded fighter squadrons in 1991, to 55 

today. 

So the number is smaller. But what we believe in Air Combat 

Command, and the Air Force believes, is that the number should 

be driven upon the threat and the environment that we are going 

to be asked to operate in. So I go to Congresswoman Tsongas’s 

point, is we have to fit it all in there. But ultimately, this Nation 

and this body will determine what their military needs to be able 

to do, and then we need to have that capability in the systems to 

do that. I believe we are at the bottom edge of that. I think we 

need more capacity. If you look at what is happening in my force 

and how often I am rotating them through the Middle East, as well 

as the requirement I would have if something really bad happened 

with a near-peer competitor, be it a South China Sea environment, 

a Kaliningrad environment, or something to that effect, those two 

numbers, to me, is going to not only validate 1,763, it may be more 

and it may be what is next. 
16 

And I mentioned it just briefly about potentially whatever is next 

in our next gen capability, whether it is an F–22-like and we take 

that capability or whatever comes out of that, we have to have the 

capacity to meet the demands of the combatant commander to do 

what this Nation asks us to do. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I agree with you. And I realize you have constraints up the chain of command, but I think it would be helpful 

for us to know, based on the threat the number is this and then 

this is what we are saying we can afford, right, so at least we have 

an honest discussion and an understanding of numbers being driven by budget or driven by threats and capabilities. When it comes 

to—you mentioned we need a multi-domain family of capabilities, 

I think, and right now, that is fourth generation. You know, we 

have the F–22 with old technology. As we have had meetings with 

a number of the combatant commanders and others, again in classified settings, there has been a discussion—is there a way for us 

to kind of have a 4.5 or a 4.3, you know, or maybe taking some F– 

16 Block 50s and doing—I know you said you can’t turn a flip 

phone into an iPhone. But is there anything we can be doing to 

augment the challenges we are having financially with the F–35 to, 

you know, create a 4.2 or 4.5 to augment so that we can have that 

multidimensional capability? 

General CARLISLE. That is a great question. And ma’am, I guess 

my challenge is, I think modernization of fourth gen is important 

to continue to put that technology, just like it is for the F–22. I believe we need to continue to modernize fourth generation capability 

as well. The challenge that I would face is, if I bought new 4.5 generation aircraft, I don’t know how I would do that and still buy 

fifth gen and what is next. You know, we are very close to getting 

the F–35 costs down into the $80- to $85 million, which is a very 

good cost for that airplane. And most fourth generation, or 4.5 generation airplane, would be in that same vicinity, in that same area. 

So I believe that the two things, from my perspective, that are 

most important is get the buy rate up on the F–35 so I buy them 

more quicker. That is as important as the end number is. I need 

to get to 60 if I can. And then we need to devise in a multi-domain 

is what is next? How do we continue to stay in front of our adversaries? How do we use space and cyber and surface and subsurface 

combined with air and the iCloud, the idea of the combat cloud 

technology to be able to defeat adversaries from different domains 

that they don’t expect it to happen with the decision advantage inside of that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one more 

quick question? 

Mr. TURNER. Sure. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thanks. I just want to go back to, I know 

this isn’t a readiness hearing, but I think it is important just for 

a second for you to talk a little bit more about—you said less than 

50 percent of our current fighter forces are ready to deploy for full 

range of combat missions, right? Less than 50 percent. Can you 

elaborate on that? You and I have talked about this a lot. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Some of that is FMC [fully mission capable] rates; 

some of it is related to parts in older airplanes; some of it is related 
17 

to pilot shortages. I mean, this is significant. If we had to go tomorrow and we needed air dominance for any of these scenarios, this 

is our main factor. So could you just comment on that? It is important. 

General CARLISLE. Yes, ma’am. So there is a few different areas 

that we can address in the readiness. But at the end of the day, 

if you look at full-spectrum operations against a high-end adversary, less than 50 percent of our fighter force is trained, capable, 

ready, and resourced with the parts, the munitions, the maintenance manpower, to be able to fight the high-end fight. And, you 

know, people have asked, we have had readiness budgets—quoteunquote ‘‘readiness budgets’’—and people continually ask me, well, 

when are we going to be ready? When are we going to get back to 

that 80 to 90 percent readiness we need? And at the current state, 

we never will. We are treading water. We are not going backwards, 

but we are not making any progress. 

It is all those things. Because the capacity is so small, we don’t 

have enough time. Because we are turning 10 squadrons over every 

6 months into the Middle East as well as doing TSPs in the Pacific 

and TSPs in Europe, theater security packages. 

So time is a factor. We don’t have enough people. We are trying 

to get that maintenance manpower back up so we can generate the 

sorties. And then the training. We have to keep the—we have to 

keep everybody trained. And if they are never home, or when they 

are home they don’t have enough flying hours, you can’t train them 

to that high-end fight. So right now we are treading water with respect to that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

for letting me indulge in that. 

Mr. TURNER. General, I appreciate your great description of the 

need for the F–35, and obviously the problems we are facing. We 

just had today our conference committee on the budget. We appreciate your statements on the constraints that you are facing. And 

we are certainly trying to advocate for higher top-end numbers that 

can help address some of those constraints. With that, I want to 

thank you, General, for appearing before us. And we will be adjourned. 

General CARLISLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 13, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 13, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 13, 2016 

(37) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. General, as you may be aware, I have been concerned about the 

increasing rate of physiological events being experienced by F/A–18 aviators in the 

Navy. While I am not aware of any similar incidents as of late in the Air Force, 

many of us on this subcommittee remember how the F–22 fleet was impacted by 

a similar rate of events several years ago. Are you aware of any similar trends 

amongst the Air Force fleet? 

General CARLISLE. The Air Force is aware of the increased rate of physiological 

events experienced by F/A–18 aviators in the Navy. The Air Force is participating 

in collaborative efforts with the F/A–18 System Safety Working Group to determine 

root cause and corrective analysis. Since the F–22 Life Support System Task Force 

concluded its investigative effort and accomplished a requested congressional testimony, the Air Force has not experienced a rate of physiological events in any airframe that is comparable to that of the Navy. 

The Air Force did, however, see a relative increase in physiological events in the 

F–15C/D community that began shortly after a fatal crash in August 2014. Since 

fiscal year 2011, the community averaged approximately 5.3 hypoxic-like events per 

year. That rate increased to roughly 13 in FY 2015. Over the next 18 months F– 

15C/D pilots reported physiological events at an increased rate so, the Air Force 

chartered an Independent Review Team (IRT) to determine root cause/corrective 

analysis. Several factors with equipment and procedures unique to the F–15 were 

found and mitigation measures were identified by the IRT. F–15C/D event rates 

have normalized since May 2016 following implementation of mitigation procedures.. The findings of both the F–22 and F–15 investigations have been captured 

and shared with sister services where applicable, and the Air Force continues collaborative efforts through system safety working group participation. 

Ms. TSONGAS. General, one of the unique aspects of the F–35 is that it is essentially a very advanced sensor as well as being an advanced fighter. However, a sensor is only effective if it can talk to other platforms and pass the data it collects. 

What investments is the Air Force making in the other tactical fighters that will 

enable the force to maximize the capabilities of the F–35? 

General CARLISLE. Link 16 is the designated primary tactical data link for exchange of information on the battlespace which the F–35 participates. The ACC/A3, 

in Nov 2014, validated an operational requirement for additional capabilities on all 

AF Link 16 platforms (Concurrent Multi-netting, Concurrent Contention Receive 

and Link 16 Enhanced Throughput). The increased network throughput provided by 

these enhancements supports the increased volume of information exchanges, such 

as the F–35 sensor information, to aid in prosecution of additional targets with 

greater success. 

Ongoing terminal modernization and platform implementation paths require a holistic, ‘‘enterprise centric’’ approach. Common implementation of these capabilities 

in the Link 16 terminals and integrated on AF platforms, including the F–35, reduces the risk of losing a shared common tactical/operating picture, situational 

awareness, and desired mission effectiveness. 

The Combat Cloud Operating Concept adds to the importance of the enterprise 

centric approach to future investments by describing the required capabilities needed to enable data sharing amongst the tactical edge platforms. The Combat Cloud 

concept for operations developed from a need for data sharing between 5th-to-4th 

and 4th-to-5th generation fighter and bomber platforms that minimizes AF and DoD 

duplication of effort. The current CSAF directed Agile Comms Capabilities Based 

Assessment is tasked to develop a solution to implement a Combat Cloud that can 

operate in contested airspace in 2025–2030, with primary focus on 5th gen platforms. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. YOUNG 

Mr. YOUNG. One of the critical components of Fifth Generation fighters is the ability to fly in super cruise, or at above mach 1 speeds without using afterburners. Can 

you discuss the importance of this capability specifically, as well as the importance 
38 

of using this capability in training? a. How many range complexes in the country 

offer Fifth Generation fighters the ability to super cruise? 

General CARLISLE. The time domain can be a weapon at the tactical level. It is 

advantageous to be able to employ air power more quickly over a larger area than 

our adversaries. However, the advantages go beyond getting somewhere faster or 

going further in the same amount of time. Supersonic speeds are also advantageous 

both in terms of survivability and lethality. In a defensive situation, speed can make 

targeting more difficult— it confounds the solution required. Offensively, it provides 

additional kinematics to some of our weapons. When delivering air-to-ground ordnance, additional speed allows further employment ranges and much desired standoff from threats. In an air-to-air engagement, additional missile kinematics allows: 

longer employment ranges, earlier shot opportunities, and/or shorter time of flight 

(i.e. the missile impacts sooner). All highly desired in an air to air engagement. 

The key to super cruise is the fact that the fighter does not require afterburners 

to fly supersonic. Afterburners are extremely inefficient. If a non-super cruise aircraft requires supersonic speed, it will use much more fuel achieving this airspeed 

and thereby reduce its range and/or time on station. Neither of which are desirable. 

However, a super cruise capable aircraft can retain it desired range and time on 

station while still reaping the tactical advantages of operating at supersonic speeds. 

Our mantra is to ‘‘train the way you fight.’’ The goal is to make the training as 

realistic as possible. The higher the correlation between training and combat, the 

better. This includes super cruise. The pace of an air to air fight is vastly quicker 

at supersonic speeds. If our airmen are not trained at this pace, they may ‘‘get behind the jet’’ and lose the fight. Our airmen must internalize this faster pace and 

be ready to execute instinctually. This can only be achieved through regular realistic 

training. 

Super cruise can be utilized in any airspace that allows supersonic flight. In general, the majority of the supersonic airspace is our many offshore/overwater ranges. 

However, the ability to train using super cruise over land is much more limited. 

This capability is limited to large training complexes such as the Nevada Test and 

Training Range (NTTR), the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR), and Alaska’s 

Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC). 

Mr. YOUNG. As you are well aware, Alaska is home to the Joint Pacific-Alaska 

Range Complex (JPARC). According to many, this is the best airspace for training 

in the world. Do you agree with this? a. Is there any other training airspace better 

suited for training the full capability of Fifth Generation fighters than the JPARC? 

b. Why is the JPARC particularly suited for Fifth Generation fighters and what can 

and should be done to improve the capability of the range? 

General CARLISLE. The Joint Pacific-Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) is certainly 

one of the best training ranges in the world. There are several attributes a training 

range must possess to fully enable Fifth Generation fighter training. 

One of the major capabilities of the F–22 is its’ ability to super cruise or fly at 

supersonic speeds without the need for inefficient afterburner use. F–22s routinely 

execute tactics at supersonic speeds and rely on this capability to maximize our tactical advantage against our adversaries. Our forces must train realistically. This requires training at supersonic speeds. Outside the JPARC, the ability to employ at 

supersonic speeds is extremely limited. Currently the only airspaces available for 

supersonic training are limited to overwater/offshore ranges. This limits realistic air 

to surface employment. The Nevada and Utah Test and Training Ranges (NTTR and 

UTTR) are exceptions, but range time available is limited due to the high demand 

of supersonic overland airspace. It is also important to note that the areas within 

the NTTR and UTTR allowing supersonic employment is limited and does not encompass the entire range. 

When our Fifth Generation fighters employ at supersonic speeds, these speeds necessitate additional airspace to fully realize the tactical advantages of supersonic 

employment—range measured not in miles, but hundreds of miles. The JPARC has 

over 62,000 square miles of airspace. This is over five times larger in area than the 

NTTR and the UTTR. The JPARC’s large size enables the CAF’s Fifth Generation 

pilots to hone their combat skills in the most realistic environment possible. 

Unlike overwater/offshore ranges, the JPARC has several live air to surface employment areas. The ability for CAF pilots to employ actual ordnance following a 

combat representative profile is imperative to training, maintaining, improving, and 

validating our wartime capabilities. 

The overland nature of the JPARC also allows instrumentation. The JPARC has 

several portions that include instrumentation to provide time, space, and positional 

information for precise after action review. This ability to accurately review, assess, 

and debrief a mission is key to the USAF continuously updating and improving our 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). In summary, the best training is the 
39 

most realistic training. The JPARC enables the Fifth Generation forces to train at 

realistic speeds, employment ranges, to employ live ordnance, and is instrumented. 

This highly desired combination of attributes enables an extremely high correlation 

between training and combat. Thereby providing an environment for some of the 

best training in the world. 

As stated above, the JPARC is undoubtedly one of the best training ranges in 

world. If ones defines improving the ‘‘capability of the range’’ as improving both the 

capacity and realism of the range, then investment in Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) infrastructure will provide the most impact. Live training is actual pilots 

flying actual aircraft. Virtual training is actual pilots flying virtual aircraft—simulators. Constructive training is utilizing computer generated entities controlled by either a man-in-the-loop or autonomously by the computer. The lines that previously 

separated these training domains are beginning to blur. Technological advancements now allow airmen flying actual aircraft to train with airmen in simulators 

to a limited degree anywhere in the world, augmented by computer generated 

threats. This emerging capability leverages our Distributed Mission Operations 

(DMO), which links dislocated simulator sites together for mutual training, and our 

advanced datalink capabilities. By combining these capabilities/domains we can exponentially increase capacity by increasing participation via additional assets linked 

into the training scenario. An example would be live F–22s and F–35s flying on the 

JPARC training with an AWACS crew operating out of a simulator at Tinker AFB 

in Oklahoma. Adding constructive threats also increases realism. We can now ‘‘inject’’ constructive Surface to Air Missile sites (SAM), or threat aircraft to augment 

the training scenario’s realism. An example would be adding constructive MiGs and 

advanced SAMs to the training scenario and datalinking to the live aircraft. 

Mr. YOUNG. Can you please describe the importance of RED FLAG-Alaska, and 

how it is different but complimentary to RED FLAG-Nellis? 

General CARLISLE. Both exercises provide similar world-class air combat training 

for our Combat Air, Space and Cyber forces, sister services, and allied partners from 

over 30 countries. While similar, each has certain advantages that benefit USAF 

Air, Space and Cyber forces. In general, RF–N offers more high-end, multi-domain 

integration with Air Operations Center (AOC) support, while RF–A offers a range 

whose dimensions better satisfy 5th generation fighter requirements. Although both 

exercises incorporate Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) elements to enhance 

training, more work is necessary to unlock its full potential. Current efforts to 

achieve a more logical and supportable ‘‘strategic calendar’’ may allow scheduling 

our forces to take advantage of what both exercises offer. Second order effects of this 

include better mutual support and deconfliction between the training squadrons 

that run the events, better/more flexible support from enabling units, and less travel 

burden on the operational units themselves. 

Mr. YOUNG. Alaska will soon become the premier location for combat-coded Fifth 

Generation fighters, with F–22s currently at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and 

F–35s expected to arrive to Eielson Air Force Base in a few years. Can you talk 

about the importance of these aircraft training together, along with the 18th Aggressor Squadron at Eielson providing red air? 

General CARLISLE. The combination of F–22s at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, 

F–35s at Eielson Air Force Base, the 18th Aggressor Squadron also located Eielson, 

and access to the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) sets the stage for 

some of the best training to be found anywhere. This is important because as the 

USAF modernizes our fleet with 5th generation capabilities our tactics, techniques, 

and procedures (TTPs) need to modernize as well. The ability for F–22s and F35s 

to easily train together will enable our combat forces to quickly develop and continuously fine-tune these TTPs. In Alaska we will be able to train locally on a daily 

basis without requiring travel to get this valuable training. 

Additionally, the collocated professional aggressor forces and access to the JPARC, 

one of the finest training ranges in the world, provides an optimum environment 

accelerating the development of these TTPs. The regular, repeatable, mixed-force 

training of our 5th generation forces in superb airspace, fighting the most capable 

aggressors will rapidly facilitate lessons learned that the entire CAF will apply and 

enable the USAF to remain the most capable and lethal force possible. 

Mr. YOUNG. Further, given the large number of Fifth Generation fighters that will 

be based in Alaska—and a large amount of strategic airlift and Army airpower— 

does it not make sense to consider Alaska for the basing of the KC–46 tanker, especially given Alaska’s 24/7 NORAD Alert Mission? a. What’s the timeline and what 

would help Alaska’s candidacy? 

General CARLISLE. The Strategic Basing process for the beddown of the KC–46 

tanker is run by Air Mobility Command (AMC). We have forwarded AMC this request. 
40 

Mr. YOUNG. From an ACC perspective, can you comment on the potential negative 

impacts of not fully funding the weather shelter for the second squadron of F–35s 

in Alaska? a. Based on your extensive experience in Alaska, is it sensible to leave 

$270 million ($100M/F–35) out on the runway during the winter time in Fairbanks, 

where temperatures can reach ¥40 to ¥50 for weeks at a time? b. What effects 

do you think these extreme cold temperatures would have on the F–35s? 

General CARLISLE. It is not prudent to leave the F–35 out on the ramp in extreme 

temperatures and doing so could have a significant operational impact if not protected. If the second squadron at Fairbanks cannot shelter their aircraft during the 

harsh winter months, there is the potential that the squadron would not be able 

to deploy/employ in the timelines expected by PACOM. 

Possible effects of cold soaking the aircraft include broken lines/seals, shorter 

times to perform maintenance tasks such as repairs, modifications, and inspections. 

In addition, the individual pilot and maintainer also have a limited exposure times 

due to the extreme elements that Alaska climatology presents. 

Mr. YOUNG. It is clear that Russia is seeking to reassert its strength around the 

world, and specifically in the Arctic Region. Based on this resurgence, as well as 

an unpredictable North Korea and belligerent China, can you discuss the importance of positioning Fifth Generation fighters in the Asia-Pacific and Arctic Regions, 

and specifically in Alaska? 

General CARLISLE. Positioning Fifth Generation fighters in the Asia-Pacific and 

Arctic Regions is of vital importance. Fifth Generation fighters will contribute directly to our Nation’s defense in Alaska. Currently F–22s sit alert for Operation 

Noble Eagle and basing of other Fifth Generation assets will only increase our capability and capacity to deter Russian Long Range Aviation. Similarly in the Asia-Pacific region these Fifth Generation fighters will act as a deterrence to both North 

Korea and China while protecting America’s partner nations as well as strategic interests in the region. 

Mr. YOUNG. Given these grave threats in the Asia-Pacific region, what will happen if the Department of Defense continues to delay its acquisition and modernization of fighter aircraft, and specifically Fifth Generation fighters? 

General CARLISLE. Continuing to delay the acquisition and modernization of fighter aircraft, specifically Fifth Generation fighters will have serious consequences if 

conflict erupts in the Asia-Pacific region. History has demonstrated that air superiority ensures victory. The U.S. military and coalition allies will face an anti-access, 

area denial (A2AD) environment that will require a fifth generation fighter to 

achieve air superiority and enable us to hold any ground target at risk at a time 

or place of our choosing with precision and persistence. Fifth generation fighters 

offer first look, first shot, first kill through stealth, maneuverability, multi-role capabilities in addition to fused sensors and avionics. They also bring decision and reaction dominance, flexibility and survivability over our adversaries. 

Too small of a Fifth Gen fleet leaves the U.S. and our allies vulnerable to enemy 

attack. Additionally, too small of a Fifth Gen fleet eliminates the possibility of deterring an enemy bent on aggression. If we cannot establish Air Superiority, we cannot 

be successful in any of our missions, and our country and the free world will be 

placed in jeopardy. 

Due to the limited numbers of F–22s, modernization of capabilities remain crucial 

to ensure the Combat Air Forces continue to dominate adversary weapon systems 

that will be fielded in the near future. 

For six consecutive years, the F–35 has experienced cuts in planned procurement, 

resulting in reductions in combat coded squadrons from 32 to 16 by Fiscal Year 

2028. Delayed F–35 procurement forces the Air Force to extend legacy aircraft and 

accept increased readiness risk. We must find ways to reduce the time to field new 

capabilities. 

Equally important are advanced weapons for air-to-air and air-to ground combat 

employment. We must pursue and field cutting-edge weapons to realize full combat 

capabilities of Fifth Gen platforms. 

Delaying the modernization or acquisition of Fifth Gen fighters in the numbers 

necessary will increase operational risk to our forces and prevent our ability to 

achieve air superiority and provide global position attack capabilities to support our 

joint force, allies, and national interests. 

Æ