NUREG-1767, Vol. 1

Environmental Impact 

Statement on the Construction and

Operation of a Proposed Mixed

Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at

the Savannah River Site, 

South Carolina

Chapters 1 through 8 and 

Appendices A through E

Final Report

 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Washington, DC 20555-0001
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 NUREG-1767, Vol. 1

Environmental Impact 

Statement on the Construction and

Operation of a Proposed Mixed 

Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at 

the Savannah River Site,

South Carolina

Chapters 1 through 8 and

Appendices A through E

Final Report 

Manuscript Completed: January 2005

Date Published: January 2005

Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

iii

ABSTRACT

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Duke Cogema Stone & Webster

(DCS) to design, construct, and operate a proposed Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication

Facility that would convert depleted uranium and weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel. The

proposed MOX facility would be located on the DOE’s Savannah River Site in South Carolina. 

Use of the proposed facility to produce MOX fuel would be part of the DOE’s surplus plutonium

disposition program. The purpose of the DOE program is to ensure that plutonium produced

for nuclear weapons and declared excess to national security is converted to proliferationresistant forms.

This final environmental impact statement (FEIS) was prepared in compliance with the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s)

regulations for implementing NEPA, and the guidance provided by the Council on

Environmental Quality regulations implementing the procedural provisions of NEPA. This FEIS

evaluates the potential environmental impacts of the proposed action. The document discusses

the purpose and need for the proposed action, describes the proposed action and its

reasonable alternatives, describes the environment potentially affected by the proposal,

presents and compares the potential environmental impacts resulting from the proposed action

and its alternatives, and identifies mitigation measures that could eliminate or lessen the

potential environmental impacts. The document also includes comments received on the draft

environmental impact statement and NRC’s responses.
iv
v

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii

1 PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.1.1 Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.1.2 MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

1.2 Description of the Proposed Action and Connected Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

1.2.1 Proposed Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

1.2.2 Connected Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

1.3 Purpose of and Need for the Proposed Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

1.4 Scope of the EIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12

1.4.1 Scoping Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12

1.4.2 Issues Studied in Detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15

1.4.3 Issues Eliminated from Detailed Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16

1.4.4 Preparation of the Final Environmental Impact Statement . . . . . . . 1-16

1.4.5 Other National Environmental Policy Act Documents Related

to This Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16

1.5 Cooperating Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17

1.6 Other State and Federal Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17

1.7 References for Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18

2 ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

2.1 No-Action Alternative — Continued Storage of Surplus Plutonium . . . . . . . . 2-1

2.2 Proposed Action — Description of Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication

Facilities and Connected Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

2.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

2.2.2 Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

2.2.2.1 Description of the Pit Disassembly 

and Conversion Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

2.2.2.2 Processes Occurring in the PDCF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

2.2.2.3 Radioactive Effluents and Wastes at the PDCF . . . . . . . 2-6

2.2.3 MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

2.2.3.1 Description of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility . . . . . . . 2-6

2.2.3.2 Processes Occurring in the Proposed MOX Facility . . . . 2-8

2.2.3.3 Radioactive Effluents and Wastes 

at the Proposed MOX Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

2.2.4 Waste Solidification Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14

2.2.4.1 Description of the Waste Solidification Building . . . . . . . 2-14

2.2.4.2 Processes Occurring in the WSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15

2.2.4.3 Radioactive Effluents and Wastes at the WSB . . . . . . . . 2-17

2.2.5 Sand Filter Technology Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
vi

CONTENTS (Cont.)

2.3 Alternatives Considered But Not Analyzed in Detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19

2.3.1 MOX Facility Location in F-Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19

2.3.2 Technology and Design Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20

2.3.2.1 Dry Compared to Wet Impurity Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20

2.3.2.2 Reagent Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20

2.3.2.3 Acid Recovery Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21

2.3.2.4 Glovebox Cooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21

2.3.2.5 Treatment of Aqueous Laboratory Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21

2.3.2.6 Pellet Grinding Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22

2.3.2.7 Facility Heat Exchangers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22

2.3.2.8 Physical Security Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22

2.3.2.9 Material Transfer from the PDCF to the 

Proposed MOX Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22

2.3.3 Immobilization of Surplus Plutonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23

2.3.4 Off-Specification MOX Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24

2.3.5 Parallex Project Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25

2.3.6 MIX MOX Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-26

2.4 Comparison of Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27

2.5 Recommendation Regarding the Proposed Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-39

2.6 References for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-39

3 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.1 General Site Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.2 Geology, Seismology, and Soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.2.1 Geology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

3.2.2 Seismology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

3.2.3 Soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

3.3 Hydrology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

3.3.1 Surface Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

3.3.2 Groundwater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

3.4 Meteorology, Emissions, Air Quality, and Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14

3.4.1 Meteorology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14

3.4.2 Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17

3.4.3 Air Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-18

3.4.4 Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25

3.5 Ecology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-26

3.5.1 Terrestrial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-26

3.5.1.1 Vegetation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27

3.5.1.2 Wildlife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29

3.5.2 Aquatic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-32

3.5.3 Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33

3.5.4 Protected Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-34

3.6 Land Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-35

3.6.1 Savannah River Site Land Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-35

3.6.2 Off-Site Land Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36

3.7 Cultural and Paleontological Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36

3.7.1 Archaeological Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37
vii

CONTENTS (Cont.)

3.7.2 Historic Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39

3.7.3 Traditional Cultural Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39

3.7.4 Paleontological Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39

3.8 Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-40

3.8.1 Electricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-40

3.8.2 Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-40

3.8.3 Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-40

3.8.4 Roads and Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-41

3.8.5 Site Safety Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-41

3.9 Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-41

3.10 Human Health Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-45

3.10.1 Hazard Exposure Pathways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46

3.10.1.1 Pathways for Human Exposure to Radiation 

and Radioactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46

3.10.1.2 Pathways for Human Exposure to Chemicals . . . . . . . . 3-47

3.10.1.3 Physical Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47

3.10.2 Receptors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48

3.10.3 Baseline Radiological Dose and Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49

3.10.4 Baseline Chemical Exposure and Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-53

3.10.4.1 Chemical Risk Assessment Background . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-53

3.10.4.2 SRS Chemical Baseline Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-54

3.10.5 Baseline Physical Hazard Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-56

3.11 Socioeconomics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-58

3.11.1 Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-58

3.11.2 Employment and Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-58

3.11.3 Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-59

3.11.4 Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-59

3.11.5 Community Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-61

3.11.6 Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-64

3.12 Aesthetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-67

3.12.1 General Description of the Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-67

3.12.2 Description of the Location of the Proposed Facilities . . . . . . . . . . 3-67

3.13 References for Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-67

4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

4.2 Impacts of the No-Action Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

4.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

4.2.2 Human Health Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

4.2.2.1 Radiological Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

4.2.2.2 Chemical Exposure and Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

4.2.2.3 Physical Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4.2.2.4 Facility Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4.2.3 Air Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4.2.4 Hydrology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

4.2.5 Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
viii

CONTENTS (Cont.)

4.3 Impacts of the Proposed Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

4.3.1 Human Health Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

4.3.1.1 Radiological Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

4.3.1.2 Chemical Exposure and Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11

4.3.1.3 Physical Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14

4.3.2 Air Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14

4.3.2.1 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17

4.3.2.2 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18

4.3.3 Hydrology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24

4.3.3.1 Surface Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24

4.3.3.2 Groundwater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-25

4.3.4 Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-26

4.3.4.1 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-27

4.3.4.2 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-30

4.3.5 Accident Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-37

4.3.5.1 Accidents Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-37

4.3.5.2 Radiological Human Health Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-45

4.3.5.3 Chemical Human Health Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-50

4.3.5.4 Hydrology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-52

4.3.5.5 Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-54

4.3.6 Deactivation and Decommissioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-55

4.3.6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-55

4.3.6.2 Decommissioning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-56

4.3.6.3 Decommissioning Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-57

4.3.7 Environmental Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-60

4.3.7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-60

4.3.7.2 Impacts of the No-Action Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-64

4.3.7.3 Impacts of the Proposed Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-67

4.3.8 Sand Filter Technology Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-69

4.4 Indirect Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-71

4.4.1 Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-71

4.4.1.1 Scope of the Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-71

4.4.1.2 Transportation Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-73

4.4.1.3 Highly Enriched Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-77

4.4.1.4 Spent MOX Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-78

4.4.2 Conversion of Uranium Hexafluoride to Uranium Dioxide . . . . . . . . 4-79

4.4.3 MOX Fuel Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-79

4.5 Cumulative Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-81

4.5.1 Cumulative Impacts at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-81

4.5.1.1 Cumulative Impacts of the MOX, PDCF, 

and WSB Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-86

4.5.1.2 Cumulative Impacts of the No-Action Alternative . . . . . . 4-94

4.5.2 Cumulative Impacts of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-94

4.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-95

4.6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-95

4.6.2 National Costs and Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-96
ix

CONTENTS (Cont.)

4.6.3 Regional Costs and Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-98

4.6.3.1 Regional Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-98

4.6.3.2 Regional Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-100

4.7 Resource Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-102

4.7.1 Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-102

4.7.2 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources . . . . . . . 4-108

4.7.3 Relationship between Short-Term Uses of the Environment

and Long-Term Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-109

4.8 References for Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-111

5 MITIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

5.2 Mitigation Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

5.2.1 Hydrology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

5.2.2 Soils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

5.2.3 Ecology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9

5.2.4 Air Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10

5.2.5 Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11

5.2.6 Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

5.2.7 Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

5.2.8 Human Health Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

5.2.9 Cultural, Historical, and Paleontological Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14

5.2.10 Aesthetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15

5.2.11 Socioeconomics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15

5.2.12 Environmental Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16

5.3 References for Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18

6 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND PERMITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

6.1 References for Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12

7 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

8 LIST OF PREPARERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

APPENDIX A: Protected Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

APPENDIX B: Letters of Consultation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

APPENDIX C: Transportation Risk Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

APPENDIX D: Socioeconomics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

APPENDIX E: Human Health Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1

APPENDIX F: Air Quality Impact Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1
x

CONTENTS (Cont.)

APPENDIX G: Additional Impacts of the No-Action Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1

APPENDIX H: Additional Impacts of the Proposed Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-1

APPENDIX I: Scoping Summary Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-1

APPENDIX J: Public Comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement

and NRC Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J-1

APPENDIX K: Commenter and Comment Document Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K-1

APPENDIX L: Public Comment Letters and Transcripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L-1
xi

FIGURES

1.1 Location of the Savannah River Site and the F-Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

1.2 Locations of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB

in the F-Area on the SRS complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

1.3 Locations of DOE facilities containing surplus plutonium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

2.1 Principal steps in the aqueous polishing process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

2.2 Principal steps in the fuel fabrication process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10

3.1 Regional location of the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

3.2 Locations of principal surface water features at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

3.3 Locations of surface water and wetlands in the F-Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

3.4 Aquifers at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11

3.5 Annual wind rose for the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16

3.6 Air quality control regions, South Carolina and Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-21

3.7 Current land cover in the area of the project site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-30

3.8 Roadways in the vicinity of the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-42

4.1 Waste streams generated by the proposed MOX facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-34

4.2 Minority population concentration in census block groups 

within an 80-km radius of the SRS F-Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-65

4.3 Low-income population concentration in census block groups 

within an 80-km radius of the SRS F-Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-66

C.1 Trailer carrying five UF6 cylinders in overpacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-15

C.2 MOX fresh fuel package loaded in SGT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-16

C.3 Scheme for NUREG-0170 classification by accident severity category

for truck accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-17

F.1 Receptor locations used in air quality modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-12

H.1 Areas affected by facility construction activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-6
xii

TABLES

1.1 Surplus plutonium inventories at DOE sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

2.1 Comparison of alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-28

3.1 Estimated emissions from four counties around the SRS and SRS point

sources in 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-19

3.2 Toxic air pollutant emissions at the SRS in 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-20

3.3 Ambient air quality standards and range of pollutant levels in

the vicinity of the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22

3.4 Aiken County maximum allowable noise levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25

3.5 Major forest types at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-28

3.6 Current waste generation rates and inventories at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43

3.7 Sources and contributions to the U.S. average individual radiation dose . . . . . 3-51

3.8 Radioactive atmospheric releases from SRS operations for 2000 . . . . . . . . . . 3-52

3.9 Radioactive liquid releases from SRS operations for 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-53

3.10 Estimated radiation exposures to the public from SRS emissions in 2000 . . . . 3-54

3.11 Modeled site boundary ambient concentrations of select SRS 

toxic air pollutant emissions in comparison with SCDHEC 

standards and EPA health risk-based guideline levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-57

3.12 ROI population statistics for selected years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-59

3.13 REA employment by industry, 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-60

3.14 REA unemployment rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-60

3.15 REA personal income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-61

3.16 City, county, and ROI housing characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-62

3.17 Local public service employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-63

3.18 Local physicians data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-65

3.19 Local school district data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-65

3.20 Local medical facility data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-66
xiii

TABLES (Cont.)

3.21 Average annual daily traffic in the vicinity of the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-66

4.1 Radiological impacts from continued plutonium storage

in current locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

4.2 Annual water usage and wastewater discharges for the sites

of continued plutonium storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

4.3 Annual estimated radiological impacts to facility workers,

SRS employees, and the public from normal operations 

at the proposed facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9

4.4 Annual physical hazard impacts from normal operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15

4.5 MOX facility and WSB construction emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18

4.6 Maximum air quality impacts during construction of the facility . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19

4.7 MOX, PDCF, and WSB operations emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-21

4.8 Maximum air quality impacts during operation of the proposed facilities . . . . . 4-22

4.9 Comparison of maximum concentration increments

and PSD increments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-23

4.10 Annual waste volumes from the construction of the facilities compared

with waste management capacities at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-28

4.11 Waste volumes from the 10-year operational period of the facilities 

compared with waste management capacities at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-31

4.12 Accidents evaluated for the proposed facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-38

4.13 Estimated human health radiological impacts to SRS employees

from hypothetical facility accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-40

4.14 Estimated human health radiological impacts to the collective

off-site public from hypothetical facility accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-41

4.15 Estimated human health radiological impacts to the maximally 

exposed member of the public from hypothetical facility accidents . . . . . . . . . 4-43

4.16 Potential impacts of accidental chemical releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-53

4.17 Summary of radiological impacts from routine facility decommissioning . . . . . 4-57

4.18 Minority population characteristics in the vicinity of the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-63
xiv

TABLES (Cont.)

4.19 Low-income population characteristics in the vicinity of the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . 4-64

4.20 Comparison of waste volume and disposal cost for HEPA 

and sand filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-70

4.21 Total collective population transportation risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-75

4.22 Routine single-shipment impacts to a maximally exposed individual . . . . . . . . 4-77

4.23 Comparison of human exposure for ammonium diuranate

and dry conversion processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-79

4.24 Estimated cumulative impacts to air quality from MOX, PDCF,

and WSB facility operations and other activities at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-87

4.25 Estimated annual cumulative radiological dose and latent cancer

fatalities resulting from MOX, PDCF, and WSB facility operations

and other activities at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-89

4.26 Estimated cumulative waste generation at the SRS resulting from 

operation of the MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilities 

and other activities at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-91

4.27 Estimated cumulative impacts to resource use and employment

from MOX, PDCF, and WSB facility operations and other activities

at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-93

4.28 Estimated cumulative transportation impacts of facility operations

and shipment of radioactive materials from other sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-95

4.29 Summary of project costs and benefits in the REA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-97

4.30 Unavoidable impacts of constructing and operating

the proposed facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-103

4.31 Irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources for

the proposed MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-110

5.1 Summary of DCS mitigation commitments and additional measures

identified by NRC staff for reducing or avoiding impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

6.1 Applicable environmental regulations and consents or activities . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

A.1 Rare, threatened, and endangered species from Aiken and Barnwell 

Counties, South Carolina, and Burke County, Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-4

C.1 Summary route data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-11
xv

TABLES (Cont.)

C.2 Shipment information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-14

C.3 Single-shipment radionuclide inventories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-14

C.4 Fractional occurrences for truck accidents by severity category

and population density zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-18

C.5 Estimated release fractions for Type A and Type B packages

under various accident severity categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-19

C.6 External dose rates and package sizes used in RADTRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-22

C.7 General RADTRAN input parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-22

C.8 Single-shipment collective population transportation risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-25

D.1 Jurisdictions included in the regional economic area and ROI 

at the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-4

D.2 ROI local government financial data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-8

D.3 ROI school district financial data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-13

E.1 Chemical inventory, spill quantity, concentrations, and mole 

fraction calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-4

E.2 Scenario meteorology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-10

E.3 Evaporative release modeling results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-11

E.4 Physical property data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-14

E.5 Estimated annual radiological releases from the facilities

during normal operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-19

E.6 SRS employee population distribution centered at the proposed

MOX facility on the SRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-20

E.7 Joint frequency distribution used for calculation of receptor dose

from facility air emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-21

E.8 Projected off-site population distribution at the SRS for the public

for the year 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-23

E.9 Ingestion parameters used in GENII for calculation of radiological 

exposure of the public for normal and accidental air emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . E-24
xvi

TABLES (Cont.)

E.10 Food production data used in GENII for calculation of radiological

ingestion exposure of the public for normal and accidental air emissions . . . . E-26

E.11 Centerline distance to site boundary from the proposed MOX facility

stack for the primary 16 compass directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-29

E.12 Source terms for detailed accident analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-29

E.13 Radionuclide quantities released to the atmosphere

for each accident type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-30

F.1 Emission factors, activity levels, and emissions for facility construction . . . . . . F-5

F.2 Emission factors, activity levels, and emissions for 

emergency generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-8

F.3 Process emissions during operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-10

F.4 Characteristics of modeled sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-13

H.1 Effects of construction on socioeconomics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-14

H.2 Effects of operations on socioeconomics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-16
xvii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The consortium of Duke Project Services Group, Inc., COGEMA, Inc., and Stone & Webster,

Inc., has formed a Limited Liability Company called Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS). 

DCS has been hired by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to design, construct, and operate

a facility (the proposed MOX facility) that would convert depleted uranium and surplus

weapons-grade plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The DOE is responsible for the surplus

plutonium disposition program for the United States. Within this program, the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the independent responsibility of determining whether the

proposed MOX facility can be built and operated in a safe and environmentally acceptable

manner. The proposed action requiring the February 2003 draft environmental impact

statement (DEIS) and this NRC final environmental impact statement (FEIS) involves a decision

by the NRC whether to authorize DCS to construct and later operate the proposed MOX facility

at DOE’s Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. DCS has submitted to the NRC,

among other documents, a revised Construction Authorization Request (CAR) and a revised

environmental report (ER), in seeking authority to begin constructing the proposed MOX facility. 

This FEIS was prepared by the staff of the NRC and its contractor, Argonne National

Laboratory, and complies with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), NRC regulations

for implementing NEPA (Title 10, Part 51 of the Code of Federal Regulations [10 CFR Part 51]),

and the applicable Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations. 

The proposed MOX facility would convert 34 metric tons (MT) (37.5 tons) of surplus weaponsgrade plutonium into MOX fuel. This facility would be built on 16.6 ha (41 acres) of land in the

F-Area of the SRS. If the NRC approves the CAR, DCS plans to request a 10 CFR Part 70

license to possess and use special nuclear material at the proposed MOX facility. Such a

license would allow DCS to operate the proposed MOX facility for 20 years. The facility would

be designed for a maximum annual throughput of 3.5 MT (3.9 tons) of plutonium.

Feedstock (surplus plutonium dioxide and depleted uranium dioxide) would be required to be

transported to the SRS to make the MOX fuel. The surplus plutonium is currently stored at

seven DOE facilities at various locations in the United States. Additionally, depleted uranium

hexafluoride would need to be transported from a DOE site (assumed to be the gaseous

diffusion uranium enrichment facility in Portsmouth, Ohio) to a commercial fuel fabrication

facility (assumed to be the Global Nuclear Fuel Americas, LLC, in Wilmington, North Carolina),

where it would be converted to depleted uranium dioxide, which would then be transported to

the SRS. Once manufactured, the MOX fuel would be transported to mission reactors, where it

would be irradiated. For purposes of complying with NEPA’s requirements, it is assumed that

one or more reactors will later be authorized by the NRC to use MOX fuel, and the FEIS

includes a generic evaluation of using MOX fuel in a reactor. In order for a specific commercial

reactor to use MOX fuel, an amendment to its 10 CFR Part 50 NRC license would be required. 

The NRC would analyze the site-specific environmental impacts related to such an amendment

if and when such a request was made to the NRC. Following irradiation and storage at reactor

sites, the spent MOX fuel would be transported to a geologic repository (assuming one is later
xviii

licensed by the NRC to operate) for final disposal, and the FEIS includes a discussion of spent

MOX fuel transportation impacts.

In addition to presenting the potential environmental impacts of the proposed MOX facility and

the related fuel cycle impacts, this FEIS discusses two proposed DOE facilities — the Pit

Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) and the Waste Solidification Building (WSB) —

which would also be located at the SRS, that would be required to support operation of the

proposed MOX facility. The PDCF would be required to convert approximately 25.6 MT

(28.2 tons) of surplus plutonium from a metallic form to plutonium dioxide powder. The

remaining quantity of surplus plutonium, called “alternate feedstock,” would be in a form that

would be suitable to go directly to the proposed MOX facility. The proposed MOX facility would

remove impurities from the plutonium dioxide and mix it with depleted uranium dioxide to make

MOX fuel.

The WSB would process liquid waste streams from the PDCF and proposed MOX facility. The

WSB may also be used for temporary storage and processing of other waste forms generated

at the proposed MOX facility and the PDCF before such wastes are transferred to the SRS

waste management system or shipped off-site for disposition. In addition, infrastructure

upgrades would be needed to support the proposed MOX facility. These upgrades would

include constructing waste transfer pipelines, realigning electric utility lines, and adding access

roads. 

A brief summary of FEIS Chapters 1-6 follows. Chapter 1 of the FEIS discusses the purpose

and need for this action and its relationship to the DOE’s surplus plutonium disposition program. 

The fundamental purpose of this DOE program is to ensure that surplus weapons-grade

plutonium is converted to proliferation-resistant forms. The DOE’s program is intended to lay

the foundation for parallel disposition of excess Russian plutonium, thereby protecting against

proliferation of materials capable of making weapons of mass destruction. 

Chapter 2 of this FEIS describes the proposed action and alternatives to the proposed action, 

including the no-action alternative. The no-action alternative consists of the continued storage

of surplus plutonium at various locations throughout the DOE complex, in the event the NRC

does not approve the proposed MOX facility. This alternative is evaluated in detail in Chapter 4. 

Other alternatives to the proposed action discussed in Chapter 2 include alternate locations for

the proposed MOX facility in the F-Area, alternate technology and design options, immobilizing

surplus plutonium instead of producing MOX fuel, deliberately making off-specification MOX

fuel, the “MIX MOX” alternative, and the Parallex Project (which involves irradiating the MOX

fuel in Canadian deuterium uranium reactors).

Chapter 3 describes the environment that would be affected by the proposed action and

includes discussions on soils, hydrology, air quality, local ecology, waste management, risks to

human health, and socioeconomic issues.

Chapter 4 evaluates and compares the environmental effects of the proposed action and the

no-action alternative. Significant or more important potential impacts are discussed in

Chapter 4, which includes the following topics: (1) human health, (2) air quality, (3) hydrology,
xix

(4) waste management, (5) accident impacts, (6) decommissioning, and (7) environmental

justice. Indirect impacts of transportation of radioactive materials, conversion of depleted

uranium, and reactor use are discussed in Chapter 4. The following potential impacts for the

no-action alternative and proposed action are considered to be less significant and are

discussed in Appendixes G and H: (1) geology, seismology, and soils; (2) noise; (3) ecology;

(4) land use; (5) cultural and paleontological resources; (6) infrastructure; and

(7) socioeconomics. A summary of the significant or more important potential impacts

discussed in Chapter 4 is presented below.

The annual collective dose to members of the public (i.e., those living and working within 80 km

[50 mi] of the SRS) produced by routine operation of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and

the WSB would be expected to result in a latent cancer fatality (LCF) rate of approximately

0.0009/yr or less. Routine operation of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB is

expected to produce small air quality impacts and would not cause exceedance of any ambient

air quality standard level for criteria pollutants at the SRS.

Construction and routine operation of the proposed facilities would not be expected to cause

any disproportionately high and adverse impacts to low-income or minority populations in the

SRS vicinity. Of the accidents evaluated, a hypothetical PDCF tritium release accident had the

highest estimated short-term impacts, approximately 3 LCFs among members of the off-site

public. Such an accident also had the highest estimated 1-year exposure impact, including the

ingestion dose, of up to 100 LCFs among members of the off-site public. However, it is

regarded as highly unlikely that such an accident would occur, and the risk to any population,

including low-income and minority communities, is considered to be low. Nevertheless, the

communities most likely to be affected by a significant accident would be minority or lowincome, given the demographics and prevailing wind direction. The extent to which low-income

or minority population groups would be affected would depend on the amount of material

released and the direction and speed of the wind. 

Transportation of uranium and plutonium feedstock materials, transuranic waste, fresh MOX

fuel, and spent MOX fuel would result in approximately 3,300,000 to 8,200,000 km (2,050,000

to 5,100,000 mi) traveled by 1,497 to 3,512 truck shipments over the operations period of the

proposed MOX facility. Up to 1 LCF might be expected from the radioactive nature of the

cargo. (Estimated LCFs for members of the public and the transportation crews were 0.2 to 0.4

and 0.1 to 0.3, respectively.) One to two latent fatalities from vehicle emissions were estimated,

and no fatalities (0.078 to 0.20 fatality) from the physical trauma of potential vehicle accidents

were estimated.

Chapter 4 of the FEIS also evaluates the use of MOX fuel in a generic reactor using a 40%

MOX fuel core. For both normal operations and design-basis accidents, the impacts of using

MOX fuel in a reactor would not be significantly different from the impacts of a reactor using

100% low-enriched uranium fuel. For highly unlikely beyond-design-basis accidents, the

impacts for a reactor using a 40% MOX fuel core could be up to 14% greater than for a reactor

using 100% low-enriched uranium fuel. Since no reactor licensee has yet sought the authority

to use MOX fuel, the transportation of fresh MOX fuel is also evaluated on a generic basis,

using a surrogate reactor located in the Midwest.
xx

Chapter 4 also presents the costs and benefits of the proposed action. The primary benefit of

operating the proposed MOX facility would be the resulting reduction in the supply of weaponsgrade plutonium available for unauthorized use. Converting surplus plutonium in this manner is

viewed as being a safer use/disposition strategy than the DOE’s continued storage of surplus

plutonium, as would occur under the no-action alternative, because it would reduce the number

of locations where the various forms of plutonium are stored. Further, converting

weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel in the United States — as opposed to immobilizing a

portion of it as the DOE had previously planned to do — lays the foundation for parallel

disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia, which distrusts immobilization because of its

failure to degrade the plutonium’s isotopic composition. Converting surplus plutonium into MOX

fuel is thus viewed as a better way of ensuring that weapons-usable material will not be

obtained by rogue states and terrorist groups. Implementing the proposed action is expected to

promote the above nonproliferation objectives. 

In addition to the above primary benefits, there would be secondary economic benefits of the

proposed action. Impacts of construction on the regional economic area (REA) and region of

influence (ROI) would be beneficial with respect to jobs and income. During operations, the

proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB would be expected to generate 490 direct and

780 indirect jobs, producing a total income of $64 million a year in the REA. The economic cost

benefit analysis for the proposed action shows an overall net benefit to the ROI and REA of

$1,940 million. National economic costs for the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB are

estimated to be $4,064 million (in 2003 dollars). The national economic benefits would include

adding employment and income in various sectors of the economy through the purchase of

goods and services required during construction and operation.

Chapter 5 of the FEIS identifies mitigation measures that could eliminate or lessen the potential

environmental impacts of the proposed action. The NRC evaluated proposed mitigation

measures identified by DCS and identified additional measures that could reduce or eliminate

adverse environmental impacts of the proposed action. On the basis of its independent review,

the NRC is making a preliminary conclusion that the potential significant impacts of the

proposed action can be mitigated. However, any possession and use license issued to DCS

should be conditioned on the commitments made by DCS and the various proposed NRC

mitigation requirements discussed in Chapter 5.

Chapter 6 presents the many federal, state, and local environmental requirements that would

be applicable to the proposed MOX facility.

After weighing the costs and benefits of the proposed action, comparing alternatives, and

considering the comments received on the DEIS (see FEIS Appendix J), the NRC staff, in

accordance with 10 CFR 51.91(d), includes in this FEIS its final NEPA recommendation

regarding the proposed action. As discussed further in Chapter 2, the NRC staff continues to

recommend that, unless safety issues mandate otherwise, the action called for is the issuance

of the proposed license to DCS, with conditions to protect environmental values. As stated in

Chapter 2, the NRC staff concludes that (1) the applicable environmental requirements

presented in FEIS Chapter 6 and (2) the proposed mitigation measures discussed in FEIS
xxi

Chapter 5 would eliminate or substantially lessen any potential adverse environmental impacts

associated with the proposed action.

Appendix J includes a summary of the comments and responses received on the DEIS.

Ninety-four commenters submitted about 750 comments on the DEIS. Appendix J also

identifies changes in the FEIS text based on the comments and revised accident analyses from

new design information for the WSB provided by DCS since publication of the DEIS.
xxii
xxiii

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following is a list of the acronyms, initialisms, abbreviations, and units of measure used in

this document. Some acronyms and abbreviations used only in tables, figures, equations, or as

reference callouts are defined in the respective tables, figures, equations, and reference lists.

Acronyms, Initialisms, and Abbreviations

7Q10 7-day low flow, 10-year recurrence flow

AADT average annual daily traffic

ADU ammonium diuranate

AEA Atomic Energy Act

Ag silver

AgNO3 silver nitrate

ALARA as low as reasonably achievable

ALI annual limit on intake

ALOHA Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (computer code)

Am americium

ANL-W Argonne National Laboratory-West

ANSI American National Standards Institute

APA aqueous polishing area

APSF Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility

AQCR Air Quality Control Region

BPIP Building Profile Input Program

BRP Reagents Processing Building

CAA Clean Air Act

CANDU Canadian Deuterium Uranium (reactor)

CAR Construction Authorization Request

CAS Chemical Abstract Services

CEDE committed effective dose equivalent

CEQ Council on Environmental Quality

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CH-TRU contact-handled transuranic (waste)

CIESIN Center for International Earth Science Information Network

CIF Consolidated Incineration Facility

CO carbon monoxide

CO2 carbon dioxide

CPT cone-penetration test

CSWTF Central Sanitary Wastewater Treatment Facility

CWA Clean Water Act
xxiv

D&D deactivation and decommissioning

DCP dry conversion process

DCS Duke Cogema Stone & Webster

DDE deep dose equivalent

DEIS draft environmental impact statement

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

DWPF Defense Waste Processing Facility

EA environmental assessment

EBR-II Experimental Breeder Reactor-II

EDE effective dose equivalent

EIS environmental impact statement

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ER Environmental Report

ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guideline

ETF Effluent Treatment Facility

FEIS final environmental impact statement

FGR Federal Guidance Report

FOF F-Area Outside Facility

FONSI Finding of No Significant Impact

FR Federal Register

FSER final safety evaluation report

FTE full-time equivalent

FY fiscal year

Ga gallium

GE General Electric

GENII Generation II (computer code)

GRP gross regional product

H2C2O4 oxalic acid

HEPA high-efficiency particulate air (filter)

HEU highly enriched uranium

HF hydrogen fluoride

HI hazard index

HLW high-level (radioactive) waste

HQ hazard quotient

HRCQ highway route controlled quantity

HSWA Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments

HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

HYDOX hydride-oxidation

ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection

IMPLAN Intelligent Multi-Resource Planning (computer code)
xxv

INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory

ISA integrated safety analysis

ISCST3 Industrial Source Complex Short-Term (version 3) model

ISFSI interim spent fuel storage installation

ITP in-tank precipitation

KAMS K-Area Material Storage (SRS)

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LCF latent cancer fatality

Ldn day-night average sound level

Leq equivalent sound pressure level

LEU low-enriched uranium

LLC Limited Liability Company

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LLW low-level (radioactive) waste

LSA low specific activity

LTA lead test assembly

MAR material at risk

MBTA Migratory Bird Treaty Act

MC&A material control and accounting

MEI maximally exposed individual

MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity (earthquake intensity scale)

MOX mixed oxide (plutonium dioxide and uranium dioxide)

MPQAP MOX Project Quality Assurance Plan

MSL mean sea level

MWMF Mixed Waste Management Facility

NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NERP National Environmental Research Park

NESHAPs National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

NMSS Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NRC)

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NO2 nitrogen dioxide

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NOI Notice of Intent

NOx nitrogen oxides

NPDES National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRHP National Register of Historic Places

NSC National Safety Council

NSPS New Source Performance Standards
xxvi

O3 ozone

OAQPS Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (EPA)

OFASB Old F-Area Seepage Basin

OHER Office of Health and Environmental Research (DOE)

OML oxalic mother liquor

ORR Oak Ridge Reservation

OSHA Occupational Health and Safety Administration

PAG protective action guide

PAH polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon

Pb lead

PDCF Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

PEIS programmatic environmental impact statement

PM particulate matter

PM10 particulate matter with a diameter less than or equal to 10 micrometers

PM2.5 particulate matter with a diameter less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers

PMF probable maximum flood

PSD Prevention of Significant Deterioration

PSSCs principal structures, systems, and components

Pu plutonium

Pu (IV) tetravalent plutonium

Pu (III) trivalent plutonium

PuO2 plutonium oxide

QA quality assurance

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

REA regional economic area

REG mitigation measures instituted to ensure compliance with regulations, permits,

and guidelines

RFETS Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

ROD Record of Decision

ROI region of influence

S&D PEIS Storage and Disposition Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

SA Supplement Analysis

SAAQS State Ambient Air Quality Standard

SC South Carolina; state route

SCAPA Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and Protective Action (DOE)

SCDHEC South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control

SCDNR South Carolina Department of Natural Resources

SCSHPO South Carolina State Historic Preservation Officer

SER safety evaluation report

SGT Safeguards Transporter

SHPO State Historic Preservation Office

SIP state implementation plan
xxvii

SNF spent nuclear fuel

SNM special nuclear material

SO2 sulfur dioxide

SOx sulfur oxides

SPCC spill prevention control and countermeasures

SPD surplus plutonium disposition

SPD EIS Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement

SPL sound pressure level

SR State Route

SRARP Savannah River Archaeological Research Program

SREL Savannah River Ecology Laboratory

SRS Savannah River Site

SWB standard waste box

TAP toxic air pollutant

TCDD tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin

TEDE total effective dose equivalent

TEEL temporary emergency exposure limit

TI transport index

TIGR thermally induced gallium removal

TRAGIS Transportation Routing Analysis Geographic Information System

TRU transuranic (radioactive waste)

TRUPACT transuranic package transporter

TSCA Toxic Substances Control Act

TSD Transportation Safeguards Division (DOE Albuquerque Operations Office)

TSP total suspended particulates

U uranium

UF6 uranium hexafluoride

UO2 uranium dioxide

U.S.C. United States Code

VOC volatile organic compound

VRM visual resource management

WAC waste acceptance criteria

WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

WM PEIS Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for

Managing Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous

Waste

WMA Wildlife Management Area

WSB Waste Solidification Building
xxviii

Units of Measure

Bq becquerel(s)

Btu British thermal unit(s)

Ci curie(s)

Ci microcurie(s)

cm centimeter(s)

d day(s)

dB decibel(s)

dBA A-weighted decibel(s)

dps disintegration(s) per second

C degree(s) Celsius

F degree(s) Fahrenheit

ft foot (feet)

ft2 square foot (feet)

ft3 cubic foot (feet)

g gram(s) or 

gravitational acceleration

g microgram(s)

gal gallon(s)

gpm gallon(s) per minute

h hour(s)

ha hectare(s)

hg mercury

Hz hertz

in. inch(es)

K kelvin degrees (temperature)

kg kilogram(s)

km kilometer(s)

km2 square kilometer(s)

kV kilovolt(s)

L liter(s)

lb pound(s)

m meter(s)

m2 square meter(s)

m3 cubic meter(s)

m micrometer(s)

mg milligram(s)

mi mile(s)

mi2 square mile(s)

min minutes

mm millimeter(s)

mo month(s)

mph mile(s) per hour

mrem millirem(s)

mSv millisievert(s)

MT metric ton(s)

MWh megawatt-hour(s)

nCi nanocurie(s)

Pa Pascal(s)

ppb part(s) per billion

ppm part(s) per million

s second(s)

Sv sievert(s)

yd3 cubic yard(s)

yr year(s)
1-1

1 PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR ACTION

1.1 Introduction

In 1992, at the end of the Cold War, the President commissioned the National Academy of

Sciences to study management and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable plutonium. 

Several agreements were subsequently reached with Russia on the mutual reduction of

plutonium stockpiles. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the surplus

plutonium disposition program for the United States. Within this program, the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the independent responsibility of reviewing a proposal to

design, construct, and operate a facility in the United States that would convert depleted

uranium dioxide and weapons-grade plutonium dioxide into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. A 1998

amendment to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 gave the NRC licensing and related

regulatory authority over the proposed facility. In accordance with the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA), 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) 4321 et seq., the proposal to build and

operate such a facility is being reviewed by the NRC in this final environmental impact

statement (FEIS), to evaluate the potential environmental impacts that would result if the

proposed action is taken. 

The surplus plutonium disposition program is discussed in Section 1.1.1. The proposed action

is described in Section 1.2, and the purpose and need for the proposed action are discussed in

Section 1.3. Section 1.4 describes the process used by the NRC to determine the scope of this

environmental impact statement (EIS), which identified the issues to be studied in detail and the

issues that do not require detailed study.

1.1.1 Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia took steps to mutually reduce

their respective stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium by declaring some of this plutonium

excess to national security needs. The surplus plutonium disposition program involves making

sure that this surplus plutonium cannot be used again to make nuclear weapons. The DOE

evaluated a number of strategies to disposition the U.S. stockpile of surplus plutonium and has

published two related EISs, a record of decision (ROD), and an amended ROD (DOE 1996,

1999, 2000, 2002). As part of this program, in 1999, the DOE selected a contractor, Duke

Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS), to design, construct, and operate a facility that would convert

uranium and weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel, as discussed further in Section 1.1.2.

To implement DOE’s surplus plutonium disposition program, the DOE ROD in January 2000 set

forth a “hybrid” approach, which involved immobilizing a portion of the surplus plutonium and

converting the remaining portion into nuclear reactor fuel. Three new facilities were proposed

for the DOE’s Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina to implement the hybrid approach. 

A Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) would convert metallic weapons material,

called pits, to plutonium dioxide powder. The proposed PDCF would be built and operated 
Purpose of and Need for Action

1 A metric ton (MT) equals 1,000 kilograms (kg) and is equivalent to 1.1 tons, or approximately

2,200 pounds (lb).

1-2

under the DOE’s jurisdiction and authority. A plutonium immobilization plant was proposed to

convert some of the plutonium dioxide powder from the PDCF and plutonium from other

sources into ceramic cylinders to be encapsulated in vitrified high-level waste. The Mixed

Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (hereafter referred to as “the proposed MOX facility”) would

convert the balance of the plutonium dioxide powder from the PDCF into MOX fuel for

subsequent irradiation in U.S. commercial reactors authorized by the NRC to use such fuel. 

Under its January 2000 ROD, the DOE planned to convert 33 metric tons (MT)1

 (36.4 tons) of

surplus plutonium into MOX fuel and to immobilize 17 MT (19 tons) in the plutonium

immobilization plant. Among the plutonium disposition program’s purposes is to reduce over

time the number of locations in the United States where the various forms of plutonium are

stored, to better ensure that weapons-usable material does not fall into the hands of rogue

states or terrorist groups. Irradiated MOX fuel would be highly radioactive, making it

inaccessible for reuse as nuclear weapons material. In September 2000, Russia and the

United States agreed to disposition 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus weapons-grade plutonium

from their respective stockpiles (White House 2000). Under this agreement, disposition may be

accomplished either by immobilization or by MOX fuel fabrication and subsequent irradiation. 

However in April 2002, the DOE issued an amended ROD (DOE 2002), in which it decided not

to pursue its hybrid approach due to budgetary constraints. The DOE determined that in order

to make progress with available funds, only one approach could be supported. Russia does not

consider immobilization alone to be an acceptable approach because immobilization, unlike the

irradiation of MOX fuel, fails to degrade the isotopic composition of the plutonium. Russia

further contends that the United States could easily retrieve plutonium from the immobilized

waste at a later date and reuse that plutonium in nuclear weapons (DOE 2002). Because an

immobilization-only approach would jeopardize Russia’s continued involvement in the joint effort

to reduce supplies of weapons-grade plutonium, the DOE decided that if only one disposition

approach is to be pursued, the MOX fuel approach is the preferred one. The DOE concluded

that implementation of the MOX-only approach is the key to successfully completing the

September 2000 agreement between Russia and the United States (DOE 2002). Accordingly,

the DOE decided to pursue a MOX-only approach, under which all 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus

weapons-grade plutonium would be converted into MOX fuel, and the DOE canceled the

plutonium immobilization plant. The DOE had earlier identified Duke Power Company’s four

reactors at the Catawba and McGuire stations (two at each station) as potential candidates to

irradiate MOX fuel. The potential candidate reactors can accommodate up to 25.5 MT

(28.2 tons) of surplus plutonium in MOX fuel. The DOE has not yet identified the additional

candidate reactors necessary to accommodate the additional MOX fuel (8.5 MT [9.4 tons]) to

be irradiated under the amended ROD. 

The DOE also issued a supplemental NEPA analysis on April 24, 2003 (DOE 2003). The

Supplement Analysis (SA) addressed the above-referenced changes in DOE’s surplus

plutonium disposition program, to determine whether the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final

Environmental Impact Statement (SPD EIS) (DOE 1999) should be supplemented. The SA
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-3

discussed how adoption of the MOX-only approach required additional aqueous processing

steps at the proposed MOX facility to remove impurities — mainly chlorides — from the

alternate feedstock material. Additional equipment at the proposed MOX facility to remove the

chlorides includes two dissolution lines, an enlarged annular tank, and a chlorine gas wash

column. The SA noted that the transuranic (TRU) waste generated by operation of the

proposed MOX facility would, after processing at the Waste Solidification Building (WSB), be

shipped from the SRS to the DOE’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE stated in its

SA that prior to obtaining the necessary clearances for shipping TRU waste to WIPP, the

amounts of such waste would be well within existing SRS storage capacity. The DOE further

found that TRU waste generated by operation of the proposed MOX facility would meet the

WIPP waste acceptance criteria, and that the impacts of packaging, transporting, and disposing

of such waste would be bounded by prior DOE environmental analyses. The SA concluded that

“the activities and potential environmental impacts associated with the proposed processing of

6.5 MT of surplus plutonium originally intended for immobilization and the increase in the total

amount of surplus plutonium to be fabricated into MOX fuel from 33 MT to 34 MT are not

different in kind, and only slightly in degree, from those described in the SPD EIS.” 

Accordingly, the DOE found no requirements for supplementing the SPD EIS.

1.1.2 MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility

As referenced above, the DOE selected DCS to design, construct, and operate the proposed

MOX facility. Because Congress gave the NRC licensing and related regulatory authority over

the proposed MOX facility, its construction and operation will require NRC approvals, issued

pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 70 (10 CFR Part 70), “Domestic

Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.” As part of its licensing review, the NRC has prepared

this FEIS in accordance with the NRC’s 10 CFR Part 51 regulations implementing NEPA and

the generally applicable Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations in 40 CFR

Part 1500. This FEIS addresses the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts related to building,

operating, and decommissioning the proposed MOX facility. Although the DOE has prepared

previous EISs that cover impacts of the proposed MOX facility on a programmatic level, the

NRC has prepared this EIS to incorporate

additional site-specific information and

design details in order to meet its NEPA

requirements as stated in 10 CFR Part 51.

To obtain approval to construct the facility,

DCS submitted a MOX Project Quality

Assurance Plan (MPQAP) on June 22,

2000, an Environmental Report (ER) on

December 19, 2000 (DCS 2000), a revised

MPQAP on January 29, 2001, and a

Construction Authorization Request (CAR)

on February 28, 2001 (DCS 2001). The

NRC then published its Notice of Intent to

prepare an EIS for the proposed MOX

Categories of Impacts

Impacts of the proposed and connected actions

include:

• Direct effects — caused by the proposed action

and occur at the same time and place,

• Indirect effects — occur later in time or are farther

removed in distance but are reasonably

foreseeable, and

• Cumulative impacts — potential impacts when the

proposed action is added to other past, present,

and reasonably foreseeable future actions.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-4

facility (NRC 2001a). Because of design changes in the proposed MOX facility resulting from

DOE’s amended ROD, DCS submitted Revision 2 of the ER on July 12, 2002 (DCS 2002a),

and an amended CAR on October 31, 2002 (DCS 2002b). DCS submitted Revision 3 of the ER

on June 20, 2003 (DCS 2003a), which updated Revision 2 to incorporate responses to requests

by the NRC for additional information and revised impacts from the WSB to include preliminary

design details provided by the DOE. DCS submitted Revision 4 of the ER on August 14, 2003

(DCS 2003b), which updated impacts from the WSB based on recent revisions by the DOE. 

On June 10, 2004, DCS submitted Revision 5 to the ER (DCS 2004a). This revision

incorporated changes in the facility design affecting waste volumes. In particular, the silver

recovery process was removed from the design. Other changes included movement of the

controlled area boundary to be colocated with the SRS site boundary, design refinements to the

WSB, and the decision to route the liquid low-level waste (LLW) streams from the proposed

MOX facility and the PDCF to the WSB rather than the Effluent Treatment Facility at the SRS. 

On the same date, DCS also submitted revisions to its CAR (DCS 2004b). If the amended CAR

is approved, DCS plans to submit its application for a 10 CFR Part 70 operating license. The

date for DCS filing such an application is not known at this time. 

The NRC’s decision-making process for the proposed MOX facility includes an environmental

review and a safety review (see text box on the MOX licensing process). In addition to this EIS,

which documents NRC’s environmental review, the NRC will prepare two final safety evaluation

reports (FSERs). The first FSER will evaluate the CAR and will address whether construction

of the proposed MOX facility may be authorized pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70 and the Atomic

Energy Act. In this regard, 10 CFR 70.23( b) states that the NRC will approve construction of a

plutonium processing and fuel fabrication facility if it finds that the design bases of the principal

structures, systems, and components (PSSCs) and the quality assurance (QA) program provide

reasonable assurance of protection against natural phenomena and the consequences of

potential accidents. The 10 CFR 70.23(b) safety findings on the CAR will be documented in the

first FSER, now scheduled to be issued in February 2005. The NRC will use the safety findings

in the first FSER and the environmental review in this EIS to decide whether or not to authorize

construction of the proposed MOX facility.

If construction is authorized, a second FSER would address whether the proposed MOX facility,

as built, may be authorized to operate under a 10 CFR Part 70 license. The second FSER

would evaluate a DCS application for a license to possess and use special nuclear material

(SNM) at the proposed MOX facility. DCS plans to submit such an application if the amended

CAR is approved. The safety findings in the second FSER and the environmental review in this

EIS would be used by the NRC to decide whether or not to issue an SNM possession and use

license to DCS, which would authorize operation of the proposed MOX facility.

Under NEPA, the scope of this EIS is broader than that of the FSERs. This EIS addresses the

environmental impacts of constructing, operating, and decommissioning the proposed MOX

facility and the environmental impacts of the alternatives considered. This EIS does not

address safety issues that are not considered to have potential environmental impacts. For

example, the effects of a postulated criticality accident are presented here because such an

accident could produce environmental impacts. However, the question of whether the criticality 
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-5

MOX Licensing Process

DCS has chosen to request authorization to build and operate a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility in

two steps. Step 1 was the Construction Authorization Request (CAR) initially filed by DCS in February 2001. 

The NRC staff is performing a safety review of the CAR and plans to issue a final safety evaluation report

(FSER) on the CAR in February 2005. As reflected in this environmental impact statement (EIS), the NRC staff

has also performed an environmental review evaluating the impacts of both the construction and operation of

the proposed MOX fuel fabrication facility.

If the NRC staff grants the CAR, DCS plans as Step 2 of the process to apply for a license to possess and use

special nuclear material (SNM) at the MOX fuel fabrication facility. If such an application is filed and accepted

for docketing, the NRC staff would publish a notice of opportunity for hearing in the Federal Register. This

notice would give individuals and organizations the opportunity to request the NRC to conduct an adjudicatory

hearing regarding any DCS request for an SNM license. NRC hearings are governed by the requirements in

10 CFR Part 2. Regardless of whether or not an adjudicatory hearing is held, the NRC staff would perform a

safety review of any DCS request for an SNM license, prepare a second FSER, and either issue DCS an

operating license or deny the application. The MOX licensing process is further summarized in the chart below.

SAFETY REVIEWS

Construction Authorization

• In a CAR, the applicant must

identify principal structures,

systems, and components

(PSSCs) that reduce the risk of

accidents and natural

phenomena hazards.

• The applicant must also address

baseline design criteria and

quality assurance (QA)

requirements. These include

issues such as fire protection,

criticality control, and quality

standards and records.

• The NRC staff issues a

construction-related FSER that

documents its findings on the

CAR and QA program

description.

License to Possess

and Use SNM

• DCS must also submit a license

application for authorization to

possess and use SNM.

• The NRC staff would issue a

second FSER that documents its

findings relative to the license

application.

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW

Environmental Impact

Statement

• Pursuant to the Code of

Federal Regulations, Title 10,

Part 51 (10 CFR Part 51)

implementing regulations for

the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA), the NRC

staff prepares a single EIS.

• The NRC EIS includes impacts

from both construction and

operation of the proposed

action and alternatives.

ADJUDICATION

Adjudication Hearing

• An adjudicatory hearing

regarding the CAR is now

being held.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-6

safety controls proposed by DCS would adequately prevent such an accident is part of the

NRC’s safety review and is not discussed in this EIS. 

1.2 Description of the Proposed Action and Connected Actions

As described further in Section 1.2.1, the proposed action involves a decision by NRC whether

or not to authorize DCS to construct and later operate the proposed MOX facility at the SRS to

convert 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to MOX fuel. Section 1.2.2

describes actions that are connected to the proposed action. Connected actions fall within the

scope of the actions evaluated in an EIS (40 CFR 1508.25). More detailed technical

information about the proposed action and connected actions is presented in Section 2.2.

1.2.1 Proposed Action

The proposed MOX facility would be built on

16.6 ha (41 acres) of land in the F-Area of

the SRS (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). DCS is

expected to request a license for 20 years. 

The facility would be designed for maximum

annual throughput of 3.5 MT (3.9 tons) of

plutonium. Impacts in the ER are based on

the maximum annual design capacity. This

FEIS is based on a total of 34 MT

(37.5 tons) of surplus plutonium. The rate

at which DCS actually processes the

plutonium would likely be less than the

facility’s design capacity. Therefore, actual

annual impacts should be less than those

presented in the ER. The period of

operation would likely be less than the

20-year license period. The actual period of

operation would vary depending on the

annual throughput over time. The 20-year

licensing period would allow deactivation

and decommissioning to occur prior to

license termination. For purposes of this

FEIS, a period of operation of 10 years is

assumed to bound impacts. If the actual period of operation is longer than 10 years as a result

of an actual throughput less than the maximum design capacity, the annual impacts would be

less, even though they would occur over a longer period of time.

Direct effects of the proposed action include effects resulting from construction, operation, and

decommissioning of the proposed MOX facility to convert 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus

plutonium into MOX fuel. Plutonium dioxide powder would be processed at the proposed MOX 

Proposed Action

• The proposed federal action is for the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission to authorize Duke

Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS) to build and

operate a facility to fabricate mixed oxide (MOX)

fuel.

• NEPA requires preparation of an EIS for major

federal actions that could significantly affect the

human environment.

• To operate the MOX facility, DCS would need an

NRC license to possess and use special nuclear

material (surplus plutonium from the U.S. nuclear

weapons program).

• Under contract with the DOE, DCS would build and

operate a facility to manufacture nuclear fuel using

surplus plutonium. 

• The NRC-licensed facility for fabricating nuclear

fuel would be located on the DOE’s Savannah

River Site.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-7

Figure 1.1. Location of the Savannah River Site and the F-Area (Source: DCS 2001).
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-8

Figure 1.2. Locations of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB

in the F-Area on the SRS complex (Source: DCS 2002a).
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-9

facility to remove impurities, such as americium and gallium, and would be mixed with the

depleted uranium dioxide to form the MOX fuel. The final blend for MOX fuel would have a

required plutonium content of 2.3% to 4.8% (percent by weight). The facility would be capable

of producing MOX fuel with a plutonium content of up to 6% (DCS 2001). 

1.2.2 Connected Actions

In order for the proposed MOX facility to

fulfill its function, other “connected actions”

would also occur. For example, the PDCF

would be the source of some of the

plutonium dioxide needed to make MOX

fuel. Therefore, the PDCF must be

constructed and authorized by the DOE to

operate so that the proposed MOX facility

would have the required material with which

to make MOX fuel. 

Feedstock (surplus plutonium dioxide and

depleted uranium dioxide) would be

required to be transported to the SRS to make the MOX fuel. Because the surplus plutonium is

currently stored at seven DOE facilities (see Figure 1.3 and Table 1.1), it would need to be

transported to the SRS (DOE 2000). The depleted uranium hexafluoride would first be

transported from a DOE site (assumed to be the gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment facility

in Portsmouth, Ohio) to an existing commercial fuel fabrication facility (assumed to be the

Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC, facility in Wilmington, North Carolina), where it would be

converted to depleted uranium dioxide, which would then be transported to the SRS. 

Two new DOE facilities (the PDCF and the WSB) are needed to support the proposed MOX

facility. The PDCF would be required to convert approximately 25.6 MT (28.2 tons) of surplus

plutonium metal to plutonium dioxide. The remaining quantity of surplus plutonium, called

“alternate feedstock,” would be in a form that would be suitable to go directly to the proposed

MOX facility. The WSB would process liquid waste streams from the PDCF and the proposed

MOX facility. Since the PDCF and WSB would not be under NRC’s Atomic Energy Act

jurisdiction, the safety issues pertaining to the PDCF and WSB will not be addressed by the

NRC in the FSERs.

As discussed in Section 4.3.4, the wastes generated at the proposed MOX facility and the

PDCF would be managed at the WSB, sent to the SRS waste management system, or sent to

approved facilities off the SRS property for disposition. In addition, infrastructure upgrades

would be needed to support the proposed MOX facility. These upgrades include waste transfer

pipelines, electric utility line realignment, and addition of access roads. 

The FEIS also evaluates transporting the fresh (unirradiated) MOX fuel made by the proposed

MOX facility (assuming it is built and is authorized to operate) to mission reactors for irradiation. 

Connected Actions

Actions closely related to the proposed action that:

• Automatically trigger other actions which may

require environmental impact statements,

• Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are

taken previously or simultaneously, or

• Are interdependent parts of a larger action and

depend on the larger action for their justification.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-10

Figure 1.3. Locations of DOE facilities containing surplus plutonium (Source: Adapted from DOE 1999).
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-11

This page is being withheld pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(a).
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-12

Proposed Action Elements

• Construction, operation, and

decommissioning of proposed MOX facility,

PDCF, and the WSB;

• Infrastructure upgrades;

• Shipment of surplus plutonium from the DOE

sites to the SRS;

• Transport of depleted uranium hexafluoride

from the DOE facility at Portsmouth, Ohio, to

the commercial fuel fabrication facility in

Wilmington, North Carolina;

• Transport of depleted uranium oxide from the

Wilmington facility to the SRS;

• Transport of MOX fuel and fuel irradiation in

surrogate reactors; and

• Spent MOX fuel transport to a geologic

repository.

to proliferation-resistant forms (DOE 1999). The purpose and need discussion establishes a

range of reasonable alternatives to the proposed action that can satisfy this underlying purpose

and need.

Following the subsequent September 2000 surplus plutonium disposition agreement between

Russia and the United States (White House 2000), the DOE determined that a MOX-only

approach best ensures the joint reduction of existing plutonium stockpiles held by the two

nations, and concluded in its amended ROD that reliance on this approach is the key to

successfully completing the agreement (DOE 2002). The result of this action would be to

reduce over time the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium are stored and

to ensure that this weapons-usable material does not fall into the hands of rogue states or

terrorist groups.

1.4 Scope of the EIS

1.4.1 Scoping Process

On March 7, 2001, the NRC issued a Notice of

Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register

(66 FR 13794) to prepare an EIS for

construction and operation of the proposed

MOX facility at the SRS near Aiken, South

Carolina. In the NOI, NRC announced plans for

two scoping meetings: one in North Augusta,

South Carolina, on April 17, 2001, and another

in Savannah, Georgia, on April 18, 2001. In a

second Federal Register notice on April 11,

2001 (66 FR 18223), the NRC announced that

a third scoping meeting would be held in

Charlotte, North Carolina, on May 8, 2001.

The three scoping meetings were held as

planned. At each meeting, the NRC staff

distributed background materials on the MOX

fuel program and NRC’s plans for conducting licensing and environmental reviews for the

facility. An open house held before each meeting provided attendees an opportunity to view

informational materials and talk informally with NRC staff. During the meeting, the NRC staff

presented an overview of the NRC’s role in the facility licensing process and described the

NRC’s approach to meeting its obligations under NEPA. The presentations were followed by a

question and answer period in which the NRC staff responded to questions from attendees. 

The majority of time at the meetings was devoted to allowing individuals to express their views

on the scope of the EIS.
Purpose of and Need for Action

2 The Scoping Summary Report (Appendix I) contains a complete summary of all comments received.

1-13

A total of about 300 individuals attended the three scoping meetings, and about 80 of them

asked questions or provided oral comments at the meetings. In addition, approximately

60 individuals or organizations submitted written comments to the NRC by regular mail, fax

transmittal, e-mail, or in person at the meetings. Some of the individuals who provided written

comments also spoke at the meetings. Some individuals attended and offered comments at

more than one meeting. Although issues raised during the scoping period were considered in

the preparation of the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS), some of those issues were

either analyzed in less detail or were not analyzed at all, depending on their relevance to the

proposed action and the anticipated impacts. The full scoping summary report (NRC 2001b) is

included as Appendix I.

The scoping process helped to determine the scope of the EIS and identify significant issues to

be analyzed in depth. For instance, two technology options for the proposed action were

identified during the scoping process. The first option is to substitute sand filters for the

proposed high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters to control air emissions from the facility. 

The second option is to substitute a dry process for the proposed wet process to remove

impurities from plutonium dioxide powder. Cumulative impacts of the proposed action, in

addition to other contaminant sources, were also identified as a relevant issue.

The no-action alternative, if NRC does not authorize construction or operation of the proposed

MOX facility, was also refined through the scoping process. In addition to the no-action

alternative of continued storage of all of the surplus weapons-grade plutonium at the present

DOE sites in an unaltered form, the public suggested considering immobilizing all of the surplus

weapons-grade plutonium at the SRS as a no-action alternative.

The scoping process identified several relevant areas of concern to the public.2

 Concerns were

expressed about the existing groundwater contamination at the SRS and the potential for the

proposed facility and waste disposal to further deteriorate groundwater quality. Existing deep

boreholes at the SRS were identified as a possible conduit for contaminant migration. 

Concerns were also expressed about the existing contamination of the Savannah River and the

potential for the proposed facility to affect surface water quality. The impacts of facility-induced

surface water quality changes on the downstream fishing and marine economy and on the

downstream tidal wetlands were also concerns raised at the scoping meetings. Similarly,

concerns were expressed regarding air quality impacts from both chemical and radiological

materials.

The potential for human health impacts to the public and workers was also a concern. This

included workers at the proposed facility, at the SRS, at the proposed reactors, and at disposal

facilities. It was also suggested that the impacts to groups other than the “Standard Man” be

assessed, such as unborn fetuses, children, and elderly populations. Impacts from possible

accidents at the proposed facility during transport of radioactive materials and at the proposed

reactors also were a significant concern. It was suggested that the worst-case accidents

should be evaluated, including natural disasters and terrorist acts.
Purpose of and Need for Action

3 The Price-Anderson Act limits the liability of the nuclear industry in the event of a nuclear accident in

the United States.

1-14

Some issues identified during the scoping process were considered to be beyond the scope of

the EIS. In general, these issues are not directly related to the assessment of potential impacts

from the proposed action now under consideration. The lack of in-depth discussion in the EIS,

however, does not imply that an issue or concern lacks value.

A number of commenters requested that the SPD EIS prepared by the DOE be supplemented

and many of the decisions already made by the DOE be revisited. Because the scope of the

EIS was limited to the action now under review by the NRC, issues pertaining to decisions

already made by the DOE and not affected by new information were addressed by referencing

the appropriate DOE analysis.

Comments that seek to alter international treaties or affect national, state, or local laws,

statutes, or regulations (e.g., comments that asked to alter Price-Anderson Act3

 limits) were not

addressed because they do not pertain to reasonably foreseeable impacts arising from the

construction and operation of the proposed MOX facility.

Comments on the scope of assessing reactor use impacts in the EIS for the proposed MOX

facility were varied. Considering that the environmental impact of reactor use of MOX fuel was

a significant issue with many commenters, it is appropriate to consider those impacts in the EIS. 

However, the currently available information does not lend itself to performing new analyses. 

The DOE’s SPD EIS (DOE 1999) analyzed impacts of MOX fuel use at the McGuire, Catawba,

and North Anna reactors. Therefore, the FEIS refers to the SPD EIS, but does not reanalyze

generic reactor use impacts of MOX fuel. The specific environmental impacts resulting from

the use of 40% MOX fuel cores in any particular reactor would be addressed by the NRC in

reviewing the requisite 10 CFR Part 50 license amendment application. Duke Energy has

submitted a license amendment request to the NRC to place lead test assemblies in its

reactors. As discussed in Section 4.4.3, impacts associated with the lead test assemblies are

considered to be outside the scope of this EIS because these activities would occur regardless

of any decision by the NRC on the proposed MOX facility.

A number of commenters requested that the EIS analyze the impacts of having to upgrade the

emergency response equipment and retrain emergency responders in the communities around

the SRS, at the reactors, and along transportation routes. Other commenters requested that

the EIS identify capabilities of local, regional, and national medical facilities to manage the

casualties resulting from potential accidental releases and assess the readiness of communities

to evacuate certain areas along the transportation routes in case of an accident. These issues

are discussed in the EIS to the extent that they are required as mitigation measures presented

in Chapter 5.

Many commenters raised a number of different issues concerning terrorism. The Scoping

Summary Report stated that the EIS would not address the impacts of terrorism because these

impacts are not considered to be reasonably foreseeable as a result of the proposed action.

However, following the events of September 11, 2001, the Commission decided to consider the
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-15

question of whether NEPA requires the evaluation of such impacts. By order dated

December 18, 2002 (CLI-02-24), the Commission ruled that NRC has no obligation under

NEPA to consider intentional malevolent acts in conjunction with the licensing of the proposed

MOX facility.

In response to the cancellation of the plutonium immobilization facility (DOE 2002), the NRC

delayed the issuance of the DEIS. The NRC held three public meetings in North Augusta,

South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and Charlotte, North Carolina, and solicited additional

written comments on how the immobilization of surplus plutonium as a no-action alternative

should be discussed (NRC 2002). The NRC also solicited views on other alternatives that

should be considered in the DEIS. In response, most commenters said they still wanted

immobilization considered as an alternative in the DEIS, while some urged the NRC to instead

focus on the proposed action. As discussed further in Section 2.3, the NRC has determined

that immobilization of plutonium did not require an in-depth evaluation in the DEIS, because it

was not a reasonable alternative to the proposed action. In response to the NRC’s solicitation

on other alternatives that should be considered, the alternative of deliberately producing offspecification MOX fuel was identified. This alternative is discussed in Section 2.3.

With respect to the proposed PDCF, the DOE’s change from a “hybrid” to a MOX-only

approach resulted in a change in the scope of the DEIS from that described in the NRC’s

March 7, 2001, NOI. The NRC stated there that the PDCF would not be part of the NRC’s

NEPA review of the proposed MOX facility (NRC 2001a). Initially, the PDCF had independent

utility apart from the MOX facility, since the DOE planned to build and operate the PDCF along

with the plutonium immobilization plant regardless of whether MOX fuel was also produced

(DOE 2000). Now, because of the DOE’s subsequent decision in its amended ROD to cancel

the plutonium immobilization plant and implement a MOX-only approach (DOE 2002), the

PDCF no longer has independent utility apart from the proposed MOX facility. Thus, for NEPA

purposes, the PDCF must be evaluated in the EIS to avoid an improper segmentation of the

potential impacts discussion.

1.4.2 Issues Studied in Detail

As discussed in the Scoping Summary Report (Appendix I), the goal of this EIS is to set forth

the impact analyses in a manner that is readily understandable by the public. Significant or

more important impacts are discussed in Chapter 4 of this FEIS. On the basis of the NRC’s

analyses and consideration of comments received during the scoping process, the following

topics are discussed in detail in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 for the no-action alternative and the

proposed action, respectively: (1) human health, (2) air quality, (3) hydrology, (4) waste

management, (5) accident impacts, (6) decommissioning, and (7) environmental justice. 

Transportation of radioactive materials, conversion of depleted uranium, and use of MOX fuel in

reactors are discussed in Section 4.4. Cumulative impacts are discussed in Section 4.5. The

cost-benefit analysis for the no-action and proposed action alternatives, which builds on the

comparison of alternatives in Section 2.4, is provided in Section 4.6. Mitigation actions to

address the potential impacts are discussed in Chapter 5.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-16

1.4.3 Issues Eliminated from Detailed Study

Impacts found to be less significant are discussed in FEIS Appendixes G and H. These

impacts include those pertaining to geology, seismology, soils, noise, ecology, land use, cultural

and paleontological resources, infrastructure, socioeconomics, and aesthetics. 

1.4.4 Preparation of the Final Environmental Impact Statement

The NRC made the DEIS available for public review and comment in February 2003 in

accordance with 10 CFR 51.73, 10 CFR 51.74, and 40 CFR 1503.1. The NRC provided a

75-day public comment period (which ended May 14, 2003) on the DEIS. The length of the

comment period exceeded the minimum of 45 days specified in 10 CFR 51.73.

During that period, the NRC held three public meetings to receive oral comments regarding the

contents of the DEIS. These public meetings were held on March 25, 2003, in Savannah,

Georgia; March 26, 2003, in North Augusta, South Carolina; and March 27, 2003, in Charlotte,

North Carolina. The NRC published notice of these meetings in the Federal Register

(68 FR 97208, February 28, 2003), on its Web site, and in local newspapers.

Approximately 45 people provided oral comments at the public meetings. A certified court

reporter recorded the oral comments and prepared written transcripts. The transcripts of the

public meetings are part of the public record for the proposed project and were used in

developing the comment summaries contained in Appendix J. In addition to oral comments

received at the public meetings, the NRC received written comments, letters, facsimile

transmittals, and e-mails regarding the DEIS and associated issues. A summary of the

comments and responses are included in Appendix J. The written comments and transcripts

are reproduced in Appendix L. 

The NRC has reviewed each comment letter and all transcripts of the public meetings and has

grouped comments relating to similar issues and topics, as permitted by the Council on

Environmental Quality’s NEPA regulations and the NRC regulations at 10 CFR 51.91 and

40 CFR 1503.4(b). Because the comments were voluminous, Appendix J provides summaries

of all substantive comments received on the DEIS. The NRC then prepared responses to each

of the comments or summaries of comments. Commenters are identified in each summary with

a commenter number. Appendix K contains an index of commenter names and commenter

numbers.

1.4.5 Other National Environmental Policy Act Documents Related to This Action

In preparing the EIS, the following other NEPA documents were considered:

Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0229, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fissile

Materials Disposition, Washington, D.C., December 1996.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-17

Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0283,

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, D.C.,

November 1999.

Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact

Statement, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., January 11, 2000 (65 Federal

Register [FR] 1608).

Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada,

DOE/EIS-0250, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management,

Feb. 2002.

1.5 Cooperating Agencies

No cooperating agencies have been involved in preparation of the EIS.

1.6 Other State and Federal Agencies

Several federal, Native American, state, and local agencies and organizations were contacted

to gather relevant information for this EIS. The scope of the analysis necessitated obtaining

information from state agencies in both South Carolina and Georgia. The following is a list of

all agencies contacted during early stages of the DEIS preparation:

Federal Agencies

U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Material Disposition

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Native American Organizations

Catawba Indian Nation

Pee Dee Indian Association

Ma Chis Lower Alabama Creek Indian Tribe

Muscogee (Creek) Nation

Indian People’s Muskogee Tribal Town Confederacy

Yuchi Tribal Organization, Inc.

United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians

State Agencies

South Carolina State Historic Preservation Office, Department of Archives and History

South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, Wildlife and Freshwater 

 Fisheries Division
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-18

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Bureau of Air Quality

South Carolina Department of Transportation

Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Wildlife Resources Division

Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division, 

 Air Protection Branch

Towns, Cities, and Counties

Columbia County, Georgia

Town of Grovetown, Georgia

Town of Harlem, Georgia

City of Augusta/Richmond County, Georgia

City of Blythe, Georgia

City of Hephzibah, Georgia

Aiken County, South Carolina

City of Aiken, South Carolina

Town of Jackson, South Carolina

Town of New Ellenton, South Carolina

City of North Augusta, South Carolina

Town of Wagener, South Carolina

Barnwell County, South Carolina

City of Barnwell, South Carolina

Town of Blackville, South Carolina

Town of Williston, South Carolina

School Districts

Columbia County Board of Education, Georgia

Richmond County Board of Education, Georgia

Aiken County Board of Education, South Carolina

Williston School District #19, South Carolina

Williston School District #29, South Carolina

Williston School District #45, South Carolina

1.7 References for Chapter 1

DCS (Duke Cogema Stone & Webster) 2000. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

Environmental Report. Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. Dec.

DCS 2001. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction Authorization Request. Docket

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. Feb.

DCS 2002a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 1 & 2.

Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2002b. Amended Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction Authorization

Request. Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2003a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 3.

Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-19

DCS 2003b. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 4.

Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2004a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 5. Docket

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June 10.

DCS 2004b. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction Authorization Request,

Revision 6/10/04. Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. 

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 1996. Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile

Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. DOE/EIS-0229. Office of

Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, DC. Dec.

DOE 1999. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement. 

DOE/EIS-0283. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, DC. Nov.

DOE 2000. “Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental

Impact Statement.” Federal Register 65:1608, Jan. 11.

DOE 2002. “Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program.” Amended Record of Decision. Federal

Register 67(76):19432-19435, April 19.

DOE 2003. Changes Needed to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program, Supplement 

Analysis and Amended Record of Decision. DOE/EIS-0283-SA1. Office of Fissile Materials

Disposition, Washington, DC, April.

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 2001a. “Notice of Intent to Prepare an

Environmental Impact Statement for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility.” Federal

Register 66:13794, March 7.

NRC 2001b. Environmental Impact Statement Scoping Process Scoping Summary Report,

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Savannah River Site. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Aug. [Reproduced in Appendix I of this EIS.]

NRC 2002. “Notice of Delay in Issuance of the Draft and Final Environmental Impact

Statements for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility.” Federal Register 67: 

20183-20185, April 24.

Tuckinan, M.S., 2003. “Proposed Amendments to the Facility Operating License and Technical

Specifications to Allow Insertion of Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Lead Assemblies and Request

for Exemption from Certain Regulations in 10 CFR Part 50,” personal communication from

Tuckinan (Duke Power, Charlotte, NC), to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency

(Washington, DC). February 27.

White House 2000. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and

the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of

Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related

Cooperation. White House, Washington, DC. Sept.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-20

 
2-1

2 ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION 

This chapter presents details of the alternatives considered in this environmental impact

statement (EIS). The no-action alternative, which is discussed in Section 2.1, considers the

continued storage of surplus plutonium in various locations throughout the U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE) complex in the event the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) either

denies Duke Cogema Stone & Webster’s (DCS’s) construction authorization request for the

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (the proposed MOX facility) or, later, denies DCS’s

subsequent request for a Title 10, Part 70 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 70)

license to possess and use special nuclear material. Section 2.2 presents the technical details

of the proposed action and the connected actions.

Section 2.3 considers several alternatives to the proposed action and explains why they are not

analyzed further in Chapter 4. These alternatives include alternate locations for the proposed

MOX facility in the F-Area, alternative technology and design options, immobilization of surplus

plutonium, deliberately making off-specification MOX fuel, the MIX MOX alternative, and the

Parallex Project.

The NRC recognizes that under the provisions of 10 CFR 70, the Commission may approve

construction of the proposed MOX facility and subsequently deny the DCS application for a

10 CFR Part 70 license to possess and use special nuclear material. Although this is a

possible outcome relative to the proposed action, the NRC is not considering construction alone

as a separate alternative because the NRC would not knowingly select an alternative involving

construction of a facility that cannot be used for its intended purpose.

Section 2.4 compares the potential impacts related to the proposed action with those of the

no-action alternative. Section 2.5 presents the NRC staff’s final environmental recommendation

on the action to be taken.

2.1 No-Action Alternative — Continued Storage of Surplus Plutonium

The no-action alternative would be a decision by the NRC not to approve the proposed MOX

facility. It is reasonable to assume that if the NRC does not approve the proposed MOX facility,

the DOE’s surplus plutonium would remain in storage at DOE facilities. The surplus plutonium

inventory is now stored at seven DOE sites. If this storage were to continue, it is possible that

limited new construction would be required at one or more of these sites to upgrade storage

conditions. However, the impacts of such construction, if required, would be addressed under a

separate site-specific environmental review by DOE. For purposes of this EIS, the impacts of

continued storage of surplus plutonium are assumed to be essentially the same as those

analyzed by DOE in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (SPD

EIS) (DOE 1999a). However, the analysis in this EIS also considers the DOE’s action to

consolidate the storage of 6 MT (6.6 tons) of non-pit surplus plutonium from the Rocky Flats

Environmental Technology Site to the Savannah River Site’s K-Area Material Storage (KAMS)
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

1 Except as noted, the descriptions provided in this section are based on information from DCS (2000, 

2001, 2002, and 2004) and DOE (1999a).

2 Pits are weapon components with a spherical metal core made of plutonium metal and several outer

layers.

2-2

facility (DOE 2002b). The impacts of the no-action alternative are presented in Section 4.2 and

Appendix G.

2.2 Proposed Action — Description of Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication

 Facilities and Connected Actions1

2.2.1 Introduction

The proposed MOX facility is designed to convert surplus weapons-grade plutonium and

depleted uranium dioxide (UO2) into MOX fuel that could be used at commercial nuclear power

plants authorized to use such fuel. If the construction authorization for the proposed MOX

facility is granted, the facility would be built on the north-northwest side of the F-Area at the

SRS (see Figure 1.2 in Section 1.2). The Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF)

would be built by DOE on the north-northeast side of the F-Area. The PDCF would be used to

recover the plutonium metal from the pits2

 of disassembled weapons and would convert the

weapons-grade plutonium to plutonium dioxide powder, which would subsequently be

transferred to the proposed MOX facility as feedstock.

Within the boundaries of the PDCF, the DOE would also construct the Waste Solidification

Building (WSB) (see Figure 1.2). The WSB would be used to process several liquid waste

streams from the proposed MOX facility and the PDCF and convert them to solid transuranic

(TRU) waste or low-level waste (LLW). This section describes the general layout of the

proposed MOX facility, the processes to be used to manufacture MOX fuel, and the systems

that would be used to handle the waste streams from the facility. As discussed in Section 1.2.2,

since the PDCF and WSB are connected actions, these proposed DOE facilities are also

discussed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4, respectively. Other elements of the proposed action as

described in Section 1.2 that are not discussed in Chapter 2 are discussed in Chapter 4. Direct

and indirect impacts of the proposed action and connected actions are presented in

Sections 4.3 and 4.4, and Appendix H.

As discussed in Section 1.4.1, the technology option of substituting a sand filter for the

proposed high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters to control air emissions from the

proposed MOX facility was identified during the scoping process. This technology option is

described in Section 2.2.5 and is analyzed in Section 4.3.8.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-3

2.2.2 Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

2.2.2.1 Description of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

The PDCF would be built by the DOE and would not be subject to NRC licensing. The facility

would be used to recover plutonium metal from weapon components, and convert it to an

unclassified (i.e., no longer exhibiting any characteristics that are protected for reasons of

national security) plutonium dioxide. The plutonium dioxide would be transferred to the

proposed MOX facility. In addition to excess weapon components, the PDCF would be able to

receive excess plutonium metal in other forms and be capable of converting it to plutonium

dioxide.

The PDCF would be designed to process up to 3.5 MT (3.9 tons) of plutonium metal into

plutonium dioxide annually. Facility operations would require a staff of about 400 personnel. 

The facility would be built in a hardened space of thick-walled concrete that meets all applicable

standards for processing special nuclear material. One or possibly both levels of the two-story

building would be below grade. Areas of the facility in which plutonium would be processed or

stored would be designed to survive natural phenomena such as earthquakes, floods, and

tornadoes, as well as potential accidents associated with fissile and radioactive materials. 

Ancillary buildings would be required for support activities.

Activities involving radioactive materials or externally contaminated containers of radioactive

materials would be conducted in gloveboxes. The gloveboxes would be interconnected by a

contained conveyor system to move materials from one process step to the next. Gloveboxes

would remain completely sealed and operate independently, except during material transfer

operations. Built-in safety features would limit the temperature and pressure inside the

gloveboxes and ensure that operations remain within criticality safety limits. When dictated by

process needs or safety concerns, an inert atmosphere would be maintained in gloveboxes. 

The exhaust from the gloveboxes would be continuously monitored for radioactive

contamination. The atmosphere in the gloveboxes would be kept at a lower pressure than that

of the surrounding areas so that any leaks of gaseous or suspended particulate matter would

be contained and filtered appropriately. The building ventilation system would include HEPA

filters and would be designed to maintain confinement, thus precluding the spread of airborne

radioactive particulates or hazardous chemicals within the facility or to the outside environment. 

Both intake and exhaust air would be filtered, and exhaust gases would be monitored for

radioactivity.

Beryllium may be a constituent of some of the pits that would be disassembled in the PDCF. 

Because inhalation of beryllium dust and particles has been proven to cause a chronic and

sometimes fatal lung disease, beryllium is of special interest from a health effects perspective. 

However, the process operations in the PDCF are expected to generate only larger,

nonrespirable turnings and pieces of the metal, and all work would be performed in gloveboxes. 

No grinding would be done that could cause small pieces of beryllium to become airborne.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

3 Tritium can be used as a boosting fuel in high-energy atomic weapons. Although the operators of the

pit conversion facility would know which pits contain tritium, the pit types and the number of surplus

pits that contain tritium are classified.

2-4

The PDCF would accommodate the following surplus plutonium-processing activities: pit

receipt, storage, and preparation; pit disassembly; plutonium conversion; oxide blending and

sampling; nondestructive assay; product canning; product storage; product inspection and

sampling for international inspection; product shipping; declassification of parts not made from

special nuclear materials; highly enriched uranium (HEU) decontamination, packaging, storage,

and shipping; tritium capture, packaging, and storage; and waste packaging, sampling, and

certification. Additional areas for support activities would be needed, including office space,

change rooms, a central control room, a laboratory, mechanical equipment rooms, mechanical

shops, an emergency generator to supply power to critical safety systems in the event of a

power outage, a warehouse, shipping and receiving areas, waste storage, guard stations, entry

portals, and parking.

2.2.2.2 Processes Occurring in the PDCF

At the PDCF, the storage containers in which the plutonium is received would be removed from

their overpacks (outer shipping containers), the contents verified, and the information regarding

the material entered into the PDCF’s material accountability system. Pits and plutonium metal

would be placed in a short-term receiving vault, checked for radiological contamination, and

transferred to the pit storage vault until processing. Before being processed in the pit

disassembly line, the pits would be segregated on the basis of the potential presence of tritium.3

Pits without tritium would go into the pit bisector glovebox, and those containing tritium would

start in the Special Recovery Line glovebox.

In the pit bisector glovebox, external structures would be cut away from the pit, and the pit

would be cut in half. Nonbonded pits (pits whose components separate easily) would be

separated into plutonium metal, HEU, classified metal shapes, and classified nuclear material

parts. The plutonium parts would be assayed as part of the material accountability program. 

HEU would be sent to the HEU-processing station for material accountability, electrolytic

decontamination, and packaging; the classified metal shapes and metal shavings would go to

the declassification furnaces; the nuclear material parts to the storage at the pit conversion

facility; and the plutonium to the hydride-oxidation (HYDOX) station for the next step of the

process. Bonded pits, which cannot be separated prior to processing, would be sent to the

HYDOX station intact. For these pits, HEU, classified metal shapes, and classified nuclear

material parts would be separated from the plutonium metal during the HYDOX process, then

sent to the HEU-processing station, declassification furnaces, and storage at the pit conversion

facility, respectively. Recovered HEU would be stored in a vault at the pit conversion facility

until shipped to the Y-12 Facility at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) for declassification,

storage, and eventual disposition. The HEU would meet Y-12 acceptance criteria prior to

shipment to the ORR.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-5

Pits with tritium would also be bisected, and the HEU, classified metal shapes, and classified

nuclear material parts would be separated from the plutonium; this would occur in the Special

Recovery Line glovebox. Under normal circumstances, all of the tritium associated with a given

pit would be captured and recovered during the tritium removal process in the Special Recovery

Line. It is expected that the tritium in a small number of pits will have absorbed into the

plutonium. For these pits, an additional step would occur in the Special Recovery Line

glovebox: the plutonium would be heated in a vacuum furnace to drive off the tritium as a gas. 

The tritium would then be captured on a catalyst bed and packaged as LLW for treatment and

disposal. HEU and classified metal shapes would be decontaminated and sent to the HEUprocessing station and declassification furnaces, respectively; classified nuclear material parts

would be placed in storage at the pit conversion facility. After confirmation that the plutonium

metal was free of tritium, the plutonium would be assayed as part of the special nuclear material

accountability program and transferred to the HYDOX station. Recovered HEU would be stored

in a vault at the pit conversion facility until shipped to the ORR for declassification, storage, and

eventual disposition. The HEU would meet Y-12 acceptance criteria prior to shipment to the

ORR.

In the HYDOX module, plutonium metal would react with hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen at

controlled temperatures and pressures in a pressure vessel to produce plutonium dioxide. The

plutonium metal would first be reacted with hydrogen gas to form a hydride. Then the vessel

would be purged of the hydrogen and the hydride reacted with nitrogen gas to form a nitride. 

The nitrogen would then be purged and replaced with oxygen for the final reaction forming

plutonium dioxide. The plutonium dioxide product would be collected and assayed for the

material accountability program to confirm that all of the plutonium metal entering the HYDOX

process left as an oxide.

In the primary canning module, the cans of plutonium dioxide would be placed into a primary

storage can made of stainless steel. This can would then be welded shut and leak tested to

ensure that the weld was sound. If the can were to fail the leak test, it would be reopened and

rewelded. After passing the leak test, the primary can would be sent to the electrolytic

decontamination module. After decontamination, each can would be rinsed, dried, and

surveyed to verify decontamination, then sent to the secondary canning module.

In the secondary canning module, primary cans would be placed into secondary stainless steel

storage cans meeting the DOE’s long-term storage requirements. Also in this module,

secondary storage cans would be welded shut and leak tested. After leak testing, each can

would be marked with a laser to identify the can and its contents, and passed to the

nondestructive assay module.

In the nondestructive assay module, each can would be assayed to confirm its contents. 

Following assay, the cans would be moved into the main storage vault and would be available

for international inspection. After inspection, the cans would be transferred to another vault that

would also be subject to international inspection. The cans would subsequently be transferred

to the proposed MOX facility.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-6

2.2.2.3 Radioactive Effluents and Wastes at the PDCF

Potential effluents and wastes from the PDCF are described in a Los Alamos National

Laboratory report (LANL 1998) and the SPD EIS (DOE 1999a). The facility would be designed

to minimize the quantities of both the effluents and wastes. Preliminary estimates indicate that

small quantities of various plutonium isotopes and americium-241 and tritium gas would be

emitted to the air from the facility. No releases to surface water would be expected directly

from the PDCF. The facility would be expected to generate small quantities of TRU waste,

LLW, mixed waste, and nonradioactive hazardous waste. All liquid radioactive wastes

generated in the PDCF would be sent to the WSB for treatment. The treated waste would

either be sent to an approved disposal facility or discharged to a permitted outfall on the SRS. 

Radioactive solid wastes generated at the facility would be packaged in accordance with the

acceptance criteria of the receiving disposal site and sent to the WSB for temporary storage

and final processing before being shipped to an approved disposal facility. Mixed waste and

hazardous waste generated at the facility would be sent to the SRS waste management system

or to an off-site permitted facility for disposition. Nonradioactive/nonhazardous solid waste

would be sent to an approved landfill. An evaluation of waste management impacts for this EIS

is presented in Section 4.3.4.

2.2.3 MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility

2.2.3.1 Description of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility

As designed, the project site would occupy an area of about 16.6 ha (41 acres). Approximately

6.9 ha (17 acres) of the site would be developed with buildings, other facilities, and paving. The

remaining 9.7 ha (24 acres) would be landscaped with either grass or gravel.

No highways, railroads, or waterways traverse the proposed MOX facility site, and material and

personnel would be moved to and from the site on existing SRS roads. The proposed MOX

facility would consist of the following buildings:

• MOX Fuel Fabrication Building

• Emergency Diesel Generator Building

• Standby Diesel Generator Building

• Secured Warehouse Building

• Administration Building

• Technical Support Building

• Reagents Processing Building

• Receiving Warehouse Building

All of these buildings except the Administration Building and the Receiving Warehouse Building

would be enclosed within a double fence perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system. 

The area within this system would total about 5.7 ha (14 acres) and would be designated as the

“Protected Area” (10 CFR Part 73).
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-7

The Technical Support Building, located between the Administration Building and the MOX Fuel

Fabrication Building, would house the main support facilities for MOX Fuel Fabrication Building

personnel and would contain the access facilities for the Protected Area and the MOX Fuel

Fabrication Building. The building would not be directly involved in the principal processing

functions of the facility. Supporting activities and facilities located in this building would include

health physics, an electronics maintenance laboratory, a mechanical maintenance shop,

personnel locker rooms, and a first aid station.

The MOX Fuel Fabrication Building would have three major functional areas: the MOX

Processing Area, the Aqueous Polishing Area, and the Shipping and Receiving Area. The

MOX Processing Area would include the blending and milling area, pelletizing area, sintering

area, grinding area, fuel rod fabrication area, fuel bundle assembly area, a laboratory area, and

storage areas for feed material, pellets, and fuel assemblies. Space would also be provided in

the MOX Fuel Fabrication Building for support equipment, such as temporary waste storage;

heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment; HEPA filter plenums; inverters;

switchgear; and pumps. The Aqueous Polishing Area would be used to remove impurities from

the feed plutonium coming from the PDCF as well as from the plutonium in the alternate

feedstock for use in the MOX Processing Area. The aqueous polishing process would extract

impurities from the weapons-grade plutonium dioxide. The Shipping and Receiving Area would

contain the equipment and facilities used to handle incoming and outgoing materials to and

from the MOX Processing Area and Aqueous Polishing Area.

The Emergency Diesel Generator Building would contain the emergency diesel generator to

provide the emergency on-site electrical power supply for safety related structures, systems, or

components. The Standby Diesel Generator Building would contain the diesel generators that

would provide the on-site electrical power source in the event of loss of off-site power. The

Secured Warehouse Building would include the Material Receipt Area, the Storage Area, the

MOX Fresh Fuel Package Storage Area, the Parts Washing Facility, the Vehicle Access Portal,

and the Vehicle Gatehouse. The Material Receipt Area would serve as the receiving facility for

most of the materials (including depleted uranium dioxide), supplies, and equipment necessary

for facility operations. The Administration Building, located outside of the Protected Area of the

complex, would provide administrative support to the facility and its operations. Space would

be provided in the building for facility management, facility operations, finance and

administration, health and safety, quality assurance, and management personnel.

The Reagents Processing Building, located adjacent to the Aqueous Polishing Area of the MOX

Fuel Fabrication Building, would provide storage for pure reagent-grade chemicals and facilities

for preparation of chemical solutions used in the Aqueous Polishing Area. The Reagents

Processing Building would consist of several separate rooms or areas for the various

chemicals. Concrete curbs around the chemical storage areas would provide for spill

containment. Chemicals would be transferred to the Aqueous Polishing Area from the

Reagents Processing Building via piping located in a below-grade concrete trench between the

two buildings.

The Receiving Warehouse Building would be a single-story, pre-engineered metal building

located outside of the perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system. The building
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-8

would consist of the Unloading Dock, the Materials Receiving Area, the Inspected Warehouse

Holding Area, the Material Transfer Dock, offices, vestibule, and the Inspection Guard Station. 

2.2.3.2 Processes Occurring in the Proposed MOX Facility

The proposed MOX facility is being designed to convert plutonium dioxide and depleted

uranium dioxide to MOX fuel. Operations at the facility would begin with the receipt of the

plutonium dioxide and depleted uranium dioxide feed materials. The plutonium dioxide would

then be purified in the aqueous polishing process before being blended with the depleted

uranium dioxide. The blended material would then be formed into pellets, the pellets

incorporated into fuel rods, the fuel rods placed in fuel assemblies, and the assemblies loaded

into transport casks for shipment to the nuclear power plants authorized to use MOX fuel. The

technology used in the fuel fabrication process includes recycling of waste and scrap streams. 

The major steps in the aqueous polishing and fuel fabrication processes are shown in

Figures 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.

2.2.3.2.1 Feed Materials

The plutonium dioxide feed material from the PDCF, transported in approved shipping

containers, would be received in the shipping and receiving area of the MOX Fuel Fabrication

Building. The feed material would be offloaded, the packaging would then be removed, and

control would be transferred to the responsible facility manager. Material control and

accounting (MC&A) and radiation protection functions would then be performed, and the feed

material would be moved to the MOX Processing Area.

Alternate feedstock (feed material not coming from the PDCF) would be received as plutonium

dioxide. Some of this material might contain higher than normal salt contaminants, some would

contain chloride contaminants, and some would contain trace amounts of enriched uranium. All

alternate feedstock would be milled to a uniform particle size to facilitate dissolution. The

alternative feedstock would be analyzed for contaminants.

If chloride contaminant concentrations were found to be above feedstock specifications, they

would be removed by conversion to chlorine gas. The chlorine gas would be passed through a

scrubber to convert the chlorine to a sodium chloride solution. If the chloride contaminants

were within feedstock specifications, the feedstock would be processed as described in

Section 2.2.3.2.2.

For uranium-rich alternate feedstock, an additional scrubbing column would be used to remove

uranium to levels that meet the specification for purified plutonium.

Depleted uranium dioxide feed material, packaged in drums and shipped by truck, would be

received at the Material Receipt Area of the Secured Warehouse Building. Conventional

materials and supplies would be received at the Secured Warehouse Building. The materials 
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-9

Figure 2.1. Principal steps in the aqueous polishing process (Source: DCS 2004).
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-10

Figure 2.2. Principal steps in the fuel fabrication process (Source: DCS 2002).
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-11

would be inventoried, sorted, and removed to storage in the Secured Warehouse Building or

delivered via on-site vehicles to the proper processing area.

2.2.3.2.2 Aqueous Polishing Process

The plutonium dioxide received at the facility would contain small amounts of impurities, mainly

gallium, americium, highly enriched uranium, and, in the case of alternate feedstock, additional

impurities. These impurities would have to be removed before the plutonium could be used in

reactor fuel. The chloride contaminants would be removed from alternate feedstock before

further aqueous polishing (see Section 2.2.3.2.1). The aqueous polishing process would

remove remaining impurities in three major steps: dissolution, purification, and conversion.

The dissolution step would involve dissolving the plutonium dioxide powder in a water-based

(aqueous) solution of silver (Ag2+) and nitric acid at nearly room temperature. An electrical

current would be passed through the solution to help dissolve the powder.

In the purification step, the plutonium in the aqueous solution would be separated from uranium,

americium, gallium, and other impurities by solvent extraction. In this process, the aqueous

solution and an organic solvent solution are mixed. The organic solvent does not readily mix

with or dissolve in water, and the two solutions will separate if they are allowed to settle. 

However, by forcibly mixing the two solutions and adjusting chemical parameters in the

aqueous solution, individual metals like plutonium can be selectively extracted from the

aqueous solution into the organic solvent. In the process proposed by DCS, the solvent

extraction process would involve mixing the aqueous solution with an organic solvent composed

of 30% tri-butyl phosphate in dodecane. The mixing would occur in the middle of tall and

narrow process vessels called columns. During mixing, the solvent would selectively extract the

plutonium and uranium from the aqueous solution. The less dense solvent containing uranium

and plutonium would then separate from the aqueous solution at the top of the columns. The

impurities would remain in the denser aqueous solution and would be removed at the bottom of

the column.

The solvent solution containing the uranium and plutonium would be washed with a nitric acid

solution. This wash solution would be returned to the acid recovery unit for recycling of the

acid. The plutonium and uranium in the organic solvent would then be mixed with an aqueous

solution containing hydroxylamine nitrate. This process would reduce the tetravalent plutonium

[Pu(IV)] to trivalent plutonium [Pu(III)], which would allow the plutonium to be removed from the

organic solvent in an aqueous solution of nitric acid, hydrazine nitrate, and hydroxylamine

nitrate. The organic solvent, which would then contain only high-enriched uranium and residual

amounts of plutonium, would be mixed with another aqueous “wash” solution to remove the

residual plutonium. The washed solvent would be routed to the uranium stripping process. 

High-enriched uranium would be stripped from the solvent by mixing the solvent with dilute nitric

acid in another separation column. The stripped uranium solution would be diluted with

depleted uranium before being transferred to the WSB for further treatment. The solvent,

which would no longer contain significant amounts of uranium, plutonium, or impurities, would

be routed to the solvent recovery mixer-settlers to be recycled.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-12

The Pu(III) solution would be converted back to a solution of Pu(IV) by driving nitrous fumes

(dinitrogen tetroxide [N2O4] and nitrogen dioxide [NO2]) through the plutonium solution in a

packed column. The offgas would be routed through an offgas treatment system before being

discharged to the atmosphere.

The conversion step would be a continuous oxalate conversion process. The oxidized Pu (IV)

would be reacted with excess oxalic acid (H2C2O4) to precipitate plutonium oxalate. Plutonium

oxalate would be collected on a filter, then dried in a screw calciner to produce purified

plutonium dioxide powder. The purified plutonium dioxide powder would be blended and stored

in cans.

Offgas from the screw calciner would be routed through the process offgas treatment unit and

HEPA filters prior to discharge to the atmosphere through the exhaust stack. The filtered oxalic

mother liquors would be concentrated, reacted with manganese to destroy the oxalic acid, and

recycled to the beginning of the extraction cycle, to minimize losses of plutonium to waste.

A liquid americium waste stream would be generated by the aqueous polishing process

described above. DCS estimates that approximately 24.5 kg (54.0 lb) of americium-241 would

annually become part of this waste stream, an amount that would contain 84,000 Ci of

radioactivity (DCS 2002). This liquid waste stream — together with an excess acid stream and

an alkaline wash stream — would be combined into the high-alpha activity waste to be piped

from the proposed MOX facility to the WSB, where it would be solidified through the use of the

WSB’s planned evaporation, neutralization, and cementation methods. (The WSB is discussed

further in EIS Section 2.2.4). The maximum annual volume of these streams from the proposed

MOX facility is estimated to be 44,200 L (11,700 gal) (DCS 2004). 

2.2.3.2.3 MOX Fuel Fabrication Process

The MOX fuel fabrication process would consist of four major steps: (1) powder master blend

and final blend production, (2) pellet production, (3) rod production, and (4) fuel rod assembly.

The first operation would be the production of the powder master blend. The purified plutonium

dioxide from the aqueous polishing process would be mixed with depleted uranium dioxide and

recycled scraps to produce an initial mixture that would be approximately 20% plutonium. This

mixture would be ground in a ball mill and mixed with additional depleted uranium dioxide and

recycled scraps to produce a final blend with the required plutonium content (typically from

2.3 to 4.8%). This final blend would be further homogenized to meet stringent plutonium

distribution requirements. During the final homogenizing, lubricants and pore-formers would be

added to control the density of the final mixture.

The final homogenized powder blend would be pressed to form green pellets. The green fuel

pellets would be sintered to obtain the required ceramic qualities. Sintering is the process of

heating the green pellets in a furnace at temperatures of up to 1,700C (3,100F). The

sintering step would remove organic products dispersed in the pellets and remove the
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pore-formers that were added during powder homogenization. The sintered pellets would be

ground to a specified diameter and sorted. Recovered powder from grinding and discarded

pellets would be recycled through a ball mill and reused in the powder processing.

Fuel rods would be loaded to an adjusted pellet length column, welded, pressurized with

helium, and then decontaminated in gloveboxes. The decontaminated rods would be removed

from the gloveboxes and placed on racks for inspection and assembly. Fuel rods would be

inserted into the fuel assembly frame, and the fuel assembly construction would be completed. 

The fuel assembly would be subjected to a final inspection before shipment to reactors.

2.2.3.3 Radioactive Effluents and Wastes at the Proposed MOX Facility

2.2.3.3.1 Airborne

DCS has proposed to treat exhausts from the Fuel Fabrication Building and remove airborne

radioactive materials with (at a minimum) a two-stage HEPA filter system before exhaust air is

discharged to the environment. The exhaust streams would include those from building

ventilation; gloveboxes; the process vents of tanks, vessels, and other equipment in the

Aqueous Polishing Area; and the sintering furnaces in the Processing Area.

The filtered exhausts would be discharged through a common stack (MOX vent stack) on the

roof of the Fuel Fabrication Building. Stack effluents would be continuously monitored. The

stack would be 37 m (120 ft) above grade.

2.2.3.3.2 Liquids

After sampling and characterization, liquid waste streams containing radioactive materials

would be transferred to the WSB for processing and treatment. Thus, no radioactive liquids

would be released directly from the facility to the environment. Within the Aqueous Polishing

Area, recycling would be used extensively to reduce liquid waste volumes and impurities before

transfer to the WSB. 

The liquid waste streams from the Aqueous Polishing Area would include the following:

• Chloride removal waste

• Liquid americium stream

• Excess acid stream

• Excess low-level radioactive solvent waste

• Stripped uranium stream

• Rinsing water

• Contaminated drains
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2.2.3.3.3 Solids

Solid radioactive wastes would be placed in appropriate containers (typically 55-gal drums),

assayed, and transferred to the WSB for processing and disposal. Whenever practical, the solid

wastes would be compacted to reduce volume and disposal costs.

The solid radioactive wastes generated in the Fuel Fabrication Building would include TRU solid

wastes and LLW (which would include uranium and/or plutonium contamination). Other

potentially radioactive, mixed, or nonradioactive hazardous wastes that might be generated by

the facility would be transferred to the WSB, SRS waste management system, or an off-site

permitted facility for disposition. Impacts associated with management of wastes from the

proposed MOX facility are presented in Section 4.3.4.

2.2.4 Waste Solidification Building

2.2.4.1 Description of the Waste Solidification Building

The WSB, which is not subject to NRC licensing, would be constructed by the DOE on the

PDCF site south of the PDCF to process the following liquid waste streams from the PDCF and

the proposed MOX facility:

• MOX facility high-alpha-activity waste stream

• MOX facility stripped uranium stream

• PDCF laboratory liquid stream

• PDCF low-level liquid waste streams

• MOX facility low-level liquid waste streams

In addition, space would be provided in the WSB for temporary storage and minimal processing

(e.g., sorting, packaging) of other waste streams, including solid LLW and TRU waste.

The WSB would occupy approximately 6,970 m2

 (75,000 ft2) of land and would be a

combination concrete and steel-frame structure (DCS 2003a,b, 2004). Concrete would be

utilized as necessary to protect against the potential impacts of natural phenomena hazards

events. In addition, a concrete-cell configuration would be used in areas where the proposed

MOX facility high-alpha stream is processed. Process enclosures adjacent to the cells would

provide worker protection to accommodate operations and maintenance activities. The

shielding and confinement would also serve as fire isolation barriers. Secondary confinement

features, such as dikes, sumps, and leak detection, would be provided for those areas with

liquid spill potential. The major pieces of process equipment would be tanks, evaporators, and

cementation equipment. Other equipment may include reverse osmosis, filtration, and

activated carbon and ion exchange columns.

The processed liquid would be mixed in the WSB with concrete and poured into containers to

produce solid waste. Cold chemical processing rooms, waste container storage, and truck
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loading/unloading areas may also be contained in hardened structures. The waste container

storage area would be at grade. The waste receipt area would have tanks to separately receive

high-alpha waste, stripped uranium waste, and the PDCF laboratory liquid stream waste. The

tank volumes would be sufficient to receive and store waste from six weeks of processing the

high-alpha-activity and stripped uranium waste streams by the proposed MOX facility and eight

weeks of processing the laboratory liquid stream by the PDCF. Additional receipt storage would

be available for low-level liquid waste streams from the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB

internal sources.

The proposed MOX facility would transfer a liquid high-alpha-activity waste and liquid LLW

streams to the WSB. The PDCF would transfer LLW streams. Within the WSB, these waste

streams would be treated separately. The WSB would process the liquid wastes into TRU

waste and LLW solid waste forms acceptable for shipment and disposal at their respective

disposal locations. Treated effluents from liquid LLW streams would be discharged to a

permitted outfall. The TRU waste form would be stored until cleared for shipment to the Waste

Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) (DOE 2003). The LLW form would be sent to a suitable disposal

site.

Within the WSB, the waste streams would be collected into receipt tanks, chemically adjusted,

evaporated, neutralized, solidified in containers, stored, and shipped. These processes would

be located inside a hardened (reinforced concrete) structure. Emissions from the process

areas would pass through a HEPA filtration confinement system before release through an

exhaust stack.

2.2.4.2 Processes Occurring in the WSB

The WSB would be designed to process and solidify three waste streams from the proposed

MOX facility and two waste streams from the PDCF. The processes that would be conducted

for each waste stream are described below.

2.2.4.2.1 Proposed MOX Facility High-Alpha-Activity Waste Stream 

The proposed MOX facility high-alpha-activity waste stream, consisting of the liquid

americium waste stream and two other liquid waste streams from the proposed MOX facility,

namely the excess acid stream and the alkaline waste stream, would be pumped approximately

610 m (2,000 ft) from the proposed MOX facility to the WSB in a double-walled stainless steel

pipe. The maximum volume received would be anticipated to be approximately 33,300 L

(8,800 gal) per year, which would be received in approximately 25 transfers, at a frequency of

about once every two weeks.

The WSB receipt tanks would be sized to hold three transfers (six weeks capacity in two

9,500-L [2,500-gal] tanks). The MOX facility high-alpha-activity stream collection tanks are

sized for three months capacity. This arrangement would provide continued MOX facility
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processing capacity in the event of a shutdown of WSB operations because of maintenance or

other disruptions. The tanks would be agitated or recirculated to mix the contents.

In the WSB, the proposed MOX facility high-alpha-activity waste stream would be sent to an

evaporator to reduce its water content. The acidic bottoms collected in the evaporator would be

neutralized with sodium hydroxide, mixed with cement, and poured into approved containers. 

The TRU waste collected in the containers would meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria and

would eventually be shipped to the WIPP for disposal (DOE 2003). The overheads from the

evaporation step would be condensed, collected, sampled, and subjected to further evaporation

or chemical treatment as necessary and finally would be sent to the Clean Water Treatment

System for final treatment and discharge to a permitted outfall (see Section 2.2.4.2.4).

2.2.4.2.2 MOX Facility Stripped Uranium Stream 

The proposed MOX facility stripped uranium stream would be pumped approximately 610 m

(2,000 ft) from the proposed MOX facility to the WSB in a double-walled stainless steel pipe.

The nominal waste volume of this stream would be 174,000 L (46,000 gal) per year, received in

approximately 42 transfers at a frequency of about one every week.

The WSB receipt tanks would be sized to hold six transfers (six weeks of MOX facility capacity).

The proposed MOX facility tanks would be sized to hold three months of MOX facility waste.

The tanks would be agitated or recirculated to mix the waste.

In the WSB, the proposed MOX facility stripped uranium stream would be evaporated, the

bottoms neutralized with sodium hydroxide, and the resulting waste mixed with cement and

deposited into approved containers. The waste in the containers would be classified as LLW

and would be shipped to a LLW disposal facility. The overheads from the evaporation step

would be condensed, collected, sampled, and subjected to further evaporation or chemical

treatment as necessary and finally would be sent to the Clean Water Treatment System for final

treatment and discharge to a permitted outfall (see Section 2.2.4.2.4).

2.2.4.2.3 PDCF Laboratory Liquid Stream

The PDCF laboratory liquid stream would be pumped approximately 240 m (800 ft) to the WSB

from the PDCF in a welded-jacketed stainless steel pipe, which would be direct buried. The

volume of this waste stream is anticipated to be a nominal 41,600 L (11,000 gal) per year

(DCS 2004), and would be received in approximately 12 transfers (3,400 L [900 gal] each) at a

frequency of about one transfer every month.

The WSB receipt tank would be sized to hold two transfers (eight weeks of PDCF laboratory

liquid stream capacity) in one 11,400-L (3,000-gal) tank. The PDCF tank is sized to provide up

to 8 weeks of PDCF processing capacity in the event of a shutdown of WSB operations for

maintenance or processing anomalies. The tank would be agitated or recirculated to mix the

waste.
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In the WSB, the PDCF laboratory liquid stream would be evaporated, the bottoms neutralized

with sodium hydroxide, and the resulting waste would be mixed with cement and deposited into

approved containers. The waste in the containers would be classified as LLW and would be

shipped to a LLW disposal facility. The overheads from the evaporation step would be

condensed, collected, sampled, and subjected to further evaporation or chemical treatment as

necessary and finally would be sent to the Clean Water Treatment System for final treatment

and discharge to a permitted outfall (see Section 2.2.4.2.4).

2.2.4.2.4 MOX Facility and PDCF Low-Level Liquid Streams

The proposed MOX facility and the PDCF would generate various aqueous liquid streams with

either very low radioactive contamination or the potential for radioactive contamination due to

their origin. These streams would be transferred, through double-walled transfer lines, to a

receipt tank or tanks at the WSB. In addition, low-level liquid waste streams would be

generated in the WSB from the evaporator overhead associated with the treatment of other

liquid waste streams sent to the WSB from the proposed MOX facility and the PDCF

(see Sections 2.2.4.2.1, 2.2.4.2.2, and 2.2.4.2.3). All of these waste streams would be

transferred to the Clean Water Treatment System in the WSB. The Clean Water Treatment

System would be designed using standard wastewater treatment technologies to meet

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), South Carolina Department of Health and

Environmental Control (SCDHEC), and DOE discharge limits for the SRS. The discharges

would be to a permitted outfall.

2.2.4.3 Radioactive Effluents and Wastes at the WSB

The WSB would be designed to minimize effluents to the air. The facility would also be

designed to minimize effluents to surface water, as discussed in Section 2.2.4.2.4. 

As discussed in Section 2.2.4.2, the WSB would receive five liquid waste streams, three from

the proposed MOX facility and two from the PDCF, and convert those waste streams to solid

TRU waste or solid LLW. An evaluation of waste management impacts for this EIS is

presented in Section 4.3.4. The solidified TRU waste would eventually be shipped to WIPP for

disposal (DOE 2003). LLW would be disposed of at a suitable disposal site.

2.2.5 Sand Filter Technology Option

This section describes the technology option of using a sand filter for air filtration instead of

high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. Although DCS has selected the use of HEPA

filters as its preferred option for removal of particulate contaminants before exhaust air is

released to the atmosphere, this EIS also evaluates the use of a sand filter (Orr 2001). The

differences in impacts are discussed in Section 4.3.8.
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It is useful to understand the physical differences in the two types of filters. HEPA filters are

designed to remove extremely fine particles suspended in the air. HEPA filters are enclosed in

rigid casing with full-depth pleated filter medium. The filter medium is normally fibrous

borosilicate glass, which is formed into a sheet folded into a series of accordion pleats. The

standard HEPA filter measures 61 cm × 61 cm × 29.2 cm deep (24 in. × 24 in. × 11.5 in. deep). 

The filter edge will be a high-temperature silicon gasket to prevent bypass leakage, and

improper installation or damage to the sealing surface can dramatically reduce the filter’s

efficiency and performance. HEPA filters function and are used in the HVAC system similarly to

standard home air filters. DCS proposes to use HEPA filters in multiple stages. The proposed

MOX facility would have many HEPA filters (Orr 2001).

Sand filters have a long history of use in DOE facilities at the SRS and at the Hanford Site near

Richland, Washington. At the SRS, DOE currently uses sand filters in the F-Area, H-Area, and

the Savannah River Laboratory. Unlike the case for HEPA filters, a facility would typically use

only a single sand filter. A sand filter designed for the proposed MOX facility would be

rectangular and would require a surface area of about 313 m2 (33,650 ft2

). The filter would be

about 3 m (10 ft) deep and would consist of gravel layers overlaid with sand layers arranged in

order of decreasing particle size (Orr 2001). A coarse sand layer would be placed at the top of

the filter to maintain integrity of the lower sand layers during filter operations. Air enters through

a supply tunnel at the bottom of the structure and is collected at the top of the sand filter. Large

fans or blowers are used to draw the air through the sand filter media. Suspended particles in

the air are trapped by the sand filter. No routine maintenance is required during operation of

sand filters (Orr 2001).

It is also useful to understand the performance differences in the two types of filters. Both filter

types have approximately the same efficiencies for collection of particulates. Neither filter type

is designed to trap gases. The filters would perform differently during some accidents. As

discussed below, the selection of filter type can affect the facility design.

Several commenters during the public scoping meetings urged the NRC to evaluate the use of

sand filters instead of HEPA filters, claiming sand filters would be better from a safety

standpoint, particularly in case of a fire at the facility. Fires often generate large volumes of

smoke that threaten the effective functioning of the filtration system by rapidly loading the filters

with smoke particles. The resulting pressure drop across the filter could cause a break in the

filter, followed by the release of contamination to the environment. This situation would not

occur with sand filters in case of a fire because they have a much larger surface area that could

trap smoke particles (Orr 2001). The integrity of HEPA filters could also be compromised

during explosion accidents.

Given the potential vulnerability of HEPA filters during fire accidents, the proposed MOX facility

is designed to mitigate the effects of an internal fire. The facility is designed into numerous fire

areas to limit the amount of combustibles involved in a single fire; this reduces the amount of

soot reaching individual banks of HEPA filters and ensures that the HEPA filters will not fail

because of excessive plugging. If a sand filter was used, fewer fire areas could be used

because sand filters are more resistant to smoke and sudden pressure changes. However, in
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the evaluation of the impacts of using sand filters instead of HEPA filters, changes in facility

design are not considered.

2.3 Alternatives Considered But Not Analyzed in Detail

This section discusses some of the more significant alternatives identified during the scoping

process and alternatives identified by DCS, but that are not subjected to in-depth evaluations in

Chapter 4. Such alternatives include alternate locations for the proposed MOX facility in the

F-Area, technology and design options, immobilization of surplus plutonium, off-specification

MOX fuel, and the Parallex Project.

2.3.1 MOX Facility Location in F-Area

The DOE previously selected the SRS as the location of the proposed MOX facility, after

evaluating several alternative sites across the country (DOE 2000). In its subsequent

Environmental Report, DCS described the process the DOE used in choosing the specific site

for the proposed MOX facility within the SRS F-Area (DCS 2000). The currently proposed

location of the MOX facility was selected from five proposed sites within the F-Area. Final site

selection was based on three siting qualification criteria that the site must meet and nine siting

evaluation criteria that were more qualitative in nature (DCS 2002). The currently proposed

location of the facility, as identified in Figure 1.2, was the only location that met all of the

qualification criteria and scored the highest when all of evaluation criteria were considered. The

criteria used by DCS in the selection process were as follows (DCS 2002):

Siting Qualification Criteria

1. Free from subsurface contamination,

2. Adequate terrain and area, and

3. Free from Resource Conservation and Recovery Act/Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (RCRA/CERCLA) features.

Siting Evaluation Criteria

1. No known or protected plant or animal species,

2. Water table significantly below the facility substructure,

3. Relatively level area in a higher location for increased security and so as not to block

drainage,

4. Proximity to existing roads and the PDCF site,

5. Location with respect to subsurface soft zones,

6. Availability of utilities,

7. Location with respect to wetland areas,

8. Proximity to archaeological features, and

9. Interference with existing site operations.

Based on the above, this EIS does not consider alternatives to the SRS in which to locate the

proposed MOX facility, nor does it further consider alternative locations within SRS F-Area.
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2.3.2 Technology and Design Options

The general design of the proposed MOX facility was provided in DOE’s SPD EIS (DOE

1999a). In developing the detailed proposed MOX facility design, DCS used the technology at

Cogema’s MELOX and La Hague facilities, with modifications to meet U.S. regulations, codes,

and standards. A general description of the proposed MOX facility design is provided in

Section 2.2.3. In its Environmental Report, DCS (2002) considered a number of technology

and design alternatives. The technology and design alternatives considered by DCS were

discussed if they had a possibility of having some potential impact or significance from an

environmental perspective. These technology and design alternatives are summarized below. 

In evaluating these technology and design alternatives, NRC concluded that, with the exception

of sand filters compared to HEPA filters, further detailed analysis was not warranted in

Chapter 4. This technology option is also summarized in Section 2.2.5.

2.3.2.1 Dry Compared to Wet Impurity Removal

A polishing process is used to remove gallium and other impurities from the plutonium dioxide

feedstock before pellet production. These impurities affect the performance of the MOX fuel in

a reactor. Although the proposed aqueous (wet) polishing process meets the criteria for

controlling the gallium content to less than 120 parts per billion (ppb) (Framatome ANP 2001), it

also generates liquid radioactive and mixed wastes. An alternate technology for purifying the

plutonium dioxide is the dry process. The dry process generates significantly less liquid waste

and involves thermally induced gallium removal (TIGR). However, in an experimental setting,

the TIGR process only reduced the gallium content to 25,000 ppb. The DOE considered the

dry process in the SPD EIS (DOE 1999a) and concluded that the dry process would not meet

the technical requirements for MOX fuel. The best reported gallium removal (Kolman et al.

2000) results in impurity contents are over 100 times the required criteria. Thus, the dry

process was not further evaluated because it could not meet the technical specifications set for

MOX fuel. In addition, TIGR remains an experimental process requiring further testing to scale

the process to production while ensuring uniform pellet feedstock (DCS 2002; Kolman et al.

2000). 

2.3.2.2 Reagent Storage

DCS considered two options for locating reagent storage and solution preparation for the

aqueous polishing process. The options were to locate the storage and solution preparation

process in the same area as the Aqueous Polishing Area or to locate them in a separate

building and to pump reagents to the aqueous polishing process. Because of the potential

explosion hazards of the chemical reagents, DCS decided to use a separate building to reduce

this hazard. Because the design alternative to this approach involves potentially larger 
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environmental impacts, namely, an increase in the explosion accident consequences,

consideration of colocating the aqueous polishing and reagent storage is not evaluated in

Chapter 4.

DCS also considered whether to store the chemical reagents in aboveground or belowground

tanks. Belowground tanks have the advantage of limiting immediate human exposure to spills. 

However, there is increased environmental risk associated with leaking belowground tanks. 

DCS decided to use aboveground tanks with concrete curbs to contain potential spills and

overflows. The NRC considered the design alternative of belowground storage tanks. 

However, this alternative would likely pose a greater risk of groundwater contamination. For

this reason, consideration of belowground tanks is not evaluated in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.3 Acid Recovery Process

DCS added an evaporator to the acid recovery process. This evaporator reduces the activity of

the distillates and recycles approximately half of the volume of distillates in lieu of using fresh

demineralized water. This also results in a volume reduction of liquid wastes that would be

processed and treated by the WSB. Because the design alternative to this approach involves

larger environmental impacts, namely, a demand for more process chemical shipments and

handling and larger waste volumes, further consideration of the aqueous polishing process

without the acid recovery process as an alternative is not evaluated in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.4 Glovebox Cooling

In the MELOX design, gloveboxes are cooled at a higher air flow rate to remove heat generated

from the reactor-grade plutonium. Because weapons-grade plutonium has a lower heat

release, gloveboxes at the proposed MOX facility can be cooled using natural convective

cooling. This results in a reduced airflow and permits a smaller HEPA filter size. The smaller

filter size reduces the volume of solid TRU waste generated by filter replacement. Because the

alternative to this design consideration (i.e., higher glovebox air flow) is unnecessary to meet

any conceivable alternative relative to the proposed MOX facility’s purpose and need to

disposition weapons-grade plutonium, use of higher glovebox flows and larger HEPA filter

banks is not evaluated as an alternative in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.5 Treatment of Aqueous Laboratory Waste

Aqueous laboratory wastes at the MELOX facility are precipitated and solidified, resulting in

TRU wastes. DCS decided to remove the plutonium from the laboratory waste and recycle this

plutonium into the aqueous polishing process. This step reduces the classification of the

laboratory waste from TRU waste to LLW. Because the alternative laboratory waste

management design would involve generation of more TRU waste and, therefore, have larger

environmental impacts, inclusion of plutonium in laboratory waste streams is not further

evaluated as an alternative in Chapter 4.
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2.3.2.6 Pellet Grinding Process

In the facility design, DCS replaced the two-stage cyclone separator in the MOX powder

processing operation with a decloggable metallic filter. This filter would reduce the TRU waste

volume that would result from the periodic replacement of other filters downstream of the pellet

grinding process. Therefore, the use of a two-stage cyclone separator instead of a decloggable

filter would result in the generation of additional TRU wastes. Since additional TRU waste

poses a larger environmental impact, use of a two-stage cyclone separator is not evaluated

further as an alternative in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.7 Facility Heat Exchangers

DCS considered two options to remove heat from the facility. The options were to use watercooled or air-cooled heat exchangers. Water-cooled exchangers can have impacts associated

with cooling tower drift or blowdown. To reduce these potential impacts, DCS decided to use

air-cooled heat exchangers. Because the water-cooled exchangers would involve generation of

cooling tower drift or blowdown and, therefore, larger environmental impacts, using this type of

exchanger is not further evaluated as an alternative in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.8 Physical Security Barriers

DCS considered several options to provide a physical security barrier around the proposed

MOX facility. One of these was the construction of an earthen berm. Because this method

would have resulted in a larger disturbed area for the site, DCS decided to use physical security

barriers that resulted in less land disturbance. Because the earthen berms would involve a

larger disturbed area and, therefore, larger environmental impacts, use of berms is not further

evaluated as an alternative in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.9 Material Transfer from the PDCF to the Proposed MOX Facility

As discussed in Section 1.2.1, the PDCF would produce plutonium dioxide feedstock for the

proposed MOX facility. The material would need to be transferred to the proposed MOX facility. 

DCS considered three transfer options: (1) tunnel, (2) closed transfer trench, and (3) vehicle

transfer. Because the first two options would result in greater land disturbance, DCS decided to

use vehicles to transfer the plutonium dioxide feedstock. Because the tunnel or closed transfer

trenches would involve a larger disturbed area and, therefore, larger environmental impacts and

because vehicle-related impacts would be small for the short distance between the facilities,

use of tunnels or trenches is not further evaluated as an alternative in Chapter 4.
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2.3.3 Immobilization of Surplus Plutonium

As discussed below, the NRC has concluded that immobilizing surplus plutonium is not a

reasonable alternative to the proposed action, and, therefore, this alternative does not require

detailed analysis in Chapter 4.

Before the DOE’s January 2002 decision to cancel the plutonium immobilization plant,

plutonium immobilization was available as a no-action disposition alternative to the proposed

action. The DOE had already evaluated the environmental impacts of this alternative as

alternative 12a in the SPD EIS (DOE 1999a), so that a new NRC analysis of this alternative was

not required. However, as discussed in Section 1.4.1, following the DOE’s January 2002

decision, the NRC solicited views on whether the immobilization alternative should still be

evaluated in this EIS. The comments solicited did not identify any persuasive reasons to further

consider the immobilization alternative.

The NRC has now determined for two reasons that immobilization is no longer a reasonable

alternative to the proposed action. First, immobilization of the 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus

plutonium would not meet a key element of the purpose and need for the proposed action, as

described in Section 1.3. Due to budgetary constraints, the DOE decided to cancel the

immobilization portion of the surplus plutonium disposition program and adopt a MOX-only

approach. The DOE determined that in order to make progress with available funds, only 

one approach could be supported. The DOE stated that after evaluating the feasibility of

implementing two disposition approaches, it believed that the best way to make the most

progress with available funds while maintaining Russian interest in and commitment to surplus

plutonium disposition was to pursue a MOX-only disposition strategy (DOE 2002a). The DOE

further stated that Russia does not consider immobilization alone to be an acceptable

approach. In the DOE’s judgment, reliance by the United States on immobilization would

therefore cause Russia to abandon its plutonium disposition efforts. Because immobilization

fails to degrade the isotopic composition of the plutonium, Russia distrusts the immobilization

alternative, as it would leave open the possibility of future retrieval and reuse of the plutonium in

nuclear weapons (DOE 2002a). As discussed further in Section 1.1.1, the DOE therefore

concluded that reliance on a MOX-only approach is the key to successfully completing the

September 2000 agreement between Russia and the United States.

The second reason that immobilization is no longer a reasonable alternative to the proposed

action is its connection with the conduct of United States foreign policy. Evaluating the

immobilization alternative now would involve the NRC in foreign policy matters that the DOE

has been conducting on behalf of the United States. In the NRC’s view, an alternative that 

would block the implementation of an agreement with another country involves foreign policy

matters that are outside NEPA’s scope. Therefore, the NRC concludes that immobilization is

not a reasonable alternative requiring detailed analysis in this FEIS.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-24

2.3.4 Off-Specification MOX Fuel

During public information meetings in September 2002, NRC was asked to consider an

alternative in which MOX fuel would be manufactured but not irradiated in commercial nuclear

power plants. Under this alternative, as understood by the NRC, off-specification fuel rods

would be manufactured in the proposed MOX facility and transported to spent fuel pools. 

These spent fuel pools could be located at either commercial nuclear power plants or interim

spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). Once at the pool, the rods would be commingled with

spent fuel rods, and possibly even incorporated into vacant positions in existing spent fuel

assemblies. The final configuration would be a proliferation-resistant form that would be a

candidate for the National Academy of Sciences’ (NAS’) spent fuel standard for surplus

plutonium disposition (NAS 2000).

Since the demands for fuel quality and specifications would be lower, the fuel rods could be

manufactured “off-specification.” The so-called “off-specification” fuel rods would offer both

environmental costs and benefits, as described below. Therefore, the NRC gave some

consideration to this alternative based on the information provided by principal proponents of

this approach (Macfarlane et al. 2001).

The alternative would involve a modified approach to manufacturing MOX fuel. The final

powder blend would still have to be homogenized, pressed into pellets, and the pellets sintered

in order to manufacture off-specification fuel rods. However, most impurities, including gallium

and americium, could remain in the finished rods. This could significantly reduce liquid

radioactive waste volumes associated with polishing the feedstock plutonium. As a result, the

demand on the WIPP to accommodate solidified high-alpha-activity waste derived from the

aqueous polishing process would be reduced.

Since the off-specification rods would not be used in a reactor, any risks of reactor accidents

involving MOX fuel would not occur. In addition, the cause of some accidents in the proposed

MOX facility would be prevented. For example, if aqueous polishing could be eliminated, then

the risks of inadvertent nuclear criticality, solution spills, electrolyzer fires, and explosions would

be considerably lower.

Since the concentration of plutonium dioxide in each off-specification rod would not be

constrained by reactor fuel specifications, the mass of plutonium dioxide in each rod could be

higher. This would result in lower numbers of manufactured rods and correspondingly lower

vehicle-related transportation risks associated with transporting rods to any reactor sites. 

Fewer rods would also reduce the time required to operate the proposed MOX facility, which

could result in lower operational costs. Criticality issues arising from the higher concentration of

plutonium could be avoided by mixing neutron-absorbing gadolinium and hafnium with the

plutonium.

However, there would be environmental costs associated with this alternative. Americium-241

would not be removed by the aqueous polishing process. Since americium-241 is a highspecific-activity alpha-emitter and poses a direct radiation hazard, radiation exposures to facility

workers, site workers, and the public would be higher during MOX facility operations,
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-25

off-specification MOX rod transportation, and handling of the off-specification rods at the

reactor site or ISFSI.

The costs of manufacturing off-specification MOX fuel rods would also be affected by the

elimination of the “fuel credit.” The fuel credit is a project cost offsetting factor that accounts for

the price a reactor licensee would pay for completed MOX fuel that meets its specifications. 

The estimated additional project costs would be $1.0 billion, thereby raising the total project

costs from $3.8 billion to $4.8 billion.

The benefit of producing electricity from the use of MOX fuel would also be eliminated by the

manufacture of off-specification MOX fuel.

Having qualitatively weighed the costs and benefits of this alternative, the staff find that this

alternative likely involves a net increase in environmental costs. Therefore, no compelling

reason exists to pursue this alternative in further detail. In addition, it is uncertain that this

proposal would meet the National Academy of Sciences’ spent fuel standard for surplus

plutonium disposition (NAS 2000). The off-specification rods would not be irretrievably

configured in irradiated spent fuel, and the isotopic distribution of the plutonium in offspecification rods would not be altered. As a result, this form is unlikely to meet with approval

from the Russian Federation, whose parallel progress on plutonium disposition under formal

bilateral agreements is integral to the purpose of and need for the proposed action. As

discussed above for the immobilization of plutonium alternative, because this alternative does

not meet the purpose of and need for the proposed action, the off-specification alternative is not

further analyzed in detail in the EIS.

2.3.5 Parallex Project Alternative

Another suggested alternative to the proposed action was to transfer the surplus plutonium to

Canada under the Parallex Project. The Parallex Project was identified by DOE in its ROD for

the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement (DOE 1997) as a possible option for dispositioning some of the surplus

plutonium. The Parallex Project is a joint Canadian, Russian, and U.S. demonstration effort to

evaluate the feasibility of burning MOX fuel in heavy-water-moderated reactors. The Parallex

Project is still ongoing. It is a limited scale test of approximately 27 kg (59 lb) of MOX fuel that

was manufactured at the DOE’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and at the Bochvar

Institute in Moscow, Russia. This MOX fuel was shipped to Canada and is currently being

tested in a Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor. Following irradiation, additional

analyses will be required to evaluate the usefulness of this approach. The DOE prepared an

environmental assessment (EA) for this action and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact

(FONSI) (DOE 1999b).

The suggested alternative of considering the Parallex Project would mean that the PDCF, the 

WSB, and the proposed MOX facility would be constructed and operated, but that the MOX fuel

would be transferred to Canada for irradiation in heavy-water-moderated reactors there. This

suggested alternative would be similar to the proposed action, except that the surplus plutonium
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-26

would be irradiated in Canada. Implementing this alternative would require a change in national

policy regarding the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium that is the responsibility of the

DOE. Therefore, this alternative is not considered further in this EIS.

2.3.6 MIX MOX Alternative

During the public comment meetings on the DEIS in March 2003, NRC was asked to consider

an alternative in which surplus weapons-grade plutonium would be mixed with reactor-grade

plutonium. This alternative was named “MIX MOX” by the proponent and is described further

below.

Weapons-grade plutonium has a lower percentage of plutonium-240 than does reactor-grade

plutonium. One concern with the immobilization alternative was that it would not isotopically

degrade the plutonium. The MOX fuel alternative does isotopically degrade the plutonium. The

depleted uranium (uranium-238) and plutonium-239 in MOX fuel would be converted to

plutonium-240 when subjected to irradiation in a nuclear reactor. The MIX MOX alternative

would change the overall percentage of plutonium-240 by adding/mixing surplus weaponsgrade plutonium with reactor-grade plutonium. The source of reactor-grade plutonium would be

European stockpiles. For example, Britain has approximately 60 MT of surplus reactor-grade

plutonium that was generated from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. The MIX MOX proponent

stated that after the materials were mixed, they could be disposed of in a geologic repository.

Several details of the MIX MOX alternative have not been fully developed. For example, it is

not clear if new facilities would be required to perform the mixing and whether any processing of

portions of the surplus plutonium would be required prior to mixing. In addition, the

percentages of the two plutonium materials required to achieve suitable isotopic degradation

have not been determined. The legality, availability, and cost of purchasing the reactor-grade

plutonium is uncertain. As such, the environmental impacts cannot be determined. Assuming

that existing DOE facilities could be used, it is conceivable that the costs of the MIX MOX

alternative could be slightly lower than the proposed action; however, the benefit of producing

electricity from the use of MOX fuel would be eliminated by the MIX MOX alternative.

The MIX MOX alternative appears to satisfy one element of the purpose of and need for the

proposed action. It appears to result in material that is proliferation resistant and would

therefore reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. However, the MIX MOX

alternative does not satisfy the second element of the purpose of and need for the proposed

action. The current United States - Russia agreement does not allow for disposition of surplus

plutonium using the MIX MOX alternative. Moreover, given that the environmental costs of the

proposed action are considered to be small, the MIX MOX alternative is not a clearly superior

alternative. Therefore, the NRC concludes that MIX MOX is not a reasonable alternative

requiring detailed analysis in this EIS.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-27

2.4 Comparison of Alternatives 

In weighing the environmental, economic, and

other benefits of the proposed action against its

environmental, economic, and other costs, the

NRC must also consider and compare

reasonable alternatives to the proposed action. 

These evaluations will be factored into the

ultimate decision of whether the action called for

is the issuance of the proposed license, with any

appropriate conditions to protect environmental

values. The proposed action and the no-action

(continued storage) alternative are compared in

the text below and in Table 2.1. The terms used

in impact categorization are defined in the text

box to the right.

The impacts of the no-action alternative and the

proposed action are compared for each technical area considered in this EIS. The level of

impacts associated with the no-action alternative evaluated includes those impacts incurred by

continued storage of surplus plutonium at DOE sites if the proposed MOX facility is not

approved by the NRC. As stated previously, projected impacts for the no-action alternative

were based on the analysis presented in the DOE SPD EIS (DOE 1999a) and were not

reevaluated for this EIS.

The proposed action was evaluated for impacts from the following activities:

• Construction, operation, and deactivation and decommissioning of the proposed

MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB at the SRS;

Transport of depleted uranium hexafluoride from a DOE site at Portsmouth, Ohio, to

a commercial fuel fabrication plant at Wilmington, North Carolina, to produce

uranium dioxide needed as feedstock for the MOX fuel fabrication process;

Conversion of depleted uranium hexafluoride to uranium dioxide;

Transport of the uranium dioxide from Wilmington to the SRS;

Transport of fresh MOX fuel from the SRS to a surrogate reactor site;

Reactor use of MOX fuel; and

Transport of spent MOX fuel to a geologic repository.

The continued storage (i.e., the no-action) alternative would result in no new construction at the

DOE locations currently storing surplus plutonium, with the possible exception of minor 

Determination of the Significance of Potential

Environmental Impacts

For purposes of describing impacts in this EIS,

each impact was assigned one of the following

three significance levels:

• Small: The environmental effects are not

detectable or are so minor that they will

neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any

important attribute of the environment.

• Moderate: The environmental effects are

sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to

destabilize, important attributes of the

environment.

• Large: The environmental effects are clearly

noticeable and are sufficient to destabilize 

important attributes of the environment.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-28

Table 2.1. Comparison of alternativesa

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Human Health Risk

Construction

 Radiological

Not applicable Human health impacts would be small.

Same exposure as SRS employees

from existing SRS operations.

 Chemical

 Physical hazards

No adverse impacts from inhalation of

construction-related emissions.

<1 fatality, 122 injuries annually over

3 to 5 years.

Normal Operations Under current operating 

conditions, human health impacts

would be small.

Human health impacts would be small.

Radiological (annual impacts)

Collective public dose

(person-Sv/yr)

Annual LCFs

0.029

0.002

0.016

0.0009

Public MEI dose (mSv/yr)

Risk of LCF

0.065

4 x 10-6

6.1 x 10-5

4 x 10-9

Facility workers collective

dose (person-Sv/yr)

Annual LCFs

1.4

0.08

2.6

0.2

Average facility worker dose 

(mSv/yr)

Risk of LCF

<3.2

<0.0002

<5

<0.0003

Chemical

Physical hazards

Insufficient data

Insufficient data

No adverse impacts from chemical

exposures.

<1 fatality, 41 injuries annually over 

10 or more years.

Accidents If an accident occurred, human

health impacts would be small to

moderate, depending on the type

of the accident. Risks would be

small.

If an accident occurred, human health

impacts would be small, moderate, or

large depending on the type of the

accident. Risks would be small.

Radiological

Event

Dose to collective public 

(person-Sv)

LCFs

Beyond design basis earthquake

6.6

0.4

PDCF tritium release (short-term

exposure).

42

3
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-29

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Chemical No data Large accidental releases of chlorine or

nitrogen tetroxide could have adverse

impacts on SRS employees and would

require rapid emergency response

actions.

Air Quality

Construction Continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites would

not require new construction, thus

no impacts to air quality would

occur.

Air emissions impacts would be small.

Annual standard level for PM2.5 <0.1% of standard level.

24-h standard level for PM2.5 4.3% of standard level.

CO, SO2, NO2 emissions from

construction equipment

<0.29% of ambient standard level.

Operations No violation of air quality

standards at DOE sites from

continued storage of surplus

plutonium.

Air emission impacts would be small.

24-h standard level for PM2.5 1.9% of standard level.

PM2.5 annual standard level 0.01% of standard level.

Toxic air pollutants and PAHs <0.04% of South Carolina standard

levels.

Prevention of significant

deterioration of air quality

<6.0% of PSD Class II Area increment

for SO2 emissions.

<6.0% PM10 increments to Class II

Areas.

<1% of Class I increment of PM10

standard at Cape Romain National

Wildlife Refuge 160 km (100 mi) from

proposed facilities.

Hydrology

Construction Not applicable Hydrological impacts would be small.

Surface water No surface water use or discharges to

surface waters during construction.

Groundwater 139 million L/yr (37 million gal/yr). Total

use for construction would be 10% of

A-Area loop water demand and 3% of

excess capacity.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-30

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Operations No impacts on water use from

continued surplus plutonium

storage at DOE sites.

Hydrological impacts would be small.

Surface water No significant impacts from discharges

to an NPDES outfall and discharge of

treated sanitary waste effluents.

Groundwater 76 million L/yr (20 million gal/yr). Total

use by proposed facilities would be 5%

of A-Area loop water demand in 2000

and 2% of excess capacity.

Waste Management

Construction No impacts to waste management

systems from continued storage of

surplus plutonium at DOE sites.

No TRU, LLW, or mixed LLW

generation; small impacts to SRS

treatment capacity for nonhazardous

liquid waste.

Waste volumes generated during a

3-5-yr construction period:

Hazardous [m3

 (yd3)] 710 (929)

Nonhazardous liquid [m3

 (million

gal)]

300,900 (79.5)

Nonhazardous solid [m3 (yd3)] 53,410 (69,858)

Operations Small impacts on waste

management systems from

continued storage of surplus

plutonium at DOE sites.

Small to moderate impacts on waste

management systems at SRS and

WIPP.

Waste volumes generated during

10-yr operation period:

TRU [m3

 (yd3)] 4,431 (5,796). TRU waste volume

would be 13% of SRS storage capacity;

2.6% of WIPP disposal capacity. 

Liquid LLW [m3

 (million gal)] 22,786 (6.0). The liquid LLW

constitutes 4% of the discharge

capacity of SRS.

Solid LLW [m3

 (yd3)] 6,052 (7,916). Estimated volumes for

solid LLW would represent about 21%

of the SRS disposal capacity (if

disposed of entirely at SRS). 

Hazardous/mixed [m3

 (yd3)] 120 (157). Estimated volume of

hazardous waste would represent less

than 2% of SRS storage capacity. 
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-31

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Nonhazardous liquid [m3

 (million

gal)]

602,000 (159). Nonhazardous liquid

waste would be 6% of SRS treatment

capacity.

Nonhazardous solid [m3

 (yd3)] 41,400 (54,149). Nonhazardous solid

waste would be disposed off-site.

Environmental Justice

Construction No impacts would occur since no

new construction would be

needed for continued storage of

surplus plutonium at DOE sites.

No exposure to radiological emissions

and no adverse impacts from inhalation

of construction-related chemical

emissions, regardless of population

group or income status.

Normal Operations Radiological and nonradiological

risks from continued storage of

surplus plutonium would be small.

No disproportionately high and

adverse effects would occur.

No disproportionately high and adverse

effects would occur from routine

operations. 

Accidents An environmental justice impact is

possible from a severe accident.

Aesthetics

Construction and Operation No impacts would occur because

no new construction is needed for

continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites.

Small impacts on visual resources from

construction and operation of the

proposed facilities.

Cultural and Paleontological

Resources

Construction No impacts would occur because

no new construction is needed for

continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites.

Two archaeological sites, 38 AK

546/547 and 38 AK 757, would be

directly affected by construction of the

proposed MOX facility. The South

Carolina State Historic Preservation

Office accepted a data recovery plan

for the sites, and data recovery was

completed for both sites in 2002.

Five additional eligible sites could

experience indirect impacts by the

construction workforce unless proper

mitigation is used.

Operations No impacts on cultural or

paleontological resources are

expected from continued storage

of surplus plutonium at the DOE

sites.

Routine operations would not impact

archaeological sites near the proposed

facilities.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-32

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Ecology

Construction No impacts would occur since no

new construction is anticipated for

continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites.

Impacts from habitat loss or noise

generation during construction of the

proposed facilities would be small.

Habitat loss Impacts to wetlands and endangered/

threatened species would be small.

Up to 14.7 ha (36.4 acres) of

woodlands would be cleared for

facilities, representing <1% of annual

timber harvest at SRS, and trees would

be small.

Noise impacts Construction noise levels as high as

80 dBA could impact wildlife within

122 m (400 ft) of the project area.

Operations Ecological impacts would be

small.

Ecological impacts would be small.

Geology, Seismology, and Soils

Construction Continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites would

not impact soils and geology since

no new construction is expected.

Impacts to soils and geology would be

small. Up to 50 ha (123 acres) would be

disturbed in F-Area; some soil erosion

and compaction.

Operations Continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites would

not impact soils and geology.

Impacts to soils and geology from

routine operations would be small.

Infrastructure

Construction No new construction is expected,

thus there would be no impacts to

existing DOE infrastructure.

Impacts to existing infrastructure would

be small.

Roads An additional 4.8 to 6.4 km (3 to 4 mi)

of roadways would be needed in the

F-Area to support construction.

Electrical power 17,700 MWh/yr representing about

3.7% of SRS capacity would be needed

during the 5-yr construction period.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-33

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Water 139 million L/yr (37 million gal/yr) representing about 3.3% of A-Area loop

groundwater capacity.

Operations Impacts occurring at DOE facilities

during continued storage of

surplus plutonium would be small.

Impacts to existing infrastructure would

be small.

Electrical power Use of about 186,000 MWh/yr,

representing 36.4% of F-Area capacity,

would occur during normal operations.

Water 76 million L/yr (20.1 million gal/yr) or

about 5% of A-Area loop water demand

in 2000 and 2% of excess capacity

would be used.

Land Use

Construction No impacts would occur since no

new construction of storage

facilities for surplus plutonium is

needed at the DOE facilities.

Small impacts to designated land use

at SRS would occur for construction of

the proposed facilities.

Normal Operations No impacts to land use would

occur at DOE facilities during

continued storage of surplus

plutonium.

Small impacts to land use would occur

from routine operations.

Accidents Depending on the type and extent of an

accident during operations, impacts

could be small, moderate, or large.

Portions of the F-Area could be

precluded from employee use until

corrective cleanup and appropriate

monitoring measures were

implemented.

Small, moderate, or large impacts to

land use in the immediate vicinity of

SRS could occur in the event that a

highly unlikely accident results in

radioactive material migrating off site.

Noise

Construction Not applicable Small impacts would occur from noise

levels generated during construction.

Equipment noise levels Equipment and vehicle noise would

reach levels of 85–90 dBA at distances

of 15 m (50 ft) from the source.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-34

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Noise levels at the SRS boundary could

reach 38 dBA, which is below EPA

guidance of 55 dBA for protection of the

public.

Operations No significant impacts would

occur at DOE plutonium storage

facilities above noise levels

currently generated by traffic and

worker activities.

Small impacts would occur from noise

levels generated during operation.

Process equipment, diesel

generators, air-conditioning noise

Noise levels could be as high as

<29 dBA at the SRS boundary, which is

well below the 55-dBA EPA guidance

level.

Socioeconomics

Construction Not applicable Impacts on the REA and ROI would be

small.

Employment 1,010 direct jobs, 810 indirect jobs for

peak construction year.

Income $91.9 million in peak construction year.

In-migrating population 350

Operations No impacts would occur from

continued storage of surplus

plutonium at DOE facilities.

Small impacts on the REA and ROI

would occur during operations.

Employment 490 direct jobs, 780 indirect jobs.

Income $64 million per year

In-migrating population 180

Cost-Benefit Impacts

Construction Continued storage of surplus

plutonium at DOE facilities would

not result in additional impacts to

the REA and ROI.

No significant adverse impacts related

to costs would occur from construction

of the proposed facilities. Some

beneficial impacts would occur. In

general, the impacts would be

considered small.

REA & ROI impacts

Employment 1,020 average annual employment

Total income $370 million

Total regional product $760 million
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-35

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Operations Impacts related to costs and

benefits from continued storage

would be small.

Impacts related to costs and benefits

from operation of the proposed facilities

would be small.

REA & ROI impacts

Employment 1,270 jobs

Total income $640 million

Total regional product $1,180 million

Net benefit $1,940 million

National Impacts

Costs $4,064 million

Benefits Economic benefits for materials

supplied, services, new scientific

knowledge, safe use of plutonium

stockpile, generation of electricity from

MOX fuel.

Transportation

Radiological No intersite transportation

expected.

Radiological impacts would be small.

Routine dose to the public 

(person-Sv)

LCFs

3.1-5.6

0.2-0.3

Dose to the transportation 

crew (person-Sv)

LCFs

2.1-5.3

0.1-0.3

Accident dose risk to the

public (person-Sv)

LCFs

0.23

0.01

Nonradiological No intersite transportation

expected.

Nonradiological impacts would be

small.

Vehicle emissions (latent 

fatalities)

Accidents (fatalities)

1-2

0.078-0.20

a

Some of the impacts for the no-action alternative are from the entire DOE site, not just activities associated

with continued storage. Therefore, the impacts of the no-action alternative are overestimated.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-36

expansion of storage facilities at the Pantex site in Texas. Construction impacts would be small

or negligible at Pantex if storage facility expansion was necessary and would occur on

previously disturbed land adjacent to the existing storage facilities (DOE 1999a). For all

present DOE storage sites, radiological and nonradiological risks would be small. Continued

storage would be expected to have no impacts on air quality, water quality, waste management

systems, cultural resources, or soils, and the economic cost would be lower than that for the

proposed action. However, continued storage would meet none of the DOE’s goals for the

plutonium disposition program.

Construction of the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB (hereafter referred to as the

proposed facilities) would disturb up to 50.0 ha (123.4 acres) of land. Impacts to endangered or

threatened species, wetlands, or aquatic or terrestrial habitats (including woodlands) at the SRS

and the F-Area vicinity would be small. Impacts to two prehistoric archaeological sites eligible

for listing on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) have been mitigated through data

recovery, and the removal of the fill during construction will be monitored (see Section 5.2.9).

The primary benefit of operation of the proposed MOX facility would be the resulting reduction

in the supply of weapons-grade plutonium available for unauthorized use once the plutonium

component of MOX fuel has been irradiated in commercial nuclear reactors. Converting

surplus plutonium in this manner is viewed as being a safer use/disposition strategy than the

continued storage of surplus plutonium at DOE sites, as would occur under the no-action

alternative, since it would reduce the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium

are stored (DOE 1997). Further, converting weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel in the

United States — as opposed to immobilizing a portion of it as DOE had previously planned to

do — lays the foundation for parallel disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia, which

distrusts immobilization for its failure to degrade the plutonium’s isotopic composition

(DOE 2002a). Converting surplus plutonium into MOX fuel is thus viewed as a better way of

ensuring that weapons-usable material will not be obtained by rogue states and terrorist groups. 

Implementing the proposed action is expected to promote the above nonproliferation objectives. 

Additionally, building and operating the proposed MOX facility is expected to result in a gain of

scientific knowledge relative to the conversion of weapons-grade plutonium into reactor fuel.

In addition to the above primary benefits, there are secondary economic benefits of the

proposed action. Impacts of construction on the regional economic area (REA) and region of

influence (ROI) would be beneficial with respect to jobs and income. Direct construction jobs

for the proposed action would total about 1,010 in the peak construction year. Although inmigration of workers during construction would be greater for the proposed action, no adverse

impacts are anticipated to public services, schools, housing availability, or the local

transportation network. Construction of the proposed facilities would be expected to generate

91.9 million in total income within the REA during the peak construction year.

During operations, the MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB would be expected to generate 490 direct

and 780 indirect jobs, producing a total annual income of $64 million in the REA. Approximately

180 people would be expected to relocate to the SRS area during operation of the proposed

facilities. No adverse socioeconomic impacts are expected as the result of proposed facility
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-37

operations. Adequate public services, schools, and housing exist to satisfy needs of the inmigrating population.

The economic cost benefit analysis for the proposed action showed an overall net benefit to the

ROI and REA of $1,940 million. National economic impacts (costs) for the proposed MOX

facility, PDCF, and WSB are estimated to be $4,064 million. The economic benefits would

include adding employment income in various national economic sectors and adding income to

businesses from the purchase of related goods and services.

The following discussion compares the primary and secondary benefits set forth above to the

environmental and economic costs of the proposed action.

Construction and routine operation of the proposed MOX facility would not be expected to

cause any disproportionately high and adverse impacts to low-income or minority populations in

the SRS vicinity. Of the accidents evaluated, a hypothetical tritium release accident at the

proposed PDCF had the highest estimated short-term impacts, approximately 3 latent cancer

fatalities (LCFs) among members of the off-site public. The same accident also had the highest

1-year exposure impact, up to 100 LCFs among members of the off-site public if ingestion of

contaminated crops was considered. However, it is highly unlikely that such an accident would

occur, and the risk to any population, including low-income and minority communities, is

considered to be low. However, the communities most likely to be affected by a significant

accident would be minority or low income, given the demographics and prevailing wind

direction. The extent to which low-income or minority population groups would be affected

would depend on the amount of material released and the direction and speed of the wind.

Continued storage of plutonium by the DOE at its present locations would not be expected to

produce additional LCFs. (Annual LCFs of approximately 0.002 in the surrounding population

of the storage sites [DOE 1999a] were estimated.) The annual collective dose to members of

the public (i.e., those living and working within 80 km [50 mi] of the SRS) produced by routine

operation of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB would be expected to result in

an LCF rate of approximately 0.0009/yr or less. Therefore, continued storage results in higher

annual impacts. 

No adverse impacts from chemical exposure of workers at the proposed MOX facility are

anticipated. Less than one fatality, and approximately 120 worker injuries per year are

anticipated during construction of the proposed facilities. Facility operations would result in

about 40 injuries per year and less than one fatality per year.

Routine MOX facility operations are expected to produce small air quality impacts and would

not result in concentrations above air quality standard levels for criteria pollutants at the SRS.

Facility construction would contribute temporarily less than 0.1% of the PM2.5 standard level,

and facility operation would contribute about 0.01% or less of this level.

Water consumption during operation of the proposed facilities would be an increase of about

5% of the water demand for the A-Area loop in 2000 and about 2% of the excess A-Area loop

capacity. Impacts to surface water are expected to be small during facility operations because
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-38

the concentrations of nonhazardous wastes in the discharge produced by the proposed facilities

would be within the guidelines of the existing NPDES permit.

Waste management systems at the SRS would not be adversely affected by wastes generated

by the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and the WSB. Adequate storage capacity and handling

procedures are in place at the SRS to process hazardous wastes generated during both

construction and facility operations. Nonhazardous liquid and solid wastes would not adversely

affect operation of the Central Sanitary Waste Treatment Facility at the SRS.

Transportation of uranium and plutonium feedstock materials, transuranic waste, and fresh

MOX fuel would result in approximately 3,300,000 to 8,200,000 km (2,050,000 to 5,100,000 mi)

traveled by 1,497 to 3,512 truck shipments over the operations period of the proposed MOX

facility. Up to 1 latent cancer fatality (LCF) might be expected because of the radioactive

nature of the cargo. (Estimated LCFs for members of the public and the transportation crews

were 0.2 to 0.4 and 0.1 to 0.3, respectively.) One to two latent fatalities from vehicle emissions

were estimated, and no fatalities (0.078 to 0.20 fatality) from the physical trauma of potential

vehicle accidents were estimated.

The use of sand filters was identified during the EIS scoping process as a potential substitute

for final HEPA filters. The sand filter technology is described in Section 2.2.5. A comparison

between sand filter and HEPA filter impacts is presented in Section 4.3.8. The NRC concludes

that the technology option to install a sand filter poses no clear reduction in overall

environmental impacts over the installation and use of HEPA filters.

A sand filter typically is designed to use locally available sand and gravel. The outer wall of the

sand filter consists of reinforced concrete placed below or partially below grade. It is designed

to withstand a design-basis earthquake and/or flood without cracking or leaking. A sand filter

designed for the proposed MOX facility would be rectangular and would require a surface area

of about 313 m2 (33,650 ft2

). The filter would be about 3 m (10 ft) deep and would consist of

gravel layers overlaid with sand layers arranged in order of decreasing particle size (Orr 2001). 

A coarse sand layer would be placed at the top of the filter to maintain the integrity of the lower

sand layers during filter operations. No routine maintenance is required during operation of

sand filters.

Use of the HEPA filters would result in a slightly higher radiological dose to facility workers

during the course of normal operations, as discussed in Section 4.3.1.1.2, and the use of a

sand filter might result in some accident impacts lower than those estimated in Section 4.3.5.2. 

As discussed in Section 4.3.2.2, the air filtration method would not have an impact on air

quality. Both filter types have approximately the same efficiencies for particulates, and neither

filter type is designed to trap gases. In addition, the disposal costs were estimated to be similar

for each filter type (Section 4.3.4).
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-39

2.5 Recommendation Regarding the Proposed Action

After weighing the costs and benefits of the proposed action and comparing alternatives

(see FEIS Sections 2.4 and 4.6), and after considering the comments received on the DEIS

(see FEIS Appendix J), the NRC staff, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.91(d), sets forth below its

NEPA recommendation regarding the proposed action. The NRC staff recommends that,

unless safety issues mandate otherwise, the action called for is the issuance of the proposed

license to DCS, with conditions to protect environmental values. In this regard, the NRC staff

concludes that (1) the applicable environmental requirements set forth in FEIS Chapter 6 and

(2) the proposed mitigation measures discussed in FEIS Chapter 5 would eliminate or

substantially lessen any potential adverse environmental impacts associated with the proposed

action.

The NRC staff has concluded that the overall benefits of the proposed MOX facility outweigh its

disadvantages and costs, based upon consideration of the following:

The national policy decision to reduce supplies of surplus weapons-grade plutonium,

as reflected in agreements between the United States and Russia;

The small radiological impacts on, and risk to, human health, that would be caused

by constructing, operating, and decommissioning the proposed MOX facility;

The small environmental impact the proposed action would have; and

The economic benefit to the local community.

As discussed in FEIS Chapter 4, postulated severe accidents evaluated in connection with the

proposed action would be expected to produce moderate to large impacts. While the

consequences of these bounding accidents would be expected to produce moderate to large

impacts, the likelihood of such accidents occurring is expected to be very low (highly unlikely).

Accordingly, the NRC concludes in its NEPA analysis that the benefits of the proposed action

outweigh its connected risks and costs.

2.6 References for Chapter 2

DCS (Duke Cogema Stone & Webster) 2000. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

Environmental Report. Docket No. 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2001. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction Authorization Request. Docket

No. 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2002. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 1 & 2.

Docket No. 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. July.

DCS 2003a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 3. Docket 

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-40

DCS 2003b. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 4. Docket 

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. Aug.

DCS 2004. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 5. Docket

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June 10.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 1997. Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,

Washington, DC. Nov.

DOE 1999a. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement. 

DOE/EIS-0283. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, DC. Nov.

DOE 1999b. “Finding of No Significant Impact in the Environmental Assessment for the

Parallex Project Fuel Manufacture and Shipment.” Federal Register 64(173):48810-48813,

Sept. 8.

DOE 2000. “Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental

Impact Statement.” Federal Register 65(7):1608-1620, Jan. 11.

DOE 2002a. “Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program.” (Amended Record of Decision) Federal 

Register 67(76):19432-19435, April 19.

DOE 2002b. Supplement Analysis for Storage of Surplus Plutonium Materials in the K-Area

Material Storage Facility at the Savannah River Site. DOE/EIS-0229-SA-2. Assistant

Secretary for Environmental Management, Washington, DC. Feb.

DOE 2003. Changes Needed to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program, Supplement

Analysis and Amended Record of Decision. DOE/EIS-0283-SA1. Office of Fissile Materials

Disposition, Washington, DC. April.

Framatone ANP 2001. Fuel Qualification Plan. Document No. 77-5005775-02. Prepared by

Framatone ANP for U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Material Disposition, on behalf of

Duke Cogema Stone & Webster. April.

Kolman, D.G., et al. 2000. “Thermally Induced Gallium Removal from Plutonium Dioxide for

MOX Fuel Production.” Journal of Nuclear Materials 282:245-254.

LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) 1998. Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

Environmental Impact Statement Data Report - Savannah River Site. LA-UR-97-2910.

Los Alamos, NM. June.

Macfarlane, A., et al. 2001. “Plutonium Disposal, the Third Way.” Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists May/June, pp. 53-57.

NAS (National Academy of Sciences) 2000. The Spent-Fuel Standard for Disposition of Excess

Weapon Plutonium; Application to Current DOE Options. National Academy Press,

Washington, DC.

Orr, M.P. 2001. “Comparison of HEPA and Deep-Bed Sand Filters for Final Air Filtration at

MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility.” Letter report from Orr (Advanced Technologies and

Laboratories, Inc., Rockville, MD) to W.C. Gleaves (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC). Nov. 15.
1-1

1 PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR ACTION

1.1 Introduction

In 1992, at the end of the Cold War, the President commissioned the National Academy of

Sciences to study management and disposition options for surplus weapons-usable plutonium. 

Several agreements were subsequently reached with Russia on the mutual reduction of

plutonium stockpiles. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for the surplus

plutonium disposition program for the United States. Within this program, the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the independent responsibility of reviewing a proposal to

design, construct, and operate a facility in the United States that would convert depleted

uranium dioxide and weapons-grade plutonium dioxide into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. A 1998

amendment to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 gave the NRC licensing and related

regulatory authority over the proposed facility. In accordance with the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA), 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) 4321 et seq., the proposal to build and

operate such a facility is being reviewed by the NRC in this final environmental impact

statement (FEIS), to evaluate the potential environmental impacts that would result if the

proposed action is taken. 

The surplus plutonium disposition program is discussed in Section 1.1.1. The proposed action

is described in Section 1.2, and the purpose and need for the proposed action are discussed in

Section 1.3. Section 1.4 describes the process used by the NRC to determine the scope of this

environmental impact statement (EIS), which identified the issues to be studied in detail and the

issues that do not require detailed study.

1.1.1 Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia took steps to mutually reduce

their respective stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium by declaring some of this plutonium

excess to national security needs. The surplus plutonium disposition program involves making

sure that this surplus plutonium cannot be used again to make nuclear weapons. The DOE

evaluated a number of strategies to disposition the U.S. stockpile of surplus plutonium and has

published two related EISs, a record of decision (ROD), and an amended ROD (DOE 1996,

1999, 2000, 2002). As part of this program, in 1999, the DOE selected a contractor, Duke

Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS), to design, construct, and operate a facility that would convert

uranium and weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel, as discussed further in Section 1.1.2.

To implement DOE’s surplus plutonium disposition program, the DOE ROD in January 2000 set

forth a “hybrid” approach, which involved immobilizing a portion of the surplus plutonium and

converting the remaining portion into nuclear reactor fuel. Three new facilities were proposed

for the DOE’s Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina to implement the hybrid approach. 

A Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) would convert metallic weapons material,

called pits, to plutonium dioxide powder. The proposed PDCF would be built and operated 
Purpose of and Need for Action

1 A metric ton (MT) equals 1,000 kilograms (kg) and is equivalent to 1.1 tons, or approximately

2,200 pounds (lb).

1-2

under the DOE’s jurisdiction and authority. A plutonium immobilization plant was proposed to

convert some of the plutonium dioxide powder from the PDCF and plutonium from other

sources into ceramic cylinders to be encapsulated in vitrified high-level waste. The Mixed

Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (hereafter referred to as “the proposed MOX facility”) would

convert the balance of the plutonium dioxide powder from the PDCF into MOX fuel for

subsequent irradiation in U.S. commercial reactors authorized by the NRC to use such fuel. 

Under its January 2000 ROD, the DOE planned to convert 33 metric tons (MT)1

 (36.4 tons) of

surplus plutonium into MOX fuel and to immobilize 17 MT (19 tons) in the plutonium

immobilization plant. Among the plutonium disposition program’s purposes is to reduce over

time the number of locations in the United States where the various forms of plutonium are

stored, to better ensure that weapons-usable material does not fall into the hands of rogue

states or terrorist groups. Irradiated MOX fuel would be highly radioactive, making it

inaccessible for reuse as nuclear weapons material. In September 2000, Russia and the

United States agreed to disposition 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus weapons-grade plutonium

from their respective stockpiles (White House 2000). Under this agreement, disposition may be

accomplished either by immobilization or by MOX fuel fabrication and subsequent irradiation. 

However in April 2002, the DOE issued an amended ROD (DOE 2002), in which it decided not

to pursue its hybrid approach due to budgetary constraints. The DOE determined that in order

to make progress with available funds, only one approach could be supported. Russia does not

consider immobilization alone to be an acceptable approach because immobilization, unlike the

irradiation of MOX fuel, fails to degrade the isotopic composition of the plutonium. Russia

further contends that the United States could easily retrieve plutonium from the immobilized

waste at a later date and reuse that plutonium in nuclear weapons (DOE 2002). Because an

immobilization-only approach would jeopardize Russia’s continued involvement in the joint effort

to reduce supplies of weapons-grade plutonium, the DOE decided that if only one disposition

approach is to be pursued, the MOX fuel approach is the preferred one. The DOE concluded

that implementation of the MOX-only approach is the key to successfully completing the

September 2000 agreement between Russia and the United States (DOE 2002). Accordingly,

the DOE decided to pursue a MOX-only approach, under which all 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus

weapons-grade plutonium would be converted into MOX fuel, and the DOE canceled the

plutonium immobilization plant. The DOE had earlier identified Duke Power Company’s four

reactors at the Catawba and McGuire stations (two at each station) as potential candidates to

irradiate MOX fuel. The potential candidate reactors can accommodate up to 25.5 MT

(28.2 tons) of surplus plutonium in MOX fuel. The DOE has not yet identified the additional

candidate reactors necessary to accommodate the additional MOX fuel (8.5 MT [9.4 tons]) to

be irradiated under the amended ROD. 

The DOE also issued a supplemental NEPA analysis on April 24, 2003 (DOE 2003). The

Supplement Analysis (SA) addressed the above-referenced changes in DOE’s surplus

plutonium disposition program, to determine whether the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final

Environmental Impact Statement (SPD EIS) (DOE 1999) should be supplemented. The SA
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-3

discussed how adoption of the MOX-only approach required additional aqueous processing

steps at the proposed MOX facility to remove impurities — mainly chlorides — from the

alternate feedstock material. Additional equipment at the proposed MOX facility to remove the

chlorides includes two dissolution lines, an enlarged annular tank, and a chlorine gas wash

column. The SA noted that the transuranic (TRU) waste generated by operation of the

proposed MOX facility would, after processing at the Waste Solidification Building (WSB), be

shipped from the SRS to the DOE’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE stated in its

SA that prior to obtaining the necessary clearances for shipping TRU waste to WIPP, the

amounts of such waste would be well within existing SRS storage capacity. The DOE further

found that TRU waste generated by operation of the proposed MOX facility would meet the

WIPP waste acceptance criteria, and that the impacts of packaging, transporting, and disposing

of such waste would be bounded by prior DOE environmental analyses. The SA concluded that

“the activities and potential environmental impacts associated with the proposed processing of

6.5 MT of surplus plutonium originally intended for immobilization and the increase in the total

amount of surplus plutonium to be fabricated into MOX fuel from 33 MT to 34 MT are not

different in kind, and only slightly in degree, from those described in the SPD EIS.” 

Accordingly, the DOE found no requirements for supplementing the SPD EIS.

1.1.2 MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility

As referenced above, the DOE selected DCS to design, construct, and operate the proposed

MOX facility. Because Congress gave the NRC licensing and related regulatory authority over

the proposed MOX facility, its construction and operation will require NRC approvals, issued

pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 70 (10 CFR Part 70), “Domestic

Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.” As part of its licensing review, the NRC has prepared

this FEIS in accordance with the NRC’s 10 CFR Part 51 regulations implementing NEPA and

the generally applicable Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations in 40 CFR

Part 1500. This FEIS addresses the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts related to building,

operating, and decommissioning the proposed MOX facility. Although the DOE has prepared

previous EISs that cover impacts of the proposed MOX facility on a programmatic level, the

NRC has prepared this EIS to incorporate

additional site-specific information and

design details in order to meet its NEPA

requirements as stated in 10 CFR Part 51.

To obtain approval to construct the facility,

DCS submitted a MOX Project Quality

Assurance Plan (MPQAP) on June 22,

2000, an Environmental Report (ER) on

December 19, 2000 (DCS 2000), a revised

MPQAP on January 29, 2001, and a

Construction Authorization Request (CAR)

on February 28, 2001 (DCS 2001). The

NRC then published its Notice of Intent to

prepare an EIS for the proposed MOX

Categories of Impacts

Impacts of the proposed and connected actions

include:

• Direct effects — caused by the proposed action

and occur at the same time and place,

• Indirect effects — occur later in time or are farther

removed in distance but are reasonably

foreseeable, and

• Cumulative impacts — potential impacts when the

proposed action is added to other past, present,

and reasonably foreseeable future actions.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-4

facility (NRC 2001a). Because of design changes in the proposed MOX facility resulting from

DOE’s amended ROD, DCS submitted Revision 2 of the ER on July 12, 2002 (DCS 2002a),

and an amended CAR on October 31, 2002 (DCS 2002b). DCS submitted Revision 3 of the ER

on June 20, 2003 (DCS 2003a), which updated Revision 2 to incorporate responses to requests

by the NRC for additional information and revised impacts from the WSB to include preliminary

design details provided by the DOE. DCS submitted Revision 4 of the ER on August 14, 2003

(DCS 2003b), which updated impacts from the WSB based on recent revisions by the DOE. 

On June 10, 2004, DCS submitted Revision 5 to the ER (DCS 2004a). This revision

incorporated changes in the facility design affecting waste volumes. In particular, the silver

recovery process was removed from the design. Other changes included movement of the

controlled area boundary to be colocated with the SRS site boundary, design refinements to the

WSB, and the decision to route the liquid low-level waste (LLW) streams from the proposed

MOX facility and the PDCF to the WSB rather than the Effluent Treatment Facility at the SRS. 

On the same date, DCS also submitted revisions to its CAR (DCS 2004b). If the amended CAR

is approved, DCS plans to submit its application for a 10 CFR Part 70 operating license. The

date for DCS filing such an application is not known at this time. 

The NRC’s decision-making process for the proposed MOX facility includes an environmental

review and a safety review (see text box on the MOX licensing process). In addition to this EIS,

which documents NRC’s environmental review, the NRC will prepare two final safety evaluation

reports (FSERs). The first FSER will evaluate the CAR and will address whether construction

of the proposed MOX facility may be authorized pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70 and the Atomic

Energy Act. In this regard, 10 CFR 70.23( b) states that the NRC will approve construction of a

plutonium processing and fuel fabrication facility if it finds that the design bases of the principal

structures, systems, and components (PSSCs) and the quality assurance (QA) program provide

reasonable assurance of protection against natural phenomena and the consequences of

potential accidents. The 10 CFR 70.23(b) safety findings on the CAR will be documented in the

first FSER, now scheduled to be issued in February 2005. The NRC will use the safety findings

in the first FSER and the environmental review in this EIS to decide whether or not to authorize

construction of the proposed MOX facility.

If construction is authorized, a second FSER would address whether the proposed MOX facility,

as built, may be authorized to operate under a 10 CFR Part 70 license. The second FSER

would evaluate a DCS application for a license to possess and use special nuclear material

(SNM) at the proposed MOX facility. DCS plans to submit such an application if the amended

CAR is approved. The safety findings in the second FSER and the environmental review in this

EIS would be used by the NRC to decide whether or not to issue an SNM possession and use

license to DCS, which would authorize operation of the proposed MOX facility.

Under NEPA, the scope of this EIS is broader than that of the FSERs. This EIS addresses the

environmental impacts of constructing, operating, and decommissioning the proposed MOX

facility and the environmental impacts of the alternatives considered. This EIS does not

address safety issues that are not considered to have potential environmental impacts. For

example, the effects of a postulated criticality accident are presented here because such an

accident could produce environmental impacts. However, the question of whether the criticality 
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-5

MOX Licensing Process

DCS has chosen to request authorization to build and operate a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility in

two steps. Step 1 was the Construction Authorization Request (CAR) initially filed by DCS in February 2001. 

The NRC staff is performing a safety review of the CAR and plans to issue a final safety evaluation report

(FSER) on the CAR in February 2005. As reflected in this environmental impact statement (EIS), the NRC staff

has also performed an environmental review evaluating the impacts of both the construction and operation of

the proposed MOX fuel fabrication facility.

If the NRC staff grants the CAR, DCS plans as Step 2 of the process to apply for a license to possess and use

special nuclear material (SNM) at the MOX fuel fabrication facility. If such an application is filed and accepted

for docketing, the NRC staff would publish a notice of opportunity for hearing in the Federal Register. This

notice would give individuals and organizations the opportunity to request the NRC to conduct an adjudicatory

hearing regarding any DCS request for an SNM license. NRC hearings are governed by the requirements in

10 CFR Part 2. Regardless of whether or not an adjudicatory hearing is held, the NRC staff would perform a

safety review of any DCS request for an SNM license, prepare a second FSER, and either issue DCS an

operating license or deny the application. The MOX licensing process is further summarized in the chart below.

SAFETY REVIEWS

Construction Authorization

• In a CAR, the applicant must

identify principal structures,

systems, and components

(PSSCs) that reduce the risk of

accidents and natural

phenomena hazards.

• The applicant must also address

baseline design criteria and

quality assurance (QA)

requirements. These include

issues such as fire protection,

criticality control, and quality

standards and records.

• The NRC staff issues a

construction-related FSER that

documents its findings on the

CAR and QA program

description.

License to Possess

and Use SNM

• DCS must also submit a license

application for authorization to

possess and use SNM.

• The NRC staff would issue a

second FSER that documents its

findings relative to the license

application.

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW

Environmental Impact

Statement

• Pursuant to the Code of

Federal Regulations, Title 10,

Part 51 (10 CFR Part 51)

implementing regulations for

the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA), the NRC

staff prepares a single EIS.

• The NRC EIS includes impacts

from both construction and

operation of the proposed

action and alternatives.

ADJUDICATION

Adjudication Hearing

• An adjudicatory hearing

regarding the CAR is now

being held.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-6

safety controls proposed by DCS would adequately prevent such an accident is part of the

NRC’s safety review and is not discussed in this EIS. 

1.2 Description of the Proposed Action and Connected Actions

As described further in Section 1.2.1, the proposed action involves a decision by NRC whether

or not to authorize DCS to construct and later operate the proposed MOX facility at the SRS to

convert 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to MOX fuel. Section 1.2.2

describes actions that are connected to the proposed action. Connected actions fall within the

scope of the actions evaluated in an EIS (40 CFR 1508.25). More detailed technical

information about the proposed action and connected actions is presented in Section 2.2.

1.2.1 Proposed Action

The proposed MOX facility would be built on

16.6 ha (41 acres) of land in the F-Area of

the SRS (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). DCS is

expected to request a license for 20 years. 

The facility would be designed for maximum

annual throughput of 3.5 MT (3.9 tons) of

plutonium. Impacts in the ER are based on

the maximum annual design capacity. This

FEIS is based on a total of 34 MT

(37.5 tons) of surplus plutonium. The rate

at which DCS actually processes the

plutonium would likely be less than the

facility’s design capacity. Therefore, actual

annual impacts should be less than those

presented in the ER. The period of

operation would likely be less than the

20-year license period. The actual period of

operation would vary depending on the

annual throughput over time. The 20-year

licensing period would allow deactivation

and decommissioning to occur prior to

license termination. For purposes of this

FEIS, a period of operation of 10 years is

assumed to bound impacts. If the actual period of operation is longer than 10 years as a result

of an actual throughput less than the maximum design capacity, the annual impacts would be

less, even though they would occur over a longer period of time.

Direct effects of the proposed action include effects resulting from construction, operation, and

decommissioning of the proposed MOX facility to convert 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus

plutonium into MOX fuel. Plutonium dioxide powder would be processed at the proposed MOX 

Proposed Action

• The proposed federal action is for the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission to authorize Duke

Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS) to build and

operate a facility to fabricate mixed oxide (MOX)

fuel.

• NEPA requires preparation of an EIS for major

federal actions that could significantly affect the

human environment.

• To operate the MOX facility, DCS would need an

NRC license to possess and use special nuclear

material (surplus plutonium from the U.S. nuclear

weapons program).

• Under contract with the DOE, DCS would build and

operate a facility to manufacture nuclear fuel using

surplus plutonium. 

• The NRC-licensed facility for fabricating nuclear

fuel would be located on the DOE’s Savannah

River Site.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-7

Figure 1.1. Location of the Savannah River Site and the F-Area (Source: DCS 2001).
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-8

Figure 1.2. Locations of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB

in the F-Area on the SRS complex (Source: DCS 2002a).
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-9

facility to remove impurities, such as americium and gallium, and would be mixed with the

depleted uranium dioxide to form the MOX fuel. The final blend for MOX fuel would have a

required plutonium content of 2.3% to 4.8% (percent by weight). The facility would be capable

of producing MOX fuel with a plutonium content of up to 6% (DCS 2001). 

1.2.2 Connected Actions

In order for the proposed MOX facility to

fulfill its function, other “connected actions”

would also occur. For example, the PDCF

would be the source of some of the

plutonium dioxide needed to make MOX

fuel. Therefore, the PDCF must be

constructed and authorized by the DOE to

operate so that the proposed MOX facility

would have the required material with which

to make MOX fuel. 

Feedstock (surplus plutonium dioxide and

depleted uranium dioxide) would be

required to be transported to the SRS to make the MOX fuel. Because the surplus plutonium is

currently stored at seven DOE facilities (see Figure 1.3 and Table 1.1), it would need to be

transported to the SRS (DOE 2000). The depleted uranium hexafluoride would first be

transported from a DOE site (assumed to be the gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment facility

in Portsmouth, Ohio) to an existing commercial fuel fabrication facility (assumed to be the

Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC, facility in Wilmington, North Carolina), where it would be

converted to depleted uranium dioxide, which would then be transported to the SRS. 

Two new DOE facilities (the PDCF and the WSB) are needed to support the proposed MOX

facility. The PDCF would be required to convert approximately 25.6 MT (28.2 tons) of surplus

plutonium metal to plutonium dioxide. The remaining quantity of surplus plutonium, called

“alternate feedstock,” would be in a form that would be suitable to go directly to the proposed

MOX facility. The WSB would process liquid waste streams from the PDCF and the proposed

MOX facility. Since the PDCF and WSB would not be under NRC’s Atomic Energy Act

jurisdiction, the safety issues pertaining to the PDCF and WSB will not be addressed by the

NRC in the FSERs.

As discussed in Section 4.3.4, the wastes generated at the proposed MOX facility and the

PDCF would be managed at the WSB, sent to the SRS waste management system, or sent to

approved facilities off the SRS property for disposition. In addition, infrastructure upgrades

would be needed to support the proposed MOX facility. These upgrades include waste transfer

pipelines, electric utility line realignment, and addition of access roads. 

The FEIS also evaluates transporting the fresh (unirradiated) MOX fuel made by the proposed

MOX facility (assuming it is built and is authorized to operate) to mission reactors for irradiation. 

Connected Actions

Actions closely related to the proposed action that:

• Automatically trigger other actions which may

require environmental impact statements,

• Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are

taken previously or simultaneously, or

• Are interdependent parts of a larger action and

depend on the larger action for their justification.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-10

Figure 1.3. Locations of DOE facilities containing surplus plutonium (Source: Adapted from DOE 1999).
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-11

This page is being withheld pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(a).
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-12

Proposed Action Elements

• Construction, operation, and

decommissioning of proposed MOX facility,

PDCF, and the WSB;

• Infrastructure upgrades;

• Shipment of surplus plutonium from the DOE

sites to the SRS;

• Transport of depleted uranium hexafluoride

from the DOE facility at Portsmouth, Ohio, to

the commercial fuel fabrication facility in

Wilmington, North Carolina;

• Transport of depleted uranium oxide from the

Wilmington facility to the SRS;

• Transport of MOX fuel and fuel irradiation in

surrogate reactors; and

• Spent MOX fuel transport to a geologic

repository.

to proliferation-resistant forms (DOE 1999). The purpose and need discussion establishes a

range of reasonable alternatives to the proposed action that can satisfy this underlying purpose

and need.

Following the subsequent September 2000 surplus plutonium disposition agreement between

Russia and the United States (White House 2000), the DOE determined that a MOX-only

approach best ensures the joint reduction of existing plutonium stockpiles held by the two

nations, and concluded in its amended ROD that reliance on this approach is the key to

successfully completing the agreement (DOE 2002). The result of this action would be to

reduce over time the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium are stored and

to ensure that this weapons-usable material does not fall into the hands of rogue states or

terrorist groups.

1.4 Scope of the EIS

1.4.1 Scoping Process

On March 7, 2001, the NRC issued a Notice of

Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register

(66 FR 13794) to prepare an EIS for

construction and operation of the proposed

MOX facility at the SRS near Aiken, South

Carolina. In the NOI, NRC announced plans for

two scoping meetings: one in North Augusta,

South Carolina, on April 17, 2001, and another

in Savannah, Georgia, on April 18, 2001. In a

second Federal Register notice on April 11,

2001 (66 FR 18223), the NRC announced that

a third scoping meeting would be held in

Charlotte, North Carolina, on May 8, 2001.

The three scoping meetings were held as

planned. At each meeting, the NRC staff

distributed background materials on the MOX

fuel program and NRC’s plans for conducting licensing and environmental reviews for the

facility. An open house held before each meeting provided attendees an opportunity to view

informational materials and talk informally with NRC staff. During the meeting, the NRC staff

presented an overview of the NRC’s role in the facility licensing process and described the

NRC’s approach to meeting its obligations under NEPA. The presentations were followed by a

question and answer period in which the NRC staff responded to questions from attendees. 

The majority of time at the meetings was devoted to allowing individuals to express their views

on the scope of the EIS.
Purpose of and Need for Action

2 The Scoping Summary Report (Appendix I) contains a complete summary of all comments received.

1-13

A total of about 300 individuals attended the three scoping meetings, and about 80 of them

asked questions or provided oral comments at the meetings. In addition, approximately

60 individuals or organizations submitted written comments to the NRC by regular mail, fax

transmittal, e-mail, or in person at the meetings. Some of the individuals who provided written

comments also spoke at the meetings. Some individuals attended and offered comments at

more than one meeting. Although issues raised during the scoping period were considered in

the preparation of the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS), some of those issues were

either analyzed in less detail or were not analyzed at all, depending on their relevance to the

proposed action and the anticipated impacts. The full scoping summary report (NRC 2001b) is

included as Appendix I.

The scoping process helped to determine the scope of the EIS and identify significant issues to

be analyzed in depth. For instance, two technology options for the proposed action were

identified during the scoping process. The first option is to substitute sand filters for the

proposed high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters to control air emissions from the facility. 

The second option is to substitute a dry process for the proposed wet process to remove

impurities from plutonium dioxide powder. Cumulative impacts of the proposed action, in

addition to other contaminant sources, were also identified as a relevant issue.

The no-action alternative, if NRC does not authorize construction or operation of the proposed

MOX facility, was also refined through the scoping process. In addition to the no-action

alternative of continued storage of all of the surplus weapons-grade plutonium at the present

DOE sites in an unaltered form, the public suggested considering immobilizing all of the surplus

weapons-grade plutonium at the SRS as a no-action alternative.

The scoping process identified several relevant areas of concern to the public.2

 Concerns were

expressed about the existing groundwater contamination at the SRS and the potential for the

proposed facility and waste disposal to further deteriorate groundwater quality. Existing deep

boreholes at the SRS were identified as a possible conduit for contaminant migration. 

Concerns were also expressed about the existing contamination of the Savannah River and the

potential for the proposed facility to affect surface water quality. The impacts of facility-induced

surface water quality changes on the downstream fishing and marine economy and on the

downstream tidal wetlands were also concerns raised at the scoping meetings. Similarly,

concerns were expressed regarding air quality impacts from both chemical and radiological

materials.

The potential for human health impacts to the public and workers was also a concern. This

included workers at the proposed facility, at the SRS, at the proposed reactors, and at disposal

facilities. It was also suggested that the impacts to groups other than the “Standard Man” be

assessed, such as unborn fetuses, children, and elderly populations. Impacts from possible

accidents at the proposed facility during transport of radioactive materials and at the proposed

reactors also were a significant concern. It was suggested that the worst-case accidents

should be evaluated, including natural disasters and terrorist acts.
Purpose of and Need for Action

3 The Price-Anderson Act limits the liability of the nuclear industry in the event of a nuclear accident in

the United States.

1-14

Some issues identified during the scoping process were considered to be beyond the scope of

the EIS. In general, these issues are not directly related to the assessment of potential impacts

from the proposed action now under consideration. The lack of in-depth discussion in the EIS,

however, does not imply that an issue or concern lacks value.

A number of commenters requested that the SPD EIS prepared by the DOE be supplemented

and many of the decisions already made by the DOE be revisited. Because the scope of the

EIS was limited to the action now under review by the NRC, issues pertaining to decisions

already made by the DOE and not affected by new information were addressed by referencing

the appropriate DOE analysis.

Comments that seek to alter international treaties or affect national, state, or local laws,

statutes, or regulations (e.g., comments that asked to alter Price-Anderson Act3

 limits) were not

addressed because they do not pertain to reasonably foreseeable impacts arising from the

construction and operation of the proposed MOX facility.

Comments on the scope of assessing reactor use impacts in the EIS for the proposed MOX

facility were varied. Considering that the environmental impact of reactor use of MOX fuel was

a significant issue with many commenters, it is appropriate to consider those impacts in the EIS. 

However, the currently available information does not lend itself to performing new analyses. 

The DOE’s SPD EIS (DOE 1999) analyzed impacts of MOX fuel use at the McGuire, Catawba,

and North Anna reactors. Therefore, the FEIS refers to the SPD EIS, but does not reanalyze

generic reactor use impacts of MOX fuel. The specific environmental impacts resulting from

the use of 40% MOX fuel cores in any particular reactor would be addressed by the NRC in

reviewing the requisite 10 CFR Part 50 license amendment application. Duke Energy has

submitted a license amendment request to the NRC to place lead test assemblies in its

reactors. As discussed in Section 4.4.3, impacts associated with the lead test assemblies are

considered to be outside the scope of this EIS because these activities would occur regardless

of any decision by the NRC on the proposed MOX facility.

A number of commenters requested that the EIS analyze the impacts of having to upgrade the

emergency response equipment and retrain emergency responders in the communities around

the SRS, at the reactors, and along transportation routes. Other commenters requested that

the EIS identify capabilities of local, regional, and national medical facilities to manage the

casualties resulting from potential accidental releases and assess the readiness of communities

to evacuate certain areas along the transportation routes in case of an accident. These issues

are discussed in the EIS to the extent that they are required as mitigation measures presented

in Chapter 5.

Many commenters raised a number of different issues concerning terrorism. The Scoping

Summary Report stated that the EIS would not address the impacts of terrorism because these

impacts are not considered to be reasonably foreseeable as a result of the proposed action.

However, following the events of September 11, 2001, the Commission decided to consider the
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-15

question of whether NEPA requires the evaluation of such impacts. By order dated

December 18, 2002 (CLI-02-24), the Commission ruled that NRC has no obligation under

NEPA to consider intentional malevolent acts in conjunction with the licensing of the proposed

MOX facility.

In response to the cancellation of the plutonium immobilization facility (DOE 2002), the NRC

delayed the issuance of the DEIS. The NRC held three public meetings in North Augusta,

South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and Charlotte, North Carolina, and solicited additional

written comments on how the immobilization of surplus plutonium as a no-action alternative

should be discussed (NRC 2002). The NRC also solicited views on other alternatives that

should be considered in the DEIS. In response, most commenters said they still wanted

immobilization considered as an alternative in the DEIS, while some urged the NRC to instead

focus on the proposed action. As discussed further in Section 2.3, the NRC has determined

that immobilization of plutonium did not require an in-depth evaluation in the DEIS, because it

was not a reasonable alternative to the proposed action. In response to the NRC’s solicitation

on other alternatives that should be considered, the alternative of deliberately producing offspecification MOX fuel was identified. This alternative is discussed in Section 2.3.

With respect to the proposed PDCF, the DOE’s change from a “hybrid” to a MOX-only

approach resulted in a change in the scope of the DEIS from that described in the NRC’s

March 7, 2001, NOI. The NRC stated there that the PDCF would not be part of the NRC’s

NEPA review of the proposed MOX facility (NRC 2001a). Initially, the PDCF had independent

utility apart from the MOX facility, since the DOE planned to build and operate the PDCF along

with the plutonium immobilization plant regardless of whether MOX fuel was also produced

(DOE 2000). Now, because of the DOE’s subsequent decision in its amended ROD to cancel

the plutonium immobilization plant and implement a MOX-only approach (DOE 2002), the

PDCF no longer has independent utility apart from the proposed MOX facility. Thus, for NEPA

purposes, the PDCF must be evaluated in the EIS to avoid an improper segmentation of the

potential impacts discussion.

1.4.2 Issues Studied in Detail

As discussed in the Scoping Summary Report (Appendix I), the goal of this EIS is to set forth

the impact analyses in a manner that is readily understandable by the public. Significant or

more important impacts are discussed in Chapter 4 of this FEIS. On the basis of the NRC’s

analyses and consideration of comments received during the scoping process, the following

topics are discussed in detail in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 for the no-action alternative and the

proposed action, respectively: (1) human health, (2) air quality, (3) hydrology, (4) waste

management, (5) accident impacts, (6) decommissioning, and (7) environmental justice. 

Transportation of radioactive materials, conversion of depleted uranium, and use of MOX fuel in

reactors are discussed in Section 4.4. Cumulative impacts are discussed in Section 4.5. The

cost-benefit analysis for the no-action and proposed action alternatives, which builds on the

comparison of alternatives in Section 2.4, is provided in Section 4.6. Mitigation actions to

address the potential impacts are discussed in Chapter 5.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-16

1.4.3 Issues Eliminated from Detailed Study

Impacts found to be less significant are discussed in FEIS Appendixes G and H. These

impacts include those pertaining to geology, seismology, soils, noise, ecology, land use, cultural

and paleontological resources, infrastructure, socioeconomics, and aesthetics. 

1.4.4 Preparation of the Final Environmental Impact Statement

The NRC made the DEIS available for public review and comment in February 2003 in

accordance with 10 CFR 51.73, 10 CFR 51.74, and 40 CFR 1503.1. The NRC provided a

75-day public comment period (which ended May 14, 2003) on the DEIS. The length of the

comment period exceeded the minimum of 45 days specified in 10 CFR 51.73.

During that period, the NRC held three public meetings to receive oral comments regarding the

contents of the DEIS. These public meetings were held on March 25, 2003, in Savannah,

Georgia; March 26, 2003, in North Augusta, South Carolina; and March 27, 2003, in Charlotte,

North Carolina. The NRC published notice of these meetings in the Federal Register

(68 FR 97208, February 28, 2003), on its Web site, and in local newspapers.

Approximately 45 people provided oral comments at the public meetings. A certified court

reporter recorded the oral comments and prepared written transcripts. The transcripts of the

public meetings are part of the public record for the proposed project and were used in

developing the comment summaries contained in Appendix J. In addition to oral comments

received at the public meetings, the NRC received written comments, letters, facsimile

transmittals, and e-mails regarding the DEIS and associated issues. A summary of the

comments and responses are included in Appendix J. The written comments and transcripts

are reproduced in Appendix L. 

The NRC has reviewed each comment letter and all transcripts of the public meetings and has

grouped comments relating to similar issues and topics, as permitted by the Council on

Environmental Quality’s NEPA regulations and the NRC regulations at 10 CFR 51.91 and

40 CFR 1503.4(b). Because the comments were voluminous, Appendix J provides summaries

of all substantive comments received on the DEIS. The NRC then prepared responses to each

of the comments or summaries of comments. Commenters are identified in each summary with

a commenter number. Appendix K contains an index of commenter names and commenter

numbers.

1.4.5 Other National Environmental Policy Act Documents Related to This Action

In preparing the EIS, the following other NEPA documents were considered:

Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0229, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fissile

Materials Disposition, Washington, D.C., December 1996.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-17

Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0283,

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, D.C.,

November 1999.

Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact

Statement, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., January 11, 2000 (65 Federal

Register [FR] 1608).

Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent

Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada,

DOE/EIS-0250, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management,

Feb. 2002.

1.5 Cooperating Agencies

No cooperating agencies have been involved in preparation of the EIS.

1.6 Other State and Federal Agencies

Several federal, Native American, state, and local agencies and organizations were contacted

to gather relevant information for this EIS. The scope of the analysis necessitated obtaining

information from state agencies in both South Carolina and Georgia. The following is a list of

all agencies contacted during early stages of the DEIS preparation:

Federal Agencies

U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Material Disposition

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

Native American Organizations

Catawba Indian Nation

Pee Dee Indian Association

Ma Chis Lower Alabama Creek Indian Tribe

Muscogee (Creek) Nation

Indian People’s Muskogee Tribal Town Confederacy

Yuchi Tribal Organization, Inc.

United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians

State Agencies

South Carolina State Historic Preservation Office, Department of Archives and History

South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, Wildlife and Freshwater 

 Fisheries Division
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-18

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Bureau of Air Quality

South Carolina Department of Transportation

Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Wildlife Resources Division

Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division, 

 Air Protection Branch

Towns, Cities, and Counties

Columbia County, Georgia

Town of Grovetown, Georgia

Town of Harlem, Georgia

City of Augusta/Richmond County, Georgia

City of Blythe, Georgia

City of Hephzibah, Georgia

Aiken County, South Carolina

City of Aiken, South Carolina

Town of Jackson, South Carolina

Town of New Ellenton, South Carolina

City of North Augusta, South Carolina

Town of Wagener, South Carolina

Barnwell County, South Carolina

City of Barnwell, South Carolina

Town of Blackville, South Carolina

Town of Williston, South Carolina

School Districts

Columbia County Board of Education, Georgia

Richmond County Board of Education, Georgia

Aiken County Board of Education, South Carolina

Williston School District #19, South Carolina

Williston School District #29, South Carolina

Williston School District #45, South Carolina

1.7 References for Chapter 1

DCS (Duke Cogema Stone & Webster) 2000. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

Environmental Report. Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. Dec.

DCS 2001. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction Authorization Request. Docket

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. Feb.

DCS 2002a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 1 & 2.

Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2002b. Amended Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction Authorization

Request. Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2003a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 3.

Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-19

DCS 2003b. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 4.

Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2004a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 5. Docket

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June 10.

DCS 2004b. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction Authorization Request,

Revision 6/10/04. Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. 

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 1996. Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile

Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. DOE/EIS-0229. Office of

Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, DC. Dec.

DOE 1999. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement. 

DOE/EIS-0283. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, DC. Nov.

DOE 2000. “Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental

Impact Statement.” Federal Register 65:1608, Jan. 11.

DOE 2002. “Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program.” Amended Record of Decision. Federal

Register 67(76):19432-19435, April 19.

DOE 2003. Changes Needed to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program, Supplement 

Analysis and Amended Record of Decision. DOE/EIS-0283-SA1. Office of Fissile Materials

Disposition, Washington, DC, April.

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 2001a. “Notice of Intent to Prepare an

Environmental Impact Statement for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility.” Federal

Register 66:13794, March 7.

NRC 2001b. Environmental Impact Statement Scoping Process Scoping Summary Report,

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Savannah River Site. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Aug. [Reproduced in Appendix I of this EIS.]

NRC 2002. “Notice of Delay in Issuance of the Draft and Final Environmental Impact

Statements for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility.” Federal Register 67: 

20183-20185, April 24.

Tuckinan, M.S., 2003. “Proposed Amendments to the Facility Operating License and Technical

Specifications to Allow Insertion of Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Lead Assemblies and Request

for Exemption from Certain Regulations in 10 CFR Part 50,” personal communication from

Tuckinan (Duke Power, Charlotte, NC), to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency

(Washington, DC). February 27.

White House 2000. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and

the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of

Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related

Cooperation. White House, Washington, DC. Sept.
Purpose of and Need for Action

1-20

 
2-1

2 ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION 

This chapter presents details of the alternatives considered in this environmental impact

statement (EIS). The no-action alternative, which is discussed in Section 2.1, considers the

continued storage of surplus plutonium in various locations throughout the U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE) complex in the event the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) either

denies Duke Cogema Stone & Webster’s (DCS’s) construction authorization request for the

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (the proposed MOX facility) or, later, denies DCS’s

subsequent request for a Title 10, Part 70 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 70)

license to possess and use special nuclear material. Section 2.2 presents the technical details

of the proposed action and the connected actions.

Section 2.3 considers several alternatives to the proposed action and explains why they are not

analyzed further in Chapter 4. These alternatives include alternate locations for the proposed

MOX facility in the F-Area, alternative technology and design options, immobilization of surplus

plutonium, deliberately making off-specification MOX fuel, the MIX MOX alternative, and the

Parallex Project.

The NRC recognizes that under the provisions of 10 CFR 70, the Commission may approve

construction of the proposed MOX facility and subsequently deny the DCS application for a

10 CFR Part 70 license to possess and use special nuclear material. Although this is a

possible outcome relative to the proposed action, the NRC is not considering construction alone

as a separate alternative because the NRC would not knowingly select an alternative involving

construction of a facility that cannot be used for its intended purpose.

Section 2.4 compares the potential impacts related to the proposed action with those of the

no-action alternative. Section 2.5 presents the NRC staff’s final environmental recommendation

on the action to be taken.

2.1 No-Action Alternative — Continued Storage of Surplus Plutonium

The no-action alternative would be a decision by the NRC not to approve the proposed MOX

facility. It is reasonable to assume that if the NRC does not approve the proposed MOX facility,

the DOE’s surplus plutonium would remain in storage at DOE facilities. The surplus plutonium

inventory is now stored at seven DOE sites. If this storage were to continue, it is possible that

limited new construction would be required at one or more of these sites to upgrade storage

conditions. However, the impacts of such construction, if required, would be addressed under a

separate site-specific environmental review by DOE. For purposes of this EIS, the impacts of

continued storage of surplus plutonium are assumed to be essentially the same as those

analyzed by DOE in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (SPD

EIS) (DOE 1999a). However, the analysis in this EIS also considers the DOE’s action to

consolidate the storage of 6 MT (6.6 tons) of non-pit surplus plutonium from the Rocky Flats

Environmental Technology Site to the Savannah River Site’s K-Area Material Storage (KAMS)
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

1 Except as noted, the descriptions provided in this section are based on information from DCS (2000, 

2001, 2002, and 2004) and DOE (1999a).

2 Pits are weapon components with a spherical metal core made of plutonium metal and several outer

layers.

2-2

facility (DOE 2002b). The impacts of the no-action alternative are presented in Section 4.2 and

Appendix G.

2.2 Proposed Action — Description of Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication

 Facilities and Connected Actions1

2.2.1 Introduction

The proposed MOX facility is designed to convert surplus weapons-grade plutonium and

depleted uranium dioxide (UO2) into MOX fuel that could be used at commercial nuclear power

plants authorized to use such fuel. If the construction authorization for the proposed MOX

facility is granted, the facility would be built on the north-northwest side of the F-Area at the

SRS (see Figure 1.2 in Section 1.2). The Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF)

would be built by DOE on the north-northeast side of the F-Area. The PDCF would be used to

recover the plutonium metal from the pits2

 of disassembled weapons and would convert the

weapons-grade plutonium to plutonium dioxide powder, which would subsequently be

transferred to the proposed MOX facility as feedstock.

Within the boundaries of the PDCF, the DOE would also construct the Waste Solidification

Building (WSB) (see Figure 1.2). The WSB would be used to process several liquid waste

streams from the proposed MOX facility and the PDCF and convert them to solid transuranic

(TRU) waste or low-level waste (LLW). This section describes the general layout of the

proposed MOX facility, the processes to be used to manufacture MOX fuel, and the systems

that would be used to handle the waste streams from the facility. As discussed in Section 1.2.2,

since the PDCF and WSB are connected actions, these proposed DOE facilities are also

discussed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4, respectively. Other elements of the proposed action as

described in Section 1.2 that are not discussed in Chapter 2 are discussed in Chapter 4. Direct

and indirect impacts of the proposed action and connected actions are presented in

Sections 4.3 and 4.4, and Appendix H.

As discussed in Section 1.4.1, the technology option of substituting a sand filter for the

proposed high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters to control air emissions from the

proposed MOX facility was identified during the scoping process. This technology option is

described in Section 2.2.5 and is analyzed in Section 4.3.8.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-3

2.2.2 Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

2.2.2.1 Description of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

The PDCF would be built by the DOE and would not be subject to NRC licensing. The facility

would be used to recover plutonium metal from weapon components, and convert it to an

unclassified (i.e., no longer exhibiting any characteristics that are protected for reasons of

national security) plutonium dioxide. The plutonium dioxide would be transferred to the

proposed MOX facility. In addition to excess weapon components, the PDCF would be able to

receive excess plutonium metal in other forms and be capable of converting it to plutonium

dioxide.

The PDCF would be designed to process up to 3.5 MT (3.9 tons) of plutonium metal into

plutonium dioxide annually. Facility operations would require a staff of about 400 personnel. 

The facility would be built in a hardened space of thick-walled concrete that meets all applicable

standards for processing special nuclear material. One or possibly both levels of the two-story

building would be below grade. Areas of the facility in which plutonium would be processed or

stored would be designed to survive natural phenomena such as earthquakes, floods, and

tornadoes, as well as potential accidents associated with fissile and radioactive materials. 

Ancillary buildings would be required for support activities.

Activities involving radioactive materials or externally contaminated containers of radioactive

materials would be conducted in gloveboxes. The gloveboxes would be interconnected by a

contained conveyor system to move materials from one process step to the next. Gloveboxes

would remain completely sealed and operate independently, except during material transfer

operations. Built-in safety features would limit the temperature and pressure inside the

gloveboxes and ensure that operations remain within criticality safety limits. When dictated by

process needs or safety concerns, an inert atmosphere would be maintained in gloveboxes. 

The exhaust from the gloveboxes would be continuously monitored for radioactive

contamination. The atmosphere in the gloveboxes would be kept at a lower pressure than that

of the surrounding areas so that any leaks of gaseous or suspended particulate matter would

be contained and filtered appropriately. The building ventilation system would include HEPA

filters and would be designed to maintain confinement, thus precluding the spread of airborne

radioactive particulates or hazardous chemicals within the facility or to the outside environment. 

Both intake and exhaust air would be filtered, and exhaust gases would be monitored for

radioactivity.

Beryllium may be a constituent of some of the pits that would be disassembled in the PDCF. 

Because inhalation of beryllium dust and particles has been proven to cause a chronic and

sometimes fatal lung disease, beryllium is of special interest from a health effects perspective. 

However, the process operations in the PDCF are expected to generate only larger,

nonrespirable turnings and pieces of the metal, and all work would be performed in gloveboxes. 

No grinding would be done that could cause small pieces of beryllium to become airborne.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

3 Tritium can be used as a boosting fuel in high-energy atomic weapons. Although the operators of the

pit conversion facility would know which pits contain tritium, the pit types and the number of surplus

pits that contain tritium are classified.

2-4

The PDCF would accommodate the following surplus plutonium-processing activities: pit

receipt, storage, and preparation; pit disassembly; plutonium conversion; oxide blending and

sampling; nondestructive assay; product canning; product storage; product inspection and

sampling for international inspection; product shipping; declassification of parts not made from

special nuclear materials; highly enriched uranium (HEU) decontamination, packaging, storage,

and shipping; tritium capture, packaging, and storage; and waste packaging, sampling, and

certification. Additional areas for support activities would be needed, including office space,

change rooms, a central control room, a laboratory, mechanical equipment rooms, mechanical

shops, an emergency generator to supply power to critical safety systems in the event of a

power outage, a warehouse, shipping and receiving areas, waste storage, guard stations, entry

portals, and parking.

2.2.2.2 Processes Occurring in the PDCF

At the PDCF, the storage containers in which the plutonium is received would be removed from

their overpacks (outer shipping containers), the contents verified, and the information regarding

the material entered into the PDCF’s material accountability system. Pits and plutonium metal

would be placed in a short-term receiving vault, checked for radiological contamination, and

transferred to the pit storage vault until processing. Before being processed in the pit

disassembly line, the pits would be segregated on the basis of the potential presence of tritium.3

Pits without tritium would go into the pit bisector glovebox, and those containing tritium would

start in the Special Recovery Line glovebox.

In the pit bisector glovebox, external structures would be cut away from the pit, and the pit

would be cut in half. Nonbonded pits (pits whose components separate easily) would be

separated into plutonium metal, HEU, classified metal shapes, and classified nuclear material

parts. The plutonium parts would be assayed as part of the material accountability program. 

HEU would be sent to the HEU-processing station for material accountability, electrolytic

decontamination, and packaging; the classified metal shapes and metal shavings would go to

the declassification furnaces; the nuclear material parts to the storage at the pit conversion

facility; and the plutonium to the hydride-oxidation (HYDOX) station for the next step of the

process. Bonded pits, which cannot be separated prior to processing, would be sent to the

HYDOX station intact. For these pits, HEU, classified metal shapes, and classified nuclear

material parts would be separated from the plutonium metal during the HYDOX process, then

sent to the HEU-processing station, declassification furnaces, and storage at the pit conversion

facility, respectively. Recovered HEU would be stored in a vault at the pit conversion facility

until shipped to the Y-12 Facility at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) for declassification,

storage, and eventual disposition. The HEU would meet Y-12 acceptance criteria prior to

shipment to the ORR.
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Pits with tritium would also be bisected, and the HEU, classified metal shapes, and classified

nuclear material parts would be separated from the plutonium; this would occur in the Special

Recovery Line glovebox. Under normal circumstances, all of the tritium associated with a given

pit would be captured and recovered during the tritium removal process in the Special Recovery

Line. It is expected that the tritium in a small number of pits will have absorbed into the

plutonium. For these pits, an additional step would occur in the Special Recovery Line

glovebox: the plutonium would be heated in a vacuum furnace to drive off the tritium as a gas. 

The tritium would then be captured on a catalyst bed and packaged as LLW for treatment and

disposal. HEU and classified metal shapes would be decontaminated and sent to the HEUprocessing station and declassification furnaces, respectively; classified nuclear material parts

would be placed in storage at the pit conversion facility. After confirmation that the plutonium

metal was free of tritium, the plutonium would be assayed as part of the special nuclear material

accountability program and transferred to the HYDOX station. Recovered HEU would be stored

in a vault at the pit conversion facility until shipped to the ORR for declassification, storage, and

eventual disposition. The HEU would meet Y-12 acceptance criteria prior to shipment to the

ORR.

In the HYDOX module, plutonium metal would react with hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen at

controlled temperatures and pressures in a pressure vessel to produce plutonium dioxide. The

plutonium metal would first be reacted with hydrogen gas to form a hydride. Then the vessel

would be purged of the hydrogen and the hydride reacted with nitrogen gas to form a nitride. 

The nitrogen would then be purged and replaced with oxygen for the final reaction forming

plutonium dioxide. The plutonium dioxide product would be collected and assayed for the

material accountability program to confirm that all of the plutonium metal entering the HYDOX

process left as an oxide.

In the primary canning module, the cans of plutonium dioxide would be placed into a primary

storage can made of stainless steel. This can would then be welded shut and leak tested to

ensure that the weld was sound. If the can were to fail the leak test, it would be reopened and

rewelded. After passing the leak test, the primary can would be sent to the electrolytic

decontamination module. After decontamination, each can would be rinsed, dried, and

surveyed to verify decontamination, then sent to the secondary canning module.

In the secondary canning module, primary cans would be placed into secondary stainless steel

storage cans meeting the DOE’s long-term storage requirements. Also in this module,

secondary storage cans would be welded shut and leak tested. After leak testing, each can

would be marked with a laser to identify the can and its contents, and passed to the

nondestructive assay module.

In the nondestructive assay module, each can would be assayed to confirm its contents. 

Following assay, the cans would be moved into the main storage vault and would be available

for international inspection. After inspection, the cans would be transferred to another vault that

would also be subject to international inspection. The cans would subsequently be transferred

to the proposed MOX facility.
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2.2.2.3 Radioactive Effluents and Wastes at the PDCF

Potential effluents and wastes from the PDCF are described in a Los Alamos National

Laboratory report (LANL 1998) and the SPD EIS (DOE 1999a). The facility would be designed

to minimize the quantities of both the effluents and wastes. Preliminary estimates indicate that

small quantities of various plutonium isotopes and americium-241 and tritium gas would be

emitted to the air from the facility. No releases to surface water would be expected directly

from the PDCF. The facility would be expected to generate small quantities of TRU waste,

LLW, mixed waste, and nonradioactive hazardous waste. All liquid radioactive wastes

generated in the PDCF would be sent to the WSB for treatment. The treated waste would

either be sent to an approved disposal facility or discharged to a permitted outfall on the SRS. 

Radioactive solid wastes generated at the facility would be packaged in accordance with the

acceptance criteria of the receiving disposal site and sent to the WSB for temporary storage

and final processing before being shipped to an approved disposal facility. Mixed waste and

hazardous waste generated at the facility would be sent to the SRS waste management system

or to an off-site permitted facility for disposition. Nonradioactive/nonhazardous solid waste

would be sent to an approved landfill. An evaluation of waste management impacts for this EIS

is presented in Section 4.3.4.

2.2.3 MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility

2.2.3.1 Description of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility

As designed, the project site would occupy an area of about 16.6 ha (41 acres). Approximately

6.9 ha (17 acres) of the site would be developed with buildings, other facilities, and paving. The

remaining 9.7 ha (24 acres) would be landscaped with either grass or gravel.

No highways, railroads, or waterways traverse the proposed MOX facility site, and material and

personnel would be moved to and from the site on existing SRS roads. The proposed MOX

facility would consist of the following buildings:

• MOX Fuel Fabrication Building

• Emergency Diesel Generator Building

• Standby Diesel Generator Building

• Secured Warehouse Building

• Administration Building

• Technical Support Building

• Reagents Processing Building

• Receiving Warehouse Building

All of these buildings except the Administration Building and the Receiving Warehouse Building

would be enclosed within a double fence perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system. 

The area within this system would total about 5.7 ha (14 acres) and would be designated as the

“Protected Area” (10 CFR Part 73).
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The Technical Support Building, located between the Administration Building and the MOX Fuel

Fabrication Building, would house the main support facilities for MOX Fuel Fabrication Building

personnel and would contain the access facilities for the Protected Area and the MOX Fuel

Fabrication Building. The building would not be directly involved in the principal processing

functions of the facility. Supporting activities and facilities located in this building would include

health physics, an electronics maintenance laboratory, a mechanical maintenance shop,

personnel locker rooms, and a first aid station.

The MOX Fuel Fabrication Building would have three major functional areas: the MOX

Processing Area, the Aqueous Polishing Area, and the Shipping and Receiving Area. The

MOX Processing Area would include the blending and milling area, pelletizing area, sintering

area, grinding area, fuel rod fabrication area, fuel bundle assembly area, a laboratory area, and

storage areas for feed material, pellets, and fuel assemblies. Space would also be provided in

the MOX Fuel Fabrication Building for support equipment, such as temporary waste storage;

heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment; HEPA filter plenums; inverters;

switchgear; and pumps. The Aqueous Polishing Area would be used to remove impurities from

the feed plutonium coming from the PDCF as well as from the plutonium in the alternate

feedstock for use in the MOX Processing Area. The aqueous polishing process would extract

impurities from the weapons-grade plutonium dioxide. The Shipping and Receiving Area would

contain the equipment and facilities used to handle incoming and outgoing materials to and

from the MOX Processing Area and Aqueous Polishing Area.

The Emergency Diesel Generator Building would contain the emergency diesel generator to

provide the emergency on-site electrical power supply for safety related structures, systems, or

components. The Standby Diesel Generator Building would contain the diesel generators that

would provide the on-site electrical power source in the event of loss of off-site power. The

Secured Warehouse Building would include the Material Receipt Area, the Storage Area, the

MOX Fresh Fuel Package Storage Area, the Parts Washing Facility, the Vehicle Access Portal,

and the Vehicle Gatehouse. The Material Receipt Area would serve as the receiving facility for

most of the materials (including depleted uranium dioxide), supplies, and equipment necessary

for facility operations. The Administration Building, located outside of the Protected Area of the

complex, would provide administrative support to the facility and its operations. Space would

be provided in the building for facility management, facility operations, finance and

administration, health and safety, quality assurance, and management personnel.

The Reagents Processing Building, located adjacent to the Aqueous Polishing Area of the MOX

Fuel Fabrication Building, would provide storage for pure reagent-grade chemicals and facilities

for preparation of chemical solutions used in the Aqueous Polishing Area. The Reagents

Processing Building would consist of several separate rooms or areas for the various

chemicals. Concrete curbs around the chemical storage areas would provide for spill

containment. Chemicals would be transferred to the Aqueous Polishing Area from the

Reagents Processing Building via piping located in a below-grade concrete trench between the

two buildings.

The Receiving Warehouse Building would be a single-story, pre-engineered metal building

located outside of the perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system. The building
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would consist of the Unloading Dock, the Materials Receiving Area, the Inspected Warehouse

Holding Area, the Material Transfer Dock, offices, vestibule, and the Inspection Guard Station. 

2.2.3.2 Processes Occurring in the Proposed MOX Facility

The proposed MOX facility is being designed to convert plutonium dioxide and depleted

uranium dioxide to MOX fuel. Operations at the facility would begin with the receipt of the

plutonium dioxide and depleted uranium dioxide feed materials. The plutonium dioxide would

then be purified in the aqueous polishing process before being blended with the depleted

uranium dioxide. The blended material would then be formed into pellets, the pellets

incorporated into fuel rods, the fuel rods placed in fuel assemblies, and the assemblies loaded

into transport casks for shipment to the nuclear power plants authorized to use MOX fuel. The

technology used in the fuel fabrication process includes recycling of waste and scrap streams. 

The major steps in the aqueous polishing and fuel fabrication processes are shown in

Figures 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.

2.2.3.2.1 Feed Materials

The plutonium dioxide feed material from the PDCF, transported in approved shipping

containers, would be received in the shipping and receiving area of the MOX Fuel Fabrication

Building. The feed material would be offloaded, the packaging would then be removed, and

control would be transferred to the responsible facility manager. Material control and

accounting (MC&A) and radiation protection functions would then be performed, and the feed

material would be moved to the MOX Processing Area.

Alternate feedstock (feed material not coming from the PDCF) would be received as plutonium

dioxide. Some of this material might contain higher than normal salt contaminants, some would

contain chloride contaminants, and some would contain trace amounts of enriched uranium. All

alternate feedstock would be milled to a uniform particle size to facilitate dissolution. The

alternative feedstock would be analyzed for contaminants.

If chloride contaminant concentrations were found to be above feedstock specifications, they

would be removed by conversion to chlorine gas. The chlorine gas would be passed through a

scrubber to convert the chlorine to a sodium chloride solution. If the chloride contaminants

were within feedstock specifications, the feedstock would be processed as described in

Section 2.2.3.2.2.

For uranium-rich alternate feedstock, an additional scrubbing column would be used to remove

uranium to levels that meet the specification for purified plutonium.

Depleted uranium dioxide feed material, packaged in drums and shipped by truck, would be

received at the Material Receipt Area of the Secured Warehouse Building. Conventional

materials and supplies would be received at the Secured Warehouse Building. The materials 
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Figure 2.1. Principal steps in the aqueous polishing process (Source: DCS 2004).
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Figure 2.2. Principal steps in the fuel fabrication process (Source: DCS 2002).
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would be inventoried, sorted, and removed to storage in the Secured Warehouse Building or

delivered via on-site vehicles to the proper processing area.

2.2.3.2.2 Aqueous Polishing Process

The plutonium dioxide received at the facility would contain small amounts of impurities, mainly

gallium, americium, highly enriched uranium, and, in the case of alternate feedstock, additional

impurities. These impurities would have to be removed before the plutonium could be used in

reactor fuel. The chloride contaminants would be removed from alternate feedstock before

further aqueous polishing (see Section 2.2.3.2.1). The aqueous polishing process would

remove remaining impurities in three major steps: dissolution, purification, and conversion.

The dissolution step would involve dissolving the plutonium dioxide powder in a water-based

(aqueous) solution of silver (Ag2+) and nitric acid at nearly room temperature. An electrical

current would be passed through the solution to help dissolve the powder.

In the purification step, the plutonium in the aqueous solution would be separated from uranium,

americium, gallium, and other impurities by solvent extraction. In this process, the aqueous

solution and an organic solvent solution are mixed. The organic solvent does not readily mix

with or dissolve in water, and the two solutions will separate if they are allowed to settle. 

However, by forcibly mixing the two solutions and adjusting chemical parameters in the

aqueous solution, individual metals like plutonium can be selectively extracted from the

aqueous solution into the organic solvent. In the process proposed by DCS, the solvent

extraction process would involve mixing the aqueous solution with an organic solvent composed

of 30% tri-butyl phosphate in dodecane. The mixing would occur in the middle of tall and

narrow process vessels called columns. During mixing, the solvent would selectively extract the

plutonium and uranium from the aqueous solution. The less dense solvent containing uranium

and plutonium would then separate from the aqueous solution at the top of the columns. The

impurities would remain in the denser aqueous solution and would be removed at the bottom of

the column.

The solvent solution containing the uranium and plutonium would be washed with a nitric acid

solution. This wash solution would be returned to the acid recovery unit for recycling of the

acid. The plutonium and uranium in the organic solvent would then be mixed with an aqueous

solution containing hydroxylamine nitrate. This process would reduce the tetravalent plutonium

[Pu(IV)] to trivalent plutonium [Pu(III)], which would allow the plutonium to be removed from the

organic solvent in an aqueous solution of nitric acid, hydrazine nitrate, and hydroxylamine

nitrate. The organic solvent, which would then contain only high-enriched uranium and residual

amounts of plutonium, would be mixed with another aqueous “wash” solution to remove the

residual plutonium. The washed solvent would be routed to the uranium stripping process. 

High-enriched uranium would be stripped from the solvent by mixing the solvent with dilute nitric

acid in another separation column. The stripped uranium solution would be diluted with

depleted uranium before being transferred to the WSB for further treatment. The solvent,

which would no longer contain significant amounts of uranium, plutonium, or impurities, would

be routed to the solvent recovery mixer-settlers to be recycled.
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The Pu(III) solution would be converted back to a solution of Pu(IV) by driving nitrous fumes

(dinitrogen tetroxide [N2O4] and nitrogen dioxide [NO2]) through the plutonium solution in a

packed column. The offgas would be routed through an offgas treatment system before being

discharged to the atmosphere.

The conversion step would be a continuous oxalate conversion process. The oxidized Pu (IV)

would be reacted with excess oxalic acid (H2C2O4) to precipitate plutonium oxalate. Plutonium

oxalate would be collected on a filter, then dried in a screw calciner to produce purified

plutonium dioxide powder. The purified plutonium dioxide powder would be blended and stored

in cans.

Offgas from the screw calciner would be routed through the process offgas treatment unit and

HEPA filters prior to discharge to the atmosphere through the exhaust stack. The filtered oxalic

mother liquors would be concentrated, reacted with manganese to destroy the oxalic acid, and

recycled to the beginning of the extraction cycle, to minimize losses of plutonium to waste.

A liquid americium waste stream would be generated by the aqueous polishing process

described above. DCS estimates that approximately 24.5 kg (54.0 lb) of americium-241 would

annually become part of this waste stream, an amount that would contain 84,000 Ci of

radioactivity (DCS 2002). This liquid waste stream — together with an excess acid stream and

an alkaline wash stream — would be combined into the high-alpha activity waste to be piped

from the proposed MOX facility to the WSB, where it would be solidified through the use of the

WSB’s planned evaporation, neutralization, and cementation methods. (The WSB is discussed

further in EIS Section 2.2.4). The maximum annual volume of these streams from the proposed

MOX facility is estimated to be 44,200 L (11,700 gal) (DCS 2004). 

2.2.3.2.3 MOX Fuel Fabrication Process

The MOX fuel fabrication process would consist of four major steps: (1) powder master blend

and final blend production, (2) pellet production, (3) rod production, and (4) fuel rod assembly.

The first operation would be the production of the powder master blend. The purified plutonium

dioxide from the aqueous polishing process would be mixed with depleted uranium dioxide and

recycled scraps to produce an initial mixture that would be approximately 20% plutonium. This

mixture would be ground in a ball mill and mixed with additional depleted uranium dioxide and

recycled scraps to produce a final blend with the required plutonium content (typically from

2.3 to 4.8%). This final blend would be further homogenized to meet stringent plutonium

distribution requirements. During the final homogenizing, lubricants and pore-formers would be

added to control the density of the final mixture.

The final homogenized powder blend would be pressed to form green pellets. The green fuel

pellets would be sintered to obtain the required ceramic qualities. Sintering is the process of

heating the green pellets in a furnace at temperatures of up to 1,700C (3,100F). The

sintering step would remove organic products dispersed in the pellets and remove the
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pore-formers that were added during powder homogenization. The sintered pellets would be

ground to a specified diameter and sorted. Recovered powder from grinding and discarded

pellets would be recycled through a ball mill and reused in the powder processing.

Fuel rods would be loaded to an adjusted pellet length column, welded, pressurized with

helium, and then decontaminated in gloveboxes. The decontaminated rods would be removed

from the gloveboxes and placed on racks for inspection and assembly. Fuel rods would be

inserted into the fuel assembly frame, and the fuel assembly construction would be completed. 

The fuel assembly would be subjected to a final inspection before shipment to reactors.

2.2.3.3 Radioactive Effluents and Wastes at the Proposed MOX Facility

2.2.3.3.1 Airborne

DCS has proposed to treat exhausts from the Fuel Fabrication Building and remove airborne

radioactive materials with (at a minimum) a two-stage HEPA filter system before exhaust air is

discharged to the environment. The exhaust streams would include those from building

ventilation; gloveboxes; the process vents of tanks, vessels, and other equipment in the

Aqueous Polishing Area; and the sintering furnaces in the Processing Area.

The filtered exhausts would be discharged through a common stack (MOX vent stack) on the

roof of the Fuel Fabrication Building. Stack effluents would be continuously monitored. The

stack would be 37 m (120 ft) above grade.

2.2.3.3.2 Liquids

After sampling and characterization, liquid waste streams containing radioactive materials

would be transferred to the WSB for processing and treatment. Thus, no radioactive liquids

would be released directly from the facility to the environment. Within the Aqueous Polishing

Area, recycling would be used extensively to reduce liquid waste volumes and impurities before

transfer to the WSB. 

The liquid waste streams from the Aqueous Polishing Area would include the following:

• Chloride removal waste

• Liquid americium stream

• Excess acid stream

• Excess low-level radioactive solvent waste

• Stripped uranium stream

• Rinsing water

• Contaminated drains
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2.2.3.3.3 Solids

Solid radioactive wastes would be placed in appropriate containers (typically 55-gal drums),

assayed, and transferred to the WSB for processing and disposal. Whenever practical, the solid

wastes would be compacted to reduce volume and disposal costs.

The solid radioactive wastes generated in the Fuel Fabrication Building would include TRU solid

wastes and LLW (which would include uranium and/or plutonium contamination). Other

potentially radioactive, mixed, or nonradioactive hazardous wastes that might be generated by

the facility would be transferred to the WSB, SRS waste management system, or an off-site

permitted facility for disposition. Impacts associated with management of wastes from the

proposed MOX facility are presented in Section 4.3.4.

2.2.4 Waste Solidification Building

2.2.4.1 Description of the Waste Solidification Building

The WSB, which is not subject to NRC licensing, would be constructed by the DOE on the

PDCF site south of the PDCF to process the following liquid waste streams from the PDCF and

the proposed MOX facility:

• MOX facility high-alpha-activity waste stream

• MOX facility stripped uranium stream

• PDCF laboratory liquid stream

• PDCF low-level liquid waste streams

• MOX facility low-level liquid waste streams

In addition, space would be provided in the WSB for temporary storage and minimal processing

(e.g., sorting, packaging) of other waste streams, including solid LLW and TRU waste.

The WSB would occupy approximately 6,970 m2

 (75,000 ft2) of land and would be a

combination concrete and steel-frame structure (DCS 2003a,b, 2004). Concrete would be

utilized as necessary to protect against the potential impacts of natural phenomena hazards

events. In addition, a concrete-cell configuration would be used in areas where the proposed

MOX facility high-alpha stream is processed. Process enclosures adjacent to the cells would

provide worker protection to accommodate operations and maintenance activities. The

shielding and confinement would also serve as fire isolation barriers. Secondary confinement

features, such as dikes, sumps, and leak detection, would be provided for those areas with

liquid spill potential. The major pieces of process equipment would be tanks, evaporators, and

cementation equipment. Other equipment may include reverse osmosis, filtration, and

activated carbon and ion exchange columns.

The processed liquid would be mixed in the WSB with concrete and poured into containers to

produce solid waste. Cold chemical processing rooms, waste container storage, and truck
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loading/unloading areas may also be contained in hardened structures. The waste container

storage area would be at grade. The waste receipt area would have tanks to separately receive

high-alpha waste, stripped uranium waste, and the PDCF laboratory liquid stream waste. The

tank volumes would be sufficient to receive and store waste from six weeks of processing the

high-alpha-activity and stripped uranium waste streams by the proposed MOX facility and eight

weeks of processing the laboratory liquid stream by the PDCF. Additional receipt storage would

be available for low-level liquid waste streams from the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB

internal sources.

The proposed MOX facility would transfer a liquid high-alpha-activity waste and liquid LLW

streams to the WSB. The PDCF would transfer LLW streams. Within the WSB, these waste

streams would be treated separately. The WSB would process the liquid wastes into TRU

waste and LLW solid waste forms acceptable for shipment and disposal at their respective

disposal locations. Treated effluents from liquid LLW streams would be discharged to a

permitted outfall. The TRU waste form would be stored until cleared for shipment to the Waste

Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) (DOE 2003). The LLW form would be sent to a suitable disposal

site.

Within the WSB, the waste streams would be collected into receipt tanks, chemically adjusted,

evaporated, neutralized, solidified in containers, stored, and shipped. These processes would

be located inside a hardened (reinforced concrete) structure. Emissions from the process

areas would pass through a HEPA filtration confinement system before release through an

exhaust stack.

2.2.4.2 Processes Occurring in the WSB

The WSB would be designed to process and solidify three waste streams from the proposed

MOX facility and two waste streams from the PDCF. The processes that would be conducted

for each waste stream are described below.

2.2.4.2.1 Proposed MOX Facility High-Alpha-Activity Waste Stream 

The proposed MOX facility high-alpha-activity waste stream, consisting of the liquid

americium waste stream and two other liquid waste streams from the proposed MOX facility,

namely the excess acid stream and the alkaline waste stream, would be pumped approximately

610 m (2,000 ft) from the proposed MOX facility to the WSB in a double-walled stainless steel

pipe. The maximum volume received would be anticipated to be approximately 33,300 L

(8,800 gal) per year, which would be received in approximately 25 transfers, at a frequency of

about once every two weeks.

The WSB receipt tanks would be sized to hold three transfers (six weeks capacity in two

9,500-L [2,500-gal] tanks). The MOX facility high-alpha-activity stream collection tanks are

sized for three months capacity. This arrangement would provide continued MOX facility
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processing capacity in the event of a shutdown of WSB operations because of maintenance or

other disruptions. The tanks would be agitated or recirculated to mix the contents.

In the WSB, the proposed MOX facility high-alpha-activity waste stream would be sent to an

evaporator to reduce its water content. The acidic bottoms collected in the evaporator would be

neutralized with sodium hydroxide, mixed with cement, and poured into approved containers. 

The TRU waste collected in the containers would meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria and

would eventually be shipped to the WIPP for disposal (DOE 2003). The overheads from the

evaporation step would be condensed, collected, sampled, and subjected to further evaporation

or chemical treatment as necessary and finally would be sent to the Clean Water Treatment

System for final treatment and discharge to a permitted outfall (see Section 2.2.4.2.4).

2.2.4.2.2 MOX Facility Stripped Uranium Stream 

The proposed MOX facility stripped uranium stream would be pumped approximately 610 m

(2,000 ft) from the proposed MOX facility to the WSB in a double-walled stainless steel pipe.

The nominal waste volume of this stream would be 174,000 L (46,000 gal) per year, received in

approximately 42 transfers at a frequency of about one every week.

The WSB receipt tanks would be sized to hold six transfers (six weeks of MOX facility capacity).

The proposed MOX facility tanks would be sized to hold three months of MOX facility waste.

The tanks would be agitated or recirculated to mix the waste.

In the WSB, the proposed MOX facility stripped uranium stream would be evaporated, the

bottoms neutralized with sodium hydroxide, and the resulting waste mixed with cement and

deposited into approved containers. The waste in the containers would be classified as LLW

and would be shipped to a LLW disposal facility. The overheads from the evaporation step

would be condensed, collected, sampled, and subjected to further evaporation or chemical

treatment as necessary and finally would be sent to the Clean Water Treatment System for final

treatment and discharge to a permitted outfall (see Section 2.2.4.2.4).

2.2.4.2.3 PDCF Laboratory Liquid Stream

The PDCF laboratory liquid stream would be pumped approximately 240 m (800 ft) to the WSB

from the PDCF in a welded-jacketed stainless steel pipe, which would be direct buried. The

volume of this waste stream is anticipated to be a nominal 41,600 L (11,000 gal) per year

(DCS 2004), and would be received in approximately 12 transfers (3,400 L [900 gal] each) at a

frequency of about one transfer every month.

The WSB receipt tank would be sized to hold two transfers (eight weeks of PDCF laboratory

liquid stream capacity) in one 11,400-L (3,000-gal) tank. The PDCF tank is sized to provide up

to 8 weeks of PDCF processing capacity in the event of a shutdown of WSB operations for

maintenance or processing anomalies. The tank would be agitated or recirculated to mix the

waste.
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In the WSB, the PDCF laboratory liquid stream would be evaporated, the bottoms neutralized

with sodium hydroxide, and the resulting waste would be mixed with cement and deposited into

approved containers. The waste in the containers would be classified as LLW and would be

shipped to a LLW disposal facility. The overheads from the evaporation step would be

condensed, collected, sampled, and subjected to further evaporation or chemical treatment as

necessary and finally would be sent to the Clean Water Treatment System for final treatment

and discharge to a permitted outfall (see Section 2.2.4.2.4).

2.2.4.2.4 MOX Facility and PDCF Low-Level Liquid Streams

The proposed MOX facility and the PDCF would generate various aqueous liquid streams with

either very low radioactive contamination or the potential for radioactive contamination due to

their origin. These streams would be transferred, through double-walled transfer lines, to a

receipt tank or tanks at the WSB. In addition, low-level liquid waste streams would be

generated in the WSB from the evaporator overhead associated with the treatment of other

liquid waste streams sent to the WSB from the proposed MOX facility and the PDCF

(see Sections 2.2.4.2.1, 2.2.4.2.2, and 2.2.4.2.3). All of these waste streams would be

transferred to the Clean Water Treatment System in the WSB. The Clean Water Treatment

System would be designed using standard wastewater treatment technologies to meet

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), South Carolina Department of Health and

Environmental Control (SCDHEC), and DOE discharge limits for the SRS. The discharges

would be to a permitted outfall.

2.2.4.3 Radioactive Effluents and Wastes at the WSB

The WSB would be designed to minimize effluents to the air. The facility would also be

designed to minimize effluents to surface water, as discussed in Section 2.2.4.2.4. 

As discussed in Section 2.2.4.2, the WSB would receive five liquid waste streams, three from

the proposed MOX facility and two from the PDCF, and convert those waste streams to solid

TRU waste or solid LLW. An evaluation of waste management impacts for this EIS is

presented in Section 4.3.4. The solidified TRU waste would eventually be shipped to WIPP for

disposal (DOE 2003). LLW would be disposed of at a suitable disposal site.

2.2.5 Sand Filter Technology Option

This section describes the technology option of using a sand filter for air filtration instead of

high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. Although DCS has selected the use of HEPA

filters as its preferred option for removal of particulate contaminants before exhaust air is

released to the atmosphere, this EIS also evaluates the use of a sand filter (Orr 2001). The

differences in impacts are discussed in Section 4.3.8.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-18

It is useful to understand the physical differences in the two types of filters. HEPA filters are

designed to remove extremely fine particles suspended in the air. HEPA filters are enclosed in

rigid casing with full-depth pleated filter medium. The filter medium is normally fibrous

borosilicate glass, which is formed into a sheet folded into a series of accordion pleats. The

standard HEPA filter measures 61 cm × 61 cm × 29.2 cm deep (24 in. × 24 in. × 11.5 in. deep). 

The filter edge will be a high-temperature silicon gasket to prevent bypass leakage, and

improper installation or damage to the sealing surface can dramatically reduce the filter’s

efficiency and performance. HEPA filters function and are used in the HVAC system similarly to

standard home air filters. DCS proposes to use HEPA filters in multiple stages. The proposed

MOX facility would have many HEPA filters (Orr 2001).

Sand filters have a long history of use in DOE facilities at the SRS and at the Hanford Site near

Richland, Washington. At the SRS, DOE currently uses sand filters in the F-Area, H-Area, and

the Savannah River Laboratory. Unlike the case for HEPA filters, a facility would typically use

only a single sand filter. A sand filter designed for the proposed MOX facility would be

rectangular and would require a surface area of about 313 m2 (33,650 ft2

). The filter would be

about 3 m (10 ft) deep and would consist of gravel layers overlaid with sand layers arranged in

order of decreasing particle size (Orr 2001). A coarse sand layer would be placed at the top of

the filter to maintain integrity of the lower sand layers during filter operations. Air enters through

a supply tunnel at the bottom of the structure and is collected at the top of the sand filter. Large

fans or blowers are used to draw the air through the sand filter media. Suspended particles in

the air are trapped by the sand filter. No routine maintenance is required during operation of

sand filters (Orr 2001).

It is also useful to understand the performance differences in the two types of filters. Both filter

types have approximately the same efficiencies for collection of particulates. Neither filter type

is designed to trap gases. The filters would perform differently during some accidents. As

discussed below, the selection of filter type can affect the facility design.

Several commenters during the public scoping meetings urged the NRC to evaluate the use of

sand filters instead of HEPA filters, claiming sand filters would be better from a safety

standpoint, particularly in case of a fire at the facility. Fires often generate large volumes of

smoke that threaten the effective functioning of the filtration system by rapidly loading the filters

with smoke particles. The resulting pressure drop across the filter could cause a break in the

filter, followed by the release of contamination to the environment. This situation would not

occur with sand filters in case of a fire because they have a much larger surface area that could

trap smoke particles (Orr 2001). The integrity of HEPA filters could also be compromised

during explosion accidents.

Given the potential vulnerability of HEPA filters during fire accidents, the proposed MOX facility

is designed to mitigate the effects of an internal fire. The facility is designed into numerous fire

areas to limit the amount of combustibles involved in a single fire; this reduces the amount of

soot reaching individual banks of HEPA filters and ensures that the HEPA filters will not fail

because of excessive plugging. If a sand filter was used, fewer fire areas could be used

because sand filters are more resistant to smoke and sudden pressure changes. However, in
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-19

the evaluation of the impacts of using sand filters instead of HEPA filters, changes in facility

design are not considered.

2.3 Alternatives Considered But Not Analyzed in Detail

This section discusses some of the more significant alternatives identified during the scoping

process and alternatives identified by DCS, but that are not subjected to in-depth evaluations in

Chapter 4. Such alternatives include alternate locations for the proposed MOX facility in the

F-Area, technology and design options, immobilization of surplus plutonium, off-specification

MOX fuel, and the Parallex Project.

2.3.1 MOX Facility Location in F-Area

The DOE previously selected the SRS as the location of the proposed MOX facility, after

evaluating several alternative sites across the country (DOE 2000). In its subsequent

Environmental Report, DCS described the process the DOE used in choosing the specific site

for the proposed MOX facility within the SRS F-Area (DCS 2000). The currently proposed

location of the MOX facility was selected from five proposed sites within the F-Area. Final site

selection was based on three siting qualification criteria that the site must meet and nine siting

evaluation criteria that were more qualitative in nature (DCS 2002). The currently proposed

location of the facility, as identified in Figure 1.2, was the only location that met all of the

qualification criteria and scored the highest when all of evaluation criteria were considered. The

criteria used by DCS in the selection process were as follows (DCS 2002):

Siting Qualification Criteria

1. Free from subsurface contamination,

2. Adequate terrain and area, and

3. Free from Resource Conservation and Recovery Act/Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (RCRA/CERCLA) features.

Siting Evaluation Criteria

1. No known or protected plant or animal species,

2. Water table significantly below the facility substructure,

3. Relatively level area in a higher location for increased security and so as not to block

drainage,

4. Proximity to existing roads and the PDCF site,

5. Location with respect to subsurface soft zones,

6. Availability of utilities,

7. Location with respect to wetland areas,

8. Proximity to archaeological features, and

9. Interference with existing site operations.

Based on the above, this EIS does not consider alternatives to the SRS in which to locate the

proposed MOX facility, nor does it further consider alternative locations within SRS F-Area.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-20

2.3.2 Technology and Design Options

The general design of the proposed MOX facility was provided in DOE’s SPD EIS (DOE

1999a). In developing the detailed proposed MOX facility design, DCS used the technology at

Cogema’s MELOX and La Hague facilities, with modifications to meet U.S. regulations, codes,

and standards. A general description of the proposed MOX facility design is provided in

Section 2.2.3. In its Environmental Report, DCS (2002) considered a number of technology

and design alternatives. The technology and design alternatives considered by DCS were

discussed if they had a possibility of having some potential impact or significance from an

environmental perspective. These technology and design alternatives are summarized below. 

In evaluating these technology and design alternatives, NRC concluded that, with the exception

of sand filters compared to HEPA filters, further detailed analysis was not warranted in

Chapter 4. This technology option is also summarized in Section 2.2.5.

2.3.2.1 Dry Compared to Wet Impurity Removal

A polishing process is used to remove gallium and other impurities from the plutonium dioxide

feedstock before pellet production. These impurities affect the performance of the MOX fuel in

a reactor. Although the proposed aqueous (wet) polishing process meets the criteria for

controlling the gallium content to less than 120 parts per billion (ppb) (Framatome ANP 2001), it

also generates liquid radioactive and mixed wastes. An alternate technology for purifying the

plutonium dioxide is the dry process. The dry process generates significantly less liquid waste

and involves thermally induced gallium removal (TIGR). However, in an experimental setting,

the TIGR process only reduced the gallium content to 25,000 ppb. The DOE considered the

dry process in the SPD EIS (DOE 1999a) and concluded that the dry process would not meet

the technical requirements for MOX fuel. The best reported gallium removal (Kolman et al.

2000) results in impurity contents are over 100 times the required criteria. Thus, the dry

process was not further evaluated because it could not meet the technical specifications set for

MOX fuel. In addition, TIGR remains an experimental process requiring further testing to scale

the process to production while ensuring uniform pellet feedstock (DCS 2002; Kolman et al.

2000). 

2.3.2.2 Reagent Storage

DCS considered two options for locating reagent storage and solution preparation for the

aqueous polishing process. The options were to locate the storage and solution preparation

process in the same area as the Aqueous Polishing Area or to locate them in a separate

building and to pump reagents to the aqueous polishing process. Because of the potential

explosion hazards of the chemical reagents, DCS decided to use a separate building to reduce

this hazard. Because the design alternative to this approach involves potentially larger 
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-21

environmental impacts, namely, an increase in the explosion accident consequences,

consideration of colocating the aqueous polishing and reagent storage is not evaluated in

Chapter 4.

DCS also considered whether to store the chemical reagents in aboveground or belowground

tanks. Belowground tanks have the advantage of limiting immediate human exposure to spills. 

However, there is increased environmental risk associated with leaking belowground tanks. 

DCS decided to use aboveground tanks with concrete curbs to contain potential spills and

overflows. The NRC considered the design alternative of belowground storage tanks. 

However, this alternative would likely pose a greater risk of groundwater contamination. For

this reason, consideration of belowground tanks is not evaluated in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.3 Acid Recovery Process

DCS added an evaporator to the acid recovery process. This evaporator reduces the activity of

the distillates and recycles approximately half of the volume of distillates in lieu of using fresh

demineralized water. This also results in a volume reduction of liquid wastes that would be

processed and treated by the WSB. Because the design alternative to this approach involves

larger environmental impacts, namely, a demand for more process chemical shipments and

handling and larger waste volumes, further consideration of the aqueous polishing process

without the acid recovery process as an alternative is not evaluated in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.4 Glovebox Cooling

In the MELOX design, gloveboxes are cooled at a higher air flow rate to remove heat generated

from the reactor-grade plutonium. Because weapons-grade plutonium has a lower heat

release, gloveboxes at the proposed MOX facility can be cooled using natural convective

cooling. This results in a reduced airflow and permits a smaller HEPA filter size. The smaller

filter size reduces the volume of solid TRU waste generated by filter replacement. Because the

alternative to this design consideration (i.e., higher glovebox air flow) is unnecessary to meet

any conceivable alternative relative to the proposed MOX facility’s purpose and need to

disposition weapons-grade plutonium, use of higher glovebox flows and larger HEPA filter

banks is not evaluated as an alternative in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.5 Treatment of Aqueous Laboratory Waste

Aqueous laboratory wastes at the MELOX facility are precipitated and solidified, resulting in

TRU wastes. DCS decided to remove the plutonium from the laboratory waste and recycle this

plutonium into the aqueous polishing process. This step reduces the classification of the

laboratory waste from TRU waste to LLW. Because the alternative laboratory waste

management design would involve generation of more TRU waste and, therefore, have larger

environmental impacts, inclusion of plutonium in laboratory waste streams is not further

evaluated as an alternative in Chapter 4.
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2-22

2.3.2.6 Pellet Grinding Process

In the facility design, DCS replaced the two-stage cyclone separator in the MOX powder

processing operation with a decloggable metallic filter. This filter would reduce the TRU waste

volume that would result from the periodic replacement of other filters downstream of the pellet

grinding process. Therefore, the use of a two-stage cyclone separator instead of a decloggable

filter would result in the generation of additional TRU wastes. Since additional TRU waste

poses a larger environmental impact, use of a two-stage cyclone separator is not evaluated

further as an alternative in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.7 Facility Heat Exchangers

DCS considered two options to remove heat from the facility. The options were to use watercooled or air-cooled heat exchangers. Water-cooled exchangers can have impacts associated

with cooling tower drift or blowdown. To reduce these potential impacts, DCS decided to use

air-cooled heat exchangers. Because the water-cooled exchangers would involve generation of

cooling tower drift or blowdown and, therefore, larger environmental impacts, using this type of

exchanger is not further evaluated as an alternative in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.8 Physical Security Barriers

DCS considered several options to provide a physical security barrier around the proposed

MOX facility. One of these was the construction of an earthen berm. Because this method

would have resulted in a larger disturbed area for the site, DCS decided to use physical security

barriers that resulted in less land disturbance. Because the earthen berms would involve a

larger disturbed area and, therefore, larger environmental impacts, use of berms is not further

evaluated as an alternative in Chapter 4.

2.3.2.9 Material Transfer from the PDCF to the Proposed MOX Facility

As discussed in Section 1.2.1, the PDCF would produce plutonium dioxide feedstock for the

proposed MOX facility. The material would need to be transferred to the proposed MOX facility. 

DCS considered three transfer options: (1) tunnel, (2) closed transfer trench, and (3) vehicle

transfer. Because the first two options would result in greater land disturbance, DCS decided to

use vehicles to transfer the plutonium dioxide feedstock. Because the tunnel or closed transfer

trenches would involve a larger disturbed area and, therefore, larger environmental impacts and

because vehicle-related impacts would be small for the short distance between the facilities,

use of tunnels or trenches is not further evaluated as an alternative in Chapter 4.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-23

2.3.3 Immobilization of Surplus Plutonium

As discussed below, the NRC has concluded that immobilizing surplus plutonium is not a

reasonable alternative to the proposed action, and, therefore, this alternative does not require

detailed analysis in Chapter 4.

Before the DOE’s January 2002 decision to cancel the plutonium immobilization plant,

plutonium immobilization was available as a no-action disposition alternative to the proposed

action. The DOE had already evaluated the environmental impacts of this alternative as

alternative 12a in the SPD EIS (DOE 1999a), so that a new NRC analysis of this alternative was

not required. However, as discussed in Section 1.4.1, following the DOE’s January 2002

decision, the NRC solicited views on whether the immobilization alternative should still be

evaluated in this EIS. The comments solicited did not identify any persuasive reasons to further

consider the immobilization alternative.

The NRC has now determined for two reasons that immobilization is no longer a reasonable

alternative to the proposed action. First, immobilization of the 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus

plutonium would not meet a key element of the purpose and need for the proposed action, as

described in Section 1.3. Due to budgetary constraints, the DOE decided to cancel the

immobilization portion of the surplus plutonium disposition program and adopt a MOX-only

approach. The DOE determined that in order to make progress with available funds, only 

one approach could be supported. The DOE stated that after evaluating the feasibility of

implementing two disposition approaches, it believed that the best way to make the most

progress with available funds while maintaining Russian interest in and commitment to surplus

plutonium disposition was to pursue a MOX-only disposition strategy (DOE 2002a). The DOE

further stated that Russia does not consider immobilization alone to be an acceptable

approach. In the DOE’s judgment, reliance by the United States on immobilization would

therefore cause Russia to abandon its plutonium disposition efforts. Because immobilization

fails to degrade the isotopic composition of the plutonium, Russia distrusts the immobilization

alternative, as it would leave open the possibility of future retrieval and reuse of the plutonium in

nuclear weapons (DOE 2002a). As discussed further in Section 1.1.1, the DOE therefore

concluded that reliance on a MOX-only approach is the key to successfully completing the

September 2000 agreement between Russia and the United States.

The second reason that immobilization is no longer a reasonable alternative to the proposed

action is its connection with the conduct of United States foreign policy. Evaluating the

immobilization alternative now would involve the NRC in foreign policy matters that the DOE

has been conducting on behalf of the United States. In the NRC’s view, an alternative that 

would block the implementation of an agreement with another country involves foreign policy

matters that are outside NEPA’s scope. Therefore, the NRC concludes that immobilization is

not a reasonable alternative requiring detailed analysis in this FEIS.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-24

2.3.4 Off-Specification MOX Fuel

During public information meetings in September 2002, NRC was asked to consider an

alternative in which MOX fuel would be manufactured but not irradiated in commercial nuclear

power plants. Under this alternative, as understood by the NRC, off-specification fuel rods

would be manufactured in the proposed MOX facility and transported to spent fuel pools. 

These spent fuel pools could be located at either commercial nuclear power plants or interim

spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). Once at the pool, the rods would be commingled with

spent fuel rods, and possibly even incorporated into vacant positions in existing spent fuel

assemblies. The final configuration would be a proliferation-resistant form that would be a

candidate for the National Academy of Sciences’ (NAS’) spent fuel standard for surplus

plutonium disposition (NAS 2000).

Since the demands for fuel quality and specifications would be lower, the fuel rods could be

manufactured “off-specification.” The so-called “off-specification” fuel rods would offer both

environmental costs and benefits, as described below. Therefore, the NRC gave some

consideration to this alternative based on the information provided by principal proponents of

this approach (Macfarlane et al. 2001).

The alternative would involve a modified approach to manufacturing MOX fuel. The final

powder blend would still have to be homogenized, pressed into pellets, and the pellets sintered

in order to manufacture off-specification fuel rods. However, most impurities, including gallium

and americium, could remain in the finished rods. This could significantly reduce liquid

radioactive waste volumes associated with polishing the feedstock plutonium. As a result, the

demand on the WIPP to accommodate solidified high-alpha-activity waste derived from the

aqueous polishing process would be reduced.

Since the off-specification rods would not be used in a reactor, any risks of reactor accidents

involving MOX fuel would not occur. In addition, the cause of some accidents in the proposed

MOX facility would be prevented. For example, if aqueous polishing could be eliminated, then

the risks of inadvertent nuclear criticality, solution spills, electrolyzer fires, and explosions would

be considerably lower.

Since the concentration of plutonium dioxide in each off-specification rod would not be

constrained by reactor fuel specifications, the mass of plutonium dioxide in each rod could be

higher. This would result in lower numbers of manufactured rods and correspondingly lower

vehicle-related transportation risks associated with transporting rods to any reactor sites. 

Fewer rods would also reduce the time required to operate the proposed MOX facility, which

could result in lower operational costs. Criticality issues arising from the higher concentration of

plutonium could be avoided by mixing neutron-absorbing gadolinium and hafnium with the

plutonium.

However, there would be environmental costs associated with this alternative. Americium-241

would not be removed by the aqueous polishing process. Since americium-241 is a highspecific-activity alpha-emitter and poses a direct radiation hazard, radiation exposures to facility

workers, site workers, and the public would be higher during MOX facility operations,
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-25

off-specification MOX rod transportation, and handling of the off-specification rods at the

reactor site or ISFSI.

The costs of manufacturing off-specification MOX fuel rods would also be affected by the

elimination of the “fuel credit.” The fuel credit is a project cost offsetting factor that accounts for

the price a reactor licensee would pay for completed MOX fuel that meets its specifications. 

The estimated additional project costs would be $1.0 billion, thereby raising the total project

costs from $3.8 billion to $4.8 billion.

The benefit of producing electricity from the use of MOX fuel would also be eliminated by the

manufacture of off-specification MOX fuel.

Having qualitatively weighed the costs and benefits of this alternative, the staff find that this

alternative likely involves a net increase in environmental costs. Therefore, no compelling

reason exists to pursue this alternative in further detail. In addition, it is uncertain that this

proposal would meet the National Academy of Sciences’ spent fuel standard for surplus

plutonium disposition (NAS 2000). The off-specification rods would not be irretrievably

configured in irradiated spent fuel, and the isotopic distribution of the plutonium in offspecification rods would not be altered. As a result, this form is unlikely to meet with approval

from the Russian Federation, whose parallel progress on plutonium disposition under formal

bilateral agreements is integral to the purpose of and need for the proposed action. As

discussed above for the immobilization of plutonium alternative, because this alternative does

not meet the purpose of and need for the proposed action, the off-specification alternative is not

further analyzed in detail in the EIS.

2.3.5 Parallex Project Alternative

Another suggested alternative to the proposed action was to transfer the surplus plutonium to

Canada under the Parallex Project. The Parallex Project was identified by DOE in its ROD for

the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement (DOE 1997) as a possible option for dispositioning some of the surplus

plutonium. The Parallex Project is a joint Canadian, Russian, and U.S. demonstration effort to

evaluate the feasibility of burning MOX fuel in heavy-water-moderated reactors. The Parallex

Project is still ongoing. It is a limited scale test of approximately 27 kg (59 lb) of MOX fuel that

was manufactured at the DOE’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and at the Bochvar

Institute in Moscow, Russia. This MOX fuel was shipped to Canada and is currently being

tested in a Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor. Following irradiation, additional

analyses will be required to evaluate the usefulness of this approach. The DOE prepared an

environmental assessment (EA) for this action and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact

(FONSI) (DOE 1999b).

The suggested alternative of considering the Parallex Project would mean that the PDCF, the 

WSB, and the proposed MOX facility would be constructed and operated, but that the MOX fuel

would be transferred to Canada for irradiation in heavy-water-moderated reactors there. This

suggested alternative would be similar to the proposed action, except that the surplus plutonium
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-26

would be irradiated in Canada. Implementing this alternative would require a change in national

policy regarding the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium that is the responsibility of the

DOE. Therefore, this alternative is not considered further in this EIS.

2.3.6 MIX MOX Alternative

During the public comment meetings on the DEIS in March 2003, NRC was asked to consider

an alternative in which surplus weapons-grade plutonium would be mixed with reactor-grade

plutonium. This alternative was named “MIX MOX” by the proponent and is described further

below.

Weapons-grade plutonium has a lower percentage of plutonium-240 than does reactor-grade

plutonium. One concern with the immobilization alternative was that it would not isotopically

degrade the plutonium. The MOX fuel alternative does isotopically degrade the plutonium. The

depleted uranium (uranium-238) and plutonium-239 in MOX fuel would be converted to

plutonium-240 when subjected to irradiation in a nuclear reactor. The MIX MOX alternative

would change the overall percentage of plutonium-240 by adding/mixing surplus weaponsgrade plutonium with reactor-grade plutonium. The source of reactor-grade plutonium would be

European stockpiles. For example, Britain has approximately 60 MT of surplus reactor-grade

plutonium that was generated from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. The MIX MOX proponent

stated that after the materials were mixed, they could be disposed of in a geologic repository.

Several details of the MIX MOX alternative have not been fully developed. For example, it is

not clear if new facilities would be required to perform the mixing and whether any processing of

portions of the surplus plutonium would be required prior to mixing. In addition, the

percentages of the two plutonium materials required to achieve suitable isotopic degradation

have not been determined. The legality, availability, and cost of purchasing the reactor-grade

plutonium is uncertain. As such, the environmental impacts cannot be determined. Assuming

that existing DOE facilities could be used, it is conceivable that the costs of the MIX MOX

alternative could be slightly lower than the proposed action; however, the benefit of producing

electricity from the use of MOX fuel would be eliminated by the MIX MOX alternative.

The MIX MOX alternative appears to satisfy one element of the purpose of and need for the

proposed action. It appears to result in material that is proliferation resistant and would

therefore reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. However, the MIX MOX

alternative does not satisfy the second element of the purpose of and need for the proposed

action. The current United States - Russia agreement does not allow for disposition of surplus

plutonium using the MIX MOX alternative. Moreover, given that the environmental costs of the

proposed action are considered to be small, the MIX MOX alternative is not a clearly superior

alternative. Therefore, the NRC concludes that MIX MOX is not a reasonable alternative

requiring detailed analysis in this EIS.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-27

2.4 Comparison of Alternatives 

In weighing the environmental, economic, and

other benefits of the proposed action against its

environmental, economic, and other costs, the

NRC must also consider and compare

reasonable alternatives to the proposed action. 

These evaluations will be factored into the

ultimate decision of whether the action called for

is the issuance of the proposed license, with any

appropriate conditions to protect environmental

values. The proposed action and the no-action

(continued storage) alternative are compared in

the text below and in Table 2.1. The terms used

in impact categorization are defined in the text

box to the right.

The impacts of the no-action alternative and the

proposed action are compared for each technical area considered in this EIS. The level of

impacts associated with the no-action alternative evaluated includes those impacts incurred by

continued storage of surplus plutonium at DOE sites if the proposed MOX facility is not

approved by the NRC. As stated previously, projected impacts for the no-action alternative

were based on the analysis presented in the DOE SPD EIS (DOE 1999a) and were not

reevaluated for this EIS.

The proposed action was evaluated for impacts from the following activities:

• Construction, operation, and deactivation and decommissioning of the proposed

MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB at the SRS;

Transport of depleted uranium hexafluoride from a DOE site at Portsmouth, Ohio, to

a commercial fuel fabrication plant at Wilmington, North Carolina, to produce

uranium dioxide needed as feedstock for the MOX fuel fabrication process;

Conversion of depleted uranium hexafluoride to uranium dioxide;

Transport of the uranium dioxide from Wilmington to the SRS;

Transport of fresh MOX fuel from the SRS to a surrogate reactor site;

Reactor use of MOX fuel; and

Transport of spent MOX fuel to a geologic repository.

The continued storage (i.e., the no-action) alternative would result in no new construction at the

DOE locations currently storing surplus plutonium, with the possible exception of minor 

Determination of the Significance of Potential

Environmental Impacts

For purposes of describing impacts in this EIS,

each impact was assigned one of the following

three significance levels:

• Small: The environmental effects are not

detectable or are so minor that they will

neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any

important attribute of the environment.

• Moderate: The environmental effects are

sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to

destabilize, important attributes of the

environment.

• Large: The environmental effects are clearly

noticeable and are sufficient to destabilize 

important attributes of the environment.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-28

Table 2.1. Comparison of alternativesa

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Human Health Risk

Construction

 Radiological

Not applicable Human health impacts would be small.

Same exposure as SRS employees

from existing SRS operations.

 Chemical

 Physical hazards

No adverse impacts from inhalation of

construction-related emissions.

<1 fatality, 122 injuries annually over

3 to 5 years.

Normal Operations Under current operating 

conditions, human health impacts

would be small.

Human health impacts would be small.

Radiological (annual impacts)

Collective public dose

(person-Sv/yr)

Annual LCFs

0.029

0.002

0.016

0.0009

Public MEI dose (mSv/yr)

Risk of LCF

0.065

4 x 10-6

6.1 x 10-5

4 x 10-9

Facility workers collective

dose (person-Sv/yr)

Annual LCFs

1.4

0.08

2.6

0.2

Average facility worker dose 

(mSv/yr)

Risk of LCF

<3.2

<0.0002

<5

<0.0003

Chemical

Physical hazards

Insufficient data

Insufficient data

No adverse impacts from chemical

exposures.

<1 fatality, 41 injuries annually over 

10 or more years.

Accidents If an accident occurred, human

health impacts would be small to

moderate, depending on the type

of the accident. Risks would be

small.

If an accident occurred, human health

impacts would be small, moderate, or

large depending on the type of the

accident. Risks would be small.

Radiological

Event

Dose to collective public 

(person-Sv)

LCFs

Beyond design basis earthquake

6.6

0.4

PDCF tritium release (short-term

exposure).

42

3
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-29

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Chemical No data Large accidental releases of chlorine or

nitrogen tetroxide could have adverse

impacts on SRS employees and would

require rapid emergency response

actions.

Air Quality

Construction Continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites would

not require new construction, thus

no impacts to air quality would

occur.

Air emissions impacts would be small.

Annual standard level for PM2.5 <0.1% of standard level.

24-h standard level for PM2.5 4.3% of standard level.

CO, SO2, NO2 emissions from

construction equipment

<0.29% of ambient standard level.

Operations No violation of air quality

standards at DOE sites from

continued storage of surplus

plutonium.

Air emission impacts would be small.

24-h standard level for PM2.5 1.9% of standard level.

PM2.5 annual standard level 0.01% of standard level.

Toxic air pollutants and PAHs <0.04% of South Carolina standard

levels.

Prevention of significant

deterioration of air quality

<6.0% of PSD Class II Area increment

for SO2 emissions.

<6.0% PM10 increments to Class II

Areas.

<1% of Class I increment of PM10

standard at Cape Romain National

Wildlife Refuge 160 km (100 mi) from

proposed facilities.

Hydrology

Construction Not applicable Hydrological impacts would be small.

Surface water No surface water use or discharges to

surface waters during construction.

Groundwater 139 million L/yr (37 million gal/yr). Total

use for construction would be 10% of

A-Area loop water demand and 3% of

excess capacity.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

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Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Operations No impacts on water use from

continued surplus plutonium

storage at DOE sites.

Hydrological impacts would be small.

Surface water No significant impacts from discharges

to an NPDES outfall and discharge of

treated sanitary waste effluents.

Groundwater 76 million L/yr (20 million gal/yr). Total

use by proposed facilities would be 5%

of A-Area loop water demand in 2000

and 2% of excess capacity.

Waste Management

Construction No impacts to waste management

systems from continued storage of

surplus plutonium at DOE sites.

No TRU, LLW, or mixed LLW

generation; small impacts to SRS

treatment capacity for nonhazardous

liquid waste.

Waste volumes generated during a

3-5-yr construction period:

Hazardous [m3

 (yd3)] 710 (929)

Nonhazardous liquid [m3

 (million

gal)]

300,900 (79.5)

Nonhazardous solid [m3 (yd3)] 53,410 (69,858)

Operations Small impacts on waste

management systems from

continued storage of surplus

plutonium at DOE sites.

Small to moderate impacts on waste

management systems at SRS and

WIPP.

Waste volumes generated during

10-yr operation period:

TRU [m3

 (yd3)] 4,431 (5,796). TRU waste volume

would be 13% of SRS storage capacity;

2.6% of WIPP disposal capacity. 

Liquid LLW [m3

 (million gal)] 22,786 (6.0). The liquid LLW

constitutes 4% of the discharge

capacity of SRS.

Solid LLW [m3

 (yd3)] 6,052 (7,916). Estimated volumes for

solid LLW would represent about 21%

of the SRS disposal capacity (if

disposed of entirely at SRS). 

Hazardous/mixed [m3

 (yd3)] 120 (157). Estimated volume of

hazardous waste would represent less

than 2% of SRS storage capacity. 
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-31

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Nonhazardous liquid [m3

 (million

gal)]

602,000 (159). Nonhazardous liquid

waste would be 6% of SRS treatment

capacity.

Nonhazardous solid [m3

 (yd3)] 41,400 (54,149). Nonhazardous solid

waste would be disposed off-site.

Environmental Justice

Construction No impacts would occur since no

new construction would be

needed for continued storage of

surplus plutonium at DOE sites.

No exposure to radiological emissions

and no adverse impacts from inhalation

of construction-related chemical

emissions, regardless of population

group or income status.

Normal Operations Radiological and nonradiological

risks from continued storage of

surplus plutonium would be small.

No disproportionately high and

adverse effects would occur.

No disproportionately high and adverse

effects would occur from routine

operations. 

Accidents An environmental justice impact is

possible from a severe accident.

Aesthetics

Construction and Operation No impacts would occur because

no new construction is needed for

continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites.

Small impacts on visual resources from

construction and operation of the

proposed facilities.

Cultural and Paleontological

Resources

Construction No impacts would occur because

no new construction is needed for

continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites.

Two archaeological sites, 38 AK

546/547 and 38 AK 757, would be

directly affected by construction of the

proposed MOX facility. The South

Carolina State Historic Preservation

Office accepted a data recovery plan

for the sites, and data recovery was

completed for both sites in 2002.

Five additional eligible sites could

experience indirect impacts by the

construction workforce unless proper

mitigation is used.

Operations No impacts on cultural or

paleontological resources are

expected from continued storage

of surplus plutonium at the DOE

sites.

Routine operations would not impact

archaeological sites near the proposed

facilities.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-32

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Ecology

Construction No impacts would occur since no

new construction is anticipated for

continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites.

Impacts from habitat loss or noise

generation during construction of the

proposed facilities would be small.

Habitat loss Impacts to wetlands and endangered/

threatened species would be small.

Up to 14.7 ha (36.4 acres) of

woodlands would be cleared for

facilities, representing <1% of annual

timber harvest at SRS, and trees would

be small.

Noise impacts Construction noise levels as high as

80 dBA could impact wildlife within

122 m (400 ft) of the project area.

Operations Ecological impacts would be

small.

Ecological impacts would be small.

Geology, Seismology, and Soils

Construction Continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites would

not impact soils and geology since

no new construction is expected.

Impacts to soils and geology would be

small. Up to 50 ha (123 acres) would be

disturbed in F-Area; some soil erosion

and compaction.

Operations Continued storage of surplus

plutonium at the DOE sites would

not impact soils and geology.

Impacts to soils and geology from

routine operations would be small.

Infrastructure

Construction No new construction is expected,

thus there would be no impacts to

existing DOE infrastructure.

Impacts to existing infrastructure would

be small.

Roads An additional 4.8 to 6.4 km (3 to 4 mi)

of roadways would be needed in the

F-Area to support construction.

Electrical power 17,700 MWh/yr representing about

3.7% of SRS capacity would be needed

during the 5-yr construction period.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-33

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Water 139 million L/yr (37 million gal/yr) representing about 3.3% of A-Area loop

groundwater capacity.

Operations Impacts occurring at DOE facilities

during continued storage of

surplus plutonium would be small.

Impacts to existing infrastructure would

be small.

Electrical power Use of about 186,000 MWh/yr,

representing 36.4% of F-Area capacity,

would occur during normal operations.

Water 76 million L/yr (20.1 million gal/yr) or

about 5% of A-Area loop water demand

in 2000 and 2% of excess capacity

would be used.

Land Use

Construction No impacts would occur since no

new construction of storage

facilities for surplus plutonium is

needed at the DOE facilities.

Small impacts to designated land use

at SRS would occur for construction of

the proposed facilities.

Normal Operations No impacts to land use would

occur at DOE facilities during

continued storage of surplus

plutonium.

Small impacts to land use would occur

from routine operations.

Accidents Depending on the type and extent of an

accident during operations, impacts

could be small, moderate, or large.

Portions of the F-Area could be

precluded from employee use until

corrective cleanup and appropriate

monitoring measures were

implemented.

Small, moderate, or large impacts to

land use in the immediate vicinity of

SRS could occur in the event that a

highly unlikely accident results in

radioactive material migrating off site.

Noise

Construction Not applicable Small impacts would occur from noise

levels generated during construction.

Equipment noise levels Equipment and vehicle noise would

reach levels of 85–90 dBA at distances

of 15 m (50 ft) from the source.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-34

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Noise levels at the SRS boundary could

reach 38 dBA, which is below EPA

guidance of 55 dBA for protection of the

public.

Operations No significant impacts would

occur at DOE plutonium storage

facilities above noise levels

currently generated by traffic and

worker activities.

Small impacts would occur from noise

levels generated during operation.

Process equipment, diesel

generators, air-conditioning noise

Noise levels could be as high as

<29 dBA at the SRS boundary, which is

well below the 55-dBA EPA guidance

level.

Socioeconomics

Construction Not applicable Impacts on the REA and ROI would be

small.

Employment 1,010 direct jobs, 810 indirect jobs for

peak construction year.

Income $91.9 million in peak construction year.

In-migrating population 350

Operations No impacts would occur from

continued storage of surplus

plutonium at DOE facilities.

Small impacts on the REA and ROI

would occur during operations.

Employment 490 direct jobs, 780 indirect jobs.

Income $64 million per year

In-migrating population 180

Cost-Benefit Impacts

Construction Continued storage of surplus

plutonium at DOE facilities would

not result in additional impacts to

the REA and ROI.

No significant adverse impacts related

to costs would occur from construction

of the proposed facilities. Some

beneficial impacts would occur. In

general, the impacts would be

considered small.

REA & ROI impacts

Employment 1,020 average annual employment

Total income $370 million

Total regional product $760 million
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-35

Table 2.1. Continued

Impact area Continued storage (no action) Proposed action

Operations Impacts related to costs and

benefits from continued storage

would be small.

Impacts related to costs and benefits

from operation of the proposed facilities

would be small.

REA & ROI impacts

Employment 1,270 jobs

Total income $640 million

Total regional product $1,180 million

Net benefit $1,940 million

National Impacts

Costs $4,064 million

Benefits Economic benefits for materials

supplied, services, new scientific

knowledge, safe use of plutonium

stockpile, generation of electricity from

MOX fuel.

Transportation

Radiological No intersite transportation

expected.

Radiological impacts would be small.

Routine dose to the public 

(person-Sv)

LCFs

3.1-5.6

0.2-0.3

Dose to the transportation 

crew (person-Sv)

LCFs

2.1-5.3

0.1-0.3

Accident dose risk to the

public (person-Sv)

LCFs

0.23

0.01

Nonradiological No intersite transportation

expected.

Nonradiological impacts would be

small.

Vehicle emissions (latent 

fatalities)

Accidents (fatalities)

1-2

0.078-0.20

a

Some of the impacts for the no-action alternative are from the entire DOE site, not just activities associated

with continued storage. Therefore, the impacts of the no-action alternative are overestimated.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-36

expansion of storage facilities at the Pantex site in Texas. Construction impacts would be small

or negligible at Pantex if storage facility expansion was necessary and would occur on

previously disturbed land adjacent to the existing storage facilities (DOE 1999a). For all

present DOE storage sites, radiological and nonradiological risks would be small. Continued

storage would be expected to have no impacts on air quality, water quality, waste management

systems, cultural resources, or soils, and the economic cost would be lower than that for the

proposed action. However, continued storage would meet none of the DOE’s goals for the

plutonium disposition program.

Construction of the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB (hereafter referred to as the

proposed facilities) would disturb up to 50.0 ha (123.4 acres) of land. Impacts to endangered or

threatened species, wetlands, or aquatic or terrestrial habitats (including woodlands) at the SRS

and the F-Area vicinity would be small. Impacts to two prehistoric archaeological sites eligible

for listing on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) have been mitigated through data

recovery, and the removal of the fill during construction will be monitored (see Section 5.2.9).

The primary benefit of operation of the proposed MOX facility would be the resulting reduction

in the supply of weapons-grade plutonium available for unauthorized use once the plutonium

component of MOX fuel has been irradiated in commercial nuclear reactors. Converting

surplus plutonium in this manner is viewed as being a safer use/disposition strategy than the

continued storage of surplus plutonium at DOE sites, as would occur under the no-action

alternative, since it would reduce the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium

are stored (DOE 1997). Further, converting weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel in the

United States — as opposed to immobilizing a portion of it as DOE had previously planned to

do — lays the foundation for parallel disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia, which

distrusts immobilization for its failure to degrade the plutonium’s isotopic composition

(DOE 2002a). Converting surplus plutonium into MOX fuel is thus viewed as a better way of

ensuring that weapons-usable material will not be obtained by rogue states and terrorist groups. 

Implementing the proposed action is expected to promote the above nonproliferation objectives. 

Additionally, building and operating the proposed MOX facility is expected to result in a gain of

scientific knowledge relative to the conversion of weapons-grade plutonium into reactor fuel.

In addition to the above primary benefits, there are secondary economic benefits of the

proposed action. Impacts of construction on the regional economic area (REA) and region of

influence (ROI) would be beneficial with respect to jobs and income. Direct construction jobs

for the proposed action would total about 1,010 in the peak construction year. Although inmigration of workers during construction would be greater for the proposed action, no adverse

impacts are anticipated to public services, schools, housing availability, or the local

transportation network. Construction of the proposed facilities would be expected to generate

91.9 million in total income within the REA during the peak construction year.

During operations, the MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB would be expected to generate 490 direct

and 780 indirect jobs, producing a total annual income of $64 million in the REA. Approximately

180 people would be expected to relocate to the SRS area during operation of the proposed

facilities. No adverse socioeconomic impacts are expected as the result of proposed facility
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-37

operations. Adequate public services, schools, and housing exist to satisfy needs of the inmigrating population.

The economic cost benefit analysis for the proposed action showed an overall net benefit to the

ROI and REA of $1,940 million. National economic impacts (costs) for the proposed MOX

facility, PDCF, and WSB are estimated to be $4,064 million. The economic benefits would

include adding employment income in various national economic sectors and adding income to

businesses from the purchase of related goods and services.

The following discussion compares the primary and secondary benefits set forth above to the

environmental and economic costs of the proposed action.

Construction and routine operation of the proposed MOX facility would not be expected to

cause any disproportionately high and adverse impacts to low-income or minority populations in

the SRS vicinity. Of the accidents evaluated, a hypothetical tritium release accident at the

proposed PDCF had the highest estimated short-term impacts, approximately 3 latent cancer

fatalities (LCFs) among members of the off-site public. The same accident also had the highest

1-year exposure impact, up to 100 LCFs among members of the off-site public if ingestion of

contaminated crops was considered. However, it is highly unlikely that such an accident would

occur, and the risk to any population, including low-income and minority communities, is

considered to be low. However, the communities most likely to be affected by a significant

accident would be minority or low income, given the demographics and prevailing wind

direction. The extent to which low-income or minority population groups would be affected

would depend on the amount of material released and the direction and speed of the wind.

Continued storage of plutonium by the DOE at its present locations would not be expected to

produce additional LCFs. (Annual LCFs of approximately 0.002 in the surrounding population

of the storage sites [DOE 1999a] were estimated.) The annual collective dose to members of

the public (i.e., those living and working within 80 km [50 mi] of the SRS) produced by routine

operation of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB would be expected to result in

an LCF rate of approximately 0.0009/yr or less. Therefore, continued storage results in higher

annual impacts. 

No adverse impacts from chemical exposure of workers at the proposed MOX facility are

anticipated. Less than one fatality, and approximately 120 worker injuries per year are

anticipated during construction of the proposed facilities. Facility operations would result in

about 40 injuries per year and less than one fatality per year.

Routine MOX facility operations are expected to produce small air quality impacts and would

not result in concentrations above air quality standard levels for criteria pollutants at the SRS.

Facility construction would contribute temporarily less than 0.1% of the PM2.5 standard level,

and facility operation would contribute about 0.01% or less of this level.

Water consumption during operation of the proposed facilities would be an increase of about

5% of the water demand for the A-Area loop in 2000 and about 2% of the excess A-Area loop

capacity. Impacts to surface water are expected to be small during facility operations because
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-38

the concentrations of nonhazardous wastes in the discharge produced by the proposed facilities

would be within the guidelines of the existing NPDES permit.

Waste management systems at the SRS would not be adversely affected by wastes generated

by the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and the WSB. Adequate storage capacity and handling

procedures are in place at the SRS to process hazardous wastes generated during both

construction and facility operations. Nonhazardous liquid and solid wastes would not adversely

affect operation of the Central Sanitary Waste Treatment Facility at the SRS.

Transportation of uranium and plutonium feedstock materials, transuranic waste, and fresh

MOX fuel would result in approximately 3,300,000 to 8,200,000 km (2,050,000 to 5,100,000 mi)

traveled by 1,497 to 3,512 truck shipments over the operations period of the proposed MOX

facility. Up to 1 latent cancer fatality (LCF) might be expected because of the radioactive

nature of the cargo. (Estimated LCFs for members of the public and the transportation crews

were 0.2 to 0.4 and 0.1 to 0.3, respectively.) One to two latent fatalities from vehicle emissions

were estimated, and no fatalities (0.078 to 0.20 fatality) from the physical trauma of potential

vehicle accidents were estimated.

The use of sand filters was identified during the EIS scoping process as a potential substitute

for final HEPA filters. The sand filter technology is described in Section 2.2.5. A comparison

between sand filter and HEPA filter impacts is presented in Section 4.3.8. The NRC concludes

that the technology option to install a sand filter poses no clear reduction in overall

environmental impacts over the installation and use of HEPA filters.

A sand filter typically is designed to use locally available sand and gravel. The outer wall of the

sand filter consists of reinforced concrete placed below or partially below grade. It is designed

to withstand a design-basis earthquake and/or flood without cracking or leaking. A sand filter

designed for the proposed MOX facility would be rectangular and would require a surface area

of about 313 m2 (33,650 ft2

). The filter would be about 3 m (10 ft) deep and would consist of

gravel layers overlaid with sand layers arranged in order of decreasing particle size (Orr 2001). 

A coarse sand layer would be placed at the top of the filter to maintain the integrity of the lower

sand layers during filter operations. No routine maintenance is required during operation of

sand filters.

Use of the HEPA filters would result in a slightly higher radiological dose to facility workers

during the course of normal operations, as discussed in Section 4.3.1.1.2, and the use of a

sand filter might result in some accident impacts lower than those estimated in Section 4.3.5.2. 

As discussed in Section 4.3.2.2, the air filtration method would not have an impact on air

quality. Both filter types have approximately the same efficiencies for particulates, and neither

filter type is designed to trap gases. In addition, the disposal costs were estimated to be similar

for each filter type (Section 4.3.4).
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-39

2.5 Recommendation Regarding the Proposed Action

After weighing the costs and benefits of the proposed action and comparing alternatives

(see FEIS Sections 2.4 and 4.6), and after considering the comments received on the DEIS

(see FEIS Appendix J), the NRC staff, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.91(d), sets forth below its

NEPA recommendation regarding the proposed action. The NRC staff recommends that,

unless safety issues mandate otherwise, the action called for is the issuance of the proposed

license to DCS, with conditions to protect environmental values. In this regard, the NRC staff

concludes that (1) the applicable environmental requirements set forth in FEIS Chapter 6 and

(2) the proposed mitigation measures discussed in FEIS Chapter 5 would eliminate or

substantially lessen any potential adverse environmental impacts associated with the proposed

action.

The NRC staff has concluded that the overall benefits of the proposed MOX facility outweigh its

disadvantages and costs, based upon consideration of the following:

The national policy decision to reduce supplies of surplus weapons-grade plutonium,

as reflected in agreements between the United States and Russia;

The small radiological impacts on, and risk to, human health, that would be caused

by constructing, operating, and decommissioning the proposed MOX facility;

The small environmental impact the proposed action would have; and

The economic benefit to the local community.

As discussed in FEIS Chapter 4, postulated severe accidents evaluated in connection with the

proposed action would be expected to produce moderate to large impacts. While the

consequences of these bounding accidents would be expected to produce moderate to large

impacts, the likelihood of such accidents occurring is expected to be very low (highly unlikely).

Accordingly, the NRC concludes in its NEPA analysis that the benefits of the proposed action

outweigh its connected risks and costs.

2.6 References for Chapter 2

DCS (Duke Cogema Stone & Webster) 2000. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

Environmental Report. Docket No. 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2001. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction Authorization Request. Docket

No. 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2002. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 1 & 2.

Docket No. 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. July.

DCS 2003a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 3. Docket 

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June.
Alternatives, Including the Proposed Action

2-40

DCS 2003b. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 4. Docket 

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. Aug.

DCS 2004. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 5. Docket

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June 10.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 1997. Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,

Washington, DC. Nov.

DOE 1999a. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement. 

DOE/EIS-0283. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, DC. Nov.

DOE 1999b. “Finding of No Significant Impact in the Environmental Assessment for the

Parallex Project Fuel Manufacture and Shipment.” Federal Register 64(173):48810-48813,

Sept. 8.

DOE 2000. “Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental

Impact Statement.” Federal Register 65(7):1608-1620, Jan. 11.

DOE 2002a. “Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program.” (Amended Record of Decision) Federal 

Register 67(76):19432-19435, April 19.

DOE 2002b. Supplement Analysis for Storage of Surplus Plutonium Materials in the K-Area

Material Storage Facility at the Savannah River Site. DOE/EIS-0229-SA-2. Assistant

Secretary for Environmental Management, Washington, DC. Feb.

DOE 2003. Changes Needed to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program, Supplement

Analysis and Amended Record of Decision. DOE/EIS-0283-SA1. Office of Fissile Materials

Disposition, Washington, DC. April.

Framatone ANP 2001. Fuel Qualification Plan. Document No. 77-5005775-02. Prepared by

Framatone ANP for U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Material Disposition, on behalf of

Duke Cogema Stone & Webster. April.

Kolman, D.G., et al. 2000. “Thermally Induced Gallium Removal from Plutonium Dioxide for

MOX Fuel Production.” Journal of Nuclear Materials 282:245-254.

LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) 1998. Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

Environmental Impact Statement Data Report - Savannah River Site. LA-UR-97-2910.

Los Alamos, NM. June.

Macfarlane, A., et al. 2001. “Plutonium Disposal, the Third Way.” Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists May/June, pp. 53-57.

NAS (National Academy of Sciences) 2000. The Spent-Fuel Standard for Disposition of Excess

Weapon Plutonium; Application to Current DOE Options. National Academy Press,

Washington, DC.

Orr, M.P. 2001. “Comparison of HEPA and Deep-Bed Sand Filters for Final Air Filtration at

MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility.” Letter report from Orr (Advanced Technologies and

Laboratories, Inc., Rockville, MD) to W.C. Gleaves (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC). Nov. 15.
3-1

3 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

3.1 General Site Description

The Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (the proposed MOX facility) and its support

facilities, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) and the Waste Solidification

Building (WSB), are proposed for construction at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s)

Savannah River Site (SRS). The SRS is located in the southwestern portion of the state of

South Carolina, as shown in Figure 3.1. The SRS is adjacent to the Savannah River, along the

state border with Georgia, approximately 20 km (12 mi) southeast of Aiken, South Carolina, and

24 km (15 mi) east of Augusta, Georgia (Arnett and Mamatey 2001b). The U.S. Government

owns the SRS, which was set aside in 1950 for the production of nuclear materials for national

defense. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, national priorities have shifted, and the site’s

priorities are now focused on waste management, environmental restoration, technology

development and transfer, and economic development. The SRS covers approximately

803 km2

 (310 mi2) in an approximately circular tract of land within Aiken, Barnwell, and

Allendale Counties in South Carolina. Public access to the SRS is limited according to DOE

security regulations. 

The proposed facility sites are located adjacent to the north-northwest edge of F-Area near the

center of the SRS (see Figure 1.2). F-Area contains facilities for chemical separations,

including F Canyon, which is the main processing facility, and waste storage, which includes 20

of the 49 active liquid high-level (radioactive) waste (HLW) tanks on the SRS.

3.2 Geology, Seismology, and Soils

This section summarizes the geology, seismology, and soil conditions of the SRS and

discusses site-specific conditions at F-Area. Geologic resources include mineral ores, fossil

fuels, and aggregate (sand and gravel) materials that can have significant economic value. The

value of soil resources depends upon the soil’s ability to grow plants. Certain soils are classified

by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, as prime

farmland or other important farmlands. The Farmland Protection Policy Act (United States

Code, Title 7, Section 4201 et seq. [7 U.S.C. 4201] et seq.) and its implementing regulations

(Code of Federal Regulations, Title 7, Part 658 [7 CFR Part 658]) require federal agencies as

part of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process to consider the extent to which

federal projects and programs contribute to the unnecessary conversion of important farmlands

to nonagricultural uses. The site’s geology and soil conditions are important in evaluating how

water and potential contaminants move through the subsurface, in evaluating erosion impacts,

and in predicting subsidence or landslides. Seismology is important in determining potential

impacts from earthquakes.
Affected Environment

3-2

Figure 3.1. Regional location of the SRS.
Affected Environment

3-3

3.2.1 Geology

The SRS is located in the Aiken Plateau portion of the Upper Atlantic Coastal Plain

approximately 32 km (20 mi) east of the Fall Line. The Fall Line is a major physiographic and

structural feature that separates the Piedmont and Coastal Plain physiographic provinces in

southeastern South Carolina (DOE 1996). Soils within the Piedmont are predominantly derived

from the weathering of bedrock. In contrast, soils within the Coastal Plain are predominantly

sediments deposited by water. The Coastal Plain sediments are located above bedrock that

consists of Paleozoic-age crystalline rock (such as granite) and Triassic-age sedimentary rock

(such as siltstone) of the Dunbarton Basin. These sediments thicken from near zero at the Fall

Line to about 1,220 m (4,000 ft) at the South Carolina coast (DCS 2003c). In general, the

sediments have a regional dip (slant of the top surface) to the southeast. The Aiken Plateau is

highly cut by narrow, steep-sided valleys separated by broad, flat areas.

Above the bedrock, the first layer of sediments at the SRS consists of about 210 m (700 ft) of

Upper Cretaceous-age quartz sand, pebbly sand, and kaolinitic clay. The next ascending layer

(known as the Tinker/Santee Formation) consists of 18 m (60 ft) of Paleocene-age clayey and

silty quartz sand, and silt (DCS 2002). Within this layer, there are occasional beds of clean

sand, gravel, clay, or carbonate. Deposits of pebbly, clayey sand, conglomerate, and Mioceneand Oligocene-age clay occur at higher elevations. This layer is noteworthy because it contains

small, discontinuous, thin calcareous sand zones (i.e., sand containing calcium carbonate) that

are potentially subject to dissolution by water. These “soft-zone” areas have the potential to

subside, causing settling of the ground surface (WSRC 2000a; DCS 2003c). These areas were

encountered in exploratory borings in F-, S-, H-, and Z-Areas of the SRS at depths between 33

and 45 m (100 and 150 ft) (DOE 1995).

The upper sediment layer in F-Area consists of primarily shallow marine quartz sand containing

sporadic clay layers (known as the Barnwell Group) (DOE 1999). This layer is about 21 m

(70 ft) thick near the western boundary of the SRS and about 52 m (170 ft) thick near the

eastern boundary.

There are 11 deep boreholes at the SRS. The closest deep borehole is located just north of an

unnamed tributary of Upper Three Runs Creek. The remaining 10 deep boreholes are not

located in the vicinity of F-Area.

In 2000, 13 exploratory borings and 63 cone penetration test (CPT) holes were used to identify

subsurface conditions at the proposed MOX facility site (DCS 2002). The CPT holes ranged

from about 19.5 m (64 ft) to 42.7 m (140 ft) below the existing grade. Some soft zones related

to past dissolution and deposition activity were identified at depth. The CPT holes were used to

define the limits of the soft zones. The planned locations of heavily loaded structures, such as

the MOX Fuel Fabrication Building and the Emergency Diesel Generator Building, were

changed to minimize the potential impact of these underlying soft zones. 

Except for some small gravel deposits, no economically viable geologic resources occur in the

vicinity of F-Area (DOE 1995).
Affected Environment

1 Peak ground acceleration is the maximum acceleration amplitude (change in velocity with respect to

time) measured by a seismic recording of an earthquake (called a strong motion accelerogram).

3-4

3.2.2 Seismology

On the basis of previous studies at the SRS

and elsewhere, there are no known faults

capable of producing an earthquake

(referred to as capable faults) within the

320-km (200-mi) radius of the site that

influence the seismicity of the region, except

for poorly constructed faults associated with

the Charleston seismic zone (DCS 2003c). 

Several faults have been identified from subsurface mapping and seismic surveys beneath the

SRS. The largest of these is the Pen Branch Fault. It passes through the SRS in a

northeast-southwest direction and is located about 5.6 km (3.5 mi) southeast of F-Area (WSRC

2000a). Because there is no evidence of movement along this fault within the last 38 million

years, the Pen Branch Fault is considered not capable. 

Two large earthquakes have occurred within

300 km (186 mi) of the SRS. The larger of

these was the Charleston earthquake of

1886. The Charleston earthquake is the

most damaging earthquake known to have

occurred in the southeastern United States

and one of the largest historic shocks in

eastern North America. This earthquake had

an estimated Modified Mercalli Intensity of X

(USGS 2001); it damaged or destroyed many

buildings in the old city of Charleston, killed

60 people, and produced structural damage

up to several hundred kilometers from its epicenter. At the SRS, this earthquake had an

estimated Richter Scale magnitude ranging from 6.5 to 7.5. The SRS area experienced an

estimated peak ground acceleration1

 of

0.10 g (1/10 the acceleration of gravity —

9.81 m/s/s [32.2 ft/s/s]) during this event

(DCS 2002).

Three earthquakes have occurred at the

SRS during recent years. They occurred on

June 8, 1985, August 5, 1988, and May 17,

1997. These earthquakes were small,

shallow events and were probably the result

of strain release near intrusive bodies or the

edges of metamorphic belts, typical of

South Carolina Piedmont type seismic

Capable Fault

A fault is described as capable if it has had

movement at or near the ground surface at least

once within the past 35,000 years, or recurrent

movement within the past 500,000 years.

Richter Scale

The magnitude of an earthquake is a measure of the

energy released during the event. It is often

measured on the Richter Scale, which runs from 0.0

upwards, with the largest earthquakes recorded

having a magnitude of 8.6. The Richter Scale is

logarithmic; a quake of magnitude 5 is 10 times

more destructive than a quake of magnitude 4.

Earthquakes greater than magnitude 6.0 can be

regarded as significant, with the likelihood of

damage and loss of life (Press and Siever 1982).

Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale

The Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) Scale is a

measure of the shaking strength of an earthquake at

different locations in the region where an earthquake

is felt. Earthquake intensities are characterized in

terms of how the shaking affects people and

buildings. The MMI Scale was originally developed in

Italy nearly a century ago and includes 12 degrees of

shaking. It was modified for use in the United States

in 1931.
Affected Environment

3-5

activity (WSRC 2000a). None of these earthquakes were associated with major faults (e.g., the

Pen Branch Fault) in the area. Rather, these earthquakes are inferred to have seismic sources

in the lower Paleozoic platform rock at a depth of about 12 km (7.5 mi) (DCS 2001a). These

earthquakes had Richter Scale magnitudes of 3.2 or less and had epicenters that were within

the SRS boundaries. Earthquakes of this magnitude are not felt, but do register on seismic

instruments (Kirkham and Rogers 1981). Seismic alarms at the SRS reactor buildings were not

triggered by any of these events (WSRC 2000a).

An earthquake with an average peak ground of 0.20 g is estimated to have an annual

probability of exceedance of 1 in 10,000 (1 × 10-4) at the SRS (DCS 2002, 2003b).

3.2.3 Soils

As discussed in Section 3.2.1, the surface soils at the SRS consist of Coastal Plain sediments. 

The surface soils are primarily sands and sandy loams with sporadic clay layers (DOE 1999). 

Currently, a stockpile of soils removed from the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF)

site on the SRS is mounded up to 15 m (50 ft) thick on the central portion of the proposed

facility site in the F-Area. These soils are similar in texture to the natural soils at the site and

would be removed from the site during construction.

The majority of soils in F-Area are classified by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural

Resources Conservation Service, as the Fuquay-Blanton-Dothan Association. These soils are

nearly level to sloping and are well drained. Soils along stream floodplains are classified as the

Troup-Pickney-Lucy Association. Both of these soil associations are subject to erosion. Slope

stability, however, has not been a significant regional issue.

The surface soils allow precipitation to drain rapidly. Because of their sandy texture and

drainage characteristics, some soil units at the SRS meet the requirements as prime farmland. 

However, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, does

not identify these areas as prime farmlands because they are not available for agricultural use.

Soil sampling was performed in the area of the proposed MOX facility and support buildings as

part of a preconstruction baseline environmental monitoring survey conducted between

September 2000 and March 2002 (SRS 2002). Fifty locations were identified for sampling by

using a statistically based sampling grid. Samples were obtained from depths of between 0 and

30.5 cm (12 in.). Samples were analyzed for metals and radionuclides. None of the metal

concentrations exceeded industrial use standards, and all of the radionuclides were well below

SRS-developed scenario-specific radionuclide limits.

3.3 Hydrology

This section discusses the hydrologic environment of the SRS and the proposed site for the

facilities. Hydrology deals with the properties, distribution, and circulation of water, particularly

surface water and groundwater. The surface waters emphasized in this section are the
Affected Environment

3-6

Savannah River and on-site streams, including treated effluent and runoff discharges to them. 

Groundwater resources are waters that occur within aquifers (e.g., water-bearing strata that can

store and transmit water in significant quantities). These resources are discussed in relation to

their use and potential contamination.

3.3.1 Surface Water

The principal surface water feature at the SRS is the Savannah River (see Figure 3.2). It

borders the southwest boundary of the site for 32 km (20 mi) (DOE 1996). Six major streams

flow through the SRS and discharge to the Savannah River: Upper Three Runs Creek, Beaver

Dam Creek, Fourmile Branch, Pen Branch, Steel Creek, and Lower Three Runs Creek. Upper

Three Runs Creek has two named tributaries, Tims Branch and Tinker Creek. Pen Branch has

one tributary, Indian Grave Branch. Steel Creek also has one tributary, Meyers Branch. None

of these bodies of water are federally designated as Wild and Scenic Rivers (DCS 2002). In

the vicinity of the F-Area, Upper Three Runs Creek has two unnamed tributaries (see

Figure 3.3) that flow to the northwest.

Two man-made lakes are located at the SRS: L Lake, which discharges to Steel Creek, and

Par Pond, which discharges to Lower Three Runs Creek (DCS 2002). There are also about

50 other small man-made ponds and about 300 natural Carolina bays (closed depressions

capable of holding water) at the SRS. The Carolina bays do not receive any direct effluent

discharge; however, they do receive storm-water runoff. 

The SRS withdraws surface water from the Savannah River mainly for industrial cooling. In

2000, the SRS withdrew about 49.7 billion L (13.1 billion gal) of water from the river. Most of

this water is returned to the river through various discharges (DOE 1999). 

The average flow in the Savannah River is 269 m3

/s (9,493 ft3/s). The 7-day low flow, 10-year

recurrence (referred to as “7Q10") flow is 123 m3

/s (4,332 ft3/s) (WSRC 2000a). This flow is the

lowest flow recorded over any 7 consecutive days within any 10-year period. Three large

upstream reservoirs (Hartwell, Richard B. Russell, and Strom Thurmond/Clarks Hill) regulate

flow in the Savannah River. This regulation is done to lessen the impacts of drought and

flooding downstream. Several communities in the area use the Savannah River as a source for

domestic water. The closest downstream water intake to the SRS is that of the Beaufort-Jasper

Water Authority at Hardeeville, South Carolina, about 130 river miles downstream of the SRS

(WSRC 2000a), which withdraws about 340 L/s (5,390 gpm) of water to service a population of

51,000 people. 

Treated effluent is discharged to the Savannah River from upstream communities and from

treatment facilities at the SRS. The average annual volume of flow discharged by the sewage

treatment facilities at the SRS is about 700 million L (185 million gal). These effluents are

released under National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits. The SRS

has five NPDES permits, two (SC0000175 and SC0044903) for industrial wastewater

discharges, two (SCR000000 and SCR1000000) for general storm-water discharges, and one

(ND0072125) for land application (DOE 1999). Permit SC0000175 regulates 76 outfalls 
Affected Environment

3-7

Figure 3.2. Locations of principal surface water features at

the SRS (Source: DCS 2002).
Affected Environment

3-8

Figure 3.3. Locations of surface water and wetlands in the F-Area

(Source: Modified from DCS 2002).
Affected Environment

3-9

(points of discharge); permit SC0044903 regulates another 7 outfalls. The 2000 compliance for

these outfalls was 99.7%. The 48 storm-water-only outfalls regulated by the site’s storm-water

permits are monitored as required. A sediment reduction and erosion plan is required for

storm-water runoff from any construction area that exceeds 2 ha (5 acres).

The Savannah River is classified as a freshwater source that is suitable for primary and

secondary contact recreation, drinking after appropriate treatment, balanced native aquatic

species development, and industrial and agricultural purposes. Primary contact means direct

contact with the water, such as while swimming. Secondary contact means having some direct

contact with the water but where swallowing is unlikely to occur, such as while fishing. Data

from the river’s monitoring locations generally indicate that South Carolina’s freshwater

standards are being met.

Runoff from the land area around F-Area drains to Upper Three Runs Creek and Fourmile

Branch (DOE 1999). Runoff from the proposed facilities area drains into unnamed tributaries of

Upper Three Runs Creek and flows to the northwest. Runoff from southern portions of the

F-Area flow to the southeast into Fourmile Branch. The location for the proposed MOX facility

is approximately 670 m (2,200 ft) southeast of Upper Three Runs Creek (WSRC 2000a). An

unnamed tributary to Upper Three Runs Creek is located within about 150 m (500 ft) of the

proposed MOX facility site (see Figure 3.3). The proposed MOX facility is located about

2,100 m (6,900 ft) north of Fourmile Branch.

Upper Three Runs Creek is a large, cool blackwater stream (i.e., a freshwater stream that has a

dark color because of organic debris and tannin-containing compounds) that flows into the

Savannah River along the western boundary of the SRS (see Figure 3.2). It drains an area of

about 544 km2

 (210 mi2) and had a mean discharge of 6.9 m3/s (245 ft3/s) near its mouth during

water year 1995 (WSRC 2000a). A water year is measured from October 1 through

September 30. The 7Q10 low-flow is about 2.8 m3

/s (100 ft3/s). The stream is about 40 km

(25 mi) long. It receives water from groundwater aquifer discharges and permitted discharges

from several areas at the SRS, including F-Area, S-Area, the Central Sanitary Waste Treatment

Facility, and treated industrial wastewater from the Chemical Waste Treatment Facility steam

condensate. The stream, however, has never received heated discharges of cooling water

from the former SRS production reactors. Flow from the sanitary wastewater discharge

averages less than 0.001 m3

/s (0.035 ft3/s). 

Fourmile Branch is a blackwater stream that has been affected by past operational practices at

the SRS (DOE 1999). Its headwaters are near the center of the SRS, and it flows

southwesterly to the Savannah River. Until June 1985, it received large volumes of hot cooling

water from the production reactor in C-Area. While the C-Area reactor was operational, the

ambient temperature in Fourmile Branch was 60C (140F) (DOE 1999). It has a watershed

area of about 54 km2

 (21 mi2) and receives permitted effluent discharges from F-Area and HArea. Average flow in the stream is approximately 1.8 m3

/s (64 ft3/s). The 7Q10 low flow at the

same location is about 0.23 m3

/s (8.2 ft3/s) (WSRC 2000a). In its lower reaches, the stream

widens and flows via braided channels through a delta. Downstream of the delta, it reforms into

one main channel, with most of the flow discharging into the Savannah River at river mile 152.1;

the remainder of the flow enters the Savannah River Swamp.
Affected Environment

3-10

Under NPDES permit SC0000175, five outfalls discharge effluent to Fourmile Branch. 

Permitted discharges include 186 basin overflows, cooling water, floor drains, steam

condensate, process wastewater, laundry effluent, storm water, sanitary treatment wastewater,

ash basin runoff, and lab drains. Within the vicinity of F-Area, there are four permitted outfalls:

F2, F3, F4, and F5. Discharge from the F2 outfall averages 0.0048 m3

/s (0.17 ft3/s). F5 has a

flow of 0.0013 m3

/s (0.046 ft3/s). Outfall F3 is not currently used, but discharges storm water. 

Outfall F4 is an “administrative outfall” (i.e., an outfall with no pollutant load). 

When the Savannah River floods, water from Fourmile Branch flows along the northern

boundary of the floodplain and joins with other streams to exit the swamp via Steel Creek

instead of flowing directly into the Savannah River. The location for the proposed facilities

would not be within the 100-year floodplain of Upper Three Runs Creek (DCS 2002). Similarly,

estimated water levels for the probable maximum flood (PMF) for Upper Three Runs Creek are

about 15 m (50 ft) below the lowest elevation in F-Area (67 m [220 ft]). 

3.3.2 Groundwater

Several aquifers occur at the SRS

(see Figure 3.4). However, no federally

designated sole-source aquifers occur there. 

The uppermost aquifer is known as the

Upper Three Runs Aquifer. It occurs at an

elevation of about 55 to 67 m (180 to 210 ft)

above mean sea level (MSL) in F-Area (DCS

2002). The Upper Three Runs Aquifer lies

on top of the leaky Gordon Confining Unit

(Green Clay aquitard), which forms a confining layer for the Gordon Aquifer (Congaree

Aquifer). The Upper Three Runs Aquifer along with the Gordon Confining Unit and the Gordon

Aquifer constitute the Floridan Aquifer System (WSRC 2000a). To the north, the Gordon

Confining Unit is not present, and the Gordon and Upper Three Runs Aquifers merge to form

the Steed Pond Aquifer. Beneath the Gordon Aquifer is the leaky Crouch Branch Confining

Unit (Ellenton aquitard), which, in turn, confines the Crouch Branch Aquifer (Cretaceous

Aquifer) (DOE 1999; WSRC 2000a). 

Groundwater in aquifers predominantly flows horizontally to points of discharge, such as

streams and swamps. In addition, some flow also occurs vertically to either underlying or

overlying groundwater aquifers. Groundwater in the Upper Three Runs Aquifer, in general,

flows horizontally and discharges to nearby streams. A small portion of the groundwater flows

vertically downward to the Gordon Aquifer. Flow in the Gordon Aquifer is mostly horizontal to

eventual stream discharge or discharge to the Savannah River, depending on location. Some of

the water also flows downward to the underlying Crouch Branch Aquifer. Water in the Crouch

Branch Aquifer primarily discharges to Upper Three Runs Creek and the Savannah River. 

Groundwater beneath the SRS flows slowly at rates that range from inches per year in the clay

aquitards that confine the aquifers to several hundred feet per year in the sandy aquifers 

Sole Source Aquifer

• An aquifer that supplies at least 50% of the

drinking water to the area above the aquifer.

• Areas that have no other water supply capable of

physically, legally, or economically providing

drinking water to local populations.
Affected Environment

3-11

Figure 3.4. Aquifers at the SRS (Source: DCS 2001a).

(WSRC 2000c). Average annual recharge to the Upper Three Runs Aquifer is 35.6 cm (14 in.)

(WSRC 1997a).

 The Crouch Branch Aquifer is an abundant and important water resource for the SRS region. 

At the SRS, groundwater is the only source of domestic water. All groundwater at the SRS is

classified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a Class II water source

(i.e., a current and potential source of drinking water). In 2000, the SRS withdrew 7.95 billion L

(2.1 billion gal) of groundwater from the Crouch Branch Aquifer in support of site operations. 

Some nearby towns, such as Aiken, South Carolina, obtain groundwater from the Crouch

Branch Aquifer, but most of the rural population draws water from the Gordon, Upper Three

Runs, or Steed Pond Aquifers. About 8 billion L/yr (2.1 billion gal/yr) of groundwater is

withdrawn from these upper aquifers within a 16-km (10-mi) radius of the site (DCS 2002).

F-Area is located on a groundwater divide between Fourmile Branch and Upper Three Runs

Creek. Near-surface groundwater in the southern portion of the F-Area primarily moves

laterally and discharges to Fourmile Creek and its tributaries to the south. In the northern

portion of the F-Area, including the proposed location of the facilities, near-surface groundwater

also primarily moves laterally, but discharges to Upper Three Runs Creek and its tributaries to

the north (WSRC 2000c). F-Area is located in a region of groundwater recharge from

precipitation.

Beneath the site for the proposed MOX facility, the Upper Three Runs Aquifer is divided into

upper and lower zones by the Tan Clay confining unit of the Dry Branch Formation (DCS 2002). 
Affected Environment

3-12

In the area near the proposed MOX facility site, the topography drops sharply to the north

toward Upper Three Runs Creek, and the water table occurs in the lower aquifer zone beneath

the Tan Clay confining unit. Water table elevation data and computer modeling indicate that

shallow groundwater flows away from the Old F-Area Seepage Basin (OFASB) in a northnorthwesterly direction and is discharged to a tributary of Upper Three Runs. A small

component of this groundwater flows beneath the westernmost corner of the proposed MOX

facility site. Depth to groundwater in the area of the OFASB and the proposed MOX facility site

ranges from 23.2 to 28.3 m (76 to 93 ft) below the present ground surface. Site preparation for

the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB would involve shallow grading and excavation to a

depth of about 12.2 m (40 ft). These activities would not encounter groundwater.

Groundwater varies in quality across the SRS. In some areas, it meets drinking water quality

standards; in other areas, such as near waste sites, it does not. The deep Crouch Branch

Aquifer is generally unaffected by site operations, except for a location near A-Area, where

trichloroethylene contamination has been found. Tritium has been reported in the Gordon

Aquifer under the Separation Areas (F- and H-Areas). The Upper Three Runs Aquifer is

contaminated with solvents, metals, and low levels of radionuclides near several SRS areas

and facilities, including the F-Area. 

Groundwater is the only source of domestic water at the SRS. The existing capacity at the SRS

is approximately 33.5 billion L/yr (8.9 billion gal/yr). Groundwater rights in South Carolina are

associated with the absolute ownership rule. Owners of land overlying a groundwater resource

are allowed to withdraw as much water as they desire; however, the state requires users who

withdraw more than 138 million L/yr (36.5 million gal/yr) to report their withdrawals. Because

the groundwater use at the SRS exceeds this value, DOE is required to report its usage to the

state (DCS 2002).

Within F-Area, four groundwater wells are used for process water. Pumping capacities for

these wells range from 1,500 to 3,800 L/min (400 to 1,000 gpm). They extract groundwater

from the Crouch Branch Aquifer. Two of these wells were formerly used for domestic water

supply. The current annual groundwater use at F-Area is 374 million L (98.8 million gal). The

estimated capacity of the wells in F-Area is about 4.2 billion L/yr (1.1 billion gal/yr) (DCS 2002).

The F-Area wells are part of a SRS A-Area domestic water loop. The combined capacity of the

F-Area and A-Area wells is about 11,360 L/min (3,000 gal/min) (DCS 2003a,b). Water

consumption in 2000 averaged 2,850 L/min (754 gal/min). Therefore, an excess capacity of

about 8,500 L/min (2,250 gal/min) exists for the A-Area loop. The A-Area loop supplies water

to both A-Area and F-Area.

Groundwater quality in F-Area is not significantly different from that of groundwater throughout

the rest of the SRS. It is abundant, usually soft, slightly acidic, and low in dissolved solids. 

F-Area groundwater can exceed drinking water standards for several contaminants. In 1999,

18% of 365 wells sampled at the General Separations and Waste Management Areas (Areas F,

E, H, S, and Z) had metal concentrations that exceeded metal drinking water standards; 10% of

471 wells sampled had organic concentrations that exceeded organic drinking water standards;

53% of 483 wells sampled exceeded drinking water standards for tritium; 40% of 372 wells
Affected Environment

3-13

sampled exceeded drinking water standards for other radionuclides; and 31% of 307 wells

sampled exceeded drinking water standards for other constituents. The sources of the

detected groundwater contamination included burial grounds, waste management facilities,

canyon buildings, seepage basins, and saltstone disposal facilities (WSRC 2000c).

Near the F-Area seepage basins and inactive process sewer line, there is widespread

radionuclide contamination. Near the F-Area Tank Farm, tritium, mercury, nitrate-nitrite (as

nitrogen), cadmium, gross alpha, and lead were detected in concentrations that exceeded

drinking water standards in one or more wells. At the Sanitary Sludge Application Site, tritium,

specific conductance, lead, and copper values exceeded their drinking water standards in one

or more wells. In addition, a subsurface plume of tritium and strontium contamination has

recently been found in F-Area. The source of groundwater contamination is from various heavy

industrial and nuclear operations over the past 50 years in the F-Area. The contaminant plume

appears to originate inside F-Area and extend beneath the MOX facility site, with movement in

a fan-like direction of groundwater flow under the proposed MOX facility site.

Contaminated groundwater also exists beneath the OFASB. The OFASB is located about

180 m (600 ft) north of F-Area, immediately adjacent to the western boundary of the proposed

MOX facility site. The OFASB has been remediated by filling the basin with clean soil, capping,

and stabilizing the contaminated soil within the basin with grout (WSRC 1997a). The results of

sampling in the compliance wells for the OFASB indicated that concentrations of several target

constituents were above drinking water standards in several wells. These contaminants

included iodine-129, nitrate, radium-226, radium-228, strontium-90, tritium, uranium (total), and

lead. There is, however, some uncertainty about whether these exceedances are related

entirely to OFASB, to upgradient F-Area facilities, or to both. A small component of the

contaminant plume from OFASB flows beneath the westernmost corner of the proposed MOX

site. Groundwater is monitored on a regular basis with 15 wells. Contaminant fate and

transport models predict that the aquifer is expected to return to an uncontaminated state

(i.e., a condition in which no maximum contaminant levels are exceeded) within 2 to 115 years,

depending on the specific contaminant.

The results of recent groundwater sampling of nine wells distributed uniformly across the

proposed MOX facility site indicate that shallow groundwater (i.e., groundwater in the Upper

Three Runs Aquifer) is contaminated (SRS 2002). Gross alpha and beta activity, tritium,

uranium, and trichloroethylene exceeded maximum contaminant levels for drinking water.

Contamination is present beneath the entire MOX site, but is greatest beneath the western

edge of the site. The contaminant plume appears to originate inside the F-Area fence and was

and is related to F-Area nuclear operations and waste management practices at OFASB.

Groundwater in the Upper Three Runs Aquifer beneath the proposed MOX facility site is

contaminated with various heavy industrial and nuclear contaminants. The proposed

construction activities will take place at least 9.1 m (30 ft) above the zone of contaminated

groundwater.
Affected Environment

2 Unless otherwise noted, the information presented in this section is based on meteorological data

collected at Bush Field in Augusta, Georgia, about 24 km (15 mi) northwest of F-Area, and

summarized by the National Climatic Data Center (NOAA 1999).

3-14

3.4 Meteorology, Emissions, Air Quality, and Noise

This section discusses the existing meteorology, current airborne pollutant emissions, air

quality, and noise environment in the vicinity of the SRS. Section 3.4.1 describes the

meteorology, or weather conditions, around the SRS. Meteorology includes the atmospheric

conditions that determine where pollutants released into the atmosphere travel and how they

are mixed with existing air and become diluted as they travel. Section 3.4.2 describes existing

air emissions from the SRS and the surrounding area. Section 3.4.3 describes regional air

quality and air quality standards. Air emissions from the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and

the WSB would combine with existing emissions to affect local and regional air quality. 

Comparing the resulting combined air quality against the standard levels provides one measure

of the facilities’ impact on air quality. Section 3.4.4 describes the existing noise environment

and applicable regulations. Noise generated by the facilities would combine with existing levels

to produce the overall noise impact.

3.4.1 Meteorology2

To provide a thorough picture of weather

conditions at a given location often requires the

use of data from several locations. Different

locations that record meteorological data may

record different parameters. Data recorded near

the site of the proposed action is generally

considered most representative of the site. 

Meteorological data for F-Area (the site of the

proposed facilities), H-Area, and Bush Field in

Augusta, Georgia, were used to describe

meteorological conditions of the affected

environment.

The climate at the SRS is characterized by short, mild winters and long, humid summers

(DCS 2002). Mountains to the north and west prevent or delay the approach of many cold air

masses (Ruffner 1985).

The annual average wind speed is 2.8 m/s (6.2 mph) at Bush Field, which is located in Augusta,

Georgia, about 24 km (15 mi) northwest of F-Area. Wind speed is highest in the spring,

averaging 3.1 m/s (7.0 mph). March has the highest monthly average wind speed of 3.4 m/s

(7.7 mph) and August the lightest, 2.3 m/s (5.1 mph). The prevailing monthly wind direction is

from the west-northwest from November through February and variable for the rest of the year. 

On the basis of observations for 1995-1999, the highest 2-minute wind speed was 20 m/s

Meteorology

Meteorology deals with weather conditions. Air

pollution meteorology emphasizes weather

conditions that determine how pollutants released

into the air travel and mix with the air. The more

important weather conditions involved in this

process include wind speed and direction and

atmospheric stability, a measure of how much

mixing is occurring in the atmosphere. 
Affected Environment

3-15

(45 mph) from the north-northwest in June 1998, and the maximum gust (5-second wind speed)

was 25 m/s (55 mph) from the north-northwest in April 1997.

A wind rose based on data from the 5-year

period 1992 through 1996 from the 62-m (200-ft)

meteorological tower in H-Area at the SRS is

presented in Figure 3.5. The wind rose indicates

no strongly predominant prevailing wind

direction, but the wind is from the northeast

about 10% of the time and from the westsouthwest over 9% of the time. Annual average

wind speeds ranged from 3.6 to 4.2 m/s (8.0 to

9.4 mph) during the 5-year period (DCS 2002).

The driest period occurs during the months of

October and November, with rainfall increasing

after then to a peak in March. A dry period

extends from April through early June, followed by a wet period from late June through early

September caused primarily by thunderstorms and showers (Ruffner 1985). Average annual

precipitation at Bush Field is 114 cm (44.7 in.). Data from 1967 to 1996 at the SRS show an

average annual precipitation of 126 cm (49.5 in.) (DCS 2002). Average monthly precipitation

ranges from 6.30 cm (2.48 in.) in November to 11.8 cm (4.65 in.) in March. The greatest

amount of precipitation recorded in a single month was 37.6 cm (14.8 in.) in October 1990, and

the least amount was in October 1953, when only trace amounts of rainfall were recorded. The

greatest amount of precipitation recorded in a 24-hour period was 21.8 cm (8.57 in.) in

October 1990. Snowfall occurs only one to three times in the winter and usually remains on the

ground for only a short period (Ruffner 1985). Annual snowfall averages 3.3 cm (1.3 in.). The

greatest monthly snowfall occurred in February 1973, with 35.6 cm (14.0 in.), and the greatest

24-hour snowfall was 34.8 cm (13.7 in.) in the same month. Freezing rain may occur one to

three times per winter (Ruffner 1985).

The average annual temperature at Bush Field is 17.5C (63.5F). At the SRS, the average

annual temperature is 17.3C (63.2F) (DCS 2002). January is the coldest month, with an

average temperature of 7.39C (45.3F), and July the warmest, averaging 26.7C (80.1F). 

Daily extreme temperatures have ranged from 42.2C (108F) in August 1983 to -18C (-1F)

in January 1985. An average of 309 freeze-free days (days with a minimum temperature

greater than 0C [32F]) occur per year. There are no freeze days from May through

September. Temperatures above 32C (90F) occur about 73 days per year, with 56 of them

occurring in June, July, and August.

Average annual relative humidity at Bush Field ranges from 83% in the early morning to 51% in

the afternoon. In July and August, the early morning relative humidity averages 90%, with

afternoons averaging 55-56%. At the SRS, comparable values for August are 97% and 50%

(DCS 2002). Dew point temperatures at Bush Field range from 1.33C (34.4F) in January to

21.0C (69.7F) in July. Heavy fog with visibility less than 0.40 km (0.25 mi) occurs on an 

Wind Rose

A wind rose summarizes wind speed and

direction graphically as a series of bars pointing

in different directions. The direction of a bar

shows the direction from which the wind blows. 

Each bar is divided into segments. Each

segment represents wind speeds in a given

range of speeds, for example, 6-8 m/s. The

length of a given segment represents the

percentage of the summarized hours that winds

blew from the indicated direction with a speed in

the given range.
Affected Environment

3-16

SRS H-Area Meteorological Tower (200-ft level)

(Period: 1992-1996)

Direction of bar indicates direction wind blows

from. Length of segment indicates percentage 

of hours wind was in a particular speed range.

Figure 3.5. Annual wind rose for the SRS (Source: Arnett

and Mamatey 2000a, Table 31).
Affected Environment

3-17

average of about 32 days per year. Heavy fog occurs throughout the year but is most likely in

November and December.

Thunderstorms, tornadoes, and hurricanes provide occasional severe weather to South

Carolina (Ruffner 1985). Thunderstorms occur on an average of 53 days per year at Bush

Field. July averages 12.6 thunderstorm days, December 0.7. More than 70% of the

thunderstorms occur in the four-month period from May through August. They are most

common in the summer months, but the more violent storms generally occur along active cold

fronts in spring (Ruffner 1985). Hail with thunderstorms is infrequent and occurs about once

every 2 years on the average (DCS 2002).

Tornadoes are rare in South Carolina. Most that do occur are during the period March through

June. April is the peak month for tornadoes, with a smaller peak in August and September

(Ruffner 1985). For the 49-year period of 1950-1998, an average of 11 tornadoes per year

occurred in South Carolina (Storm Prediction Center 2001). Between 1880 and 1995, a total of

17 significant tornadoes were reported in Aiken and Barnwell Counties, South Carolina, and

Burke County, Georgia. Nine tornadoes have caused damage on the SRS, one with estimated

wind speeds as high as 67 m/s (150 mph). None have caused damage to buildings on the SRS

(DCS 2002).

Tropical storms or hurricanes affect South Carolina about once every 2 years. Most do little

damage and affect only the costal areas, decreasing in intensity as they move inland. Those

that do move far inland can cause considerable flooding (Ruffner 1985). Thirty-six hurricanes

caused damage in South Carolina between 1700 and 1989, and the interval between them has

ranged from 2 months to 27 years. About 80% have occurred in August and September.

Between 1886 and the present, 17 storms (10 hurricanes and 7 tropical storms) have passed

within 64 km (40 mi) of the proposed MOX facility site. All the hurricanes had been downgraded

to tropical storms or tropical depressions before reaching SRS (Weather Site, Inc. 2003). The

only hurricane-force winds measured at the SRS were associated with Hurricane Gracie on

September 29, 1959, when wind speeds of 34 m/s (75 mph) were measured at F-Area

(DCS 2002).

3.4.2 Emissions

The SRS is classified as a “major source” (of airborne pollutant emissions) under the Clean Air

Act (CAA), with potential emissions of more than 227,000 kg/yr (250 tons/yr). The SRS has

construction and operating permits from the South Carolina Department of Health and

Environmental Control (SCDHEC), Bureau of Air Quality, for about 199 point sources. 

Thirty-eight of these sources are permitted for air toxics. During 2000, 137 sources operated at

least part of the year, and 62 were on cold standby or under construction.
Affected Environment

3 “Criteria” air pollutants are common air pollutants for which federal standards have been established.

3-18

Significant sources of criteria air pollutants3 or their precursors and toxic air emissions at the

SRS include coal-fired powerhouse boilers (two in A-Area and three in H-Area) and No. 2

oil-fired package steam generators (two in K-Area and two portable units). Other facilities

emitting nonradiological emissions include 128 pieces of equipment powered by diesel engines,

the Defense Waste Processing Facility, groundwater air strippers, the Consolidated Incineration

Facility, and controlled burning. During 2000, the SRS continued to be in compliance with

permitted emission rates and special conditions (Arnett and Mamatey 2001b).

SRS point source emissions for 1999 are compared with point source and total emissions within

the four surrounding counties — Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell Counties in South Carolina and

Burke County in Georgia — in Table 3.1. The SRS contributed less than 6% of the four-county

point source emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), volatile organic

compounds (VOCs), and particulate matter less than 10 m and less than 2.5 m in diameter,

(PM10 and PM2.5, respectively) in 1999. The SRS contributed about 17% of the four-county area

point source emission of carbon monoxide

(CO). However, CO is generated primarily

by mobile sources, and the SRS emitted

only about 0.20% of the total point and

nonpoint CO for the four-county area. 

Arnett and Mamatey (2001a) provide an

inventory of about 200 toxic air pollutant

emissions from the SRS for 1999. 

Table 3.2 lists the emissions that exceeded

0.9 MT (1 ton) per year.

3.4.3 Air Quality

The SRS is located in the Augusta-Aiken

Interstate Air Quality Control Region

(AQCR) #53, which comprises 6 counties in

South Carolina and 13 in Georgia

(see Figure 3.6) (EPA 1972). Both South

Carolina and Georgia have adopted State

Ambient Air Quality Standards (SAAQS)

identical to the federal National Ambient Air

Quality Standards (NAAQS) for the criteria

pollutants (see adjacent text box). In

addition, South Carolina has retained the

annual standard for total suspended

particulates (TSP) and adopted an

additional standard for gaseous fluorides

(SCDHEC 2000; GDNR 2000).

Air Quality Terms

Particulate matter (PM) is dust, smoke, other solid

particles, and liquid droplets in the air. The size of

the particulate is important and is measured in

micrometers (m). A micrometer is 1 millionth of a

meter (0.000039 in.).

Total suspended particulate (TSP) is PM with a

diameter less than 30 m. PM10 is PM with a

diameter less than 10 m and PM2.5 is PM 

with a diameter less than 2.5 m. The

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

has set standards for PM10 and PM2.5 designed 

to protect human health and welfare.

Criteria pollutants are pollutants for which the EPA

has prepared documents detailing their health and

welfare impacts and set standards specifying the air

concentrations that avoid these impacts. The criteria

pollutants are sulfur oxides, nitrogen dioxide, carbon

monoxide, PM10, PM2.5, lead, and ozone.

Volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are organic

vapors in the air that can react with other substances,

principally nitrogen oxides, to form ozone. The

reactions are energized by sunlight.

Background is a concentration value, usually based

on measured pollutant data, that accounts for the

impacts of emission sources not included explicitly in

the air quality model.
Affected Environment

3-19

Table 3.1. Estimated emissions from four counties around

the SRS and SRS point sources in 1999a

SRS emissions

Four-county area

emissions (tons/yr)b

As percentage (%)

of four-county area

Pollutantc,d Point Total

Total

(tons/yr) Point Total

CO 712 62,300 124 17 0.20

NOx 6,800 17,700 337 5.0 1.9

SO2 14,600 15,400 346 2.4 2.3

PM10 1,250 1,747 54.5 4.4 3.1

PM2.5 696 1,120 37.9 5.4 3.4

VOCs 1,770 8,330 7.45 0.42 0.089

a

Four SRS border counties: Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale, South

Carolina; and Burke, Georgia. “Point” values are for all point sources. 

“Totals” are for all sources, including point, area, and mobile.

b

To convert tons to kilograms, multiply by 907.2.

c

The reference does not include lead. Lead emissions have been

lowered by reductions in the lead content of gasoline. 

d

Ozone is not emitted directly and is not listed in this table. It is formed

in the air by chemical reactions involving VOCs and NOx.

Source: EPA (2001).

South Carolina is currently designated as

being in attainment (i.e., in compliance with

standards) for all criteria pollutants

(40 CFR 81.341). Georgia is designated as

in attainment except for the 13-county area

around Atlanta, which is designated as

nonattainment for the 1-hour ozone standard

(40 CFR 81.311). A list of the ambient

standards and the high and low ambient

concentrations at air quality monitoring

stations within 80 km (50 mi) of the proposed

MOX facility site is shown in Table 3.3. The

regulations for Prevention of Significant

Deterioration (PSD) of air quality

(40 CFR 52.21) place limits on the total 

National Ambient Air Quality

Standards (NAAQS)

The EPA sets NAAQS for criteria pollutants (sulfur

oxides, PM10, PM2.5, carbon monoxide, nitrogen

dioxide, lead, and ozone). The primary NAAQS

specify maximum ambient (outdoor air) concentrations of the criteria pollutants that would protect public

health with an adequate margin of safety. Secondary

NAAQS specify maximum concentrations that would

protect public welfare. If both a primary and a

secondary standard exist, the lower (more restrictive)

standard is normally used for assessment purposes. 

Some of the NAAQS for an averaging time of

24 hours or less allow the standard values to be

exceeded a limited number of times per year.
Affected Environment

3-20

Table 3.2. Toxic air pollutant

emissions at the SRS in 1999

Pollutanta

CAS

numberb

Emissions

(tons/yr)c

Benzene 71-43-2 4.16

Chloroform 67-66-3 6.30

Formaldehyde 50-0-0 1.28

Formic acid 64-18-6 3.45

Hexane 110-54-3 1.14

Hydrochloric acid 7647-1-0 1.73

Hydrogen sulfide 7783-6-4 5.71

Methoxychlor 67-56-1 1.46

Nitric acid 7697-37-2 1.04

Sodium hydroxide 1310-73-2 1.32

Tetrachloroethylene 127-18-4 2.17

Toluene 108-88-3 1.87

Trichloroethylene 79-1-6 5.53

Xylenes 1330-20-7 4.96

a

Only pollutants with emissions of more than

1 ton are listed.

b

Chemical Abstract Services (CAS) number

— a number assigned to a specific chemical by

CAS. The number avoids the ambiguity

associated with multiple names for the same

chemical and also avoids problems associated

with name differences between languages.

c

To convert tons to kilograms, multiply by

907.2.

Source: Arnett and Mamatey (2001a,

Table 45).

increase in ambient pollution levels above established baseline levels for SO2, NO2, and PM10. 

Under those regulations, the allowable increases are smallest in Class I areas (national parks

and wilderness areas). The rest of the country is subject to PSD II increments. States can

choose a less stringent set of Class III increments, but no states have chosen to do so. The

Cape Romain National Wildlife Refuge, the PSD Class I area closest to the SRS, is about

160 km (100 mi) to the east. The facilities at the SRS have not been required to obtain PSD

permits (DCS 2002).
Affected Environment

3-21

Figure 3.6. Air quality control regions, South Carolina and Georgia.
3-22

Affected Environment

Table 3.3. Ambient air quality standards and range of pollutant

levels in the vicinity of the SRS

Pollutant

Averaging

time

Ambient

standard

(g/m3)b,c

Concentrations

(g/m3)

Locations

(city, county, state) Years

SO2 3 hours 1,300d 180 –, Barnwell, SC 1999

58 –, Barnwell, SC 1997

 24 hours 365e 55 Augusta, Richmond, SC 1997-2000

13 –, Barnwell, SC 1997-1998

 Annual 80e 5.2f –, Aiken, SC/

Augusta, Richmond, GA

1999/

1997-2000

2.6f –, Aiken, SC/

–, Barnwell, SC

1996-1998/

1997-2001

NO2 Annual 100g 9.4 –, Aiken, SC 1997-2000

5.6 –, Barnwell, SC 1999, 2001

CO 1 hour 40,000e –h –

 8 hours 10,000e –h –

O3 1 hour 235g 233i Augusta, Richmond, SC/

–, Edgefield, SC 1998/1998

165i –, Edgefield, SC 2001

 8 hoursj 157g 194k Augusta, Richmond, SC 1998

145k –, Barnwell, SC 2001

PM10 24 hours 150g 165i –, Lexington, SC 1997

36i –, Aiken, SC 2001

 Annual 50g 29 –, Lexington, SC 1999

17 –, Aiken, SC 2001
3-23

Affected Environment Table 3.3. Continued Pollutant Averaging time Ambient standard (g/m3)b,c Concentrations (g/m3) Locations (city, county, state) Years PM2.5 24 hoursj 65g 42l Augusta, Richmond, GA 1999 17l –, Colleton, SC 2000

 Annualj 15g 19.9 Augusta, Richmond, GA 1999

11.2 –, Colleton, SC 2000

Pb Calendar 

 Quarter

1.5g 0.04 

0.00 

–, Lexington, SCMultiple

1999

1997-2001

TSPm Annual 75e 41n –, Aiken, SC 1998

26n –, Lexington, SC 2001

aBased on available data for 1997 through 2001 unless otherwise noted. The vicinity of the SRS was taken to be the area

within 80 km (50 mi) of the proposed MOX facility and includes all or part of Aiken, Bamberg, Barnwell, Colleton, Edgefield,

Hampton, Lexington, and Orangeburg Counties in South Carolina and Burke, Columbia, Jenkins, Richmond, and ScrevenCounties in Georgia. The listed concentrations are not always directly comparable to the ambient standards. Except for 13

counties around Atlanta, Georgia, that are nonattainment for 1-hour O3, both South Carolina and Georgia have been designated

as in attainment for all implemented standards. Footnote b summarizes criteria for determining standard attainment.

bUnless otherwise noted, South Carolina and Georgia SAAQS are the same as NAAQS. South Carolina has additional

standards for gaseous fluorides that are not shown because they are not emitted by the proposed facility.

Footnotes continued on next page.
3-24

Affected Environment

Table 3.3. Continued

cMethods of determining whether standards are attained depend on pollutant and averaging time. The 3-hour and 24-hour

SO2 standards and the 1-hour and 8-hour CO standards are not to be exceeded more than once per calendar year. The annual

TSP, SO2, and NO2 standards are not to be exceeded in any calendar year. The lead standard is not to be exceeded in any

calendar quarter. The 1-hour ozone (O3) standard is attained when the expected number of days per calendar year with

maximum hourly concentrations above the standard is less than or equal to one and applies only in areas designatednonattainment when the 8-hour O3 standard was adopted in July 1977. The 8-hour O3 standard is attained when the 3-year

average of the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour concentrations is less than or equal to the standard. The 24-hour

PM10 standard is attained when the expected number of days per calendar year with a 24-hour average concentration above the

standard is less than or equal to one. In areas that meet certain criteria, attainment of the 24-hour PM10 standard is based on

having the 3-year average of the 99th percentile 24-hour averages less than or equal to the standard. The annual PM10 standard

is met when the 3-year average of the annual means is less than or equal to the standard. The 24-hour PM2.5 standard is met

when the 3-year average of the 98th percentile 24-hour averages is less than or equal to the standard. The annual PM2.5 standard

is met when the 3-year average of the annual means is less than or equal to the standard.

dSecondary (welfare-based) standard.ePrimary (health-based) standard.fYears 2000 and 2001 data for Aiken County not available; years 1999 and 2000 data for Richmond County not available.gPrimary and secondary standard.hNo CO data in vicinity of SRS for 1997-2001.iSecond highest concentration.jNAAQS only; implementation of the standard has been delayed, and states have not developed attainment plans.kFourth highest concentration.l98th percentile concentration.mSouth Carolina standard.nBased on South Carolina data for 1998-2001.

Sources: 40 CFR 50; SCDHEC (2002a-d); EPA (2002, 2003a).
Affected Environment

4 Ldn is a 24-hour average sound level that gives additional weight to noise that occurs during the night

(10:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.).

5 dBA is A-weighted decibels, a unit of weighted sound-pressure level measured by specific methods

and using the A-weighting specified by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). It

duplicates the ear’s sensitivity to sound.

6 For sounds that vary with time, Leq is the steady sound level that would contain the same total sound

energy as the time-varying sound over a given time.

3-25

3.4.4 Noise

The Noise Control Act of 1972 and subsequent amendments (Quiet Communities Act of 1978,

42 U.S.C. 2901-4918) delegate the authority to regulate noise to the states. However,

South Carolina and Georgia do not have noise regulations. The Aiken County Zoning and

Development Standards Ordinance limits noise levels by frequency band (see Table 3.4). The

EPA guideline recommends an Ldn

4

 of 55 dBA5 to protect the public from the effects of noise in

typically quiet outdoor and residential areas (EPA 1974). To protect the general population

against hearing loss, the EPA guideline recommends an Leq(24)6

 (Leq averaged over 24 hours) 

Table 3.4. Aiken County maximum

allowable noise levelsa

Nighttimeb sound pressure

level at property

boundary (dB)

Frequency

band (Hz) Nonresidential Residential

20-75 69 65

75-150 60 50

150-300 56 43

300-600 51 38

600-1,200 42 33

1,200-2,400 40 30

2,400-4,800 38 28

4,800-10,000 35 20

a

This table gives nighttime sound pressure

levels (SPLs). Allowable daytime levels are

generally louder than nighttime levels. 

b

Nighttime: 9:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.

Source: DOE (1996).
Affected Environment

3-26

of 70 dBA or less over a 40-year period. The Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal

Interagency Committee on Urban Noise have issued land use compatibility guidelines indicating

that yearly day-night average sound levels (Ldn) of less than 65 dBA are compatible with

residential land uses and that, if a community determines it is necessary, levels up to 75 dBA

may be compatible with residential uses and transient lodgings (but not mobile homes) if such

structures incorporate suitable noise reduction features (14 CFR 150, Appendix A).

Major noise sources in active areas at the SRS include industrial facilities and equipment such

as cooling systems, transformers, engines, vents, paging systems; construction and materialshandling equipment; and vehicles. Outside of active operational areas, vehicles and trains

generate noise. Most industrial facilities at the SRS are located far enough from the site

boundary that the associated noise levels at the boundary would be barely distinguishable from

background levels.

Noise impacts to the general public arise primarily from transportation of people and materials

to and from the site by vehicles, helicopters, and trains (DCS 2002). A noise survey was

conducted in the SRS area in 1989 and 1990 (NUS 1990). Seven off-site locations were

selected along major routes used by SRS employees entering and leaving the site. Summer

Ldn levels ranged from 62 to 72 dBA; winter Ldn levels ranged from 51 to 70 dBA. Summer 24-hr

Leq levels ranged from 60 to 67 dBA; winter values ranged from 54 to 65 dBA.

3.5 Ecology

This section describes the plant and animal

resources at the SRS, with emphasis on those

components that could be affected by the

construction and operation of the proposed MOX

facility and associated Pit Disassembly

Conversion Facility/Waste Storage Building

(PDCF/WSB) complex. Particular attention is

given to species and special habitats protected

by the federal government under the Endangered Species Act, as well as species of special

concern listed by the states of South Carolina (Aiken and Barnwell counties) and Georgia

(Burke County). In addition to federal and state regulations, DOE protects plants, animals, and

Carolina bays in DOE Research Set-Aside Areas. Unless otherwise cited, the information

presented in this section has been abstracted from DCS (2002).

3.5.1 Terrestrial

This section describes the native plant communities and wildlife species at the SRS and in the

F-Area where the proposed facilities would be constructed. Wildlife habitats, wildlife

management areas, and ecological research sites are also described.

Ecological Resources

Ecological resources include plant and animal

species and the habitats on which they depend

(e.g., forests, fields, wetlands, streams, and

ponds).
Affected Environment

3-27

3.5.1.1 Vegetation

At the time land for the SRS was purchased by the government in 1950, about 40% of the site

was old field, crop land, or developed by the former town of Ellenton. The remainder of the

area was forested (WSRC 1994). As the DOE developed the SRS, the vegetation changed

over time. Many of the old fields reverted back to forested areas. In addition, this increase in

wooded area also resulted from timber and watershed protection management directed by the

U.S. Forest Service (WSRC 1994; DOE 1999). 

In 1972, the entire SRS was designated as the nation’s first National Environmental Research

Park (NERP). Thirty specified areas within the SRS are designated as DOE Research SetAside Areas that are reserved for ecological research. These areas total 5,672 ha

(14,005 acres), or about 7% of the SRS (Davis and Janecek 1997), and are selected and

managed by the Savannah River Ecology Laboratory (SREL) (WSRC 1994). They serve as

control areas, providing a context for comparisons with other areas on the SRS that may be

affected by human activities. The set-aside areas are located in each of the major vegetation

communities characteristic of the SRS (DOE 2000b). The closest set-aside area to the

proposed facilities is Set-Aside Area No. 13 (Organic Soils), located about 500 m (1,640 ft)

northwest of the proposed facilities. Most of this 310.8-ha (767.3-acre) area is located on the

north side of Upper Three Runs Creek. Set-Aside Area No. 15 (Whipple/Office of Health and

Environmental Research [OHER] Study Site) is located about 1.8 km [1.1 mi] northeast of the 

proposed facilities, and three other set-asides (No. 1 [Field 3-412/Ellenton Bay], No. 6 [BeechHardwood Forest], and No. 14 [Mature Hardwood Forest]) are located more than 3.4 km

(2.1 mi) southwest of the facility area. Upper Three Runs Creek borders or runs through these

set-aside areas (Davis and Janecek 1997). 

In June 1999, the DOE designated a 4,055-ha (10,012-acre) area of the SRS as a biological

and wildlife refuge. This area, known as the Crackerneck Wildlife Management Area (WMA)

and Ecological Preserve (Crackerneck WMA), is located in the western portion of the SRS. It is

bordered by a narrow buffer zone along South Carolina State Route 125 and by Upper Three

Runs Creek. The South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (SCDNR) manages this

area (DOE 2000b). 

Currently, nearly 90% of the land (72,900 ha [180,000 acres]) at the SRS is forested with

upland pine, hardwood, mixed (pine and hardwood), and bottomland hardwood forests. The

major upland and wetland forest types at the SRS (including major species and coverage) are

listed in Table 3.5. Pine forests cover about 65% of the upland areas of the SRS (DOE 1999). 

These pine forests are managed by the U.S. Forest Service and have displaced much of the

upland hardwood communities (DOE 1991a). Natural resource management is actively

practiced on more than 80% of the SRS, including about 73,710 ha (182,000 acres) of

commercial forests and 4,860 ha (12,000 acres) of nonforest lands (DOE 2000b; WSRC 1994).

Approximately 5% of land at the SRS is developed with industrial and transportation

infrastructure and grassland, old fields, or shrub vegetation (WSRC 1994). This land is

generally classified as “facility.” The industrial and transportation development includes

administrative and production facilities, electrical substations, roads, and railroads and occupies
Affected Environment

3-28

Table 3.5. Major forest types at the SRS

Forest type Canopy species Midstory species

Coverage

[hectares

(acres)]

Upland Forests

 Dry longleaf

 pine-scrub oak

Longleaf pine (sparse) Oaks, black cherry, common

persimmon (continuous)

3,058

(7,551)

 Longleaf pine Longleaf pine, loblolly pine,

water oak

Black cherry, common

persimmon, sand hickory,

sassafras, water oak

15,533

(38,353)

 Mixed yellow pine Loblolly, slash and/or

longleaf pines

American holly, black cherry,

common persimmon, sand

hickory, sassafras, water oak,

sweetgum, red maple, redbay,

sweetbay magnolia

27,020

(66,716)

 Southern mixed

 hardwood

Oaks (white, scarlet, laurel,

post, southern red, turkey,

bluejack, blackjack),

hickories (mockernut,

pignut), yellow poplar,

blackgum, red maple,

sweetgum, white ash, pines

(loblolly, longleaf)

Sparkleberry, vaccinium,

American holly, black cherry,

mockernut hickory, white ash,

sassafras, dogwood, Georgia

hackberry

12,805

(31,618)

Wetland Forests

 Bottomland Oaks (water, laurel, overcup,

willow), southern magnolia,

sweetgum, elms (American,

winged), red maple, yellow

poplar, river birch, tag alder,

waxmyrtle, loblolly pine

American holly, redbay,

sweetbay magnolia, ironwood,

southern hackberry, red

buckeye, honeysuckle

12,531

(30,941)

 Southern swamp Bald cypress, water tupelo,

sweetgum

Ashes (water, red), sourgum,

red maple, American elm

4,285

(10,581)

Total: 75,232

(185,760)

Sources: DOE (1991a, 2000b); Workman and McLeod (1990); WSRC (1994).

about 1,587 ha (3,919 acres). Vegetated areas associated with the developed areas are

actively maintained (lawns and landscaped areas). These associated vegetated areas occur

primarily on power line rights-of-way, roadsides, some borrow pits, some burial sites, and in

forest openings and occupy about 1,345 ha (3,322 acres) (DOE 2000b). Unless managed,

most scrub-shrub areas will develop into forest within 5 to 10 years (WSRC 1994). The

vegetated areas also include permanent upland meadows, scrub-shrub areas, and SRS wildlife

food plots. Controlled burns of 6,075 to 7,290 ha (15,000 to 18,000 acres) of pine-dominated

uplands are conducted annually to reduce flammable materials and to enhance the

development of fire-tolerant plant communities and improve wildlife habitat. Additionally,

improved planting techniques and seedling survival have resulted in conversion of significant
Affected Environment

3-29

areas of loblolly and slash pine forests to young longleaf pine forests over the past 10 years

(DOE 2000b).

Habitats in the 16.7-ha (41.3-acre) area proposed for the MOX facility include pine

(or evergreen) forest (5.9 ha [14.6 acres]), mixed pine (combination of both pine and deciduous

[hardwood] species, with pine trees predominant) (1.4 ha [3.4 acres]), mixed deciduous (0.3 ha

[0.8 acre]), grassland (1.6 ha [3.9 acres]), “facility” (developed) (3.6 ha [9.0 acres]), old field

(fields formerly used for agriculture but now undergoing natural succession) (1.1 ha

[2.7 acres]), spoils (2.8 ha [6.8 acres]), and deciduous (hardwood trees, essentially the

southern mixed hardwood forest type of Table 3.5) (0.04 ha [0.1 acre]) (see Figure 3.7). The

grassland habitat occurs within the transmission line right-of-way that crosses the proposed

MOX site. The spoils habitat originated from the excavation for the Actinide Packaging and

Storage Facility (APSF) in the F-Area. Although soil was excavated, the APSF was not

constructed. This area is covered primarily with various grass and forb species. The standard

seed mixture used to establish a plant cover on such areas includes grass and forb species

such as unhulled and hulled common Bermuda grass, browntop millet, and unscarified

Appalachian lespedeza (Bowling 2001).

Habitats in the 9.1-ha (22.5-acre) area proposed for the PDCF and WSB include pine forest

(0.8 ha [2.0 acres]), deciduous (2.5 ha [6.2 acres]), and facility (5.8 ha [14.3 acres])

(see Figure 3.7).

Forested and facilities areas primarily surround the immediate project area (see Figure 3.7). 

The forested areas are dominated by loblolly pine with some mixed hardwoods

(e.g., sweetgum, turkey oak, and water oak). The sparse understory and shrub layers consist

of sparkleberry, dogwood, jasmine, and wax myrtle. Also present are areas dominated by a

closed canopy of longleaf pine with sweetgum and willow oak as minor components. 

Vegetation along the unnamed tributaries to Upper Three Runs Creek include loblolly pine,

sweetgum, red oak, and sycamore in the canopy, with black cherry, dogwood, and young

individuals of the canopy tree species in the understory (Wike and Nelson 2000). The

grassland habitat associated with the transmission line also occurs in this area. The OFASB

area located west of the proposed MOX facility site also contains a vegetated cover similar to

that over the spoils area within the proposed MOX facility site.

3.5.1.2 Wildlife

Among the numerous wildlife species reported from the SRS are 44 species of amphibians,

59 species of reptiles, 258 species of birds, and 54 species of mammals. The SRS has among

the highest biodiversity of herpetofauna (reptiles and amphibians) in the United States because

of the area’s warm, moist climate and its wide variety of habitats (DOE 2000b). Snakes that

could occur in the project area include eastern hognose snake, eastern garter snake, eastern

coachwhip, scarlet king snake, rat snake, corn snake, and pine snake. Lizards could include

the green anole, southern fence lizard, several species of skinks, and the eastern glass lizard. 

Amphibians could include the southern toad and oak toad. The southern leopard frog, bullfrog,

and other frogs and toads could occur in the small drainage basins near the site, while 
Affected Environment

3-30

Figure 3.7. Current land cover in the area of the project site.
Affected Environment

3-31

amphibians such as tree frogs and salamanders could occur within the unnamed tributary to

Upper Three Runs Creek (Conant 1958; Mayer and Wike 1997).

Bird species at the SRS that are very common to abundant include black vulture, eastern

kingbird, acadian flycatcher, common crow, northern mockingbird, blue-gray gnatcatcher, rubycrowned kinglet, red-eyed vireo, northern parula, black-throated warbler, ovenbird, northern

cardinal, savannah sparrow, white-throated sparrow, and song sparrow (WSRC 1994). As

many as 17,000 ducks and coots are winter migrants at the SRS. Most of these congregate on

Par Pond, L Lake, and other large ponds and Carolina bays (DOE 1991a). Wood ducks are the

only waterfowl species that commonly breed on the SRS (WSRC 1994). Several mammal

species can be found in old field/clearcuts, pine plantations, and scrub oak/longleaf pine

habitats (these are the generalized habitat types that occur within the vicinity of the facilities). 

These species include southern short-tailed shrew, Virginia opossum, golden mouse, oldfield

mouse, raccoon, eastern cottontail, and white-tailed deer. Other mammals that can occur

within two of these habitat types include least shrew, striped skunk, raccoon, eastern harvest

mouse, gray and fox squirrels, southeastern shrew, spotted skunk, feral hog, and gray fox. 

Several bat species also occur in one or more of these habitats (WSRC 1994).

Populations of white-tailed deer, feral hogs, and beaver are controlled through selective harvest

strategies (DOE 2000b), which has included public hunts for white-tailed deer and feral hogs

(Noah 1995; DOE 1996). The deer herd is estimated at about 3,000, with harvests averaging

about 1,580 animals per hunting season. The feral hog population now exceeds 2,500 (DOE

2000b). The feral hogs originated from free-ranging domestic swine abandoned after resident

farmers were relocated in 1952. They now occur over about 70% of the SRS (WSRC 1994). 

The hogs are trapped wherever they are found. Beavers are trapped where they compromise

the safety or operations of roads, railroads, culverts, or research plots, or where they are

causing significant resource damage. Increasing numbers of coyotes and armadillos may

require the SRS to initiate control measures for these species in the future (DOE 2000b). Other

commercial and recreational wildlife resources at the SRS are not exploited over most of the

SRS because of restricted access and safety concerns. These species include bobcat, gray

and red fox, mink, muskrat, Virginia opossum, river otter, eastern cottontail, raccoon, fox and

gray squirrels, waterfowl, northern bobwhite, mourning dove, wild turkey, common snipe, and

American woodcock (WSRC 1994). Hunting has been allowed for most of these species

(except for bobcat, foxes, river otter, and fox squirrel) at the Crackerneck WMA (SCDNR

2000/2001). However, since late September 2001, hunting has been closed to the general

public in this area. A controlled hunt was later allowed to help regulate the SRS deer herd.

The developed areas of the SRS include buildings, parking lots, infrastructure, and landscaped

areas. Nevertheless, a number of wildlife species have been reported from these areas. A

total of 43 species have been reported from the F-Area, including 4 species of amphibians,

12 species of reptiles, 18 species of birds, and 9 species of mammals. Several bird species are

abundant: rock dove, common crow, northern mockingbird, American robin, and European

starling. Common mammals include Virginia opossum, eastern cottontail, house mouse, feral

cat, striped skunk, and raccoon. The densities of most wildlife species are higher in

undeveloped areas then in developed areas. Exceptions include the house sparrow, house

finch, rock dove, house mouse, Norway rat, and feral cat. Nevertheless, the use of developed
Affected Environment

3-32

areas of the SRS by wildlife is more common than previously reported, and these areas can be

expected to contribute to the site’s environmental diversity (Mayer and Wike 1997).

3.5.2 Aquatic

Six major streams and several associated tributaries flow through the SRS, and the Savannah

River bounds the southwestern border of the SRS. More than 50 man-made ponds also occur

at the SRS (DOE 1999). The two largest are L Lake (405 ha [1,000 acres]), which discharges

into Steel Creek, and Par Pond (1,069 ha [2,640 acres]), which discharges into Lower Three

Runs Creek (Section 3.3.1). These lakes do not have any direct interactions with the F-Area. 

Altogether, about 2,000 ha (4,940 acres) of open water occurs at the SRS (WSRC 1994).

At least 81 fish species have been identified at the SRS (DOE 2000b). Sport and commercial

fishing on the SRS is allowed only within the Crackerneck WMA. Extensive fishing also occurs

in the Savannah River. Commercial fish species include the American shad, hickory shad, and

striped bass. Recreational species include largemouth bass, chain pickerel, crappie, bream,

sunfish, and catfish (DOE 1996; WSRC 1994, 1997b). The man-made ponds support

populations of bass and sunfish (DOE 1999).

Some SRS surface waters are classified as Category I resources. These waters are defined by

the U.S. Department of the Interior as unique and irreplaceable on a national or eco-regional

basis. These areas would include Carolina bays and cypress-tupelo swamps. Any surface

waters supporting species of concern and areas containing high-quality wetlands or headwater

streams (e.g., portions of Upper Three Runs Creek) would also be considered for Category I

status (DOE 2000b).

The F-Area is drained by Upper Three Runs Creek and Fourmile Branch (see Figure 3.3). 

Upper Three Runs Creek is the most pristine stream at the SRS and would be considered a

Category I resource. It contains more than 550 species of aquatic insects and supports about

60 fish species. The more abundant fish species include bowfin, American eel, redfin pickerel,

dusky shiner, yellowfin shiner, coastal shiner, flat bullhead, tadpole madtom, mosquitofish,

redbreast sunfish, warmouth, spotted sunfish, and blackbanded darter. More than 10 other fish

species are common in Upper Three Runs Creek (Bennett and McFarlane 1983). Upper Three

Runs Creek is an important spawning area for blueback herring and provides seasonal nursery

habitat for American shad, striped bass, and other Savannah River species (DOE 1999). This

stream also appears to be an important spawning site for the spotted sucker (WSRC 1994).

About 48 fish species have been collected from Fourmile Branch. Those in the stream’s lower

reaches include species common to the Savannah River. The only abundant fish species

collected from Fourmile Branch are mosquitofish, redbreast sunfish, and spotted sunfish. 

Common species include longnose gar, bowfin, golden shiner, bluehead chub, creek chub,

creek chubsucker, pirate perch, and brook silverside (Bennett and McFarlane 1983).

Water bodies in the vicinity of the proposed facilities include unnamed tributaries to Upper

Three Runs Creek (see Figure 3.3) and small drainages and detention basins associated with
Affected Environment

3-33

permitted discharge outfalls. Macroinvertebrate (e.g., aquatic insects, snails, clams, and

worms) and fish surveys indicate that Upper Three Runs Creek is unaffected by SRS NPDESpermitted discharges (Specht and Paller 2001).

3.5.3 Wetlands

More than 20% of the SRS consists of wetlands,

including open waters. Most wetlands on the

SRS are associated with floodplains, streams,

and impoundments. Wetland types on the SRS

include bottomland hardwoods, southern swamp

(cypress-tupelo), freshwater marshes, and

Carolina bays. Areal coverage of forested

wetlands is given in Table 3.5. The freshwater

marshes total 1,380 ha (3,407 acres), and the

Carolina bays total about 785 ha (1,939 acres) (DOE 2000b). The conditions of many wetlands

at the SRS are similar to conditions that existed before the government assumed control of the

site, except for those wetlands along stream corridors and adjacent portions of the Savannah

River swamp that were degraded by thermal releases from reactor operations. These areas

have been recovering since cessation of cooling water releases (WSRC 1994).

Over 300 Carolina bays (closed depressions capable of holding water) occur on the SRS (DOE

2000b). Carolina bays are characterized by their elliptical or ovoid shape, with a

northwest/southeast orientation of their long axis (WSRC 1994). The Carolina bays on the SRS

have remained largely undisturbed since 1950 and thus are valuable examples of these

regional wetlands (Schalles et al. 1989). The median size of the Carolina bays is about 0.8 ha

(2.0 acres), and only 15 exceed 4 ha (10 acres). The Carolina bays have characteristics similar

to other wetlands (e.g., shallow marshes, herbaceous bogs, shrub bogs, or swamp forests). 

They also have a xeric to hydric (dry to moist) gradient from their peripheral sand rim to the

center depression (Schalles et al. 1989). More than 135 species of plants have been identified

from these wetlands. Most are dominated by grasses and sedges (Schalles et al. 1989; WSRC

1994). Amphibians are the most prevalent vertebrates that utilize the Carolina bays, but many

reptiles, birds, and mammals also have been observed at these wetlands (Schalles et al. 1989). 

Less than 20 of the Carolina bays contain permanent fish populations. Fish species include

redfin pickerel, mud sunfish, lake chubsucker, and mosquito fish (DOE 1999). An accelerated

program has been initiated at the SRS to restore impacted Carolina bays (DOE 2000b). No

Carolina bays occur near the proposed facility sites.

No wetlands occur on the proposed facility sites. Wetland habitat does occur along the

unnamed tributary to Upper Three Runs Creek located near the eastern border of the proposed

facility site (see Figure 3.3). The dominant species of vegetation in this wetland are yellow

poplar, laurel oak, red maple, red bay, and cherrybark oak. Maiden cane also occurs near the

wetland boundary (Wike and Nelson 2000).

Wetlands

Wetlands are areas that are inundated or

saturated by surface water or groundwater at a

frequency and duration sufficient to support, and

that under normal circumstances do support, a

prevalence of vegetation adapted for life in

saturated soil conditions.
Affected Environment

3-34

3.5.4 Protected Species

Table A.1 (Appendix A) lists the threatened,

endangered, and other special status species

that may be found in the vicinity of the SRS.

Appendix A also discusses the federally and

state-endangered red-cockaded woodpecker

(Picoides borealis), which receives special

attention at the SRS.

No federal- or state-listed wildlife species have

been reported from the proposed project area,

but several species may exist in the general

vicinity. The American alligator (Alligator mississippiensis) is federally threatened (by virtue of

its similarity to the endangered American crocodile [Crocodylus acutus]). While it is fairly

common at the SRS, it has only been recently observed near the F-Area, and its occurrence

there is considered uncommon. The federally threatened (state-endangered) bald eagle

(Haliaeetus leucocephalus) actively nests in the Pen Branch area and in an area south of Par

Pond. These areas are 14 km (8.7 mi) and 12 km (7.5 mi) southwest and southeast of the

proposed project area, respectively. The closest nesting area of the federally and

state-endangered red-cockaded woodpecker to the proposed facility site is about 5 km (3.1 mi)

away. The proposed area for the facilities does not occur within red-cockaded woodpecker

management areas (see Appendix A). However, all areas containing pines, including those at

the proposed sites, provide suitable forage areas for this species. The federally and

state-endangered wood stork (Mycteria americana) has been observed near the Fourmile

Branch delta, about 21 km (13 mi) from the proposed site. The federally endangered

(state-endangered) shortnose sturgeon (Acipenser brevirostrum) occurs in the Savannah River

as far upstream as the SRS.

Walk-through surveys did not reveal any federal- or state-listed wildlife species within the

proposed facility area (USFS 2000). The Bachman’s sparrow (Aimophila aestivalis) is adapted

to open meadow and shrubby meadow habitats such as those that occur throughout F-Area. 

The eastern woodrat (Neotoma floridana) could inhabit the transitional areas between the

hardwood forest and F-Area facilities, and the moist stream bottom area is suitable for the 

star-nosed mole (Condylura cristata). The upland pine and pine-oak ridge habitats are highly

suitable for the southern hognose snake (Heterodon simus) and pine snake (Pituophis

melanoleucus) (USFS 2000). The American sandburrowing mayfly (Dolania americana) is a

relatively common aquatic insect in Upper Three Runs Creek (WSRC 1994). This species was

formerly a candidate species for federal listing, but it is not currently listed by the U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service (USFWS) or State of South Carolina.

More than 1,300 species of plants occur at the SRS (WSRC 1994); however, only 53 species

are considered to be sensitive, as determined by state, federal, and global ratings. The smooth

coneflower (Echinacea laevigata) is the only federally listed (endangered) plant species at the

SRS; it is also state endangered. Smooth coneflowers inhabit roadsides and open, sunny

areas. The collection of plants from natural populations was a significant factor in the

Protected Species

Endangered species. Any species in danger of

extinction throughout all or a significant portion of

its range.

Threatened species. Any species likely to

become endangered within the foreseeable

future throughout all or a significant portion of its

range.
Affected Environment

3-35

endangerment of the species (Arnold et al. 1998). Three populations of the smooth coneflower

have been identified at the SRS. Activities near these known populations are highly restricted

(DOE 2000b).

Nearly 300 populations of other sensitive plant species occur at the SRS (DOE 2000b). 

Included are three populations of the state-listed (species of concern) piedmont azalea

(Rhododendron flammeum) that have been found along the steep slopes adjacent to the Upper

Three Runs Creek floodplain in an area northwest of F-Area (DOE 1999).

Walk-through surveys of the proposed MOX facility site in October 1998 and March 2000 did

not reveal any populations of the smooth coneflower (USFS 2000). Because this species is

adapted to meadow and open forest habitats, the project area appears to be too disturbed or

shady for the coneflower’s establishment and successful survival. The survey did indicate that

suitable habitat for several rare plant species exists in areas adjacent to the survey site. The

hardwood slope provides habitat suitable for leech brush (Nestronia umbellata), piedmont

azalea, and striped garlic (Allium cuthbertii). The moist bottom and lower slope sections are

suitable for green-fringed orchid (Platanthera lacera) and least trillium (Trillium pusillum var.

pusillium). The upland pine and pine-oak ridge areas are suitable for lance-leaf wild-indigo

(Baptisia lanceolata) and bearded milk-vetch (Astragalus villosus) (USFS 2000).

3.6 Land Use

This section briefly describes land use patterns on and around the SRS. Land use is a

classification of parcels of land relative to their suitability for or the actual presence of human

activities (e.g., industry, agriculture, recreation, etc.) and natural uses. Natural resource

attributes and other environmental characteristics could make a site more suitable for some

land uses than for others. Changes in land use may have both beneficial and adverse effects

on other resources (e.g., ecological, cultural, geological, and hydrological).

3.6.1 Savannah River Site Land Use

Existing land use at the SRS can be characterized into three main categories: (1) undeveloped/

forest, (2) wetlands/water, and (3) developed. Approximately 73% of the SRS is undeveloped;

22% consists of wetlands, streams, and lakes; and 5% is developed (e.g., facilities, roads, and

utility corridors). The forested areas are managed for timber production. The U.S. Forest

Service, under an interagency agreement with DOE, harvests approximately 728 ha

(1,800 acres) of timber from the SRS each year. Prime farmland soils exist at the SRS, but

areas of prime farmland are not identified within the SRS because the land is not available for

agricultural activities (DCS 2002). A portion of the SRS is open for fishing, as discussed below

for the Crackerneck WMA. Since late September 2001, hunting has been closed to the general

public in this area. A limited hunting period was later allowed to control the SRS deer herd.

As discussed in Section 3.5.1.1, the SRS has been designated a National Environmental

Research Park by DOE. The scientific community can use the site to study the impacts of
Affected Environment

3-36

human activity on cypress swamp and hardwood forest ecosystems. Approximately 5,700 ha

(14,085 acres) of land is set aside at the SRS for nondestructive environmental research (DOE

1999).

The F-Area is generally classified by the SRS land use plan as developed; some areas within

F-Area are classified as industrial or heavy industrial.

Future land use at the SRS is determined by the DOE through site development, land use, and

future planning processes (DCS 2002). SRS planners have developed a land use zone

planning model for the site that is consistent with their past support of a multiple-use planning

concept where compatible. Three principal planning zones have been established: Site

Industrial, Site Industrial Support, and General Support. The SRS Long Range Comprehensive

Plan includes the construction and operation of the proposed facilities as part of the plan for its

Nuclear Materials Stewardship mission (DOE 2000b). New missions for the SRS in the 21st

Century, as stated in the Savannah River Site Strategic Plan, include the construction and

operation of new facilities for tritium extraction and the storage and disposal of surplus

plutonium. In addition to these new facilities, the SRS plans to play an increased role in the

advancement of nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting (DOE 2000a).

3.6.2 Off-Site Land Use

Predominant regional land uses in the vicinity of the SRS include urban and residential,

industrial, agricultural, and recreational areas. Forest and agricultural land predominantly

border the SRS, with only limited urban and residential development. The nearest residences

are located to the west, north, and northeast, some within 60 m (200 ft) of the SRS boundary. 

Farming is diversified throughout the region and includes such crops as peaches, watermelon,

cotton, soybeans, corn, and small grains. Incorporated and industrial areas are also present

near the site, including textile mills, polystyrene foam and paper plants, chemical processing

plants, and a commercial nuclear power plant. Open water and nonforested wetlands occur

along the Savannah River Valley. Recreational areas within 80 km (50 mi) of the SRS include

Sumter National Forest, Santee National Wildlife Refuge, and Clark’s Hill/Strom Thurmond

Reservoir. State, county, and local parks include Redcliffe Plantation, Rivers Bridge, Barnwell

and Aiken County State Parks in South Carolina, and Mistletoe State Park in Georgia. The

Crackerneck WMA, which includes a portion of the SRS along the Savannah River, is open to

the public for fishing (DOE 1999).

3.7 Cultural and Paleontological

 Resources

Cultural resources include archaeological

sites and historic structures and features that

are protected under the National Historic

Preservation Act of 1966, as amended. 

Cultural and Paleontological Resources

Cultural resources include archaeological sites,

historic structures and features, and traditional

cultural properties.

Paleontological resources are the fossil remains of

past life forms.
Affected Environment

7 Of the 850 plus sites that have been recorded at the SRS, some are prehistoric, some are historic, and some

have both a prehistoric and historic component. For this reason, the sum of prehistoric sites plus historic sites is

much greater than the approximate total of 850 sites.

3-37

Cultural resources also include traditional cultural properties that are important to a

community’s practices and beliefs and that are necessary to maintain the community’s cultural

identity. Cultural resources that meet the eligibility criteria for listing on the National Register of

Historic Places (NRHP) are considered “significant” resources and must be taken into

consideration during the planning of federal projects. Federal agencies are also required to

consider the effects of their actions on sites, areas, or other resources (e.g., plants) that are of

religious significance to Native Americans as established under the American Indian Religious

Freedom Act. Native American graves and burial grounds are protected by the Native

American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act.

Paleontological resources are the fossil remains of past life forms. Paleontological resources

with significant research potential are protected under the Antiquities Act. 

3.7.1 Archaeological Resources

The Savannah River Archaeological Research Program (SRARP) of the South Carolina

Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology, University of South Carolina, has been conducting

archaeological investigations at the SRS since 1973 (SRARP 1989). The SRARP prepared an

archaeological resource management plan for the SRS in 1989. The purpose of the plan is to

provide the DOE with a means of addressing future archaeological resource management

needs at the SRS and to establish a series of research directions to facilitate better

management of these resources. The SRS currently manages its archaeological resources

under the terms of a 1990 Programmatic Agreement among the DOE Savannah River

Operations Office, the South Carolina State Historic Preservation Officer (SCSHPO), and the

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. 

Over a period of more than 25 years, members of the SRARP have been very active in

recording more than 850 archaeological sites at the SRS.7

 Although most of these sites have

not been formally evaluated for eligibility for listing on the NRHP, 67 sites have been identified

as potentially eligible (DOE 1999). In general terms, prehistoric sites within the SRS consist of

village sites, base camps, limited-activity sites, quarries, and workshops. Nearly 800 prehistoric

sites have been recorded at the SRS (DCS 2002). As detailed below, several prehistoric sites

have been recorded within or near the proposed facilities. Two prehistoric sites within the

footprints of the proposed facilities and their associated grading area have been determined to

be eligible for listing on the NRHP. 

Historic sites at the SRS include farmsteads, tenant dwellings, mills, plantations, slave quarters,

rice farm dikes, dams, cattle pens, ferry locations, churches, schools, towns, cemeteries, commercial buildings, and roads. About 400 historic sites have been recorded to date at the SRS

(DOE 1999). No historic sites have been recorded within the vicinity of the proposed facilities.
Affected Environment

8 Archaeologists look at the position of artifacts relative to layers of soil and other artifacts to help determine

sequences of events. Objects found closer to the surface of an undisturbed site were deposited more recently

than objects found below them (i.e., an archaeologist would expect to find Woodland Period artifacts in one or

more layers of soil above Archaic Period artifacts in a stratigraphically preserved site).

3-38

Archaeological surveys have been conducted in the F-Area in the vicinity of the proposed

facilities. Fifteen prehistoric sites have been identified. Nine of these sites were recorded

during 1993 and 1994 (Cabak et al. 1996). Four sites were recorded during SRS surveys

conducted between 1973 and 1977 (Hanson et al. 1978). One site was recorded in 1983

(as cited in Cabak et al. 1996), and the remaining site was recorded in a 1999 survey covering

unsurveyed lands remaining for the proposed location of the surplus plutonium disposition

facilities (King and Stephenson 2000). 

Four sites are located within the area of direct project disturbance. Two of the four prehistoric

sites (38AK546/547 and 38AK757) are eligible for listing on the NRHP. Site 38AK546/547,

located within the area of the proposed MOX facility, is eligible because of its potential to

provide significant information about the prehistory of the Aiken Plateau, in particular the use of

ridge slope settings during the Early Mississippian period (King and Stephenson 2000). Site

38AK757 is located within the boundary of the proposed PDCF facility and is important for

learning more about the use of upland settings by prehistoric inhabitants of the area during the

Mississippian Period (King and Stephenson 2000). Two sites within the area of the proposed

MOX facility, 38AK330 and 38AK548, were determined not eligible in consultation with the

SCSHPO, and no further work is required for these two sites (Green 2000, as cited in DCS

2002).

Eleven prehistoric sites are located near the

proposed facilities. Five of those sites

(38AK106, 38AK155, 38AK563, 38AK564,

and 38AK581) have been recommended

eligible for listing on the NRHP. Site

38AK106 has been recommended eligible

on the basis of its integrity, high density of

artifacts, and research potential for

providing information on the Early Archaic,

Early Woodland, and Late Woodland time

periods. Site 38AK155 is eligible because

of its potential to yield important information

on subsistence strategies and the use of

upland streamside settings between 3000 B.C. and A.D. 1450 (between the Late Archaic and

Early Mississippian periods). Site 38AK563 is important because it contains cultural deposits

ranging from the Early Archaic Period through the Late Woodland Period and has the potential

to provide information on the changes in human use of the floodplain over a considerable time

range. Site 38AK564 has been recommended eligible because it contains stratigraphically8

separated evidence of site use from the Early Archaic and Late Archaic/Early Woodland time

periods. Site 38AK581 contains evidence of numerous occupations by prehistoric people

during the Woodland Period. The site has been recommended eligible on the basis that these

Date Ranges of Prehistoric Time Periods 

Used by Archaeologists at the SRS

 Mississippian A.D. 1100 - 1450

 Late Woodland A.D. 500 - 1100

 Middle Woodland 600 B.C. - A.D. 500

 Early Woodland 1000 B.C. - 600 B.C.

 Late Archaic 3000 B.C. - 1000 B.C.

 Middle Archaic 6000 B.C. - 3000 B.C.

 Early Archaic 8000 B.C. - 6000 B.C.

Source: SRARP (1989). 
Affected Environment

3-39

various occupations appear in a well-defined stratigraphic sequence and potentially contain

important information about changes that occurred during that time period (Cabak et al. 1996).

3.7.2 Historic Structures

No architectural inventories have been conducted to date at the SRS. The SRS has a number

of nuclear production facilities, including facilities important to tritium and plutonium production,

that may have historic value as related to events during the Cold War. Construction of the

F-Area began in 1951 under the Atomic Energy Commission. The F-Area was historically used

for plutonium recovery during DOE’s plutonium production phase (DCS 2002). The areas of

construction for the proposed facilities do not contain structures. No existing buildings within

the F-Area have been identified for reuse, modification, or demolition related to MOX facility

activities.

3.7.3 Traditional Cultural Properties

Traditional cultural properties are places and resources important to traditional American

cultures, which include, but are not restricted to, Native American cultures. Village sites,

ceremonial locations, burials, cemeteries, and natural areas containing important resources,

such as traditional plants, are typical types of properties of concern to Native American cultures. 

Properties of traditional value to immigrant groups (e.g., from Europe and Africa), such as

cemeteries, also can be considered as traditional cultural properties. Native American groups

with traditional ties to the area include the Apalachee, Cherokee, Chicksaw, Creek, Shawnee,

Westo, and Yuchi (DCS 2002). Many of these groups were relocated to the Oklahoma Territory

in the 1800s. However, issues related to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act have

surfaced within the central Savannah River valley. Native American representatives have

expressed concern over traditional plant resources that could exist at the SRS (DOE 1991b;

DCS 2002). None of the identified plant resources is currently known to exist in the F-Area. 

Consultations with appropriate Native American Tribes, Bands, and Nations are underway

regarding the proposed MOX facility (Appendix B).

3.7.4 Paleontological Resources

While some fossil-bearing strata are known to exist at the SRS, none are known within the

F-Area. Paleontological resources that have been recorded within the SRS area mostly date to

54 to 39 million years ago during the Eocene Age. Those resources include fossil plants,

invertebrate fossils, giant oysters, other mollusks, and bryozoa. Most known paleontological

resources in the area are considered common and of low research potential (DOE 1999). The

discovery of paleontological resources within the area of the proposed facilities is not

anticipated.
Affected Environment

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3.8 Infrastructure

This section briefly describes the existing infrastructure of the SRS as it pertains to the

proposed action. Site infrastructure includes utilities, roads, and railroads needed to support

construction and operation of the facilities. A detailed discussion of the SRS infrastructure is

provided in the DOE Surplus Plutonium Disposition EIS (DOE 1999).

3.8.1 Electricity

The SRS uses a 115-kV power line system in a ring arrangement to supply electricity to the

operations areas. Power is supplied by three transmission lines from the South Carolina

Electric and Gas Company. The F-Area receives power from the 200-F power loop supplied by

the 251-F electrical substation. The current F-Area power consumption rate is about

63,000 MWh/yr; the F-Area total capacity is about 700,000 MWh/yr (DCS 2002). The total SRS

usage of electrical power is 370,000 MWh/yr out of a site capacity of 4,400,000 MWh/yr.

3.8.2 Water

Domestic water supplies at the SRS come from a system composed of several wells and water

treatment plants. The system includes three wells and a water treatment plant in the A-Area

and two wells and a backup water treatment plant in the B-Area. A 43-km (27-mi) piping loop

provides domestic water from the A- and B-Areas to other SRS operations areas, including 

the F-Area (DCS 2002). Current domestic water usage in F-Area is 378 million L/yr 

(100 million gal/yr) compared with a capacity of 890 million L/yr (235 million gal/yr). 

Within F-Area, four deep groundwater wells are used for process water. Pumping capacities 

for these wells range from 1,500 to 3,800 L/min (400 to 1,000 gpm), and they extract

groundwater from the Crouch Branch Aquifer. Two of these wells were formerly used for

domestic water supply. The current annual groundwater use at F-Area is 1.4 billion L 

(370 million gal) (DCS 2002). The estimated capacity of the wells in F-Area is about 

4.2 billion L/yr (1.1 billion gal/yr).

3.8.3 Fuel

Coal and oil are used at the SRS to power steam plants located in A-, D-, H- and K-Areas. The

produced steam is distributed across the site in an aboveground pipeline distribution system.

Coal is delivered by rail and is stored at coal piles in A-, D-, and H-Areas. Number 2 grade fuel

oil is delivered by truck and is used in the K-Area. Natural gas is not used at the SRS.
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This page is being withheld pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(a).
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Figure 3.8. Roadways in the vicinity of the SRS.
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Current waste generation rates and inventories at the SRS are presented in Table 3.6. Waste

management practices at the SRS include minimization, characterization, treatment, storage,

transportation, and disposal of waste generated from ongoing site activities. Waste

minimization at the SRS is accomplished through source reduction, recycling, and employee

participation in pollution prevention programs. Total solid waste volumes have decreased by

70% since 1991.

The types of waste currently managed at the SRS are high-level waste (HLW), transuranic

(TRU) waste, mixed TRU waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed LLW, hazardous waste, and 

Table 3.6. Current waste generation rates

and inventories at the SRSa

Waste type

Generation rate

(m3

/yr)

Inventoryb

(m3)

TRUc

 Contact handled 171 6,034 

 Remotely handled 0.6 1 

LLW 8,195 1,616d

Mixed LLW

 RCRA

 TSCAe

61

<1

7,717 

3 

Hazardous 74 1,416 

Nonhazardous

 Liquid

 Solid

416,100f

6,670

NAg

NA 

a

Sources for estimates presented in this table are DOE

(1997) for TRU waste, LLW, and mixed LLW; DOE (1996)

for hazardous and nonhazardous solid waste; and Sessions

(1997) for nonhazardous liquid waste.

b

Inventory projections were as of end of fiscal year 1996

for those presented in DOE (1997).

c

Includes mixed TRU waste.

d

LLW is disposed of on-site at the SRS. The estimated

inventory shown is less than the generation rate (for

FY1996) because it represents only LLW that had not been

disposed of as of the end of FY 1996.

e

TSCA = Toxic Substances Control Act.

 f416,000 m3

/yr = 416,100,000 L/yr.

g

NA = not applicable; nonhazardous wastes are not held

in long-term storage.
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nonhazardous waste. The first five types contain radioactive material. Of the seven waste

types currently managed at the SRS, HLW would not be generated by the proposed MOX

facility, the PDCF, or the WSB. The proposed MOX facility would generate a liquid high-alphaactivity waste that would be further processed, resulting in the generation of TRU waste and

LLW (DCS 2002).

The TRU wastes generated at the SRS

include contaminated equipment, protective

clothing, and tools. Most of these wastes

are stored on concrete pads that are not

covered with soil. TRU waste generated

before 1986 is stored on five concrete pads

and one asphalt pad that have been covered

with approximately 1.2 m (4 ft) of soil. TRU

waste generated since 1986 is stored on

13 concrete pads that are not covered with

soil. These storage pads are located in the

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Facility, which is located in E-Area (DOE

1995). In 1996, it was decided to vent and

purge all buried drums; this process was

completed in 1999 (Arnett and Mamatey

2000b). A TRU waste characterization and

certification facility to prepare TRU waste for

treatment and to certify TRU waste for

disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

(WIPP) is planned for 2007. This TRU

waste facility would be built to manage other

SRS TRU waste and is independent of the

proposed action. In the interim, drums that

are certified for shipment to WIPP will be

stored on concrete pads in E-Area (DOE 1999). 

Liquid and solid LLW types are treated at the SRS. Aqueous LLW streams undergo filtration,

reverse osmosis, and ion exchange at the F-and H-Area effluent treatment facility (ETF) to

remove the radionuclide contaminants. The treated effluent is discharged to Upper Three Runs

Creek. 

Treatment residuals are eventually immobilized with grout for on-site disposal. Solid LLW is

categorized into four groups: low-activity wastes (those that radiate less than 0.002 Sv/h

[200 mrem/h] at 5.1 cm [2 in.] from the unshielded container); intermediate-activity wastes

(those that radiate greater than 0.002 Sv/h [200 mrem/h] at 5.1 cm [2 in.]); intermediate-activity

tritium waste (intermediate-activity waste with more than 3.7 × 1011 Bq [10 Ci] of tritium per

container); and long-lived waste (waste contaminated with long-lived isotopes that exceed the 

waste acceptance criteria [WAC] for on-site disposal) (DCS 2002). Wastes in the first three

categories are stored and disposed of in vaults, and wastes in the fourth category are placed in

Waste Types

Transuranic (TRU) waste: Refers to radioactive

waste that contains more than 100 nanocuries per

gram (nCi/g) of alpha-emitting isotopes with atomic

numbers greater than 92 and half-lives greater than

20 years. Such waste results primarily from the

fabrication of plutonium weapons and plutoniumbearing reactor fuel. Generally, little or no shielding

is required.

Low-level waste (LLW): Refers to radioactive waste

that is not classified as HLW, TRU, or spent nuclear

fuel (SNF).

Hazardous waste: Refers to nonradioactive waste

materials defined by the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (RCRA) as hazardous wastes. These

wastes are considered to pose potential hazard to

human health when improperly treated, stored,

disposed of, or otherwise managed because of their

quantity, concentration, and physical and chemical

characteristics. (Note: hazardous waste mixed with

low-level [radioactive] waste or TRU waste is

referred to as mixed low-level waste or mixed TRU

waste, respectively.)
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3-45

a waste storage building until treatment and disposal technologies are developed. Located in

the E-Area, the vaults are below-grade concrete structures, and the storage building is a metal 

structure on a concrete pad. Disposal facilities at the SRS are projected to meet solid LLW

disposal capacity needs for the next 20 years.

Mixed LLW is stored in various tanks and buildings located in the A-, E-, M-, N-, and S-Areas of

the SRS. The current mixed waste program at the SRS primarily involves the safe storage of

these wastes until treatment and disposal facilities become available. A site treatment plan

(WSRC 2000b) for mixed wastes has been developed, as required by the Federal Facility

Compliance Act, that specifies treatment technologies or technology development schedules for

all SRS mixed waste. During 1999, plans for all mixed LLW were met in accordance with the

site treatment plan (Arnett and Mamatey 2000b).

Hazardous waste is managed at the SRS either by accumulating the waste at the generating

facility for a maximum of 90 days or storing it in Resource Construction and Recovery Act

(RCRA)-permitted hazardous waste storage buildings or on interim storage pads located in the

B- and N-Areas. Most of the waste is shipped off-site to commercial RCRA-permitted facilities. 

In 1999, 297 m3

 (388 yd3) of hazardous waste was shipped off-site to commercial disposal

facilities (Arnett and Mamatey 2000b).

The treatment of nonhazardous wastewater at the SRS has been centralized since 1994 with

the completion and operation of the 2.8 million-L/day (0.75 million-gal/day) Central Sanitary

Wastewater Treatment Facility. This facility treats sanitary wastewater by an extended aeration

activated sludge process that separates the wastewater into clarified effluent and sludge. 

The collection, hauling, and disposal of solid sanitary waste at the SRS is privatized, and the

waste is sent to the Three Rivers Landfill southwest of the B-Area. Other nonhazardous waste

consists of scrap metal, powerhouse ash, domestic sewage, scrap wood, construction debris,

and used railroad ties. These wastes are disposed of by means appropriate to their nature. 

3.10 Human Health Risk

Human health can be adversely affected by radioactive and hazardous chemical contaminants

in the environment. This section discusses how humans can become exposed to these

materials, the potential effects of this exposure, potential human receptors considered in this

EIS, and the existing conditions at the SRS and the surrounding area. Methods used to

estimate the potential for injuries or fatalities among workers are also discussed.
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3.10.1 Hazard Exposure Pathways

3.10.1.1 Pathways for Human Exposure to Radiation and Radioactivity

Radioactivity released from the SRS reaches the environment and people in a variety of ways. 

The routes that radioactive materials follow to get from an SRS facility to the environment and

then to people are called pathways. The primary human exposure pathways for these releases

are discussed below:

• Inhalation exposure pathway: Individuals in the path of airborne emissions would

receive a dose from breathing in the radioactive material. Some of this material

also deposits on the ground and over time may become resuspended in the air, at

which time it may also be inhaled.

• Direct radiation from contaminated soil: Material that is deposited on the ground

from passing airborne emissions becomes an external exposure source of direct

radiation.

• Immersion in radioactive clouds: Individuals in the path of radioactive airborne

emissions would receive an external dose during immersion in the passing “cloud”

of material.

• Ingestion exposure pathway: Radioactive materials can be transported through a

variety of routes into the human diet. Airborne radioactive material may deposit

directly on food crops or animal feed crops, resulting in potential exposure from

human ingestion of the food crops or indirectly from ingestion of contaminated

animal products. Material deposited on farmland may also be taken up through the

roots by human and animal food crops. Material deposited on surface water or

land may reach groundwater. Contaminated surface water or groundwater could

be used for irrigating crops or direct consumption by humans. Contaminated

surface water could also result in contamination of aquatic species, such as fish,

which could subsequently be consumed by humans.

One important pathway of radioactive material released from the SRS in the form of particulate

matter is the airborne pathway. After being discharged from a stack, the radioactive particulate

matter will be carried by wind downwind of the facility, where it will either be inhaled by

individuals or settle on the ground. Radioactivity in the soil will cause direct radiation exposures

in individuals located near contaminated soil. Soil contamination may also be resuspended into

the air by the wind and then inhaled farther downwind. Food produced on farmlands with

contaminated soil will also contain this radioactivity. Precipitation runoff from downwind soil will

carry radioactivity to local surface waters, such as lakes, rivers, and streams. Finally,

radioactivity in surface water may accumulate in fish or other aquatic life that can be consumed

by humans.
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Radiation and Radioactivity

Radioactivity or radioactive decay is the process by which unstable atoms emit radiation to reach a more stable

state.

Radiation is the movement of energetic particles or waves through matter and space. Radiation comes from

radioactive material or from equipment such as x-ray machines. Radiation may be either ionizing radiation or

non-ionizing radiation.

Ionizing radiation is radiation that has enough energy to cause atoms to lose electrons and become ions. For

example, the radioactive decay of plutonium produces radiation that can ionize matter (e.g., tissue).

Radiation dose is the quantity of radiation energy that is deposited in a material. The radiation dose to humans

is measured in units of sieverts (Sv). The unit of rem is also used. One sievert is equal to 100 rem.

Collective dose is the sum of the individual doses received in a given period of time by a specified population. 

The unit of collective dose is person-sieverts, or person-rem.

The DOE has determined the critical types of radioactivity and pathways for radioactive

materials released from SRS operations. Tritium and cesium-137 are the primary contributors

to doses to members of the public. The major pathways for tritium released into air were

through breathing air and eating food, whereas the major pathway for tritium and cesium-137

released into site streams were through drinking river water and eating fish from the river

(DOE 1999). Pathways or routes by which radioactive material moves through the environment

to reach humans can be complex. For example, contaminants can settle on grass that is eaten

by cows that produce milk that is consumed by humans. The meat of the cows can also be

consumed by humans. Another example, more relevant to the SRS, would be game animals

that consume contaminated vegetation and then are eaten by humans. A detailed discussion

of the many pathways at the SRS is presented in the annual environmental report (Arnett and

Mamatey 2001b).

3.10.1.2 Pathways for Human Exposure to Chemicals

Humans can also be exposed to nonradioactive chemicals released to the environment. The

DOE has determined that the critical chemicals among those released from SRS operations to

the environment are arsenic and benzene (Arnett and Mamatey 2000b). Exposures may occur

primarily through inhaling pollutants released to air, drinking contaminated groundwater or

surface water, ingesting contaminants in foodstuffs grown in contaminated soil or irrigated with

contaminated groundwater, or ingesting contaminated soil. 

3.10.1.3 Physical Hazards

Although not attributable to releases of contaminants to the environment, there is a risk of

injuries and fatalities from physical hazards for construction and operation workers at any

facility. The U.S. Bureau of Labor keeps statistics on the annual number of injuries and
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fatalities by industry type. Where possible, these statistics have been used to estimate the

extent of physical hazard risk for the no-action and proposed action alternatives.

3.10.2 Receptors

Effects of radiation and chemical exposures for the no-action and proposed action alternatives

during normal operations were estimated by first calculating the doses to relevant receptors. 

The analyses considered three groups of people: (1) members of the public, (2) SRS

employees, and (3) facility workers. For purposes of this EIS, these three groups are defined

as follows:

• Members of the Public: Individuals who live and work outside the SRS within 80 km

(50 mi) of the proposed facilities: 

- Might be exposed to trace amounts of radioactive and chemical materials

released to the environment through exhaust stacks.

- Could receive radiation and chemical exposures primarily through inhalation of

material in the air, external radiation from deposited radioactive material, and

ingestion of contaminated food.

• SRS Employees: Individuals employed at the SRS who are not workers at the

proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, or the WSB. SRS employees include those

workers assigned radiological work at other nuclear facilities within the SRS

boundary, as well as those who are not assigned radiological work, such as cafeteria

workers or persons in administrative positions:

- Might be exposed to direct radiation from radioactive materials (although at a

great distance) and to trace amounts of plutonium or uranium released to the

environment through site exhaust stacks.

- Could receive radiation and chemical exposures primarily through inhalation of

material in the air and external radiation from radioactive material deposited on

the ground.

- Work-related physical hazard risks are present.

- Estimate of impacts to transient population groups (soda machine vendors, etc.)

are bounded by impacts to this group. 

• Facility Workers: Individuals who work at the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, or

the WSB and who receive a radiation dose in the course of employment in which

the assigned duties of the individuals involve exposure to radiation or to radioactive

material from licensed and unlicensed sources of radiation:
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3-49

- Might be exposed to direct gamma radiation emitted from radioactive materials,

such as depleted uranium compounds.

- Could receive small radiation doses from inhaling uranium, plutonium, or other

radionuclides compared with the direct radiation doses resulting from enclosed

processes; ventilation controls would be used to inhibit airborne emissions in

facilities.

- Would be protected by a dosimetry program to control doses below the maximum

regulatory limit of 0.05 Sv/yr (5 rem/yr) for workers (10 CFR 20.1201).

- For chemical exposures, facility workers are addressed under separate

regulations (e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act [OSHA]); their exposures

are not quantitatively addressed in this FEIS. However, physical hazards

(i.e., risks of injury and fatality) are addressed for both construction and

operations workers.

Impacts to a maximally exposed individual (MEI) were also evaluated. The MEI is a hypothetical

person who, because of proximity, activities, or living habits, could receive the highest possible

dose of radiation or of a hazardous chemical from a given event or process. For members of

the public, potential locations for an MEI would be at the site boundary, the closest possible

public access points near the operations under consideration. For SRS employees not directly

involved in facility operations, MEI locations are considered at distances of 100 m (330 ft) or

more from a facility. An MEI for radiation exposure is not always considered for facility workers

because these workers are monitored, and their exposure is expected to be kept as low as

reasonably achievable (ALARA), with workers being rotated into and out of relatively higher

exposure job functions. In such cases, an average worker dose was estimated. 

3.10.3 Baseline Radiological Dose and Risk

The radiological baseline in the vicinity of the

SRS includes background radiation, manmade (anthropogenic) sources, and radiation

from ongoing SRS operations. Background

radiation comes from natural sources, such

as cosmic radiation and naturally occurring

radioactive material, and from anthropogenic

sources that cannot be controlled, such as

global fallout from nuclear testing or nuclear

accidents. Anthropogenic sources, including

consumer products (e.g. television sets and

smoke detectors) and medical procedures,

account for additional exposure. Human

exposure to radiation is measured in units of

sieverts (Sv). Background radiation levels

What Is a Sievert?

A sievert is a unit of radiation dose. The effects of

radiation exposure on humans depend on the kind of

radiation received, the total amount absorbed by the

body, and the tissues involved. A sievert (Sv) is

calculated by a formula that takes these three factors

into account. Another common unit of radiation dose

is the rem (1 Sv = 100 rem). The U.S. average

individual radiation dose is about 0.0036 Sv

(0.36 rem) or 3.6 millisievert (mSv) [360 millirem

(mrem)] from natural background and anthropogenic

sources.
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Latent Cancer Fatality (LCF)

What it is: The primary adverse health effect from the low-level radiation doses received from proposed MOX

facility, PDCF, or WSB operations and potential accidents would be the possible induction of latent cancer

fatalities (LCFs). LCFs are a measure of the expected number of additional cancer deaths in a population (or

people dying of cancer) as a result of exposure to radiation. Death from cancer induced by exposure to

radiation may occur at any time after the exposure takes place. However, latent cancers would be expected to

occur in a population from one year to many years after the exposure takes place. To place the significance of

these additional LCF risks from exposure to radiation into context, the average individual has approximately

1 chance in 4 of dying from cancer (LCF risk of 0.25).

How it is calculated: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has suggested (Eckerman et al. 1999) a

conversion factor that for every 100 person-Sv (10,000 person-rem) of collective dose, approximately

6 individuals would ultimately develop a radiologically induced cancer. If this conversion factor is multiplied by

the individual dose, the result is the individual increased lifetime probability of developing an LCF. For

example, if an individual receives a dose of 0.00033 Sv (0.033 rem), that individual’s LCF risk over a lifetime is

estimated to be 2 × 10-5. This risk corresponds to a 1 in 50,000 chance of developing a LCF during that

individual’s lifetime. If the conversion factor is multiplied by the collective (population) dose, the result is the

number of excess LCFs. Because these results are statistical estimates, values for expected LCFs can be,

and often are, less than 1.0 for cases involving low doses or small population groups. If a population group

collectively receives a dose of 50 Sv (5,000 rem), which would be expressed as a collective dose of 50 personSv (5,000 person-rem), the number of potential LCFs experienced from within the exposure group is 3. If the

number of LCFs estimated is less than 0.5, on average, no LCFs would be expected.

result in a national annual average individual exposure of approximately 3.0 mSv (300 mrem),

with an additional 0.60 mSv (60 mrem) from other anthropogenic sources. A more detailed

breakdown of these sources is presented in Table 3.7.

Radiation from SRS operations is estimated by analyzing monitoring data. The SRS has an

extensive radiological monitoring network both on- and off-site to assess the effects of site

operations on air, surface water, groundwater, soil, terrestrial and aquatic food products, and

local game animals. These routine environmental surveillance activities include monitoring

airborne and liquid effluent discharges from their points of origin at each operating facility on

the SRS to determine compliance with applicable exposure standards. The results of the

effluent monitoring and environmental surveillance and the potential radiation doses to

members of the public in surrounding areas from those effluents are published annually by the

Environmental Monitoring Section of Westinghouse Savannah River Company (e.g., Arnett and

Mamatey 2001b).

Airborne emissions from the SRS operations for 2000 are summarized in Table 3.8. Liquid

releases for 2000 are summarized in Table 3.9. The estimated off-site radiation doses from

both airborne and liquid releases were below all applicable radiation exposure standards for

humans and aquatic organisms (Arnett and Mamatey 2001b). The estimated exposures and

the applicable standard for each exposure are summarized in Table 3.10. The estimated allpathway dose to an MEI was 0.0018 mSv (0.18 mrem), which is 0.18% of the DOE’s 1.0 mSv

(100-mrem) all-pathway dose standard for annual exposure. For an NRC-licensed facility, such

as the proposed MOX facility, a dose limit of 1.0 mSv/yr (100 mrem/yr) from operations for an

individual member of the public is also applicable (10 CFR 20.1301).
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Table 3.7. Sources and contributions to the

U.S. average individual radiation dosea

Source

Effective dose

equivalent

[mSv/yr

(mrem/yr)]

Natural background radiation

 Cosmic radiation 0.27 (27)

 Rocks and soil (external) 0.28 (28)

 Internal to body 0.40 (40)

 Radon (internal/inhalation) 2.0 (200)

 Subtotal 2.95 (295)

Man-made background radiation

 Weapons test fallout <0.01 (<1)

 Consumer products 0.10 (10)

 Medical

 Diagnostic X-rays 0.39 (39)

 Nuclear Medicine 0.14 (14)

 Subtotal 0.64 (64)

Total 3.60 (360)

a

Source: Modified from Arnett and Mamatey (2001b) and

NCRP (1987).

Workers at the SRS with the potential to be exposed to external radiation or to inhale airborne

radioactivity take part in a monitoring program in accordance with 10 CFR 835 (“Occupational

Radiation Protection”). In 2000, 3,382 SRS workers had a measurable dose with a combined

total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) of 1.632 person-sievert (person-Sv) (163.2 person-rem)

for an average TEDE of 0.00048 Sv (0.048 rem) (DOE undated).

The primary health concerns attributed to radiation exposure are the development of cancer

and hereditary (genetic) effects. Although radiation-induced genetic effects have been observed

in laboratory animals (given very high doses of radiation), no evidence of genetic effects has

been observed among the children born to atomic bomb survivors from Hiroshima and

Nagasaki. Thus, latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) are the radiological health effect end point used

in this EIS as a measure of human health impacts. A conservative assumption in this regard is

that any amount of radiation may pose some risk for causing cancer, and that the risk is higher

for higher radiation exposures. A linear, no-threshold dose response relationship is used to

describe the relationship between radiation dose and the occurrence of cancer. This

dose-response model suggests that any increase in dose, no matter how small, results in an

incremental increase in risk. For the purposes of this EIS, the risk of a latent cancer fatality

(LCF) is taken to be 0.06 LCF per person-Sv (0.0006 LCF per person-rem). (See the text box

in this section for a discussion on LCFs.) This LCF risk factor is a gender- and age-averaged

value that accounts for differences between male and female receptors from infancy through

old age living in the United States (Eckerman et al. 1999). While female receptors were 
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Table 3.8. Radioactive atmospheric releases

from SRS operations for 2000

Radionuclide Curiesa Radionuclide Curiesa

Gases and Vapors Particulates (cont.)

H-3 (oxide) 3.24 × 104 Eu-152 4.13 × 10-5

H-3 (elem.) 1.24 × 104 Eu-154 1.64 × 10-5

H-3 total 4.48 × 104 Eu-155 4.02 × 10-6

C-14 1.33 × 10-1 Hg-203 2.23 × 10-10

Kr-85 5.28 × 104 Ra-226 1.74 × 10-5

I-129 1.71 × 10-3 Ra-228 2.74 × 10-5

I-131 6.96 × 10-6 Ac-228 1.80 × 10-6

I-133 1.18 × 10-4 Th-228 5.76 × 10-7

Th-230 1.74 × 10-5

Particulates Th-232 2.58 × 10-6

Cr-51 1.21 × 10-4 Th-234 1.04 × 10-4

Co-57 3.26 × 10-7 Ba-133 5.4 × 10-10

Co-58 1.27 × 10-4 U-233 1.50 × 10-8

Co-60 8.60 × 10-4 U-234 3.98 × 10-4

Ni-59 4.17 × 10-13 U-235 1.80 × 10-5

Ni-63 5.09 × 10-6 U-236 4.16 × 10-11

Zn-65 2.23 × 10-5 U-238 5.20 × 10-4

Sr-89,90 3.89 × 10-3 Np-237 2.26 × 10-10

Zr-95 1.68 × 10-5 Pu-238 3.59 × 10-4

Zr-85 1.07 × 10-9 Pu-239 2.05 × 10-3

Nb-94 3.95 × 10-10 Pu-240 1.99 × 10-7

Nb-95 1.13 × 10-4 Pu-241 4.09 × 10-6

Tc-99 8.75 × 10-5 Pu-242 7.03 × 10-9

Ru-103 4.23 × 10-5 Am-241 1.46 × 10-4

Ru-106 1.04 × 10-5 Am-243 6.02 × 10-6

Sb-124 5.63 × 10-10 Cm-242 4.47 × 10-7

Sb-125 5.34 × 10-5 Cm-244 7.68 × 10-5

Sn-113 6.20 × 10-10 Cm-245 1.04 × 10-13

Sn-126 6.45 × 10-14 Cm-246 3.98 × 10-6

Cs-134 1.31 × 10-4 Ar-39 3.30 × 10-5

Cs-137 8.15 × 10-3 Na-22 7.90 × 10-11

Ce-141 4.16 × 10-5 Mn-54 1.30 × 10-10

Ce-144 1.44 × 10-4 Se-79 4.47 × 10-9

Pa-233 2.23 × 10-10

Pr-144 3.68 × 10-13 Alpha 7.35 × 10-4

Pr-144m 4.43 × 10-15 Beta-Gamma 3.57 × 10-2

Pm-147 1.30 × 10-5

a

One curie (Ci) equals 3.7 × 1010 becquerels (Bq). One Bq equals

one disintegration per second (dps).

Source: Modified from Arnett and Mamatey (2001b).
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Table 3.9. Radioactive liquid

releases from SRS operations

for 2000 (including direct 

and seepage basin

migration releases)

Radionuclide Curiesa

H-3 5.34 × 103

Sr-90 5.44 × 10-2

Co-60 1.62 × 10-3

I-129 7.82 × 10-2

Cs-137 8.81 × 10-2

U-234 2.87 × 10-5

U-235 6.18 × 10-6

U-238 1.97 × 10-4

Pu-238 2.21 × 10-5

Pu-239 1.68 × 10-5

Am-241 1.19 × 10-5

Cm-244 7.01 × 10-6

Alpha 1.96 × 10-2

Beta-Gamma 4.44 × 10-2

a

One Ci equals 3.7 × 1010 Bq.

Source: Modified from Arnett

and Mamatey (2001b).

estimated to have a slightly higher LCF rate than males, and infants a higher LCF rate than

adults, the use of this risk factor for estimating collective LCF risks to the public in this EIS

should provide a reasonable average based on current understanding of radiological effects in

humans. On the other hand, the collective LCF risks to the facility workers and SRS employees

evaluated in this EIS may be conservative (overestimated) because the more susceptible

receptors, such as infants, considered in determining the LCF risk factor are not present in the

SRS employee population.

3.10.4 Baseline Chemical Exposure and Risk

3.10.4.1 Chemical Risk Assessment Background

As stated in Section 3.10.2, human exposure to nonradioactive chemicals in air, water, or soil

may occur through ingestion, inhalation, or contact with skin. Methods used to assess hazards

associated with chemical exposures may simply involve a comparison of concentrations in air,

water, or soil with health-risk based standards or guidelines available from state and federal

agencies (see SRS Baseline Risks below). More detailed assessments estimate the extent of 
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Table 3.10. Estimated radiation exposures to the public

from SRS emissions in 2000

Pathway/receptor Dose Standard

Air

 Maximally exposed individual [mSv (mrem)] 0.0004 (0.04) 0.10 (10)a

 Collective population [person-Sv (person-rem)] 0.023 (2.3) NAb

Liquid

 Maximally exposed individual [mSv (mrem)] 0.0014 (0.14) 0.04 (4)c

 Collective population [person-Sv (person-rem)] 0.039 (3.9) NA

Total

 Maximally exposed individual [mSv (mrem)] 0.0018 (0.18)d 1.0 (100)e

 Collective population [person-Sv (person-rem)] 0.062 (6.2)d NA

a

Set by the EPA in “National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants —

Radionuclides,” 40 CFR 61 Subpart H, December 15, 1989.

b

NA = not applicable.

c

Adopted from the EPA in DOE Order 5400.5 as set forth in “National Primary Drinking Water

Standards,” 40 CFR Part 141.11, July 9, 1976.

d

Sum of the air and liquid pathways.

e

All pathway dose standard from DOE Order 5400.5.

Source: Arnett and Mamatey (2001b).

human exposure due to a particular source and compare that exposure with benchmark levels

for noncarcinogenic risks (“hazard index” approach) or benchmarks for carcinogenic risks. 

In estimating either noncancer risks (that is, noncancer adverse health outcomes, such as liver

damage or developmental impairment) due to chemical exposures or increased lifetime cancer

risk, the first step is to estimate the chemical concentration in air, water, and/or soil, either

present from natural sources or attributable to anthropogenic sources. The concentration

estimate is combined with an estimate of the human intake level to produce a chemical-specific

daily intake estimate. (The intake level is usually from the upper end of the expected range of

possible intakes in order to make sure risk estimates take individuals who have unusually high

intakes into account). Estimated intakes are compared with chemical-specific reference doses

or cancer slope factors. The reference doses and cancer slope factors are developed by the

EPA for many commonly used chemicals and are based on a broad range of toxicological data. 

See the text box for further information on risk estimation procedures.

3.10.4.2 SRS Chemical Baseline Risks

Public water supplies in the vicinity of the SRS are monitored and regulated to be in compliance

with health-based federal standards, and remediation programs are underway at the SRS to
Affected Environment

3-55

Concepts in Estimating Risks from Exposures to Chemicals in Air, Water, and Soil

Reference Dose: Intake level of a chemical that is very unlikely to have noncancer adverse effects; measured

in units of milligrams per kilogram of body weight per day (mg/kg-d). Different reference doses often apply for

oral and inhalation exposures.

Hazard Quotient: a comparison of the estimated intake level or dose of a chemical in air, water, or soil with its

reference dose; expressed as a ratio.

Example: If 5 parts per billion (0.005 mg/L) benzene is in groundwater used for drinking and 2 L is ingested

daily by a 70-kg (150-lb) person over a period of 10 years, then

Intake = (0.005 mg/L × 2 L/day)/70 kg = 0.00014 mg/kg-d.

The reference dose for chronic ingestion of benzene is 0.0003 mg/kg-d.

The benzene hazard quotient is 0.00014/0.0003 = 0.5. This hazard quotient is less than 1, indicating that

the exposure is unlikely to cause adverse noncancer health effects.

Hazard Index: The sum of hazard quotients for all chemicals to which an individual is exposed. Used as a

screening tool, a hazard index of less than 1 indicates that adverse health effects are unlikely. However, a

hazard index of greater than 1 does not necessarily mean adverse health effects will occur, because different

chemicals may react differently in the human body (that is, they may have different, nonadditive kinds of

toxicity).

Slope Factor: an upper-bound estimate of a chemical’s probability of causing cancer over a 70-year lifetime,

based on the extent of intake during the exposure period and given in units of inverse intake [(mg/kg-d)-1 or

1/(mg/kg-d)]. For a carcinogen, different slope factors often apply for oral and inhalation exposures.

Increased Lifetime Cancer Risk: an upper-bound estimate of the likelihood that an individual will develop

cancer as a result of exposure to a cancer-causing chemical. It is the product of the intake level and the slope

factor.

Example: benzene is also a cancer-causing chemical with an oral slope factor of up to 0.055 (mg/kg-d)-1.

Assuming 5 parts per billion (0.005 mg/L) in water and calculating intake as above, but averaging over a

lifetime of 70 years, the increased lifetime cancer risk for benzene ingestion would be:

0.00014 mg/kg-d x 0.055 (mg/kg-d)-1 x 10-yr exposure/70-yr lifetime = 0.0000011 (also can be stated as

1.1 × 10-6 or 1.1 in 1 million).

This increased risk level would be considered to be small. It is at the lower end of the risk range of

0.000001 (10-6, or 1 in 1 million) to 0.0001 (10-4, or 1 in 10,000) which generally does not require mitigating

actions.

control exposure to and eliminate areas of soil contamination. Therefore, the most important

potential exposure pathway for workers and the general public would be through inhalation of

contaminants released to air from ongoing SRS operations.

The SRS has approximately 200 regulated sources of air emissions. In 1991, the SCDHEC

established Air Pollution Control Regulation 61-62.5, Standard No. 8, to regulate hazardous or

toxic air pollutant emissions. To demonstrate compliance with this standard, the SRS

completed an air emissions inventory and air dispersion modeling for all site sources in 1993,
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3-56

as summarized in Arnett and Mamatey (2001b). An update to the modeling was submitted in

1998 (Dukes 1998). The modeling effort provides estimates of maximum ambient

concentrations at or beyond the SRS boundary due to SRS emission sources for about

200 toxic air pollutants (TAPs). The estimated maximum concentrations of the TAPs did not

exceed values given in the 2001 version of the SCDHEC standard No. 8 (SCDHEC 2001). 

Because regulatory standards are not developed exclusively on the basis of public health

considerations, and because the basis for the SCDHEC standard concentrations is not

described in available documentation (SCDHEC 2001), the potential for adverse human health

impacts was assessed through comparison with health risk-based guideline levels. Specifically,

the reported maximum ambient 24-hour average concentrations were modified by a factor

of 0.2 to estimate annual average concentrations (based on EPA guidance [EPA 1992]). These

estimated annual average concentrations were compared with health risk-based air

concentrations developed by the EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS)

(Smith et al. 1999) and with EPA-established reference concentrations for non-cancer effects

(EPA 2003b). Although only two TAPs (TCDDs and tetrachloroethylene) exceeded the EPA

guideline levels, 10 TAPs had estimated annual average concentrations between the EPA

guideline cancer risk level values of 10-6 to 10-4 (see Table 3.11).

3.10.5 Baseline Physical Hazard Risks

Although worker physical hazard risks (i.e., risks of fatality or injury from on-the-job accidents)

can be minimized when workers adhere to safety standards and use protective equipment as

necessary, certain rates of accidents have been associated with all types of work. Risks can be

calculated on the basis of historical industrywide statistics, as described below.

The expected annual numbers of worker fatalities and injuries for specific industry types are

calculated on the basis of rate data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as reported by the

National Safety Council (NSC 2001), and on the number of annual full-time equivalent (FTE)

workers required for manufacturing activities. Employment at the SRS in 2000 was

13,227 people (DCS 2001b). It is assumed that, in general, the types of activities required for

these employees would be similar to those for the manufacturing industrial sector, so those

fatality and injury rates are used to estimate annual risks. A rate of 3.3 fatalities per

100,000 FTEs and 4.6 injuries per 100 FTEs is used. On the basis of these rates, the estimated

annual number of fatalities for SRS workers is less than 1 (specifically, 0.44) per year. The

estimated number of injuries is 610 per year (includes only injuries resulting in lost workdays,

not including the day of injury). These physical hazard risks represent the baseline risks for

existing SRS operations for comparison with impacts under the no-action and proposed action

alternatives. However, actual injury and fatality risks over the past 10 years or more have been

lower than those predicted on the basis of national statistics.
3-57

Affected Environment Table 3.11. Modeled site boundary ambient concentrations of select SRS toxic air pollutant (TAP) emissions in comparison with SCDHEC standards and EPA health risk-based guideline levels Toxic air pollutant (TAP) Number of SRS sources SRS maximum modeled 24-hour average concentration (g/m3)a SRS Estimated Annual Average Concentration (g/m3)b SCDHEC standard (g/m3) EPA guideline level (g/m3)c

TAPs with ambient level exceeding EPA guideline level TCDDs 1 0.00002 4 x 10-6 0 3 x 10-8 to 3 x 10-6 Tetrachloroethylene 36 99 20 3,350 0.17-17TAPs with estimated annual ambient level between EPA Guideline 10-6 and 10-4 cancer risk level

 Arsenic 7 0.05 0.01 1.0 0.00023-0.023 Benzene 118 4.6 0.9 150 0.13-13 (30) Beryllium 7 0.009 0.0020 0.01 0.00042-0.042 (0.02) Bis(chloromethyl)ether 1 0.002 0.0004 0.03 2 x 10-5 to 2 x 10-3

 Carbon tetrachloride 16 4.2 0.84 150 0.067-6.7 Dimethyl benzidine 1 0.002 0.0004 NA 0.00038-0.038 Heptachlor 1 0.01 0.002 2.5 0.00077-0.077 Hydrazine 5 0.06 0.012 0.5 0.0002-0.02 Quinoline 1 0.004 0.0008 NA 0.00029-0.029 Trichloroethylene 38 23 5 6,750 0.5-50

aSCDHEC Standard No. 8 requires that the standards be compared with modeled maximum 24-hour average

concentrations at or beyond the site boundary.

bEPA guideline values should be compared with annual average concentrations; these values were estimated as

the maximum 24-hour ambient concentrations multiplied by 0.2.

cWhere a range is given, the range corresponds to a 10-6 to 10-4 risk level (that is, the concentration that if inhaled

for a lifetime would result in an increased individual risk of developing cancer of between 1 in 1 million and 1 in10,000). Values in parentheses are verified reference concentrations established by the EPA (2003b), alsorecognized as important guidelines under SCDHEC Standard No. 8.

Sources: Dukes (1998); SCDHEC (2001); Smith et al. (1999, Table 2).
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3.11 Socioeconomics

This section discusses existing socioeconomic conditions in the vicinity of the SRS as they

relate to the proposed facilities. The socioeconomic data presented for the SRS describe a

regional economic area (REA) comprising 15 counties around the site (see Appendix D) and a

region-of-influence (ROI) surrounding the site comprising 4 counties — Columbia and

Richmond Counties in Georgia and Aiken and Barnwell Counties in South Carolina. The REA

is used to assess the potential regional economic impacts of site activities, specifically impacts

on employment and unemployment and on personal income. The REA constitutes a broad

market area defined by economic linkages between the various sectors in the regional

economy.

The ROI was defined on the basis of the current residential locations of full-time SRS workers

directly involved in the SRS activities and encompasses the area in which most of these

workers spend their wages and salaries. The ROI is used to assess the impacts of site

activities on population, housing, community services, and community fiscal conditions. More

than 90% of SRS workers currently reside in these counties (DCS 2001b). In the following

sections, data are presented for each of the counties in the ROI.

3.11.1 Population

The population of the ROI was at 475,095 in 2000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a) and was

expected to reach 489,000 by 2001, as shown in Table 3.12. In 2000, 30% of the ROI total

(142,552 people) resided in Aiken County (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001), with 25,337 in the

city of Aiken. Over the period 1990-2000, population in the ROI as a whole, in Aiken County,

and in the city of Aiken grew slightly, with average growth rates of 1.4%, 1.7%, and 

2.5%, respectively. Over the same period, population in South Carolina as a whole grew at a

rate of 1.4%. 

In 2000, 41% of the ROI population (195,182 persons) resided in the city of Augusta/

Richmond County, Georgia, with 19% (89,288) located in Columbia County, Georgia, and 5%

(23,478) in Barnwell County, South Carolina (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000). Growth in

Augusta/Richmond County over the period 1990-2000 was slight at 0.3%, relatively high in

Columbia County over the same period at 3.1%, and moderate in Barnwell County at 1.5%.

Other incorporated places in the immediate vicinity of the SRS are Barnwell (population 5,035 in

2000), Blackville (2,973), Elko (212), Hilda (436), Jackson (1,625), New Ellenton (2,250),

North Augusta (17,574), and Willston (3,307) (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a).

3.11.2 Employment and Unemployment

Employment in the REA totaled 207,660 people in 2000 and was expected to reach 214,000 in

2002. Employment grew at an annual average rate of 1.6% between 1990 and 2000

(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, 2002b). The economy of the REA is dominated by the trade 
Affected Environment

3-59

Table 3.12. ROI population statistics for selected years

Entity 1990a 2000a

Average

annual growth

rate (%),

1990-2000

2002

(projected)

Georgia

 Columbia County 66,031 89,288 3.1 95,000

 Richmond County/City of Augusta 189,719 195,182 0.3 196,000

South Carolina

 Aiken County 120,991 142,552 1.7 147,000

 City of Aiken 19,872 25,337 2.5 27,000

 Barnwell County 20,293 23,478 1.5 24,000

ROI Total 415,394 475,095 1.4 489,000

Georgia 6,478,216 8,186,453 2.4 8,580,000

South Carolina 3,486,703 4,012,012 1.4 4,130,000

a

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002a).

and service industries, with these activities currently contributing almost 63% of all employment

in the REA (see Table 3.13). The manufacturing sector is also a significant employer in the

REA, with 27% of total REA employment. Employment at the SRS in 2000 was 13,227 people

(DCS 2001b). 

Unemployment in the REA steadily declined during the late 1990s from a peak rate of 8.0% in

1993 to the 2002 rate of 5.7% (see Table 3.14) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002). 

Unemployment in Georgia was 4.7% in August 2002; in South Carolina the rate was 5.7% in

that month.

3.11.3 Income

Personal income in the REA was $14.8 billion in 2000 and was expected to reach $15.6 billion

in 2002. Personal income grew at an annual average rate of 1.8% over the period 1990-1999

(see Table 3.15). Personal income per capita in the REA also rose in the 1990s and was

expected to reach $24,700 in 2002, compared with $23,146 at the beginning of the period. 

3.11.4 Housing

Total housing in Columbia County grew at an annual rate of 3.5% over the period 1990-2000

(see Table 3.16), with total housing units expected to reach 35,400 in 2002, reflecting the

relatively high growth in county population. About 9,580 new units were added to the existing

housing stock in the county between 1990 and 2000. On the basis of annual population growth

rates, there were expected to be 2,340 vacant housing units in the county in 2002, with

420 expected to be rental units available to construction workers at the proposed facilities.
Affected Environment

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Table 3.13. REA employment by industry, 2000

Sector Employment

Percent of

REA total

Agriculturea 6,250 3.0

Mining 877 0.4

Construction 11,399 5.5

Manufacturing 55,853 27.0

Transportation and Public Utilities 5,028 2.4

Trade 34,389 17.0

Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 7,783 3.7

Services 86,673 42.0

Other 193 0.1

Total 207,660

a

1997 data; U.S. Department of Agriculture (1999).

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002b), except as noted.

Total housing in the City of Augusta/Richmond

County grew at an annual rate of 0.6% over the

period 1990-2000 (see Table 3.16), with total

housing units expected to reach 82,800 in 2002,

reflecting the relatively slow growth in county

population. Only 5,000 new units were added

to the existing housing stock in the county

between 1990 and 2000. On the basis of

annual population growth rates, there were

projected to be 8,440 vacant housing units in

the county in 2002, with 3,550 of those

expected to be rental units available to

construction workers at the proposed facilities. 

Total housing in Aiken County grew at an

annual rate of 2.3% over the period 1990-2000

(see Table 3.16), with total housing units

expected to reach 64,100 in 2002. Growth in

the city of Aiken was 2.9% over this period, with

11,900 total housing units expected in 2002. 

Almost 12,700 new units were added to the

existing housing stock in the county between 1990 and 2000, 2,830 of which were built in the

city of Aiken. On the basis of annual population growth rates, there were expected to be

6,610 vacant housing units in the county in 2002, with 1,610 expected to be rental units

available to construction workers at the proposed facilities.

Table 3.14. REA

unemployment rates

Period

Rate

(%)

REA

 1990-2000 average 6.7

 2002a

 5.7

Georgia

 1990-2000 average 5.0

 2002b

 4.7

South Carolina

 1990-2000 average 5.4

 2002b

 5.7

a

Rate is for July 2002.

b

Rate is for August 2002.

Source: U.S. Bureau of

Labor Statistics (2002).
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3-61

Table 3.15. REA personal income (2003 dollars)

Parameter 1990a 2000a

Average

annual growth

rate (%),

1990-2000

2002

(projected)

Total personal income ($ millions) 12,426 14,814 1.8 15,600

Personal income per capita ($) 23,146 24,681 0.6 25,300

a

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (2002).

Total housing in Barnwell County grew at an annual rate of 2.6% over the period 1990-2000

(see Table 3.16), with total housing units expected to reach 10,500 in 2002, reflecting the

moderate growth in county population. About 2,300 new units were added to the existing

housing stock in the county between 1990 and 2000. On the basis of annual population growth

rates, there were projected to be 1,210 vacant housing units in the county in 2002, with 300 of

those expected to be rental units available to construction workers at the proposed facilities.

Total housing in the ROI as a whole grew at an annual rate of 1.8% over the period 1990-2000

(see Table 3.16), with total housing units expected to reach 202,000 in 2002. About 31,600

new units were added to the existing housing stock in the ROI between 1990 and 2000. On the

basis of annual population growth rates, there were projected to be 19,600 vacant housing units

in the ROI in 2002, with 5,910 of those expected to be rental units available to construction

workers at the proposed facilities.

3.11.5 Community Resources

Construction and operation of the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB would result in

increased revenues and expenditures for local government jurisdictions, including counties,

cities, and school districts. Revenues would come primarily from state and local sales taxes

associated with employee spending during construction and operation and local property taxes. 

Additional revenues would be used to support additional local community services currently

provided by each jurisdiction.

Construction and operation of the proposed facilities would result in increased demand for

community services in the counties, cities, and school districts likely to host relocating

construction workers and operations employees. Additional demands would also be placed on

local medical facilities and physician services.

Tables D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D present information on revenues and expenditures by the

various local government jurisdictions in the ROI. Tables 3.17 and 3.18 present data on

employment and levels of service (number of employees per 1,000 population) for public safety,

general local government services, and physicians. Tables 3.19 and 3.20 provide staffing data

for school districts and hospitals.
Affected Environment

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Table 3.16. City, county, and ROI housing characteristicsa

Parameter 1990b 2000c

2002

(projected)

Georgia

 Columbia County

 Owner occupied 17,322 25,557 27,100

 Rental 4,519 5,563 5,900

 Total unoccupied units 1,904 2,201 2,340

 Total units 23,745 33,321 35,400

 Richmond County/City of Augusta

 Owner occupied 38,762 42,840 43,100

 Rental 29,913 31,080 31,300

 Total unoccupied units 8,613 8,392 8,440

 Total units 77,288 82,312 82,800

South Carolina

 Aiken County

 Owner occupied 33,491 42,036 43,400

 Rental 11,392 13,551 14,000

 Total unoccupied units 4,383 6,400 6,610

 Total units 49,266 61,987 64,100

 City of Aiken

 Owner occupied 5,130 6,804 7,140

 Rental 2,619 3,483 3,660

 Total unoccupied units 794 1,086 1,140

 Total units 8,543 11,373 11,900

 Barnwell County

 Owner occupied 5,194 6,810 7,010

 Rental 1,906 2,211 2,280

 Total unoccupied units 754 1,170 1,210

 Total units 7,854 10,191 10,500

 ROI Total

 Owner occupied 99,673 123,902 128,000

 Rental 49,250 54,016 55,200

 Total unoccupied units 16,520 19,116 19,600

 Total units 165,443 197,034 202,000

a

Column entries may not add up due to independent rounding.

b

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1994).

c

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002a).
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3-63

Table 3.17. Local public service employment (2001)

Part A: Georgia

Columbia County Grovetown Harlem

Number

Level of

servicea Number

Level of

servicea Number

Level of

servicea

Police protection 147 1.8 17 2.8 7 3.9

Fire protectionb 3 0 4 0.7 1 0.6

General 435 5.3 33 5.4 14 7.7

Total 585 7.2 54 8.9 22 12.1

Augusta-Richmond

County Blythe Hephzibah

Number

Level of

servicea Number

Level of

servicea Number

Level of

servicea

Police protection 357 1.8 1 1.4 4 1.0

Fire protectionb 283 1.4 0 0 7 1.8

General 1,673 8.6 1 1.4 4 1.0

Total 2,313 11.9 2 2.8 15 3.9

State of

Georgia

level of

servicea,c

Police protection 2.4

Fire protectionb 1.1

General 52.0

Total 55.4

Part B: South Carolina

Aiken County Aiken Jackson

Number

Level of

servicea Number

Level of

servicea Number

Level of

servicea

Police protection 131 1.4 54 2.1 4 2.5

Fire protectionb 78 0.8 -d -d -d -d

General 60 0.6 239 9.4 7 4.3

Total 269 2.8 347 13.7 11 6.8

New Ellenton North Augusta Wagener

Number

Level of

servicea Number

Level of

servicea Number

Level of

servicea

Police protection 4 1.8 48 2.7 3 3.5

Fire protectionb -

d -d 6 0.3 -d -d

General 5 2.2 125 7.1 5 5.8

Total 9 4.0 179 10.2 8 9.3
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3-64

Table 3.17. Continued

Barnwell County Barnwell Blackville

Number

Level of

servicea Number

Level of

servicea Number

Level of

servicea

Police protection 26 2.1 13 2.6 8 2.7

Fire protectionb -d -d 3 0.6 1 0.3

General 150 12.3 22 4.4 11 3.7

Total 176 14.5 38 7.6 20 6.7

Williston

State of

South

Carolina

level of

service Number a,c

Level of

servicea

Police protection 9 2.7 2.5

Fire protectionb 1 0.3 0.8

General 12 3.6 54.9

Total 22 6.7 58.2

a

Level of service represents the number of employees per 1,000 persons in each

jurisdiction.

b

Does not include volunteers.

c

2000 data.

d

Police and fire services are provided by a combined department.

Sources: Aiken County: Powell (2001); Barnwell County: Aguilar (2001); Columbia County:

J. Johnson (2001); Edgefield County: Harling (2001); Richmond County: Colliander (2001); City

of Aiken: Rideout (2001); City of Jackson: S. Johnson (2001); Town of New Ellenton: Bledsoe

(2001); City of North Augusta (2000); Town of Wagener: Salley (2001); City of Barnwell: Vargo

(2001); Town of Blackville: McDonald (2001); Town of Williston: Fowler (2001); Town of

Grovetown: Kent (2001) and Capatillo (2001); Town of Harlem: Moore (2001); City of Augusta

(1999); Town of Blythe (2000); Town of Hephzibah (2000); U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000).

3.11.6 Traffic

Vehicular access to the SRS is provided from South Carolina SCs 19, 64, 125, 781, and

U.S. Highway 278, as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.8. Highway 19 runs north from the site

through New Ellenton towards Aiken; SC 64 runs in an easterly direction from the site towards

Barnwell; SC 125 runs through the site itself in a southeasterly direction between North Augusta

and Allendale, passing through Beech Island and Jackson. U.S. 278 also runs through the site,

in a southeasterly direction between North Augusta and Barnwell. SC 781 connects U.S. 278

with Willston to the northeast of the site. The northern perimeter of the site is about 16 km

(10 mi) from downtown Aiken. Table 3.21 shows average annual daily traffic (AADT) flows over

these road segments, together with congestion level designations (levels of service). Levels of

service designations were developed by the Transportation Research Board (1985) and range

from A to F. Designations A through C represent good traffic operating conditions with some

minor delays experienced by motorists; F represents jammed roadway conditions.
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Table 3.18. Local physicians data (1997)

County

Number of

physicians

Level of

servicea

Georgia

 Columbia County 324 4.0

 Richmond County 1,189 6.1

South Carolina

 Aiken County 190 1.4

 Barnwell County 14 0.6

a

Level of service represents the number of

physicians per 1,000 persons in each county.

Source: American Medical Association

(1999).

Table 3.19. Local school district data (2001)

School district

Number of

teachers

Student-toteacher ratioa

South Carolina

 Aiken County 1,486 17.0

 Barnwell County

 School District 19 80 14.4

 School District 29 70 14.9

 School District 45 183 15.3

State total 44,967 15.2

Georgia

 Columbia County 1,064 17.0

 Richmond County 2,200 16.0

State total 89,561 16.0

a

The number of students per teacher in each school district.

Sources: Ferriter (2001); Georgia Department of Education (2000).
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Table 3.20. Local medical facility data (2001)

Hospital

Number of

staffed beds

Occupancy

rate (%)a

Aiken Regional Medical Centers 245 56

Barnwell County Hospital 33 37

Georgia Regional Hospital at Augusta 196 79

Medical College of Georgia Hospital 446 56

Select Specialty Hospital 17 NAb

St. Joseph Hospital 151 48

University Hospital 553 50

Walton Rehabilitation Institute 58 78

ROI Total 1,699 -

a

Percent of staffed beds occupied.

b

NA = not available.

Source: SMG Marketing Group Inc. (Copyright 2001, used with

permission).

Table 3.21. Average annual daily traffic (AADT) in the vicinity of the

SRS (2000)

Road segmenta

Traffic

volume

(AADT)

Level of

serviceb

SC 125 in the vicinity of Jackson 13,400 B

U.S. 278 between SC 302 and Barnwell county line 5,400 A

SC 19 in the vicinity of New Ellenton 13,900 B

SC 781 between U.S. 278 and U.S. 78 2,700 A

U.S. 278 to SC 37 2,500 A

SC 64 between SC 20 and Barnwell 6,900 A

SC 125 between SC 17 and Martin 2,100 A

a

SC = state route (highway); U.S. = U.S. highway. 

b

Level of service designations as developed by the Transportation

Research Board (1985). Levels range from A to F, with A representing

the best traffic operating conditions and F representing jammed

roadway conditions.

Source: McCoy (2001), except as noted.
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3.12 Aesthetics

Natural and man-made features give a landscape character and aesthetic quality. The

character of a landscape is determined by the elements of form, line, color, and texture; each

may influence the character of a landscape to a varying degree. The stronger the influence of

any one or all of these elements, and the more visual variety that can successfully coexist in the

landscape, the more aesthetic quality present in the landscape

3.12.1 General Description of the Site

The viewshed within the vicinity of the SRS consists principally of agricultural and forested land,

with some residential and industrial development. The landscape is characterized mainly by

wetland or forest on low mountains and hills with intermittent open land. Vegetation consists of

hardwood forests in the low-lying areas and wetland forests, with oak and pine forests on higher

ground. 

3.12.2 Description of the Location of the Proposed Facilities

Various concrete industrial buildings and other structures, administrative and support buildings,

and parking areas are located within the F-Area at the SRS. The largest structures are

approximately 30 m (100 ft) high, with some stacks and towers reaching 60 m (200 ft) high. All

of the industrial and administrative areas are brightly lit at night and are visible when

approached on SRS access roads. The industrial and other developed areas in the vicinity of

F-Area, including utility corridors, are generally consistent with a Bureau of Land Management

visual resource management (VRM) Class IV designation (activities that lead to major

modification of the existing character of the landscape). The remainder of the site fits a VRM

Class III (hosting activities which at most only moderately change the existing character of the

landscape) or IV designation (DOI 1986a,b). 

The closest publicly accessible viewing location is from State Highway 125, about 6 km (4 mi)

to the southwest. Public view of F-Area is restricted by the heavily wooded terrain between

Route 125 and the site.

3.13 References for Chapter 3

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Aiken, SC. May.

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Transportation) to T. Allison (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL). May.

McDonald, J. 2001. Personal communication from McDonald (Town of Blackville, SC) to

J. Jackson (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL). July.

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(Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL). July.

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1 Definitions of descriptive terms used to categorize the magnitudes of impacts are provided in

Section 2.4.

4-1

4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

4.1 Introduction

This final environmental impact statement (FEIS) evaluates the potential impacts of the 

construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (the

proposed MOX facility) proposed for construction at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Operation

of the proposed MOX facility would also require the construction of two support facilities, the Pit

Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) and the Waste Solidification Building (WSB).

Construction of the facilities would involve site preparation, including the clearing and grading of

land, realignment of electrical utilities, and addition of access roads. After site preparation, the

remaining construction activities would involve excavation for the foundation and erection of the

buildings, connection of SRS utilities to the facilities, and final landscaping. Details of the

construction and operational impacts are provided in Sections 4.3 and Appendix H. Operational

impacts would include routine facility emissions, waste management, and potential accidents. 

The impacts of the transportation of the MOX feed materials, the fresh MOX fuel, and spent

MOX fuel are discussed collectively with the transport of transuranic (TRU) waste generated by

MOX fuel production in Section 4.4.1.1

Once the fresh MOX fuel was manufactured and transported, it would be irradiated in

authorized nuclear reactors as part of the power generation process. Following irradiation, the

spent fuel would be temporarily stored at the reactor sites until shipped to a final disposal

repository. The potential indirect impacts for the use of MOX fuel in a nuclear reactor are

discussed in Section 4.4.3.

An initial evaluation of projected decommissioning impacts is provided in Section 4.3.6. 

However, the exact nature and scope of these impacts are uncertain because only present-day

technologies are considered, and decommissioning of the facilities would occur well into the

future.

In addition to considering the proposed action, this FEIS, in Section 4.2, considers the no-action

alternative should the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) either not authorize

construction of the proposed MOX facility, or not license its operation. Under the no-action

alternative, the surplus plutonium would continue to be stored at its current storage locations.

As stated in Section 1.4.2, this chapter presents significant or more important environmental

impacts of the proposed action and no-action alternative. Impacts considered to be less

significant are presented in Appendixes G and H. The technical areas discussed in this chapter

include human health, air quality, surface water and groundwater, waste management, and

decommissioning. Impacts from potential accidents at the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF,
Environmental Consequences

2 A pit is the core element of a nuclear weapon’s “primary” or fission component.

4-2

and the WSB are discussed in Section 4.3.5. Environmental justice is discussed in detail in

Section 4.3.7. In addition, transportation impacts are discussed in detail for the proposed

action in Section 4.4.1. 

Human health impacts include potential exposure to radiological and chemical materials via

pathways associated with air, water, soil, and the food chain. Air quality impacts relate to

compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) from emissions of chemical

pollutants. Surface and groundwater impacts relate to capacity effects from using these waters

and to potential changes in quality of these waters. Waste management impacts relate to the

types and quantities of both radiological, hazardous, and nonhazardous wastes generated and

how those wastes would be handled. Generally technical terms used in this chapter are defined

and discussed in Chapter 3. In those cases, the reader is referred back to specific areas of

Chapter 3.

4.2 Impacts of the No-Action Alternative

4.2.1 Introduction

As described in Section 2.1, the no-action alternative would be a decision by the NRC not to

approve the proposed MOX facility. If such a decision is made, the 34 MT (37.5 tons) of

weapons-useable fissile nuclear materials would remain in storage at DOE sites. The impacts

of the continued storage of surplus plutonium would be essentially the same as those discussed

under the no-action alternative of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact

Statement (SPD EIS) (DOE 1999a, Section 4.2) and are summarized in the following sections. 

Some of the impacts for the no-action alternative presented in this EIS represent impacts for

the entire DOE site at which the surplus plutonium is currently being stored.

It is possible that limited new construction would be required at one or more sites to upgrade

surplus plutonium storage conditions. For example, previous analyses assumed that surplus

pits2

 at the Pantex site in Texas would be moved from Zone 4 to Zone 12, but DOE decided to

leave the surplus pits in Zone 4 for long-term storage (DOE 2002a). If new construction is

required to accommodate continued storage, the impacts of that construction would be

addressed under a separate environmental review required by the DOE regulations for

implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (Code of Federal Regulations

Title 10, Part 1021 [10 CFR 1021]).

The SPD EIS discusses plans to build an Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF) at

the SRS and to move SRS surplus plutonium to that facility for continued storage (DOE 1999a). 

After publication of the SPD EIS, the APSF project was canceled. Surplus plutonium at the

SRS continues to be stored in existing facilities. It should also be noted that the potential

impacts of construction and operation of the proposed MOX facility (as summarized in
Environmental Consequences

4-3

Section 4.3) would be avoided by implementation of the continued storage alternative. The

impacts of continued storage are presented in the following sections.

The DOE is currently working to close the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS)

by the year 2006. Such a closure entails the shipment of all radioactive waste and special

nuclear materials, including the surplus plutonium, to off-site locations. Storage of the RFETS

surplus plutonium at other DOE sites currently storing surplus plutonium is expected to result in

a long-term reduction of radiological exposure to workers and the public. For example,

approximately 6 MT (6.6 tons) of plutonium dioxide is expected to be shipped from the RFETS

to the SRS (Roberson 2002). Storage of the additional plutonium material during normal

operations was estimated to result in small, if any, impacts to noninvolved workers and the

public (DOE 2002c). The eventual removal and return of the shipping containers was estimated

to result in a dose of no greater than 1 mrem/yr to a maximally exposed individual (MEI) of the

public (DOE 2002c). Thus the cumulative risks from the no-action alternative presented in

Table 4.1, which includes the RFETS, are expected to bound the risks that the surplus

plutonium will contribute to other DOE storage sites following shipment from the RFETS.

4.2.2 Human Health Risk

4.2.2.1 Radiological Risk

The radiological doses and risks for members of the public are shown in Table 4.1 for all

ongoing activities at each of the storage sites; radiological doses and risks from maintaining the

surplus plutonium are portions of the totals. The doses are less than 2% of doses associated

with natural background (see Section 3.10.3 and Table 3.7 for information on background

radiation).

The average annual dose to facility workers maintaining the surplus plutonium inventories at the

storage sites is also shown in Table 4.1. The maximum individual worker dose for the sites

(3.2 mSv/yr [320 mrem/yr] at Pantex) is 16% of the administrative limit set by DOE

(DOE 1999b) and 6% of the radiological limit of 50 mSv/yr (5,000 mrem/yr) as specified in 10

CFR 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection.”

4.2.2.2 Chemical Exposure and Risk

Health risks from exposure to hazardous chemicals used in ongoing operations at the storage

sites within the DOE complex were estimated in the Storage and Disposition of WeaponsUsable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1996a,

Appendix M) (these risks are also summarized in the SPD EIS [DOE 1999a]). The estimated

baseline cancer risks for the storage sites include inhalation exposures to all carcinogens

measured from site point emission sources. Surplus plutonium storage would account for only

a small portion of the total exposures from ongoing operations at the various DOE sites. For

members of the public, the estimated increased lifetime cancer risks from continued operations
Environmental Consequences

4-4

Table 4.1. Radiological impacts from continued plutonium

storage in current locationsa,b

Site

Annual

population

dose within

80 km

in 2030

[person-Sv

(person-rem)]

Expected number of

fatal cancers in

population from

50 years of storagec

Annual dose to

the public MEI

[mSv (mrem)]

Public MEI

50-year fatal

cancer riskc

Average

worker

dose

[mSv/yr

(mrem/yr)]

Hanford 4.7 × 10-4

(4.7 × 10-2)

1 × 10-3 4.1 × 10-6

(4.1 × 10-4)

1 × 10-8 2.5 (250)

INEEL 7.6 × 10-7

(7.6 × 10-5)

2 × 10-6 1.4 × 10-7

(1.4 × 10-5)

4 × 10-10 0.26 (26)

Pantex 6.3 × 10-8

(6.3 × 10-6)

2 × 10-7 1.8 × 10-10

(1.8 × 10-8)

5 × 10-13 3.2 (320)d

SRS 2.9 × 10-6

(2.9 × 10-4)

9 × 10-6 6.8 × 10-8

(6.8 × 10-6)

2 × 10-10 2.5 (250)

LLNL 6.7 × 10-5

(6.7 × 10-3)

2 × 10-4 3.1 × 10-6

(3.1 × 10-4)

9 × 10-9 2.5 (250)

LANL 0.027

(2.7)

8 × 10-2 6.5 × 10-2

(6.5)

2 × 10-4 2.5 (250)

RFETSe 1.0 × 10-3

(0.10)

3 × 10-3 4.8 × 10-3

(0.48)

1 × 10-5 2.5 (250) 

a

The population doses and cancer risks are from all ongoing activities at each site. The worker doses are

for workers involved in surplus plutonium continued storage activities.

b

MEI = maximally exposed individual, INEEL = Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory,

SRS = Savannah River Site, LLNL = Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, LANL = Los Alamos National

Laboratory, RFETS = Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site.

c

Latent cancer fatalities are calculated by multiplying dose by the Federal Guidance Report

(FGR) 13 health risk conversion factor of 0.06 fatal cancer per person-Sv (6 × 10-4 fatal cancer per personrem) (Eckerman et al. 1999).

d

This is the dose for workers involved in gasket replacement activities projected to occur over a period of

10 years; the dose for other storage workers at Pantex would be 1.16 mSv/yr (116 mrem/yr).

e

Closure of the RFETS is planned for 2006. As discussed in Section 4.2.2.1, the risks presented here are

expected to bound the impacts on storage of the RFETS surplus plutonium at other DOE storage sites.

Source: DOE (1999a, Section 4.2.4, based on data in DOE 1996a).

at all the storage sites were estimated to be lower than or within the risk range of 1 × 10-6 to

1 × 10-4 (the target used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to determine

whether mitigation actions are needed [EPA 1990; see Section 3.10.4]). Except for Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the hazard index (HI) for members of the public was

also less than 1 in every case (an HI of less than 1 indicates no or small noncancer health risk;

see Section 3.10.4). The general public HI for LLNL was estimated as 1.1, narrowly exceeding

the noncancer health risk screening criterion. For the site employee populations, the noncancer

HI values for all sites except the SRS and LLNL were less than 1; the value for the SRS was

1.2, and the value for LLNL was 2.4. Estimated cancer risks from ongoing operations for

employees at several sites (i.e., Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory

[INEEL], SRS, LANL, RFETS) also exceeded EPA’s tolerable risk range, although none was

greater than 10-3. 
Environmental Consequences

4-5

The emissions data used as the basis for the HI values and cancer risks from all ongoing

operations at the storage sites are several years old. The methods used to estimate the HI

values and cancer risks are generally conservative (assuming such things as the public

receptor present at the site boundary for 24 hours per day), resulting in overestimates of actual

exposure. Furthermore, only a small portion of the total exposures from site emissions would

be from plutonium storage activities. Therefore, although it is possible on the basis of the cited

data that members of the public (for LLNL) or on-site employees (for several sites) might

experience adverse health impacts as a result of exposures from ongoing plutonium storage

operations, it is more likely that actual exposures would be less than those that would result in

adverse health impacts.

4.2.2.3 Physical Hazards

The number of full-time employees required to maintain continued storage of the excess

plutonium at the various sites was not given in the SPD EIS (DOE 1999a). Therefore, it is not

possible on the basis of available information to estimate the annual number of fatalities and

injuries that would be associated with continued plutonium storage under the no-action

alternative.

4.2.2.4 Facility Accidents

The potential for accidental release of plutonium from storage vaults is much lower than for

release from MOX fuel fabrication, which involves numerous operations. In the SPD EIS

(DOE 1999a), the health risks of beyond-design-basis earthquake events on plutonium storage

facilities were reported for the off-site population. Of the DOE sites evaluated, a high value of

0.4 latent cancer fatality (LCF) was reported for the 80-km (50-mi) off-site population at INEEL

(see Section 3.10.3 for LCF definition). For a MEI of the public, an explosive airplane crash at

Pantex was estimated to result in an LCF probability of 0.04.

There is no known use of hazardous chemicals required for the continued storage of the

surplus plutonium at the various storage sites. Therefore, accidental release of hazardous

chemicals during continued storage would not be expected.

4.2.3 Air Quality

The SPD EIS (DOE 1999a) summarized ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants (carbon

monoxide [CO], nitrogen dioxide [NO2] , particulate matter with a diameter of 10 m or less

[PM10], and sulfur dioxide [SO2]) at each storage site from total site contributions, including

plutonium storage operations. With one exception, the total site contributions were in

compliance with applicable standards. At LLNL, however, the estimated maximum 1-hour

ambient concentration of NO2 was 2.5 times higher than the State of California standard. 

Because plutonium storage operations do not generate appreciable quantities of NO2,
Environmental Consequences

4-6

continued storage of the plutonium would not change the impacts of ongoing operations on air

quality at LLNL.

4.2.4 Hydrology

The annual water usage and wastewater discharges for all ongoing activities at each of the

storage sites are shown in Table 4.2. Water use and wastewater generation for maintaining the

surplus plutonium storage are small portions of the totals. No impacts to surface or groundwater resources from continued storage are anticipated beyond those of existing activities.

4.2.5 Waste Management

For all the storage locations, wastes generated by activities required to maintain continued

storage of surplus plutonium would be a portion of the existing waste generation rates and are

not anticipated to change appreciably. Continued storage should not have a major impact on

waste management activities at any of the sites.

4.3 Impacts of the Proposed Action

This section presents the direct impacts of the proposed action. As discussed in Section 2.2,

the proposed action is for NRC to authorize DCS to construct and later operate the proposed

MOX facility at the SRS to convert 34 MT (37.5 tons) of surplus plutonium to MOX fuel. 

Section 4.3.1 presents the estimated impacts to human health. Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 cover

potential impacts to air and water, respectively. Waste management impacts (Section 4.3.4),

potential accident impacts (Section 4.3.5), and environmental justice impacts (Section 4.3.7) 

Table 4.2. Annual water usage and wastewater

discharges for the sites of continued

plutonium storage

Site

Water requirement

(million L/yr)a

Wastewater discharge

(million L/yr)

Hanford 13,511/195 246

INEEL 0/7,570 540

Pantex 0/249 141

SRS 127,000/13,247 700

LLNL NAb NAb

LANL 0/5,760 693

RFETS 439/0 130

a

Surface water/groundwater.

b

NA = not available.

Source: DOE (1996a, Section 4.2).
Environmental Consequences

4-7

were also evaluated. The scope of the proposed action includes decommissioning of the

proposed facilities (Section 4.3.6).

As discussed in Section 1.4.1, the technology option to substitute sand filters for the proposed

high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters was identified during the scoping process. 

Discussions of the differences in impacts between sand filters and HEPA filters are summarized

in Section 4.3.8.

Construction of the proposed MOX facility is assumed to occur over a 5-year period.

Construction of the WSB is assumed to occur during the same 5-year period; whereas

construction of the PDCF is assumed to begin 2 years after the construction start for the other

facilities (DCS 2002c). 

If construction of the proposed MOX facility is authorized, DCS plans to submit an application

for a 20-year license to possess and use special nuclear material to manufacture MOX fuel. 

The actual operation period may be 10 to 14 years, with the additional time needed for facility

startup, testing, and decommissioning prior to license termination. For purposes of evaluating

operational impacts, a 10-year period was assumed for processing the 34 MT (37.5 tons) of

surplus plutonium. That period is based on the facility design for a maximum annual throughput

of 3.5 MT (3.9 tons) of plutonium. If the actual period of operation is greater than 10 years

because the actual throughput is less than the maximum facility design capacity, the annual

impacts would be less, but they would occur over a longer time period.

The following sections present potential impacts on human health, air quality, hydrology, waste

management, and environmental justice. A discussion of the impacts in other technical areas is

presented in Appendix H.

4.3.1 Human Health Risk

4.3.1.1 Radiological Risk

4.3.1.1.1 Construction

The construction workers for the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB, like other

workers at the SRS, would be subject to exposure to baseline radiation from other SRS

activities. However, no additional radiological impacts to the construction workers, to existing

SRS workers, or members of the public off-site are expected from the construction activities

because no surface contamination is present.

Although radioactive contamination is present in the groundwater underlying the Old F-Area

Seepage Basin and the proposed MOX facility, the primary movement of this contamination is

expected to follow the direction of the groundwater flow. This direction is toward the northnorthwest, where the groundwater discharges to Upper Three Runs Creek (WSRC 1995), away
Environmental Consequences

4-8

from the proposed facilities. Another possible source of exposure of the construction workers

would be any radioactively contaminated soil in the area disturbed by construction activities. An

exploration and sampling program across the project site, however, did not identify any

radioactive contaminants (DCS 2000b; Fledderman 2002). As discussed in Section 5.2.8, soil

would be further sampled for radioactive contamination before excavation begins at the site. If

contamination was found, potential exposures and health impacts to the construction workers

would be assessed.

4.3.1.1.2 Operations

Radiological impacts to human health from normal operations would result from releases to the

environment and direct exposure of facility workers to sources of radiation (see description in

Section 3.10). The impacts were evaluated for three receptor groups (facility workers, SRS

employees, and members of the public). 

All radiological impacts were assessed in terms of committed dose and associated health

effects. The dose calculated was the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) (10 CFR Part 20),

which is the sum of the deep dose equivalent (DDE) from exposure to external radiation and the

50-year committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) from exposures to internal radiation. 

Details of the dose calculations are provided in Appendix E. The DDE is the dose equivalent at

a tissue depth of 1 cm and applies to external whole-body exposure. The CEDE is the dose

equivalent to organs or tissues that is received over a 50-year period following the intake of

radioactive material.

For each of the receptor groups, doses were estimated for the group as a whole (population or

collective dose) and for an MEI. The MEI was defined as a hypothetical person who —

because of proximity, activities, or living habits — could receive the highest possible dose. The

MEI for SRS employees and members of the public usually was assumed to be at the location

of the highest on-site or off-site air concentrations of contaminants, respectively — even if no

individual actually worked or lived there. Under actual conditions, all radiation exposures and

releases of radioactive material to the environment are required to be as low as reasonably

achievable (ALARA), a practice that has as its objective the attainment of dose levels as far

below applicable limits as is practical, taking into account social, technical, economic, and

public policy considerations. Annual estimated radiological impacts from normal operations of

the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB are provided in Table 4.3.

Facility Workers 

MOX facility: Approximately 400 workers are expected to be employed at the MOX facility. 

Facility workers during normal operations were estimated to receive an annual collective dose

of 0.15 person-Sv (15 person-rem). Approximately 0.12 person-Sv (12 person-rem) would be

from external exposure and the remaining 0.03 person-Sv (3 person-rem) from internal

exposure. The resulting health effects were calculated to be approximately 0.009 LCF/yr. On

average, the facility workers’ dominant exposure pathway would be external exposure. 
4-9

Environmental Consequences Table 4.3. Annual estimated radiological impacts to facility workers, SRS employees, and the public from normal operations at the proposed facilities PDCF MOX facility WSB Receptor Dose [person-Sv (person-rem)] Latent cancer fatalities/yra Dose [person-Sv (person-rem)] Latent cancer fatalities/yra Dose [person-Sv (person-rem)] Latent cancer fatalities/yra Collective population Facility workers 1.97 (197) 0.1 0.15 (15) 0.009 0.50 (50) 0.03

 SRS employees  (13,295)b

0.00031

(0.031)

2 ×10-5 0.00022

(0.022)

1 ×10-5 –c –

 Public (1,042,000 persons off-site)

0.015(1.5) 0.0009 0.00073

(0.073)

4 ×10-5 – –

PDCF MOX facility WSB

Dose

[Sv (rem)] LCF riskd

Dose

[Sv (rem)] LCF riskd

Dose

[Sv (rem)] LCF riskd

Maximally exposed individual Facility worker 0.020

(2.0)

0.001 0.017

(1.7)

0.001 0.020

(2.0)

0.001

 SRS employee  (225 m to the ENE)

5.6 ×10-7

(5.6 ×10-5)

3 ×10-8 4.2 ×10-7

(4.2 ×10-5)

3 ×10-8 – –

 Public  (10,680 m to the N)

3.5 ×10-8

(3.5 ×10-6)

2 ×10-9 5.1 ×10-9

(5.1 ×10-7)

3 ×10-10 – –

aLatent cancer fatalities are calculated by multiplying dose by the Federal Guidance Report (FGR) 13 health risk conversion factor of

0.06 fatal cancer per person-Sv (6 × 10-4 fatal cancer per person-rem) (Eckerman et al. 1999).

bSource: Birch (2001).cImpacts from the WSB are included in the proposed MOX facility results.dFor annual individual exposure estimates, number represents the lifetime risk of fatality from a radiologically induced cancer.
Environmental Consequences

4-10

However, the MEI dose of approximately 0.017 Sv/yr (1.7 rem/yr) with a fatal cancer risk of

1 chance in 1,000 (0.001) was estimated from inhalation exposure. The facility worker

estimates were based on operational experience from a similar facility, as discussed in

Appendix E.

PDCF: Average annual worker exposures are expected to remain below 0.005 Sv/yr

(0.5 rem/yr), the SRS guideline. For 393 workers, an annual collective dose should not exceed

1.97 person-Sv (197 person-rem) with the potential for 0.1 LCFs/yr of operation. The maximum

annual exposure to a single facility worker is expected to be maintained less than the DOE

administrative limit of 0.02 Sv/yr (2 rem/yr) (DOE 1994). Such an exposure has an expected

lifetime risk of developing a fatal cancer of approximately 0.001 (1 chance in 1,000).

WSB: Average annual worker exposures are expected to remain below 0.005 Sv/yr

(0.5 rem/yr), the SRS guideline. For 100 workers, an annual collective dose should not exceed

0.50 person-Sv (50 person-rem) with the potential for 0.03 LCFs/yr of operation. The maximum

annual exposure to a single facility worker is expected to be maintained at less than the DOE

administrative limit of 0.02 Sv/yr (2 rem/yr). Such an exposure has an expected lifetime risk of

developing a fatal cancer of approximately 0.001 (1 chance in 1,000). 

SRS Employees

MOX facility and WSB: Normal operations were estimated to result in an annual collective

SRS employee dose of 0.00022 person-Sv/yr (0.022 person-rem/yr), which corresponds to

approximately 1 x 10-5 LCF/yr. The MEI dose was found to occur at a location 225 m (738 ft)

east-northeast of the proposed MOX facility stack location. The MEI was estimated to receive a

dose of 4.2 x 10-7 Sv/yr (4.2 x 10-5 rem/yr), which results in an annual fatal cancer risk of 3 x 10-8

(1 chance in 33 million).

PDCF: Normal operations were estimated to result in an annual collective dose of

0.00031 person-Sv (0.031 person-rem) to the SRS employee population, resulting in an

estimated 2 x 10-5 LCFs/yr of operation. An MEI located 225 m (738 ft) east-northeast of the

facility stack location was estimated to receive an annual dose of 5.6 x 10-7 person-Sv

(5.6 x 10-5 person-rem). The resulting lifetime LCF is approximately 3 x 10-8 (1 chance in

33 million).

Members of the Public

Operation of the facilities is considered to have an insignificant impact on members of the

public. Maximally exposed individuals of the public were estimated to receive exposures that

are about 10,000 times less than that received from the baseline radiological exposures as

discussed in Section 3.10.3.

MOX facility and WSB: For members of the public, operations were estimated to result in an

annual collective population dose of 0.00073 person-Sv/yr (0.073 person-rem/yr), which is
Environmental Consequences

4-11

about 3.2% of the estimated dose received by the public from air emissions from the SRS for

the year 2000 (0.023 person-Sv [2.3 person-rem]), as discussed in Section 3.10. The number

of expected annual LCFs from operations was estimated to be 4 x 10-5. The MEI location was

determined to be at the SRS fenceline, 10,680 m (35,040 ft) north of the proposed MOX facility

stack location. An MEI at this location would receive an estimated annual dose of

5.1 x 10-9Sv/yr (5.1 x 10-7 rem/yr). This dose corresponds to an annual fatal cancer risk of

3 x 10-10 and is 1.3% of the estimated dose received by the public MEI from air emissions from

the SRS for the year 2000 (4 x 10-7 Sv [4 × 10-5 rem]), as discussed in Section 3.10.

PDCF: Normal operations were estimated to result in an annual collective population dose of

0.015 person-Sv (1.5 person-rem) that corresponds to approximately 0.0009 LCFs/yr of

operation. Thus, the average member of the public would receive a dose of approximately

1.4 x 10-8 Sv (1.4 x 10-6 rem), with an expected lifetime risk of developing a fatal cancer of

9 x 10-10 (1 chance in 1.1 billion). The pubic MEI was estimated to receive an individual dose of

3.5 x 10-8 Sv (3.5 x 10-6 rem) that has an expected lifetime fatal cancer risk of 2 x 10-9 (1 chance

in 500 million).

4.3.1.2 Chemical Exposure and Risk

4.3.1.2.1 Construction

The potential airborne emissions of criteria pollutants (a group of air pollutants for which federal

ambient standards exist) from construction of the proposed MOX facility and supporting

facilities are summarized in Section 4.3.2.1. Emissions of toxic air pollutants during

construction would be very low (less than 1 kg/yr (2 lb/yr) [DCS 2000a, 2002a]) and would not

result in adverse health impacts. The potential ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants at

or beyond the SRS boundary resulting from facility construction emissions were modeled. The

estimated incremental criteria pollutant levels varied between 0.01% and 5% of the applicable

ambient standard levels (see Table 4.6 in Section 4.3.2.1). Levels of criteria pollutants above

the ambient standard levels would not be expected in the vicinity of SRS. 

Wastewater generated during construction would be transported to the SRS Central Sanitary

Wastewater Treatment Facility for treatment (DCS 2002a). No adverse impacts from human

exposure to contaminants in wastewater effluents are expected from the construction of the

facilities.

Hazardous wastes generated during construction would be shipped off-site to permitted

commercial recycling, treatment, and disposal facilities. Exposure to hazardous materials used

during construction (e.g., paints, solvents) would be kept to a minimum by following applicable

OSHA regulations and precautions, such as ensuring good ventilation and cleaning up small

chemical spills as soon as they occur.

If soil contamination from past site activities exists in the construction area for the proposed

facilities, construction workers doing excavation work could be exposed, primarily through
Environmental Consequences

4-12

inhalation or incidental soil ingestion. The project site is located at the northern boundary of the

main processing facility in the F-Area. Historically, the site proposed for facility construction has

been used as a disposal area for excavated soil from F-Area construction projects (Wike 2000). 

A recent limited investigation of possible contamination in the proposed construction area

included 50 shallow soil samples (i.e., cores from 0 to 12 in.) (Fledderman 2002). Data were

available for 10 metals (aluminum, beryllium, chromium, copper, gallium, iron, lead,

manganese, nickel, and zinc). The concentrations in all samples were lower than the

corresponding EPA Region IX health-based screening levels for industrial use properties. 

These results do not indicate an initial cause for concern regarding potential chemical

exposures for excavation workers. However, the number of substances analyzed was low, and

past operating history shows extensive contamination at SRS with such substances as

trichloroethylene and arsenic, which were not analyzed in the soil samples. Also, if

contamination was present at lower soil depths it would not have been detected. Therefore, if

indications of possible chemical contamination (e.g., chemical odors, presence of old

construction rubble) are observed during excavation activities, further soil testing to evaluate

the potential for adverse health impacts to construction workers would be necessary.

4.3.1.2.2 Operations

During operations, the proposed MOX facility would use about 30 chemicals for processing,

mostly for aqueous polishing to remove impurities from the plutonium (DCS 2004a; Table 3-2;

DCS 2002b; 2004b); the chemicals would include dodecane, hydrazine, hydrogen peroxide,

hydroxylamine nitrate, nitric acid, nitrogen, nitrogen tetroxide, and tributyl phosphate. The WSB

would use three chemicals for waste processing: aluminum nitrate, nitric acid, and sodium

hydroxide (DCS 2004a; Table G-2). Operation of the PDCF would require about 15 processing

chemicals, including nitrogen, chlorine, sulfuric acid, phosphoric acid, and aluminum sulfate

(DOE 1999a; Table E-7). At all three facilities, the chemicals would generally be stored in liquid

or compressed gas form. Accidental releases of the process chemicals are discussed in

Section 4.3.5.3 and Appendix E. After the chemicals were used in operations, resulting wastes

would be recycled through the systems or disposed of at appropriate licensed facilities for

hazardous or radioactive waste. The facilities would not discharge any process liquid directly to

the environment. 

Facility Workers. For normal operations, inhalation exposures and risks for facility workers

(those working at the proposed MOX facility and related facilities) are difficult to estimate. This

is due, in part, to the large amount of uncertainty associated with estimating airborne chemical

concentrations in various rooms of the facilities. For this reason, quantitative estimates of risks

to facility workers from inhalation of substances emitted during facility operations were not

developed for this FEIS. However, the workplace environment would be monitored to ensure

that airborne chemical concentrations were below applicable occupation exposure limits. In

addition, health risks from occupational exposure through all pathways would be minimized by

using enclosed operations (e.g., gloveboxes) to the extent possible.
Environmental Consequences

3 A chemical with a “low volatility” does not readily change from a liquid to a gas at a relatively low

temperature (e.g., near room temperature).

4-13

SRS Employees and the Public. SRS employees and members of the public could be

exposed to chemicals emitted to air, water, or soil from the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF,

and the WSB. 

In general, the chemicals involved in processing at the three facilities would be used in small

amounts, have low volatilities3

, and/or have low toxicities. On the basis of information that

emissions of hazardous chemicals from all three facilities to air and water would be very low

(Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3), no hazard index or increased cancer risk estimates were made for

SRS employees and the public. Adverse impacts to SRS employees and the public from

exposure to air or water emissions from the facilities would not be expected. Two process

chemicals from the proposed MOX facility requiring special consideration, hydrazine and

uranium dioxide, are discussed below.

Hydrazine would be used in the aqueous polishing process to separate plutonium from the

solvent. Hydrazine is highly reactive and corrosive; it is a carcinogen and a reproductive

hazard. The maximum anticipated on-site inventory of hydrazine would be 480 L (126 gal);

annual use would be 2,000 L (530 gal). In the Reagent Storage Building, hydrazine would be

kept in sealed containers. Prior to use in the aqueous polishing process, the hydrazine would

be blanketed with nitrogen (a process in which the nitrogen gas, which does not mix well with

hydrazine, shields the liquid hydrazine from unwanted side reactions). As discussed in

Section 3.10.4.2, current SRS sitewide hydrazine emissions do not result in exceedance of the

ambient level specified in the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control

(SCDHEC) standard. During permitting of the proposed MOX facility, demonstration that

operational hydrazine emissions would be limited to levels that would not cause exceedance of

the SCDHEC standard would be conducted.

During the fuel fabrication process, purified plutonium dioxide powder would be mixed with

depleted uranium dioxide powder. The health risk from plutonium exposure is dominated by the

radiological risk, whereas the health risk from uranium exposure is dominated by the chemical

risk (i.e., possible damage to the kidney). The radiological health risk from plutonium emissions

during operations of the proposed MOX facility and related facilities is addressed above in

Section 4.3.1.1.2.

In the proposed MOX facility, uranium powder would be processed in closed containers located

in gloveboxes to confine contamination to inaccessible areas and keep occupational exposures

within specified guideline and standard levels (DCS 2004a). Air exhaust from gloveboxes

would be equipped with HEPA filters to collect particulate emissions. Operation of the facility

would generate less than 1 g of uranium emissions annually (see Table E.1). These uranium

emissions would result in small exposures and chemical health risks for SRS employees and

the public.
Environmental Consequences

4-14

4.3.1.3 Physical Hazards

4.3.1.3.1 Construction

As with any construction project, there would be occupational hazards to construction workers

at the proposed MOX facility and related facilities. Occupational hazards were estimated by

using the same method as was discussed in Section 3.10.5 for baseline physical hazards. The

annual fatality and injury rates for construction activities used were as follows: 13.6 fatalities per

100,000 full-time workers and 4.2 injuries per 100 full-time workers (NSC 2001). On the basis

of this methodology, the annual number of fatalities was calculated to be less than 1 for all

facilities, assuming peak year employment (see Table 4.4). The estimated annual number of

injuries was about 40 per year for each facility. The injuries included in these numbers are

those resulting in lost workdays, not including the day of injury.

4.3.1.3.2 Operations

Occupational hazards associated with normal operations at the proposed MOX facility and

related facilities were estimated by the same method discussed in Section 3.10.5; impacts are

summarized in Table 4.4. Annual fatality and injury rates used were as follows: 3.3 fatalities per

100,000 full-time workers and 4.6 injuries per 100 full-time workers (NSC 2001). Annual fatality

and injury rates for the manufacturing sector were used because that sector was assumed to

be the most representative for operational work at the proposed facilities. The annual number

of fatalities was estimated to be less than 1 for all facilities. The estimated number of injuries

was 36 per year collectively for operation of the proposed MOX facility and the PDCF, and 5 per

year for the WSB (includes only injuries resulting in lost workdays, not including the day of

injury).

4.3.2 Air Quality

This section presents the maximum potential air quality impacts associated with construction

and operation of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB. Air quality impacts

associated with construction and operation of the facilities were assessed by determining the

concentrations of pollutants in the air caused by emissions associated with the facilities and

comparing those concentrations with generally accepted measures of air quality impact,

typically standards set by regulatory agencies. Two types of standards exist. Incremental

standards set maximum concentrations that cannot be exceeded by emissions from sources

associated with a facility or facilities. Total standards set maximum concentrations that cannot

be exceeded by total emissions from both sources associated with a facility or facilities and

other nearby sources, such as existing SRS sources. 

Determining the air quality concentrations involves three steps. First, the emissions of the

sources associated with a facility or facilities are calculated. Next, the incremental

concentrations caused by these emissions are determined with an air quality model that uses

emissions and meteorological data to estimate concentrations at various locations. To
4-15

Environmental Consequences Table 4.4. Annual physical hazard impacts from normal operationsa Facility Peak year construction FTEsb Annual operations FTEsb Projected annual fatalities – construction Projected annual fatalities – operations Projected annual injuries – construction Projected annual injuries – operations MOX facility 950 400 0.13 0.013 40 18 PDCF 1,024 400 0.14 0.013 40 18 WSB 1,000 100 0.14 0.003 42 5

aFatality estimates of less than 0.5 should be interpreted as “no expected fatalities.” Construction of

each of the facilities is projected to require 3 to 5 years. The duration of operations is estimated as 10 ormore years.

bFull-time equivalent employees; the numbers of FTEs were obtained from DCS (2004a) for the

proposed MOX facility and the WSB, and from DOE (1999a) for the PDCF.
Environmental Consequences

4 PM2.5 background values were the 2001 maximum annual average and the maximum 98th percentile

concentrations measured at the two rural background monitors within 80 km (50 mi) of the MOX

facility. Compliance with the 24-hour PM2.5 standard is based on the 98th percentile values being

below the standard level.

4-16

determine a total concentration, the impacts of other sources not associated with a facility or

facilities must be added to the incremental concentrations. The impacts of these other sources

are determined either by additional modeling or by selecting a measured background

concentration representative of the impacts of the sources not modeled. Finally, the

incremental concentrations due to a facility or facilities alone or the total concentrations due to a

facility or facilities and other sources are compared against appropriate measures of impact.

In this analysis, incremental impacts of construction activities and operations were determined

separately using the Industrial Source Complex Short Term (ISCST3) air quality model (EPA

1995). (Appendix F provides additional detail on the calculations of emissions and the

assumptions and data used in the model.) The ISCST3 model is recommended by the EPA for

modeling construction activities and operations. The meteorological data used in modeling

came from Athens, or Atlanta, Georgia, and Columbia, South Carolina, nearby locations where

meteorological data are recorded. The maximum modeled pollutant concentrations were

selected to represent the impact of construction activities or operations. 

The impacts of other sources were taken into account by adding two additional concentrations

to the facility maximum: an SRS maximum concentration for other sources at the SRS (SRS

maxima) and a background concentration representing the overall impact of non-SRS sources. 

The total concentrations were then compared with the applicable ambient standard levels given

in Table 3.3. Facility maxima were compared with the incremental PSD standards to provide

another measure of impact.

The background concentrations are those used by the State of South Carolina to evaluate air

quality impacts. The SRS environmental staff modeled the maxima in support of its air permit

process (SCDHEC 2001). These SRS maxima are based on the assumption that all permitted

sources operate at their fully permitted limits; thus these values are conservative estimates of

SRS impacts. In addition, for a given pollutant and averaging time, maximum values

associated with the proposed action and other SRS facilities are unlikely to occur at the same

locations. Adding them together for comparison with the corresponding standard level adds

additional conservatism to the procedure. 

A slightly different procedure was used to evaluate potential impacts of PM2.5. Implementation

of the PM2.5 standard has been delayed, and states have not developed plans for attaining it. 

SRS maxima and background values were not available for PM2.5. Background values were

taken as the maximum concentrations measured at background monitors within 80 km (50 mi)4

of the SRS and were added to the modeled facility maxima for comparison with applicable

standard levels. Background concentrations also were not available for air toxics and are

generally considered negligible. Therefore, for air toxics, the sum of the facility maximum

concentration and the SRS maxima was taken to be the total concentration for comparison with

ambient standard levels.
Environmental Consequences

4-17

4.3.2.1 Construction

The earth-moving activities during the construction period for the proposed MOX facility and the

WSB will not overlap the earth-moving activity period for the PDCF. The impacts presented

below assume simultaneous construction of the proposed MOX facility and the WSB and were

found to exceed the impacts from construction of the PDCF. The impacts presented are,

therefore, considered to be bounding for construction activities.

During construction, emissions of criteria pollutants (see Section 3.4.2), total suspended

particulates (TSP), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) would include fugitive dust

emissions from earthmoving activities, fugitive dust emissions from the concrete batch plant,

and exhaust emissions from diesel-powered construction equipment and from worker and

delivery vehicles. The emissions associated with constructing the proposed MOX facility and

the WSB are listed in Table 4.5. The tabulation does not include emissions of lead, a criteria

pollutant. The phaseout of lead in gasoline has led to a significant reduction in lead levels

throughout the country. Appendix F summarizes the emission factors and assumptions used in

estimating construction emissions.

Fugitive dust emissions would be the emissions of principal concern during construction of the

facilities. Dust from construction activities and exhaust from diesel construction equipment

would be emitted within the limited area of the construction site. Other vehicles used by

construction workers and for deliveries would emit exhaust along various roadways around the

site, and this dispersal would reduce the impacts of these emissions relative to emissions from

the limited construction area. Therefore, only fugitive dust emissions from construction

activities and operation of the concrete batch plant and exhaust emissions from construction

equipment were analyzed for the construction phase.

The results of the impact analysis for construction of the proposed MOX facility and the WSB,

including the total concentration and its individual components (i.e., the modeled facility

maximum, the SRS maximum, and the background concentration) are presented in Table 4.6. 

As noted above, the totals are conservative in that they overestimate the likely concentrations. 

Comparison of the total concentrations with applicable ambient standard levels provides a

measure of the impact of construction.

Annual maxima would occur 10.7 to 9.5 km (5.9 to 6.7 mi) west northwest of the proposed MOX

facility site. Short-term maxima would occur 9.5 to 10.4 km (5.9 to 6.5 mi) west or west

northwest of the site except for the 1-hour CO maximum, which would occur 20.6 km (12.8 mi)

to the southeast.

The total TSP concentration would be close to, but still less than, the maximum value allowed

by the applicable standard. Most of this TSP concentration would be due to existing sources;

the TSP concentration from facility construction would be at most only 0.06% of the standard

level. Expected PM10 ambient levels would not exceed standard levels, and the concentrations

from construction of the facilities would be equivalent to, at most, 5.0 and 0.05% of the 24-hour

and annual PM10 standard levels, respectively.
Environmental Consequences

4-18

Table 4.5. MOX facility and WSB construction emissionsa,b,c

Construction

Construction Concrete batch equipment

fugitive dustd plant exhaust

Annual Hourly Annual Hourly Annual Hourly

Pollutant (kg/yr) (g/h) (kg/yr) (g/h) (kg/yr) (g/h)

TSP 121,000 59,200 5,670 2,730 5,580 2,680

PM10 36,900 17,800 1,640 790 5,580 2,680

PM2.5 18,500 8,880 850 409 5,580 2,680

CO 0 0 0 0 25,600 12,300

NO2 0 0 0 0 67,600 32,500

SO2 0 0 0 0 6,510 3,130

VOC 0 0 0 0 6,550 3,150

a

See Appendix F for details on emission calculations.

b

Hourly values are based on a construction schedule of 8 hours per day, 5 days per

week, 52 weeks per year.

c

The proposed MOX facility and the WSB are assumed to be constructed at the

same time. The construction of the PDCF is expected to occur outside the time frame

for construction of the other two facilities.

d

Calculations assume that water is applied to control dust, resulting in a 50%

reduction in emissions, and that emissions from earth-moving activities occur over a

9-month period.

Expected PM2.5 ambient levels would not exceed standard levels. Construction of the facilities

would not exceed 4.3 and 0.070% of the 24-hour annual PM2.5 standard levels, respectively.

The CO, SO2, and NO2 construction emissions would be from construction equipment exhaust. 

Concentrations from these emissions would amount to at most 0.29% of any ambient standard

level and would not contribute to concentrations in excess of a standard level.

4.3.2.2 Operations

DCS has proposed to treat exhausts from the proposed MOX facility with (at a minimum) a twostage HEPA filter system to remove radioactive materials before the exhaust is discharged to

the atmosphere. 

The introduction to Section 4.3.2 provides a short discussion of the method used to assess air

quality impacts. Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.5 discusses the human health impacts of routine and

accidental chemical and radiological releases to the air. In addition to the emissions discussed

in this section, the facilities also would emit the radionuclides listed in Table E.5.
4-19

Environmental Consequences Table 4.6. Maximum air quality impacts during construction of the facility Pollutant concentration (g/m3) Percent of standard Receptor locationa Pollutant Averaging time Facility maximumb SRS maximumc,d Backgroundc Totale Ambient standardf Total concentration Facility maximum Distance [km (mi)] Direction TSP Annual 0.045 46.6 28 74.6 75 99.5 0.061 10.7 (6.7) WNW PM10 24 hours 7.5 97.0 41 145.5 150 97.0 5.0 10.4 (6.5) WNW Annual 0.023 6.9 19 25.9 50 51.8 0.047 10.7 (6.7) WNW PM2.5 24 hours 2.8 -g 27 29.8 65 45.8 4.3 10.4 (6.5) WNW Annual 0.011 -g 13.6 13.6 15 90.7 0.070 10.7 (6.7) WNW

CO 1 hour 40 262.7 10,100 10,400 40,000 26 0.10 20.6 (12.8) SE

8 hours 8 67.4 6,800 6,880 10,000 69 0.08 9.5 (5.9) WNW

SO2 3 hours 3.7 1,171.3 50 1,225 1,300 94 0.29 9.6 (6.0) W

24 hours 0.83 337.2 18 356 365 98 0.23 9.5 (5.9) WNWAnnual 0.006 27.1 4 31 80 39 0.008 9.5 (5.9) WNW

NO2 Annual 0.063 17.32 9 26 100 26 0.06 9.5 (5.9) WNW

a Location of facility maximum from center of proposed MOX facility site.bMaximum concentration due to facility construction, modeled with ISCST3 model.cBased on SCDHEC (2001) and EPA (2003).dThe SRS maxima are based on maximum permitted emissions from SRS sources and do not necessarily quantify actual air quality impacts.eSum of facility maximum, SRS maximum, and background.fSouth Carolina and Georgia standards are the same as NAAQS except for TSP, which is a South Carolina standard.gSRS maxima and background levels are not available for PM2.5. Values for background are the 2001 maximum annual average and maximum 98 percentile 24-hour

average values measured at the two rural background monitors within 80 km (50 mi) of the MOX facility. 
Environmental Consequences

4-20

For purposes of this analysis, it was assumed that the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB

would operate at the same time. While this may not always be the case, the combined analysis

bounds the air quality impacts from normal operations. 

The emissions from operation of the facilities are summarized in Table 4.7. It is expected that

all these facilities would use electric boilers; there would be no emissions associated with

production of hot water or steam. Air pollutants associated with the MOX process would be

emitted from the stack located toward the eastern end of the proposed MOX facility. 

Nonradiological emissions from this stack would be limited to NO2 from the aqueous polishing

process. There would be no process emissions from the PDCF (DOE 1999a, Table G-59). 

Particulates from the cementation process in the WSB would be controlled to meet the

condition specified in the SCDHEC permit.

Emissions from emergency and standby dieselpowered generators and storage of diesel fuel

have been considered. Emergency and standby

generators and associated fuel storage facilities

would be located at each of the three facilities

and would emit criteria pollutants, TSP, VOCs,

and air toxics (see Table 4.7). The tabulated

process VOCs would result from the storage of

diesel fuel and would be small because of the low

volatility of diesel fuel.

Parking lots and access roads would be paved to minimize fugitive dust emissions. Vehicle

combustion emissions would be released along various roadways around the site, and this

dispersal would reduce emission impacts compared with the emissions from the

emergency/standby generator diesels. Only the process emissions from the facilities and diesel

generators were modeled to evaluate emissions for the operations phase.

The results of the impact analysis for normal operations, including the total concentration and

its individual components — the modeled facilities maxima, the SRS maximum, and the

background levels — are presented in Table 4.8. As noted above, the totals are conservative in

that they overestimate the likely total concentration. Impacts during normal operations were

estimated by assuming that all three facilities were operating simultaneously. For short-term

concentrations of 24 hours or less, emergency generators were assumed to operate 24 hours

per day to simulate an extended power loss. For annual averages, the generators and process

sources were modeled with emissions appropriate to their expected schedules (see

Appendix F). Comparison of the total modeled concentrations with applicable ambient standard

levels provides a measure of the potential impact of normal facility operations on air quality.

The total concentrations are all less than the levels stipulated in the corresponding standards,

and the three facilities would contribute concentrations equivalent at most to 1.9% (for 24-hour

PM10) of the corresponding standard level. Given the conservative overestimation in the SRS

maxima, ambient levels above the standard levels would not be expected. 

Air Toxics

Air toxics, also known as hazardous air

pollutants, are substances judged to have

adverse impacts on human health when present

in the ambient air. The EPA and some states

have issued lists of substances regulated as air

toxics. The specific substances listed and the

types of regulations applied differ among

jurisdictions.
Environmental Consequences

4-21

Table 4.7. MOX, PDCF, and WSB operations emissionsa

Process Emergency generators

Pollutantb

Annual

(kg/yr)

Hourly

(g/h)

Annual

(kg/yr)

Hourly

(g/h)

TSP 6.00 463 761 4,222

PM10 3.00 234 692 3,740

PM2.5 0.90 70.2 649 3,500

SO2 1,640 11,800

CO 3,440 25,900

NO2 13,700 31,100 29,300 217,100

VOCsc 1.48 0.169 1,160 8,720

Chlorine 15.0 1.71 

Acetone 2.9 9.75 

Benzene 7.48 48.6

Toluene 2.71 17.6

Xylenes 1.86 12.1

Propylene 26.9 175

Formaldehyde 0.760 4.94

Acetaldehyde 0.243 1.58

Acrolein 0.076 0.493

Naphthalene 1.25 8.14

Total PAHsd 2.04 13.3 

a

See Appendix F for details on emission calculations.

b

Except for PAHs, directly emitted criteria pollutants, their

precursors, and federally listed air toxics are included. Naphthalene is

both an air toxic and a component of PAH.

c

Process emissions are from storage of diesel fuel.

d

PAHs = polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons.

Sources: DCS (2002a,c,d; 2004a,c); DOE (1999a).

The concentrations of toxic air pollutants and total polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs)

associated with emissions from emergency and

standby generators are all calculated to be less

than 0.03% of the South Carolina standard

levels.

Comparing the incremental facility concentrations with Prevention of Significant Deterioration

(PSD) increments (see Table 4.9) provides

another perspective on operational impacts

even when a PSD analysis is not required. As

the table shows, maximum concentrations for

3-hour and 24-hour averaging times would all be

less than 6.0% of the PSD Class II increments 

Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)

The NAAQS establish maximum pollutant levels

that should not be exceeded. The PSD program

limits the deterioration of existing air quality in

areas with air cleaner than the NAAQS. The

program establishes a baseline level of air

quality and specifies increments that cap the

increases in pollutant levels above that baseline. 

The program applies to sulfur oxides, PM10, and

nitrogen dioxide emitted by major new or

modified sources. Smaller increments apply in

special areas such as national parks (Class I

areas) than in other areas (Class II areas).
4-22

Environmental Consequences

Table 4.8. Maximum air quality impacts during operation of the proposed facilities

Concentration (g/m3) Percent of standard Receptor locationa

Pollutant

Averaging

time

Facility

maximumb

SRS

maximumc,d Backgroundc Totale

Ambient

standardf

Total

concentration

Facility

increment

Distance

(km [mi]) Direction

TSP Annual 0.0017 46.6 28 74.6 75 99.5 0.002 16.5 (10.2) NEPM10 24 hours 1.31 97.0 41 139 150 93.0 0.87 9.6 (6.0) W

Annual 0.0015 6.9 19 25.9 50 52 0.003 16.5 (10.2) NE

PM2.5 24 hours 1.21 –g 27 28.2 65 43.4 1.9 9.5 (5.9) WNW

Annual 0.0014 –g 13.6 13.6 15 90.7 0.009 16.5 (10.2) NE

NO2 Annual 0.074 17.3 9 26.4 100 26 0.060 16.5 (10.3) NE

SO2 3 hours 22 1,171.3 50 1,243 1,300 96 1.7 9.6 (6.0) W

24 hours 4.9 337.2 18 360 365 99 1.3 9.5 (5.9) WNW

Annual 0.0035 27.1 4 31.1 80 39 0.004 16.8 (10.4) NE

CO 1 hour 116 262.7 10,100 10,478 40,000 26 0.29 9.7 (6.0) NW

8 hours 26 67.4 6,800 6,890 10,000 69 0.26 9.7 (6.0) NW

Benzene 24 hours 0.019 4.6 NAh 4.6 150 3.1 0.01 9.5 (5.9) WNW

Toluene 24 hours 0.007 14.6 NA 14.6 2,000 0.7 0.0004 9.5 (5.9) WNWXylene 24 hours 0.005 69 NA 69.0 4,350 1.6 0.0001 9.5 (5.9) WNWPropylene 24 hours 0.067 NA NA NA NA NA NA 9.5 (5.9) WNWFormaldehyde 24 hours 0.002 0.15 NA 0.152 7.5 2.0 0.03 9.5 (5.9) WNWAcetaldehyde 24 hours 0.0006 <0.01 NA 0.011 1,800 <0.001 <0.0001 9.5 (5.9) WNWAcrolein 24 hours 0.0002 <0.01 NA 0.010 1.25 0.82 0.02 9.5 (5.9) WNWNaphthalene 24 hours 0.003 <0.01 NA 0.013 1,250 0.001 0.0002 9.5 (5.9) WNWChlorine 24 hours 0.0003 0.04 NA 0.04 75 0.054 0.0004 10.8 (6.7) NAcetone 24 hours 0.002 NA NA NA NA NA NA 9.8 (6.1) WTotal PAHs 24 hours 0.005 <0.01 NA 0.015 160 <0.010 0.003 9.5 (5.9) WNW

aLocation of facility maximum from center of the proposed MOX facility site.bMaximum concentration due to normal facility operations, modeled using ISCST3 model (EPA 1995).cSCDHEC (2001) and EPA (2003) for criteria pollutants; Hunter (2001) for air toxics.dThe SRS maxima are based on maximum permitted emissions from SRS sources and do not necessarily quantify actual air quality impacts.eSum of facility maximum, SRS maximum, and background.fSouth Carolina and Georgia standards are same as NAAQS for PM10, PM2.5, NO2, SO2, and CO. The TSP standard and the air toxic standards are South Carolina

standards.

gSRS maxima and background levels are not available for PM2.5 and acetone. Values for PM2.5 background are the 2001 maximum annual average and maximum

98 percentile 24-hour average values measured at the two rural background sites within 80 km (50 mi) of the MOX facility.

hNA = not available.
Environmental Consequences

4-23

Table 4.9. Comparison of maximum concentration

increments and PSD incrementsa

PSD increment

Maximum (g/m3

) Percent

Averaging increment PSD II

Pollutant time (g/m3

) Class I Class II increment

SO2 3 hours 22 25 512 4.30

24 hours 4.9 5 91 5.38

Annual 0.0035 2 20 0.02

NO2 Annual 0.074 2.5 25 0.30

PM10 24 hours 1.31 8 30 5.33

Annual 0.0014 4 17 <0.01

a

Class I increments apply only in Class I areas. An appropriate comparison

is made in the text.

for SO2, NO2 , and PM10. These pollutants are emitted by the emergency generators, not the

processes, and the concentration estimates assume all generators at all three facilities operate

continuously. For annual averages, the maximum concentrations would all be less than 0.02%

of the PSD Class II increments. 

Class I PSD increments were compared with the concentrations expected to be experienced at

the closest receptor location to the Cape Romain National Wildlife Refuge, the nearest PSD

Class I area. This receptor location is 51 km (32 mi) from the site, near the maximum distance

at which the ISCST3 model can reliably estimate concentrations. All concentration increments

were less than 1% of the Class I increments. Concentration increments attributable to the three

facilities would be even lower at Cape Romain, located about 160 km (100 mi) from the site.

Concentrations of lead and ozone were not modeled. Facility operations would not emit lead. 

Ozone is formed by photochemical reactions of precursors (including NO2 and VOCs) in the

atmosphere. Contributions of individual sources to ozone formation cannot be quantified

accurately. As shown in Tables 3.1 and 4.7, ozone precursor emissions from facility operations

would be a small percentage of the four-county totals, about 0.3% and 0.02% for NO2 and

VOCs, respectively. The impact of facility operations on ozone concentrations in the area

would be negligible.

Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), federal actions in nonattainment and maintenance areas must

demonstrate that they conform to the applicable state implementation plan (SIP). The SRS is

located in an attainment area for all NAAQS and is not covered by a maintenance plan. Thus,

the requirement to demonstrate conformity with the SIP would not apply to the proposed MOX

facility, PDCF, and WSB. At some time in the future, EPA will issue conformity regulations for

the new NAAQS for ozone and PM2.5. Those regulations could impose requirements to

demonstrate conformity with the SIP on the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, or WSB.
Environmental Consequences

4-24

4.3.3 Hydrology

4.3.3.1 Surface Water

4.3.3.1.1 Construction

The estimated annual average water use for constructing the proposed MOX facility is

125 million L (33 million gal) (DCS 2002a). An additional 12 million L/yr (3.2 million gal/yr) of

water would be needed for constructing the PDCF (DOE 1999a), and 2 million L/yr (0.5 million

gal/yr) of water would be needed for constructing the WSB. Because surface water would not

be used for supplying this water, there would be no impacts to surface water levels or flows. No

direct releases of contaminated effluent are planned for construction operations. Sanitary

waste would be collected with a combination of portable toilets and semipermanent facilities

connected to the SRS Central Sanitary Waste Treatment Facility. All wastewater would be

treated in the sitewide treatment system, which has sufficient hydraulic and organic capacity to

treat the flows expected from construction activities (DCS 2002a).

During construction, surface water quality could, however, be impacted by contaminated runoff

from sources such as accidental oil or diesel fuel spills and sediment from disturbed areas and

from construction materials stockpiled in areas that are exposed to precipitation. Two areas of

concern identified in the Scoping Comments (see Appendix I) are Upper Three Runs Creek,

which would receive runoff water from the affected area via nearby unnamed tributaries, and

the Savannah River, which receives water from Upper Three Runs Creek. To comply with

South Carolina standards for storm-water management and sediment reduction, detention

ponds would be built at strategic locations as part of the SRS construction program. These

detention ponds would be designed to control the release of storm-water runoff at a rate equal

to or slightly less than that of the predevelopment stage. Good engineering practices, as

required by the SCDHEC (see Chapter 6), such as the use of siltation fences or straw bales to

control sediment and runoff, would be followed during construction, and a sediment control plan

would be developed for areas exceeding 2 ha (5 acres) that are disturbed by construction (DCS

2002a). Therefore, impacts to surface water quality from construction activities are expected to

be small. Similarly, impacts from accidental releases of contaminants such as gasoline, oil,

diesel fuel, or paint during construction are expected to produce small impacts on surface water

quality because cleanup activities would be prompt and thorough, as required in the facility’s

Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan. This plan would be developed by DCS to

meet EPA regulations (40 CFR Part 112).

4.3.3.1.2 Operations

Normal operations of the proposed MOX facility would utilize 9.1 million L (2.4 million gal) of

water per year (DCS 2002a). An additional 48 million L/yr (12.7 million gal/yr) of water would be

needed for operating the PDCF, and 19 million L/yr (5 million gal/yr) of water would be needed

for operating the WSB, but none of this water would be from surface water resources. 
Environmental Consequences

4-25

Therefore, there would be no impacts to surface water levels or flows. The nonhazardous

wastewater produced by the proposed facilities would be discharged to an existing National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) outfall (H16) in the F-Area under an existing

South Carolina Discharge permit, SC0000175. This water flows into Upper Three Runs Creek

and ultimately the Savannah River. Because the concentrations of nonhazardous wastes in the

discharge would be under the guidelines of the NPDES permit, impacts to water quality in

Upper Three Runs Creek and the Savannah River would be small. The uncontaminated

heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) condensate would be discharged to the

stormwater system in accordance with SCDHEC standard stormwater permit conditions.

Sanitary wastewater would be sent to the WSRC Central Sanitary Waste Treatment Facility.

Storm-water runoff from the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB would be

controlled under existing NPDES storm-water permits. These permits would limit potential

contaminants to safe concentrations, and compliance with the permit conditions would ensure

that any surface water impacts were small.

4.3.3.2 Groundwater

4.3.3.2.1 Construction

During construction, the groundwater system beneath the SRS would be directly affected by

additional pumping from existing wells because groundwater would be the only source of water

used for construction activities. Groundwater for constructing the MOX facilities would be

obtained from the A-Area loop, which obtains groundwater from wells in the F- and A-Areas. 

The capacity of the A-Area loop wells in 2000 was about 11,360 L/min (3,000 gal/min) (DCS

2003a). Water use from the loop, including F-Area use, averaged about 2,850 L/min

(754 gal/min) in 2000. Construction of the MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB would require about

264 L/min (70 gal/min). This additional groundwater demand would represent an increase of

about 10% for the A-Area loop and about 3% of the excess loop capacity. This withdrawal

would have a small impact on the groundwater system at SRS.

In addition to impacts from groundwater use, impacts during construction (e.g., grading and

excavating) could also occur because groundwater beneath the proposed MOX facility site is

contaminated (Section 3.3.2). Impacts from this contamination would not be measurable

because the deepest construction activities would occur at least 9.1 m (30 ft) above the zone of

groundwater contamination (DCS 2002a). Because direct releases of contaminated effluent to

groundwater during construction are not planned, there would be no direct impacts to

groundwater quality. Groundwater quality, however, could still be indirectly affected by

accidental releases of contaminated effluents and infiltration of contaminated runoff. However,

these impacts are expected to be small because appropriate good engineering practices would

be implemented during construction, detention basins would be used to control runoff, and any

spills would be promptly and thoroughly cleaned up as required under the facility Stormwater

Pollution Prevention Plan.
Environmental Consequences

4-26

4.3.3.2.2 Operations

During normal operations, groundwater would be the only source of water used for the facilities,

and the groundwater system beneath the SRS would be directly impacted by additional

pumping that would deplete the resource. Operation of the proposed MOX facility would

require 9.1 million L/yr (2.4 million gal/yr), the PDCF would require 48 million L/yr (12.7 million

gal/yr), and the WSB would require 19 million L/yr (5 million gal/yr) (DCS 2002a). This water

would be obtained from the A-Area loop groundwater wells. Impacts on the SRS groundwater

system would be small because the total water use, approximately 145 L/min (38 gal/min),

would represent an increase of about 5% of the water demand for the A-Area loop in 2000 and

about 2% of the excess A-Area loop capacity.

Groundwater quality would not be affected because there would be no discharges (either

shallow or deep) to underlying aquifers. During the scoping process, several commenters

expressed concerns about potential contamination of groundwater resources by plutonium. 

Because no direct releases of contaminated effluent to the groundwater are planned during

normal operations of the proposed facilities and because the facilities would not use settling or

holding basins as part of the wastewater treatment system, there would be no direct impacts to

groundwater quality (DCS 2002a).

Indirect impacts to groundwater could also occur during normal operations. These impacts

would result from discharges to the NPDES outfall and surface spills. The impacts of such

spills are expected to be small because appropriate good engineering practices would be

implemented during the operational period, discharges would comply with NPDES guidelines,

and any spills would be promptly and thoroughly cleaned up as required under the facility Spill

Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan.

4.3.4 Waste Management

This section presents the waste management impacts associated with the construction and

operation of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB. Waste management impacts

relate to the types and quantities of radioactive, hazardous, and nonhazardous wastes

generated and how these wastes are handled. Wastes generated by the three facilities would

be managed similarly to wastes generated by other SRS facilities. The NRC conducted an

evaluation to determine if existing and proposed facilities and capacities at SRS and within the

DOE complex (e.g., the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant [WIPP]) would be adequate for handling and

disposing of the generated waste. Because the types of wastes generated by the proposed

MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB would be similar to the types of wastes already

generated by existing SRS facilities and the volumes would be relatively small compared to the

overall existing or projected volumes, the human health impacts discussed in Section 3.10 for

current activities at SRS are expected to bound the human health impacts, if any, resulting from

the waste generated by the proposed action. Also, the human health impacts discussed in

Section 3.10 are not anticipated to change significantly as a result of the waste generated from

the proposed action.
Environmental Consequences

4-27

The WSB would process waste from both the proposed MOX facility and the PDCF. The waste

volumes presented in the tables in this section are based on where the particular waste type is

generated (e.g., solid TRU waste generated at the WSB as a result of processing the liquid

high-alpha-activity waste transferred from the proposed MOX facility is presented as TRU waste

volume for the WSB). The waste types that would be generated include TRU waste, liquid and

solid LLW, hazardous/mixed waste, and liquid and solid nonhazardous waste.

4.3.4.1 Construction

The construction of the proposed MOX facility and the WSB is expected to take 5 years; the

construction of the PDCF is expected to take 3 years. Waste generated from construction

activities would be similar to that from construction of any industrial building and would include

liquid and solid waste (nonhazardous) and hazardous wastes. Such solid wastes would be

managed consistently with SRS waste management practices (see Section 3.9). No high-level

(radioactive) (HLW) waste, TRU waste, low-level (radioactive) (LLW) waste, or mixed LLW

would be expected to be generated during construction. No hazardous or radiologically

contaminated soil is expected to be generated (DCS 2002a).

Hazardous wastes that would be generated would be similar to those expected during the

construction of any industrial facility. Examples of these wastes include liquids (such as motor

oil), batteries, and other machinery-related products, cleaning products, and other chemicals

(such as insecticides and pesticides). These wastes would be managed in accordance with the

hazardous waste management practices in place at the SRS. The current practice includes

accumulating the waste at the generating facility (which in this case would be in the F-Area) for

a maximum of 90 days as necessary, and packaging such wastes in U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT)-approved containers to ship off-site to permitted commercial recycling,

treatment, or disposal facilities.

As shown in Table 4.10, the following waste types and estimated volumes would be generated

during construction of the three facilities:

• For the proposed MOX facility: 77 m3

/yr (100 yd3/yr) of hazardous wastes;

36 million L/yr (9.5 million gal/yr) of nonhazardous liquid waste and 8,410 m3

/yr

(11,000 yd3

/yr) of nonhazardous solid waste;

• For the PDCF: 50 m3

/yr (65 yd3/yr) of hazardous waste, 5.3 million L/yr

(1.4 million gal/yr) of nonhazardous liquid waste and 120 m3

/yr (157 yd3/yr) of

nonhazardous solid waste; and 

• For the WSB: 35 m3

/yr (46 yd3/yr) of hazardous waste, 21 million L/yr

(6.3 million gal/yr) of nonhazardous liquid waste and 2,200 m3

/yr (2,880 yd3/yr) of

nonhazardous solid waste. 
4-28

Environmental Consequences

Table 4.10. Annual waste volumes from the construction of the facilities

compared with waste management capacities at the SRS

SRS capacitya

Disposal

Estimated Estimated Estimated Storage (total

MOX facility PDCF WSB Characterization (total capacity

construction construction construction or treatment capacity in m3 unless

Waste type wasteb wastec wasteb (annual capacity) in m3) specified)

TRU (m3/yr) –d –d –d 1,720 34,400 168,500e

LLW Liquid (L/yr) –d –d –d 17,830,000 NAf 594,000,000 L

 Solid (m3/yr) –d –d –d 17,830 NA 30,500

Hazardousg

(m3/yr)

 77 50 35 17,830 5,170 NA

Nonhazardous Liquidh (L/yr) 36,000,000 5,300,000 21,000,000 1,033,000,000 NA NA

 Solid (m3/yr) 8,410 120 2,200 NA NA 24,900,000i

aStorage and disposal capacity estimates presented represent total capacity at the SRS. Sources of estimates: DOE

(1999a).

bThe construction period for the proposed MOX facility is assumed to be 5 years; the construction period of the PDCF is

assumed to be 3 years. The construction period of the WSB is assumed to be 5 years. Source of estimates: DCS (2003a).

cSource of estimates: DOE (1999a).dNo radioactive waste would be generated by facility construction.eValue represents limit for TRU waste at the WIPP.fNA = not applicable.

Footnotes continued on next page.
4-29

Environmental Consequences Table 4.10. Continued gHazardous waste that would be generated is less than 4% of the treatment and about 3% of the storage capacity at the SRS. For estimating impact on the storage capacity, the annual generation rates for the three facilities were summed and the total divided by the storage capacity at the SRS. Hazardous wastes are generally not stored on-site for more than 90 days, consistent with permit requirements. Hazardous wastes are sent off-site for disposal. hNonhazardous liquid waste generated during construction of the facilities is equivalent to about 6% of the treatment capacity at SRS. iThe disposal capacity presented for nonhazardous solid waste is for a privatized landfill (Three Rivers Landfill) that is located on site. The combined volume of nonhazardous solid waste that would be generated from the construction of the

three facilities constitutes less than 1% of the disposal capacity at the landfill.
Environmental Consequences

4-30

The impact of the facilities construction waste on SRS waste management capacities would be

small. The hazardous waste that would be generated would be shipped off-site to permitted

facilities. The impacts at these permitted facilities from the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and

WSB wastes are expected to be within the bounds of the evaluations performed for the waste

facilities. The nonhazardous liquid waste generated by the facilities would constitute a small

percentage of the SRS’s capacity for treatment (about 6%). Nonhazardous solid wastes are

packaged in conformance with standard industrial practice and shipped to commercial or

municipal facilities for recycling or disposal. Estimates for waste volumes that would be

generated during construction of the facilities are presented in Table 4.10.

4.3.4.2 Operations

This section describes the waste management impacts of operating the proposed MOX facility,

the PDCF, and the WSB. A discussion of radioactive effluents and wastes for each facility is

provided in Sections 2.2.2.3, 2.2.3.3, and 2.2.4.3. The WSB would process some waste

streams from the proposed MOX facility and PDCF. Other wastes would be managed by

existing SRS waste management facilities. This section is divided into two parts. The first part

describes where the waste is generated at each facility. A more detailed description of the

processes that generate waste is provided in Chapter 2. The second part describes how those

wastes would be handled and describes the potential waste management impacts. Consistent

with waste management practices at the SRS, all wastes generated from operations of the

facilities would be transferred to the WSB or to the appropriate facilities or areas elsewhere

within the SRS or outside of the SRS for subsequent treatment, storage, shipment off site, or

disposal. The period of operation for the proposed MOX facility is expected to be about 10

years.

Wastes that would be generated and the impacts from such wastes were identified as concerns

during scoping. The waste types that would be generated from the three facilities include the

following: solid TRU waste, liquid and solid LLW, hazardous/mixed waste, and nonhazardous

liquid and solid waste. The estimated waste generation rates from the operation of each of the

facilities are discussed in Sections 4.3.4.2.1 and 4.3.4.2.2 and are summarized in Table 4.11. 

Overall, the operation of the facilities would have a small impact on the SRS waste

management system. The DOE has concluded (DOE 2003) that impacts are bounded by its

SPD EIS (DOE 1999a).

4.3.4.2.1 Operating Facility Description

MOX Facility. The proposed fabrication of MOX fuel consists primarily of two steps: the

aqueous polishing process and the fuel fabrication process. These two processes generate

several types of waste that are discussed below. The aqueous polishing step removes

impurities from the plutonium. The fuel fabrication process involves the blending of the purified

plutonium with the depleted uranium dioxide to form pellets. The pellets would be incorporated 
4-31

Environmental Consequences Table 4.11. Waste volumes from the 10-year operational period of the facilities compared with waste management capacities at the SRSSRS capacitya Estimated Estimated Estimated MOX facility PDCF WSB Characterization Storage Disposal operational operational operational or treatment (total (total Waste type wasteb wasteb wasteb (annual capacity) capacity) capacity) TRU (m3)c 2,340 180 1,911 1,720 34,400 168,500d LLWe Liquid (L) 10,800,000 416,000 11,570,000 17,830,000 NAf 594,000,000

 Solid (m3) 1,760 184 4,108 17,830 NA 30,500

Hazardousg (m3) 110 10 0 17,830 5,170 NA

Nonhazardoush

 Liquid (L) 333,000,000 250,000,000 19,000,000 1,033,000,000 NA NA Solid (m3) 13,400 18,000 10,000 NA NA NA

aStorage and disposal capacity estimates presented represent total capacity at the SRS. Sources of estimates: DOE

(1999a).

bThe facilities are assumed to be in operation for a 10-year period. Sources for estimates: MOX facility (DCS 2004a);

PDCF (DOE 1999a and DCS 2004a); WSB (DCS 2004a and DOE 1999a). The volumes presented for WSB TRU and solidLLW represent that generated from processing the high-alpha liquid and stripped uranium waste streams from the MOXfacility. Liquid LLW volume was obtained from DCS 2004a (presented on page 5-23 of DCS 2004a as 890 m3 annually and

multiplied by 13 years of approximate operation for the WSB). Hazardous and nonhazardous waste volumes obtained bysubtracting PDCF volumes presented in this table from values presented in DCS 2004a Table 5-15c.

cThe combined values of TRU waste that would be generated from the three facilities is estimated to be approximately

26% and 13% of the treatment and storage capacity, respectively, at the SRS. The generated TRU waste is approximately2.6% of the disposal capacity at WIPP.

dValue represents limit for TRU waste at the WIPP.

Footnotes continued on next page.
4-32

Environmental Consequences

Table 4.11. Continued

eThe volume reported for PDCF (in DOE 1999a) is 60 m3/yr (or 600 m3/10 yrs), but the liquid versus solid amounts were

not specified. The volume of 41,600 L/yr or 416,000 L (416 m3) over 10 years, as reported in DCS 2004a, was subtracted

from the volume reported in DOE 1999a to obtain the volume for solid LLW (i.e., 600 m3 – 416 m3 = 184 m3). The liquid LLW

generated by the three facilities constitutes 4% of the discharge capacity at SRS. The solid LLW generated constitutes about21% of the disposal capacity at SRS (if disposed of entirely at the SRS). Disposal of solid LLW will either be at the SRS or at

another approved facility.

fNA = Not applicable.gHazardous waste that would be generated is less than 1% of the treatment and less than 2% of the storage capacity at

the SRS. 

hThe nonhazardous liquid waste generated constitutes about 6% of the treatment capacity at SRS. 
Environmental Consequences

4-33

into the fuel rods, which would then be placed in fuel assemblies. Figure 4.1 depicts the waste

streams and volumes generated and the final disposition for each. 

The aqueous polishing process would generate approximately 33,300 L/yr (8,800 gal/yr) of

liquid high-alpha waste, 174,000 L/yr (46,000 gal/yr) of stripped uranium waste, 1,078,000 L/yr

(285,000 gal/yr) of chloride removal waste, and 10,600 L/yr (2,800 gal/yr) of excess solvent

waste. The liquid high-alpha waste consists of three waste streams (liquid americium waste

stream, excess acid waste stream, alkaline wash waste stream). The liquid high-alpha waste

and the stripped uranium waste stream would be sent to the WSB via separate pipelines for

further treatment. Because the liquid high alpha waste and stripped uranium waste would be 

processed at the WSB, the final waste volumes following processing are included in the

discussion of the WSB. The chloride removal waste would be collected in tanks and

transferred to the WSB. The excess solvent waste would be sent to SRS facilities or to a

commercial facility for treatment and disposal as a contaminated solvent waste.

The fuel fabrication process and maintenance activities would generate approximately

1,340 m3

/yr (1,750 yd3/yr) of solid nonhazardous waste, 176 m3/yr (230 yd3/yr) of solid LLW,

and 234 m3

/yr (306 yd3/yr) of solid TRU waste. The solid non-hazardous waste consists of

sanitary waste (e.g., garbage, machine shop waste, and other industrial waste) and nonsanitary waste (e.g, paper, metal cans, plastic and glass bottles). 

The MOX facility would also generate approximately 33.3 million L/yr (8.8 million gal/yr) of

nonhazardous liquid waste. This waste includes uncontaminated HVAC condensate, rinse

water, and sanitary waste from sinks, showers, urinals, and water closets from the inactive

area. The uncontaminated HVAC condensate (94,600 L/yr [25,000 gal/yr]) would be

discharged to the stormwater system. The remaining nonhazardous liquid waste would be

sent to SRS for processing at the CSWTF.

PDCF. The PDCF would be used to recover the plutonium metal from the pits of disassembled

weapons and would convert the weapons-grade plutonium to plutonium dioxide powder. The

PDCF would accommodate the following surplus plutonium-processing activities: pit receipt,

storage, and preparation; pit disassembly; plutonium conversion; oxide blending and sampling;

nondestructive assay; product canning; product storage; product inspection and sampling for

international inspection; product shipping; declassification of parts not made from special

nuclear material (SNM); highly enriched uranium (HEU) decontamination, packaging, storage,

and shipping; tritium capture, packaging, and storage; and waste packaging, sampling and

certification.

Aside from the 41,600 L/yr (11,000 gal/yr) of laboratory radioactive liquid waste that would be

transferred to the WSB for further processing, the operations at the PDCF would also generate

about 18 m3

/yr (24 yd3/yr) of solid TRU waste. TRU waste generated during operations would

include spent filters, contaminated beryllium pieces and cuttings, used containers and

equipment, paper and cloth wipes, analytical and quality control samples, and solidified

inorganic solutions. Liquid TRU wastes would be evaporated or solidified before being

packaged for storage. About 60 m3

/yr (78 yd3/yr) of LLW (assumed to be all solid) would also

be generated. LLW generated during operations would originate from activities in the 
Environmental Consequences

4-34

Figure 4.1. Waste streams generated by the proposed MOX facility (Source: Modified from DCS 2003a; 2004a).
Environmental Consequences

4-35

processing areas. LLW would include equipment, wipes, protective clothing, solidified inorganic

solutions, and tritium. Liquid LLW would be evaporated or solidified before being packaged for

accumulation. About 1 m3

/yr (1.3 yd3/yr) of hazardous/mixed waste generated during

operations would include spent cleaning solutions, vacuum pump oils, film processing fluids,

hydraulic fluids, antifreeze solutions, paints, chemicals, lead packaging, and contaminated rags

or wipes. Hazardous waste would be packaged for treatment and disposal at off-site permitted

commercial facilities.

Two types of nonhazardous waste would be generated; 25 million L/yr (6.6 million gal/yr) liquid

waste and 1,800 m3

/yr (2,350 yd3/yr) of solid waste. Nonhazardous solid waste would include

office garbage, machine shop waste, and other industrial wastes from utility and maintenance

operations. Recyclable solid waste would be sent off the site for recycling. Nonhazardous

liquid waste would include sanitary waste from sinks, showers, urinals, and water closets and

process wastewater from lab sinks and drains, mop water, and cooling tower blowdown. 

Waste Solidification Building. The WSB would process three waste streams from the

proposed MOX facility (i.e., liquid high-alpha waste, stripped uranium waste, and liquid LLW)

and two waste streams from the PDCF (i.e., PDCF laboratory liquid stream and liquid LLW). 

The WSB would be expected to generate about 191 m3

/yr (250 yd3/yr) of solid TRU waste from

the processing of the liquid high-alpha-activity waste resulting from the aqueous polishing step

conducted at the proposed MOX facility. About 890,000 L/yr (235,000 gal/yr) of liquid LLW

would also be generated from the processing of the liquid high-alpha-activity waste and the

stripped uranium waste from the aqueous polishing step, and the laboratory liquid waste from

the PDCF. The waste streams would be batch-transferred as a separate waste to the WSB

through separate double-walled stainless steel pipelines. The wastes would be collected in the

waste receipt area of the WSB. This area would be equipped with separate collection tanks for

each waste type, with capacities to hold waste volumes generated for a period of 6-8 weeks at

a time.

Following receipt at the WSB, the high-alpha-activity waste would be reduced in volume by

evaporation, and the still bottoms would be neutralized with sodium hydroxide. The distillate

would be subjected to further treatment at the WSB and discharged to a permitted outfall. The

neutralized bottoms would be blended with cement to produce a solid TRU waste matrix

suitable for disposal at WIPP. The high-activity waste overheads (materials that evaporate and

are collected) would be transferred to the low-activity waste head tank for a second evaporator

process. 

The stripped uranium waste and the PDCF laboratory liquids would also be evaporated at the

WSB to reduce the volume. As noted above, the high-activity waste overheads would be

further evaporated in the low-activity waste evaporator. The process is similar to what would be

used for the liquid high-alpha waste. About 410 m3

/yr (536 yd3/yr) of solid LLW is expected to

be generated at the WSB from processing the stripped uranium waste transferred from the

proposed MOX facility (DCS 2004c). 
Environmental Consequences

4-36

4.3.4.2.2 Waste Management Impacts from Operation

This section describes how the TRU, liquid and solid LLW, mixed LLW, hazardous, and

nonhazardous wastes would be managed. It also describes the potential waste management

impacts for a 10-year period. As discussed above, approximately, 4,431 m3

 (5,796 yd3) of TRU

waste would be generated each 10-year period during the operation of the three facilities. The

DOE has a national program for the management and disposal of defense-related TRU waste. 

Subsequently, waste acceptance criteria (WAC) for receipt of TRU waste at WIPP have been

established for contact-handled TRU (CH-TRU) waste. The TRU wastes generated from the

proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB are expected to be in this category. The WAC

that must be met for CH-TRU waste to be transported to, managed at, and disposed of at

WIPP address container properties, radiological properties, physical properties, chemical

properties, and data package contents. The generator facilities are required to transmit

characterization, certification, and shipping data to WIPP before shipping waste. 

The liquid LLW generated (22,786,000 L [6.0 million gal]/10 yr) from the three facilities would

be transferred to the WSB for treatment and then discharged to the Upper Three Runs Creek

consistent with permit discharge limitations. The liquid LLW from the three facilities would be

about 4% of the discharge capacities at SRS. Solid LLW generated (6,052 m3

[7,916 yd3]/10 yr) would be packaged, certified, and accumulated at the F-Area before transfer

to the appropriate facilities for treatment and disposal (at the SRS E-Area waste vaults or at an

approved off-site facility). The solid LLW from the three facilities would constitute about 21% of

the disposal capacity at SRS (if disposed of entirely at SRS). 

Hazardous wastes (120 m3

 [157 yd3]/10 yr) generated from the three facilities would either be

transferred to the SRS for treatment and storage at either on-site or off-site facilities and

disposal at off-site, permitted facilities or shipped off site for treatment and disposition at

permitted facilities. If the treatment and disposal are assumed to be on-site, the expected

wastes volumes from the facilities would represent less than 2% of the capacities at the SRS. 

Therefore, the facilities’ waste should not affect the SRS hazardous waste management

system.

Nonhazardous solid waste (41,400 m3

 [54,149 yd3]/10 yr) generated from the three facilities

would be packaged and transported in accordance with standard industrial practices. 

Recyclable waste would be sent off-site, with the remaining waste (primarily solid sanitary

waste) sent to the Three Rivers Landfill for disposal. The nonsanitary waste would be sent offsite for recycling or disposal. 

Nonhazardous liquid wastes (602,000,000 L [159 million gal]/10 yr) from the three facilities

would be treated before being discharged to the F-Area sanitary sewer system, which connects

to the SRS Central Sanitary Wastewater Treatment Facility. The wastes of this type expected

to be generated by operations of the facilities are estimated to be about 4% of the capacity of

the Central Sanitary Wastewater Treatment Facility. These additional wastes would constitute

a small contribution and should not affect the nonhazardous liquid waste management system

at the SRS. 
Environmental Consequences

4-37

Although the current plans call for treating all liquid LLW generated at the proposed MOX

facility, the PDCF, and the WSB at the WSB and discharging the treated effluents to a

permitted outfall on the SRS site following the NPDES permit guidelines, it is possible that at

some future date liquid LLW streams generated at these facilities may be sent to the Effluent

Treatment Facility (ETF) on the SRS. If that should happen, the waste management impacts

discussed in this EIS would still be comparable to or would bound the impacts that would occur

during the management of wastes resulting from the operation of the three facilities, namely the

proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB. 

4.3.5 Accident Impacts

This section discusses hypothetical accidents that could occur at the proposed facilities (the

MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB), and the estimated maximum impacts that such

accidents could produce. Table 4.12 lists the various accidents considered, and Tables 4.13,

4.14, and 4.15 list the estimated radiological impacts on SRS employees, the collective off-site

public, and the maximally exposed member of the public, respectively. The potential impacts of

accidental chemical releases from the proposed facilities are discussed in Section 4.3.5.3. This

section describes the potential accident impacts in more detail and includes a discussion of

impacts on local groundwater quality that could result from accidental releases.

4.3.5.1 Accidents Considered

4.3.5.1.1 Proposed MOX Facility

To obtain a possession and use license, DCS is required under 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H, to

perform an integrated safety analysis (ISA) to identify the hazards of the proposed MOX facility

in a systematic and comprehensive manner. As an initial part of that process, DCS has

completed a safety assessment that identified the following types of events that could lead to

releases to the environment — natural phenomena, loss of confinement, internal fire, explosion,

load handling events, external man-made events, criticality, direct radiation exposure, and

chemical releases (DCS 2002a).

With respect to natural phenomena, DCS has shown that flooding does not pose a credible

threat to the proposed MOX facility. For the remainder of the credible natural phenomena

events, which include extreme winds, earthquakes, tornadoes, external fires, rain, snow, ice,

and lightning, the applicant has committed to design criteria and standards that would prevent

accidents associated with these hazards. For this reason, the effects of accidents caused by

these phenomena are not described in this EIS.

External man-made events were also considered in DCS’s hazard evaluation. These events

include hazards from nearby facilities or vehicles. These hazards may include industrial

facilities, military facilities, chemical facilities, nearby SRS facilities, pipelines, automobiles, and

aircraft. A screening evaluation by DCS determined that credible external man-made events 
4-38

Environmental Consequences

Table 4.12. Accidents evaluated for the proposed facilities

Facility/

accident Description

Proposed MOX facility

Internal fire A fire was postulated to occur in a storage location for polished plutonium dioxide powder (the PuO2 Final

Dosing Unit). The frequency of this event is considered to be unlikely or lower because multiple failures arerequired for this event to occur.

Explosion A hypothetical explosion event was postulated to occur in an aqueous polishing process cell and involved the

maximum material at risk in any process cell. Simultaneous failure of the design features and administrativecontrols resulting in an explosion and the subsequent release of radioactive materials is highly unlikely.

Load handling

The load-handling event postulated to produce the largest radiological consequences was a drop event

involving the glovebox in the Jar Storage and Handling Unit. This glovebox would contain jars of plutoniumpowder. The frequency associated with this event is estimated to be unlikely or lower since multiple failureswould be required for this event to occur.

Criticality A criticality hazard arises whenever fissionable materials (e.g., uranium-235 or plutonium-239) are present in

sufficient quantities to attain a self-sustaining fission chain reaction under optimal conditions. Thus, a generichypothetical criticality event was evaluated.

Chemicalreleases

Chemical releases were modeled by assuming that the largest container for each chemical in storage at thefacility was punctured. Chemical-specific characteristics were used to determine the amount of materialreleased.

PDCF

Fire The bounding fire accident was assumed to occur in a plutonium glovebox. Against procedure, a flammable

cleaning liquid was assumed to be taken into the glovebox used for blending plutonium powder. The liquid isinadvertently spilled and ignited, involving all of the gloves. 

Explosion Multiple equipment failures and operator errors were postulated to result in the ignition of a hydrogen and

oxygen gas mixture in an inert-atmosphere glovebox. The resulting explosive pressure was assumed todamage the glovebox windows but would be insufficient to compromise the building HEPA filtration system.

Leak/spill A forklift or other heavy vehicle running over a package of plutonium dioxide was postulated as the most

catastrophic leak or spill. A portion of the released oxide becomes airborne and is filtered by the HEPA filtrationsystem before entering the environment.
4-39

Environmental Consequences

Table 4.12. Continued

Facility/

accident Description

Criticality A criticality involving plutonium dioxide powder was postulated because the PDCF handles amounts in excess

of that required for such an accident. However, facility design and procedures are intended to preclude such an

occurrence. No specific scenario was identified other than multiple failures due to human error.

Earthquake During an earthquake event, the PDCF was expected to maintain its structural integrity, and the major safety

systems, including building confinement and HEPA filtration, were assumed to continue to function. It wasconservatively assumed that loose plutonium powder in gloveboxes would be resuspended and result in someminor spills.

Tritiumrelease

Tritium contamination of parts in a glovebox was assumed to be released during a major glovebox fire. Theformation of tritiated water vapor is postulated to occur, and the resulting vapor is released through the buildingventilation system.

Chemicalreleases

Chemical releases were modeled by assuming that the largest container for each chemical in storage at the

facility was punctured. Chemical-specific characteristics were used to determine the amount of materialreleased.

WSB

Loss of confinement

A facility-wide spill of all material in the low-activity process area was considered due to natural phenomena oran external event. The high-activity waste in this area is in hardened structures that are designed to withstandsuch an event (DCS 2003b).

Fire The bounding fire accident was postulated to be an area fire in the low-activity processing section of the WSB. 

As a result of structural damage to the facility, thousands of gallons of unprocessed low-activity waste, lowactivity bottoms, low-activity overheads, effluent bottoms, and effluent overheads are released.

Earthquake An earthquake event was assumed to cause a spill of all material in the low-activity process area. A fire was

then assumed to occur throughout the entire facility except for within the hardened structure that contains thehigh-activity cells. The potential impacts are taken to be the sum of the loss of confinement and fire eventsevaluated for the WSB.

Chemicalreleases

Chemical releases were modeled by assuming that the largest container for each chemical in storage at thefacility was punctured. Chemical-specific characteristics were used to determine the amount of materialreleased.
4-40

Environmental Consequences

Table 4.13. Estimated human health radiological impacts to 

SRS employees from hypothetical facility accidents

SRS employee population

SRS employee MEI

Facility/accident Dose [Sv (rem)]

Likelihood

of LCFa

Major exposure

pathway

Dose

[person-Sv 

(person-rem)]

Fatalities

(LCFs)a

Major exposure

pathway

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility Criticality 0.00070 (0.070) 4 × 10-5 External 0.062 (6.2) 0.004 External Earthquake 4.0 x 10-5 (0.0040) 2 × 10-6 Inhalation 0.023 (2.3) 0.001 Inhalation

 Explosion 0.00033 (0.033) 2 × 10-5 Inhalation 0.19 (19) 0.01 Inhalation Fire 1.2 × 10-6 (0.00012) 7 × 10-8 Inhalation 0.00071 (0.071) 4 × 10-5 Inhalation

 Leak/spill 4.0 × 10-7 (4.0 × 10-5) 2 × 10-8 Inhalation 0.00023 (0.023) 1 × 10-5 Inhalation Tritium release 0.026 (2.6) 0.002 Inhalation 18 (1,800) 1 InhalationProposed MOX Facility Criticality 0.023 (2.3) 0.001 External 3.0 (300) 0.2 External Explosion 0.0068 (0.68) 0.0004 Inhalation 3.9 (390) 0.2 Inhalation Internal fire 0.00025 (0.025) 2 × 10-5 Inhalation 0.15 (15) 0.009 Inhalation

 Load handling 0.0010 (0.10) 6 × 10-5 Inhalation 0.60 (60) 0.04 InhalationWaste Solidification Building Loss of confinement 0.00030 (0.030) 2 × 10-5 Inhalation 0.16 (16) 0.01 Inhalation Fire 0.0058 (0.58) 0.0003 Inhalation 3.2 (320) 0.2 Inhalation Earthquake 0.0061 (0.61) 0.0004 Inhalation 3.4 (340) 0.2 Inhalation

aLatent cancer fatalities are calculated by multiplying dose by the FGR 13 health risk conversion factor of 0.06 fatal cancer per person-Sv

(6 × 10-4 fatal cancer per person-rem) (Eckerman et al. 1999). Values are rounded to one significant figure.
Environmental Consequences

4-41

Table 4.14. Estimated human health radiological impacts to the 

collective off-site public from hypothetical facility accidents

Dose 

[person-Sv Fatalities Major exposure

Facility/accident (person-rem)] (LCFs)a pathway

Short-Term Exposure

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

 Criticality 0.048 (4.8) 0.003 External

 Earthquake 0.054 (5.4) 0.003 Inhalation

 Explosion 0.44 (44) 0.03 Inhalation

 Fire 0.0017 (0.17) 0.0001 Inhalation

 Leak/spill 0.00053 (0.053) 3 × 10-5 Inhalation

 Tritium release 42 (4,200) 3 Inhalation

Proposed MOX Facility

 Criticality 1.3 (130) 0.08 Inhalation

 Explosion 9.1 (910) 0.5 Inhalation

 Internal fire 0.35 (35) 0.02 Inhalation

 Load handling 1.4 (140) 0.08 Inhalation

Waste Solidification Building

 Loss of confinement 0.38 (38) 0.02 Inhalation

 Fire 7.3 (730) 0.4 Inhalation

 Earthquake 7.7 (770) 0.5 Inhalation

1-Year Exposure without Ingestion

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

 Criticality 0.052 (5.2) 0.003 External

 Earthquake 0.054 (5.4) 0.003 Inhalation

 Explosion 0.44 (44) 0.03 Inhalation

 Fire 0.0017 (0.17) 0.0001 Inhalation

 Leak/spill 0.00053 (0.053) 3 × 10-5 Inhalation

 Tritium release 42 (4,200) 3 Inhalation

Proposed MOX Facility

 Criticality 1.5 (150) 0.09 Inhalation

 Explosion 9.1 (910) 0.5 Inhalation

 Internal fire 0.35 (35) 0.02 Inhalation

 Load handling 1.4 (140) 0.08 Inhalation

Waste Solidification Building

 Loss of confinement 0.38 (38) 0.02 Inhalation

 Fire 7.3 (730) 0.4 Inhalation

 Earthquake 7.7 (770) 0.5 Inhalation
Environmental Consequences

4-42

Table 4.14. Continued

Dose 

[person-Sv Fatalities Major exposure

Facility/accident (person-rem)] (LCFs)a pathway

1-Year Exposure with Ingestion

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

 Criticality 0.13 (13) 0.008 Ingestion

 Earthquake 0.16 (16) 0.01 Ingestion

 Explosion 1.3 (130) 0.08 Ingestion

 Fire 0.0049 (0.49) 0.0003 Ingestion

 Leak/spill 0.0016 (0.16) 0.0001 Ingestion

 Tritium release 1,800 (180,000) 100 Ingestion

Proposed MOX Facility

 Criticality 9.6 (960) 0.6 Ingestion

 Explosion 27 (2,700) 2 Ingestion

 Internal fire 1.1 (110) 0.07 Ingestion

 Load handling 4.1 (410) 0.2 Ingestion

Waste Solidification Building

 Loss of confinement 0.65 (65) 0.04 Ingestion

 Fire 13 (1,300) 0.8 Ingestion

 Earthquake 14 (1,400) 0.8 Ingestion

a

Latent cancer fatalities are calculated by multiplying dose by the FGR 13

health risk conversion factor of 0.06 fatal cancer per person-Sv (6 × 10-4 fatal

cancer per person-rem) (Eckerman et al. 1999). Values are rounded to one

significant figure.

will not significantly impact facility operations (DCS 2002a). For this reason, the effects of

accidents caused by such events are not described in this FEIS.

Direct radiation hazards generally arise from radioactive material or other sources that emit

penetrating gamma or neutron radiation. The radioactive material that would be used in the

proposed MOX facility produces mostly alpha radiation, which is not as penetrating and is a less

significant direct radiation hazard, but could cause adverse health effects when inhaled. As a

result, there would be no accidents at the proposed MOX facility that would produce a direct

radiation hazard to the public. In addition, other than a criticality event, there would be no

accidents that would produce a direct radiation exposure hazard for an SRS employee.

The events for which accident consequences were evaluated in this FEIS are internal fire,

explosion, load handling event, criticality, and chemical releases. The methods employed to

analyze accident consequences were based on conservative assumptions and were intended to

provide a comprehensive, bounding analysis for all potential events up to and including design

basis accidents. 
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Table 4.15. Estimated human health radiological impacts

to the maximally exposed member of the public

from hypothetical facility accidents

Dose 

Dose Likelihood Major exposure

Facility/accident [mSv (mrem)] of LCFa pathway

Short-Term Exposure

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

 Criticality 0.0038 (0.38) 2 × 10-7 External

 Earthquake 0.0011 (0.11) 7 × 10-8 Inhalation

 Explosion 0.0094 (0.94) 6 × 10-7 Inhalation

 Fire 3.5 × 10-5 (0.0035) 2 × 10-9 Inhalation

 Leak/spill 1.2 × 10-5 (0.0012) 7 × 10-10 Inhalation

 Tritium release 0.90 (90) 5 × 10-5 Inhalation

Proposed MOX Facility

 Criticality 0.098 (9.8) 6 × 10-6 External

 Explosion 0.2 (20) 1 × 10-5 Inhalation

 Internal fire 0.0077 (0.77) 5 × 10-7 Inhalation

 Load handling 0.030 (3.0) 2 × 10-6 Inhalation

Waste Solidification Building

 Loss of confinement 0.0081 (0.81) 5 × 10-7 Inhalation

 Fire 0.16 (16) 1 × 10-5 Inhalation

 Earthquake 0.17 (17) 1 × 10-5 Inhalation

1-Year Exposure without Ingestion

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

 Criticality 0.0042 (0.42) 3 × 10-7 External

 Earthquake 0.0011 (0.11) 7 × 10-8 Inhalation

 Explosion 0.0094 (0.94) 6 × 10-7 Inhalation

 Fire 3.5 × 10-5 (0.0035) 2 × 10-9 Inhalation

 Leak/spill 1.2 × 10-5 (0.0012) 7 × 10-10 Inhalation

 Tritium release 0.90 (90) 5 × 10-5 Inhalation

Proposed MOX Facility

 Criticality 0.11 (11) 7 × 10-6 External

 Explosion 0.2 (20) 1 × 10-5 Inhalation

 Internal fire 0.0077 (0.77) 5 × 10-7 Inhalation

 Load handling 0.030 (3.0) 2 × 10-6 Inhalation

Waste Solidification Building

 Loss of confinement 0.0081 (0.81) 5 × 10-7 Inhalation

 Fire 0.16 (16) 1 × 10-5 Inhalation

 Earthquake 0.17 (17) 1 × 10-5 Inhalation
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Table 4.15. Continued

Dose 

Dose Likelihood Major exposure

Facility/accident [mSv (mrem)] of LCFa pathway

1-Year Exposure with Ingestion

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

 Criticality 0.012 (1.2) 7 × 10-7 Ingestion

 Earthquake 0.0016 (0.16) 1 × 10-7 Inhalation

 Explosion 0.013 (1.3) 8 × 10-7 Inhalation

 Fire 4.9 × 10-5 (0.0049) 3 × 10-9 Inhalation

 Leak/spill 1.3 × 10-5 (0.0013) 8 × 10-10 Inhalation

 Tritium release 39 (3,900) 0.002 Ingestion

Proposed MOX Facility

 Criticality 0.6 (60) 4 × 10-5 Ingestion

 Explosion 0.23 (23) 1 × 10-5 Inhalation

 Internal fire 0.012 (1.2) 7 × 10-7 Inhalation

 Load handling 0.045 (4.5) 3 × 10-6 Inhalation

Waste Solidification Building

 Loss of confinement 0.010 (1.0) 6 × 10-7 Inhalation

 Fire 0.20 (20) 1 × 10-5 Inhalation

 Earthquake 0.21 (21) 1 × 10-5 Inhalation

a

Latent cancer fatalities are calculated by multiplying dose by the FGR 13 health

risk conversion factor of 0.06 fatal cancer per person-Sv (6 × 10-4 fatal cancer per

person-rem) (Eckerman et al. 1999). Values are rounded to one significant figure.

Radiological release accidents were classified into likelihood categories on the basis of

qualitative estimates (DCS 2001, 2002a). The likelihood categories were defined as follows:

• Not Unlikely – Event may occur during the facility’s lifetime.

• Unlikely – Event is not expected to occur during the facility’s lifetime, but may be

considered credible.

• Highly Unlikely – Event originally classified as “not unlikely” or “unlikely” to which

sufficient controls have been applied to further reduce its likelihood to an acceptable

level.

DCS did not classify the likelihood of chemical release accidents. An assessment was

conducted that assumed the largest container for each chemical in storage was punctured,

although safety precautions are exercised to avoid such occurrences.

A short description of each event evaluated for the accident risk assessment is given in

Table 4.12. Additional details of the assessment methodology are provided in Appendix E.
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4.3.5.1.2 Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

A wide range of accident scenarios was considered previously for the PDCF (DOE 1999a). 

Potential accidents from both man-made and natural phenomena were considered. The

potential accidents evaluated for this FEIS were taken from DOE (1999a) and are listed in

Table 4.12.

4.3.5.1.3 Waste Solidification Building

A procedure similar to those used for the proposed MOX facility and the PDCF was used to

identify potential accidents at the WSB. Those accidents considered to be credible were

evaluated (DCS 2003b). A description of the accidents is presented in Table 4.12.

4.3.5.2 Radiological Human Health Risk

For exposures to depleted uranium, the health impacts would be expected to be dominated by

the chemical toxicity of the compounds rather than by their radiological effects (see

Section 4.3.5.3). A lethal exposure from the chemical toxicity of uranium (resulting from kidney

failure), would occur with an internal radiation dose of about 0.01 Sv (1 rem) (over a lifetime), a

dose that is not considered to have any significant radiation health effects.

Receptors: Radiation doses and health risk effects were calculated for SRS employees and

the public. General definitions of these receptor groups are given in Section 3.10.2.

For radiological hazards, the dose consequences to facility workers and SRS employees

following an accident would generally be dominated by the 50-year committed effective dose

equivalent from radioactive material inhaled immediately following the event. For the purposes

of analyses in this FEIS, this period of inhalation is assumed to last 8 hours. This exposure

pathway would dominate the dose (except in the case of criticality accidents) because it is

assumed that direct exposure to contaminated areas following an accident can be effectively

limited. In addition, no food is grown on the SRS, so the consumption of contaminated food is

not included in the dose for facility workers or SRS employees. Criticality accidents involve

radionuclides, other than uranium or plutonium, that pose a higher direct radiation hazard than

do inhalation or ingestion.

Unlike SRS employees, members of the public could reasonably be expected to be exposed to

both contaminated soil and food for some time beyond the early phase of an accident if no

protective action is taken. Initial food contamination occurs through the direct deposition of

airborne radioactive material onto crops. A lower level of contamination occurs through crop

root uptake of radioactive material from contaminated soil. Thus, the largest ingestion

exposure would occur if crops were ready for harvest immediately following an accidental

release. Many stakeholders want to know what could happen if no interdiction of crops

occurred. Whether an individual would be exposed to contaminated soil and food would

depend on the specific protective actions that the applicant and government agencies might
Environmental Consequences

4-46

take following an accident. The NRC recognizes that some interdiction would likely occur

following a significant accident, even if contamination levels were below the protective action

guides. Therefore, three separate sets of impacts to members of the public were assessed for

accidents. The first set of impacts is for the early phase (short-term period) of an accident

similar to the exposure pathways evaluated for the SRS employees. The second and third sets

of impacts are for the intermediate/long-term period (1 year) following an accident. The second

set presents the impacts without the ingestion pathway (if interdiction occurred). The third set

presents the ingestion pathway included in the impacts (if interdiction did not occur) with crops

assumed to be ready for harvest immediately following an accidental release (a bounding

analysis). Thus, a range of impacts to the public are presented to provide perspective on the

potential exposures associated with the consumption of contaminated crops for the 1-year

exposure period.

Population doses were calculated for up to a distance of 80 km (50 mi) from the release point

for 10 downwind distances and 16 wind directions. Radiation doses were calculated for the

following receptors for accident conditions:

• SRS employee MEI: For the purposes of the accident consequence assessment, an

employee on the SRS at the point of maximum air concentration located close to,

but outside, the facility’s protected area fence (at least 100 m [330 ft] or more from

the accident location). Exposure pathways assessed were inhalation exposure and

direct radiation from the passing cloud of airborne radioactive material (cloudshine)

released by the accident. A period of 8 hours of direct radiation exposure from

deposited radioactive material on the ground (groundshine) following the accident

was also considered.

• SRS employee population: All employees on the site located more than 100 m

(330 ft) from the accident location outside the facility. The same exposure pathways

as evaluated for the SRS employee MEI were evaluated for the collective SRS

employee population.

• Off-site MEI: A hypothetical individual member of the public living off-site and

receiving the maximum exposure from accidental releases. For the purposes of the

accident consequence assessment, this individual was assumed to be located at the

SRS boundary. A short-term exposure period, involving the same exposure

pathways assessed for the SRS employees, and a 1-year exposure period were

evaluated. The 1-year exposure evaluation included the short-term exposures, but it

also included a 1-year exposure, not 8 hours, to groundshine and a 1-year ingestion

exposure to contaminated food grown locally. Contaminated crops were not

assumed to be condemned; all locally grown food was assumed to have been

consumed.

• General population: All members of the public within an 80-km (50-mi) radius of the

site where the accident might occur. Short-term and 1-year impacts to the general

population were assessed on the basis of the same exposure pathways as for the

public, or off-site, MEI.
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During an accident, facility workers might be subject to severe physical and thermal (fire) forces

and could be exposed to releases of chemicals and radiation. The risk to the facility workers

would be very sensitive to the specific circumstances of each accident and would depend on

how rapidly the accident developed, the exact location and response of the workers, the

direction and amount of the release, the physical and thermal forces causing or caused by the

accident, meteorological conditions, and characteristics of the room or building if the accident

occurred indoors. Quantitative facility worker accident impacts are not provided in this FEIS. 

For most events, the applicant has conservatively assumed that consequences to the facility

worker MEI would exceed the applicable performance requirements in 10 CFR 70.61 and has

identified preventive or mitigative features in the facility’s design basis in order to meet the

performance requirements. However, it is recognized that worker injuries and fatalities would

be possible from chemical, radiological, thermal, and physical forces if an accident did occur.

Impacts: Estimated radiological impacts from the four hypothetical accident scenarios

considered are presented in Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 and are discussed below. While the

consequences of many of these accidents are significant, the likelihood of significant accidents

will be very low (highly unlikely) through the use of safety systems discussed in DCS’s

Construction Authorization Request. Thus, the overall risk of significant accidents is 

considered to be low.

SRS employee population: SRS employees were assumed to be unshielded from the passing

plume of airborne radioactivity released during an accident. The impacts for the collective SRS

employee population given in Table 4.13 were estimated for inhalation and external radiation

exposure. External radiation exposure consisted of cloudshine and groundshine. Groundshine

exposure was evaluated for 8 hours following an accident and was negligible, less than

approximately 0.02% of the total dose, in all cases. The impacts presented in Table 4.13 are

the highest potential impacts to the SRS employee population and were found to occur in the

direction of the major F-Area facilities, toward the south-southwest. The dominant exposure

pathway was inhalation for all accidents except for the hypothetical criticality events. For those

hypothetical criticality events, exposure to cloudshine was estimated to account for

approximately 70% of the collective dose; the remaining dose was estimated to result from

inhalation. 

The SRS employee MEI was estimated to receive a maximum dose, 0.026 Sv (2.6 rem), from

the tritium release at the PDCF. This dose was from the inhalation pathway. For this dose, the

likelihood of developing a latent fatal cancer was estimated to be 0.002 (about 1 chance in

500). SRS employee MEI impacts for all accidents considered are presented in Table 4.13.

Members of the public: As discussed above, impacts to the public were assessed for a shortterm period immediately following the accident and for a 1-year exposure period following the

accident that includes the short-term exposures. With the exception of nuclear criticality

accident events, inhalation was the dominant exposure pathway for the public in the short term

and 1-year exposure without ingestion. Maximum inhalation doses would occur to the westnorthwest of the SRS and would be more than 100 million times any external exposure. For the

1-year exposure to the public with ingestion, the ingestion pathway was the dominant exposure

pathway. The highest potential 1-year ingestion dose would be to the southwest of the SRS. 
Environmental Consequences

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Inhalation would account for the remainder of the dose except in the case of the criticality

accidents where external exposure and inhalation make up the balance of the dose. Further

details of the accident risk analysis are given in Appendix E.

The tritium release accident at the proposed PDCF was estimated to result in the largest shortterm exposure. An estimated collective dose of 42 person-Sv (4,200 person-rem) was

projected to be received by a population of approximately 309,900 persons extending out to

80 km (50 mi) to the west-northwest of the proposed MOX facility. The average individual dose

was projected to be approximately 0.14 mSv (14 mrem), about 4% of the value an individual

would receive on an annual basis from existing natural and man-made sources in the SRS

vicinity. However, persons living closer to the accident location would receive a higher dose on

average as discussed below for the hypothetical public MEI. The collective population dose

received from this accident is estimated to have a risk of an additional 3 LCFs in the affected

population.

The tritium release accident at the PDCF also produced the largest 1-year collective population

doses. For the case without ingestion, the results were the same as discussed above for the

short-term impacts because inhalation of the passing airborne emissions was the dominant

exposure pathway. For the case with ingestion, the largest impact was calculated for winds

blowing toward the southwest, where 18,010 people reside. The estimated collective

population dose was 1,800 person-Sv (180,000 person-rem). This dose corresponds to a

human health effect of up to 100 LCFs. However, for the purposes of this EIS, all contaminated

food that would be grown in an affected area is assumed to be eaten. Because the amount of

contaminated food exceeds the amount that would be consumed by persons living within the

affected area, it is further assumed that some of the affected food would be shipped out of the

region and consumed by persons living outside the region. Excluding ingestion, the dose

received by the people residing in the southwest sector was 1.7 person-Sv (170 person-rem). 

The remainder of the dose was attributed to the ingestion of all contaminated crops in the

southwest sector. Therefore, the collective dose of 1,800 person-Sv includes doses to persons

both within the affected area and outside the region. As shown in Table 4.15, the public MEI

was estimated to receive a dose of 0.039 Sv (3.9 rem) for this hypothetical accident, on the

basis of individual consumption rates in Appendix E. Assuming that all 18,010 persons

received the MEI dose, which would be an overestimate of the dose, the corresponding

collective population dose would be about 40% of the total collective dose estimated above for

the case including ingestion. Therefore, the people living within the affected area would receive

less than 40% of the collective dose estimated.

The potential 100 LCFs among members of the public estimated from the PDCF tritium release

accident is intended to be an upper bound for such an accident when the ingestion of

contaminated food is considered. The GENII code used for the accident analysis provides

impacts for the four seasons of the year (winter, spring, summer, and autumn), which

correspond to various phases of crop growth. Ingestion impacts increase from winter (from

radionuclide deposition on soil only) through autumn (from radionuclide deposition on plants

immediately prior to harvest). As discussed earlier in this section, when impacts were

estimated, crops were assumed to be ready for harvest (autumn) at the time of an accidental

release. This assumption was made to place an upper bound on any expected impacts
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resulting from the ingestion of contaminated food. In addition, ingestion pathway impacts

estimated with GENII typically display a steady increase upon progressing from winter through

spring, summer, and autumn, resulting from an increase in direct deposition on crops due to

increased crop growth. However, in the case of tritium contamination, an ingestion dose of

0 person-Sv was estimated for winter, spring, or summer, and an ingestion dose of

1,800 person-Sv (180,000 person-rem) was estimated for autumn.

GENII incorporates a tritium-specific model that recognizes that tritium, in the form of water

vapor, is an integral part of the environment and human metabolism and exchanges readily with

other water in the environment. As modeled, the deposited tritium has a chance to dissipate in

the environment prior to crop harvest (i.e., winter, spring, and summer impacts), but if deposited

immediately prior to harvest (autumn impacts), the tritium is assumed to remain in the crops. 

Thus, the 100 LCFs calculated from the collective population dose of 1,800 person-Sv

(180,000 person-rem) from the PDCF tritium release accident is a high upper-bound estimate

because further dissipation of the tritium after crop harvest would be likely to occur before

ingestion.

Impacts were assessed for an MEI living at the SRS boundary for short-term, 1-year without

ingestion, and 1-year with ingestion exposures. In all three cases, maximum impacts were

found to occur to a hypothetical individual located 9,070 m (5.6 mi) northwest of the facilities as

a result of the PDCF tritium release accident. As shown in Table 4.15 , the highest estimated

dose to the public MEI was 0.90 mSv (90 mrem) in the short term from inhalation exposure. The

potential maximum 1-year exposure without ingestion accident impact was estimated to be the

same as the short-term exposure impact because both are dominated by inhalation exposure to

the passing airborne contaminant plume immediately following an accidental release. If

ingestion of contaminated crops is considered, a total exposure of 39 mSv (3,900 mrem) was

estimated for the MEI. The resulting health effects were estimated to be a chance of

contracting a latent fatal cancer over their lifetime of 5 × 10-5 (1 chance in 20,000) and 0.002

(about 1 chance in 500) as a result of the short-term or 1-year without ingestion exposures and

the 1-year with ingestion exposure, respectively.

No mitigative actions were considered in the above analysis for the 1-year MEI exposure with

ingestion. However, current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommendations

(FDA 1998) include a protective action guide (PAG) of 5 mSv (500 mrem) CEDE and 50 mSv

(5,000 mrem) committed dose equivalent to an individual tissue or organ, whichever is more

limiting. These intervention levels of dose are radiation doses at which protective actions

should be considered. The maximum public MEI ingestion dose of 39 mSv (3,900 mrem) would

exceed the FDA PAG of 5 mSv (500 mrem) CEDE.

The impacts presented here are intended to provide a comprehensive bounding analysis for all

potential events up to and including design basis accidents as discussed in Section 4.3.5.1. 

While non-credible “worst-case” accidents were not evaluated, a number of conservative

assumptions were used to ensure that potential future impacts are bounded. Should an

accident occur, potential nearby receptors would be the most vulnerable immediately after the

event because they might not be aware of the accident and might not receive notification in time

to take protective actions. However, those individuals farther from an accident would be more
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likely to receive notification in time and would be in a position to reduce doses by taking

protective actions. The consequences reported here provide a range of impacts including the

assumption that no protective actions are taken. Protective actions include sheltering or

evacuation in the short-term and the banning of locally grown food in the long-term. Further,

the 1-year results with ingestion presented here are based on the assumption that an accident

occurs immediately before harvest. This is a bounding assumption because the direct

deposition of radioactivity on crops would cause the highest ingestion exposures. However,

long-term exposure without ingestion was also included for perspective. In addition, this

analysis assumes that individuals are not sheltered during the accident and passing of the

radioactive plume. Thus, the estimated accident impacts presented in this EIS are considered

to bound future possible outcomes.

The radiological risks of accidents described in this FEIS are considered to be low because

either the likelihood of these accidents would be significantly diminished, or sufficient controls

would be applied to ensure the dose consequences are much lower than those presented here. 

The requirements to reduce the risk of accidents that could result in high consequences are

contained in the NRC’s regulations in 10 CFR Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear

Material," and the DOE’s 10 CFR Part 830 "Nuclear Safety Management." In order to obtain a

license to possess and use special nuclear material from the NRC, for example, the applicant

must show that the risk of each credible high-consequence event is limited through the use of

engineered controls, administrative controls, or both. Pursuant to this and other performance

requirements, mitigation measures identified in Chapter 5 of this FEIS include those controls

identified by the applicant to reduce the risks of potential accidents.

4.3.5.3 Chemical Human Health Risk

An analysis of potential impacts from accidental chemical releases was conducted. The

analysis considered maximum inventories of stored chemicals at the proposed facilities and

each chemical’s physical characteristics (e.g., volatility) and its toxic concentration levels. 

Liquid storage containers with the largest chemical inventories were assumed to be punctured

(e.g., by a forklift), resulting in a spill of the entire chemical contents of the container on an

outdoor concrete surface. In general, it was assumed that the spill would occur onto an

impervious surface from which evaporation could occur, rather than onto a soil surface where

absorption would limit evaporation. (Two chemical releases were modeled as pressurized

releases; see below.) Evaporation from the chemical pool was assumed to be of limited

duration, not more than an hour, because of rapid mitigative response. The Areal Locations of

Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA, Version 5.2.3) model (Reynolds 1992) was used with the aid

of a liquid pool evaporation algorithm to assess the downwind consequences of such boundingcase spills. An assessment of the accidental release of uranium dioxide powder was also

included. 

For each release, potential impacts to two populations were evaluated — the off-site general

public and SRS employees. For the SRS employee evaluation, a wind speed of 2.2 m/s

(4.9 mph), F atmospheric stability class, and a temperature of 25.8C (78.5F), was determined

to represent the site-specific 95th percentile concentration. This was established on the basis
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of the ARCON96 model chi/Q value (ratio of concentration to emissions) estimated at a

distance of 100 m (330 ft) from the release. For the off-site general public evaluation, the

bounding conditions were determined to be a wind speed of 1.3 m/s (3.0 mph), F atmospheric

stability class, and a temperature of 25.8C (78.5F), representing site-specific, 95th percentile

nighttime bounding meteorology. The 95th percentile meteorology was assumed to be a

reasonable approximation of conditions that would produce the 95th percentile concentration

consistent with the ARCON96 estimate at 100 m (330 ft). Details on the modeling assumptions

are provided in Appendix E. 

The criteria levels used to assess potential exposures were temporary emergency exposure

limits (TEELs) adopted by the DOE Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and

Protective Action (SCAPA) (Craig 2002). TEEL values are available for about 2000

substances; they are derived by using a hierarchy of other available criteria values (Craig et al.

2000). If Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) developed by panels of

toxicologists for the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) are

available, these are used for the TEEL values. If ERPGs are not available, TEELs usually are

based on emergency planning and other guideline levels developed for the protection of

workers (Craig 2002).

Several TEEL concentration values are available for each chemical (see text box on next page). 

For the purposes of this analysis, modeled exposures of SRS employees (assumed to be

located 100 m [330 ft] from the release location) to levels greater than TEEL-3 for any chemical

were defined as large consequence, and levels less than TEEL-3 but greater than TEEL-2 were

defined as moderate consequence. The assessment for the off-site general public differed

slightly, as discussed below.

The distance from the release location to the SRS boundary (the nearest location for potential

exposures of the general public) is 8.2 km (5.1 mi). Since the ALOHA model restricts release

durations to 1 hour, the ambient air concentration at that location could not be readily obtained

(the concentrations for downwind distances at times exceeding 1 hour are not directly provided

in the ALOHA model). Because plume travel time exceeded 1 hour (i.e., the ALOHA limit) for

all of the evaporative spill scenarios considered, the estimated site boundary concentration was

obtained by extrapolation methods (see Appendix E). To assess impacts to the general public,

site boundary concentrations greater than TEEL-2 levels for any chemical were defined as large

consequence, and levels less than TEEL-2 but greater than TEEL-1 were defined as moderate

consequence. In addition, the maximum distances from the release point to which chemical

TEEL-1 and TEEL-2 air concentrations could extend were estimated using the ALOHA model.

Two release scenarios, one involving nitrogen tetroxide and the other involving chlorine, were

modeled as pressurized releases. The HGSYSTEM model (Post 1994a,b; Hanna et al. 1997)

was used to simulate pressurized jet releases for punctured containers and the downwind

dispersion of the released material. As was done with the ALOHA model for the evaporative

dispersion cases, all model runs accounted for the influence of dense vapor cloud behavior on

downwind dispersion in releases determined to exhibit this behavior.
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The results of the assessment are summarized in Table 4.16. No accidental releases would

result in concentrations exceeding TEEL-1 levels beyond the site boundary. Impacts from

these spills on the general public would be small. For all spills, impacts could be minimized with

rapid emergency response actions by nearby workers. This response would include quick

mitigative action to cover the spill and to minimize evaporation and downwind transport. For

SRS employees, impacts could be moderate or large for spills involving chlorine or nitrogen

tetroxide. Specific response actions covered under the existing SRS Emergency Response

Plan (SRS 2001), including remaining indoors (i.e., sheltering in place) and evacuating (e.g.,

including rapid evacuation of all nonemergency workers to an upwind location and into

designated buildings), would be implemented to minimize worker exposures to spills involving

hazardous chemicals of this type. The SRS Emergency Response Plan may be revised to

address specific hazards that are not covered in the existing plan subsequent to safety analysis

reviews required under DOE chemical safety standards or orders (e.g., DOE-STD-3009-94,

DOE Order 420.1).

4.3.5.4 Hydrology

During the scoping process, a concern was raised about groundwater contamination through

existing deep boreholes. There are 11 deep boreholes at the SRS. The closest deep borehole

is located north of the unnamed tributary that is just north of the proposed MOX facility

(see Figure 3.3). Impacts to the groundwater from the proposed facilities have been evaluated. 

The deep boreholes were determined not to be a credible path by which materials from the

proposed facilities could contaminate groundwater, and there would be no discharges to

groundwater. Surface spills from the facilities that might travel toward the deep boreholes

would be intercepted by the unnamed tributary. Accidental releases that might possibly reach

the groundwater would flow in the shallow groundwater aquifer and discharge to Upper Three

Runs Creek.

Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEELs)

TEEL-1: The maximum concentration in air below which it is believed

that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without

experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or

perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.

TEEL-2: The maximum concentration in air below which it is believed

that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without

experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects

or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action.

TEEL-3: The maximum concentration in air below which it is believed

that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without

experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.
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This page is being withheld pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(a).
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Because accidental releases to surface water would be quickly remediated as required by the

facility’s Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan, impacts would be negligible. 

Materials released by leaks or ruptures of vessels and piping used to store and transfer process

chemicals and liquid radioactive waste could affect surface water and groundwater. Bulk

process chemicals would be stored and chemical mixtures would be prepared in the Reagent

Processing Building. DCS has identified a number of chemical process safety controls to

prevent significant spills or other accidents that would have the potential to significantly affect

the human environment. These measures include administrative controls over segregation and

separation of incompatible chemicals, concentration controls on specific reagents, and a

process safety instrumentation and control system to measure and control process conditions

to ensure safety limits are not exceeded.

Groundwater quality could be indirectly impacted by accidental releases of contaminated

effluents or hazardous stored liquids and infiltration of contaminated runoff. Such impacts,

however, are expected to be negligible because of adherence to guidelines established in

existing NPDES permits and prompt cleanup of any spills as required under the facility’s Spill

Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan. Storage vessels for liquid wastes would be

located in the Aqueous Polishing Building. 

A rupture of the low-level liquid radioactive waste transfer line could release wastewater

containing radioactivity at concentrations up to the ETF waste-acceptance criteria levels. DCS,

however, has committed to liquid containment features, including containment basins below

storage tanks that hold contaminated liquids (stainless-steel-lined floors and portions of walls

would be used to create basins in the tank room of the Aqueous Polishing Building) and doublewall pipe and a leak detection system for the transfer line. 

The WSB would be connected to the proposed MOX facility and PDCF by stainless steel

double-walled pipelines for transfer of stripped uranium wastes and the high-alpha-activity

wastes. The waste streams that constitute the high-alpha-activity waste stream include the

americium stream, the alkaline wash stream, and the excess acid stream. The combined

volumes of these streams would be about 44,200 L/yr (11,700 gal/yr) (DCS 2002a, 2004a). 

The stripped uranium stream would average about 174,000 L/yr (46,000 gal/yr) during normal

operations. The stripped uranium stream would contain only 1% uranium-235 to avoid issues

of criticality. To minimize the probability of a pipe failure, both of these waste streams would be

transported in double-walled stainless steel pipes. In addition, the pipes would be designed to

withstand the effects of a design-basis earthquake and other natural phenomena. If either of

these lines ruptured, impacts to surface water or groundwater would be small because of the

small quantities of waste involved in the transfer and prompt and thorough cleanup required

under the SRS Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan.

4.3.5.5 Waste Management

Wastes that may be generated from the accident scenarios discussed in this FEIS are expected

to be similar in type and of volumes that would be within the bounds of the capacities at the
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Deactivation

Deactivation is the process of removing a facility

from operation and placing it in safe-shutdown

condition for an extended period of time. 

Deactivation would involve:

• Removal of unused plutonium and uranium

feedstock, process chemicals, and loose

surface contamination;

• Depressurization of all facility systems; and

• Sealing of gloveboxes and ventilation

systems.

SRS for waste management. Potential impact to the waste management system at the SRS is

expected to be minimal.

4.3.6 Deactivation and Decommissioning

4.3.6.1 Introduction

License termination is considered the final stage of the licensing process for an NRC-licensed

facility. License termination entails deactivation and decommissioning of the facility as part of

the termination process. Decommissioning involves the removal of the facility safely from

service and reduction of residual radioactivity to a level that permits release of the property for

unrestricted or restricted use. Termination of the MOX facility license would be governed by

10 CFR 70.38. Decommissioning of the proposed MOX facility would be conducted in

accordance with criteria of 10 CFR 20 Subpart E (Radiological Criteria for License Termination). 

The PDCF and WSB may not be decommissioned after completion of MOX facility operations,

but they are included in this evaluation to bound the analysis.

DCS plans to deactivate the proposed MOX

facility and request NRC to terminate the license

once the facility’s mission for disposition of

excess plutonium is completed (DCS 2002a). 

This plan is based on the contract between DOE

and DCS that calls for DCS to deactivate the

proposed MOX facility and place it in a safeshutdown condition once operations have

ended. In addition, the supporting DOE-owned

and -operated support facilities, the PDCF and

the WSB, would also require decommissioning

once the surplus plutonium mission was

completed. The ultimate fate of the facilities

would then become the responsibility of DOE. 

DOE may choose to reuse or decommission the facilities once the surplus plutonium mission

has been completed. DOE will make a decision on when and how to decommission the

facilities.

Currently, it is difficult to determine the possible final disposition of the facilities following the

completion of their intended mission. The proposed MOX facility would be owned by DOE and

operated by DCS under the terms of the DOE-DCS contract and scope of work. The course of

decommissioning and future use of all three facilities would depend largely on DOE decisions

that would be made at some future date as the facilities approached the end of their operating

lives. Since the scoping process identified decommissioning as a significant issue, the potential

impacts of decommissioning the facilities are presented below.
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Decommissioning

Decommissioning is the process of decontaminating and dismantling the facilities following

deactivation and returning the site to an end

state that meets the prescribed regulatory

criteria. Decommissioning would involve:

• Chemical decontamination,

• Physical decontamination of equipment,

structures, and materials (e.g., disassembly

of equipment and enclosures and removal of

materials), and

• Removal of structures and restoration of the

site to a prescribed end state.

4.3.6.2 Decommissioning Process

Options for decommissioning nuclear facilities

are discussed generically in NRC’s Final

Generic Environmental Impact Statement on

Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities

(NUREG/CR-0586 [NRC 1988]). As stated in

that document, it is the objective of the NRC to

conduct decommissioning as an end point of

the license termination process.

Other options, such as safe storage, deferred

decommissioning, or restricted release, could

have been evaluated. However, for safe

storage and deferred decommissioning, the

doses to workers during decommissioning

would be greater because of the decay of

transuranic radionuclides (e.g., plutonium-241

and plutonium-238). That is, the radioactivity in a facility would increase because of the ingrowth of daughter products. Restricted release was not considered at this time because the

“base case” for decommissioning under 10 CFR Part 20, Subpart E, would be unrestricted

release. DCS would need to provide additional justification to support a request for restricted

release, which at this point in the project would be speculative.

On the basis of the EIS on decommissioning of nuclear facilities (NRC 1988), it is assumed that

the decommissioning process for the facilities would include 2 years of preparation and

planning, followed by actual decommissioning activities. In general, decommissioning planning

would be conducted during the last 2 years of normal plant operation. During that time, detailed

plans and procedures would be prepared, a decommissioning staff would be trained, safety and

environmental reports would be prepared (if necessary), and effluent control system

modifications would be started.

Work would begin immediately following facility shutdown. Chemical decontamination would be

followed by physical decontamination of most plant areas, including disassembly of equipment

and enclosures and removal of resulting materials, such as structural components. These

materials would be packaged and transported off-site as waste. The main facility and service

system (e.g., decommissioning equipment and accessories) would be removed last. Some

buildings, such as the Administration Building at the proposed MOX facility might not require

any decommissioning prior to release for unrestricted use.
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Table 4.17. Summary of radiological

impacts from routine facility

decommissioning

Exposure

Dosea

[person-Sv

(person-rem)]

Occupational

 Deactivationb 6.3 (630)

 Decommissioning 19 (1,900)

 Transportationc 0.99 (99)

 Total 27 (2,700)

Public

 Deactivation 8.2 × 10-9 (8.2 × 10-7)

 Decommissioning 1.8 × 10-7 (1.8 × 10-5)

 Transportationc 1.2 (120)

 Total 1.2 (120)

Grand total 28 (2,800)

a

Doses are rounded to two significant

figures.

b

Assumed to follow the same preparation

process for long-term custodial care (NRC

1998).

c

Assumes 686 shipments. Estimated

from single shipment risks for TRU waste

shipments from the SRS to WIPP presented

in Monette et al. (1996).

4.3.6.3 Decommissioning Impacts

4.3.6.3.1 Radiological Impacts

Because of the uncertainties involved in future operation of the facilities, most of the specific

information needed to assess actual decommissioning impacts would depend on the actual

operating history of the facilities. Because of the lack of a full-scale MOX facility, PDCF, and

WSB, the analysis conducted for this FEIS has been extrapolated from the generic information

provided in NRC’s final generic EIS for a small mixed oxide fuel fabrication plant (NUREG/CR0129; NRC 1979) and from NUREG/CR-0586 (NRC 1988). The extrapolation is based on a

comparison of the size of the facilities as represented by the total area covered (square meters

or square feet) by the MOX Fuel Fabrication Building plus the PDCF and the WSB. The

objective of this analysis is to obtain baseline information pertaining to the radiological impact

associated with decommissioning activities. Thus, the radiological impact from the proposed

MOX facility was estimated to be about 28 times that in the NRC’s generic EIS. Given the

uncertainties in the decommissioning

activities that would be undertaken at the

proposed facilities in the future, this

assumption provides a reasonable estimate

of the decommissioning impacts. The

radiological impacts associated with

decommissioning are presented in

Table 4.17.

4.3.6.3.2 Nonradiological Impacts

Geology and Soils. Soils covered by

buildings and paved surfaces would be

reclaimed to support the designated

vegetation type after decommissioning. Soil

treatments, including grading, disking, and

fertilizer applications, would be used

following removal of concrete foundations of

structures and asphalt from paved parking

areas. The movements of trucks and other

vehicles involved in removing concrete and

major facility components during

decommissioning might result in soil

compaction in localized areas. The use of

chisel plows or other equipment might be

required to loosen the soil in areas where

compaction was severe. Depending on the

final engineering design for the facility sites,

some earth moving might be needed. Soils
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in the storm-water retention area might be moved and/or graded to prevent erosion and to

enhance establishment of plant species on areas to be revegetated. Attempts would be made

to grade the area to fit with the existing topography of this portion of F-Area at the time of

decommissioning.

Hydrology. The types of impacts to surface and groundwater during decommissioning of the

facilities would be similar to those occurring during construction. Water would be used for dust

suppression when necessary and might be needed during planting until vegetation becomes

established. Runoff from areas being graded after the removal of concrete or asphalt would be

minimized through use of silt fences or straw bales to control erosion. No impacts are

anticipated to groundwater during decommissioning activities. Impacts to surface water during

decommissioning would be small because of the measures employed to control runoff.

Air Quality and Noise. The types of air quality impacts expected during decommissioning of

the facilities would be similar to those anticipated during facility construction. Vehicles used

during decommissioning might create fugitive dust during dry conditions at the SRS. Fugitive

dust would be controlled by watering during these periods. As described in Section 4.3.2.1,

impacts to air quality would be small.

Noise associated with dismantling and removal of facility structures from F-Area and the SRS

would be localized and temporary. Impacts of noise would be similar to those generated by

initial construction of the facility (see Section H.2.1 in Appendix H) and would be small.

Ecology. Assuming that full decommissioning occurs and DCS removes the facilities and

allows restricted use of the facility areas on the SRS, the following ecological impacts could

occur. Although decommissioning plans may call for removal of facility structures, other areas

designed to support operations may not be changed. The 4.5 ha (11.0 acres) occupied by the

relocated 115-kV power line would remain in use as the power line continued to provide

electricity to other F-Area facilities. Also, the 2.0 ha (5.0 acres) of new roads and road

upgrades would remain. The 0.6 ha (1.5 acres) occupied by the storm-water basin might also

be retained for that use. If storm-water control was not necessary, this area could provide

wetland and pond habitats. The remaining areas located within the fenced boundaries of the

facilities and along the pipeline rights-of-way could be revegetated. Revegetation goals could

include establishing landscaped lawn around buildings, grass and forb species (e.g., similar to

the vegetated conditions on the existing spoils pile area within the proposed location for the

proposed MOX facility area), or evergreen and mixed forest habitats. The choice of treatment

would depend upon the restricted use planned for the area in the future.

During decommissioning activities, wildlife would be affected in a manner similar to what would

occur during construction (see Section H.3.1.1.2 in Appendix H). Impacts would primarily be

disturbance and displacement caused by noise and human presence. Following

decommissioning, a potentially diverse wildlife community could reoccupy the facility areas. 

Reforestation of the areas would be the most productive for wildlife, while use of the area for

new facilities would be least productive for wildlife.
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On the basis of the assessment of impacts to ecological resources during construction of the

proposed facilities (Section H.3.1, Appendix H), the impacts of decommissioning are expected

to be minor.

Land Use. The F-Area is classified as developed/industrial land. Construction of the proposed

facilities is consistent with this classification and the SRS Long Range Comprehensive Plan

(DOE 2000b). Decommissioning of the facility site for unrestricted use at SRS would not

interfere with current uses or anticipated future uses of the F-Area. Lands in adjacent areas on

the SRS managed by the U.S. Forest Service would not be adversely affected by

decommissioning activities.

Cultural and Paleontological Resources. Decommissioning is not likely to affect any

archaeological sites, historic structures, or traditional cultural properties at the proposed project

site. Mitigation measures to avoid impacts during construction of the facility at one prehistoric

archaeological site that is eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP)

are described in Section H.5.1.1 (Appendix H). Prior to decommissioning, a plan would be

developed by DOE describing actions that would be taken to avoid or protect any known or new

archaeological sites discovered in areas likely to experience surface disturbance or impacts

from runoff because of decommissioning activities. The plan would also address other impacts

of decommissioning workers such as unauthorized pedestrian traffic or vehicular activity in the

vicinity of known sites or eligible sites. If the mitigation measures described in Section H.5.1.1

are implemented during decommissioning, the impacts to cultural resources could be avoided

or minimized.

Nonradiological Impacts of Transportation. Decommissioning would require the transport of

demolished structures and components to on-site or off-site disposal areas. The transport of

structural materials and components would be along existing SRS roads and local South

Carolina highways and would not require new roadway construction. Vehicular traffic on the

SRS and local roadways related to decommissioning activities is not expected to affect traffic

volume or traffic flow patterns on local roads.

Waste Management. The demolition of the facilities would generate solid waste in the form of

structural materials such as concrete and steel and contaminated facility components. The

exact quantities and classification of waste types cannot be determined at this time; the

information presented here on waste types and volumes is based only on projections. The

handling and disposal of wastes produced during decommissioning would comply with all

regulatory requirements. 

Socioeconomics. The types of impacts to socioeconomic and community resources during

the decommissioning of the facilities would be similar to those occurring during their

construction. The number of workers expected to be needed for decommissioning is about the

same as for construction. Socioeconomic impacts from construction are described in

Section H.7.1 (Appendix H). No adverse impacts are anticipated to local communities relative

to housing demand for workers or community services from decommissioning activities. 

Assuming that they would have sufficient notice of the completion of decommissioning impacts, 
Environmental Consequences

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local communities should be able to plan for the loss of revenue generated by the work force. 

The projected costs of decommissioning are discussed below.

Decontamination and Decommissioning Costs. Uncertainties surrounding the precise

nature of activities and, consequently, the magnitude of the cost associated with

decommissioning of the proposed MOX facility have meant that no direct estimates of these

costs have been made to date. However, estimates have been made on the basis of the costs

of decommissioning efforts for a similar facility at the RFETS in Colorado (DCS 2001). 

Facilities currently being decommissioned at the RFETS have supported activities that are

broadly similar to those likely to take place in a MOX fuel fabrication facility and in the

associated aqueous polishing facility. These activities at the RFETS have included the

manufacture of plutonium weapons components, including casting and machining in dry

gloveboxes, and the recovery of plutonium from plutonium residue in “canyon” rooms. On the

basis of the volume and types of wastes generated during the decommissioning of those

buildings, estimates of the direct costs of decommissioning of the proposed MOX facility and

related facilities are about $377 million (FY 2003 dollars).

In addition to the direct costs of the facilities, a number of indirect costs would also be incurred. 

These costs include site security, residue and fuel deactivation and removal, environmental

programs, project management, and costs associated with borrowing funds to finance the

project (DCS 2001). Significant contingency allowances would also have to be included.

On the basis of data gathered from other, similarly large nuclear fuel cycle-related projects, it

can be concluded that the indirect costs are likely to be roughly approximate to the direct costs

of construction and operation. It has also been estimated that decommissioning costs of similar

projects are equivalent to about 80% of project capital cost (DOE 1995). Design and

construction costs for the MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilities, including contingency, are estimated

to be $1,929 million (NNSA 2002). Using both approaches, the total decommissioning cost for

the three facilities would, therefore, lie in the range of $758 million to $1,543 million (2003

dollars).

4.3.7 Environmental Justice

4.3.7.1 Introduction

Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority

Populations and Low-Income Populations (Volume 59, page 7629 of the Federal Register

[59 FR 7629]), issued by President Clinton on February 11, 1994, requires federal agencies to

incorporate environmental justice as part of their missions. Specifically, it directs executive

branch agencies to address, as appropriate, any disproportionately high and adverse human

health or environmental effects of their actions, programs, or policies on minority and lowincome populations. Although independent agencies, such as the NRC, were only requested to

comply with Executive Order 12898, the NRC, in a letter dated March 31, 1994, stated it would

endeavor to carry out the measures set forth in the Executive Order and accompanying
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memorandum as part of its efforts to comply with the requirements of NEPA. The NRC has

developed guidelines for environmental justice analyses described in Environmental Review

Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs (NRC 2001, NRC 2003). 

The analysis of the potential impacts of the no-action and proposed action alternatives on

environmental justice communities near the SRS uses demographic data from the 2000 census

to describe the distribution of minority and low-income populations in the vicinity of the SRS. 

The definitions of minority and low-income population groups as used in this analysis are as

follows:

• Minority. Beginning with the 2000 census, where appropriate, the census form

allows individuals to designate multiple population group categories to reflect their

ethnic or racial origin. Persons are included in the minority category if they classify

themselves as belonging to any of the following racial groups: Hispanic, Black or

African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Other

Pacific Islander. In addition, persons who classify themselves as being of multiple

racial origin may choose up to six racial groups as the basis of their racial origins. 

The “minority population” therefore incorporates all persons, including those

classifying themselves in multiple racial categories, except those who classify

themselves as not of Hispanic origin and as White or “Other Race” (U.S. Bureau of

the Census 2002).

• Low-Income. Individuals who fall below the poverty line are classified as lowincome. The poverty line takes into account family size and age of individuals in the

family. In 1999, for example, the poverty line for a family of five with three children

below the age of 18 was $19,882 in annual income. For any given family below the

poverty line, all family members are considered as being below the poverty line for

the purposes of analysis (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002).

Data on minority and low-income populations are available at the county, census tract, block

group, and block level. To fully evaluate the potential environmental justice impacts of the

proposed action alternative, the distribution of minority and low-income populations was

analyzed at the census block group level. The analysis was based on guidelines for

environmental justice analyses described in Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing

Actions Associated with NMSS Programs (NRC 2001). An 80-km (50-mi)-diameter buffer zone

around F-Area at the SRS was used as the basis for the analysis so as to include potential

adverse human health or socioeconomic impacts related to the construction and operation at

the SRS. Accidental chemical and radiological releases, for example, have the potential to

affect minority and low-income population groups located some distance from the site,

depending on the size and nature of potential releases and on meteorological conditions. The

actual extent of any such effects would depend on the magnitude and nature of any release at

the site. 

In addition to demographic data, the NRC solicited comments and information regarding the

potential for the proposed action to cause disproportionate impacts to environmental justice

communities at the public scoping meetings (see Section 1.4.1). The comments received at
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these meetings are presented in Appendix I, Section 2.2.13. In summary, environmental justice

impacts were a concern to many stakeholders. It was stated that contamination could affect

fishing resources that might be used for subsistence by low-income and minority population

groups some distance downstream of the site. This information further supported NRC’s

decision to use a larger assessment area for environmental justice impacts. It was also stated

that many low-income people rely to a greater extent on food produced from gardens.

Guidelines for performing environmental justice reviews are described in NRC’s NUREG-1748

(NRC 2001). The analysis method is multistep and consists of first determining if a site has a

potential environmental justice concern based on the identification of low-income and minority

populations that could be affected by the proposed action. Next, a determination is made as to

whether possible impacts would disproportionately impact low-income or minority populations. 

In cases where the low-income and minority populations are located next to the site, potential

impacts could be disproportionate. In other cases, specific behavior of low-income and minority

populations, such as the consumption of a greater portion of homegrown crops and other food

items, for example, may result in a disproportionate impact. Finally, if it is determined that there

would be a potential impact, an assessment would be made as to whether the impact of any

aspect of construction and operation of the proposed facilities, including accidents, on lowincome or minority populations would be both “high and adverse.”

Block group level data for minority and low-income populations for all block groups within 80 km

(50 mi) of F-Area are shown in Tables 4.18 and 4.19. Data for each population group are

compared with the state and county minority and low-income totals. The environmental justice

impacts of the transportation of MOX fuel were not considered because of the uncertainty

surrounding the routes that would be selected and the timing and quantity of MOX fuel

shipments. NRC guidelines suggest that disproportionate effects on minority and low-income

populations should be considered if the minority or low-income populations in block groups are

more than 20 percentage points higher than the state and county levels, or where the local

minority or low-income population exceeds 50%. Using data in Table 4.18, adding

20 percentage points to the state average would mean that disproportionate effects on minority

populations should be considered if the percentage of minorities in a block group is greater than

57.2% in Georgia and 53.8% in South Carolina. Disproportionate effects on low-income

populations should be considered if the percentage of the low-income persons in a block group

is greater than 34.7% in Georgia and 35.4% in South Carolina (Table 4.19). Minority and

low-income percentages in each block group were also compared with the county minority and

low-income averages by adding 20 percentage points to the corresponding county minority and

low-income percentages. This analysis considered block groups with minority and low-income

populations more than 20 percentage points above the state or county value as block groups

that have environmental justice populations. Any block group where minority and low-income

populations exceeded 50% of the block group population was also considered in the analysis.

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the census block groups for the 80-km (50-mi) buffer zone area. The

shaded areas are those block groups where minority and low-income individuals are

20 percentage points higher than the state or county averages, or greater than 50% of the total

population in the block group.
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Environmental Consequences Table 4.18. Minority population characteristics in the vicinity of the SRS County White Hispanic Black American Indian or Alaskan Native Asian Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander Other Two or more races Total minority Percent minority Georgia Bulloch 2,850 138 1,152 3 9 1 25 22 1,212 29.8 Burke 10,433 316 11,343 51 57 3 141 215 11,810 53.1 Columbia 72,862 2,297 9,952 276 2,997 80 703 1,376 15,384 17.4 Emanuel 674 17 274 1 0 0 0 6 281 29.4 Jefferson 3,041 101 2,713 7 15 1 56 52 2,844 48.3

 Jenkins 4,827 287 3,472 13 18 8 177 60 3,748 43.7 Lincoln 571 3 129 1 3 0 1 7 141 19.8 McDuffie 3,862 100 1,115 18 17 3 28 50 1,231 24.2 Richmond 91,006 5,545 99,391 552 3,000 249 2,024 3,553 108,769 54.4 Screven 8,234 147 6,963 22 40 8 31 76 7,140 46.4 Warren 579 14 324 3 1 0 0 3 331 36.4Within 80-km buffer 198,939 8,965 136,828 947 6,157 353 3,186 5,420 152,891 43.5State 5,327,281 435,227 2,349,542 21,737 173,170 4,246 196,289 114,188 2,859,172 34.9South Carolina Aiken 101,745 3,025 36,442 566 905 36 1,181 1,677 40,807 28.6 Allendale 3,068 181 7,960 10 14 7 95 57 8,143 72.6 Bamberg 6,075 118 10,411 27 32 1 23 89 10,583 63.5 Barnwell 12,956 327 9,990 81 91 8 182 170 10,522 44.8 Colleton 605 102 261 0 0 0 64 20 345 36.3 Edgefield 13,962 503 10,209 81 59 8 107 169 10,633 43.2 Hampton 6,259 482 8,276 28 22 1 102 69 8,498 57.6 Lexington 40,976 957 6,085 186 117 10 517 477 7,392 15.3 McCormick 1,312 21 1,736 2 2 1 3 13 1,757 57.2 Orangeburg 9,888 127 7,983 121 26 4 44 199 8,377 45.9 Saluda 9,679 1,159 5,011 37 4 0 511 111 5,674 37.0Within 80-km buffer 206,525 7,002 104,364 1,139 1,272 76 2,829 3,051 112,731 35.3State 2,695,560 95,076 1,185,215 13,718 36,014 1,628 39,926 39,950 1,316,452 32.8
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Table 4.19. Low-income population characteristics in

the vicinity of the SRS

County

Low-income

population

Percent

low-income

Georgia

 Bulloch 711 17.3

 Burke 6,348 28.7

 Columbia 4,462 5.1

 Emanuel 214 22.9

 Jefferson 1,155 19.6

 Jenkins 2,419 28.4

 Lincoln 128 18.8

 McDuffie 796 15.6

 Richmond 37,522 19.5

 Screven 3,043 20.1

 Warren 142 15.6

 Within 80-km buffer 56,940 16.6

 State 1,033,793 12.6

South Carolina

 Aiken 19,388 13.9

 Allendale 3,466 34.5

 Bamberg 4,403 27.8

 Barnwell 4,834 20.9

 Colleton 212 21.5

 Edgefield 3,407 15.5

 Hampton 2,747 22.8

 Lexington 5,517 11.4

 McCormick 492 16.3

 Orangeburg 3,260 17.9

 Saluda 2,374 15.7

 Within 80-km buffer 50,100 16.2

 State 547,869 13.7

4.3.7.2 Impacts of the No-Action Alternative

For all the storage sites, radiological and nonradiological risks from continued storage of

surplus plutonium would be small regardless of the racial and ethnic composition of the

populations surrounding the sites, and independent of the economic status of individuals

constituting the populations. Continued storage would have no disproportionately high and

adverse effects on minority or low-income populations.
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Environmental Consequences

Figure 4.2. Minority population concentration in census block groups within an 80-km (50-mi) radius of the SRS F-Area

(Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002).
4-66

Environmental Consequences Figure 4.3. Low-income population concentration in census block groups within an 80-km (50-mi) radius of the SRS F-Area (Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002).
Environmental Consequences

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4.3.7.3 Impacts of the Proposed Action

As discussed above, the analysis of environmental justice impacts is a multistep process. As

depicted by the shaded areas in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, low-income and minority populations

meeting the definition of environmental justice populations are present within the 80-km (50-mi)

assessment area. The next step is to determine whether any impacts would be

disproportionate to the low-income or minority populations. Generally, impacts are larger the

closer a person is to the source of the impact. Therefore, low-income and minority populations

could be disproportionately impacted if they were located closer to the source of the impact

than the general population. As depicted in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, the majority of the border of

the SRS is populated by predominately minority populations. In addition, specific behavior may

result in disproportionate impacts. For example, during the scoping meetings and public

meetings on the DEIS, commenters noted that some low-income and minority people relied

heavily on homegrown foods and fish from the Savannah River. In addition, it was reported that

some in the environmental justice community did not understand the impacts discussed in the

DEIS. On the basis of the location of the low-income and minority populations and specific

behavior, the NRC concludes that impacts to low-income and minority populations could be

disproportionate. The following sections discuss whether the impact of any aspect of

construction and operation of the proposed facilities, including accidents, on low-income or

minority populations would be both “high and adverse.”

4.3.7.3.1 Construction

No radiological risks and only very low chemical exposure and risk are expected during

construction. Chemical exposure would be limited to toxic air pollutants released at levels 

below applicable standards and would not result in any high adverse health impacts. Because

the health impacts on the general population within the 80-km (50-mi) assessment area during

construction would be negligible, impacts on the minority and low-income population would be

small.

4.3.7.3.2 Routine Operations

Radiological impacts to the general public during routine operation of the proposed facilities

would be minimal and would not cause any adverse health impacts. The facilities are expected

to produce an annual latent cancer risk of approximately 2 × 10-9 for the MEI member of the

public. The annual collective dose to members of the public living and working within 80 km

(50 mi) of SRS associated with the facilities is expected to produce an LCF risk of

approximately 0.0009 or less. In addition, no surface releases that might enter local streams or

interfere with subsistence activities by low-income or minority populations are expected to

occur. Because the health impacts of routine operations on the general public would be small

and there would be no releases that would affect any water or food used for subsistence, there

would be no disproportionately high adverse impact on low-income or minority population

groups within the 80-km (50-mi) assessment area.
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4.3.7.3.3 Accidents

An airborne release following an accident at the proposed facilities has the potential for causing

up to 3 LCFs in the area surrounding SRS in the short term because of inhalation exposure. Up

to 100 LCFs could occur following the ingestion of contaminated crops. These estimated latent

cancer fatalities apply to the entire population within a given sector, which would include both

environmental justice populations and non-environmental justice populations. (See discussion

in Section 4.3.5 on the accident assessment methodology). If an accident producing such an

airborne release were to occur, people living closer to SRS would be impacted to a greater

degree than those living farther away from SRS. In the unlikely event of such an accident at

the proposed facilities, many of the communities most likely affected would be minority or low

income, given the demographics within the 80-km (50-mi) assessment area (see Figures 4.2

and 4.3). In addition, following a hypothetical accident severe enough to produce such a

significant airborne release, impacts would be larger if contaminated crops were ingested. In

the long-term, the impacts to low-income and minority groups could be higher because of the

reliance on homegrown foods. On the basis of the above estimate of accident impacts and

considering that low-income and minority populations would be more likely to rely on

homegrown foods, the NRC concludes that the impacts to low-income and minority populations

could be high and adverse in the event of an accident as described above. However, it is highly

unlikely that such an accident would occur. Therefore, the risk to any population, including lowincome and minority communities, is considered to be low. 

In the event that accidents producing significant contamination occurred as described above,

appropriate measures are expected to be taken to ensure that the impacts to all populations,

including low-income and minority populations, would be minimized (see Section 5.2.12). The

extent to which low-income or minority population groups would be affected would depend on

the amount of material released and the direction and speed at which airborne material was

dispersed from the facility by the wind. Although the overall risk would be very small, the

greatest short-term risk of exposure following an airborne release would be to the population

located to the west-northwest of SRS. The greatest 1-year exposure risk would be to population

groups residing to the southwest of the site following the ingestion of contaminated crops. With

no ingestion, the greatest 1-year risk would still be to the west-northwest. Airborne releases

following an accident would likely have a larger impact area than would an accident that

released contaminants directly onto the soil surface. A surface release entering local streams

could temporarily interfere with subsistence activities by low-income and minority populations

located within a few kilometers downstream of SRS.

Monitoring of contaminant levels in soil and surface water following an accident would provide

the public with information on the extent of any contaminated areas. Analysis of contaminated

areas to decide how to control use of high health risk areas would reduce the potential impact

to local residents.
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4.3.7.3.4 Decommissioning

Impacts of decommissioning are not expected to disproportionally affect low income or minority

populations in the SRS vicinity. A detailed analysis of impacts would be prepared by DOE in a

NEPA document specifically on decommissioning and site closure if plans call for full

decommissioning of the facilities. Important elements of the environmental analysis in the DOE

NEPA document would likely address the disposal process and locations of disposal sites for

structural materials and facility components resulting from decommissioning.

4.3.8 Sand Filter Technology Option

Sand filters are air filtration systems used to prevent the release of radioactive material from

nuclear facilities to the atmosphere. In a sand filter, the airborne radioactive material is forced

through large beds of stone, gravel, and sand that capture and retain radioactive material. 

Filtered air is discharged to the atmosphere from a nearby stack. 

As discussed in Sections 1.4.1 and 2.2.5, the use of sand filters was identified during the EIS

scoping process as a potential substitute for final HEPA filters. Differences in impacts between

sand filters and HEPA filters are discussed below. Specifically, this section presents the

impacts to human health, air quality, hydrology, waste management, potential accident impacts,

and facility decommissioning.

Relative to radiological impacts during routine operations, those human receptors who would be

affected by such a change would be the proposed MOX facility workers, SRS employees, and

the public. However, the differences in emissions between the two filter types is not significant. 

Thus, the impacts presented in Section 4.3.2.2 on routine operational impacts from the

proposed MOX facility to SRS employees and the public would hold for both sand filters and the

proposed HEPA filters. In the case of the proposed MOX facility workers, exposure would

occur from maintenance activities during normal operations. Monitoring to ensure adequate

performance would be required for both filter types. However, HEPA filters, unlike sand filters,

would require periodic replacement in addition to monitoring (Orr 2001). The additional

exposure in the case of HEPA filters would be minimized with the use of a bag-in/bag-out

system (one that isolates the filters from personnel and the environment during replacement)

and the maintenance of practices to limit releases of radioactivity to levels ALARA (Orr 2001).

With regard to chemical risks, the difference in chemical removal efficiency between HEPA

filters and sand filters is small. Therefore, the impacts presented in Section 4.3.2.2 would be

representative for either filter type.

Because air quality impacts associated with the proposed MOX facility would be dominated by

the emission of gaseous chemical compounds, and neither HEPA filters nor sand filters are

effective for gases, sand filters do not present a clear advantage over HEPA filters. Air quality

impacts would be mitigated by other off-gas treatment systems associated with the proposed

action.
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If sand filters were chosen over HEPA filters at the proposed MOX facility, excavation would be

needed for the filter foundations. Excavation is not expected to extend to a depth likely to

encounter groundwater. The depth of the sand filter would depend on spatial configuration and

topography at the specific site selected for the filter. A surface area of 3,162 m2

 (33,650 ft2)

would be required for the sand filter (Orr 2001). Operation of a sand filter at the proposed MOX

facility would not impact groundwater resources. The filter would be covered to prevent

precipitation from enhancing recharge of the underlying aquifers and would have a concrete

wall and bottom.

The impact to waste management practices was also evaluated with regards to the type of air

filters that could be used during proposed MOX facility operations. The waste volume and

associated disposal costs from routine operations using HEPA filters versus use of sand filters

are compared in Table 4.20. TRU waste and LLW would be generated if HEPA filters were

used, and primarily TRU waste would be generated if sand filters were used. 

Relative to radiological impacts resulting from accidents, sand filters may provide a larger

margin of safety for SRS employees and the public. Two of the four accidents evaluated, the

internal fire event and the explosion event, have the potential to damage HEPA filters. If the

major vent duct work itself remained intact for these accidents, filter efficiency would not be lost

if sand filters were used, and the impacts for the internal fire event and the explosion event

could be approximately 100 times lower than the impacts presented for HEPA filters in

Section 4.3.5. (Appendix E presents more information on the amount of radioactivity released

from each accident considered.) DCS has committed to a strategy of making explosions highly

unlikely if they could result in high consequences to SRS employees and members of the

public. By preventing explosions, DCS would prevent impaired function of the facility HEPA

filters. Further, DCS would maintain safety controls in the proposed MOX facility that would

either prevent fires, or for some areas, ensure that fires are contained to single fire areas that

would limit the amount of radioactive material involved a fire. Where fires are limited to fire

areas, DCS would ensure that the facility HEPA filters would continue to function in the high

temperature and soot environment created by the bounding fire.

The decommissioning impacts described in Section 4.3.6 were based on the proposed use of

HEPA filters. However, if a sand filter was used, there is the possibility that it could be left in 

Table 4.20. Comparison of waste volume

and disposal cost for HEPA and sand filters

Parameter HEPA filter Sand filter

Waste amount 2,178 filters 9,543 m3

Disposal costa $9,333,000 $8,411,750

Type of waste TRU, LLW TRU

a

Estimated disposal cost for HEPA filters is

based on the number of filters required, while

the cost for the sand filters is based on total

volume of sand and rock requiring disposal.
Environmental Consequences

4-71

place, incurring little additional decommissioning work. Otherwise, there could be significant

impacts, such as economic costs and human health risks, from excavating the contaminated

material and possibly transporting and disposing of significant amounts of low-level or

transuranic waste, depending on the level of contamination (Orr 2001).

In conclusion, the technology option to install sand filters would not clearly result in lower net

environmental impacts than the use of HEPA filters. By selecting sand filters, DCS could

reduce environmental impacts in the areas of human health risk to facility workers and accident

mitigation. However, controls on HEPA filter change-out and a DCS safety strategy to prevent

accidents that would challenge HEPA filter function provide an equivalent reduction of impacts.

4.4 Indirect Impacts

4.4.1 Transportation

This assessment is based on the transportation assessment presented in the NRC’s

NUREG-0170 report (NRC 1977). Since that assessment was conducted, computer models

and basic assumptions have been refined, but the overall approach to estimating transportation

impacts has remained the same.

4.4.1.1 Scope of the Analysis

The technical approach for estimating transportation risks involves use of several computer

models and databases. For assessment of normal transport, risks were calculated for the

collective populations of all potentially exposed individuals, as well as for an MEI receptor. 

Potentially exposed populations include those persons living and working along the transport

route, those present at vehicle stops, and those on the road near the shipment. The accident

assessment included consideration of the probabilities and consequences of a range of

possible transportation-related accidents, including low-probability accidents that have high

consequences, and high-probability accidents that have low consequences. The details of the

transportation analysis are provided in Appendix C. Transportation impacts are presented in

Section 4.4.1.2.

Transportation concerns raised during the scoping process for this EIS (see Appendix I)

included the impacts of transporting MOX feed materials (depleted uranium hexafluoride [UF6]

and the surplus plutonium metal) transport. As discussed below, impacts from the

transportation of depleted uranium and surplus plutonium metal (pit material) feed materials

were analyzed. Impacts of transporting the plutonium dioxide from the proposed PDCF to the

proposed MOX facility are not considered because of the short distance involved and the

absence of public roads in this area (DCS 2002a). The NRC intended to evaluate truck and rail

transportation impacts of shipping fresh MOX fuel from the SRS (see Appendix I). However,

this FEIS evaluated only truck shipments of such fuel because of the added security provided

through the use of the Safeguards Transporter, as described in Appendix C, Section C.2.3. 
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The transportation risk assessment conducted for operation of the proposed MOX facility

involved estimating the potential human health risks during transport of feed and waste

materials associated with the MOX fuel fabrication process. The risk assessment also

considered the risks associated with the transport of the MOX fuel following fabrication.

Transport of the depleted uranium feed materials analyzed included shipment of depleted UF6

from Portsmouth, Ohio, to Wilmington, North Carolina, and depleted uranium dioxide (UO2)

from Wilmington to the proposed MOX facility at the SRS. Assessment of the transport of

plutonium pit material considered shipments from existing storage sites to the SRS. Of the

34 MT (37.5 tons) of plutonium expected to be processed into MOX fuel, 7.3 MT (8.0 tons)

would be initially available at the SRS site. Under a separate action (DOE 2002a),

approximately 6 MT (6.6 tons) of surplus plutonium is to be shipped from RFETS to SRS

(Roberson 2002), which currently has 1.3 MT (1.4 tons) (DOE 1996a). The proposed action

would therefore require the shipment of another 26.7 MT (29.4 tons) of plutonium,

approximately 21.3 MT (23.4 tons) of which is expected to come from the Pantex Plant in

Texas. This FEIS analyses the transportation impacts of the Pantex shipments and the

remaining 5.4 MT (5.9 tons) of plutonium whose origins are not yet determined. However, the

remaining plutonium would come from storage at other DOE sites. For the purposes of this

FEIS, the analysis assumed that the remaining 5.4 MT (5.9 tons) of plutonium would come from

the Hanford Site, the plutonium storage site farthest from the SRS. Thus, the actual

transportation impacts are expected to be lower than those presented here because some

plutonium from closer storage sites is expected to be used. Impacts of shipping TRU waste

from the WSB to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico were evaluated for two

cases that bound the potential number of shipments. No volume reduction of the TRU waste is

analyzed for the first option, resulting in approximately 2,300 truck shipments over the life of the

project. The second option analyzes a case involving a volume reduction of TRU waste by a

3:1 ratio, shipments being constrained by a wattage limit.

Additionally, the FEIS evaluates the impacts of shipping all the fresh MOX fuel from the SRS to

a surrogate commercial nuclear plant. The fresh MOX fuel is expected to be used in reactors in

the eastern to midwestern portion of the United States. For purposes of impact assessment, a

midwestern site was chosen for the surrogate nuclear plant because such a location maximizes

the distances necessary to transport the fuel, thus providing conservative estimates of potential

impacts. A surrogate nuclear power plant was chosen because no licensed nuclear plant has

applied to NRC for authority to use MOX fuel. Thus, the impacts presented here are expected

to bound the impacts for future shipments of fresh MOX fuel.

For all shipments, risks were estimated for truck transport for both normal (incident-free) and

accident conditions. In both cases, “vehicle-related” and “cargo-related” impacts were

evaluated.

Vehicle-related risks result simply from moving any material from one location to another,

independent of the characteristics of the cargo. For example, increased levels of pollution from

vehicular emissions during normal conditions may affect human health. Similarly, accidents

during transportation may cause fatalities from physical trauma.
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4-73

Cargo-related risk, on the other hand, refers to risk attributable to the characteristics of the

cargo being shipped. The radiological cargo-related risks from the transportation of depleted

uranium, surplus plutonium, fresh MOX fuel, and TRU waste would be caused by exposure to

ionizing radiation. Exposures to radiation occur during both normal transportation and during

accident conditions. In the case of the depleted uranium materials considered, cargo-related

risks also include chemical hazards during accident conditions.

The risks from exposure to hazardous chemicals during transportation-related accidents can be

either acute (result in immediate injury or fatality) or latent (result in cancer that would present

itself after a latency period of several years). The acute health end point — potential

irreversible adverse effects — was evaluated for the assessment of cargo-related population

impacts from transportation accidents. Accidental releases during transport of the uranium

compounds (UF6 and UO2) were evaluated quantitatively. The analysis of UF6 effects included

consideration of the formation of hydrogen fluoride (HF) from the reaction of UF6 with moisture

in the air. Chemical health effects from transportation of plutonium compounds were not

assessed because the radiological impacts are far greater than any chemical impacts.

Unlike the case for radiological exposure, the acute chemical effects evaluated were assumed

to exhibit a threshold nonlinear relationship with exposure; that is, some low level of exposure

can be tolerated without inducing a health effect. To estimate risks, chemical-specific

concentrations were developed for potential irreversible adverse effects. All individuals

exposed at these levels or higher following an accident were included in the transportation risk

estimates. In addition to acute health effects, the cargo-related risk of excess cases of latent

cancer from accidental chemical exposures could be evaluated. However, none of the

chemicals that might be released in any of the transportation accidents involving UF6, UO2,

plutonium, or the MOX fuel would be carcinogenic. As a result, no predictions for excess

chemically induced latent cancers are presented in this assessment for accidental chemical

releases.

4.4.1.2 Transportation Impacts

The estimated exposures and the associated human health effects are discussed in this section

and summarized in Table 4.21.

4.4.1.2.1 Routine Transportation

Radiological risks during routine transportation would result from the potential exposure of

people to low levels of external radiation near a loaded shipment. DOT and NRC regulations —

49 CFR Part 173.441 (Radiation Level Limitations) and 10 CFR Part 71.47 (External Radiation

Standards for All Packages) — were set to maintain these external radiation levels at a value

considered to be protective of the public. The maximum allowable external dose rate is

0.1 mSv/h (10 mrem/h) at 2 m (6.5 ft) from the outer lateral sides of the transport vehicle. In

this analysis, the external dose rates expected are approximately 0.0024 mSv/h (0.24 mrem/h),

0.0076 mSv/h (0.76 mrem/h), 0.048 mSv/h (4.8 mrem/h), and 0.040 mSv/h (4.0 mrem/h) at 1 m
Environmental Consequences

4-74

(3.3 ft) for the UF6, UO2, MOX fuel, and TRU waste shipments, respectively (Biwer et al. 1997;

DCS 2001; DOE 1997b). Since the regulatory maximum is approximately 0.14 mSv/h

(14 mrem/h) at a distance of 1 m (3.3 ft), the external dose rates from the depleted uranium

shipments, the MOX fuel shipments, and the TRU waste shipments are expected to be less

than 6%, 35%, and 30% respectively, of that regulatory maximum. For this analysis, the

external dose rate for the shipments of plutonium metal were set to the regulatory maximum,

but it is expected that the dose rate from these shipments would actually be similar to those for

the fresh MOX fuel and TRU waste.

Combined total exposures of 3.1 to 5.6 person-Sv (310 to 560 person-rem) and 2.1 to

5.3 person-Sv (210 to 530 person-rem) were estimated for the public and the transportation

crews, respectively, from all shipments. The resulting expected LCFs were 0.2 to 0.4 and 0.1 to

0.3, respectively (see Table 4.21). These impacts to the public would be insignificant because

the exposure would be spread out over several years among all the people along the

transportation routes. If no TRU waste volume reduction occurs, TRU waste shipments from

the WSB to WIPP would have the highest average individual dose to the public, 0.0025 mSv

(0.53 mrem), estimated from a total collective dose of 3.0 person-Sv (300 person-rem) spread

over 566,000 persons along the route. Thus, the routine radiological impacts to the public for

the entire shipping campaign would be negligible, an average member of the public would

receive only 0.15% or less of the value for exposure to background radiation in one year.

For an MEI member of the public (defined as being located 30 m [98 ft] away from a shipment

passing at a speed of 24 km/h [15 mph] [Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992]), the greatest

radiological risk would be from the plutonium metal shipments, as shown in Table 4.22. In this

case, a risk of 6 × 10-10 ( a chance of less than 1 in 1 billion) of contracting a fatal cancer is

0.0003% of the value for an annual exposure to background radiation. However, the value for

potential exposure to multiple shipments would be correspondingly higher. For example, if the

same MEI were present for three shipments of depleted UO2, that individual would receive a

dose of approximately 1.1 × 10-6 mSv [3 × (3.7 ×10-7 mSv)].

For transportation crew members, the largest estimated single shipment dose to one

transportation crew member was 0.0013 Sv (0.13 rem) for shipments of plutonium from the

Hanford Site to the PDCF. In this case, the risk of contracting a fatal cancer is 1 in 13,000.

A total of up to 2 latent fatalities were estimated from vehicle emissions for the entire shipping

campaign. Thus, approximately 2 fatalities or less might be expected from vehicle emissions. 

This vehicle-related impact is insignificant because the proposed action truck travel on U.S.

highways for the high end of the entire shipping campaign, 8,200,000 km (5,090,000 mi) as

shown in Table 4.21, is only 0.0038% of similar truck travel on an annual basis in the United

States, 217,550,000,000 km (135,179,000,000 mi) (BTS 2002). 
4-75

Environmental Consequences Table 4.21. Total collective population transportation risks Parameter Depleted UF6 Depleted UO2 Pu metal TRU wastea MOX fuel Total campaigna Origin site Portsmouth, OH Wilmington, NC Storage sites WSB MOX facility Destination site Wilmington, NC MOX facility PDCF WIPP surrogate reactor Shipment summary Shipments 110 60 430 299-2,314 598 1,497-3,512 Distance (km)b 103,000 26,500 1,130,000 730,000- 5,650,000 1,280,000 3,280,000- 8,200,000 Population impacts Cargo-related c Radiological impacts

 Dose risk (person-Sv)d Routine crew 0.0061 0.0045 0.72 0.46-3.6 0.93 2.1-5.3 Routine public Off-link 0.00044 0.00013 0.12 0.019-0.15 0.038 0.18-0.30 On-link 0.0011 0.00035 0.35 0.058-0.45 0.094 0.50-0.89 Stops 0.0045 0.0018 1.7 0.31-2.4 0.34 2.4-4.4 Total 0.0060 0.0022 2.2 0.39-3.0 0.48 3.1-5.6 Accidente 0.0025 0.00049 0.00063 0.063 0.16 0.23

 Latent cancer fatalitiesf

 Crew 0.0004 0.0003 0.04 0.03-0.2 0.06 0.1-0.3 Public 0.0005 0.0002 0.1 0.03-0.2 0.04 0.2-0.4 Chemical impacts Irreversible adverse effectsg

1.3 × 10-7 0 NAh NA NA 1.3 × 10-7

Vehicle-related i

 Emission fatalities 0.04 0.008 0.3 0.2-1 0.6 1-2 Accident fatalities 0.003 0.0012 0.028 0.017-0.13 0.029 0.078-0.20
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Environmental Consequences

Table 4.21. Continued

aThe number of TRU waste shipments will depend on the waste treatment process used (DCS 2004a). The largest volume reduction estimated

would result in the fewest number of shipments. The largest number of shipments corresponds to the minimum amount of TRU waste treatment

necessary for shipment.

bTo convert km to mi, multiply by 1.609.cCargo-related impacts are impacts attributable to the radioactive or chemical nature of the waste material.dTo convert person-Sv to person-rem, multiply by 100.eAccident dose risk is a societal risk and is the product of accident probability and accident consequence.fLatent cancer fatalities are calculated by multiplying dose by the FGR 13 health risk conversion factor of 0.06 fatal cancer per person-Sv (6 × 10-4

fatal cancer per person-rem) (Eckerman et al. 1999).

gPotential for irreversible adverse effects from chemical exposures. Exposure to HF or uranium compounds is estimated to result in fatality of

approximately 1% or less of those persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997).

hNA = not applicable.iVehicle-related impacts are impacts independent of the cargo in the shipment.
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Table 4.22. Routine single-shipment impacts to a

maximally exposed individuala

Shipment type

Dose

[mSv (mrem)]

Risk of developing

a latent fatal cancer

Depleted UF6 2.3 × 10-7

(2.3 × 10-5)

1 × 10-11

Depleted UO2 3.7 × 10-7

(3.7 × 10-5)

2 × 10-11

Pu metal 1 × 10-5

(1 × 10-3)

6 × 10-10

MOX fuel 1.5 × 10-6

(1.5 × 10-4)

9 × 10-11

TRU waste 2.4 × 10-6

(2.4 × 10-4)

1 × 10-10

a

Individual is located 30 m (98 ft) from a passing 

shipment traveling at 24 km/h (15 mph).

4.4.1.2.2 Accident Impacts

The total radiological collective population accident dose risk to the public from all shipments

was estimated to be 0.23 person-Sv (23 person-rem). The resulting estimated LCFs are 0.01

for the entire shipping campaign.

 Chemical impacts would be negligible; only 1.3 x 10-7 irreversible adverse effect from depleted

UF6 shipments is expected for the entire shipping campaign. As discussed in Appendix C

(Section C.2.6), this value corresponds to approximately 1 x 10-9 fatality.

Total fatalities from direct physical trauma as a result of accidents were estimated to be up to

0.20. Thus, no fatalities are expected from accidents for the entire shipping campaign.

4.4.1.3 Highly Enriched Uranium

As described in Section 2.2.2.2, HEU is a by-product of the plutonium pit disassembly process. 

This recovered HEU from the PDCF would be shipped to the Y-12 facility at the Oak Ridge

Reservation for declassification, storage, and eventual disposition. The transportation risks for

these shipments were analyzed and included in estimates presented in the SPD EIS for

transport of all radioactive material associated with the conversion of 33 MT (36.4 tons) of

plutonium to MOX fuel as part of Alternative 3 (see Table L-6 in DOE 1999a). The total

radiological transportation risks for Alternative 3 were 0.024 and 0.038 LCFs expected for

transportation workers and the public, respectively. Thus, the transportation risks for the HEU
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shipments are considered to be insignificant because they represent only a small portion of an

insignificant impact.

4.4.1.4 Spent MOX Fuel 

Transportation of the spent MOX fuel to a final disposal site would be required after irradiation

in a commercial nuclear reactor. The types of transportation risks posed would be the same as

those considered above for the uranium and plutonium feed materials, the fresh MOX fuel, and

the TRU waste. These risks include the radiological cargo-related risks from routine transport

and hypothetical accidents and the vehicle-related risks, such as traffic accident fatalities and

potential latent fatalities from vehicle emissions.

Estimating specific transportation risks for the spent MOX fuel is premature at this time

because of the uncertainty in the actual location of both the commercial reactors that would be

used for irradiation of the fresh MOX fuel and the final disposal site. As discussed in

Section 4.4.1.1, the actual commercial reactors that would be used to irradiate the fresh MOX

fuel are not yet known. The only disposal site currently under consideration in the United

States is the proposed geologic repository at Yucca Mountain in Nye County, Nevada (DOE

2002d). For purposes of complying with NEPA requirements, it is assumed that spent MOX

fuel would eventually be shipped to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. However, the

DOE’s application for a license to operate the Yucca Mountain repository has not yet been

submitted to the NRC. There is no assurance that the DOE’s application, if submitted, would be

approved.

On a per kilometer traveled basis, the routine radiological and vehicle-related transportation

risks for spent MOX fuel would be similar to those estimated in this FEIS for fresh MOX fuel,

plutonium metal, or TRU waste. The transportation risks of commercial spent nuclear fuel

(SNF) and spent MOX fuel transport in particular were estimated in DOE’s EIS concerning

disposal of SNF and high-level waste at Yucca Mountain (DOE 2002d). In the mostly legalweight truck scenario, approximately 53,000 truck shipments were estimated to result in

approximately 12 LCFs to workers, 3 LCFs to the public, and 5 traffic fatalities. A rough

estimate of the transportation risks of the spent MOX fuel can be obtained based on average

shipment risks calculated from these results to show that no fatalities would be expected. 

Shipment of all the spent MOX fuel, approximately 598 shipments assuming three assemblies

per cask, might be expected to result in approximately 0.1 worker LCFs, 0.03 public LCFs, and

0.056 transportation fatalities. Actual impacts would be lower or higher depending on the actual

shipment distances relative to the average in the Yucca Mountain EIS (DOE 2002d). Thus, no

significant impacts would be expected because the estimated risks are only a very small

fraction of the radiological and vehicular risks to which the public are exposed to on a routine

basis as discussed in Section 4.4.1.2.1.
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4.4.2 Conversion of Uranium Hexafluoride to Uranium Dioxide

As discussed in Section 1.2.2, it is assumed that the conversion of uranium hexafluoride to

uranium dioxide would take place at the Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC facility in

Wilmington, North Carolina. The impacts of the general conversion process are described in

the environmental assessment for the last license renewal of that facility (NRC 1997). At that

time, the Wilmington facility was using the ammonium diuranate (ADU) process and was

planning to begin using a new dry conversion process (DCP). The ADU process is a “wet”

process that has higher impacts than the DCP. The GE facility currently uses the DCP. The

environmental assessment includes a discussion of the impacts from both the ADU process

and DCP. Therefore, it is believed that the impacts summarized below would bound impacts

from the conversion process if another facility was ultimately selected.

No measurable impacts have been observed to the air, surface water, or vegetation due to

releases from the Wilmington facility. Impacts to the shallow groundwater aquifer have

occurred. The Wilmington facility produces gaseous, liquid, and solid effluent streams. 

Gaseous effluents are controlled by the use of HEPA filters and scrubbers permitted by the

State of North Carolina, as necessary. Liquid effluents are controlled by the use of treatment

systems and wastewater retention basins designed to reduce the concentration of contaminants

prior to discharge. Solid wastes are managed through segregation, recycling, off-site disposal,

and incineration. Discharges are permitted and are monitored to ensure compliance with permit

requirements. Impacts to a hypothetical MEI and to the collective population are summarized in

Table 4.23.

4.4.3 MOX Fuel Use

This section evaluates on a generic basis the impacts of using MOX fuel in reactors by

summarizing analyses performed by the DOE in the SPD EIS (DOE 1999a). 

Table 4.23. Comparison of human exposure for ammonium

diuranate (ADU) and dry conversion processes (DCPs)

Pathway/receptor ADU dose DCP dose

Air

 Maximally exposed individual [mSv/yr (mrem/yr)] 0.001 (0.1) 0.0005 (0.05)

 Collective population [person-Sv (person-rem)] 0.0009 (0.09) 0.00045 (0.045)

Liquid

 Maximally exposed individual [mSv/yr (mrem/yr)] 0.007 (0.7) 0.001 (0.1)

 Collective population [person-Sv (person-rem)] NAa NA

Total

 Maximally exposed individual [mSv/yr (mrem/yr)] 0.008 (0.8) 0.00015 (0.15)

 Collective population [person-Sv (person-rem)] 0.0009 (0.09) 0.00045 (0.045)

a

Not applicable because liquid effluent in the river quickly dilutes to background levels;

therefore, the collective dose impact is negligible.
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The DOE’s analysis is provided in Section 4.28 and Appendix K.7 of the SPD EIS. Impacts

resulting from both normal operations and postulated accidents were evaluated for six reactors,

two each at the Catawba, McGuire and North Anna nuclear stations. The range of impacts at

each of these reactors were considered to reasonably bound the impacts of reactors that could

use MOX fuel. Therefore, the range impacts is considered to represent a generic analysis. 

This range includes impacts from both ice condenser-type reactors (i.e., Catawba and McGurie) 

and non-ice condenser-type reactors. It was assumed that up to 40% of the fuel assemblies in

a generic reactor would contain MOX fuel and that the remaining assemblies would contain the

type of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel now used by commercial reactors. The impacts

resulting from the use of MOX fuel in such a hybrid reactor core were estimated and compared

with the impacts that would result from the use of a reactor core containing only LEU fuel.

The impacts from normal operations would be the same whether the reactor core contained

40% MOX fuel or 100% LEU fuel. The public surrounding such a generic reactor was

estimated to receive a collective dose in the range of 0.057 person-Sv/yr (5.7 person-rem/yr) to

0.203 person-Sv/yr (20.3 person-rem/yr). The estimated number of annual LCFs produced by

such a dose would be less than 0.01. No individual would be expected to receive more than

0.0073 mSv/yr (0.73 mrem/yr) due to reactor operations under normal conditions. 

Some of the beyond-design-basis accidents were estimated to cause prompt fatalities in the

highly unlikely event that they occurred. The change in the number of prompt fatalities due to

the use of MOX fuel was estimated to range from 0 to 28 additional fatalities (815 versus 843 in

the worst accident). 

These doses are a small fraction of the annual average background dose. For comparison, as

discussed in Section 3.10, the average annual natural background radiation dose to an

individual in the United States is 3.6 mSv (360 mrem).

The SPD EIS (DOE 1999a) also analyzed potential MOX fuel use impacts from both postulated

design-basis and beyond-design-basis accidents. The impacts were estimated in terms of both

the consequences (the impacts that would result if the accident occurred) and risks (taken to be

the consequences multiplied by the probability of occurrence of the accident). The risk was

estimated over a 16-year campaign. The risk, over the entire 16-year period, of a LCF

associated with design-basis accidents to the public surrounding a reactor using all LEU fuel

ranged from 2.19 × 10-4 to 8.98 × 10-4. The change in risk of a LCF associated with a reactor

using 40% MOX fuel ranged from about 6% lower to 3% greater. For beyond-design-basis

accidents, the campaign risk of a LCF to the public surrounding a reactor using all LEU fuel

ranged from 0.144 to 5.25 × 10-5. The change in risk of a LCF associated with a reactor using

40% MOX fuel ranged from about 7% lower to 14% greater.

The analysis in this EIS does not specifically consider impacts from the use of the lead test

assembly (LTA) program. The LTA program consists of fabricating, transporting, using in a

reactor, and analyzing a limited number of fuel assemblies. The DOE estimated the impact of

the LTA program in the SPD EIS. The LTA program is considered to be independent of the

proposed action. That is, the NRC decision regarding the proposed MOX facility is not affected

by the DOE’s decision on how to make and test the LTAs.
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Cumulative Impacts

Cumulative impacts are potential impacts when

the proposed action is added to other past,

present, and reasonably foreseeable future

actions.

On February 27, 2003 (as amended September 23, 2003), Duke Power submitted a license 

amendment request to irradiate four MOX fuel lead test assemblies in the spring of 2005 in its

Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 (Docket Nos. 50-413, 50-414). The NRC is currently

reviewing this license amendment request. In addition, in order for any specific commercial

reactor to use MOX fuel on a production scale, an amendment to a 10 CFR Part 50 license,

issued by the NRC, would be required. The NRC would perform its own site-specific NEPA

analyses in evaluating any license amendment application it may later receive seeking

authorization to use MOX fuel.

Impacts of transporting fresh MOX fuel to reactors is presented in Section 4.4.1.2.1, and

impacts of transporting spent MOX fuel to a geologic repository is presented in Section 4.4.1.4. 

The impacts of disposing of the MOX fuel is included in the FEIS for Yucca Mountain

(DOE 2002d).

4.5 Cumulative Impacts

This section assesses potential cumulative

impacts of construction and operation of the

proposed MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilities. 

Cumulative impacts are distinguished from the

direct and indirect impacts of these facilities,

which are discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 and

Appendix H. Direct effects are caused by the

proposed action and occur at the same time and

place. Indirect effects are caused by the proposed action and occur later in time or are farther

removed in distance but are still reasonably foreseeable.

Cumulative impacts were determined by adding the expected impacts of past, present, and

reasonably foreseeable future actions to the projected direct and indirect impacts of the

proposed MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilities. The impacts of construction and normal operations

of the proposed facilities were evaluated for each impact area and are presented in Section 4.3. 

The impacts of past and present actions were determined from site environmental reports and

other available documents (e.g., recent EISs). Reasonably foreseeable future actions include

among others, those that would occur if the proposed MOX facility is built and operated, and

include actions to be undertaken by the DOE as part of its surplus plutonium disposition

program. The impacts of reasonably foreseeable future actions were taken from recently

published NEPA analyses. Although the cumulative impact analysis focused on impacts at the

SRS and vicinity (Section 4.5.1), an evaluation of cumulative impacts of off-site transportation

activities is also included (Section 4.5.2).

4.5.1 Cumulative Impacts at the SRS

A review was conducted of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future activities on the

SRS. Past impacts were included in the cumulative impact assessment only if the residual
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effects of past actions are still in existence (e.g., past land use changes that are still in effect). 

Past impacts that have come and gone (e.g., operational impacts of decommissioned facilities)

were not included in the cumulative impact assessment. The impacts of present activities and

residual past activities at the SRS were determined from annual environmental reports that

document the results of ongoing monitoring activities (e.g., Arnett and Mamatey 2001), as well

as descriptions of the SRS baseline conditions in various recent DOE EISs. The impacts of

past and present activities at the SRS are described qualitatively for each impact area in

Chapter 3.

Nuclear facilities within an 80-km (50-mi) radius of the SRS include Georgia Power’s Vogtle

Electric Generating Plant across the river from the SRS; Chem-Nuclear Inc., a commercial

low-level waste burial site just east of the SRS; and Starmet CMI, Inc. (formerly Carolina

Metals), located southeast of the SRS, which processes uranium-contaminated metals. 

Radiological impacts from the operations of the Vogtle Electric Generation Plant, a two-unit

commercial nuclear power plant, are small, but they are included in this cumulative impact

analysis. The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Annual Report

(SCDHEC 1995) indicates that operation of the Chem-Nuclear Services facility and the Starmet

CMI facility do not noticeably affect radiation levels in air or liquid pathways in the vicinity of the

SRS. 

The counties surrounding the SRS host numerous industrial facilities (e.g., Bridgestone Tire,

textile mills, paper product mills, and manufacturing facilities) with permitted air emissions that

cumulatively affect regional air quality. South Carolina Electric and Gas Company’s Urquhart

Station, a three-unit, 250-megawatt, coal- and natural-gas-fired steam electric plant, is located

near the SRS in Beech Island, South Carolina. All of these facilities contribute to ambient air

quality at the SRS and thus are included within the SRS baseline used in the analysis of

cumulative air quality impacts.

A number of construction and operating permits for industrial facilities in Aiken, Barnwell,

Allendale, and Edgefield Counties have recently been filed with the South Carolina Department

of Health and Environmental Control Bureau of Air Quality. No new permits have been applied

for in Augusta-Richmond, Columbia, and Burke Counties in Georgia. In addition, a number of

road projects are planned in the area. These include relatively minor improvements in the

Aiken and North Augusta, South Carolina, areas that are part of the Augusta Regional

Transportation Study and would take place in 2003 through 2007. Additional road projects in

the area include improvements to a 13-km (8-mi) portion of US 78 from Montmorenci, South

Carolina, to Windsor, South Carolina (to the east of Aiken), and the extension of I-520 across

the Savannah River into North Augusta. This latter project would take place in 2006 through

2009.

Construction of new facilities and roads would result in short-term air quality impacts and would

only contribute to the cumulative impact of MOX facilities if the construction period of facilities

overlapped with the MOX construction or operational period. Impacts to air quality resulting

from operations of new facilities and roads would result in changes to regional air quality. It is

difficult to adequately predict the contribution of these facilities and roads to cumulative air 
Environmental Consequences

4-83

quality impacts with the information available. All facilities would require permitting, and this

permit process would take into consideration regional air quality NAAQS compliance.

Reasonably foreseeable future actions at the SRS were identified by reviewing recent NEPA

documents for the site. A brief synopsis of future projects at the SRS that are considered in the

cumulative impact analysis is presented in the following paragraphs:

• Final Defense Waste Processing Facility Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement,

DOE/EIS–0082–S (DOE 1994). The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) has been

constructed at the SRS and is currently processing sludge from SRS HLW tanks. However,

SRS baseline data do not include the impacts of all planned DWPF operations, including

the processing of salt solution from these tanks. Therefore, the cumulative impact analysis

includes some effects of DWPF in the impacts of past and present activities and some in

the impacts of reasonably foreseeable future actions.

• Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement,

DOE/EIS-0240 (DOE 1996b). The cumulative impact analysis incorporates an alternative at

the SRS that would blend highly enriched uranium to 4% low-enriched uranium as uranyl

nitrate hexahydrate (61 FR 40619; August 5, 1996).

• Final Environmental Impact Statement on Management of Certain Plutonium Residues and

Scrub Alloy at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, DOE/EIS-0277 (DOE 1998). 

DOE plans to process certain plutonium-bearing materials currently being stored at the

RFETS (64 FR 8068; February 18, 1999, and 66 FR 4803; January 18, 2001). These

materials are plutonium residues and scrub alloy remaining from nuclear weapons

manufacturing operations. DOE has decided to ship certain residues from the RFETS to

the SRS for plutonium separation and stabilization. The separated plutonium would be

stored at the SRS pending disposition decisions. Environmental impacts from using the

F-Canyon to chemically separate the plutonium from the remaining materials at the SRS are

included in the cumulative impact analysis.

• Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Construction and Operation of a Tritium

Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site, DOE/EIS-0271 (DOE 1999c). DOE plans to

construct and operate a facility at the SRS to extract the tritium from commercial light-water

reactor targets and targets of similar design (64 FR 26369; May 14, 1999). The proposed

action and alternatives would provide tritium extraction capability to support either reactor or

accelerator tritium production. Environmental impacts from the maximum processing option

in the EIS are included in the cumulative impact analysis.

• Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0283

(DOE 1999a). The SPD EIS analyzed implementation of DOE’s disposition strategy for

surplus plutonium. The decision to site the facilities to implement this strategy at the SRS

(as described in 65 FR 1608, January 11, 2000) is the basis for the proposed action

analyzed in this EIS. The SPD EIS was used in some cases to determine the impacts of the

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility for inclusion in the cumulative impact analysis.
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• Savannah River Site Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Final Environmental Impact

Statement, DOE/EIS-0279 (DOE 2000c). The selected alternative in the Record of

Decision (ROD) for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Management EIS is to prepare for disposal of

about 97% by volume (about 60% by mass) of the aluminum-based fuel considered in the

EIS (48 MT [53 tons] heavy metal), using a melt and dilute treatment process (65 FR 48224;

August 7, 2000). The impacts of this process are included in the cumulative impact

analysis. The remaining 3% by volume (about 40% by mass) would be managed using

conventional processing in existing SRS chemical separation facilities. As part of the

preferred alternative, DOE will develop and demonstrate the melt and dilute technology. 

Following development and demonstration of that technology, DOE will begin detailed

design, construction testing, and startup of a new treatment and storage facility to combine

with a new dry storage facility. The SNF will remain in existing wet storage until treated and

will then be placed in dry storage.

• Savannah River Site High-Level Waste Tank Closure Final Environmental Impact

Statement, DOE/EIS-0303 (DOE 2002b). DOE evaluated three alternatives for tank

closure. All of these alternatives would start after bulk waste removal. DOE decided (as

described in 67 FR 53784; August 19, 2002) to implement the preferred alternative

identified in the EIS (i.e., stabilize tanks and fill with grout). The impacts of this alternative

are presented in this cumulative impact analysis.

• Savannah River Site Waste Management Final Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS0217 (DOE 1995). This EIS provides a basis for the selection of a sitewide approach to

managing present and future (through 2024) wastes generated at the SRS. These wastes

would come from ongoing operations and potential actions, new missions, environmental

restoration, and decontamination and decommissioning programs. The EIS evaluated the

treatment of wastewater discharges in the Effluent Treatment Facility, F- and H-Area Tank

Farm operations and waste removal, and construction and operation of an HLW evaporator

in the H-Area Tank Farm. In addition, it evaluated the Consolidated Incineration Facility

(CIF) for the treatment of mixed waste, including incineration of benzene waste from the intank precipitation (ITP) process. (The CIF has suspended operations and the ITP process

is to be replaced by an alternative evaluated in DOE 2001.) The first ROD stated that DOE

would configure its waste management systems according to the moderate treatment

alternatives described in the EIS (60 FR 55249; October 30, 1995). The second ROD

(62 FR 27241; May 9, 1997) was deferred regarding treatment of mixed waste to ensure

consistency with the Approved Site Treatment Plan (WSRC 2000). The Waste

Management EIS is relevant to the assessment of cumulative impacts because it provides

the baseline forecast of waste generation from operations, environmental restoration, and

decontamination and decommissioning. This forecast was updated in 1999 (Halverson

1999).

• Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Treatment and Management of SodiumBonded Spent Nuclear Fuel, DOE/EIS-0306 (DOE 2000d). DOE plans to treat all spent

nuclear fuel from the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II) and sodium-bonded spent

nuclear fuel at Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) (located at INEEL) (65 FR

56565, September 19, 2000). Fermi-1 sodium-bonded spent nuclear fuel will be stored
Environmental Consequences

4-85

pending a decision on alternative treatments. DOE does not plan to implement any of the

alternatives proposed for the SRS. However, some of the impact projections from other

EISs (e.g., cumulative waste generation from the High-Level Waste Tank Closure EIS

[DOE 2000a]) include impacts at the SRS from sodium-bonded spent nuclear fuel, and

these impacts were excluded from the cumulative impact analysis.

• Savannah River Site Salt Processing Alternatives Final Supplemental Environmental Impact

Statement, DOE/EIS-0082-S2 (DOE 2001). A process to separate the high-activity and lowactivity waste fractions in high-level waste solutions is planned to replace the in-tank

precipitation process assessed in the Defense Waste Processing Facility EIS (DOE 1994). 

The Salt Processing EIS evaluates four alternatives: small tank precipitation; ion exchange;

solvent extraction; and direct disposal in grout. The proposed MOX facility cumulative

impact analysis includes maximum impacts of the solvent extraction process as selected in

the DOE ROD for this project (66 FR 201, p. 52752, October 17, 2001).

• Environmental Assessment for the Construction and Operation of the Highly Enriched

Uranium Blend-Down Facilities at the Savannah River Site, DOE/EA-1233 (DOE 2000e). 

DOE plans to construct and operate a low-enriched uranium (LEU) loading station and

modifications to the existing HEU blend-down facilities. The process will convert offspecification HEU (60% uranium-235) to less than 20% uranium-235 for use as commercial

fuel. The environmental assessment (EA) for this facility indicated that impacts would be

either negligible or unmeasurable. A Finding of No Significant Impact was issued on

November 3, 2000.

• Draft Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Stockpile

Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility, DOE/EIS-236-S2 (DOE 2003b). A

modern pit facility (MPF) has been proposed by DOE’s National Nuclear Security

Administration to manage and maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DOE has

prepared a Supplement to the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Stockpile

Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility. This MPF EIS evaluates the

environmental impacts associated with constructing a new MPF at four alternate sites,

including the SRS, and across a range of pit production capabilities. The MOX facility

cumulative impact analysis incorporates the impacts of the highest pit production rate

(450 pits/year).

For all impact areas but employment, it was conservatively assumed that the impacts of past,

present, and future activities would occur simultaneously. In reality, there would be less overlap

of impacts in time (e.g., the impacts of some projects would be declining during the operational

life of the facility), and cumulative impact, therefore, actually would be less than is presented

here. Impacts to the MEI were also determined using a conservative approach that assumed

the same MEI would be exposed to all concurrent actions (see Section 4.3.1.1.2 for the location

of MEI for the proposed MOX facility). In reality, the MEIs for different activities vary and are

dependent on the location of the activity (Simpkins 2000).
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Topics Evaluated and Impact Criteria

Used in the Cumulative Impact Analysis

• Air quality: % NAAQS for criteria pollutants.

• Human health: Radiological dose to off-site

MEI, off-site population, and SRS workers and

resultant latent cancer fatalities.

• Waste generation: Generation rate of various

waste types relative to existing SRS capacity.

• Resource use: Amount of land developed

relative to total SRS area; amount of electricity

and water used relative to existing SRS

capacity.

• Employment: Number of jobs at the SRS.

4.5.1.1 Cumulative Impacts of the MOX, PDCF, and WSB Facilities

Cumulative impacts of the facilities at the SRS were evaluated in detail for (1) air quality;

(2) human health; (3) waste generation; (4) resource use (land, electricity, and water); and

(5) employment. These impacts were evaluated on the basis of the anticipated effects of facility

construction and normal operations (as presented in Section 4.3) and the potential for

contributions to existing cumulative impacts on the SRS. The analysis focused primarily on

normal facility operations over an assumed 10-year operating period. Construction impacts

were considered in the cumulative impact analysis only with respect to the amount of land

developed, because other construction impacts would be too short-lived to contribute

substantially to cumulative impacts to any resources. Additionally, standard mitigation practices

employed during construction (e.g., dust control measures, erosion control) would likely reduce

these impacts to negligible levels.

Impacts to water quality, geologic resources,

ecological resources, aesthetic and scenic

resources, and cultural resources are not

treated explicitly in the cumulative impact

analysis because direct and indirect impacts

to these resources are expected to be small

(see Sections 4.3 and Appendix H). Facility

operations would not contribute to the

cumulative impacts of SRS activities on water

quality because liquid effluents would be

discharged to surface water under existing

NPDES permit guidelines. No impacts are

anticipated to aesthetic and scenic resources

because the facilities would be visually

consistent with surrounding SRS industrial

facilities and would not be visible from offsite. Impacts to geologic, ecological, and cultural resources are expected to be small and

would be limited to the immediate vicinity of the facilities (which would be located on a partially

developed site), thus reducing the potential for cumulative impact. Any cumulative impacts to

these resources would be proportional to the cumulative impact projected for land development

at the SRS.

Cumulative impacts to air quality were evaluated for five pollutants — TSP, PM10, NO2, SO2,

and CO. Normal operations of the MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilities would result in small

contributions (2% or less) to cumulative concentrations of these air pollutants (see Table 4.24). 

For four air pollutants (annual total suspended particulates, 24-hour PM10, 3-hour SO2, and

24-hour SO2), the cumulative total concentrations would be above 90% of the NAAQS and,

therefore, approaching noncompliance. However, even without the contributions from

operations of the proposed facilities, the cumulative totals for these four pollutants would be

above 90% of the NAAQS. The cumulative total concentration of PM2.5 could not be 
4-87

Environmental Consequences Table 4.24. Estimated cumulative impacts to air quality from MOX, PDCF, and WSB facility operations and other activities at the SRSa Pollutant concentrations (g/m3) TSP, annual PM10 NO2, annual SO2 CO Source 24 h annual 3 h 24 h annual 1 h 8 h SRS baselineb, c 74.6 138 25.9 26.3 1,246 355 31.1 10,363 6,867 MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB 0.002 1.3 0.002 0.07 22 4.9 0.004 116 26 SNF managementd 0.02 0.1 0.02 3.4 1.0 0.1 0.02 9.8 1.3 HEU dispositione 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.7 0.3 0.02 0.1 0.07 Tritium extraction facilityf 0.0002 0.01 0.00009 0.006 0.09 0.001 0.00009 3.6 0.5 Plutonium residuesg 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Salt processingh 0.001 0.07 0.001 0.03 0.4 0.05 0.0005 18.0 2.3

Tank closurei 0.005 0.08 0.004 0.03 0.2 0.04 0.002 1.2 0.3Modern Pit Facilityj 0.18 0.33 0.07 2.4 1.9 0.83 0.17 6.8 4.7

Total concentration (g/m3) 74.9 139.9 26.0 32.2 1,247.6 361.5 31.3 10,518.2 6,902.5

MOX, PDCF, and WSBcontribution (%)

0.00 0.9 0.01 0.23 1.8 1.4 0.01 1.1 0.4

NAAQS (g/m3) 75 150 50 100 1,300 365 80 40,000 10,000

% of standards 99.6 93.3 52.0 32.3 96.0 99.0 39.2 26.3 69.0

aMaximum predicted off-site cumulative ground-level concentrations of nonradiological pollutants.bSRS baseline includes the impacts of existing SRS facilities (SRS maximum) and regional emissions (background) from Table 4.8.

These values are hypothetical levels that are based on maximum permitted emissions from SRS sources and do not necessarily represent

actual air quality conditions.

cIncludes Defense Waste Processing Facility operations.dSource: DOE (2000c).eSource: DOE (1996b).fSource: DOE (1999c).gSource: DOE (1998).hSource: DOE (2001) using maximum impact alternative.iSource: DOE (2002b).jSource: DOE (2003b).
Environmental Consequences

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determined because information was not available for many of the future actions considered

here. However, the facilities would contribute a very small amount of PM2.5 (0.009% of the

annual standard) and only when emergency generators were used. It should be noted that all

of the air quality analyses are based on very conservative assumptions (e.g., maximum

concentrations for all facilities), and it is not likely that NAAQS exceedances would occur at the

SRS. 

During normal operations, the contribution of the MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilities to cumulative

radiological dose to the public would be small (7% or less of total dose; see Table 4.25). The

cumulative dose to an MEI would increase by 1% as a result of facility operations. The

estimated risk of a LCF resulting from cumulative dose to the MEI is extremely small (4 × 10-7). 

The estimated number of LCFs resulting from cumulative collective dose to the off-site

population is 0.02. These very small numbers mean that statistically, radiological doses from

plant operations would not be expected to cause any latent cancer fatalities in the off-site

population.

Cumulative collective dose to workers at SRS would increase approximately 9% as a result of

MOX, PDCF, and WSB facility operations. The number of expected LCFs among workers

resulting from cumulative dose (that resulting from dose contributions from the SRS baseline,

the proposed action, and other reasonably foreseeable future actions) is 1.7. For most types of

waste, facility operations would contribute relatively small volumes to the cumulative waste

generation volumes at the SRS (see Table 4.26), and existing waste treatment facilities at the

SRS have sufficient capacity to treat this cumulative total (see Section 4.3.4.2). The largest

proportionate increase would be in the amount of nonhazardous solid waste (approximately

19% increase).

The cumulative impacts of the facilities to land development, electricity usage, and groundwater

usage at the SRS would be quite small and well within existing SRS capacity (see Table 4.27). 

Construction of the facilities would result in a slight increase (1.7%) in the amount of developed

land at the SRS, but the cumulative amount of developed land on the SRS would remain quite

small (3.9% of the total site). Facility operations would use 186,000 MWh/yr of electricity

(3.6% of SRS capacity). Cumulative electricity demand resulting from facility operations and all

existing and planned actions would be only 28% of SRS capacity. Facility operations would use

76 million L/yr (20.1 million gal/yr) of groundwater (0.02% of SRS capacity). Cumulative

groundwater demand would be only 4.8% of SRS capacity.

Determination of the cumulative impacts on the SRS workforce is complicated by the fact that

employment is not expected to be constant during the life of the facility and other existing and

planned actions at the SRS discussed in the beginning of Section 4.5.1. The analysis

presented here considered the time lines of workforce projections for the SRS baseline and

reasonably foreseeable future actions and the year in which the workforce would be highest. 

The results of these conservative analyses are presented in Table 4.27. Overall, employment

at the SRS has decreased from 22,070 in September 1993 to 14,193 in September 2000. 

Projections indicate that site employment will continue to decline to approximately 10,000 by 
4-89

Environmental Consequences Table 4.25. Estimated annual cumulative radiological dose and latent cancer fatalities resulting from MOX, PDCF, and WSB facility operations and other activities at the SRS Dose to maximally exposed individuala Collective dose to off-site population Collective dose to workers Source Air pathway (rem) Liquid pathway (rem) Total dose (rem) Latent cancer fatalitiesb Air pathway (person- rem) Liquid pathway (person- rem) Total dose (person- rem) Latent cancer fatalitiesb Total dose (person- rem) Latent cancer fatalitiesb SRS baselinec 4.0 × 10-5 1.4 × 10-4 1.8 × 10-4 1.1 × 10-7 2.3 3.9 6.2 3.7 × 10-3 163 0.1 MOX, PDCF, and WSB 4.0 × 10-6

–d 4.0 × 10-6 2.4 × 10-9 1.6 –d 1.6 9.4 × 10-4 262 1.6 × 10-1

SNF managemente 1.5 × 10-5 5.7 × 10-5 7.2 × 10-5 4.3 × 10-8 0.6 0.2 0.8 4.5 × 10-4 55 3.3 × 10-2HEU dispositionf 2.5 × 10-6

–d 2.5 × 10-6 1.5 × 10-9 0.2 –d 0.2 9.6 × 10-5 11.3 6.8 × 10-3

Tritium extraction facilityg

2.0 × 10-5

–d 2.0 × 10-5 1.2 × 10-8 0.8 –d 0.8 4.6 × 10-4 4.0 2.4 × 10-3

Plutonium residue managementh

5.7 × 10-7

–d 5.7 × 10-7 3.4 × 10-10 0.006 –d 0.006 3.7 × 10-5 7.6 4.6 × 10-3

Defense waste processing facilityi

1.0 × 10-6

–d 1.0 × 10-6 6.0 × 10-10 0.07 –d 0.07 4.2 × 10-5 118 7.1 × 10-2

Salt processingj 3.1 × 10-4

–d 3.1 × 10-4 3 × 10-9 18.1 –d 18.1 1.1 × 10-2 29 1.7 × 10-2

DOE complex miscellaneous componentsk

4.4 × 10-6 4.2 × 10-8 4.4 × 10-6 2.7 × 10-11 0.007 2.4 × 10-4 0.007 4.3 × 10-6 2 1.2 × 10-3

Tank closurel 2.5 × 10-8

–d 2.5 × 10-8 1.5 × 10-11 0.0014 –d 0.0014 8.4 × 10-7 1,600 1.0

Modern Pit Facilitym 8.0 × 10-9

–d 8.0 × 10-9 4.8 × 10-12 1.3 × 10-6

–d 1.3 × 10-6 7.8 × 10-10 560 3.4 × 10-1

Vogtle Nuclear Power Plantn

5.4 × 10-7 5.4 × 10-5 5.5 × 10-5 3.3 × 10-8 0.04 0.003 0.05 2.7 × 10-5

–d –d

Total 4.0 × 10-4 2.5 × 10-4 6.5 × 10-4 3.9 × 10-7 23.6 4.1 27.7 0.02 2,812 1.7

MOX, PDCF, and WSB contribution to total (%)

1.0 0.00 0.62 0.62 6.7 0.00 5.7 5.7 9.3 9.3

See next page for footnotes.
4-90

Environmental Consequences

Table 4.25. Continued

aThe MEIs for different facilities for the same pathway and the MEIs for different pathways for the same facility are likely to be different individuals.

Therefore, simple addition of doses for all MEIs to estimate the total MEI dose is not accurate, but it is shown here to be conservative, (i.e., to present impacts

that are overestimates of what would actually happen).

bLatent cancer fatalities are calculated by multiplying dose by the FGR-13 health risk conversion factor of 6 × 10-4 fatal cancer per person-rem (Eckerman

1999).

cSRS baseline includes the impacts of existing facilities and the residual impacts of past activities. Values are from Arnett and Mamatey (2001).dLess than minimum reportable levels.eSource: DOE (2000c); SNF = spent nuclear fuel.fSource: DOE (1996b).gSource: DOE (1999c).hSource: DOE (1998).iSource: DOE (1994).jSource: DOE (2001).kSource: DCS (2002a).lSource: DOE (2002b).mSource: DOE (2003b).nSource: NRC (1996).
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Environmental Consequences Table 4.26. Estimated cumulative waste generation at the SRS resulting from operation of the MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilities and other activities at the SRS Total waste generation over 30-year period (m3) Annual waste generation Source Low-level waste Hazardous- mixed waste Transuranic waste Nonhazardous solid waste (m3) Nonhazardous liquid waste (L) SRS baselinea, b 120,000 3,900 6,000 6,670 4.2 × 108 MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilitiesc 28,838 120 4,431 4,140 6.0 × 107

Salt processingd 920 56 0 –e Negligible

Environmental restoration and D&D activitiesd

62,000 6,200 0 NAf NA

Modern Pit Facilityg 150,900 290 33,900 6,900 8.2 × 107

Other future actionsh,i 21,750 4,013 10,100 4,105 2.2 × 107Total volume 384,408 14,580 54,521 21,815 5.8 × 108MOX, PDCF, and WSB contribution to total (%)

7.5 0.8 8.1 19.0 10.4

SRS treatment capacity 534,900 534,900 –j –k 1.0 × 109Total volume as % of SRS capacity 71.9 2.7 –j –k 58.0

aSRS baseline includes the impacts of existing facilities and the residual impacts of past activities.bHigh-level, low-level, hazardous-mixed, and transuranic waste volumes from DOE (2001); nonhazardous solid and liquid

waste volumes from DCS (2002a).

cTotal waste generation for MOX, PDCF, and WSB operations over a 10-year period, the operational period of these

facilities.

dSource: DOE (2001).eValue presented in DOE (2001) as 61 metric tons/yr.

Footnotes continued on next page.
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Environmental Consequences

Table 4.26. Continued

fNA = not available.gSource: DOE (2003b).h30-year waste generation volumes include life-cycle waste associated with DWPF operations (DOE 1994), HLW tank

closure (DOE 2002b), SNF management (DOE 2000c), Tritium Extraction Facility (DOE 1999c), plutonium residues (DOE

1998), HEU disposition (DOE 1996b), commercial light water reactor waste, and weapons components that could beprocessed at the SRS. Values presented were derived from values provided in DOE (2001), but were adjusted to remove thecontribution from SPD facilities (included in salt processing values) and sodium-bonded SNF management, which no longerinvolves SRS operations.

iNonhazardous waste volumes include waste generated by activities associated with HEU disposition (DOE 1996b),

Tritium Extraction Facility (DOE 1999c), DWPF operations (DOE 1994), and HLW tank closure (DOE 2002b).

jTransuranic waste is transported off-site for disposal at the WIPP facility.kNonhazardous solid waste is recycled or disposed of at on-site and off-site facilities.
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Environmental Consequences Table 4.27. Estimated cumulative impacts to resource use and employment from MOX, PDCF, and WSB facility operations and other activities at the SRS Land area Electricity Groundwater Employment Source Developed area (acres)

%

Total

SRS

area

Average

annual

usage

(MWh/yr)

% Total

SRS

capacity

Average

annual 

usage

(L/yr)

% Total

SRS

capacity

Number

of

workers

%

SRS

total

SRS baselinea 7,241b 3.7 411,000 9.3 1.7 × 1010 4.7 13,227 78.2

MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilities

123 0.06 186,000 4.2 7.6 × 107 0.02 490 2.9

SNF managementb 0 0.00 15,800 0.4 2.1 × 108 0.06 520 3.1

HEU dispositionc 0 0.00 5,000 0.1 1.9 × 107 0.005 125 0.7

Tritium extraction facilityd 3 0.002 20,600 0.5 NAe NA 400 2.4

Plutonium residue managementf

0 0.00 1,329 0.03 1.6 × 107 0.005 NA NA

Defense waste processing facilityg

105 0.05 32,000 0.7 NA NA 60 0.4

Salt processingh 0 0.00 24,000 0.6 1.2 × 107 0.003 220 1.3

Tank closurei 0 0.00 0 0.0 8.7 × 106 0.002 85 0.5Modern pit facilityj 171 0.09 545,600 12.4 5.0 × 108 0.1 1,797 10.6

Total 7,643 3.9 1,241,329 28.2 1.8 × 1010 4.8 16,924 100.0

aSRS baseline includes the impacts of existing facilities and the residual impacts of past activities.bSource: DOE (2000c); SNF = spent nuclear fuel.cSource: DOE (1996b).dSource: DOE (1999c).eNA = not available.fSource: DOE (1998).gSource: DOE (1994).hSource: DOE (2001).iSource: DOE (2000a).jSource: (DOE 2003b).
Environmental Consequences

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2010 (DOE 1999c). Facility construction would result in a peak workforce of 1,000 in 2005. 

Facility operations would support 490 workers annually (3.2% of the total projected for the

SRS).

4.5.1.2 Cumulative Impacts of the No-Action Alternative

The no-action alternative would be a decision by the NRC not to approve the proposed MOX

facility. Because all the surplus plutonium would remain at the DOE sites, the facilities planned

for processing this surplus plutonium at the SRS — the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and the

WSB — would not be constructed. Since none of the surplus plutonium from other DOE sites

would be stored at the SRS, none of the projected impacts of these facilities (as presented in

Section 4.5.1.1) would occur.

4.5.2 Cumulative Impacts of Transportation

Cumulative impacts of transportation were estimated by adding the contributions from four

sources:

• Historical shipments of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste;

• Reasonably foreseeable future actions involving the transportation of radioactive

materials;

• Spent fuel shipments to a geological repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada;

• General transportation of radioactive materials not related to any particular action;

and

• Transportation of surplus plutonium and depleted uranium to the SRS, fresh MOX

fuel from the SRS to a surrogate Midwest nuclear power plant, and TRU waste to the

WIPP.

Estimates of contributions from the first four sources to the collective occupational dose and

dose to the general population were summarized in the EIS for a geological repository at Yucca

Mountain (DOE 2002d). These estimates are presented in Table 4.28. The future SNF

shipments listed in Table 4.28 include potential spent MOX fuel shipments to the repository. 

The shipment risks from spent MOX fuel are similar to those for typical SNF. Therefore, these

risks are expected regardless of the fuel type, normal LEU or MOX, that will be used in existing

nuclear power plants in the future. The estimated dose resulting from the proposed action is

similar to that resulting from historical shipments of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste,

100 times smaller than that resulting from reasonably foreseeable future actions and

1,000 times less than general transportation. The contribution to cumulative occupational and

general population dose associated with the proposed action is expected to be insignificant.
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Table 4.28. Estimated cumulative transportation impacts

of facility operations and shipment of radioactive

materials from other sources (1943 to 2048)

Category

Collective

occupational

dose

[person-Sv

(person-rem)]

Latent

cancer

fatalities

Collective dose 

to the general

population

[person-Sv

(person-rem)]

Latent

cancer

fatalities

Historical shipmentsa 3.3 (330) 0.2 2.3 (230) 0.1

Reasonably foreseeable

future actionsa

197 (19,670) 12 498 (49,770) 30

Spent fuel shipments to

geologic repositorya

88 (8,800) 5 16 (1,600) 1

General transportation

(1943 to 2048)a

3,300 (330,000) 198 2,900 (290,000) 174

MOX shipmentsb 2.1-5.3 (210-530) 0.1-0.3 3.3-5.6 (330-560) 0.2-0.4

Total 3,600 (360,000) 200 3,400 (340,000) 200

a

Source: DOE (2002d).

b

Doses represent total for all shipments associated with the MOX program. (See Table 4.20

[total campaign].)

4.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis

4.6.1 Introduction

This section compares the costs and benefits of the proposed action with the costs and benefits

of the no-action alternative. The cost-benefit analysis sets forth the various environmental

impacts (both negative and positive) of the proposed action, and the economic costs and

benefits of building and operating the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB. Costs

and benefits are assessed at both the national and regional levels. At the national level, the

overall costs of proposed MOX facility construction and operation are compared with the

benefits of plutonium supply reduction. The benefits to national security from plutonium supply

reduction are substantial, but these benefits are not quantifiable in terms of dollars and cents. 

The national benefits associated with the proposed action that are quantifiable include project

expenditures during construction and operation of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and

the WSB. Various sectors in the national economy would provide the materials, equipment,

and services needed to build and operate these facilities. However, because of the preliminary

nature of the data needed to calculate impacts, no quantitative estimate of the impacts of

construction and operation of the proposed MOX facility on the national economy was included
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in this EIS. A significant national benefit of the proposed action would be the avoided cost of

continued plutonium storage. These costs are estimated to be approximately $256 million per

year (2003 dollars) (NNSA 2002). Another national benefit of the proposed action would be the

generation of additional supplies of electricity. However, this analysis does not assign a

specific economic value to the electricity that would be generated by the irradiation of MOX fuel

given the uncertainty surrounding the associated costs, in particular, the cost of power plant

infrastructure upgrades.

There would also be regional costs and benefits associated with construction and operation of

the proposed MOX facility. At the regional level, excluding costs and benefits that cannot be

quantified, the proposed MOX facility would produce an overall net benefit of $1,940 million

(see Table 4.29).

4.6.2 National Costs and Benefits

The primary national benefit of construction and operation of the proposed MOX facility would

be a reduction in the supply of weapons-grade plutonium available for unauthorized use. Once

the plutonium component in MOX fuel has been irradiated in commercial nuclear reactors, the

isotopic composition of the plutonium would be more proliferation resistant. Moreover, since

the plutonium would then be part of the resultant high-level nuclear waste, the plutonium would

no longer be available for other uses. Compared with the no-action alternative — in which the

weapons-grade plutonium would continue to be stored at several existing DOE locations —

converting surplus plutonium into MOX fuel and irradiating it better ensures its security, since it

would reduce the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium are stored (DOE

1997a). Converting surplus weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel is thus viewed as better

ensuring that weapons-usable material would not be obtained by rogue states and terrorist

groups. Implementing the proposed action would promote the above nonproliferation

objectives.

A significant benefit of the MOX program would be the avoided cost of continuing to store the

plutonium inventory. These costs are estimated to be approximately $256 million per year

(2003 dollars) (NNSA 2002).

For the no-action alternative, although the costs and benefits of continued storage of plutonium

in the present DOE locations are not re-evaluated in this analysis, these issues are discussed in

the SPD EIS (DOE 1999a). Some of the impacts of the no-action alternative represent impacts

of each entire DOE site, not just the impacts of continued storage. Continued storage of

plutonium by the DOE at its present locations would not be expected to produce additional

LCFs. Annual LCFs of approximately 0.002 in the surrounding population of the storage sites

were estimated. The annual collective dose to members of the public (i.e., those living and

working within 80 km [50 mi] of the SRS) produced by routine operation of the proposed MOX

facility, the PDCF, and the WSB would be expected to result in an LCF rate of approximately

0.0009/yr or less. Therefore, continued storage would result in higher annual impacts.
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Table 4.29. Summary of project costs and benefits in the REA

(in millions of 2003 dollars, except where noted)

Item MOX facilitya

Costs

Internal costs

 Construction 6

 Operation 3

Short-term external costs (construction)

 Housing shortages 2% of vacant rental housing

units would be required

 Overcrowding in local public facilities Minimal

 Inflation Minimal

 Noise and congestion Minimal

 Water and sewage systems Minimal

Long-term external costs (operations)

 Housing values Less than 1% of vacant owner

occupied housing would be

required

Cost of providing public services Less than 1% increase in

revenues would be required

 Deterioration in recreational values Minimal

 Restrictions to water and land Minimal

 Aesthetic values Minimal

 Cultural and historical sites Minimal

Total REA costs 9

Benefits

Avoided cost of continued plutonium storage 14

Total tax revenues 110

Economic activity in the REA

 Construction 

 Annual average employment 1,020 jobs

 Total income 370

 Total regional product 760

 Operations

 Annual average employment 1,270 jobs

 Total Income 640

 Total regional product 1,180

 Other benefits

 Enhancement of recreational values Minimal

 Increased knowledge of the environment Minimal

Total REA benefits 1,950

Net REA benefit +1,940

a

Data may not add to totals because of independent rounding.
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The national costs associated with the proposed action are the total life-cycle costs, which

include research and development and pre-capital costs, design and construction costs,

operating costs, deactivation costs, and contingency costs. Decommissioning costs are not

included given the uncertainty surrounding their magnitude. The total cost of the proposed

action is estimated to be $4,064 million (in 2003 dollars), with $2,238 million to cover the cost of

the proposed MOX facility and $1,825 million for the PDCF and WSB (NNSA 2002). A

significant item included in the estimated total cost of the proposed facilities is the credits

associated with the value of the MOX and HEU fuel. These items amount to $1,002 million

over the life of the project (NNSA 2002).

4.6.3 Regional Costs and Benefits

The various quantifiable costs and benefits of the proposed MOX facility in the REA are

identified in Table 4.29. Costs and benefits are presented for construction and operation,

including decommissioning, over a 20-year project life. On balance, the proposed MOX facility

would provide a net benefit (total benefits minus total costs) to the REA. The net benefit of the

proposed MOX facility would be approximately $1,940 million. Sections 4.6.3.1 and 4.6.3.2

provide a more detailed description of the costs and benefits of the proposed MOX facility.

4.6.3.1 Regional Costs 

Both potential internal and external costs are included in the assessment. Potential external

costs include both long-term and short-term costs. Long-term external costs can also be

associated with potential accidents at the proposed facilities. The impacts of accidents

associated with the proposed facilities on agriculture, water, and fisheries resources, and

subsequently on the economies of communities surrounding SRS, would be small. In the case

of the most serious accidents, potential damage to crops under the plume in the event of an

airborne release and the subsequent damage to water resources from the associated runoff

would be small because the amount of radioactive material deposited per unit area would be

relatively small. Dilution of runoff would occur fairly rapidly in the affected rivers and streams

and would not cause any significant risk to the economies of the communities downstream of

the location of the proposed facilities. Any interdiction of crops as a result of the deposition of

radioactive material would be a limited, one-time event, and if it were to occur at all, would only

affect a small number of farm communities.

Although the probability of severe accidents is very low, if such accidents did occur, the people

living within 80 km (50 mi) of the SRS would likely be affected. The extent to which the

surrounding population would be affected would depend on the amount of material released

and the direction and speed at which airborne material was dispersed by wind conditions at the

time of the accident. While the overall risk to the surrounding population would be very low

(since the probability of severe accidents occurring would be very low), the greatest short-term

risk of exposure would be to population groups located to the west-northwest of SRS, while the

greatest 1-year risk would be to the southwest of SRS from crop contamination.
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4-99

Routine operation of the proposed facilities is expected to produce an annual latent cancer risk

of about 1 in 250 million for the maximally exposed member of the public. The annual collective

dose (associated with the facilities) to members of the public living and working within 80 km

(50 mi) of SRS is expected to produce an LCF risk of approximately 0.0009 or less.

No adverse impacts from chemical exposure of workers at the proposed facilities are

anticipated. Less than one fatality and approximately 410 worker injuries are expected during

the 10-year operating period of the proposed facilities.

Routine proposed facilities operations are expected to produce insignificant impacts to air

quality and would not exceed any ambient air quality standards for criteria pollutants at SRS. 

Maximum levels of PM2.5 in the vicinity of SRS already exceed the applicable levels, and facility

construction would create an additional 0.07% of the present standard; facility operations would

contribute 0.009%.

Water consumption during operation of the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB would

represent an increase of about 5% of the water demand for the A-Area loop in 2000 and about

2% of the excess A-Area loop capacity. Discharges to surface water from the WSB during

facility operations would comply with the NPDES permit guidelines.

Waste management systems at SRS would not be adversely affected by wastes generated by

the proposed facilities. Adequate storage capacity and handling procedures are in place at

SRS to process hazardous wastes generated during both construction and operation. 

Nonhazardous liquid and solid wastes would not adversely affect the Central Sanitary Waste

Treatment Facility.

Other long-term external costs would include the potential impact of the proposed MOX facility,

PDCF, and WSB (proposed facilities) on deterioration in recreational values, access restrictions

to water or land (including any income lost), aesthetic impacts, impacts on local cultural and

historical sites, decreased housing values, and the increased cost of providing local public

services.

No impacts to recreational values, local aesthetic quality, or local water or land access would be

expected from the proposed facilities. The location of the proposed facilities is close to the

center of the SRS, and no recreation opportunities are currently available to the public in the

vicinity. The proposed facilities would not change the industrial nature of the F-Area, and since

the closest viewing location is about 8 km (5 mi) to the south, no changes in aesthetic quality

would be expected (see Appendixes G and H). Construction of the facilities would occur on

land already owned by the federal government and would have no impact on water or land

access.

Impacts to housing values resulting from facility construction and operation, or to the cost of

providing local public services are unlikely because of the relatively small number of long-term

new residents that would be expected to move into the REA from elsewhere. Sufficient local

housing is likely to be available to absorb new residents. Only 2% of vacant rental housing

would be needed for workers during construction and less than 1% of vacant owner-occupied
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housing would be needed during operations. Changes in local public expenditures to maintain

existing levels of public services would likely be small, with five additional local public service

employees likely to be required (see Appendixes G and H).

The impacts of MOX fuel transportation, including those on property values, were not

considered because of uncertainty surrounding the routes that would be used and the timing of

shipments.

Short-term external costs include the contribution of the proposed facilities to housing

shortages; local inflation, noise, and congestion; impacts on the local water supply and sewage

systems; and crowding in local public schools, hospitals, and other local public facilities.

The proposed facilities would not produce any significant costs in the REA at the SRS in the

short term. Sufficient vacant rental units would be available in the REA for use by construction

workers, and sufficient owner occupied units would be available to operations employees

(see Section G.2.7 in Appendix G). Inflation in prices in the local area is not likely because

much of the equipment, materials, and services required would be specialized, and a significant

portion would be obtained from outside the REA. Material and equipment expenditures

assumed to be made locally would not likely push local industries to capacity, and no labor

shortages would be likely. Any construction and managerial positions not filled from within the

local labor market would be taken by workers moving to the area from other labor markets in

the southeastern United States (see Appendixes G and H).

Noise and congestion from construction activities for the proposed facilities would likely be

minor. Additional traffic generated during construction and operation would be unlikely to cause

any additional traffic congestion on the major road segments surrounding the site, given the

relatively small incremental increase in traffic from the proposed action (see Appendix H). 

Relatively small utility requirements would mean that no impacts would be expected on the local

water supply and sewage systems. Local public schools, hospitals, and other local public

facilities are not expected to suffer any overcrowding because of the relatively small number of

new residents expected during the construction and operation under the proposed action

(see Appendix H).

Internal costs are the life-cycle costs of design, construction, and operation of the project borne

by the federal government. The internal costs of the proposed action in the REA are

approximated using a cost localization factor that apportions total life-cycle project costs on the

basis of the ratio of REA population to total national population. Internal costs apportioned to

the REA using this method are small, amounting to $9 million for the proposed action.

4.6.3.2 Regional Benefits

The potential benefits of construction and operation of the proposed facilities include economic

benefits — such as employment, income, and gross regional product — and various additional

potential benefits — such as enhancement of recreational values, environmental enhancement
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in support of the protection of wildlife and wildlife habitat, and increased knowledge of the

environment.

A significant benefit of the proposed action would be the avoided costs of continued plutonium

storage. At the national level, these costs are estimated to be approximately $256 million per

year (NNSA 2002) and would be incurred for as long as the material continued to be stored. 

Application of the same localization factor used in Section 4.6.3.1 to estimate the regional

portion of plutonium storage costs avoided with the construction and operation of a MOX facility

indicates that $14 million would be saved over what it would cost if plutonium was stored in

existing facilities for an additional 25 years.

The measurement of the local employment and income economic benefits is based on the use

of regional economic multipliers. These multipliers capture the indirect (off-site) effects of onsite activities associated with construction and operation.

To estimate employment benefits, life-cycle cost estimates were used (NNSA 2002) in

association with data on the relationship between direct and indirect (off-site) employment

benefits associated with construction and facility operations at the SRS. Data on the

relationship between direct and indirect employment for a MOX facility were taken from the

SPD EIS (DOE 1999a; see Appendix F, Section 9.2 for more information on the methodology

used). By using direct (on-site) facilities employment data taken from the ER (DCS 2002a) as

the basis for calculation, the indirect employment impacts during the construction and operation

of the proposed facilities were estimated by application of the direct-to-indirect employment

multiplier for the project at the SRS from the SPD EIS. The direct impacts of no action were

estimated by using the relationship between total annual cost during construction and operation

and direct employment for the proposed action. Indirect impacts were then estimated by

application of the direct-to-indirect employment multiplier for a proposed MOX facility at the

SRS from the SPD EIS (DOE 1999a).

The impacts on regional income of construction and operation were estimated by using

employment impact estimates together with average regional income multipliers for the REA

taken from IMPLAN regional economic data (MIG Inc. 2001). IMPLAN input-output economic

accounts show the flow of commodities to industries from producers and institutional

consumers. The accounts also show consumption activities by workers, owners of capital, and

imports from outside the region. The IMPLAN model contains 528 sectors representing

industries in agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade,

utilities, finance, insurance and real estate, and consumer and business services. The model

also includes information for each sector on employee compensation; proprietary and property

income; personal consumption expenditures; federal, state, and local expenditures; inventory

and capital formation; and imports and exports.

The benefits of the proposed facilities to the economy of the REA would be significant (see

Table 4.29). In the peak year of construction, 1,820 workers would be required for the

proposed action. On average, 1,020 jobs would be created for the proposed facilities during

the construction period. During operations, 1,270 workers would be required in each year. The

facility would also contribute significantly toward personal income within the REA. The
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proposed facilities would produce $370 million in income over the construction period and

$640 million during operations (see Appendix H).

No taxes are paid by the federal government (income, property, or sales taxes), and contractors

constructing and operating a facility on behalf of the federal government are currently exempt

from local sales taxes in Georgia and South Carolina. Although local tax revenues, primarily

state income and sales tax revenues, paid by federal government employees, contractors, and

their employees would increase, the increase would be relatively small. During both

construction and operation, the proposed facilities would produce approximately $110 million in

tax revenues in the REA.

The gross regional product (GRP) provides the best measure of the overall benefits of both

alternatives to the economy of the REA. The GRP is the sum of value added in the production

of all goods and services in a year and measures the overall level of economic activity in the

REA. The proposed facilities would produce $1,950 million in GRP in the REA over the entire

life of the project.

4.7 Resource Commitment

Construction of the proposed facilities would result in some impacts that cannot be avoided. 

Impacts may be irreversible if the future uses of the resource are limited. This section

addresses unavoidable, irreversible, and irretrievable impacts of constructing and operating the

facility and the relationship between short-term uses of F-Area and the SRS for the facility and

long-term productivity. A summary of unavoidable impacts is presented in Table 4.30.

4.7.1 Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Impacts

Geology and Soils. Impacts to geology and soils from construction and operation of the

proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB are expected to be insignificant. Restoration work,

consisting of final grading and revegetation, would reclaim over half of the 41.9 ha

(103.5 acres) of land in the F-Area that would be disturbed during construction. The 41.9-ha

(103.5-acre) disturbed area is assumed to include 2 ha (4.9 acres) for laydown area for

constructing the PDCF, and 9.7 ha (24 acres) for a laydown area for constructing the WSB. 

Some land in the area would be permanently altered because of constructing buildings, roads,

and parking lots. The proposed MOX facility would permanently alter 6.9 ha (17 acres) of land,

the PDCF would permanently alter 1.2 ha (3 acres), and the WSB would permanently alter

about 2.5 ha (6.2 acres). Because soils in the affected areas are not unique within the SRS,

and the permanently altered areas represent only about 7% of the land available in F-Area

(160 ha [395 acres]) and only about 0.01% of the 80,292 ha (198,400 acres) of land area at

SRS (DCS 2002a), overall physical impacts on soil would be insignificant.
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Table 4.30. Unavoidable impacts of constructing and 

operating the proposed facilities

Resource Unavoidable impacts

Geology and soils • Construction excavation work may result in release of

contaminated materials

Surface water • Potential impacts to surface water quality by release of

nonhazardous discharge effluent, sediment, contaminated

runoff, or accidental release of oil or construction

equipment fuel

Ecology • Initial loss of up to 50.0 ha (123.4 acres) of woodland and

grassland habitat in F-Area. Over 30 ha (75 acres) would

be landscaped following construction.

Land use • A worst-case accident at the facility could result in minor

land use impacts outside of the SRS

Cultural and paleontological

resources

• Construction would directly affect two prehistoric

archaeological sites that are eligible for listing on the

National Register of Historic Places

Waste management • Small impact to waste management system at the SRS

• Volumes of TRU and hazardous waste produced by

facilities would represent 3% of the WIPP disposal

capacity and 2% of the SRS treatment and storage

capacity, respectively.

• Nonhazardous liquids produced would be about 6% of the

capacity at SRS. 

Human health risk • Annual radiological impacts to SRS employees from

exposure to radioactive air pollutants are expected to be

small at 1 × 10-5 LCFs/yr for the MOX facility and WSB

collectively and 2 × 10-5 for the PDCF. The risk from the

public’s exposure to radioactive air pollutants is also

expected to be small, at 4 × 10-5 annual LCFs for MOX

and WSB combined, and 9 × 10-4 for the PDCF facilities.

• MOX facility workers would have an expected lifetime LCF

of about 1 chance in 1,000.

• 122 lost workday injuries annually during a 3-5-year

construction period

• 41 lost workday injuries annually during 10 or more years

of operations

Socioeconomics • Increase in employment of 0.1 of a percentage point

during construction

• In-migrating workers during construction and operations

would require 2% and <1% of vacant housing in the ROI
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The potential exists that accidental releases of contaminated material during construction and

normal operations might adversely affect receiving soils. However, if good engineering

practices were used and any accidental spills were cleaned up promptly and thoroughly,

chemical impacts to soil would be insignificant.

Surface Water. Impacts to surface water are expected to be negligible. Because surface

water would not be used to supply water for construction or operations, there would be no

impacts to surface water levels or flows.

Surface water quality could potentially be impacted by nonhazardous discharge effluent,

sediment, contaminated runoff, and accidental releases. However, good engineering practices,

compliance with existing NPDES permits, and prompt, thorough cleanup of accidental releases

would help to ensure that impacts to surface water quality during construction and normal

operations would be insignificant.

Groundwater. The groundwater system beneath the SRS would be directly affected

(i.e., used) during construction and normal operations of the proposed facilities because it is the

only source of water for these activities. However, the impact to existing groundwater supplies

would be small. Projected total water use for the proposed and existing facilities in the A-Area

loop, which obtains water from wells in both A-Area and F-Area, represents about 3% of the

existing capacity during the construction phase. There would be no releases to underlying

aquifers.

No direct impacts to groundwater quality (as opposed to quantity) are expected from

construction or normal operations; there would be no releases to underlying aquifers. Water

use during operation of the facilities represents an increase of about 5% of the water demand

for A-Area loop in 2000 and about 2% of the excess A-Area loop capacity. Groundwater quality

could be impacted by discharges to an NPDES outfall and accidental releases of contaminated

material. However, impacts are expected to be negligible because of good engineering

practices, prompt and thorough cleanup of any spills, and adherence to NPDES permit

requirements.

Air Quality. Emissions associated with the construction and normal operation of the proposed

facilities would have a negligible effect on air quality. Concentrations of pollutants would remain

below standard levels. For both construction and normal operations, contributions of the 

proposed facilities to TSP, PM10, PM2.5, CO, SO2, NO2, and PAH concentrations would be 5.0%

or less of applicable standard levels.

Noise. Potential noise impacts from construction and operation of the proposed facilities

should be negligible at all off-site locations.

Ecology. Impacts of construction on ecological resources would primarily result from the loss

and alteration of up to 50.0 ha (123.4 acres) of habitat. The woodland and grassland habitats

that would be impacted represent a small fraction of those types of habitats at the SRS. 

Overall, the adverse impacts related to construction are expected to be limited to the immediate
Environmental Consequences

4-105

project vicinity and should not affect the viability of any vegetation types or wildlife populations

at the SRS.

Sediment and erosion control measures implemented during site preparation and construction

should prevent impacts to surface waters, aquatic and wetland resources, and protected fish

species. No federally listed species have been reported in the areas that will be disturbed by

construction. The SRS has established habitat management areas for the federally and stateendangered red-cockaded woodpecker, but the proposed facilities would not be located within

any of these areas.

No adverse impacts to ecological resources are expected from operations of the proposed

facilities.

Land Use. Land use of the entire F-Area is currently classified as developed/industrial. Since

the facilities would be industrial, no adverse effects to land use would result from their

construction or routine operation. If an operational accident occurred, F-Area would remain in

developed/industrial land use. A worst-case accident could result in minor impacts to lands

outside of the SRS. Future F-Area land use is expected to remain developed/industrial.

Cultural and Paleontological Resources. Construction of the proposed facilities would

directly affect two prehistoric sites that are eligible for listing on the NRHP. Data recovery plans

have been implemented, excavation has been completed, and monitoring will be conducted

during ground-disturbing construction activities. Five additional eligible sites are located in the

vicinity of the construction area. Mitigation measures would be taken to ensure that these sites

were not disturbed directly or indirectly by construction activities.

No historic structures, traditional cultural property, or fossil-bearing strata have been identified

in the project area; therefore, there would be no MOX-related impacts to such resources during

construction.

Routine operations are unlikely to affect archaeological resources. However, the potential

exists that storm-water detention releases resulting from a heavy rainfall could cause erosion in

the area of an eligible site. Periodic monitoring of this site may be required.

An operational accident might affect archaeological resources by restricting access to sites that

require regular monitoring. Such an accident might also affect traditional plant resources that

might be present on the SRS.

Transportation. The existing road network at the SRS can readily accommodate the additional

traffic expected during construction. In addition, the increased construction traffic would have

negligible impacts on noise and air emissions. For operations, the impacts of transportation of

the uranium and plutonium metal feed materials to the SRS, shipping fresh MOX fuel to a

surrogate nuclear power plant site, shipping TRU waste to WIPP, and shipping spent MOX fuel

were considered.
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For routine transportation, the expected LCFs from radiation exposure could be up to 0.3 each

for the public and transportation crews. A total of up to 2 latent fatalities were estimated from

vehicle emissions. Thus, up to 2 fatalities might be expected from routine transportation

activities.

It is estimated that the radiological transportation risk from accidents is 0.01 LCF over the

course of the entire shipping campaign. Chemical impacts from accidents would be negligible:

1.3 x 10-7 irreversible adverse effect (approximately 1 x 10-9 fatality) from depleted UF6 is

expected for the entire shipping campaign. None of the chemicals that might be released in

any transportation accident are known to be carcinogens.

Total fatalities from direct physical trauma from accidents were estimated to range as high as

0.20. This value indicates that no fatalities are expected from accidents for the entire shipping

campaign.

Infrastructure. Construction activities and normal operational activities are not expected to

adversely impact current SRS infrastructures. Projected electrical power, water, and fuel needs

are well within existing capacities. The existing infrastructure would require a coordinated

upgrading to support all phases of the surplus disposition program at the SRS: the proposed

MOX facility, PDCF, and the WSB.

Waste Management. The impacts of facility construction waste on existing SRS waste

management capacities would be minimal. The types and volumes of wastes generated would

be similar to those that would be expected during the construction of an industrial facility. 

These wastes would be managed in accordance with current SRS waste management

practices. Hazardous waste would be shipped off-site to commercial RCRA permitted facilities. 

The nonhazardous liquid waste generated would represent less about 6% of the SRS capacity

for treatment. Solid waste would be shipped to off-site facilities for recycling or disposal.

Wastes generated by facility operations would have a small to moderate impact on the waste

management system at the SRS. Estimated volumes for TRU waste would represent about

13% of SRS storage capacity and 2.6% of the WIPP storage capacity. Estimated volumes for 

solid low-level waste and hazardous waste would represent about 21% and less than 2% of the

SRS disposal and storage capacities, respectively. Nonhazardous liquid wastes generated by

facility operations are estimated to be about 6% of the capacity of the Central Sanitary

Wastewater Treatment Facility. Nonhazardous solid wastes would be shipped off-site for

recycling or disposal.

Human Health Risk. Less than 1 facility annually is predicted during the construction and

normal operation phases of the facility. An estimated 122 lost workday injuries would occur

annually over the 5-year construction period, and 41 annually over the assumed 10 or more

years of operations.

No radiological impacts or adverse health impacts from emissions of toxic air pollutants are

expected during the construction phase of the proposed facilities, and no adverse impacts to

SRS employees and the public from exposure to emissions of toxic air pollutants are expected
Environmental Consequences

4-107

during normal operations. Annual radiological impacts to SRS employees for exposure to air

emissions from the MOX and WSB facilities collectively and the PDCF are expected to be very

small, approximately 1 × 10-5 and 2 × 10-5 LCF/yr, respectively. Similarly, the risk to the public

would be small at 3 × 10-10 and 9 × 10-10 LCF/yr.

Hydrazine is the only chemical, aside from the radionuclides, that would be used in MOX

processing that is listed as a hazardous air pollutant under the Clean Air Act. During routine

operations, off-gas treatment systems would be expected to keep hydrazine emissions to very

low levels that would not cause adverse health impacts to the off-site public or noninvolved

workers.

Socioeconomics. The potential socioeconomic impacts from constructing and operating the

proposed facilities would be insignificant. The increase in the annual average employment

growth rate would be less than 0.1 of a percentage point over the duration of construction; even

less during the operation phase.

In-migration of 350 people during the peak construction year would have only a marginal effect

on population growth requiring 2.0% of the available vacant rental housing units in the region of

influence (ROI) for construction and less than 1% of the available vacant owner occupied

housing units for facility operations.

There would be no significant impact on public finances or the need for additional local public

service employees during construction or normal operation.

Minor impacts would occur to agriculture and commercial fishing as demand for their products

increase during construction and normal operation. No significant impacts on agriculture and

downstream fisheries are expected from facility operations.

Any impacts associated with the transportation of fresh MOX fuel, including impacts on property

values, would be minimal.

Environmental Justice. There would be no unavoidable environmental justice impacts from

routine operations.

Aesthetics. The addition of the proposed facilities would not adversely affect the overall

aesthetics of the F-Area or the SRS. The size and appearance of facility structures would be

similar to those of existing buildings adjacent to the F-Area and would maintain the industrial

nature of the F-Area.

Cumulative Impacts. Cumulative impacts of normal operations of the proposed facilities at the

SRS were evaluated for air quality, health and safety, waste generation, resource use, and

employment. Cumulative impacts for water quality, geologic resources, ecological resources,

aesthetic resources, and cultural and paleontological resources were not explicitly addressed

because direct and indirect impacts to these resources are expected to be negligible.
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4-108

Cumulative impacts to air quality from proposed facility operations are not expected to be

significant. On the basis of conservative assumptions, facility operations are projected to

contribute 2% or less to cumulative concentrations of criteria air pollutants.

During normal operations, the facilities’ contribution to cumulative radiological doses to the offsite population would be low (5.7% of the total). A cumulative dose to a MEI would increase by

1.0%. No LCFs are expected from the cumulative dose to the MEI or to the off-site population. 

Transportation of radioactive materials associated with facility operations would not contribute

significantly to cumulative impacts (collective occupational dose, dose to the general public, and

LCFs).

For most types of waste, facility operations would contribute 10% or less of the cumulative

waste volumes generated at the SRS; existing waste treatment facilities will be able to handle

this cumulative total. The largest proportionate increase would be in the amount of

nonhazardous solid waste (18.8% of total). 

The cumulative impacts of the proposed facilities to land development, electricity usage, and

groundwater usage at the SRS would be quite small and well within existing SRS capacities.

Construction activities would result in a peak workforce of 1,000 in the peak construction year,

or about 6% of the cumulative SRS employees. Facility operations would support 490 workers

annually (2.9% of the total projected workforce for the SRS) and result in a cumulative total of

16,924 employees at the SRS.

4.7.2 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources

This section addresses the major irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources

associated with the no-action alternative and proposed action as described in Chapter 2. A

commitment of a resource is irreversible when its primary or secondary impacts limit the future

options for a resource. An irretrievable commitment refers to the use or consumption of

resources neither renewable nor recoverable for use by future generations.

The 23.6 ha (58.3 acres) within which the proposed MOX facility, PDCF, and WSB would be

built and the estimated 15.5 ha (38.3 acres) needed for infrastructure upgrades (e.g., pipeline

and powerline rights-of-way, storm-water basin, batch plant, and roads) would be precluded

from other uses until the NRC license to operate the facility was terminated (i.e., about 20 years

into the future). About 3.6 ha (8.9 acres) of mostly woodland vegetation surrounding the

proposed MOX facility site border would require grading for facility construction. Existing

habitats would be eliminated, and ecological succession that would typically lead to progression

from grassland to woodland vegetation would not occur. Although ultimate decommissioning of

the facility could result in removal of all structures and paved surfaces, it is unlikely that

woodland habitat comparable in quality to that north and west of the F-Area could become

reestablished in less than 50 to 70 years.
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4-109

Construction and operation activities would involve use of materials that could not be recovered

or recycled. Soil excavated to produce the cement used in concrete would be irretrievably lost. 

Concrete and steel represent the bulk of construction materials. Other major construction

materials that would be irretrievably lost or difficult to recycle include aluminum, lumber, piping

materials, and electric wires and cables (DCS 2002a).

Water would be used for dust suppression during construction. Except for the water chemically

bound in the production of concrete, water needed for construction and operation would

eventually be recycled through the atmosphere and surface waters for distribution elsewhere. 

Water used during operation would be treated and discharged to the environment. Water

obtained from groundwater supplies would be replaced through natural recharges of local

aquifers. An estimated 760 million L (201 million gal) of water would be needed during the

10-year operating life of the facilities. Construction water requirements would total about

695 million L (185 million gal). A list of resources that would be required for the proposed MOX,

PDCF, and WSB facilities is provided in Table 4.31.

Construction, operation, deactivation, and decommissioning of the project site would require a

commitment of financial and human resources. Commitments of machinery, construction

equipment vehicles, and fossil fuels (e.g., fuel oil and diesel oil) would be needed during the life

of the project. None of these resources is expected to be in short supply in the vicinity of the

SRS.

No valuable mineral resources are known to be present at the project site or immediate vicinity

that could by affected by facility construction and operation security requirements in the F-Area.

4.7.3 Relationship between Short-Term Uses of the Environment

and Long-Term Productivity

Short-term uses of the environment for the proposed action include (1) using a 23.6-ha

(58.3-acre) area in F-Area for the proposed facilities, and (2) using an additional 15.5 ha

(38.3 acres) of land for infrastructure upgrades and a process pipeline right-of-way needed to

transport liquid high-level alpha waste from the proposed MOX facility. These uses would allow

the U.S. government to fulfill its obligations in a September 2000 agreement with the Russian

government to convert surplus weapons-grade plutonium no longer needed for defense

purposes into MOX fuel for irradiation in nuclear reactors.

The proposed action would result in favorable short-term effects for the local economy,

specifically for the nearby communities of Aiken and North Augusta, South Carolina, and

Augusta, Georgia. These communities would benefit from the increase in income generated by

direct jobs and workers in support industries in the SRS vicinity.

The use of 39.1 ha (96.6 acres) of land (up to 50.0 ha [123.4 acres] would be disturbed by

construction) on the SRS for the facility is consistent with the SRS Long Range Comprehensive

Plan (DOE 2000b) and use of the F-Area for processing nuclear materials. The proposed

project would require clearing of up to 14.8 ha (36.4 acres) of woodland. Clearing would 
Environmental Consequences

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Table 4.31. Irreversible and irretrievable commitments of

resources for the proposed MOX, PDCF, and WSB facilities

Resource Consumption

Constructiona

 Electricity 85,500 MWh

 Fuel oil 7.624 million L (1,960,000 gal)

 Water 695 million L (185 million gal)

 Concrete 149,300 m3

 (195,240 yd3)

 Steel 36,367 MT (40,100 tons)

Operationsb,c

 Electricity 1,860,000 MWh

 Water 760 million L (201 million gal)

 Fuel oil 5,362,600 L (1,376,000 gal)

 Plutonium 34 MT (37.5 tons)

 Depleted uranium 665 MT (726 tons)

 Argon 3.7 m3

 (129 million ft3)

 Argon-methane 103,930 m3

 (3.67 million ft3)

 Dodecane 29,144 L (7,700 gal)

 Helium 96,570 m3

 (3.41 million ft3)

 Hydrogen 105,070 m3

 (3.71 million ft3)

 Hydrogen peroxide 20,060 L ( 5,300 gal)

 Hydrazine (35%) 15,140 L (4,000 gal)

 Hydroxylamine nitrate 348,220 L (92,000 gal)

 Manganese nitrate 45.4 kg (100 lb)

 Nitric acid 49,205 L (13,000 gal)

 Nitrogen 45,310 million m3

 (1.6 billion ft3)

 Nitrogen tetroxide 37,380 million m3

 (1.32 million ft3)

 Oxalic acid dehydrate 40,363 kg (89,000 lb)

 Oxygen 20,110 m3

 (710,000 ft3)

 Porogen 2,993 kg (6,600 lb)

 Silver nitrate 1,088 kg (2,400 lb)

 Sodium carbonate 1,995 kg (4,400 lb)

 Sodium hydroxide (10M) 189 L (50 gal)

 Tri-butyl phosphate 28,009 L (7,400 gal)

 Zinc stearate 2,798 kg (6,170 lb)

a

Consumption amounts are based on a 5-year construction

period.

b

Represents total volumes for the MOX and PDCF facilities.

c

Consumption amounts are based on facility operations for an

assumed 10-year period. The data on chemicals are only for the

proposed MOX facility.
Environmental Consequences

4-111

eliminate wildlife habitat in these woodlands. Infrastructure upgrades for electrical supply and

additional roadways built for the proposed project would have long-term benefit to F-Area for

ongoing and future projects. If DOE decides to decommission the proposed facilities and

remove all structures and paved surfaces, the site could be reclaimed to woodland vegetation. 

Reclamation would require about 50 to 70 years to establish woodlands comparable in species

composition to areas that would be cleared for construction. 

4.8 References for Chapter 4

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Roberson, J.H. 2002. “Declaration of Jessie Hill Roberson,” in the matter of Jim Hodges,

Governor, State of South Carolina, Plaintiff, v. Spencer Abraham, Secretary, 

United States Department of Energy, and the United States Department of Energy,

Defendants. United States District Court, District of South Carolina, Aiken Division, 

Civ. 1 02 1426-22. May.

SCDHEC (South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control) 1995. 

South Carolina Nuclear Facility Monitoring — Annual Report 1995. Columbia, SC.

SCDHEC 2001. Air Dispersion Modeling Summary Sheet for Westinghouse Savannah River

Company (dated April 3, 2001). E-mail from R. DuBose (Air Quality Division, Westinghouse

Savannah River Company, Charlotte, NC) to A. Smith (Argonne National Laboratory,

Argonne, IL). June 8.

Simpkins, A.A. 2000. Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual Location Determination for

NESHAPS Compliance. WSRC-RP-2000-00036. Westinghouse Savannah River

Company, Aiken, SC.

SRS (Savannah River Site) 2001. SRS Emergency Response Plan. WSRC-SCD-7, Rev. 16. 

Aiken, SC. July 31.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002. U.S. Census American Fact Finder. Washington, DC. 

Available at http://factfinder.census.gov/.

Wike, L.D. (compiler) 2000. Site Selection for Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the

Savannah River Site. Westinghouse Savannah River Company, Aiken, SC. July.

WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company) 1995. RCRA Facility Investigation/Remedial

Investigation Report, Revision 1, for the Old F-Area Seepage Basin. WSRC-RP-94-942,

Rev. 1. Prepared for U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC. June.

WSRC 2000. Savannah River Approved Site Treatment Plan, 2000 Annual Update. 

WSRC-TR-94-0608, Rev. 8. Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC.
Environmental Consequences

4-116

 
5-1

5 MITIGATION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses potential means to mitigate adverse environmental impacts from the

proposed action as required by Appendix A of Title 10, Part 51, of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR Part 51). Mitigation measures for the proposed Pit Disassembly and

Conversion Facility (PDCF) have been considered by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in

its Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (SPD EIS) (DOE 1999) and

January 11, 2000, Record of Decision (DOE 2000, 2002) and are not repeated in this

document. The recent DOE supplemental analysis (DOE 2003) discusses impacts related to

operation of the proposed Waste Solidification Building (WSB) but does not identify any

mitigation measures for the WSB. Therefore, for completeness, the discussion of mitigation

measures in this EIS includes potential measures for the WSB. A full discussion of potential

mitigation measures for each resource area is provided in Section 5.2, and these measures are

summarized in Table 5.1. It is important to note that while potential mitigation measures for the

WSB are identified in this EIS, the NRC does not have the regulatory authority to implement

mitigation measures for DOE facilities. For the purpose of reaching a final NRC staff decision

on its proposed action, the NRC assumes that the DOE will not implement the mitigation

measures identified herein that pertain to the proposed WSB.

Under Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulation 40 CFR 1500.2(f), federal agencies

shall to the fullest extent possible use all practicable means consistent with the requirements of

the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other essential considerations of national

policy to restore and enhance the quality of the human environment and avoid or minimize any

possible adverse effects of their actions on the quality of the human environment. The CEQ

regulations define mitigation to include the following: (1) avoiding the impact altogether by not

taking a certain action or parts of an action; (2) minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or

magnitude of the action and its implementation; (3) rectifying the impact by repairing,

rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment; (4) reducing or eliminating the impact over

time by preservation and maintenance operations during the life of the action; and (5)

compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or environments. 

This definition has been used in defining potential mitigation measures.

The NRC staff has reviewed the mitigation measures and has concluded that no additional

mitigation measures are required beyond the regulatory requirements and those measures

identified by DCS. 

5.2 Mitigation Measures 

The NRC staff evaluated proposed mitigation measures identified by Duke Cogema Stone &

Webster (DCS) (2003) and identified other potential measures that could reduce or eliminate

adverse environmental impacts of the proposed mixed oxide (MOX) facility and WSB (as
Mitigation

5-2

Table 5.1. Summary of DCS mitigation commitments and additional measures

identified by NRC staff for reducing or avoiding impactsa

Technical area Mitigation 

Measures

proponent

Soils and

Hydrology

• Control of pollutants in stormwater discharges during

construction will be addressed as provided in the Storm Water

Pollution Prevention Plan that Duke Cogema Stone & Webster

(DCS) will file with its notice of intent to discharge stormwater

during construction under the South Carolina National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for

stormwater discharges from construction activities (Permit No.

SCR100000). Filing of a Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan

is required by Part IV, “Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plans,”

in Permit No. SCR100000. The South Carolina Department of

Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) has issued the

NPDES General Permit for stormwater discharges from

construction activities as provided in South Carolina Regulations

(SC Regulation R.61-9.122.28).

• Erosion and sediment controls will be implemented as provided

in the Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan that DCS will file

with its notice of intent to discharge stormwater during

construction under the South Carolina NPDES General Permit

for stormwater discharges from construction activities (Permit

No. SCR100000). Filing of a Storm Water Pollution Prevention

Plan is required by Part IV, “Storm Water Pollution Prevention

Plans,” in Permit No. SCR100000. The SCDHEC has issued the

NPDES General Permit for stormwater discharges from

construction activities as provided in SC Regulations

R.61-9.122.28.

• Creation of foundations and building of structures for the

proposed mixed oxide (MOX) facility, and Waste Solidification

Building (WSB) (hereafter “the facilities”) will be limited to the

upper soil layers, thus minimizing impacts to groundwater.

• Good engineering practices will be used during operation and

construction to minimize chemical impacts to soils.

• Sanitary wastes generated during construction will be collected

with a combination of portable toilets and semipermanent

facilities connected to the Central Sanitary Waste Treatment

Facility.

• Regular monitoring of the double-walled liquid high-alpha waste

pipeline will be conducted to detect leaks.

REG

REG

DCS

DCS

DCS

DCS
Mitigation

5-3

Table 5.1. Continued

Technical area Mitigation 

Measures

proponent

Ecology • The right-of-way for the 610-m (2,000-ft) pipeline to convey

liquid high-alpha-activity waste and stripped uranium waste for

the proposed MOX facility to the WSB will be less than 7.6 m

(25 ft) wide and thus will minimize vegetation removal.

• Before construction activities begin, the site would be surveyed

for migratory bird nests.

• Measures should be taken to protect trees on the MOX site not

selected for removal and not controlled after site clearing by the

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service —

Savannah River. If such trees or other landscape features not

controlled by the USDA Forest Service — Savannah River are

accidentally scarred or damaged, they should be replaced in a

manner consistent with the Savannah River Site Natural

Resources Management Plan.

• Construction crews would receive environmental briefings as

appropriate to alert them to specific areas of concern

(e.g., possible harassment and other adverse impacts to wildlife

species during the construction period) and to explain the

reasons for such concern.

• Impacts during the clearing of vegetation should be controlled

by the USDA Forest Service — Savannah River, consistent with

the Savannah River Site Natural Resources Management Plan.

• Following construction, site restoration (e.g., soil stabilization

and revegetation) would be conducted in compliance with

appropriate U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) policies for

reclamation of construction areas.

• Access roads should be sited on previously disturbed areas

where possible to minimize sensitive vegetation removal.

DCS

DCS

NRC

NRC

NRC

DCS

NRC

Air Quality and

Noise

• DCS will have a Construction Emissions Control Plan, which will

implement a number of good engineering practices to reduce

fugitive dust emissions consistent with the requirements in

SC Regulation R.61-62.6, “Control of Fugitive Particulate

Matter.”

• Particulate emissions from the silo hopper and concrete mixer

used in the cementation process during operation of the WSB

will be required to meet the conditions specified in the SCDHEC

permit.

REG

REG
Mitigation

5-4

Table 5.1. Continued

Technical area Mitigation 

Measures

proponent

Infrastructure • Road upgrades for ingress and egress of the proposed MOX

site will be conducted in existing traffic rights-of-way.

DCS

Land Use • No mitigation measures are needed to reduce impacts of the

proposed action on land use.

Waste

Management

• No mitigation measures are needed to reduce impacts of the

proposed action on the Savannah River Site (SRS) waste

management system.

Human Health

Risk

• Radiation doses to workers during construction will be kept to a

minimum by using administrative limits and ALARA (as low as

reasonably achievable) programs, including worker rotations.

• Exposure to hydrazine will be limited by complying with

SCDHEC emission standards. 

• To minimize adverse effects to facility and SRS workers from

exposure to nitrogen tetroxide, DCS should comply with the

requirements in the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration’s (OSHA’s) Process Safety Management Rule

(29 CFR 1910.119).

• The radiation exposure of radiographers will be monitored or

badged during construction.

• The radiography contractor will follow the contractor’s existing

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or agreement-state

license in evaluating and monitoring radiographer exposure.

• Radiation and chemical exposures of facility workers during

operations would be kept to a minimum through (1) use of

engineering controls to keep airborne chemical concentrations

below applicable occupational exposure limits, and (2) use of

enclosed operations to the extent possible.

• To minimize adverse effects to facility and SRS workers in the

event of an accidental release of process chemicals identified

as presenting moderate or high risks to workers (as identified in

Section 4.3.5.3), DCS has committed in its Construction

Authorization Request (CAR) to integrate any emergency

preparedness plans for the proposed MOX facility with the DOE

SRS Emergency Response Plan.

• Construction workers should be protected from inadvertent

radiation and chemical exposures by soil testing and analysis

prior to excavation to ascertain that levels of radiation and

inorganic or organic chemicals in soils would not present a

health hazard during construction activities.

REG

REG

REG

REG

REG

DCS

DCS

NRC
Mitigation

5-5

Table 5.1. Continued

Technical area Mitigation 

Measures

proponent

Cultural and

Paleontological

Resources

• Periodic monitoring of nearby eligible archaeological sites shall

be conducted to check for possible erosion.

• Additional mitigation measures, such as avoidance agreements,

shall be determined in consultation with the South Carolina

State Historic Preservation Office (SCSHPO).

• If inadvertent discoveries of cultural resources occur during site

construction, mitigation would follow the guidelines of 36 CFR

800.11 and/or 43 CFR 10.4.

DOE

DOE

REG

Aesthetics • No mitigation measures are necessary to reduce aesthetic

impacts of the proposed action.

Socioeconomics • No mitigation measures are necessary to reduce impacts to

socioeconomic factors.

Environmental

Justice

• DCS should work closely with SRS to implement procedures to

protect low-income and minority groups in the event of an

accidental chemical or radiological release from the proposed

facilities that impact areas beyond the SRS boundary.

• DCS should conduct focused public information campaigns to

provide important information to low-income and minority

groups/communities. Included in these campaigns would be

descriptions of existing monitoring programs, and information on

the nature, extent, and likelihood of any airborne release from

the facility. The campaigns would also include a description of

the relevant risks associated with the proposed facilities. These

campaigns should include information on sheltering and other

protection strategies that may be needed, including detailed

descriptions of any evacuation procedures that may be required.

• DCS should provide public information to local agencies and

groups representing low-income or minority groups on existing

soil or groundwater contamination monitoring programs and the

nature, extent, and likelihood of surface release. Key

information would include the extent of any likely damage to

drinking water supplies and subsistence resources, and the

relevant preventative measures that may be taken.

• DCS should meet with local communities providing emergency

response services and other emergency facilities to discuss

additional measures to ensure that the low-income and minority

populations in their jurisdictions are located and fully prepared in

the event that sheltering or evacuation procedures are required, 

in addition to public information campaigns targeting low-income

and minority groups. This would include the development of

spatial databases providing information on the locations of lowincome and minority populations, local resources available to

emergency response agencies, and any evacuation routes that

might be required.

NRC

NRC

NRC

NRC
Mitigation

5-6

Table 5.1. Continued

a

The mitigation measures are commitments made by DCS that were identified in the ER (DCS

2002) and other potential measures identified by the NRC staff in preparing this EIS. Under the

column “Measures proponent,” “DCS” refers to the applicant, “DOE” refers to the U.S. Department of

Energy, “NRC” refers to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and “REG” refers to a regulatory

requirement or a permit/license condition that DCS would be required to implement.

indicated in Table 5.1). The applicant, DCS, has proposed design features and other activities

to reduce impacts for the proposed MOX facility. In Table 5.1, the proponent for these

mitigation measures is designated as “DCS.” In addition, compliance with federal and state

regulations, permits, and guidelines will reduce potential impacts (see Chapter 6 for a

discussion of applicable environmental regulations and permits). For example, the South

Carolina National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) general permit requires the

implementation of a Storm Water Pollution and Prevention Plan that would mitigate potential

impacts to surface waters from construction activities. The regulations, permits, and guidelines

typically recommend best management practices. These practices (i.e., mitigation measures)

would be determined during the permitting process, which would occur in the future. For that

reason, general types of activities that would comprise best management practices are

discussed. The proponent for these mitigation measures is designated as “REG,” and for other

mitigation measures proposed by the NRC staff, the proponent is designated as “NRC” in

Table 5.1. Not all NRC-suggested mitigation measures are within the NRC’s regulatory

authority. 

5.2.1 Hydrology

Surface water resources could be adversely affected by construction of the proposed MOX

facility and WSB. Introducing pollutants or erosion into surface waters could impact the quality

of the surface water and aquatic organisms. Several design features that would mitigate

impacts to surface water were proposed by DCS and the DOE. During construction of the

proposed MOX facility and WSB, no direct discharges of contaminated water into Upper Three

Runs Creek, Four Mile Branch, or their tributaries, are expected to occur. Sanitary wastes

would be collected with a combination of portable toilets and semipermanent facilities

connected to the Savannah River Site (SRS) Central Wastewater Treatment Facility. All

wastewater would be treated in the sitewide treatment system before release under existing

NPDES permits, thus minimizing impacts to surface waters.

Potential impacts from stormwater discharges during construction would be mitigated by

compliance with the Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan that is required by South Carolina

Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) regulations. DCS plans to file this

plan in its notice of intent to discharge storm water during construction under the South

Carolina NPDES General Permit for stormwater discharges from construction activities (Permit

No. SCR100000). Under the General Permit, best management practices would be followed to

divert the flow of runoff water away from exposed soils, store flows, or otherwise limit runoff and
Mitigation

5-7

the discharge of pollutants from exposed areas to the degree attainable. Such practices might

include, but not necessarily be limited to, use of silt fences, earth dikes, drainage swales,

sediment traps, check dams, temporary or permanent sediment basins, temporary seeding,

permanent seeding, mulching, use of geotextiles, sod stabilization, vegetative buffer strips,

protection of trees, and preservation of mature vegetation. Because groundwater would be

used as the source of water during construction, groundwater could be adversely affected

during construction of the facilities. Because the capacity of the existing wells at SRS are

sufficient to meet the needs of the project, further mitigation would not significantly reduce the

impacts associated with using groundwater during construction. While construction could

directly impact groundwater quality if any of the buildings or structures extended below the

surface of the groundwater, the design for the proposed MOX facility and WSB do not involve

encroachment on groundwater. Groundwater could be indirectly impacted by infiltration of

contaminated surface water or surface spills during construction. These impacts would be

mitigated by following appropriate good engineering practices and following the provisions of

the required Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan as discussed above.

During normal operation of the proposed MOX facility and WSB, surface water would not be

used. The primary mitigation activities for surface water quality would be ensuring that releases

of effluent meet NPDES permit guidelines. Design features proposed by DCS and the DOE

include this mitigation strategy. Mixed, hazardous, and radioactive wastes in liquid form would

be sent off site for disposition, or sent to SRS waste management facilities, or would be treated

and processed at the WSB prior to being discharged to surface waters or converted into a solid

waste. See Section 4.3.4 for a further discussion of how such solid wastes would be managed. 

Stormwater run-off from paved areas would be collected by the stormwater system. The

stormwater would be temporarily retained in a detention basin to reduce the amounts of oils and

other pollutants from entering surface water. The uncontaminated HVAC condensate would

also be discharged to the stormwater system in accordance with SCDHEC standard stormwater

permit conditions. The detention basin would also reduce the flow into surface waters following

precipitation events. 

Water for normal operations would be obtained from existing SRS wells. Because the quantity

of water required for operations is within the capacity of the existing wells, further mitigation

would not significantly reduce the impacts of using the groundwater during operations. The

design features for the project do not include direct releases to underlying aquifers. However,

the quality of groundwater could be affected indirectly by receipt of contaminated surface water. 

As discussed above, design features have been proposed by DCS and the DOE to limit

contamination of surface water. Operation of a sand filter, if used, would not directly impact

groundwater because the filter would be covered to prevent infiltration and it would have a

concrete wall and bottom.

Deactivation and decommissioning could also impact water resources at the site. These

impacts would be mitigated by using the methods discussed above for construction.

Accidents could impact surface water and groundwater directly and indirectly. Impacts to

surface water would primarily be indirect. These impacts would be produced by contaminated

runoff from spill areas. DCS has committed to preparing and implementing a Spill Control and
Mitigation

5-8

Countermeasures Plan during operation. A similar plan would be prepared for the WSB. 

Mitigation would be accomplished by following best management practices in these plans that

would include prompt cleanup and removal of contaminated materials. Direct impacts to

groundwater could occur if there were a failure in the underground pipelines carrying liquid

waste from the proposed MOX facility to the WSB. The impacts would be mitigated by regular

monitoring of the system to detect leaks for the double-walled pipelines, and developing

contingency plans to remediate any spills promptly and thoroughly.

Further mitigation was not identified by the NRC that would significantly reduce the impacts to

surface water or groundwater.

5.2.2 Soils

Soils could be affected by construction activities, normal operations, activities associated with

deactivation and decommissioning, and accidents. Several design features proposed by DCS

and the DOE were considered to be mitigation measures. The locations selected for the

proposed MOX facility and the WSB contain soils that are not unique to the SRS, and there are

no soils classified as prime farmlands. In addition, the grading and landscape plans would be

designed in part to reduce future erosion following construction activities and limit slope

instability.

To a great extent, the impacts of construction on soils would be mitigated by the following

SCDHEC regulations (see discussion in Chapter 6) that require installation of sediment

detention basins that would catch and hold runoff water. These detention ponds would be

situated in strategic locations and would be designed to control the release of storm-water

runoff at a rate equal to or slightly less than that of the predevelopment conditions. In addition,

following good engineering practices will be required by the Stormwater Pollution Prevention

Plan that DCS will file with the State of South Carolina in its Notice of Intent to discharge

stormwater during construction under the General Permit for stormwater discharges (Permit No.

SCR100000). Such practices could include silt fences, sediment traps, check dams, etc., and

would mitigate the consequences of construction including impacts associated with potential

spills. 

During normal operations, there would be no planned direct discharges of water to the soil, and

stack emissions of contaminated particulates would be filtered. These mitigation measures

would minimize adverse impacts to the soil.

During deactivation and decommissioning, impacts could once again occur to soils through

mobilization of contaminants by water or wind. Mitigation activities for this phase of the project

would be the same as those outlined for construction.
Mitigation

5-9

Accidents during the lifetime of the facilities could also adversely impact soils. Following the

Spill Control and Countermeasures Plan as discussed in Section 5.2.1 would mitigate these

potential impacts.

Further mitigation was not identified by the NRC that would significantly reduce the impacts to

soils.

5.2.3 Ecology

Construction of the proposed MOX facility and WSB and associated infrastructure would disturb

up to 50.0 ha (123.4 acres) of land in the F-Area of the SRS. Several design features proposed

by DCS and the DOE were considered to be mitigation measures. The location of the facilities

would mitigate many of the construction impacts to ecological resources. The site selected for

the facilities would be largely in previously disturbed or developed locations, and there are no

designated wetlands or Carolina bays within the areas to be disturbed. For example, a portion

of the construction activities for the proposed MOX facility would take place in an area where

spoils for previous F-Area construction has been stored, and most of the WSB would be located

within “facility” land (e.g., landscaped areas). Also the new, widened, and realigned roads

would be located within previously cleared rights-of-way. In addition, the facilities would not be

located within either the red-cockaded woodpecker management area or its supplemental

management area. Clearing of vegetation should be conducted in accordance with the

Savannah River Site Natural Resources Management Plan by the U.S. Department of

Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service. Complying with this plan will minimize impacts to ecological

resources. Following construction, the cleared and graded areas not covered with facilities,

parking lots, or roads would be landscaped. This landscaping would provide habitat for some

wildlife species, mitigating the loss of habitat from constructing the facilities.

As discussed in Section 5.2.1, complying with the Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan would

mitigate impacts of ecological resources. Best management practices for soil erosion and

sediment control would be used to prevent runoff and dust from entering sensitive habitats and

nearby streams (e.g., unnamed tributaries to Upper Three Runs Creek), and direct construction

disturbance of nearby streams would be avoided. 

Potential mitigation measures to protect ecological resources were identified by the NRC. DCS

should take action at the construction site to prevent the workforce from removing vegetation in

excess of that needed for construction clearing. To ensure protection of vegetation during

construction, DCS should designate an environmental supervisor to supervise vegetation

clearance. Any accidentally scarred or damaged trees should be replaced consistent with the

Savannah River Site Natural Resources Management Plan. Construction crews should also

receive environmental briefings as appropriate to alter them to specific areas of concern (e.g.,

possible harassment and other adverse impact to wildlife species during the construction

period, identification of spills and notification of supervisors) and to explain the reasons for such

concerns. In addition, following construction, site restoration (e.g., soil stabilization and

revegetation) should be done in compliance with appropriate DOE policies for reclamation of

construction areas.
Mitigation

5-10

During normal operations, the major mitigation factor would be to limit releases of contaminants

(chemicals and radioactive materials) to the environment. The mitigation measures discussed

in Section 5.2.1 would also mitigate impacts to ecological resources.

Impacts of deactivation and decommissioning would be mitigated by using the same methods

described for construction, particularly those for erosion and sediment control.

Accidents could also impact ecological resources at the proposed facilities. These impacts

would be produced primarily by contaminated runoff water entering sensitive habitat. Additional

impacts could occur through air emissions from an accident. Mitigation measures would

include following the Spill Control and Countermeasures Plan discussed in Section 5.2.1. 

These mitigation measures would reduce the likelihood of bioaccumulation and

biomagnification in the food chain.

The NRC staff has reviewed the mitigation measures for ecological resources and has

concluded that no additional mitigation measures are required beyond the regulatory

requirements and the measures identified by DCS.

5.2.4 Air Quality

During construction of the proposed MOX facility and WSB, emission of criteria pollutants

(carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, and sulfur dioxide [CO, NO2, and SO2]), total suspended

particulates (TSP), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) would require mitigation. Of these,

suspended particles would be the principal concern. Suspended particles could be produced by

fugitive dust from earthmoving activities, fugitive dust from the concrete batch plant, and

exhaust emissions from diesel-powered construction equipment and from worker and delivery

vehicles. Most of this dust would be generated within the construction site; dust created along

roadways in the SRS would be naturally mitigated by dispersal. To a great extent, the impacts

of construction on air quality would be mitigated by the following SCDHEC regulations

(see discussion in Chapter 6). South Carolina Regulations (SC Regulations R.61-62.6, Control

of Fugitive Particulate Matter) require DCS to have a Construction Emissions Control Plan. 

This plan would implement a number of good engineering practices to reduce fugitive dust

emissions. These would include applying, as appropriate, standard dust control practices, such

as watering or sweeping roads and water exposed areas. Particulate emissions from the silo

hopper and concrete mixer used during the cementation process to construct the WSB would

be controlled as provided in a State of South Carolina Permit to Construct the concrete batch

plant. The State of South Carolina Permit to Construct would provide for controls on particulate

emissions consistent with the requirements in SC Regulations R.61-62.5, Standard No. 4,

“Emissions from Process Industries.”
Mitigation

5-11

During normal operations, air quality impacts would be produced by process emissions, testing

of emergency diesel generators, trucks moving materials and wastes, and employee vehicles. 

Several design features proposed by DCS and the DOE were considered to be mitigation

measures. These impacts would be mitigated by using an air filtration system (e.g., highefficiency air particulate [HEPA] filters or sand filter) to remove radioactive particulates prior to

discharge of process exhaust air to the atmosphere and by using internal scrubbers to reduce

chemical gas concentrations. Parking lots and access roads would be paved to minimize the

emission of fugitive dust during normal operations.

Mitigation activities for deactivation and decommissioning would be similar to those used for

construction. These strategies would be primarily aimed at reducing fugitive dust.

In the event of an accident, adverse impacts to the air would be mitigated by the air filtration

systems and prompt and thorough cleanup, if necessary.

Further mitigation was not identified by the NRC that would significantly reduce the impacts to

air quality.

5.2.5 Noise

Noise is unwanted sound that interferes with or interacts negatively with the human or natural

environment. Construction of the proposed MOX facility and WSB could adversely affect the

level of noise. These adverse impacts would be mitigated by locating the facilities away from

the SRS public boundary and sensitive receptors. The siting of the facilities is considered a

design feature that mitigates noise impacts. The level of noise could also be a concern for

federally listed or endangered species; however, none are known to occur in F-Area. As

discussed in Section H.3.1.1, noise levels could startle small mammals and frighten birds. 

Generally, these disturbances would be short-term and localized. Construction workers could

also be adversely affected by the levels of noise. Compliance with Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA) regulations to implement appropriate hearing protection

measures would mitigate noise impacts to workers. These measures include the use of

standard silencing packages on construction equipment, administrative controls, engineering

controls, and personal hearing protection devices.

During normal operations, noise would be produced by cooling systems, vents, motors,

generators, material-handling equipment, employee vehicles, and truck traffic. Impacts of

these noises on the public would be mitigated by the location of the facilities (about 8.7 km

[5.4 mi] from the site boundary). 

Operation workers could also be exposed to noise levels higher than the acceptable limits

specified by the OSHA in its noise regulation (29 CFR 1926.52). Appropriate mitigation

programs would be implemented according to pertinent OSHA standards to minimize impacts

on workers. These programs include the use of administrative control, engineering controls,

and personal hearing protection devices.
Mitigation

5-12

Mitigation measures used during deactivation and decommissioning of the facilities would be

similar to those employed for construction.

Further mitigation was not identified by the NRC that would significantly reduce the impacts

from noise.

5.2.6 Infrastructure

Upgrades of roadways to and from the proposed MOX site would be conducted in existing

traffic rights-of-way.

5.2.7 Waste Management

During construction of the proposed MOX facility and WSB, hazardous and nonhazardous

wastes would be generated. Impacts of hazardous and nonhazardous wastes would be

mitigated by managing them in accordance with the hazardous waste management practices in

place at the SRS and following applicable state and federal regulations. These practices are

discussed in Section 4.3.4. The regulations address collecting, handling, storing, sampling, 

treating, and disposal of the various types of waste minimize impacts to numerous resources

including hydrology, soils, air quality, ecology and human health.

Impacts of wastes generated during normal operations of the facilities would be similarly

mitigated by managing them in accordance with the hazardous waste management practices in

place at the SRS and following applicable state and federal regulations.

During deactivation and decommissioning, impacts of generated wastes would be mitigated in

the same ways as discussed above. Impacts of wastes produced by accidents would be

mitigated by rapid and thorough cleanup and by following the prescribed SRS waste

management practices.

Further mitigation was not identified by the NRC that would significantly reduce the waste

management impacts.

5.2.8 Human Health Risk

As discussed in the previous sections, complying with various regulations will mitigate impacts

to construction workers. Impacts of fugitive dust on workers would be mitigated by following the

Construction Emissions Control Plan. Occupational hazards (e.g., chemical exposure, noise,

physical hazards) to workers would be mitigated by following OSHA guidelines. Impacts from

hazardous wastes generated during facility construction would be mitigated by appropriately

packaging and shipping the material off-site for commercial recycling, treatment, or disposal. 

Exposure to hazardous materials such as paints and solvents would be mitigated by following

good engineering practices, such as using good ventilation and cleaning up small spills
Mitigation

5-13

promptly and thoroughly. Wastewater generated during construction would be transported to

the CSWTF for treatment prior to release. 

During construction of the proposed MOX facility and WSB, workers could be adversely

affected by exposure to soil or groundwater previously contaminated by radioactivity or

chemicals. Potential mitigation measures were identified by the NRC staff to mitigate the

possibility that workers could be exposed to the previously disturbed soils that may be

contaminated. As discussed in Section 4.3.1, DCS has conducted limited testing of the

previously disturbed soils. Impacts from contaminated soil should be mitigated by conducting

further sampling of the soil for radioactive contamination before excavation begins at the site. 

In addition, workers should be monitored, as appropriate, to ensure that radioactive doses are

maintained at levels as low as reasonably achievable.

During normal operations of the proposed MOX facility and WSB, workers could be impacted

by exposure to internal and external radiation. These impacts would be mitigated by complying

with NRC regulations including instituting monitoring, enforcing administrative limits, and

developing ALARA programs that would include worker rotations. DCS has incorporated

several design features into the proposed MOX facility design to mitigate exposure to workers

and the public. These include, but are not limited to, containment (e.g., gloveboxes), shielding,

and air filtration.

During normal operations, workers at the proposed MOX facility and WSB could also be

impacted by chemical exposure. Complying with OSHA guidelines and SCDHEC regulations

would mitigate adverse impacts from chemicals. Health risks from occupational exposures

through all pathways (i.e., inhalation, skin contact [dermal], and ingestion) would be mitigated

by using enclosed operations (e.g., gloveboxes) as much as possible. In addition, workplace

exposure to such chemicals as hydrazine, that are used in the plutonium polishing process to

separate plutonium from the solvent, would be monitored to ensure that airborne concentrations

within the facility were kept below the occupational exposure limit. Off-gas treatment systems

would be used to limit hydrazine emissions to very low levels that would mitigate adverse

human health impacts.

During the fuel fabrication process at the proposed MOX facility, purified plutonium dioxide

would be mixed with depleted uranium dioxide. Impacts from this process would be mitigated

by performing the mixing in closed containers located in gloveboxes that would confine

contamination to inaccessible areas. Air exhaust from the gloveboxes would be passed

through HEPA filters to collect particulate emissions.

During normal operations, occupational hazards to workers at the proposed MOX facility and

WSB would be mitigated by following OSHA guidelines.

DCS has committed to establishing a protocol with the DOE to integrate DCS’s emergency

plans with the existing SRS emergency preparedness program. The consequences of

accidents (fire, explosion, load handling, and criticality) on human health would be mitigated by

following SRS emergency procedures. For fires, key features would include fire barriers,

minimizing combustibles and ignition sources, installing ventilation systems with fire dampers
Mitigation

5-14

and HEPA filters, using nitrogen blanket systems, providing only qualified canisters and

containers, incorporating fire suppression and detection systems, developing and following

appropriate emergency procedures, providing worker training, and equipping and training local

fire brigades. For explosions, the following mitigation devices would be available: scavenging

air systems, hydrogen monitoring systems, temperature control systems, chemical addition and

concentration control systems, sampling systems, process shutdown controls, operator training,

and operations and maintenance procedures. Key mitigation features for load handling include

load path restrictions, crane-operating procedures, maintenance procedures, operator training,

qualified canisters, reliable load-handling equipment, and ventilation systems with HEPA filters. 

Key mitigation features for criticality accidents include geometry, mass, and moderation

controls.

Mitigation activities for the deactivation and decommissioning of the facilities would be

essentially the same as those discussed for construction.

The NRC staff has reviewed the mitigation measures for human health impacts and has

concluded that no additional mitigation measures are required beyond the regulatory

requirements and the measures identified by DCS.

5.2.9 Cultural, Historical, and Paleontological Resources

Construction of the proposed MOX facility and WSB would directly impact two prehistoric

archaeological sites that are eligible for listing on National Register of Historical Places. There

are no known fossil-bearing strata within the area of the project, and although there are about

400 historic sites or sites with historic components, none of them are located within the location

of the proposed facilities.

Impacts of construction to two prehistoric archaeological sites were mitigated in part through

data recovery as described in a data recovery plan that was submitted and approved by the

South Carolina State Historic Preservation Office (SCSHPO) (Long 2002). When construction

activities begin, the removal of fill on the site areas will be monitored by staff members of the

SRARP (Gould 2002).

Five additional eligible sites are located in the vicinity of the planned construction, but no direct

impacts to these sites are expected. However, indirect impacts could still affect these sites. 

Possible mitigation activities for these indirect impacts include awareness training for workers

so that they would not inadvertently disturb the sites, possible restrictions on where heavy

machinery is allowed, and periodic monitoring by staff members of the SRARP to check for

possible surface erosion or evidence of other impacts from an increase in F-Area activities

(e.g., unauthorized pedestrian or vehicle activity at the archaeological sites). The need for an

avoidance agreement for one site or additional mitigation activities for potential erosion at

several of the sites should be determined in consultation with the SCSHPO.
Mitigation

5-15

Inadvertent discoveries of cultural resources could also occur during site construction. 

Mitigation of any adverse impacts to these sites would follow the guidelines of 36 CFR 800.11

(historic properties) and/or 43 CFR 10.4 (Native American human remains, funerary objects,

objects of cultural patrimony, and objects that are sacred).

During normal operations, archaeological resources are unlikely to be affected. Therefore, no

mitigation activities would be required.

Potential impacts of deactivation and decommissioning eligible archaeological sites or historic

structures would have to be evaluated at the time of decommissioning. Mitigation measures

would be determined in consultation with the SCSHPO. 

Further mitigation was not identified by the NRC that would significantly reduce the impacts to

cultural, historical, and paleontological resources.

5.2.10 Aesthetics

Construction, operation, deactivation, and decommissioning of the structures associated with

the proposed MOX facility and WSB would have a minimal effect on the scenic character of the

surrounding area and would be consistent with the VRM Class IV designation of the area. The

buildings would be low-rise structures with heights of less than 30 m (100 ft). This height would

be similar to that of other buildings in the area. The tallest new structure would be a stack that

is 37 m (120 ft) above the existing grade. Impacts of these buildings on visual resources would

be mitigated by the presence of trees and rolling terrain that would effectively screen them from

view, and the distance of the facility from the nearest publicly accessible viewpoints located on

State Highway 125 and SRS Road 1, both approximately 6 km (4 mi) away.

Further mitigation was not identified by the NRC that would significantly reduce the impacts.

5.2.11 Socioeconomics

Construction of the proposed MOX facility and WSB would have a minor beneficial

socioeconomic impact on the region. Therefore, further mitigation would not significantly

reduce the impacts. Although the region should benefit from the construction, the peak

demand for workers could adversely affect other construction activities in the area. These

impacts would be mitigated by the short duration of the peak demand for workers (a few

months). In addition, given that a majority of workers would be hired from the existing regional

labor pool, impacts from worker relocation to area businesses, public services, and facilities

would be mitigated.

Transportation impacts during construction would be primarily associated with construction

labor. To minimize conflicts with other SRS activities, the work schedule would be coordinated

and staggered with other SRS activities to minimize the number of vehicles entering and exiting

the SRS during peak commuting periods.
Mitigation

5-16

Normal operations of the facilities would require approximately 480 new permanent positions

and an additional 780 indirect jobs. Given the population and its rate of growth, no significant

socioeconomic impacts are expected, and further mitigation would not significantly reduce the

impacts.

The impacts of deactivation and decommissioning of the facility would be similar to those for

construction, and mitigation activities would be similar to those previously discussed. No

mitigation of socioeconomic impacts would be required for accidents, unless residents were

evacuated and prevented from quickly returning to their homes. Such impacts would be

mitigated, to the extent possible, by rapid cleanup of the accident.

5.2.12 Environmental Justice

As discussed in Section 4.3.7, impacts to the environmental justice community would not be

high and adverse from construction and normal operations associated with the proposed action. 

Mitigation measures discussed above in Section 5.2.8 would mitigate impacts to the general

public including the environmental justice community. Therefore, further mitigation would not

significantly reduce impacts specific to the environmental justice community.

Section 4.3.7 discusses possible impacts to the environmental justice community from

accidents. In developing mitigation measures for these potential impacts, the NRC considered

that accident impacts are different from impacts from construction or normal operations. That is

construction and normal operations impacts would occur, if the facilities were authorized to be

constructed, but the likelihood of accident impacts is less certain. In addition, mitigation of

accident impacts for the general public would also mitigate potential impacts to the

environmental justice community. Considering these factors, the NRC identified the following

potential mitigation measures specifically to address disproportionate impacts to the

environmental justice community from potential accidents.

Various procedures might be used to reduce the potential impacts to low-income and minority

groups in the event of an accidental chemical or radiological release from the facilities. As

discussed in Sections 4.3.5 and 4.3.7, the potential impacts associated with accidents would be

lower if the population exposed to population exposed to a contaminate plume did not ingest

crops that could be contaminated. In addition, seeking shelter indoors would reduce the

inhalation and direct exposure associated with contaminate plumes. Because the mitigation

activities for part of the environmental justice community involve knowing what to do in case of

an accident, the NRC believes that education and public outreach are potential methods to

mitigate these potential impacts. The potential mitigation activities include development and

implementation of the following:
Mitigation

5-17

• Focused public information campaigns to provide technical and environmental

health information directly to low-income and minority groups, or to local

agencies and representative groups; and

• Additional programs directed at local communities providing emergency

response services and other emergency facilities to incorporate additional

measures to protect low-income and minority populations.

Included in the public information campaigns would be descriptions of existing air and

groundwater monitoring programs; the nature, extent, and likelihood of any future airborne or

groundwater release from the facilities; and the likely characteristics of environmental and

health impacts. Key information would include the extent of any likely damage to drinking water

supplies and subsistence resources and the relevant preventive measures that may be taken.

The additional programs under the second group of measures would ensure that the lowincome and minority population in local government jurisdictions are located and fully prepared

in the event that sheltering or other protection strategies may be required and would ensure

that detailed descriptions of evacuation routes that may be used have been developed and

distributed. In addition to public information campaigns targeting low-income and minority

groups, these programs would include the development of spatial database programs for use

by local emergency response planners. These databases would provide information on the

locations of low-income and minority populations and the locations of relevant local resources

available to emergency response agencies, and would have detailed descriptions of evacuation

routes that might be required.

The NRC staff has reviewed the mitigation measures for environmental justice and has

concluded that no additional mitigation measures are required beyond the regulatory

requirements and the measures identified by DCS.
Mitigation

5-18

5.3 References for Chapter 5

DCS (Duke Cogema Stone & Webster) 2002. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

Environmental Report, Revision 1 & 2. Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2003. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 4.

Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. Aug.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 1999. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental 

Impact Statement. DOE/EIS-0283. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, DC. 

Nov.

DOE 2000. “Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental

Impact Statement.” Federal Register 65:1608, Jan. 11.

DOE 2002. “Amended Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program.”

Federal Register 67:19432, April 19.

DOE 2003. Changes Needed to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program Supplement 

Analyses and Record of Decision. DOE/EIS-0283-SA1. Office of Fissile Materials

Disposition, Washington, DC, April.

Gould, A.B. 2002. Letter from Gould (Director, Environmental Quality Division, DOE,

Savannah River Operations Office, Aiken, SC) to C.C. Long (South Carolina State Historic 

Preservation Office, Columbia, SC). October 24.

Long, C.C. 2002. Letter from Long (South Carolina State Historic Preservation Office,

Columbia, SC) to A.B. Gould (Director, Environmental Quality Division, DOE, Savannah

River Operations Office, Aiken, SC). October 24.
6-1

6 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND PERMITS

The proposed project would be subject to many federal, state, local, and other legal

requirements, and a variety of permits, licenses, and approvals would have to be obtained.

Many of these requirements are identified and their status summarized in Table 6.1. For items

that are the responsibility of the facility owner or operator, Table 6.1 presents requirement

status on the basis of information obtained from the environmental report (ER) (DCS 2002a;

2003a,b; 2004). No independent evaluation was made of the status of consents not discussed

in the ER that are the responsibility of the facility owner or operator. For items that are the

responsibility of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), references are made to other

sections of this environmental impact statement (EIS) that discuss their status.

Because of the early stage of project design, the information in Table 6.1 should not be

considered comprehensive or binding. It may later be determined that the facility is subject to

additional requirements that are not listed in Table 6.1 or qualifies for exemptions or exclusions

from some requirements that are listed.

For ease of reference, the information in Table 6.1 has been divided into the following

categories:

 Civilian Use of Nuclear Material,

 Air Quality Protection and Noise Control,

 Protection of Water Resources,

 Waste Management and Pollution Prevention,

 Biotic Resources,

 Cultural Resources,

 Transportation, and

 Other.
Environmental Regulations and Permits

6-2

Table 6.1. Applicable environmental regulations and consents or activities

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

Civilian Use of Nuclear Material

NRC Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as

amended (AEA)

(42 U.S.C. 2011

et seq.); 10 CFR

Part 40

Part 40 License to

receive, possess, use,

and transfer depleted

uranium

DCS has satisfied this

requirement by specifying

depleted uranium activities in

the Construction Authorization

Request for its Part 70 License

(DCS 2001, Sections 1.2.2

and 1.2.3, and 2002b). 

NRC AEA; 10 CFR

Part 70

Part 70 License to

receive, possess, use,

and transfer plutonium

DCS has applied for this

consent by filing a Construction Authorization Request and

an Environmental Report with

the NRC (DCS 2002a;

2003a,b).

South Carolina

Department of

Health and

Environmental

Control

(SCDHEC)

AEA; South

Carolina (SC)

Regulations

R.61-63

Radioactive Materials

License to receive, use,

possess, transfer, and

dispose of radioactive

material, including

depleted uranium

DCS has satisfied this

requirement by applying for a

Part 70 License from the NRC.

Air Quality Protection and Noise Control

SCDHEC Clean Air Act

(CAA) Section

165 (42 U.S.C.

7475); SC

Regulations

R.61-62.5

Standard No. 7

Prevention of Significant

Deterioration (PSD)

Permit to construct and

operate a new major

stationary source of air

pollution in an area that

complies with National

Ambient Air Quality

Standards for carbon

monoxide, lead, nitrogen

dioxide, ozone, sulfur

oxides, particulate

matter with aerodynamic

diameter less than or

equal to 10 m (PM10),

and PM2.5

DCS has determined that

gaseous emissions from the

facility would not be enough to

trigger the requirement for a

PSD Permit (DCS 2002a,

Section 7.2.1.1). 

Section 4.3.2.2 discusses

impacts of facility operations

on air quality.
Environmental Regulations and Permits

6-3

Table 6.1. Continued

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

SCDHEC

SCDHEC

SCDHEC

CAA, Title V,

Sections 501 -

507 (42 U.S.C.

7661 - 7661f);

SC Regulations

R.61-62.70

CAA, Section

112 (42 U.S.C.

7412); 40 CFR

Part 61; SC

Regulations

R.61-62.63

CAA, Section

111 (42 U.S.C.

7411); 40 CFR

Part 60; SC

Regulations

R.61-62.60

Title V Operating Permit

for a new or existing

stationary source that is

a major source; a source

subject to National

Emission Standards for

Hazardous Air Pollutants

(NESHAPs); a source

subject to New Source

Performance Standards

(NSPS); or an affected

source under the Acid

Rain Program

Approval for

Construction of a new

source or modification

that is subject to

NESHAPs

Demonstration of

Compliance with

applicable NSPS

DCS has determined that the

quantity of criteria and

hazardous air pollutants (other

than radionuclides) expected

to be emitted during facility

operation would not be

enough to trigger the

requirement for a Title V

Operating Permit (DCS 2002a,

Section 7.2.1.1). Even so,

DCS has initiated consultation

with the SCDHEC and plans to

submit any permit forms

necessary to augment the

existing Title V Operating

Permit held by the DOE SRS

(DCS 2002a, Section 7.2.1.1).

DCS has determined that the

proposed facility would be

subject to NESHAPs

requirements in 40 CFR Part

61, Subpart H, which govern

radionuclide emissions from all

DOE-owned or DOE-operated

facilities, whether or not they

are licensed by the NRC. 

However, EPA Region IV and

SCDHEC approved an

alternate calculation

methodology that exempted

the facility from preparing an

application for NESHAPs

construction approval (DCS

2002a, Section 7.2.1.1).

Section 4.3.2.2 discusses

impacts on air quality during

routine operation.

DCS has determined that the

facility would not trigger the

requirement to comply with

any NSPS (DCS 2002a,

Section 7.2.1.1).
Environmental Regulations and Permits

Table 6.1. Continued

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

6-4

SCDHEC CAA, Section

112(r) (42

U.S.C. 7412); 40

CFR Part 68,

Subpart G; SC

Regulations

R.61-62.68

Risk Management Plan

for any stationary source

that has more than a

threshold quantity of a

regulated substance in a

process

DCS has determined that a

Risk Management Plan is not

required because the

projected quantities of

regulated substances at the

facility would not be greater

than threshold levels (DCS

2002a, Section 7.1.2).

SCDHEC SC Pollution

Control Act (SC

Code of Laws,

1976, as

amended,

Title 48,

Chapter 1); SC

Regulations

R.61-62.1,

Section II.A

State Construction

Permit to construct, alter,

or add to a source of air

contaminants within

South Carolina, if the

emission limits imposed

would be more restrictive

than those imposed by

other federal or state air

permitting requirements

DCS plans to develop a

Construction Emissions

Control Plan and to submit

standard permit application

forms required by the

SCDHEC in order to evaluate

the applicability of all state air

permitting requirements (DCS

2002a, Section 7.2.1.1).

NRC CAA, Section

176 (42 U.S.C.

7506); 40 CFR

Part 93,

Subpart B

Determination of

Conformity with

applicable air quality

implementation plans

No air quality implementation

plans apply to the area where

the facility is located.

Protection of Water Resources

SCDHEC Clean Water Act

of 1977 (CWA)

(33 U.S.C. 1251

et seq.); SC

Regulations

R.61-9

National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination

System (NPDES) Permit

for Storm Water

Discharges during

Construction for

discharges of storm

water from any land

disturbance activity

affecting an area greater

than 5 acres

DCS has determined that the

facility construction activities

would be covered by the South

Carolina NPDES General

Permit for storm-water

discharges from construction

activities within the state

(Permit No. SCR100000),

provided that a notice of intent,

supported by a Storm Water

Management Pollution

Prevention Plan is filed before

construction activities are

initiated (DCS 2002a,

Section 7.2.1.2). DCS plans to

submit the notice of intent and

required plans at the

appropriate time.
Environmental Regulations and Permits

Table 6.1. Continued

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

6-5

SCDHEC CWA (33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.);

SC Regulations

R.61-9

NPDES Permit for Storm

Water Discharges from

Industrial Activity Areas

for discharges of storm

water from any facility or

activity classified as

"associated with

industrial activity"

DCS has determined that the

South Carolina NPDES

General Permit for storm-water

discharges from industrial

activities within the state

(Permit No. SCR000000)

would cover runoff exposed to

pollutants in an industrial

activity area at the facility after

construction is complete,

provided that a notice of intent,

supported by a Storm Water

Management Pollution

Prevention Plan, is filed (DCS

2002a, Section 7.2.1.2). DCS

plans to submit the notice of

intent and required plan at the

appropriate time.

SCDHEC CWA (33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.);

SC Regulations

R.61-9

NPDES Permit for

Wastewater Discharges

for discharges to surface

waters of wastewater

from industrial facilities

DCS has determined that the

facility would not discharge

process wastewater.

Accordingly, DCS has

consulted with the SCDHEC

regarding the need for an

NPDES permit and plans, as

appropriate, to file a notice of

intent to discharge nonprocess wastewater covered

by the South Carolina NPDES

general permit for utility water

discharges (Permit No. SCG

250000) (DCS 2004,

Section 7.2.1.2).

SCDHEC SC Pollution

Control Act (SC

Code of Laws,

1976, as

amended,

Title 48,

Chapter 1); SC

Regulations

R.61-67

State Construction

Permit to construct, alter,

or add to wastewater

treatment facilities within

South Carolina

DCS has initiated consultation

with the SCDHEC and at the

appropriate time, plans to

obtain a permit to construct the

tie-in between the existing

SRS Central Sanitary Waste

Treatment Facility and the

sanitary wastewater system

from the facility (DCS 2004,

Section 7.2.1.2).
Environmental Regulations and Permits

Table 6.1. Continued

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

6-6

SCDHEC SC Safe

Drinking Water

Act (SC Code of

Laws, 1976, as

amended,

Title 44,

Chapter 55); SC

Regulations

R.61-58

Public Water System

Construction Permit for

construction,

modification, or

expansion of any public

water system

DCS has initiated consultation

with the SRS Environmental

Protection Department, which

is responsible for compliance

with SCDHEC requirements

applicable to the existing

drinking water systems at the

SRS. DCS plans to obtain the

necessary permit before

construction begins on a tie-in

between the existing SRS

drinking water system and the

facility drinking water system

(DCS 2002a, Section 7.2.1.3).

SCDHEC SC Safe

Drinking Water

Act (SC Code of

Laws, 1976, as

amended,

Title 44,

Chapter 55);

SC Regulations

R.61-58

Public Water System

Operating Approval for

placing a new, modified,

or expanded public

water system into

service

DCS has initiated consultation

with the SRS Environmental

Protection Department, which

is responsible for compliance

with SCDHEC requirements

applicable to the existing

drinking water systems at the

SRS. DCS plans to obtain the

necessary operating approval

before beginning operation of

the tie-in between the existing

SRS drinking water system

and the facility drinking water

system (DCS 2002a,

Section 7.2.1.3).

U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA)

CWA (33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.);

40 CFR Part 112

Spill Prevention Control

and Countermeasures

(SPCC) Plan for any

facility that could

discharge oil in harmful

quantities into navigable

waters

DCS plans to prepare the

required SPCC Plan (DCS

2002a, Section 7.2.1.2).

SCDHEC CWA (33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.);

SC Regulations

R.61-101

State Water Quality

Certification certifying

that the applicable state

water quality standards

will not be violated as a

result of discharges to

navigable waters by an

activity authorized by a

federal license 

The SCDHEC has notified

DCS that a State Water

Quality Certification in

accordance with SC regulation

R.61-101 is not required

(SCDHEC 2003).
Environmental Regulations and Permits

Table 6.1. Continued

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

6-7

NRC; U.S. Army

Corps of

Engineers

CWA (33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.);

Executive Order

11988 (42 FR

26951; May 24,

1977) as

amended by

Executive Order

12148 (44 FR

43239; July 20,

1979)

Floodplain Assessment

to evaluate the effects of

issuing a Part 70

License on any

floodplain

DCS has completed a

floodplain assessment and

incorporated its results into the

design of the facility (DCS

2002a, Section 7.1.3 and

Table 7-1). Section 3.3.1

discusses the results of the

floodplain assessment.

U.S. Department

of the Interior

(National Park

Service); NRC

Wild and Scenic

Rivers Act, as

amended

(16 U.S.C. 1271

et seq.)

Wild and Scenic Rivers

Assessment to ensure

that issuing a Part 70

License will not result in

activities that would

adversely affect the

values for which a river

is being studied or has

been designated as a

wild and scenic river

DCS has determined that no

river that is being studied or

has been designated as a

national wild and scenic river

occurs within the SRS (DCS

2002a, Section 4.4.2.1).

U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers

CWA (33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.)

Section 404 Permit to

discharge dredged or fill

material into waters of

the United States,

including wetlands

DCS has determined that no

wetlands are present on the

facility site and that no other

discharge of dredged or fill

material into water of the

United States would occur at

the facility site (DCS 2002a,

Section 4.6.2.2). Therefore,

DCS has concluded that no

Section 404 permit is required

from the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (DCS 2002a,

Section 7.1.3 and Table 7-1).
Environmental Regulations and Permits

Table 6.1. Continued

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

6-8

Waste Management and Pollution Prevention

EPA; SCDHEC Resource

Conservation

and Recovery

Act (RCRA), as

amended by the

Hazardous and

Solid Waste

Amendments of

1984 (HSWA)

(42 U.S.C. 6901

et seq.),

Subtitle C; SC

Regulations

R.61-79.262

EPA Identification

Number to identify a

hazardous waste

generator

DCS has determined that the

facility would generate small

quantities of hazardous

wastes. Therefore, DCS plans

to file a notice of hazardous

waste activity with EPA and

obtain an EPA identification

number when hazardous

waste activities commence at

the site (DCS 2002a,

Section 7.2.1.4). Hazardous

waste generated during facility

operations is discussed in

Section 4.3.2.4.

SCDHEC RCRA, as

amended by

HSWA (42

U.S.C. 6901 et

seq.), Subtitle C;

SC Regulations

R.61-79.270

Hazardous Waste

Facility Permit for a

facility that will store

hazardous wastes

beyond the allowed

accumulation periods,

treat hazardous wastes,

or dispose of hazardous

wastes

DCS has determined that the

facility will not store hazardous

waste beyond the allowed

accumulation time. Also, DCS

does not plan to treat or

dispose of hazardous waste at

the facility. Therefore, DCS

has concluded that the facility

would not require a hazardous

waste facility permit (DCS

2002a, Section 7.2.1.4).

SCDHEC RCRA, as

amended by

HSWA (42

U.S.C. 6901 et

seq.), Subtitle I;

SC Regulations

R.61-92

Underground Storage

Tank Installation and

Operation Permits to

install and operate an

underground storage

tank that will contain

regulated substances,

including petroleum

products and other

substances defined in

Section 101(14) of the

Comprehensive Environmental Response

Compensation and

Liability Act (CERCLA)

DCS has initiated consultation

with the SCDHEC regarding 

underground storage tanks for

managing regulated

substances at the facility and

plans to obtain the necessary

permits at the appropriate time

(DCS 2002a, Section 7.2.1.4).
Environmental Regulations and Permits

Table 6.1. Continued

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

6-9

Biotic Resources

NRC; U.S. Fish

and Wildlife

Service; South

Carolina

Department of

Natural

Resources;

Georgia

Department of

Natural

Resources

Endangered

Species Act of

1973, as

amended (16

U.S.C. 1531 et

seq.); Migratory

Bird Treat Act of

1918 (MBTA), as

amended (16

U.S.C. 703-712);

Nongame and

Endangered

Species

Conservation

Act (SC Code of

Laws, 1976, as

amended, Title

50, Chapter 15);

Endangered

Wildlife Act of

1973 (Georgia

Laws 1973,

p. 932, et seq.);

Wildflower

Preservation Act

of 1973 (Georgia

Laws 1973,

p. 333, et seq.)

Consultation between

the NRC, the U.S. Fish

and Wildlife Service, and

affected states to ensure

that activities resulting

from issuance of a Part

70 License (1) are not

likely to jeopardize the

continued existence of

any species listed at the

federal or state level as

endangered or

threatened, or result in

destruction of critical

habitat of such species

and (2) will include

appropriate precautions

to mitigate adverse

effects on birds

protected by the MBTA

DCS has obtained

declarations from the U.S. Fish

and Wildlife Service and the

South Carolina Department of

Natural Resources indicating

that facility construction and

operation would have no effect

on threatened and

endangered species under

their jurisdictions (DCS 2002a,

Sections 7.1.6 and 7.2.3). 
Environmental Regulations and Permits

Table 6.1. Continued

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

6-10

Cultural Resources

NRC; Advisory

Council on

Historic Preservation; South

Carolina State

Historic Preservation Officer

National Historic

Preservation Act

of 1966, as

amended (16

U.S.C. 470 et

seq.); Archaeological and

Historical

Preservation Act

of 1974 (16

U.S.C.

469-469c-2);

Antiquities Act of

1906 (16 U.S.C.

431 et seq.);

Archaeological

Resources

Protection Act of

1979, as

amended

(16 U.S.C.

470aa-mm)

Archaeological and

Historical Resources

Consultation between

the NRC and the State

Historic Preservation

Officer or Tribal Historic

Preservation Officer

before allowing federally

licensed activities to

proceed in an area

where archaeological or

historic resources might

be located

DCS has determined that,

while there are no historic sites

located within the facility site,

there are two prehistoric

archaeological sites that are

eligible for listing on the

National Register of Historical

Places (DCS 2002a,

Section 4.8.2). Mitigation of

these sites was completed

during August 2002

(DCS 2002a, Table 7-1).

Sections 3.7 and 4.3.7.8

describe the required

consultations.

NRC American Indian

Religious

Freedom Act of

1978 (42 U.S.C.

1996); Native

American

Graves

Protection and

Repatriation Act

of 1990 (25

U.S.C. 3001, et

seq.)

Native American

Resources Consultation

between the NRC and

Native Americans to

ensure that activities

resulting from issuance

of a Part 70 License

have been designed to

protect access to,

physical integrity of, and

confidentiality of Native

American sites

DCS reports that consultation

has been initiated with

appropriate Native American

groups to identify concerns

about construction activities

associated with a facility such

as the MOX facility at the SRS

(DCS 2002a, Section 4.8.4). 

Sections 3.7.3 and 4.2.6.3

discuss the status of this

consultation.
Environmental Regulations and Permits

Table 6.1. Continued

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

6-11

Transportation

U.S. Department

of Transportation

(DOT); NRC

Hazardous

Materials

Transportation

Act, as amended

by the

Hazardous

Materials

Transportation

Uniform Safety

Act of 1990 and

other acts (49

U.S.C. 1501, et

seq.); Atomic

Energy Act of

1954, as

amended (42

U.S.C. 2011, et

seq.); 49 CFR

172, 173, 174,

177, and 397; 10

CFR 71

Packaging, Labeling,

and Routing

Requirements for

Radioactive Materials

At the appropriate time, DCS

will comply with DOT and NRC

requirements for packaging,

labeling, and routing of

radioactive materials. 

DCS has identified no specific

permits, licenses, or approvals

that will be required for

transportation of materials to

or from the facility.

Other

NRC; U.S.

Natural Resource

Conservation

Service

Farmland

Protection Policy

Act (7 U.S.C.

4201 et seq.);

7 CFR Part 658

Prime Farmland

Assessment to consider

alternatives to address

the adverse effects on

prime farmland of

activities resulting from

issuance of a Part 70

license

DCS has determined that none

of the land on the facility site

has been identified as prime

farmland because the land is

not available for agricultural

production (DCS 2002a,

Section 7.1.7 and Table 7-1).

NRC National

Environmental

Policy Act of

1969, as

amended

(NEPA)

(42 U.S.C. 4321

et seq.); 40 CFR

1500 - 1508; 10

CFR Part 51

Environmental Impact

Statement (EIS) to

evaluate the potential

environmental impacts of

a proposed major federal

action that may

significantly affect the

quality of the human

environment, and to

consider alternatives to

the proposed action

This EIS meets the requirements of the NEPA.
Environmental Regulations and Permits

Table 6.1. Continued

Responsible

agency Authority Requirement Status

6-12

OSHA; South

Carolina

Department of

Labor, Licensing,

and Regulation

Occupational

Safety and

Health Act, as

amended (29

U.S.C. 651, et

seq.); 29 CFR

1910.119; SC

Regulations,

Chapter 71,

Article 1,

Subarticle 6,

“South Carolina

Occupational

Safety and

Health

Standards for

General Industry

and Public

Sector Marine

Terminals”

Process Hazard Analysis

to identify, evaluate, and

control the hazards of a

process involving a

flammable liquid or gas,

hydrocarbon fuel, or

highly hazardous

chemical at or above the

specified threshold

quantity 

Before operating the proposed

facility, DCS would be required

to perform a process hazard

analysis for nitrogen tetroxide,

which would be present at the

proposed MOX facility in a

quantity greater than the

specified threshold quantity.

6.1 References for Chapter 6

DCS (Duke Cogema Stone & Webster) 2001. Construction Authorization Request for the

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2002a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 1 & 2.

Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2002b. Amended Construction Authorization Request for the Mixed Oxide Fuel

Fabrication Facility. Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2003a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 3. 

Docket number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June.

DCS 2003b. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 4. 

Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. Aug.

DCS 2004. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 5.

Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June 10. 

SCDHEC (South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control) 2003. “Duke

Cogema Stone and Webster (DCS) Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility 401 Water Quality

Certification.” Letter from Q. Epps (Section Manager, Water Quality Certification Standards,

Navigable Waters, and Wetlands Programs, SCDHEC, Columbia, SC) to M.L. Birch

(Manager, Environment, Safety and Health, DCS, Charlotte, NC) Mar. 3.
1 Italicized words and phrases are entries in this glossary.

7-1

7 GLOSSARY

7Q10 flow: The 7-day low flow, 10-year recurrence flow for a river. This flow is the lowest

recorded over any 7 consecutive days within any 10-year period.

absorbed dose (dose1): The amount of energy deposited in any material by ionizing radiation. 

The unit of absorbed dose, the rad, is a measure of energy absorbed per gram of material.

accident: An unplanned sequence of events resulting in undesirable consequences, such as

the release of radioactive or hazardous material to the environment. 

accident risk: Risk based on both the severity of an accident (consequence) and the

probability that the accident will occur. High-consequence accidents that are unlikely to occur

(low probability) may pose a low overall risk. For purposes of comparison, accident risk is

typically calculated by multiplying the accident consequence (for example, dose or expected

fatalities) by the probability of the accident’s occurring.

accident severity categories: A method of characterizing all the possible types of accident

scenarios that might occur according to their likely outcome and the probability of occurrence.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission method, which is used in this environmental impact

statement, divides the spectrum of accidents into eight categories. Category I accidents are the

least severe but the most frequent; Category VIII accidents are very severe but very infrequent.

 

accident source term: The amount of radioactive or hazardous material released to the

environment following an accident.

acute: Resulting in immediate impacts.

acute health endpoint: A human health impact involving immediate injury or fatality.

administrative outfall: An authorized liquid waste outfall that discharges no pollutants.

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation: Under the National Historic Preservation Act of

1966, the Council reviews federal undertakings that may affect historic structures, sites, or

archeological artifacts. Second contact in sequential review that begins with the State Historic

Preservation Officer. 

An independent federal agency that serves as the chief policy advisor to the President and

Congress on matters concerning historic preservation. Included on the 20 member Council are

the heads of several federal agencies, including the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture.
Glossary

7-2

aerosol: Particles of solid or liquid matter that can remain suspended in air from a few minutes

to many months, depending on the particle size and weight.

aerosolize: The process of converting a solid or a liquid into an airborne suspension of fine

particles (an aerosol).

affected environment: For an environmental impact statement (EIS), a description of the

existing environment covering information necessary to assess or understand the impacts. It

must contain enough detail to support the impact analyses and must highlight environmentally

sensitive resources (for example, floodplains, wetlands, threatened and endangered species,

archeological resources).

aggregate: The sum total.

air pollutant: Any substance in air which could, if in high enough concentration, harm humans,

other animals, vegetation, or material. Pollutants may include almost any natural or artificial

composition of matter capable of being airborne.

air quality: A measure of the quantity of pollutants, measured individually, in the air. These

levels are often compared to regulatory standards.

Air Quality Control Region (AQCR): An interstate or intrastate area designated by the

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for the attainment and maintenance of National Ambient

Air Quality Standards.

air quality standards: The legally prescribed level of constituents in the outside air that cannot

be exceeded during a specific time in a specified area.

air toxics (hazardous air pollutants): Substances that have adverse impacts on human

health when present in the ambient air.

ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable): An approach to keep radiation exposures (both

to the workforce and the public) and releases of radioactive material to the environment at

levels that are as low as social, technical, economic, practical, and public policy considerations

allow. ALARA is not a dose limit; it is a practice whose objective is the attainment of dose

levels as far below applicable limits as possible.

algorithm: A formula or set of steps used to solve a problem.

ALOHA model: A computer model used to assess the impacts of potential chemical releases.

alpha particle ( ): A positively charged particle made up of two protons and two neutrons that

is emitted in the radioactive decay of certain atoms. An alpha particle is identical to the nucleus

of the helium atom. It is easily stopped by a sheet of paper. Since they cannot penetrate

human skin, alpha particles are not considered an external exposure hazard. Alpha particles

within the body can cause harm, however.
Glossary

7-3

ambient: Undisturbed, natural conditions, such as ambient temperature; surrounding

conditions.

ambient air: The surrounding atmosphere, usually the outside air, as it exists around people,

plants and structures. It is not the air in immediate proximity to emissions sources. 

Ambient Air Quality Standards: Regulations prescribing the levels of airborne pollutants that

may not be exceeded during a specified time in a defined area. 

American Indian Religious Freedom Act: States that the policy of the United States is to

protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent rights of freedom to believe, express,

and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native

Hawaiians. These rights include, but are not limited to, access to sites, use and possession of

sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremony and traditional rites. 

anthropogenic: Produced by human activities. 

aqueous process: An operation involving chemicals dissolved in water.

aquifer: A geologic formation that can yield significant quantities of groundwater to wells and

springs.

aquitard: A geologic unit that is not permeable enough to transmit significant quantities of

water. Aquitards transmit water at a very slow rate to or from an adjacent aquifer.

Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act: A federal law directed at the preservation of

historic and archaeological data that would otherwise be lost as a result of federal construction.

It authorized the U.S. Department of the Interior to undertake recovery, protection, and

preservation of archaeological and historic data.

Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979: A federal act protecting cultural

resources on federally owned lands. This act requires a permit for archaeological excavations

or the removal of any archaeological resources on public or Native American lands. 

archaeological site: Any location where humans have altered the terrain or discarded artifacts

during prehistoric or historic times.

artifact: An object produced or shaped by human beings and of archaeological or historical

interest.

as low as reasonably achievable: See ALARA.

atom: The smallest unit of an element that is capable of entering into a chemical reaction and

displays the properties of the element.
Glossary

7-4

Atomic Energy Act of 1954: A federal law that created the Atomic Energy Commission, which

later split into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy and Research and

Development Administration (ERDA). ERDA became part of the Department of Energy in 1977. 

This act encouraged the development and use of nuclear energy and research for the general

welfare and the security of the United States. This act authorized the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) to regulate and license fuel fabrication facilities that seek to receive,

possess, use, or transfer special nuclear material.

atomic number: The number of positively charged protons in the nucleus of an atom and the

number of electrons on an electrically neutral atom.

attainment area: An area considered to have air quality as good as or better than the National

Ambient Air Quality Standards for a given pollutant. An area may be in attainment for one

pollutant and nonattaining for others.

attenuate: To lessen the magnitude or severity of an impact or effect.

background radiation: Radiation that is part of our natural world. It can originate from

naturally occurring radioactive materials within the Earth and from outer space (cosmic

sources). Background radiation also includes global fallout as it exists in the environment from

the testing of nuclear explosive devices. Background radiation varies considerably with

location.

becquerel (Bq): A unit used to measure radioactivity. One Becquerel is that quantity of a

radioactive material that will have one transformation in one second. There are 3.7 x 1010 Bq in

one curie (Ci).

beta particle ( ): Beta particles are electrons except they are not bound to an atom. They

cannot travel far from their radioactive source (about one half inch in human tissue and a few

yards in air). 

beyond design basis accident: An accident generally with more severe impacts to on-site

personnel and the public than a design basis accident. This accident is used for estimating the

impacts of a facility or process.

bioaccumulation: The net accumulation of a chemical by an organism as a result of uptake

from all routes of exposure.

biomagnification: The tendency of some chemicals to accumulate to higher concentrations at

higher levels in the food chain through dietary accumulation.

biota: The plant and animal life of a region.

blackwater stream: A freshwater stream that has a dark color because of organic debris and

tannin-containing compounds. 
Glossary

7-5

borrow material: Material such as soil or sand that is removed from one location and used as

fill material in another location.

borrow pits: An excavated area from which earthy material has been removed, typically for

construction purposes.

bound: To estimate or describe a lower or upper limit on a potential environmental or health

consequence when uncertainty exists.

bounding: In the case of accident analysis, that which represents the maximum reasonably

foreseeable event or impact.

breach: A general term referring to a hole in a cylinder or container. A breach may be caused

by corrosion or by mechanical forces.

bryozoa: Bryozoa are microscopic aquatic animals that live in large colonies of interconnected

individuals. Bryozoa are abundant in modern marine environments and are also an important

part of the fossil record. They are commonly referred to as sea mats, moss animals, or lace

corals.

calcareous sand: Sand containing calcium carbonate, calcium, or limestone; it is usually white

or tan.

cancer: A group of diseases characterized by uncontrolled cellular growth. Increased

incidence of cancer can be caused by exposure to radiation and some chemicals.

candidate species: Species for which substantial information is available to support proposing

that they be added to the federal threatened and endangered species list.

CANDU (Canadian deuterium-uranium reactor): A heavy-water reactor that uses natural

uranium as a fuel and heavy water as a moderator and a coolant.

canister: A container (generally stainless steel) into which immobilized radioactive waste is

placed and sealed.

canopy: The upper forest layer of leaves consisting of the tops of individual trees whose

branches sometimes cross each other.

canyon building: A term for a chemical separations plant, inspired by the building’s long, high,

narrow structure. Chemical separation is a process for extracting uranium and plutonium from

dissolved spent nuclear fuel and irradiated targets.

capable fault: A fault is described as capable if it has had movement at or near the ground

surface at least once within the past 35,000 years, or recurrent movement within the past

500,000 years. 
Glossary

7-6

capping: The process of installing a layer of clay or other impermeable material over the top of

a closed landfill to prevent entry of rainwater and to minimize the escape of chemicals into the

surrounding soil.

carbonate: Rocks and associated minerals that contain carbonate ion, as in calcium carbonate.

carbon monoxide (CO): A colorless, odorless gas that is toxic if breathed in high

concentrations over an extended period. Carbon monoxide is a criteria air pollutant. One

source of carbon monoxide is engine exhaust.

carcinogen: A substance that is capable of producing or inducing cancer.

cargo-related impacts: Transportation risks associated with the nature of the cargo itself.

Carolina bays: Closed, elliptical-shaped depressions capable of holding water. They are a

type of wetland.

cask (for radioactive materials): A heavily shielded container that meets all applicable

regulatory requirements for shipping spent nuclear fuel or high-level waste.

Category I Resources: Resources (for example, waters) defined by the U.S. Department of

the Interior as unique and irreplaceable on a national or eco-regional basis.

Cenozoic: A geologic era dating from approximately 65 million years ago to the present. It is

known as the age of mammals.

census blocks: Census blocks are defined by the U.S. Bureau of Census and are the smallest

geographic unit for which the Census Bureau tabulates data. Blocks contain data from the

2000 Census of Population, including total population, population by race and ethnicity, age,

marital status, population density and the number and composition of households, and

information on housing unit types. Many blocks correspond to individual city blocks bounded by

streets, but blocks – especially in rural areas – may include many square miles and may have

some boundaries that are not streets. The Census Bureau established blocks covering the

entire nation for the first time in 1990. Over 8 million blocks are identified for Census 2000.

census block groups: Census block groups are geographic entities consisting of groups of

individual census blocks. Census blocks are grouped together so that they contain between

250 and 550 housing units.

census tract: An area usually containing between 2,500 and 8,000 persons that is used for

organizing and monitoring census data. The geographic dimensions of census tracts vary

widely, depending on population density. Census tracts do not cross county borders.

clay: A rock or mineral fragment of any composition that is smaller than very fine silt grains,

having a diameter of less than 0.00016 in. (1/256 mm).
Glossary

7-7

Class II water source: Current and potential drinking water, as classified by the EPA.

Clean Air Act: A federal law that mandates and provides for the enforcement of air pollution

control standards from various sources. Its purpose is to protect the health and welfare of the

public by controlling air pollution.

closed canopy: A forest canopy that is dense enough that the tree crowns fill or nearly fill the

canopy layer so that light cannot reach the forest floor directly.

cloudshine: The exposure pathway of direct external exposure from radioactive material

suspended in air.

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR): A publication in codified form of all federal regulations in

force.

collective dose: The sum of individual doses received by all those exposed to a specified

source of radiation in a given period of time. (Also referred to as population dose.)

collective population risk: A measure of possible loss or injury in a group of people that

takes into account the probability that the hazard will cause harm and the consequences of that

event. The collective population risk does not express the risk to specific individual members of

the population.

committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE): The sum of the committed dose equivalents to

various tissues of the body, each multiplied by its weighting factor. It does not include

contributions from external doses. Committed effective dose equivalent is expressed in units of

rem and provides an estimate of the lifetime radiation dose to an individual from radioactive

material taken into the body through either inhalation or ingestion.

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of

1980 (Superfund): An act providing the regulatory framework for the remediation of past

contamination from hazardous waste. If a site meets the act’s requirements for designation, it

is ranked along with other Superfund sites on the National Priorities List. This ranking is the

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s way of determining the priority of sites for cleanup.

conservative estimates: Conservative estimates lean on the side of pessimism and toward

maximizing estimates of negative impacts.

consortium: A group (of companies) formed to undertake an enterprise beyond the resources

of any one member.

contact-handled transuranic waste: Transuranic waste with a surface radiation dose rate not

greater than 200 millirems per hour. It can be safely handled without any shielding other than

that provided by the waste container itself.

conversion: An operation for changing material from one form, use, or purpose to another.
Glossary

7-8

cooling water: Water circulated through a nuclear reactor or processing plant to remove heat.

cosmic radiation: Streams of highly penetrating, charged particles composed of protons,

alpha particles, and a few heavier nuclei that bombard the earth from outer space. Cosmic

radiation is part of the natural background radiation.

cost-benefit analysis: A formal quantitative procedure comparing costs and benefits of a

proposed project or act under a set of preestablished rules.

Council on Environmental Quality: The President’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)

was established by the enactment of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The CEQ is

responsible for developing regulations to be followed by all federal agencies in developing and

implementing their own specific NEPA implementation policies and procedures. 

criteria pollutants: Common air pollutants for which National Ambient Air Quality Standards

have been established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under Title I of the

Clean Air Act. Criteria pollutants include sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide,

ozone, particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5), and lead. Standards for these pollutants were

developed on the basis of scientific knowledge about their health effects.

critical habitat: Specific areas within the geographical range of an endangered species that is

formally designated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act as

essential for conservation of the species. 

criticality: A state in which a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction is achieved.

cultural resources: Archaeological sites, architectural structures or features, traditional-use

areas, and Native American scared sites or special use areas.

cumulative impacts: Potential impacts when the proposed action is added to other past,

present, and reasonable foreseeable future actions. Cumulative impacts can result from

individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.

curie (Ci): The unit used to describe the intensity of radioactivity in a sample of material. A

curie is equal to 37 billion disintegrations per second, which is approximately the activity of one

gram of radium. It is also a quantity of any nuclide or mixture of nuclides having one curie of

radioactivity. 

D&D (deactivation and decommissioning): The removal of the facility safely from service

and reduction of residual radioactivity to a level that permits release of the property to a

specified end state.

deactivation: The process of removing a facility from operation and placing it in a safe and

stable condition. Deactivation involves removal hazardous and radioactive materials. 
Glossary

7-9

decibel (dB): A standard unit for measuring sound-pressure levels based on a reference

sound pressure of 0.0002 dyne per square centimeter. This is the smallest sound a human can

hear. In general, a sound doubles in loudness with every increase of slightly more than

3 decibels.

decibel, A-weighted (dBA): A measurement of sound approximating the sensitivity of the

human ear and used to characterize the intensity or loudness of sound.

decommissioning: The process of decontaminating and dismantling a facility following

deactivation and returning the site to an end state that meets the prescribed regulatory criteria. 

deep dose equivalent (DDE): The dose equivalent derived from external radiation at a depth

of 1 cm in tissue.

deionized water: Water from which both negative and positive ions have been removed by an

ion exchange process. 

Department of Energy (DOE): A federal agency whose mission is to achieve efficiency in

energy use, diversity in energy sources, a more productive and competitive economy, improved

environmental quality, and a secure national defense. It was created in 1977.

depleted uranium: Uranium whose content of the isotope uranium-235 is less than 0.7%,

which is the uranium-235 content of naturally occurring uranium.

depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6): A compound of uranium and fluorine from which most

of the uranium-235 isotope has been removed. 

dermal absorption: Entry of a substance into the body through the skin. 

design basis accident: For nuclear facilities, an assumed abnormal event used to establish

the performance requirements of structures, systems, and components that are necessary to

keep the facility in a safe shutdown condition indefinitely, or to prevent or mitigate the

consequences of such an event, so as to ensure that the public and operating staff are not

exposed to radiation in excess of appropriate guideline values.

detention ponds: Engineered depressions in the land that contain storm-water runoff until it

can slowly seep back into the ground or evaporate.

direct impact: An effect that results solely from the construction or operation of a proposed

action without intermediate steps or processes. Examples include habitat destruction, soil

disturbance, air emissions, and water use.

direct jobs: The number of workers required at a site to implement an alternative.
Glossary

7-10

disposition: A process of use or disposal of materials that results in the remaining material

being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation resistant than

the original form.

disproportionately high and adverse environmental impact: An adverse environmental

impact determined to be unacceptable or above generally accepted norms. A

disproportionately high impact refers to an environmental hazard with a risk or rate of exposure

for a low-income or minority population that exceeds the risk or rate of exposure for the general

population.

disproportionately high and adverse human health effect: Any effect on human health from

exposure to environmental hazards that exceeds generally accepted levels of risk and affects

low-income and minority populations at a rate that appreciably exceeds the rate for the general

population.

dissolution: The chemical dispersal (dissolving) of a solid throughout a liquid medium.

dose (radiation dose): In a general sense, dose is a measure of the amount of energy from

ionizing radiation deposited in a material. Dose is affected by the type of radiation, the amount

of radiation, and the physical properties of the material itself. Radiation dose to humans is

measured in units of sieverts (Sv) or rem (1 Sv = 100 rem).

drainage basin: An aboveground area of the Earth’s surface that supplies the water to a

particular stream.

ecology: The study of the interrelationships of organisms and their environment.

ecosystem: A group of organisms and their physical environment.

effective dose equivalent: The sum of the products of the dose equivalent to various organs

or tissues and the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are

irradiated. This sum is a risk-equivalent value that can be used to estimate the risk of health

effects to the exposed individual. The effective dose equivalent includes the dose from radiation

sources internal and/or external to the body and is expressed in units of rem or sievert. 

effluent: A gas or fluid discharged into the environment, treated or untreated. Most frequently,

the term applies to wastes discharged to surface waters.

emissions: Substances that are discharged into the air.

endangered species: Any species (plant or animal) that is in danger of extinction throughout

all or a significant part of its range. Requirements for declaring a species endangered are found

in the Endangered Species Act.

Endangered Species Act of 1973: An act requiring federal agencies, with the consultation

and assistance of the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce, to ensure that their actions will
Glossary

7-11

not likely jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species or

adversely affect the habitat of such species.

environmental impact statement (EIS): A document required of federal agencies by the

National Environmental Policy Act for major proposals or legislation that will or could

significantly affect the environment. It describes the positive and negative effects of the

proposed and alternative actions.

environmental justice: The fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, incomes, and

educational levels with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of

environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment implies that no population of

people should be forced to bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental impacts

of pollution or environmental hazards due to a lack of political or economic strength.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): A federal agency that is responsible for setting, or

working with state and local governments, to set standards that help control and prevent

pollution and minimize the potential health effects in areas of solid and hazardous waste,

pesticides, water, air, drinking water, and toxic and radioactive substances. It was created in

1970.

Eocene: A geologic epoch early in the Cenozoic era, dating from approximately 56 to

34 million years ago.

epicenter: The point on the Earth’s surface directly above the focus of an earthquake.

equivalent dose: The equivalent dose is a measure of the effect that radiation has on

humans. It takes into account the type of radiation and the absorbed dose. Not all types of

radiation produce the same effects. For example, when considering beta, x-ray, and gamma

ray radiation, the equivalent dose (in rem) is equal to the absorbed dose (in rads). For alpha

radiation, the equivalent dose is assumed to be 20 times the absorbed dose.

erosion: The removal and transport of materials by wind, ice, or water on the Earth’s surface.

exposure: Contact of an organism with a chemical, radiological, or physical agent.

exposure pathways: A route or sequence of processes by which a radioactive or hazardous

material may move through the environment to humans or other organisms. Each exposure

pathway includes a source or release from a source, an exposure point, and an exposure route.

external exposure: Exposure to radiation or hazardous substance that originates from

sources outside of the body.

facility: Any building, structure, system, process, equipment, or activity that fulfills a specific

purpose on a site.
Glossary

7-12

facility workers: Persons working at the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility who are directly

involved with the handling of radioactive or hazardous materials.

fault (geologic): A fracture in rock along which movement of one side relative to the other has

occurred.

fauna: Animals, especially those of a specific region, considered as a group.

Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992: A federal law that amended the Resource

Conservation Recovery Act with the objectives of bringing all federal facilities into compliance

with applicable federal and state hazardous waste laws, waiving federal sovereign immunity

under those laws, and allowing the imposition of fines and penalties. The law requires the

U.S. Department of Energy to submit an inventory of all its mixed waste and to develop a

treatment plan for mixed waste.

FIREPLUME: A computer code used to evaluate atmospheric dispersion of contaminants in an

airborne release plume.

fissile nuclear material: Nuclear materials that are fissionable by slow (thermal) neutrons. 

Fissile materials include uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium-239.

fission: The splitting of a heavy atomic nucleus into at least two nuclei of lighter elements,

accompanied by the release of energy and generally one or more neutrons. Fission can occur

spontaneously or be induced by neutron bombardment.

 

floodplain: The lowlands adjoining inland and coastal waters and relatively flat areas,

including, at a minimum, that area inundated by a 1% or greater-chance flood in any given year. 

The level area adjoining a river or stream that is sometimes covered by flood water. The base

floodplain is defined as the 100-year (1%) floodplain.

flora: Plants, especially those of a specific region, considered as a group.

fly-ash: Small solid ash particles from the noncombustible portion of fuel that are small enough

to escape with the exhaust gases.

forb: An herb other than grass.

fossil: An impression or trace of an animal or plant of past geologic ages that has been

preserved in the Earth’s crust.

fossil fuel: Natural gas, petroleum, coal, and any form of solid, liquid, or gaseous fuel derived

from such materials for the purpose of creating useful heat.
Glossary

7-13

Fujita Scale: The official classification system for tornado damage. The scale ranges from F0

(gale tornado, minor damage, winds up to 72 mph) to F6 (inconceivable tornado, winds

319-379 mph). F2 on the Fujita scale indicates a significant tornado causing significant

damage.

fugitive dust: The dust released into the air from activities associated with construction,

manufacturing, or vehicles operating on open fields or dirt roads. It is a subset of fugitive

emissions.

fugitive emissions: Emissions that are not caught by a capture system. They are often

caused by equipment leaks, evaporative processes, and windblown disturbances. 

full-time equivalent (FTE): Equivalent to a full-time worker. For example, two people, each

working half time, constitute one FTE.

gamma radiation ( ): High-energy, short-wavelength electromagnetic radiation emitted from a

radioactive nucleus during decay. Gamma radiation frequently accompanies alpha and beta

emissions and always accompanies fission. Gamma rays are very penetrating and are best

stopped or shielded by dense materials such as lead or uranium. Gamma rays are similar to

X-rays but are more energetic.

Gaussian model: An air dispersion model based on the assumption that the time-averaged

concentration of a substance emitted from a point source has a Gaussian distribution about the

mean centerline. A Gaussian distribution is represented by a symmetrical bell-shaped curve.

glauconitic sand: Sand that contains the mineral glauconite, which consists of a dull green

earthy iron potassium silicate.

GENII: A computer software code used to evaluate dose from the migration of radionuclides

introduced into the environment that may eventually affect humans through ingestion,

inhalation, or direct radiation.

geologic repository: An underground facility intended for the disposal of nuclear waste. The

waste is isolated by placing it in mined cavities in a continuous, stable geologic formation at

depths typically greater than 300 m (984 ft).

geology: The science that deals with the study of the materials, processes, environments, and

history of the Earth, including the rocks and their formation and structure.

glovebox: An airtight box used to work with hazardous material. It is vented to a closed

filtering system, and has gloves attached inside to protect the worker.

gravitational acceleration (g): An acceleration equal to the Earth’s gravitational acceleration

at sea level (32 feet /second/second).
Glossary

7-14

gross alpha: The total (or gross) radioactivity in a sample due to emission amount of alpha

particles. It includes both naturally occurring and man-made radiation.

groundshine: Radiation from ground-deposited radionuclides.

groundwater: The supply of water found beneath the Earth’s surface, usually in aquifers,

which may supply wells and springs. Generally, all water contained in the ground.

grout: A cementing or sealing mixture of cement and water to which sand, sawdust, or other

additives (sometimes waste) may be added. In terms of waste management practices, grouting

is used to reduce the mobility of a waste material. In-situ grout is used to stabilize

contaminated soil without having to remove it.

habitat: Area where a plant or animal lives.

half-life (radiological): The time in which half the atoms of a radioactive substance decay to

another nuclear form. It varies for different radioisotopes from millionths of a second to billions

of years.

hazard Index (HI): A measure of the noncancer risk involved in human exposure to a chemical

substance. It is the sum of the hazard quotients for all chemicals to which an individual is

exposed. A Hazard Index value of 1.0 or less means that no adverse human health effects

(noncancer) are expected to occur.

hazard quotient (HQ): A comparison of the estimated intake level or dose of a chemical in air,

water, or soil with its reference dose; expressed as a ratio. 

hazardous waste: According to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, a waste that

because of its characteristics may (1) cause or significantly contribute to an increase in

mortality or an increase in serious irreversible illness, or (2) pose a substantial hazard to human

health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or

otherwise managed. Hazardous wastes possess at least one of the following characteristics:

ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity. Hazardous waste is nonradioactive.

headwaters: The source of a flowing body of water.

health risk conversion factors: Estimates of the expected number of health effects cause by

exposure to a given amount of radiation. Health risk conversion factors are multiplied by the

estimated radiation dose received by a given population in order to estimate the number of

health effects expected to occur as a result of an exposure.

heavy combination trucks: Rigs composed of a separable tractor unit containing the engine

and one to three freight trailers connected to each other and the tractor. They are typically used

for shipping radioactive wastes.

herpetofauna: Reptiles and amphibians.
Glossary

7-15

HGSYSTEM: A computer code used to assess hazardous chemical impacts.

high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters: A filter designed to remove 99.97% of particles

as small as 0.3 micrometers in diameter from a flowing air stream.

high-level (radioactive) waste (HLW): The highly radioactive waste material that results from

the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing

and any solid waste derived from the liquid. High-level waste contains a combination of

transuranic waste and fission products in concentrations requiring permanent isolation. Highlevel waste may include other highly radioactive material that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, consistent with existing law, determines by rule requires permanent isolation.

highly enriched uranium: Uranium enriched in the isotope uranium-235 to 20% or above,

which thus becomes suitable for nuclear weapons use.

HIGHWAY: A transportation routing model. 

historic structures: A standing structure that has historic significance.

human health risk: The likelihood that a given exposure or series of exposures will damage

the health of individuals.

hydrazine: A highly reactive and corrosive chemical that is a carcinogen and a reproductive

hazard. It is the only chemical that would be used in the MOX process that is listed as a

hazardous air pollutant under the Clean Air Act.

hydrogen fluoride: A colorless, toxic, fuming, corrosive liquid or gas. It is produced when

uranium hexafluoride (UF6) comes in contact with water, such as humidity in the air. It is often a

by-product when UF6 is converted to another chemical form.

hydrology: The study of water, including groundwater, surface water, and rainfall.

ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection): An international body tasked

with providing an overview of radiation standards and regulations and information to help

standardize these regulations.

immobilization: A process used to stabilize waste, thus inhibiting its release into the

environment.

impoundment: A natural or artificial body of water confined by a dam, dike, floodgate, or other

barrier.

in attainment: In compliance with air quality standards. Areas that are in attainment have air

quality that is as good as or better than specified in the National Ambient Air Quality Standards

for a given pollutant. An area may be in attainment for one pollutant and nonattaining for others.
Glossary

7-16

incremental impact: The impact due to an emission source (or group of sources) in isolation,

without including background levels.

indirect impact: An effect that is related to, but removed from a proposed action by an

intermediate step or process. An example would be surface-water quality changes resulting

from soil erosion at construction sites.

indirect jobs: Jobs generated or lost in related industries within a regional economic area as a

result of a change in direct employment.

infrastructure: The basic facilities, services, and utilities needed for the functions of an

industrial facility or site. Transportation and electrical systems are part of the infrastructure.

ingestion: To take in by mouth. Material that is ingested enters the digestive system.

inhalation: To take in by breathing. Material that is inhaled enters the lungs.

in-migration: People moving into an area, in this case, the region of influence.

in situ: In its natural position or place.

internal exposure: The radiation dose to internal organs and tissues of the body from the

ingestion or inhalation of radioactive contaminants in air, water, food, or soil.

invertebrates: Animals without a backbone (insects, for example).

ion: An atom that has too many or too few electrons, causing it to have an electrical charge,

and therefore to be chemically active.

ion exchange: A process that removes specific chemicals and radionuclides from a liquid

stream (usually water) for the purposes of purification or decontamination. In this process, salts

present as charged ions in water are attached to active groups on and in an ion exchange resin,

and other ions are discharged into water allowing separation of the two groups of ions.

ionizing radiation: Radiation that has enough energy to remove electrons from atoms,

causing them to become charged or ionized. 

irradiate: Expose to some form of radiation, usually a nuclear reactor. Irradiated reactor

components and fuel are subjected to neutron radiation and become radioactive themselves or

produce isotopes.

ISCST3: Version 3 of the Short-Term Industrial Source Complex model. It was used to

estimate potential air quality impacts from MOX facility construction and operation activities.

isotope: An atom of an element with a specific atomic number and atomic mass. Isotopes of

the same element have the same number of protons (atomic number) but different numbers of
Glossary

7-17

neutrons (atomic mass). For example, uranium-235 is an isotope of uranium with 93 protons

and 143 neutrons; uranium-238 is an isotope of uranium with 92 protons and 146 neutrons.

kaolinitic clay: A fine, usually white clay that contains the mineral kaolinite, a hydrous silicate

of aluminum.

Ldn: A 24-hour average sound level that gives additional weight to noise that occurs during the

night (10:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.).

Leq: For sounds that vary with time, Leq is the steady sound level that would contain the same

total sound energy as the time-varying sound over a given period.

Leq(24): Leq averaged over 24 hours.

Land Disposal Restrictions: Part of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments to RCRA. 

They restrict land disposal of certain hazardous wastes; these wastes may be land disposed

only if they meet specified treatment standards.

land use: A characterization of land surface in terms of its potential utility for various activities.

latent: Occurring some time (usually several years) after exposure.

latent cancer fatalities (LCFs): Deaths resulting from cancer that has become active after a

latent period following exposure to a cancer-causing agent. Latent cancer fatalities are similar

to naturally occurring cancer and may be expressed at any time after the initial exposure.

latent cancers: Cancers that occur after a latency period of about 10 or more years from the

time of exposure.

latency period: The average period of time between exposure to an agent and the onset of a

health effect.

latent fatalities (latent mortality): Fatalities that result from acute or chronic environmental

exposures to hazardous substances or radiation but that do not occur immediately after

exposure. 

lead: A gray-white metal that is listed as a criteria air pollutant. Health effects from exposure to

lead include brain and kidney damage and learning disabilities.

linear/no threshold hypothesis: A hypothesis that implies, in part, that even small doses of

radiation cause some risk of inducing cancer, and doubling of the radiation dose would mean

doubling of the expected number of cancers. 

listed species: Species that are considered threatened or endangered.

loam: A soil consisting of an easily crumbled mixture of clay, silt, and sand.
Glossary

7-18

low-enriched uranium (LEU): Uranium enriched in the isotope uranium-235, greater than

0.7% but less than 20% of the total mass. Naturally occurring uranium contains about 0.7%

uranium-235, almost all the rest is uranium-238.

low-level (radioactive) waste: Waste that contains radioactivity and is not classified as highlevel waste, transuranic waste, or spent nuclear fuel.

low-specific-activity (LSA) drum: A container, such as a 55-gallon drum, that is used to

package low-specific-activity material. The depleted uranium considered in this EIS is lowspecific-activity material.

macroinvertebrates: Small animals, such as larval aquatic insects, that are visible to the

naked eye and have no vertebral column.

magnitude: A measure of the total energy released by an earthquake. It is commonly

measured in numerical units on the Richter scale. Each unit is different from an adjacent unit

by a factor of 30.

marsh: An area of low-lying wetlands dominated by grasslike plants.

maximally exposed individual: A hypothetical person who — because of proximity, activities,

or living habits — could receive the highest possible dose of radiation or of a hazardous

chemical from a given event or process.

meteorology: The science dealing with the atmosphere and its phenomena, especially as

relating to weather.

metric ton: A unit of mass equal to approximately 1.1 short (U.S.) tons, or 2,200 pounds.

millirem (mrem): A unit of radiation exposure equal to one-thousandths of a rem.

Miocene: A geologic epoch of the Cenozoic era dating from approximately 24 to 5 million

years ago.

mitigation: A series of actions implemented to ensure that projected impacts will result in no

net loss of habitat value or wildlife populations. The purpose of mitigative actions is to avoid,

minimize, rectify, or compensate for any adverse environmental impact.

mixed low-level (radioactive) waste: Low-level waste that also contains hazardous chemical

components regulated under the Resource Conservation Recover Act.

mixed oxide: For the purposes of this EIS, a physical blend of uranium oxide and plutonium

oxide.

mixed transuranic waste: Transuranic waste that also contains hazardous chemical

components regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
Glossary

7-19

mixed waste: Waste that contains both hazardous and radioactive components.

model: A conceptual, mathematical, or physical system obeying certain specified conditions,

whose behavior is used to understand the physical system it is attempting to mimic. Models are

often used to predict the behavior or outcome of future events.

moderator: A material (usually water, heavy water, or graphite) used in some nuclear reactors

to slow down high-velocity neutrons, thereby increasing the likelihood of fission. Moderation

controls are a factor in mitigating criticality accidents.

Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale: A measure of the perceived intensity of earthquake ground

shaking, originally developed in Italy nearly a century ago. It includes 12 degrees of shaking

from I (not felt by people) to XII (nearly total damage). 

molar concentration: The amount of a substance dissolved per unit volume of solution.

National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS): Air quality standards established by the

Clean Air Act, as amended. The primary NAAQS are intended to protect the public health with

an adequate margin of safety; and the secondary NAAQS are intended to protect the public

welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects of a pollutant. 

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs): A set of national

emission standards for listed hazardous pollutants emitted from specific classes or categories

of new and existing sources. These standards were implemented in the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1977.

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969: A federal law constituting the basic

national charter for protection of the environment. The act calls for the preparation of an

environmental impact statement (EIS) for every major federal action that may significantly affect

the quality of the human or natural environment. The main purpose is to ensure that

environmental information is provided to decision makers so that their actions are based on an

understanding of the potential environmental and socioeconomic consequences of a proposed

action and the reasonable alternatives.

National Historic Preservation Act: A federal law providing that property resources with

significant national historic value be placed on the National Register of Historic Places. It does

not require permits; rather, it mandates consultation with the proper agencies whenever it is

determined that a proposed action might impact a historic property.

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): A federal permitting system

controlling the discharge of effluents to surface waters of the United States and regulated

through the Clean Water Act, as amended. 

National Register of Historic Places (NRHP): A list of districts, sites, buildings, structures,

and objects of prehistoric or historic local, state, or national significance. The list is maintained

by the Secretary of the Interior.
Glossary

7-20

nitrogen oxides (NOx): The oxides of nitrogen, primarily nitrogen oxide (NO) and nitrogen

dioxide (NO2), that are produced in the combustion of fossil fuels. Nitrogen dioxide emissions

constitute an air pollution problem, because they contribute to acid deposition and the formation

of atmospheric ozone. Nitrogen oxides are criteria air pollutants.

noise: Any sound that is undesirable because it interferes with speech and hearing, is intense

enough to damage hearing, or is otherwise annoying (unwanted sound).

Noise Control Act of 1972: A federal law directing all federal agencies to carry out programs

in a manner that furthers the national policy of promoting an environment free from noise that

jeopardizes health or welfare.

nonattainment area: The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s designation for an air

quality control region (or portion thereof) in which ambient air concentrations of one or more

criteria pollutants exceed National Ambient Air Quality Standards.

normal operations: Conditions during which facilities and processes operate as expected or

designed. In general, normal operations include the occurrence of some infrequent events that,

although not considered routine, are not classified as accidents.

Notice of Intent: A notice that an environmental impact statement will be prepared and

considered. It describes the proposed action and provides information on issues and potential

impacts and invites comments and suggestions on the scope of the environmental impact

statement.

nuclear power plant: A facility that converts nuclear energy into electric power. Heat

produced in a nuclear reactor is used to make steam, which drives a turbine connected to an

electric generator.

nuclear reactor: A machine in which a fission chain reaction is maintained for the purpose of

irradiating materials or producing heat for the generation of electricity.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): The NRC is an independent regulatory agency

created out of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1975 to regulate civilian uses of nuclear

material. It is responsible for ensuring that activities associated with the operation of nuclear

power and fuel cycle plants and the use of radioactive materials in medical, industrial, and

research applications are carried out with adequate protection of public health and safety, the

environment, and national security.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982: The act that authorized federal agencies to develop a

geologic repository for the permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive

waste.

off-link population: Persons living or working within 0.8 km (0.5 mi) of each side of a

transportation route.
Glossary

7-21

Oligocene: A geologic epoch of the Cenozoic era dating from approximately 34 to 24 million

years ago.

on-link population: Persons sharing a transportation route.

order of magnitude: A range of numbers extending from some value to 10 times that value. 

If, for example, a number is two orders of magnitude greater than another, it is 100 times

greater. 

organic compounds: A large group of chemical compounds containing mainly carbon,

hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen. All living organisms are made up of organic compounds. 

outfall: The discharge point of a drain, sewer, or pipe into a body of water.

oxide: A compound formed when an element (for example, plutonium) is bonded to oxygen.

ozone: A strong-smelling, reactive toxic chemical gas consisting of three oxygen atoms

chemically attached to each other. It is the product of the photochemical process involving the

sun’s energy and ozone precursors, such as hydrocarbons and oxides of nitrogen. In the

stratosphere, ozone protects the Earth from the sun’s ultraviolet rays, but in lower levels of the

atmosphere, ozone is considered an air pollutant and can cause irritation of the eyes and

respiratory tract. Ozone is one of the criteria air pollutants specified under Title I of the Clean

Air Act and is a major constituent of smog.

PM10: Particulate matter with a diameter less than 10 m (0.0004 in.). Particles less than this

diameter are small enough to be breathed and could be deposited in the lungs. PM10 is one of

the six criteria air pollutants specified under Title I of the Clean Air Act.

PM2.5: Particulate matter with a diameter less than 2.5 m (0.0001 in.). A standard for this

material as a criteria pollutant has been defined but not yet implemented.

Paleocene: The earliest epoch in the Cenozoic era, dating from approximately 65 to 56 million

years ago.

paleontology: The study of plant and animal life that existed in former geologic times,

particularly through the analysis of fossils.

Paleozoic: The longest era of geologic time, dating from approximately 544 to 248 million

years ago. Seed-bearing plants, amphibians, and reptiles first appeared in the Paleozoic era.

parameters: Data or values that are input to computer codes or equations. They are

quantifiable or measurable characteristics like wind speed, temperature, pH, vehicular speed,

duration of exposure, etc.
Glossary

7-22

particulate matter (PM): Fine liquid or solid particles such as dust, smoke, mist, fumes, or

smog, found in air or emissions. The size of the particulates is measured in micrometers (); a

micrometer is 1 millionth of a meter (0.000039 in.). Particle size is important because the

Environmental Protection Agency has set standards for PM10 and PM2.5 designed to protect

human health and welfare. Particulate matter is a criteria pollutant.

particulates: Solid particles and liquid droplets small enough to become airborne.

Pascal (Pa): A unit of measurement for pressure in the International System of Units (SI). 

1 pascal = 0.0001450 pounds per square inch.

Pasquill atmosphere stability class: A classification scheme that describes the degree of

atmospheric turbulence. Categories range from extremely unstable (A) to extremely stable (F). 

Unstable conditions promote the rapid dispersion of atmospheric contaminants and result in

lower contaminant air concentrations compared with stable conditions.

permitted outfalls: Outfalls that are regulated by permits.

person-rem: A unit used to measure the radiation exposure to an entire group and to compare

the effects of different amounts of radiation on groups of people; it is the product of the average

dose equivalent (in rem) to a given organ or tissue multiplied by the number of persons in the

population of interest.

person-sievert: A unit of radiation exposure. One person-sievert is equivalent to 100 personrem.

person-year: The sum of the number of years each person in a study population is at risk; a

metric used to aggregate the total population at risk, assuming that 10 people at risk for 1 year

is equivalent to 1 person at risk for 10 years.

physiographic province: A region in which the landforms are similar in geologic structure and

differ significantly from the landform patterns in adjacent regions.

physiographic regions: Geographic regions based on geologic setting.

pit: The core element of a nuclear weapon’s fission component.

plasma arc cutting: Plasma arc cutting uses a high-velocity jet of electrically charged gas to

cut metal at temperatures up to 50,000F.

plume: The elongated pattern of contaminated air or water originating at a point source such

as a smoke stack or a hazardous waste disposal area.

plutonium: A heavy, radioactive, metallic element with the atomic number 94. It is produced

artificially in a reactor by the bombardment of uranium with neutrons and is used in the

production of nuclear weapons. Weapons-usable plutonium consists mainly of plutonium-239.
Glossary

7-23

point source: A source of effluents that is small enough in dimensions that it can be treated as

if it were a point. A point source can be either a continuous source or a source that emits

effluents only in puffs for a short time.

pollutant: Any material entering the environment that has undesired effects.

pollution: The addition of an undesirable agent to the environment in excess of the rate at

which natural processes can degrade, assimilate, or disperse it.

pollution prevention: The use of any process, practice, or product that reduces or eliminates

the generation and release of pollutants, hazardous substances, contaminants, and wastes,

including those that protect natural resources through conservation or more efficient utilization.

polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs): Organic compounds that include only carbon and

hydrogen with a fused ring structure containing at least two benzene (six-sided) rings. Some

PAHs are potent human carcinogens. The combustion of organic substances is a common

source of atmospheric PAHs.

Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD): A program used in development of permits

for new or modified industrial facilities in an area that is already in attainment. The intent is to

prevent an attainment area from becoming a non-attainment area. Allowable increases are

lowest in Class I areas (national parks and wilderness areas); the rest of the country is subject

to PSD II increments.

Price Anderson Act: First enacted into law in 1957, it limits the liability of the nuclear power

industry in the event of an accident.

primary contact recreations: Activities such as swimming and diving where there is direct

contact with the water. 

prime farmland: Land with the best combination of physical and chemical characteristics for

economically producing high yields of food, feed, forage, fiber, and oilseed crops with minimum

inputs of fuel, fertilizer, pesticides, and labor. Prime farmland includes cropland, pastureland,

rangeland, and forestland.

probable maximum flood: Flood levels predicted for hydrological conditions that maximize

the flow of surface waters.

proliferation: The spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities and the weapons

(e.g., missiles) capable of delivering them.

proprietary income: Income from self-employment.

protected species: Species that are protected by federal legislation, such as the Endangered

Species Act or the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
Glossary

7-24

radiation: Energy radiated in the form of waves or particles through matter and space. 

Radiation comes from radioactive material or from equipment such as X-ray machines. 

Radiation may be either ionizing radiation or non-ionizing radiation.

radiation dose: See dose.

radioactive waste: Materials that are radioactive or are contaminated with radioactive

materials and for which use, reuse, or recovery are impractical.

radioactivity: The spontaneous decay or disintegration of unstable atomic nuclei,

accompanied by the emission of radiation. Eventually the unstable nuclei reach a stable state.

radionuclide: An atom that exhibits radioactive properties. Standard practice for naming a

radionuclide is to use the name or atomic symbol of the element, followed by its atomic weight. 

(For example, cobalt-60 [Co-60], a radionuclide of cobalt with an atomic weight of 60.) 

Radionuclides can be man-made or naturally occurring, can have a long life, and can have

potentially mutagenic or carcinogenic effects on the human body.

RADTRAN 4: A computer code that calculates population risks associated with the transport of

radioactive materials by truck, rail, air, ship, or barge. 

raffinate: The decontaminated salt solution produced by removal of radionuclides from a highlevel waste solution.

raptors: Birds of prey (for example, hawks, owls, eagles).

reference dose: The chemical intake level below which noncancer adverse effects are very

unlikely. It is measured in units of milligrams per kilogram of body weight per day (mg/kg/d).

regional economic area (REA): A geographic area consisting of an economic node and the

surrounding, economically related counties, including the places of work and residences of the

labor force. The REA for this EIS is made up of the 15 counties surrounding the Savannah

River Site.

region of influence (ROI): The physical area that bounds the environmental, sociological,

economic, or cultural features of interest for the purpose of analysis. A site-specific geographic

area that includes the counties where approximately 90% of the site’s current employees

reside. The ROI for this EIS consists of Columbia and Richmond Counties in Georgia and Aiken

and Barnwell Counties in South Carolina.

release fraction: The portion, or fraction, of a material that could be released or spilled to the

environment during an accident. 

rem (roentgen equivalent man): A unit used to derive a quantity called absorbed dose. The

dosage of an ionizing radiation that will cause the same biological effect as one roentgen of

X-ray or gamma-ray exposure; 100 rem is equivalent to one sievert.
Glossary

7-25

remediation: Action taken to permanently remedy a release, or threatened release, of a

hazardous or radioactive substance to the environment, instead of or in addition to removal.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA): A federal law that provides for a “cradleto-grave” regulatory program for hazardous waste, including a system for managing hazardous

waste from its generation to its ultimate disposal.

Resource Management Class: Four classifications of use to describe different degrees of

modification of the landscape. Class I are areas where the natural landscape is preserved,

including national wilderness area and wild sections of national wild and scenic rivers; Class II

are areas with very limited land development activity, resulting in visual contrasts that are seen

but do not attract attention; Class III are areas in which development may attract attention, but

the natural landscape still dominates; Class IV are areas in which development activities lead

to major modification of the existing character of the landscape.

respirable: Able to be inhaled into the lungs.

Richter Scale: A logarithmic scale used to express the total amount of energy released by an

earthquake. The scale has 10 divisions, from 1 (not felt by humans) to 10 (nearly total

destruction).

risk: The likelihood of suffering a detrimental effect as a result of exposure to a hazard. In

accident analysis, a quantitative or qualitative expression of possible loss that takes into

account both the probability that an event will cause harm and the consequences of that event.

Record of Decision (ROD): A document separate from but associated with an environmental

impact statement that publicly and officially discloses the responsible agency’s decision on the

EIS alternative to be implemented.

roentgen: A unit of exposure to ionizing X- or gamma radiation equal to or producing one

electrostatic unit of charge per cubic centimeter of air. It is approximately equal to one rad.

runoff: The portion of rainfall, melted snow, or irrigation water that flows across the ground

surface and eventually enters streams.

Safe Drinking Water Act: A federal law protecting the quality of public water supplies, water

supply and distribution systems, and all sources of drinking water.

Safety Evaluation Report (SER): The SER is an NRC document, associated with a proposed

action, that focuses on health and safety issues and compliance with NRC regulations. There

are two SERs associated with the MOX facility: one for the construction authorization and

another for the operating license application.

sanitary waste: Nonhazardous, nonradioactive liquid and solid waste generated by normal

housekeeping activities.
Glossary

7-26

saltstone: A cement-like solid waste form that is a blend of cement, fly-ash, and slag used to

immobilize low-radioactivity salt solutions.

savanna: A grassland with widely scattered trees and shrubs.

scoping: The process of inviting public comment on what should be considered prior to

preparation of an environmental impact statement. Scoping assists the preparers of an EIS in

defining the proposed action, identifying alternatives, and developing preliminary issues to be

addressed in an EIS.

scrub-shrub: Woody vegetation that is less than 20 feet tall, including true shrubs, young

trees, and trees or shrubs that are small or stunted because of environmental conditions.

secondary contact recreations: Activities having some direct contact with water, but where

swallowing of the water is not likely to occur. An example is fishing.

sedges: Perennial nonwoody plants common to most fresh water wetlands. They resemble

grasses.

sediment: Eroded soil particles that are deposited downhill or downstream by surface runoff.

seismic: Pertaining to any earth vibration, especially that of an earthquake.

seismic zone: An area defined by the Uniform Building Code (1991) on the basis of its

susceptibility to damage as the result of earthquakes. The United States is divided into six

zones: Zone 0, no damage; Zone 1, minor damage; Zone 2A (Eastern United States), moderate

damage; Zone 2B (Western United States), slightly more damage that 2A; Zone 3, major

damage; and Zone 4, areas within Zone 3 nearer certain major fault systems.

seismology: The study of earthquakes.

shielding: Any material that is placed between a source of radiation and people, equipment, or

other objects in order to absorb the radiation and reduce radiation exposure. 

sievert (Sv): A unit of radiation dose used to express a quantity called equivalent dose. This

relates the absorbed dose in human tissue to the effective biological damage of the radiation by

taking into account the kind of radiation received, the total amount absorbed by the body, and

the tissues involved. Not all radiation has the same biological effect, even for the same amount

of absorbed dose. One sievert is equivalent to 100 rem.

silt: A sedimentary material consisting of fine mineral particles intermediate in size between

sand and clay. 

siltation: The process by which a river, lake, or other water body becomes clogged with

sediment. The process of covering or obstructing with silt.
Glossary

7-27

sinter: To form a homogenous mass by heating without melting.

slag: A glass-like material left as a residue by the smelting of metallic ore.

slope factor: An upper bound estimate of a chemical’s probability of causing cancer, based on

extent of intake and given in units of inverse intake (1/mg/Kg-d).

source term: The estimated quantities of radionuclides or chemical pollutants released to the

environment from a source or group of sources.

special nuclear material: As defined in Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act, “ (1) plutonium,

uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the

NRC determines to be special nuclear material, or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of

the foregoing.”

species of concern: A native species that is not listed as endangered or threatened but that

has experienced a long-term decline in population or is vulnerable to a significant decline due to

low numbers, restricted distribution, dependence on limited habitat resources, or sensitivity to

environmental disturbance.

specific activity: The radioactivity of the radionuclide per unit mass of the nuclide. The

specific activity of a material in which the radionuclide is essentially uniformly distributed is the

radioactivity per unit mass of the material.

specific conductance: Specific conductance is the electrical conductivity of water normalized

to a temperature of 25C. It is a good measure of the concentration of total dissolved solids

and salinity in water.

spent (nuclear) fuel: Fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation

and whose constituents have not been separated. Spent fuel has been burned (irradiated) in a

reactor to the extent that it no longer makes an efficient contribution to a nuclear chain reaction. 

This fuel is more radioactive than it was before irradiation.

SRS employees: Persons working at the Savannah River Site but not directly involved with the

handling of radioactive or hazardous materials at the MOX facility.

stability class: Stability class describes the potential of atmospheric conditions to disperse

pollutants. A relatively stable atmosphere contains very little turbulence so that pollutant

concentrations remain high. Unstable atmospheric conditions promote vertical mixing and, thus,

lower pollutant concentrations. The original Pasquill Stability Classifications consisted of six

classes; A, the most unstable, through F, the most stable.

State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO): The state officer charged with the identification

and protection of prehistoric and historic resources in accordance with the National Historic

Preservation Act.
Glossary

7-28

subsidence: The process of sinking or settling of a land surface due to natural or artificial

causes.

sulfur dioxide (SO2): A compound of sulfur produced by the burning of sulfur-containing

compounds and considered to be a major air pollutant. Sulfur dioxide is a criteria pollutant.

surface water: Water on the Earth’s surface that is directly exposed to the atmosphere, as

distinguished from water in the ground (groundwater). 

temporary emergency exposure limits (TEELs): The TEEL-1 concentration for a chemical is

the maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be

exposed without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a

clearly defined objectionable odor. The TEEL-2 value is the maximum concentration in air below

which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without

experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could

impair their abilities to take protective action. The TEEL-3 value is the maximum concentration

in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour

without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.

terrestrial: Pertaining to plants or animals living on land rather than in the water.

threatened species: Any species that is likely to become an endangered species within the

foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range. Requirements for declaring

a species threatened are contained in the Endangered Species Act.

threshold non-linear relationship: In a threshold nonlinear relationship, some low level of

exposure to a harmful substance can be tolerated without causing a health effect. (See also

linear/no threshold hypothesis.)

throughput: A general term that refers to the amount of material handled or processed by a

facility in a specified time period.

topography: The shape of the earth’s surface. The relative position and elevations of natural

and man-made features of an area.

total effective dose equivalent (TEDE): The sum of the effective dose equivalent (EDE) from

exposure to external radiation and the 50-year committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE)

from exposure to internal radiation.

total suspended particulates (TSP): Particles of solid or liquid matter — such as soot, dust,

aerosols, fumes, and mist — up to approximately 30 m in size, that can be suspended in the

air. National, South Carolina, and Georgia Ambient Air Quality Standards all set the annual

primary (health-based) TSP level at 75 g/m3 .
Glossary

7-29

toxicity: The ability of a substance to cause damage to cells or tissues of living organisms

when the substance is inhaled, ingested, or absorbed by the skin.

Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA): A federal law authorizing the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency to secure information on all new and existing chemical substances and to

control any of these substances determined to cause unreasonable risk to public health or the

environment. This law requires that the health and environmental effects of all new chemicals

be reviewed by the EPA before such chemicals are manufactured for commercial purposes.

traditional cultural properties: Places and resources important to traditional American

cultures, which include, but are not restricted to, Native American cultures.

TRAGIS (Transportation Routing Analysis Geographic Information System): A GIS-based

transportation and analysis computer model for rail, highway, and waterway transportation

modes.

transport index: The radiation dose rate at 1 meter (approximately 3 feet) from the lateral

sides of a vehicle transporting radioactive material.

transuranic: Of, relating to, or being any element whose atomic number is higher than that of

uranium (that is, 92). All transuranic elements are radioactive.

transuranic (TRU) waste: Radioactive waste that contains more than 100 nanocuries per

gram of alpha-emitting isotopes with atomic numbers greater than 92 and half-lives greater than

20 years. Such wastes result primarily from fuel reprocessing and from the fabrication of

plutonium weapons and plutonium-bearing reactor fuel.

Triassic: The first period of the Mesozoic era, dating from approximately 246 to 213 million

years ago.

trichloroethylene (TCE): An organic solvent and degreaser.

tritium: A radioactive isotope of the element hydrogen, having two neutrons and one proton. It

can be taken into the body easily because it is chemically identical to natural hydrogen. Tritium

decays by beta emission with a half-life of about 12.5 years.

Type A package: A type of packaging for radioactive materials. The package must withstand

the conditions of normal transportation without loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents. It

does not usually require special handling or transportation equipment.

Type B package: A more durable type of packaging for radioactive materials than Type A. In

addition to meeting all the Type A standards, Type B packaging must also provide a high

degree of assurance that the package integrity will be maintained, even during severe

accidents, with essentially no loss of the radioactive contents.
Glossary

7-30

unscarified seed: Seed that has not had the hard outer coat scuffed or otherwise treated to

improve germination.

Upper Cretaceous: A geologic time period from about 90 to 66 million years ago. The entire

Cretaceous period dates from approximately 144 million to 66 million years ago; it is known as

the age of dinosaurs. 

uranium: A heavy, silvery-white metallic element (atomic number 92) with many radioactive

isotopes. One isotope, uranium-235, is most commonly used as a fuel for nuclear fission. 

Another, uranium-238, is transformed into fissionable plutonium-239 following its capture of a

neutron in a nuclear reactor.

uranium dioxide (UO2): A black crystalline powder that is widely used in the manufacture of

fuel pellets for nuclear reactors. 

valence: The number of electrons with which a given atom generally bonds, or the number of

bonds an atom forms.

vehicle-related impacts: Transportation risks (physical trauma or emissions) that are related

to the transportation vehicle itself, not the cargo it is carrying. 

viewshed: The extent of the area that may be viewed from a particular location. Viewsheds

are generally bounded by topographic features such as hills or mountains.

Visual Resource Management (VRM): A process devised by the Bureau of Land

Management to assess the aesthetic quality of a landscape and to design proposed activities in

a way that would minimize their visual impact on that landscape. The process consists of a

rating of site visual quality followed by a measurement of the degree of contrast between the

proposed development activities and the existing landscape.

vitrification: A process by which glass is used to encapsulate or immobilize radioactive

wastes.

volatile organic compounds (VOCs): A broad range of organic compounds, that readily

evaporate and vaporize at normal temperatures and pressures. Examples include certain

solvents, paint thinners, degreasers (benzene), chloroform, and methyl alcohol. VOCs can

react with other substances, principally nitrogen oxides, to form ozone. The reactions are

energized by sunlight.

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): A national disposal site for transuranic and mixed

transuranic waste, located in southeastern New Mexico.

waste management: The planning, coordination, and direction of functions related to

generation, handling, treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal of waste. It also includes

associated pollution prevention and surveillance and maintenance activities.
Glossary

7-31

waste minimization: An action that economically avoids or reduces the generation of waste

by source reduction and recycling; or reduces the toxicity of hazardous waste, improving energy

usage.

waste stream: A waste or group of wastes with similar physical form, radiological properties,

EPA waste codes, or associated Land Disposal Restriction treatment standards. A waste

stream may result from one or more processes or operations. Also, a waste or group of wastes

from a process or a facility with similar physical, chemical, or radiological properties.

wastewater: Water originating from human sanitary water use (domestic wastewater) and

from a variety of industrial processes (industrial wastewater).

watershed area: All land and water within the confines of a drainage basin.

weapons-grade: Plutonium or highly enriched uranium, in metallic form, that was

manufactured for weapons application. Weapons-grade plutonium contains less that 7%

plutonium 240.

wetland: Land areas exhibiting hydric (moist) soil conditions, saturated or inundated soil during

some portion of the year, and plant species tolerant of such conditions. Wetlands include

swamps, marshes, and bogs.

Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: The federal law that established the National Wild and Scenic

Rivers System. It was designed to preserve and protect the free-flowing condition of selected

rivers having outstanding natural, cultural, or recreational features. For federally owned land

within the boundaries of rivers in the system, certain activities that would have a direct and

adverse effect on the river values may be controlled.

wind rose: A circular diagram showing, for a specific location, the percentage of time the wind

blows from each compass direction over a specified period of record. A wind rose for use in

assessing consequences of airborne releases also shows the frequency of different wind

speeds for each compass direction. 
Glossary

7-32

 
8-1

8 LIST OF PREPARERS

J. Adducci — Maps and Figures; B.A. History and Geography, University of Illinois at Chicago;

7 years experience in geographic information system (GIS) applications.

T. Allison — Environmental Justice, Socioeconomics, Aesthetics, Cost-Benefit Analysis;

M.S. Mineral and Energy Resource Economics, M.A. Geography, West Virginia University;

B.A. Economics and Geography, Portsmouth Polytechnic (Great Britain); 15 years experience

in environmental assessment.

G. Anast — Scoping Summary Report, Glossary; B.A. Biology and Mathematics, North Central

College; 12 years experience in environmental assessment.

H. Avci — Project Manager; Description of MOX Facility; Ph.D., Nuclear Engineering, M.S.

Nuclear Engineering, B.S. Nuclear Engineering, University of Wisconsin; 15 years experience in

environmental assessment.

B. Biwer — Human Health Assessment, Radiological Risk, Transportation Risk Analysis; Ph.D.

Chemistry, M.S. Chemistry, Princeton University, B.A. Chemistry, St. Anselm College; 12 years

experience in environmental assessment.

M.D. Blevins — NRC Project Manager; M.S. Environmental Systems Engineering, Clemson

University; B.S. Chemistry, West Virginia University; 9 years experience in environmental

assessment.

D. Brown — NRC Technical Integration, Radiological Risk Assessment; M.S. Health Physics,

Clemson University, B.S. Physics, Muhlenberg College; 7 years experience in environmental

assessment.

Y.-S. Chang — Meteorology, Emissions, Air Quality, Noise; Ph.D. Chemical Engineering, M.S.

Chemical Engineering, University of Iowa, B.S. Chemical Engineering, Seoul National

University; 15 years experience in environmental assessment.

S.Y. Chen — Decommissioning; Ph.D. Nuclear Engineering, M.S. Nuclear Engineering,

University of Illinois, B.S. Nuclear Engineering, Tsing Hua University; 20 years experience in

environmental assessment.

B.J. Davis — NRC Project Manager; M.S. Materials Engineering, University of Maryland,

B.S. Materials Engineering, Virginia Tech; 2 years experience in environmental assessment.

J.D. DePue — Technical Editing, Document Coordination; M.S. Biology, B.A. Political Science,

Texas A&I University; 29 years experience in technical and environmental assessment

document editing. 

Appendix A

A-1

APPENDIX A:

PROTECTED SPECIES
Appendix A

A-2
Appendix A

A-3

APPENDIX A:

PROTECTED SPECIES

Sixty-one threatened, endangered, and other special status species listed by the federal

government or the State of South Carolina may be found in the vicinity of the Savannah River

Site (SRS). Protected species listed by the state for Aiken and Barnwell Counties (within which

most of the SRS is located) and by Georgia for the reach of the Savannah River bordering the

SRS and for Burke County across the river from the SRS are listed in Table A.1. Table A.1

also lists the status and habitat preferences for the protected species. Species from Allendale

County, South Carolina, and Screven County, Georgia, are not considered because of the

distance of these counties from the F-Area. No designated critical habitat for threatened or

endangered species exists on the SRS (DOE 1996).

The SRS has established a proactive threatened and endangered species program that

includes habitat restoration. In particular, special efforts have been enacted since 1986 to

reestablish and expand the population of the federally and state-endangered red-cockaded

woodpecker (Picoides borealis) at the SRS. The SRS has been divided into three natural

resource habitat management areas: (1) a 34,858-ha (86,069-acre) red-cockaded woodpecker

habitat management area, (2) a 19,508-ha (48,167-acre) supplemental red-cockaded

woodpecker habitat management area, and (3) other-use areas totaling 25,965 ha

(64,111 acres) (DOE 2000). Within the red-cockaded woodpecker habitat management area,

harvest rotation for loblolly and longleaf pine is set at 100 and 200 years, respectively. These

long rotation periods are designed to increase the number of potential cavity nesting trees. 

Rotation for pines within the supplemental red-cockaded woodpecker habitat management and

other-use areas is set at 50 years to encourage woodpecker recovery within the designated

red-cockaded woodpecker habitat management area. The bottomland hardwood, upland

hardwood, and mixed pine/hardwood timber management areas that do not provide redcockaded woodpecker habitat are managed on 100-year rotations (DOE 2000). No redcockaded woodpecker management is practiced within the other-use area (Edwards et al.

1999).

A combination of methods has been used to improve the red-cockaded woodpecker population

at the SRS. These methods have included removing southern flying squirrels from redcockaded woodpecker nesting cavities, excavating new nesting cavities, thinning hardwood

midstory trees, and augmenting the number of female red-cockaded woodpeckers at the SRS. 

The excavation of cavities has allowed nesting use in younger tree stands several decades

before the birds would be able to do this on their own (Allen 1990a,b). The annual conversion

of slash and loblolly pine areas to longleaf pine also provides a long-term benefit to redcockaded woodpeckers and other wildlife species associated with the longleaf pine savanna

ecosystem (DOE 2000).

The endangered status of the red-cockaded woodpecker is primarily related to the loss of

mature pine forests in the southeastern states from logging and fire suppression; only about 1%
Appendix A

A-4

of the species’ historical habitat remains (WSRC 1994; FWS 2001a). They prefer longleaf and

loblolly pines that are more than 70 years old, often selecting those trees with red-heart

disease, which softens the core of the tree. They forage in pine trees over 30 years old (WSRC

1994; USAF 1996). The woodpeckers also prefer areas with minimal midstory trees, so as to

lessen potential competition (e.g., from other woodpecker species) and predation (e.g., black

rat snakes) (FWS 2001a). Other species either compete for or use abandoned red-cockaded

woodpecker cavity holes, including southern flying squirrels, chickadees, bluebirds, titmice,

herpetofauna (amphibians and reptiles) and insects (particularly bees and wasps) (FWS

2001b).

The red-cockaded woodpecker is a social species, living in a family group that inhabits a

collection of cavity trees called a cluster. Each bird in the group maintains its own cavity tree,

but only one pair in the group actually nests. A cluster may include from 1 up to 20 or more

cavity trees on 1.2 to 24.3 ha (3 to 60 acres), averaging about 4.0 ha (10 acres). Territory size

is related to both habitat suitability and population density. The typical territory for a family

group ranges from about 50.6 to 81.0 ha (125 to 200 acres), but reported extremes are as low

as 24.3 ha (60 acres) and as high as 243 ha (600 acres) (FWS 2001a,b).

The SRS contains two subpopulations of the red-cockaded woodpecker. Currently 26 active

clusters with almost 150 individual birds occur on the SRS. In 1985, only four birds were

reported from the SRS (DOE 2000). The closest nesting area to the proposed facility site is

about 5 km (3.1 mi) away (DOE 1999). The proposed area for the facility does not occur within

either the red-cockaded woodpecker habitat management area or the supplemental

management area. However, all areas containing pines, including those at the proposed site,

provide suitable forage areas for this species.

Table A.1. Rare, threatened, and endangered species from Aiken and Barnwell 

Counties, South Carolina, and Burke County, Georgia

Species

common name

(scientific name)

Status,

federal/statea,b

County

locationsc Habitat

Plants

Aethusa-like trepocarpus

(Trepocarpus aethusae)

–/SC A Bottomland hardwoods

American eelgrass

(Vallisneria americana)

–/SC Ba Ponds and streams, mostly in the

sandhills

American nailwort

(Paronychia americana)

–/SC A, Ba Sandhills, dry pinelands

Awnpetal meadowbeauty

(Rhexia aristosa)

–/SC Ba Wet depressions, Carolina bays,

savannas, pinelands

Bearded milkvetch

(Astragalus villosus)

–/SC A, Ba Pinelands, disturbed sites
Appendix A

A-5

Table A.1. Continued

Species

common name

(scientific name)

Status,

federal/statea,b

County

locationsc Habitat

Biennial beeblossum

(Gaura biennis)

–/SC A, Ba Streambanks, meadows,

roadsides

Bog spicebush

(Lindera subcoriacea)

–/RC A, Ba Evergreen-shrub bogs, acidic

swamp forests, and seepage

bogs

Boykin’s lobelia

(Lobelia boykinii)

–/SC Ba Cypress ponds, wet pinelands,

Carolina bays

Canada moonseed

(Menispermum canadense)

–/SC Ba Moist woods and thickets

Candby’s cowbane

(Oxypolis canbyi)

E/E, E Ba, Bu Peaty muck of shallow cypress

ponds, wet pine savannas, and

adjacent sloughs and drainage

ditches

Candy’s bulrush

(Scirpus etuberculatus)

–/SC A Swamps and quiet or flowing

shallow water

Carolina birds-in-a-nest

(Macbridea caroliniana)

–/SC A, Ba Freshwater margins

Carolina bugbane

(Trautvetteria caroliniensis)

–/SC Ba Woods, especially in damp or wet

soils

Carolina larkspur

(Delphinium carolinianum)

–/SC A Dry woods, prairies, and sandhills

Carolina wild petunia

(Ruellia caroliniensis spp. ciliosa)

–/SC A Moist or dry woods

Collins’ sedge

(Carex collinsii)

–/SC A Bogs, especially white cedar

swamps

Creeping St. johnswort

(Hypericum adpressum)

–/RC Ba Marshes, shores, and wet

meadows

Cypressknee sedge

(Carex decomposita)

–/SC Ba Wooded swamps

Drowned hornedrush

(Rhynchospora inundata)

–/SC A, Ba Inundated pond margins and wet

peat

Durand’s white oak

(Quercus sinuata)

–/SC Ba Wooded slopes, edges of streams

Dwarf burhead

(Echinodorus parvulus)

–/SC A, Ba Carolina bays

Eared goldenrod

(Solidago auriculata)

–/SC A Fields, roadsides, open woods
Appendix A

A-6

Table A.1. Continued

Species

common name

(scientific name)

Status,

federal/statea,b

County

locationsc Habitat

Eastern leatherwood

(Dirca palustris)

–/SC A Rich, moist woods

Eastern wahoo

(Euonymus atropurpurea)

–/SC A Woodlands and thickets, usually

on moist, rich soils

Elliott’s croton

(Croton elliottii)

–/SC A, Ba Carolina bays

Faded trillium

(Trillium discolor)

–/SC A Moist woods

False rue anemone

(Enemion biternatum)

–/RC A Moist woods

Flax leaf false-foxglove

(Agalinis linifolia)

–/RC A Wet, sandy soils

Florida bladderwort

(Utricularia floridana)

–/SC Ba Shallow ponds, often within

Carolina bays

Georgia beargrass

(Nolina georgiana)

–/SC A, Ba Sandhills

Georgia plume

(Elliottia racemosa)

–/T Bu Sand ridges, dry oak ridges,

evergreen hammocks, sandstone

outcrops

Green fringed orchid

(Platanthera lacera)

–/SC A, Ba Carolina bays, bottomland

hardwoods

Ground juniper

(Juniperus communis)

–/SC A Dry, rocky, or otherwise poor soils

Hooded pitcher plant

(Sarracenia minor)

–/U Bu Acidic soils of open bog, wet

savannas, pond margins, low

areas in pine flatwoods,

sphagnum seeps of bottomland

forests, sloughs and ditches

Lance-leaf wild-indigo

(Baptisia lanceolata)

–/SC Ba Pine forests, open woods

Least trillium

(Trillium pusillum var pusillum)

–/NC A Alluvial or low woods, savannas

Leechbrush

(Nestronia umbellula)

–/SC, T A, Ba, Bu Dry, open, upland forests of

mixed hardwood and pines

Long sedge

(Carex folliculata)

–/SC A Wet or swampy woods
Appendix A

A-7

Table A.1. Continued

Species

common name

(scientific name)

Status,

federal/statea,b

County

locationsc Habitat

Loose watermilfoil

(Myriophyllum laxum)

–/RC A, Ba Sinkhole ponds and other

shallow, freshwater ponds; and

sandy, clear streams draining

spring-fed swamps

Lowland brittle fern

(Cystopteris protrusa)

–/SC A Moist woods

Muhlenberg maidencane

(Amphicarpum

muehlenbergianum)

–/SC Ba Pastures, pinelands, moist

margins of woods, disturbed sites

Narrow-leaved trillium

(Trillium lancifolium)

–/NC A Moist woods

Nutmeg hickory

(Carya myristiciformis)

–/RC Ba Bottomland hardwoods

Pickering’s morning-glory

(Stylisma pickeringii var

pickeringii)

–/SC A Scrub habitats with scant litter

accumulation, sparse ground

cover, and little canopy cover

(scrubby oaks and pines)

Piedmont azalea

(Rhododendron flammeum)

–/SC A, Ba Upland hardwood bluffs

Piedmont bladderwort

(Utricularia olivacea)

–/SC Ba Shallow, acidic ponds

Piedmont cucumber tree

(Magnolia cordata)

–/SC A Rich woods

Piedmont mock bishopweed

(Ptilimnium nodosum)

E/E A, Ba Wet savannas and peaty fringes

of pineland pools and cypress

ponds

Piedmont three-awned grass

(Aristida condensata)

–/SC A Sand pine scrub, sandhills,

disturbed sites

Pine-leaved golden aster

(Pityopsis pinifolia)

–/SC A Barrens, sandy soils

Pink ladyslipper

(Cypripedium acaule)

–/U Bu Acid soils of pine woodlands,

upland hardwoods with pines

Pyramid magnolia

(Magnolia pyramidata)

–/RC A Low, moist situations

Red standing-cypress

(Ipomopsis rubra)

–/SC A, Ba Pastures, roadsides

Relict trillium

(Trillium reliquum)

E/E A Rich moist woods on bluffs and

ravine slopes
Appendix A

A-8

Table A.1. Continued

Species

common name

(scientific name)

Status,

federal/statea,b

County

locationsc Habitat

Reticulated nutrush

(Scleria reticularis)

–/SC Ba Damp, sandy soils and pine

barrens

Robbins’ spikerush

(Eleocharis robbinsii)

–/SC A, Ba Mud or shallow water

Rose coreopsis

(Coreopsis rosea)

–/RC A Wet, often sandy or acid soils, or

in shallow water

Sandhill rosemary

(Ceratiola ericoides)

–/T Bu Very dry, openly vegetated, scruboak sandhills

Sandhills milkvetch

(Astragalus michauxii)

–/SC Ba Sandhills, open sandy woods

Sarvis holly

(Ilex amelanchier)

–/SC A Woody streambanks in sandhills,

wet depressions, Carolina bays

Scarlet beebalm

(Monarda didyma)

–/SC Ba Moist woods and thickets

Shoals spiderlily

(Hymenocallis coronaria)

–/NC A Major streams and rivers in rocky

shoals and in cracks of exposed

bedrock

Shortleaf sneezeweed

(Helenium brevifolium)

–/RC Ba Swampy or boggy places and

moist pine woods

Shortleaf yelloweyed grass

(Xyris brevifolia)

–/SC A Pine flatwoods, pond margins

Silky camellia

(Stewartia malacodendron)

–/R Bu Rich, wooded bluffs and ravine

slopes, transitional areas between

sandhills and creek swamps

Slender arrowhead

(Sagittaria isoetiformis)

–/SC A, Ba Carolina bays

Small-flowered buckeye

(Aesculus parviflora)

–/RC A Upland hardwood bluffs

Small-flowered silverbell-tree

(Halesia parviflora)

–/SC A, Ba Dry, sandy, upland sites

Smooth coneflower

(Echinacea laevigata)

E/E A, Ba Meadows and open woodlands on

basic or near neutral soils

Southeastern sneezeweed

(Helenium pinnatifidium)

–/SC Ba Wet pinelands

Spatulate seedbox

(Ludwigia spathulata)

–/SC A, Ba Wet depressions, pond margins,

Carolina bays

Stalkless yellowcress

(Rorippa sessiliflora)

–/SC A Bottomland hardwoods
Appendix A

A-9

Table A.1. Continued

Species

common name

(scientific name)

Status,

federal/statea,b

County

locationsc Habitat

Striped garlic

(Allium cuthbertii)

–/SC A, Ba Sandhills, marshes

Sweet pitcher plant

(Sarracenia rubra)

–/SC, E A, Bu Acidic soils in open bogs, sandhill

seeps, wet savannas, low areas

in pine flatwoods, along sloughs

and ditches

Three-angle spikerush

(Eleocharis tricostata)

–/SC Ba Pine barren ponds

Tracy beakrush

(Rhynchospora tracyi)

–/SC Ba Carolina bays

Upland swamp-privet

(Forestiera ligustrina)

–/SC A Sandy or rocky soils

Water toothleaf

(Stillingia aquatica)

–/SC Ba Grass-sedge wet depressions,

bogs

White wicky

(Kalmia cuneata)

–/NC A Borders of Carolina bays and

bogs; between sandhills and

upland swamps

Winter grape fern

(Botrychium lunarioides)

–/SC A Open fields, meadows, sandy or

gravelly streambanks

Yellow pipewort

(Syngonanthus flavidulus)

–/RC A Wet pinelands, pond margins

Invertebrates

Arogos skipper

(Atrytone arogos)

–/SC A Open fields, meadows, prairies

Barrel floater

(Anodonta couperiana)

–/SC Ba Streams, rivers

Carolina slabshell

(Elliptio congaraea)

T/E Ba Streams, rivers

Eastern creekshell

(Villosa delumbis)

–/SC Ba Streams, rivers

Eastern floater

(Pyganodon cataracta)

–/SC Ba Streams, rivers

Paper pondshell

(Utterbackia imbecillis)

–/SC Ba Streams, rivers

Rayed pink fatmucket

(Lampsilis splendida)

–/SC Ba Streams, rivers
Appendix A

A-10

Table A.1. Continued

Species

common name

(scientific name)

Status,

federal/statea,b

County

locationsc Habitat

Southern rainbow

(Villosa vibex)

–/SC Ba Streams, rivers

Yellow lampmussel

(Lampsilis cariosa)

–/SC Ba Streams, rivers

Fish

Robust redhorse

(Moxostoma robustum)

–/E Bu Mainstream river habitats (e.g.,

Augusta Shoals of Savannah

River)

Shortnose sturgeon

(Acipenser brevirostrum)

E/E, E A, Bu Spawns in large coastal rivers;

remainder of year spent in lower

reaches or river estuary

Amphibians and Reptiles

American alligator

(Alligator mississippiensis)

T(S/A)/– A, Ba Savannah River Swamp, Par

Pond, Beaver Dam Creek, and

other streams

Bird-voiced treefrog

(Hyla avivoca)

–/SC A, Ba Wooded swamps along creeks

and larger waterways

Black swamp snake

(Seminatrix pygaea)

–/SC A Cypress ponds

Eastern coral snake

(Micrurus fulvius)

–/SC A Well-drained pine woods; open,

dry, or sandy areas; pond and

lake borders; and hammocks

Eastern tiger salamander

(Ambystoma tigrinum tigrinum)

–/SC A Savannah River Swamp and

Carolina bays

Florida green water snake

(Nerodia floridana)

–/SC A Swamps, marshes, and quiet

bodies of water

Gopher frog

(Rana capito)

–/SC A, Ba Gopher tortoise burrows during

daylight hours

Gopher tortoise

(Gopherus polyphemus)

–/E, T A, Bu Sandy soil and abundant

herbaceous vegetation (e.g.,

longleaf pine savannas); often

forced to inhabit roadsides and

old fields

Pine (or gopher) snake

(Pituophis melanoleucus)

–/SC A Flat, sandy pine barrens,

sandhills, and dry mountain

ridges, usually in or near pine

woods
Appendix A

A-11

Table A.1. Continued

Species

common name

(scientific name)

Status,

federal/statea,b

County

locationsc Habitat

Southern hognose snake

(Heterodon simus)

–/SC A Sandy woods, fields, and groves,

dry river floodplains, and

hardwood hammocks

Spotted turtle

(Clemmys guttata)

–/SC, U A, Ba, Bu Heavily vegetated, shallow

wetlands with standing or slowly

flowing water

Birds

Bachman’s sparrow

(Aimophila aestivalis)

–/R Bu Mature open pine woods,

regenerating clearcuts, old

pastures with dense ground cover

of grasses and forbs, palmetto

scrub

Bald eagle

(Haliaeetus leucocephalus)

T/E A Active nests in Pen Branch area

and area south of Par Pond

Little blue heron

(Egretta caerulea)

–/SC A Freshwater ponds, lakes, and

marshes; coastal saltwater

wetlands

Red-cockaded woodpecker

(Picoides borealis)

E/E, E A, Ba, Bu Nests in mature pine forests

(particularly longleaf); forages in

pine forests

Wood stork

(Mycteria americana)

E/E, E Ba, Bu Variety of freshwater and

estuarine wetlands for breeding,

feeding, and nesting; nests in

trees in standing water or on

islands 

Mammals

Black bear

(Ursus americanus)

–/SC A Forests and swamps

Eastern fox squirrel

(Sciurus niger)

–/SC A, Ba Pine forests with interspersed

clearings

Eastern woodrat

(Neotoma floridana)

–/SC A, Ba Hummocks, swamps, and

cabbage palmetto

Hoary bat

(Lasiurus cinereus)

–/SC A Wooded areas

Rafinesque’s big-eared bat

(Corynorhinus rafinesquii)

–/E A Roosts in or near mature forests

with water nearby; forage among

canopies of large trees
Appendix A

A-12

Table A.1. Continued

Species

common name

(scientific name)

Status,

federal/statea,b

County

locationsc Habitat

Spotted skunk

(Spilogale putorius)

–/SC A Brushy or sparsely wooded areas,

along streams, among boulders,

prairies

Star-nosed mole

(Condylura cristata)

–/SC A, Ba Low, wet ground near lakes and

streams

a

E = endangered; T = threatened; T(S/A) = threatened (similarity of appearance); NC = of concern,

national (unofficial, plants only); R = rare; RC = of concern, regional (unofficial, plants only);

SC = species of concern; U = unusual; – = not listed.

b

For species listed from both South Carolina and Georgia counties, the status for South Carolina is

provided first.

c

A = Aiken County, South Carolina; Ba = Barnwell County, South Carolina; Bu = Burke County,

Georgia.

Sources: Burt and Grossenheider (1976); Conant (1958); DCS (2002); DOE (1991); Fernald

(1989); Flora of North America Editorial Committee (1997); Gleason and Cronquist (1991); Harrar and

Harrar (1962); Knox and Sharitz (1990); National Geographic Society (1999); Ozier et al. (1999);

Patrick et al. (1995); Petrides (1988); SCDNR (2001a,b); USDA (2001); Workman and McLeod (1990);

Wunderlin (1982).

References for Appendix A

Allen, D.H. 1990a. Establishment of a Viable Population of Red-Cockaded Woodpeckers at the

Savannah River Site, Annual Report FY 1990. U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River

Site, Aiken, SC, and USDA Forest Service, Southeastern Forest Experiment Station,

Clemson, SC. Aug. 31.

Allen, D.H. 1990b. Letter from Allen (USDA Forest Service, Southeastern Forest Experiment

Station, Clemson, SC) to P. Jackson (DOE Savannah River Operations Office,

Environmental Division, Aiken, SC). Aug. 30.

Burt, W.H., and R.P. Grossenheider 1976. A Field Guide to the Mammals. 3rd Edition. 

Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA.

Conant, R. 1958. A Field Guide to Reptiles and Amphibians of the United States and Canada

East of the 100th Meridian. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA.

DCS (Duke Cogema Stone & Webster) 2002. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

Environmental Report, Revision 1 & 2. Docket No. 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 1991. Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Siting,

Construction, and Operation of New Production Reactor Capacity. DOE/EIS-0144D. Office

of New Production Reactors, Washington, DC. April.

DOE 1996. Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement. DOE/EIS-0229. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,

Washington, DC. Dec.
Appendix A

A-13

DOE 1999. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement. 

DOE/EIS-0283. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington DC. Nov.

DOE 2000. Savannah River Site Long Range Comprehensive Plan. Savannah River Site,

Aiken, SC. Dec.

Edwards, J.W., et al. 1999. Savannah River Site Red-Cockaded Woodpecker Management

Plan. U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service, Savannah River Natural Resource

Management and Research Institute, Aiken, SC. Feb.

Fernald, M.L. 1989. Gray’s Manual of Botany. Dioscorides Press, Portland, OR.

Flora of North America Editorial Committee 1997. Flora of North America North of Mexico. 

Volume 3. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.

FWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) 2001a. The Red-Cockaded Woodpecker at

Carolina Sandhills NWR. U.S. Department of the Interior. Available at 

http://carolinasandhills.fws.gov/rcw.html.

FWS 2001b. Red-Cockaded Woodpecker. U.S. Department of the Interior. Available at

http://rcwrecovery.fws.gov/rcw.htm.

Gleason, H.A., and A. Cronquist 1991. Manual of Vascular Plants of Northeastern United

States and Adjacent Canada. The New York Botanical Garden, Bronx, NY.

Harrar, E.S., and J.G. Harrar 1962. Guide to Southern Trees. Dover Publications, Inc.,

New York, NY.

Knox, J.N., and R.R. Sharitz 1990. Endangered, Threatened, and Rare Vascular Flora of the

Savannah River Site. Savannah River Site, National Environmental Research Park

Program, Aiken, SC.

National Geographic Society 1999. Field Guide to the Birds of North America. 3rd Edition. 

Washington, DC.

Ozier, J.C., et al. (proj. coords.) 1999. Protected Animals of Georgia. Georgia Department of

Natural Resources, Wildlife Resources Division, Nongame Wildlife-Natural Heritage

Section, Social Circle, GA.

Patrick, T.S., et al. 1995. Protected Plants of Georgia. Georgia Department of Natural

Resources, Wildlife Resources Division and Georgia Natural Heritage Program, Social

Circle, GA.

Petrides, G.A. 1988. A Field Guide to Eastern Trees Eastern United States and Canada. 

Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, MA.

SCDNR (South Carolina Department of Natural Resources) 2001a. South Carolina Rare,

Threatened & Endangered Species Inventory. Species Found in Aiken County. South

Carolina Department of Natural Resources, Wildlife and Freshwater Fisheries Division,

Columbia, SC. Available at http://www.dnr.state.sc.us/heritage/owa/county_species.

list?pcounty=aiken.

SCDNR 2001b. South Carolina Rare, Threatened & Endangered Species Inventory. Species

Found in Barnwell County. South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, Wildlife and

Freshwater Fisheries Division, Columbia, SC. Available at http://www.dnr.state.sc.us/

heritage/owa/county_species.list?pcounty=barnwell.

USAF (U.S. Air Force) 1996. The Red-Cockaded Woodpecker. Air Force Materiel Command,

Air Force Development Test Center, Office of Public Affairs, Eglin AFB, FL. Available at

http://www.eglin.af.mil/46tw/46xp/46xpe/fact/images/wpecker.pdf.
Appendix A

A-14

USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture) 2001. The PLANTS Database, Version 3.1. Natural

Resources Conservation Service, National Plant Data Center, Baton Rouge, LA. Available

at http://plants.usda.gov.

Workman, S.W., and K.W. McLeod 1990. Vegetation of the Savannah River: Major Community

Types. SRO-NERP-19. Savannah River Site, National Environmental Research Park

Program, Aiken, SC. April.

WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company) 1994. “SRS Ecology Environmental

Information Database.” CD database prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy by

Westinghouse Savannah River Company under Contract No. DE-AC09-89SR18035. 

May 5.

Wunderlin, R.P. 1982. Guide to the Vascular Plants of Central Florida. University Press of

Florida, Tampa, FL.
Appendix B

1 The following letters have been reproduced from the best available copies.

B-1

APPENDIX B:

LETTERS OF CONSULTATION1
Appendix B

B-2
Appendix B

B-3
Appendix B

B-4
Appendix B

B-5
Appendix B

B-6
Appendix B

B-7
Appendix B

B-8
Appendix B

B-9
Appendix B

B-10
Appendix B

B-11
Appendix B

B-12
Appendix B

B-13
Appendix B

B-14
Appendix B

B-15
Appendix B

B-16
Appendix B

B-17
Appendix B

B-18

Enclosures to letter from Abrams not included.
Appendix B

B-19
Appendix B

B-20
Appendix B

B-21
Appendix B

B-22
Appendix B

B-23
Appendix B

B-24

 
Appendix C

C-1

APPENDIX C:

TRANSPORTATION RISK ANALYSIS
Appendix C

C-2
Appendix C

C-3

APPENDIX C:

TRANSPORTATION RISK ANALYSIS

This appendix provides the detailed methodology, input parameters and assumptions, and

results for the transportation risk analysis performed in support of this Mixed Oxide Fuel

Fabrication Facility Environmental Impact Statement (MOX EIS). The analysis evaluates

transportation of depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6) from the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion

Plant in Portsmouth, Ohio, to the Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC Fuel Fabrication Facility in

Wilmington, North Carolina; transportation of the uranium dioxide (UO2) conversion product

from Wilmington to the proposed MOX facility; transportation of plutonium metal from U.S.

Department of Energy (DOE) storage sites; and transportation of the fresh MOX fuel from the

proposed MOX facility to a surrogate nuclear power plant site.

C.1 Methodology

C.1.1 Overview

The transportation risk assessment considers human health risks from routine transport

(normal, incident-free conditions) of hazardous materials and from potential accidents. In both

cases, risks associated with the nature of the cargo itself, or “cargo-related” impacts, and those

related to the transportation vehicle (regardless of type of cargo), or “vehicle-related” impacts,

are considered.

C.1.1.1 Routine Transportation Risk

The radiological risk associated with routine transportation is cargo-related and results from the

potential exposure of people to low levels of external radiation near a loaded shipment. It is

assumed that there are no cargo-related risks posed by incident-free transport of hazardous

chemicals. No direct chemical exposure to radioactive material will occur during routine

transport because, as discussed in Section C.2.2, these materials will be in packages that are

designed and maintained to ensure that they will contain and shield their contents during

normal transport. Any leakage or unintended release would be considered under accident

risks. 

Vehicle-related risks during routine transportation are caused by potential exposure to

increased vehicular emissions. These emissions include diesel exhaust, tire and brake

particulate emissions, and fugitive dust raised from the roadbed by passing vehicles.
Appendix C

C-4

C.1.1.2 Accident Transportation Risk

The cargo-related radiological risk from transportation-related accidents lies in the potential

release and dispersal of radioactive material into the environment during an accident and the

subsequent exposure of people through multiple exposure pathways, such as exposure to

contaminated soil, inhalation, or the ingestion of contaminated food. Cargo-related hazardous

chemical accident impacts to human health during transportation come from immediate

inhalation exposure resulting from container failure and chemical release during an accident.

Vehicle-related accident risks refer to the potential for transportation-related accidents that

result in fatalities caused by physical trauma unrelated to the cargo.

C.1.2 Routine Risk Assessment Methodology

The RADTRAN 4 computer code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) was used in the routine and

accident cargo-related risk assessments to estimate the radiological impacts to collective

populations. RADTRAN 4 was developed by Sandia National Laboratories to calculate

population risks associated with the transportation of radioactive materials by truck, rail, air,

ship, or barge. The code has been used extensively for transportation risk assessments since

it was originally issued in the late 1970s as RADTRAN (RADTRAN 1) and has been reviewed

and updated periodically. RADTRAN 1 was originally developed to facilitate the calculations

presented in NUREG-0170 (NRC 1977b). 

C.1.2.1 Collective Population Risk

The radiological risk associated with routine transportation results from the potential exposure

of people to low-level external radiation in the vicinity of loaded shipments. Even under routine

transportation, some radiological exposure could occur. Because the radiological

consequences (dose) would occur as a direct result of normal operations, the probability of

routine consequences is taken to be 1 in the RADTRAN 4 code. Therefore, the dose risk is

equivalent to the estimated dose.

For routine transportation, the RADTRAN 4 computer code considers major groups of

potentially exposed persons. The RADTRAN 4 calculations of risk for routine highway and rail

transportation include exposures of the following population groups:

• Persons along the Route (Off-Link Population). Collective doses were calculated for

all persons living or working within 0.8 km (0.5 mi) of each side of a transportation

route. The total number of persons within the 1.6-km (1-mi) corridor was calculated

separately for each route considered in the assessment.

• Persons Sharing the Route (On-Link Population). Collective doses were calculated

for persons in all vehicles sharing the transportation route. This group includes
Appendix C

C-5

persons traveling in the same or opposite directions as the shipment, as well as

persons in vehicles passing the shipment.

• Persons at Stops. Collective doses were calculated for people who might be

exposed while a shipment was stopped en route. For truck transportation, these

stops include those for refueling, food, and rest. 

• Crew Members. Collective doses were calculated for truck transportation crew

members involved in the actual shipment of material. Workers involved in loading or

unloading were not considered. The doses calculated for the first three population

groups were added together to yield the collective dose to the public; the dose

calculated for the fourth group represents the collective dose to workers.

The RADTRAN 4 calculations for routine dose generically compute the dose rate as a function

of distance from a point source (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1995). Associated with the calculation

of routine doses for each exposed population group are parameters such as the radiation field

strength, the source-receptor distance, the duration of exposure, vehicular speed, stopping

time, traffic density, and route characteristics (such as population density). The RADTRAN

manual contains derivations of the equations used and descriptions of these parameters

(Neuhauser and Kanipe 1995).

C.1.2.2 Maximally Exposed Individual Risk

In addition to the assessment of the routine collective population risk, the risk to a maximally

exposed individual (MEI) was estimated. In RADTRAN 4, the MEI is assumed to be located

30 m (100 ft) from the transport route as the radioactive shipment passes by at a speed of

24 km/h (15 mph).

C.1.2.3 Vehicle-Related Risk

Vehicle-related health risks resulting from routine transportation are associated with the

generation of air pollutants by transport vehicles during shipment and would be independent of

the radioactive or chemical nature of the shipment. The health endpoint assessed under

routine transportation conditions was the excess latent mortality from inhalation of vehicular

emissions. These emissions consist of particulate matter in the form of diesel engine exhaust,

tire and brake particulates, and fugitive dust raised from the roadway by the transport vehicle. 

Risk factors for pollutant inhalation in terms of latent mortality have been used in this analysis. 

Vehicle-related risks from routine transportation were calculated for each shipment by

multiplying the total distance traveled by the appropriate risk factor.
Appendix C

C-6

C.1.3 Accident Assessment Methodology

As stated above, the radiological transportation accident risk assessment also uses the

RADTRAN 4 code for estimating collective population risks. The hazardous chemical

transportation accident risk assessment relies on the HGSYSTEM model (Post 1994a,b; Hanna

et al. 1994). The model is a widely applied code recognized by the U.S. Environmental Agency

(EPA) for use in chemical accident consequence predictions. The FIREPLUME model (Brown

et al. 1997) was used to supplement the HGSYSTEM model in the analysis of fire scenarios

involving depleted uranium releases. The HGSYSTEM and FIREPLUME models were used

previously in assessing the hazardous chemical transportation impacts from transportation of

depleted uranium materials (Biwer et al. 1997).

The risk analysis for potential accidents differs fundamentally from the risk analysis for routine

transportation because occurrences of accidents are statistical in nature. The accident risk

assessment is treated probabilistically in RADTRAN 4 for radiological risk and in the

HGSYSTEM approach used to estimate the hazardous chemical component of risk. Accident

risk is defined as the product of the accident consequence (dose or exposure) and the

probability of the accident’s occurring. In this respect, RADTRAN 4 and the HGSYSTEM

approach both estimate the collective accident risk to populations by considering a spectrum of

transportation-related accidents. The spectrum of accidents was designed to encompass a

range of possible accidents, including low-probability accidents that have high consequences,

and high-probability accidents that have low consequences (such as “fender benders”). For

radiological risk, the results for collective accident risk can be directly compared with the results

for routine collective risk because the latter results implicitly incorporate a probability of

occurrence of 1 if the shipment takes place. Such is not the case for chemical materials,

because routine transport would pose no exposure risk.

C.1.3.1 Radiological Accident Risk Assessment

The RADTRAN 4 calculation of collective accident risk uses models that quantify the range of

potential accident severities and the responses of transported packages to accidents. The

spectrum of accident severity is divided into several categories, each of which is assigned a

conditional probability of occurrence — that is, the probability that if an accident does occur, it

will be of a particular severity. Release fractions, defined as the fraction of the material in a

package that could be released in an accident, are assigned to each accident severity category

on the basis of the physical and chemical form of the material. The model takes into account

the mode of transportation and the type of packaging through selection of the appropriate

accident probabilities and release fractions, respectively. The accident rates, the definition of

accident severity categories, and the release fractions used in this analysis are discussed

further in Sections C.2 and C.3.

For accidents involving the release of radioactive material, RADTRAN 4 assumes that the

material is dispersed in the environment according to standard Gaussian diffusion models. For

the risk assessment, default data for atmospheric dispersion were used, representing an

instantaneous ground-level release and a small-diameter source cloud (Neuhauser and Kanipe
Appendix C

C-7

1995). The calculation of the collective population dose following the release and dispersal of

radioactive material includes the following exposure pathways:

• External exposure to the passing radioactive cloud,

• External exposure to contaminated ground,

• Internal exposure from inhalation of airborne contaminants, and

• Internal exposure from the ingestion of contaminated food.

For the ingestion pathway, state-average food transfer factors, which relate the amount of

radioactive material ingested to the amount deposited on the ground, were calculated in

accordance with the methods described by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Regulatory Guide 1.109 (NRC 1977a) and were used as input to the RADTRAN code. Doses

of radiation from the ingestion or inhalation of radionuclides were calculated by applying

standard dose conversion factors (DOE 1988a,b).

C.1.3.2 Chemical Accident Risk Assessment

The risks from exposure to hazardous chemicals during transportation-related accidents can be

either acute (resulting in immediate injury or fatality) or latent (resulting in cancer that would

present itself after a latency period of several years). The acute health endpoint, potential

irreversible adverse effects, was evaluated for the assessment of cargo-related population

impacts from transportation accidents. Accidental releases during transport of the uranium

compounds (UF6 and UO2) were evaluated quantitatively.

The acute effects evaluated were assumed to exhibit a threshold nonlinear relationship with

exposure; that is, some low level of exposure can be tolerated without inducing a health effect. 

To estimate risks, chemical-specific concentrations were developed for potential irreversible

adverse effects. All individuals exposed at these levels or higher following an accident were

included in the transportation risk estimates. In addition to acute health effects, the cargorelated risk of excess cases of latent cancer from accidental chemical exposures could be

evaluated. However, none of the chemicals that might be released in any of the accidents

would be carcinogenic. As a result, no predictions for excess latent cancers from accidental

chemical releases are presented in this report.

The primary exposure route of concern with respect to accidental release of hazardous

chemicals would be inhalation. Although direct exposure to hazardous chemicals via other

pathways, such as ingestion or absorption through the skin (dermal absorption), would also be

possible, these routes would be expected to result in much lower exposure than the inhalation

pathway doses for the uranium compounds. The likelihood of acute effects would be much less

for the ingestion and dermal pathways than for inhalation.
Appendix C

C-8

The HGSYSTEM model (Version 3.0) (Hanna et al. 1994) has a built-in source-term algorithm

that is used to compute the rate, quantity, and type of atmospheric release of a hazardous air

pollutant, including pool evaporation from a spill of a volatile organic liquid. The model can be

used to evaluate frequently encountered accidental releases from ruptured tanks, drums, and

pipes. The model incorporates a chemical data library of physical and chemical properties

(such as vapor pressure, boiling point, and molecular weight) for 30 compounds. Physical

properties of the chemical released, along with container content input, such as the container

geometry and rupture characteristics (e.g., hole size), are used by HGSYSTEM to compute

chemical release rate and duration. The risk assessment for hazardous chemicals assumed

that particulate releases would be of short duration as liquid and solid (as respirable fraction)

aerosols.

The approach for hazardous chemicals incorporates the same accident severity categories and

release fractions used by RADTRAN 4 for radiological accidents. The risks associated with the

consequences estimated with the HGSYSTEM code were computed separately with a risk

quantification spreadsheet program.

C.1.3.3 Vehicle-Related Accident Risk Assessment

The vehicle-related accident risk refers to the potential for transportation accidents that could

result directly in fatalities not related to the nature of the cargo in the shipment. This risk

represents fatalities from physical trauma. State-average rates for transportation fatalities are

used in the assessment. Vehicle-related accident risks are calculated by multiplying the total

distance traveled by the rates for transportation fatalities. In all cases, the vehicle-related

accident risks are calculated on the basis of distances for round-trip shipment since the

presence or absence of cargo would not be a factor in accident frequency.

C.2 Input Parameters and Assumptions

The principal input parameters and assumptions used in the transportation risk assessment are

discussed in this section. Where appropriate, applicable government regulations are

referenced. Transportation of hazardous chemical and radioactive materials is governed by 

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), NRC, and EPA regulations, and by the Hazardous

Materials Transportation Act. These regulations may be found in the Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR) at 49 CFR Parts 171-178, 49 CFR Parts 383-397, 10 CFR Part 71, and

40 CFR Parts 262 and 265, respectively. State organizations are also involved in regulating

such transport within their borders. All transportation-related activities must be in accordance

with applicable regulations of these agencies. However, the DOT and NRC have primary

regulatory responsibility for shipment of radioactive materials. Those regulations most pertinent

to this risk assessment can be found in 49 CFR 173 (Shippers—General Requirements for

Shipments and Packagings), 49 CFR 397 (Transportation of Hazardous Materials; Driving and

Parking Rules), and 10 CFR 71 (Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material).
Appendix C

C-9

C.2.1 Route Characteristics

The transportation route selected for a shipment determines the total potentially exposed

population and the expected frequency of transportation-related accidents. For truck

transportation, the route characteristics most important to the risk assessment include the total

shipping distance between each origin-and-destination pair of sites and the population density

along the route. 

C.2.1.1 Route Selection

The DOT routing regulations concerning radioactive materials on public highways are

prescribed in 49 CFR 397.101(Requirements for Motor Carriers and Drivers). The objectives of

the regulations are to reduce the impacts of transporting radioactive materials, to establish

consistent and uniform requirements for route selection, and to identify the role of state and

local governments in routing radioactive materials. The regulations attempt to reduce potential

hazards by prescribing that populous areas be avoided and that travel times be minimized. In

addition, the regulations require that the carrier of radioactive materials ensure that the vehicle

is operated on routes that minimize radiological risks, and that accident rates, transit times,

population density and activity, time of day, and day of week are considered in determining risk. 

However, the final determination of the route is left to the discretion of the carrier, such as for

shipments of depleted UF6 and UO2, unless the shipment contains a "highway route controlled

quantity" (HRCQ) of radioactive material as defined in 49 CFR 173.403 (Definitions), such as

the plutonium metal or the MOX fuel.

A vehicle transporting an HRCQ of radioactive materials is required to use the interstate

highway system except when moving from origin to interstate or from interstate to destination,

when making necessary repair or rest stops, or when emergency conditions make continued

use of the interstate unsafe or impossible. Carriers are required to use interstate

circumferential or bypass routes, if available, to avoid populous areas. Any state or Native

American tribe may designate other "preferred highways" to replace or supplement the

interstate system. Under its authority to regulate interstate transportation safety, the DOT can

prohibit state and local bans and restrictions as "undue restraint of interstate commerce." State

or local bans can be preempted if inconsistent with the HRCQ regulations. Shipments of TRU

waste will follow designated Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) routes to the WIPP repository.

For this analysis, representative shipment routes were identified using the WebTRAGIS

(Version 1.10) routing model (Johnson and Michelhaugh 2000) for the truck shipments. The

routes were selected to be reasonable and consistent with routing regulations and general

practice, but they are considered only representative because the actual routes used would be

chosen in the future and are often determined by the shipper. At the time of shipment, route

selection would reflect current road conditions, including road repairs and traffic congestion.

The HIGHWAY data network in WebTRAGIS is a computerized road atlas that includes a

complete description of the interstate highway system and of all U.S. highways. In addition,

most principal state highways and many local and community highways are identified. The
Appendix C

C-10

code is periodically updated to reflect current road conditions and has been compared with

reported mileages and observations of commercial trucking firms.

Routes are calculated within the model by minimizing the total impedance between origin and

destination. The impedance is basically defined as a function of distance and driving time along

a particular segment of highway. The population densities along a route are derived from 2000

census data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. 

The WebTRAGIS database version used was Highway Data Network 2.1. Summary route

information on the truck routes used in the analysis is provided in Table C.1.

C.2.1.2 Population Density

Three population density zones — rural, suburban, and urban — were used for the population

risk assessment. The fractions of travel and average population density in each zone were

determined with the WebTRAGIS routing model. Rural, suburban, and urban areas are

characterized according to the following breakdown: rural population densities range from 0 to

54 persons/km2

 (0 to 139 persons/mi2); suburban densities range from 55 to 1,284 persons/km2

(140 to 3,326 persons/mi2); and urban covers all population densities greater than

1,284 persons/km2

 (3,326 persons/mi2). Use of these three population density zones is based

on an aggregation of the 11 population density zones provided in the WebTRAGIS model

output. For calculation purposes, information about population density was generated at the

state level and used as RADTRAN input for all routes. Route average population densities and

other route characteristics are given in Table C.1.

C.2.1.3 Accident and Fatality Rates

For calculating accident risks, vehicle accident involvement and fatality rates are taken from

data provided in Saricks and Tompkins (1999). For each transport mode, accident rates are

generically defined as the number of accident involvements (or fatalities) in a given year per

unit of travel by that mode in the same year. Therefore, the rate is a fractional value — the

accident-involvement count is the numerator, and vehicular activity (total traveled distance) is

the denominator. Accident rates are derived from multiple-year averages that automatically

account for such factors as heavy traffic and adverse weather conditions. For assessment

purposes, the total number of expected accidents or fatalities is calculated by multiplying the

total shipping distance for a specific case by the appropriate accident or fatality rate.

For truck transportation, the rates presented in Saricks and Tompkins (1999) are specifically for

heavy combination trucks involved in interstate commerce. Heavy combination trucks are rigs

composed of a separable tractor unit containing the engine and one to three freight trailers

connected to each other and the tractor. Heavy combination trucks are typically used for

shipping radioactive wastes. Truck accident rates are computed for each state on the basis of 
C-11

Appendix C Table C.1. Summary route data Route Fraction of travel Average population density [persons/km2 (persons/mi2)] Total distance

Origin Destination [km (mi)] Rural Suburban Urban Rural Suburban Urban

Portsmouth, OH Wilmington, NC 936 (581) 55.5 40.7 3.9 18.5 (47.8) 366.7 (949.8) 2,155 (5,582)Wilmington, NC PDCF 443 (275) 60.1 37.5 2.4 15.7 (40.7) 353.1 (914.6) 2,140 (5,543)Pantex PDCF 2,179 (1,354) 67.8 28.5 3.7 13.4 (34.6) 332.4 (861.0) 2,271 (5,882)Hanford Site PDCF 4,434 (2,755) 76.7 20.9 2.3 11.3 (29.2) 320.5 (830.1) 2,244 (5,811)Proposed MOX facility WIPP 2,442 (1,518) 70.7 26.7 2.6 13.2 (34.2) 315.6 (817.4) 2,173 (5,627)Proposed MOX facility Surrogate Nuclear

Power Plant

2,147 (1,334) 57.1 37.4 5.5 18.5 (47.8) 342.1 (886.1) 2,366 (6,128)
Appendix C

C-12

statistics compiled by the DOT Office of Motor Carriers for 1994 to 1996. Saricks and

Tompkins (1999) present accident involvement and fatality counts, estimated kilometers of

travel by state, and the corresponding average accident involvement and fatality rates for the

3 years investigated. Fatalities (including of crew members) are deaths that are attributable to

the accident and that occurred within 30 days of the accident. 

The truck accident assessment presented in this EIS uses accident (fatality) rates for travel on

interstate highways. The total accident risk for a case depends on the total distance traveled in

various states and does not rely on national average accident statistics. However, for

comparative purposes, the national average truck accident rate on interstate highways

presented in Saricks and Tompkins (1999) is 3.15 × 10-7 accidents/truck-km (5.07 × 10-7

accidents/mi).

Note that the accident rates used in this assessment were computed using all interstate

shipments, regardless of the cargo. Saricks and Kvitek (1994) point out that shippers and

carriers of radioactive material generally have a higher-than-average awareness of

transportation risk and prepare cargoes and drivers for such shipments accordingly. This

preparation should have the twofold effect of reducing component and equipment failure and

mitigating the contribution of human error to accident causation. However, these mitigating

effects were not considered in the accident assessment.

C.2.2 Packaging

Shipment packaging for radioactive materials must be designed, constructed, and maintained

to ensure that it will contain and shield the contents during normal transportation. For more

highly radioactive material, the packaging must contain and shield the contents in severe

accidents. The type of packaging used is determined by the radioactive hazard associated with

the packaged material. The basic types of packaging required by the applicable regulations are

designated as Type A, Type B, or industrial packaging (generally for low-specific-activity [LSA]

material). 

C.2.2.1 Depleted UF6 and UO2 Packaging

Depleted UF6 and UO2 shipments would use Type A and industrial packaging, respectively. 

These types of packaging must withstand the conditions of normal transportation without the

loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents. "Normal" transportation refers to all transportation

conditions except those resulting from accidents or sabotage. Approval of Type A packaging is

obtained by demonstrating that the packaging can withstand specified testing conditions

intended to simulate normal transportation. Type A packaging usually does not require special

handling, packaging, or transportation equipment. The depleted UF6 would be shipped in

Model 30B cylinders (USEC 1999) with overpacks, and the depleted UO2 would be shipped in

55-gal drums.
Appendix C

C-13

C.2.2.2 Plutonium Metal, MOX Fuel, and TRU Waste

The plutonium metal, MOX fuel, and TRU waste would be shipped in Type B packaging. In

addition to meeting all the Type A standards, Type B packaging must also provide a high

degree of assurance that the package integrity will be maintained even during severe accidents,

with essentially no loss of the radioactive contents or serious impairment of the shielding

capability. Type B packaging is required for shipping large quantities of radioactive material

and must satisfy stringent testing criteria (as specified in 10 CFR 71). The testing criteria were

developed to simulate conditions of severe hypothetical accidents, including impact, puncture,

fire, and immersion in water. The most widely recognized Type B packagings are the massive

casks used to transport highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power stations. 

Large-capacity cranes and mechanical lifting equipment are usually necessary for handling

Type B packagings. Many Type B packagings are transported on trailers specifically designed

for that purpose. 

Plutonium metal as pits is expected to be shipped in DOE-approved FL containers, while piece

parts might be shipped in DOE-approved USA/9975 containers (DOE 1999b). TRU waste

would be transported to the WIPP in Type B containers referred to as the Transuranic Package

Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II). 

The MOX fresh fuel package is a Type B cylindrical container designed to carry three MOX fuel

assemblies. MOX fuel does not require specific shielding material, and the containment shell

provides a single containment boundary in accordance with 10 CFR 71.63(b)(1). The current

design (DCS 2001b) specifies 4.46 m (175 in.) as the overall package length without the impact

limiters. The impact limiters themselves are of a conventional polyurethane filled design and

have an outer diameter of 1.5 m (60 in.). The outer diameter of the package containment shell

is 0.74 m (29 in.). The package is designed to accommodate 3,200 kg (7,100 lb) of payload,

including internal supports and the fuel assemblies. The package gross weight is 6,580 kg

(14,500 lb).

C.2.3 Shipment Configurations and Number of Shipments 

The anticipated shipment information for the proposed action is summarized in Table C.2. 

Table C.3 lists the radionuclide inventory for each shipment type. Depleted UF6 shipments

would consist of five overpacked 30B cylinders per truck, as depicted in Figure C.1. Each 

cylinder would contain about 2,277 kg (5,020 lb) of depleted UF6. Depleted UO2 shipments

would consist of 24 55-gal drums in a commercial covered tractor trailer. Each drum would

contain approximately 667 kg (1,470 lb) of depleted UO2. For this analysis, sufficient quantities

of UF6 and UO2 were assumed to be shipped so that a total of 34 MT(37.5 tons) of plutonium

could be fabricated into MOX fuel assemblies for irradiation as reactor fuel (DCS 2002a). Thus,

a total of 110 shipments of depleted UF6 and 60 shipments of depleted UO2 would be required.

As discussed in Section 4.4.1.1, it was assumed that 26.7 MT (29.4 tons) of plutonium would

require transportation to the PDCF from Pantex and Hanford. On the basis of the information 
Appendix C

C-14

Table C.2. Shipment information

Origin Destination Material

Package

type

Amount per

package

[kg (lb)]

Packages

per

shipment

Number of

shipments

Portsmouth, OH Wilmington, NC UF6 30B cylinder 2,277 (5,020) 5 110

Wilmington, NC MOX facility UO2 30-gal drum 667 (1,470) 24 60

Pantex PDCF Pu metal Type B 62.3 (137)a NAb 343

Hanford PDCF Pu metal Type B 62.3 (137)a NA 87

MOX facility Surrogate nuclear

power plant

MOX fuel Type B 3 assemblies 1 598

WSB WIPP TRU waste TRUPACT-II 2,590

(5,700)a 3 299–

2,314

a

Estimated amount per shipment.

b

Not available, dependent on actual container used.

Table C.3. Single-shipment radionuclide inventories (Ci)a

TRU Wastec,d

Isotopes UF6 UO2 Pu metal MOX fuelb

Volume

Reduction

No

Volume

Reduction

U-234 0.474 0.868 NAe NA 0.0231 0.00299

U-235 0.0445 0.0752 NA 0.00706 0.000530 6.87 × 10-5

U-238 2.57 4.74 NA 0.438 5.43 × 10-6 7.04 × 10-7

Th-234 2.57 4.74 NA NA NA NA

Pa-234m 2.57 4.74 NA NA NA NA

Pu-236 NA NA NA 2.22 NA NA

Pu-238 NA NA 836 429 0.0822 0.0107

Pu-239 NA NA 7,070 4,860 0.567 0.0735

Pu-240 NA NA 1,730 1,080 0.110 0.0142

Pu-241 NA NA 129,000 43,000 9.88 1.28

Pu-242 NA NA 0.494 0.0956 3.76 × 10-5 4.87 × 10-6

Am-241 NA NA 3,820 NA 3,650 474

a

To convert from Ci to Bq, multiply by 3.7 × 1010.

b

Source: DCS (2001b).

c

Source: DCS (2002b).

d

Source: DCS (2004).

e

NA = not applicable.
Appendix C

C-15

Figure C.1. Trailer carrying five UF6 cylinders in overpacks (Photo courtesy of United

States Enrichment Corporation [USEC 1999]).

presented in Didlake (1998), approximately 62.3 kg (137 lb) of plutonium would be in each

shipment. The plutonium would be packaged in a suitable Type B container and shipped via

the Safeguards Transporter (SGT) discussed later in this section.

Approximately 1,748 MOX fuel assemblies would be shipped to commercial reactor sites. 

Transport of the MOX fuel would be by SGT, one MOX fuel package per shipment. Figure C.2

shows a representative shipment configuration. With three assemblies per shipping cask,

598 shipments would be expected between the years 2007 and 2021 (DCS 2002a).

The SGT is a specially designed component of a tractor-trailer vehicle and is used by the Office

of Secure Transportation of the DOE Albuquerque National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) Service Center for the transport of special nuclear materials, such as plutonium. Since

1975, more than 151 million km (94 million mi) of travel transporting DOE-owned cargo has

been accumulated without an accident involving a fatality or a release of radioactive material. 

Although details of vehicle enhancements and some operational aspects are classified, key

characteristics are as follows (DOE 1999b):

• Enhanced structural characteristics and a highly reliable tie-down system to protect

the cargo from impact;

• Heightened thermal resistance to protect the cargo in case of fire;

• Established operational and emergency plans and procedures governing the

shipment of nuclear materials;

• Couriers who are armed federal officers and who have received vigorous 

specialized training;

• An armored tractor component that provides courier protection against attack and

contains advanced communications equipment;
Appendix C

C-16

Figure C.2. MOX fresh fuel package loaded in SGT.

• Specially designed escort vehicles containing advanced communications and

additional couriers;

• 24-hour-a-day, real-time communications to monitor the location and status of all

SGT shipments; and

• Significantly more stringent maintenance standards than those for commercial

transport equipment.

TRU waste was assumed to be fixed in cement, placed in standard waste boxes (SWBs), and

shipped in TRUPACT-II containers from the WSB to the WIPP for disposal (DCS 2002b; 2004). 

Each TRUPACT-II contained 2 SWBs, and each truck shipment consisted of 3 TRUPACT-II

containers. The number of TRU waste shipments could range from about 23 to 178 shipments

per year (DCS 2004). The upper end of the range assumes that no volume reduction of the

waste occurs, but the annual throughput in either case contains the same amount of americium. 

Thus, the total number of shipments over the 13-year operational life of the WSB would range

from 299 to 2,314.

C.2.4 Accident Characteristics

Assessment of transportation accident risk takes into account the fraction of material in a

package that would be released or spilled to the environment during an accident, commonly

referred to as the release fraction. The release fraction is a function of the severity of the

accident and the material packaging. For instance, a low-impact accident, such as a "fenderbender," would not be expected to cause any release of material. Conversely, a very severe

accident would be expected to release nearly all of the material in a shipment into the

environment. The method used to characterize accident severities and the corresponding

release fractions for estimating both radioactive and chemical risks are described below.

C.2.4.1 Accident Severity Categories

A method to characterize the potential severity of transportation-related accidents has been

described in the NRC NUREG-0170 report, Final Environmental Statement on the
Appendix C

C-17

VII

VI VII

VIII

V VI VII

IV V VI VII

III IV V VI VII

II III IV

I III IV

0.5 1 1.5 2

0

6.7

22

89

220

440

1330

2220

1300 Kelvin Fire Duration (hours)

Crush Force (10

3

newtons) Figure C.3. Scheme for NUREG-0170

classification by accident severity

category for truck accidents

(Source: NRC 1977b).

Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes (NRC 1977b). The NRC

method divides the spectrum of transportation accident severities into eight categories. Other

studies have divided the same accident spectrum into six categories (Wilmot 1981),

20 categories (Fischer et al. 1987), or more (Sprung et al. 2000); however, these latter studies

focused primarily on accidents involving shipments of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). In this analysis,

the NUREG-0170 scheme was used for all shipments.

The NUREG-0170 scheme for accident classification is shown in Figure C.3 for truck

transportation. Severity is described as a function of the magnitudes of the mechanical forces

(impact) and thermal forces (fire) to which a package may be subjected during an accident. 

Because all accidents can be described in these terms, severity is independent of the specific

accident sequence. In other words, any sequence of events that results in an accident in which

a package is subjected to forces within a certain range of values is assigned to the accident

severity category associated with that range. The scheme for accident severity is designed to

take into account all credible transportation-related accidents, including those accidents with

low probability but high consequences and those with high probability but low consequences.
Appendix C

C-18

Each severity category represents a set of accident scenarios defined by a combination of

mechanical and thermal forces. A conditional probability of occurrence — that is, the probability

that if an accident occurs, it is of a particular severity — is assigned to each category. The

fractional occurrences for accidents by accident severity category and population density zone

are shown in Table C.4 and are used for estimating both radioactive and chemical risks.

Category I accidents are the least severe but the most frequent; Category VIII accidents are

very severe but very infrequent. To determine the expected frequency of an accident of a given

severity, the conditional probability in the category is multiplied by the baseline accident rate. 

Each population density zone has a distinct distribution of accident severities related to

differences in average vehicular velocity, traffic density, location (rural, suburban, or urban), and

other factors. 

C.2.4.2 Package Release Fractions

In NUREG-0170, radiological and chemical consequences are calculated by assigning package

release fractions to each accident severity category. The release fraction is defined as the

fraction of the material in a package that could be released from the package as the result of an

accident of a given severity. Release fractions take into account all mechanisms necessary to

create release of material from a damaged package to the environment. Release fractions vary

according to the type of package and the physical form of the material.

Representative release fractions for accidents involving depleted UF6 and UO2 shipments were

taken from NUREG-0170 (NRC 1977b). The recommendations in NUREG-0170 are based on

best engineering judgments and have been shown to provide conservative estimates of 

Table C.4. Fractional occurrences

for truck accidents by severity category

and population density zone

Fractional occurrence by

population density zone

Severity

category

Fractional

occurrence Rural Suburban Urban

Truck

I 0.55 0.1 0.1 0.8 

II 0.36 0.1 0.1 0.8 

III 0.07 0.3 0.4 0.3 

IV 0.016 0.3 0.4 0.3 

V 0.0028 0.5 0.3 0.2 

VI 0.0011 0.7 0.2 0.1 

VII 8.5 x 10-5 0.8 0.1 0.1 

VIII 1.5 x 10-5 0.9 0.05 0.05

Source: NRC (1977b).
Appendix C

C-19

material releases following accidents. The release fractions used are those reported in

NUREG-0170 for both low-specific-activity (LSA) drums and NRC Type A packages. Release

fractions for accidents of each severity category are given in Table C.5. As shown in that table,

the amount of material released from the package ranges from zero for minor accidents to

100% for the most severe accidents. As shown in Table C.5, representative release fractions

for accidents involving fresh MOX fuel were assumed to be the same as those developed for

SNF in the NRC’s study (Fischer et al. 1987), commonly referred to as the Modal Study, on the

behavior of SNF in Type B containers under accident conditions. These values were derived on

the basis of best engineering judgments. These values are expected to be conservative when

applied to fresh MOX fuel because the fuel has not yet become embrittled through use.

Also important for the purposes of risk assessment are the fraction of the released material that

can be entrained in an aerosol (part of an airborne contaminant plume) and the fraction of the

aerosolized material that is also respirable (of a size that can be inhaled into the lungs). These

fractions depend on the physical form of the material. Most solid materials are difficult to

release in particulate form and are, therefore, relatively nondispersible. Conversely, liquid or

gaseous materials are relatively easy to release if the container is breached in an accident. 

Table C.5. Estimated release fractions for Type A

and Type B packages under various accident

severity categories

Release fractiona

NUREG-0170

Severity

category Type Ab Type Bc Type Bd TRUPACT-IIe

I 0 0 0 0

II 0.01 0 6 × 10-8 0

III 0.1 0.01 2 × 10-7 8 × 10-9

IV 1 0.1 2 × 10-6 2 × 10-7

V 1 1 2 × 10-6 8 × 10-5

VI 1 1 2 × 10-5 2 × 10-4

VII 1 1 2 × 10-5 2 × 10-4

VIII 1 1 2 × 10-5 2 × 10-4

a

Values are for total material release fraction (the fraction

of material in a package released to the environment during an

accident).

b

Source: NRC (1977b), used for depleted UF6 and UO2

shipments.

c

Source: NRC (1977b), used for Pu metal shipments.

d

Source: Fischer et al. (1987), used for fresh MOX fuel

shipments.

e

Source: DOE (1997). Aerosolized and respirable fractions

are both assumed to equal 1.0.
Appendix C

C-20

The aerosolized fraction for the UF6 was taken to be 0.01 except in the case of higher severity

accidents (Categories VI through VIII) involving fire, for which it was taken to be 0.33

(Policastro et al. 1997). The respirable fraction was taken to be 1 for all accidents. For UO2,

which was assumed to behave as a loose powder, the aerosolized fraction was set to 0.1, with

a respirable fraction of 0.05 (Biwer et al. 1997). The aerosolized fraction and the respirable

fraction were taken to be 1 × 10-6 and 0.05, respectively, for the Pu metal expected to behave

as immobile material (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992). For the MOX fuel, the aerosolized fraction

was taken to be 1, and the respirable fraction taken to be 0.05 in accordance with spent fuel

particulates as derived from NUREG-0170 in Neuhauser and Kanipe (1992). Release fractions

used for the TRU waste shipments are given separately in Table C.5. 

C.2.4.3 Atmospheric Conditions during Accidents

Hazardous material released to the atmosphere is transported by the wind. The amount of

dispersion, or dilution, of the contaminant material in the air depends on the meteorologic

conditions at the time of the accident. Because predicting the specific location of an off-site

transportation-related accident and the exact meteorologic conditions at the time of the accident

is impossible, generic atmospheric conditions were selected for the accident risk assessment. 

Neutral weather conditions were assumed. These conditions were represented by Pasquill

atmospheric stability Class D with a wind speed of 4 m/s (9 mph). Because neutral

meteorological conditions are the most frequently occurring atmospheric stability condition in

the United States, these conditions are most likely to be present in the event of an accident

involving a hazardous material shipment. Observations at National Weather Service surface

meteorological stations at more than 300 U.S. locations indicate that on a yearly average,

neutral conditions (represented by Pasquill Classes C and D) occur about half (50%) the time;

stable conditions (Pasquill Classes E and F) occur about one-third (33%) of the time; and

unstable conditions (Pasquill Classes A and B) occur about one-sixth (17%) of the time (Doty

et al. 1976). The neutral category predominates in all seasons, but it is most prevalent (nearly

60% of the observations) during winter.

C.2.5 Radiological Risk Assessment Input Parameters and Assumptions

The dose (and, correspondingly, the risk) to populations during routine transportation of

radioactive materials is directly proportional to the assumed external dose rate from the

shipment. The actual dose rate from the shipment is a complex function of the composition and

configuration of shielding and containment materials used in the packaging, the geometry of the

loaded shipment, and the characteristics of the radioactive material itself. 

Shipments of depleted UF6 and UO2 have been studied previously (Biwer et al. 1997) for the

Depleted UF6 Programmatic EIS (PEIS) (DOE 1999a). Representative shipment dose rates

were developed using the MicroShieldTM shielding code (Negin and Worku 1992). The input to

MicroShieldTM consisted of the activity of a material, the geometry and composition of the

shipping package, and the amount of material in the package. Where multiple packages per

shipment were assumed, a dose rate for the shipment was derived from the summation of the
Appendix C

C-21

individual package dose rates, taking into consideration the configuration of the packages on

the transport vehicle and the relative distances to a receptor.

Table C.6 lists the external dose rates developed for the Depleted UF6 PEIS and used in this

transportation analysis. The dose rates are presented in terms of the transport index (TI),

which is the dose rate at 1 m (3 ft) from the lateral sides of the transport vehicle. The

regulatory limit established in 49 CFR Part 173.441 (Radiation Level Limitations) and 10 CFR

Part 71.47 (External Radiation Standards for All Packages) to protect the public is 0.1 mSv/h

(10 mrem/h) at 2 m (6 ft) from the outer lateral sides of the transport vehicle. The estimated

dose rate at a distance of 1 m (3 ft) from a truck shipment of depleted UO2 identical to that

considered for this analysis was 0.0076 mSv/h (0.76 mrem/h). Depleted UF6 in larger, 14-ton

cylinders in overcontainers was estimated to have external dose rates of 0.0023 mSv/h

(0.23 mrem/h) and 0.0024 mSv/h (0.24 mrem/h) for truck (1 cylinder/tractor-trailer) and rail

(4 cylinders/railcar) shipments, respectively. For this analysis, depleted UF6 shipments, each

involving five 30B cylinders, were assumed to have an external dose rate of 0.0024 mSv/h

(0.24 mrem/h), which is more consistent with the line source geometry of the railcar shipments

in the Depleted UF6 PEIS (DOE 1999a). These estimated dose rates for the depleted uranium

shipments are less than 5% of the allowed maximum value. A value of 0.040 mSv/h

(4.0 mrem/h) was used for the WSB TRU waste shipments. This value represents the highest

estimated dose rate for TRUPACT-II truck shipments estimated for any TRU waste generator

site considered in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Disposal Phase Final Supplemental

Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1997). For MOX fuel shipments, preliminary analysis

has estimated a conservative value of 0.0484 mSv/h (4.84 mrem/h) for the external dose rate at

1 m (DCS 2001a). The regulatory maximum of 0.10 mSv/h (10 mrem/h) at 2 m was assumed

for the plutonium metal. This dose rate corresponds approximately to 0.14 mSv/h (14 mrem/h)

at 1 m.

In addition to the specific parameters discussed previously, values for a number of general

parameters must be specified within the RADTRAN code to calculate radiological risks. These

general parameters define basic characteristics of the shipment and traffic and are specific to

the mode of transportation. The user’s manual for the RADTRAN code (Neuhauser and Kanipe

1992) contains derivations and descriptions of these parameters. The general RADTRAN input

parameters used in the radiological transportation risk assessment are summarized in

Table C.7.

C.2.6 Hazardous Chemical Risk Assessment Input Parameters and Assumptions

To estimate the consequences of chemical accidents, two potential health effects end points

were evaluated: (1) adverse effects and (2) irreversible adverse effects. Potential adverse

effects range from mild and transient effects — such as respiratory irritation, redness of the

eyes, and skin rash — to more serious and potentially irreversible effects. Potential irreversible

adverse effects are defined as effects that generally occur at higher concentrations and are

permanent in nature — including death, impaired organ function (such as damaged central

nervous system or lungs), and other effects that may impair everyday functions. 
Appendix C

C-22

Table C.6. External dose rates and package

sizes used in RADTRAN

Shipment

Dose rate at 1 m

[mSv/h (mrem/h)]

Package size

(m)

UF6 0.0024 (0.24) 12a

UO2 0.0076 (0.76) 6.0a

Pu metal 0.14 (14) 9

TRU waste 0.040 (4.0) 7.4

MOX fuel 0.0484 (4.84) 3.66b

a

Source: Biwer et al. (1997).

b

Active length of fuel assembly (DCS 2001a).

Table C.7. General RADTRAN input parametersa

Parameter Truckb

Number of crew members 2

Distance from source to crew (m) 3.1

Average vehicular speed (km/h)c

 Rural

 Suburban

 Urban

88.49

40.25

24.16

Stop time (h/km) 0.011

Number of people exposed while stopped 50

Distance for exposure while stopped (m) 20

Number of people per vehicle sharing route 2

Population densities (persons/km2

)

d Route specific

One-way traffic count (vehicles/h)

 Rural

 Suburban

 Urban

470

780

2,800

a

Accident conditional probabilities are listed by severity

category in Table C.4; accident release fractions are given in

Table C.5.

b

Source: Biwer et al. (1997).

c

Fraction of rural and suburban travel on freeways was set

to 1 in RADTRAN. Thus, the rural speed was used for both

urban and suburban zones.

d

Route-specific population densities are listed in

Table C.1.
Appendix C

C-23

For uranium compounds, an intake of 10 mg or more was assumed to cause potential adverse

effects (McGuire 1991), and an intake of 30 mg or more was assumed to cause potential

irreversible adverse effects. These intake levels are based on NRC guidance (NRC 1994). For

hydrogen fluoride (HF), which is a by-product of UF6 reacting with moisture in the air following

an accidental release, potential adverse effects levels were assumed to occur at levels that

correspond to Emergency Response Planning Guideline No. 1 (ERPG-1) or equivalent levels,

and potential irreversible adverse effects levels were assumed to occur at levels that

correspond to ERPG-2 or equivalent levels. The ERPG values have been generated by teams

of toxicologists who review all published (as well as some unpublished) data for a given

chemical (AIHA 1996). In addition to potential irreversible adverse effects, the number of

fatalities from accidental chemical exposures was estimated to facilitate comparisons with

radiological impacts. For exposures to uranium and HF, it was estimated that the number of

fatalities occurring would be about 1% of the number of irreversible adverse effects (EPA

1993a; Policastro et al. 1997). 

Application of the FIREPLUME code involves the choice of a number of parameters that affect

the results. Input values were selected to represent reasonable conditions at a generic location

without being too conservative. More details about the models and input parameters are

presented in Post et al. (1994a,b) and Brown et al. (1997).

C.2.7 Routine Nonradiological Vehicle Emission Risks

Vehicle-related risks during incident-free transportation include incremental risks caused by

potential exposure to airborne particulate matter from fugitive dust and vehicular exhaust

emissions. The health end point assessed under routine transport conditions is the excess

(additional) latent mortality caused by inhalation of vehicular emissions. These emissions are

primarily in the form of diesel exhaust and fugitive dust (resuspended particulates from the

roadway). Strong epidemiological evidence exists suggesting that increases in ambient air

concentrations of PM10 (particulate matter with a mean aerodynamic diameter less than or

equal to 10 μm) lead to increases in mortality (EPA 1996a,b). Currently, it is assumed that no

threshold exists and that the dose-response functions for most health effects associated with

PM10 exposure, including premature mortality, are linear over the concentration ranges

investigated (EPA 1996a). Over both the short and long terms, fatalities (mortality) may result

from life-shortening respiratory or cardiovascular diseases (EPA 1996a; Ostro and Chestnut

1998). The long-term fatalities also are assumed to include those from cancer.

The increased ambient air particulate concentrations caused by the transport vehicle, due to

fugitive dust and diesel exhaust emissions, were related to such premature latent fatalities in

the form of risk factors by Biwer and Butler (1999) for transportation risk assessments. Thus, in

this assessment, a value of 8.36 × 10-10 latent fatalities/km for truck transport was used. This

value is for heavy combination trucks (truck class VIIIB). The risk factor is for areas with an

assumed population density of 1 person/km2

. One-way shipment risks are obtained by

multiplying the appropriate risk factor by the average population density along the route and the

route distance. The risks reported for routine vehicle risks in this analysis are for round-trip

travel of the transport vehicle. 
Appendix C

C-24

The vehicle risks reported here are estimates based on the best available data. However, as is

true for the radiological risks, there is a large, not readily quantifiable, degree of uncertainty in

the vehicle emission risk factors. For example, large uncertainties exist as to the extent of

increased mortality with an incremental rise in particulate air concentrations and as to whether

there are threshold air concentrations that are applicable. Also, estimates of the particulate air

concentrations caused by transport vehicles are dependent on location, road conditions, vehicle

conditions, and weather.

As discussed by Biwer and Butler (1999), there are large uncertainties in the human health risk

factors used to develop the emission risks. In addition, because of the conservatism of the

assumptions made to reconcile results with those presented in an EPA study (EPA 1993b),

latent fatality risks estimated with the above risk factor may be considered to be near an upper

bound. Use of this risk factor for truck class VIIIB will give estimated fatalities comparable to

those from accident fatalities in some cases. In addition, the question as to what exactly

constitutes a fatality as a direct consequence of increased PM10 levels from vehicle emissions is

still an open question, but long-term fatalities have been associated with increased levels of

PM10 (Biwer and Butler 1999).

C.3 Transportation Impacts

Single shipment transportation impacts are presented in Table C.8. Total collective population

transportation impacts are presented in Section 4.4.1.3. 

C.4 References for Appendix C 

AIHA (American Industrial Hygiene Association) 1996. The AIHA 1996 Emergency Response

Planning Guidelines and Workplace Environmental Exposure Level Guides Handbook. 

Fairfax, VA.

Biwer, B.M., and J.P. Butler 1999. “Vehicle Emission Unit Risk Factors for Transportation Risk

Assessments.” Risk Analysis 19:1157-1171.

Biwer, B.M., et al. 1997. Transportation Impact Analyses in Support of the Depleted Uranium

Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Attachment to intraoffice

memorandum from Biwer to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL). May 21.

Brown, D., et al. 1997. FIREPLUME: Modeling Plume Dispersion from Fires and Applications to

UF6 Cylinder Fires. ANL/EAD/TM-69. Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL.

DCS (Duke Cogema Stone & Webster) 2001a. Responses to Request for Clarification of

Additional Information for the Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS) Mixed Oxide (MOX)

Fuel Fabrication Facility (FFF) Environmental Report (ER). Docket Number 070-03098. 

Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2001b. “Response to Clarification Request — Responses to Request for Additional

Information on the Duke Cogema Stone & Webster Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

Environmental Report.” Letter, with attachments, from P.S. Hastings (DCS, Charlotte, NC)

to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Washington, DC). Oct.
Appendix C

C-25

Table C.8. Single-shipment collective population transportation risks

MOX 

Depleted UF6 Depleted UO2 Pu metal From TRU Waste

MOX facility

From

Portsmouth, OH

From

Wilmington, NC

From

Pantex

From

Hanford

to

surrogate

From

WSB

Impact category

to

Wilmington, NC

to

MOX facility

to

PDCF

to

PDCF

commercial

reactor

to

WIPP

Population impacts

 Cargo-relateda

 Radiological impacts

 Dose riskb

 (person-rem)

 Routine crew 0.0055 0.0075 0.14 0.27 0.16 0.16

 Routine public

 Off-link 4 × 10-4 2.2 × 10-4 0.026 0.035 0.0064 0.0063

 On-link 9.8 × 10-4 5.8 × 10-4 0.072 0.12 0.016 0.020

 Stops 0.0041 0.0029 0.33 0.67 0.057 0.10

 Total 0.0054 0.0037 0.43 0.82 0.079 0.13

 Accidentc 0.0023 8.2 × 10-4 8.8 × 10-5 3.8 × 10-4 0.027 0.0027–0.021

 Latent cancer

 fatalitiesd

 Crew fatalities 3 × 10-6 5 × 10-6 9 × 10-5 2 × 10-4 9 × 10-5 9 × 10-5

 Public fatalities 5 × 10-6 3 × 10-6 3 × 10-4 5 × 10-4 6 × 10-5 8 × 10-5– 9 × 10-5

Chemical impacts

Irreversible adverse 1.2 × 10-9 0 NAf NA NA NA

 effectse

 Vehicle-relatedg

 Emission fatalities 4 × 10-4 1 × 10-4 7 × 10-4 9 × 10-4 0.001 6 × 10-4

 Accident fatalities 2.7 × 10-5 2 × 10-5 5.4 × 10-5 1.1 × 10-4 4.8 × 10-5 5.8 × 10-5

a

Cargo-related impacts are impacts attributable to the radioactive or chemical nature of the waste material.

b

To convert from person-rem to person-Sv, multiply by 0.01.

c

Dose risk is a societal risk and is the product of accident probability and accident consequence.

d

Latent cancer fatalities are calculated by multiplying dose by the FGR 13 health risk conversion factor of 0.06 fatal cancer

per person-Sv (6 × 10-4 fatal cancer per person-rem) (Eckerman et al. 1999).

e

Potential for irreversible adverse effects from chemical exposures. Exposure to HF or uranium compounds is estimated to

result in fatality of approximately 1% or less of those persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997).

f

NA = not applicable.

g

Vehicle-related impacts are impacts independent of the cargo in the shipment.

DCS 2002a. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 1 & 2. 

Docket No. 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DCS 2002b. Responses to the Request for Additional Information on the Environmental Report,

Revisions 1 & 2. DCS-NRC-000116, Docket No. 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. Oct. 29.

DCS 2004. Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Report, Revision 5. Docket

Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC. June 10.

Didlake, J. 1998. Fissile Materials Disposition Program SST/SGT Transportation Estimation. 

SAND98-8244. Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA. June.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 1988a. External Dose Rate Conversion Factors for

Calculation of Dose to the Public. DOE/EH-0070. Office of Environment, Safety, and

Health, Washington, DC.
Appendix C

C-26

DOE 1988b. Internal Dose Conversion Factors for Calculation of Dose to the Public. 

DOE/EH-0071. Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, Washington, DC.

DOE 1997. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Disposal Phase Final Supplemental Environmental

Impact Statement, Vol. II Appendices. DOE/EIS-0026-S-2. Carlsbad, NM. Sept.

DOE 1999a. Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the

Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride. DOE/EIS-0269. 

Washington, DC.

DOE 1999b. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement. 

DOE/EIS-0283. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, DC.

Doty, S.R., et al. 1976. A Climatological Analysis of Pasquill Stability Categories Based on

STAR Summaries. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climatic

Center, Asheville, NC. April.

Eckerman, K.F., et al. 1999. Cancer Risk Coefficients for Environmental Exposure to

Radionuclides, Federal Guidance Report No. 13. EPA 402-R-99-001. Prepared by Oak

Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office

of Radiation and Indoor Air, Washington, DC. Sept.

EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) 1993a. Hydrogen Fluoride Study, Report to

Congress, Section 112(n)(6), Clean Air Act as Amended, Final Report. EPA550-R-93-001. 

Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office, Washington, DC. Sept.

EPA 1993b. Motor Vehicle-Related Air Toxics Study. EPA 420-R-93-005. Office of Mobile

Sources, Ann Arbor, MI. April.

EPA 1996a. Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particular Matter: Policy

Assessment of Scientific and Technical Information. EPA-452/R-96-013. Office of Air

Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, NC. July.

EPA 1996b. Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter. EPA-600/P-95-001aF, Vols. 1-3. Office

of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, NC. April.

Fischer, L.E., et al. 1987. Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway

Accident Conditions. NUREG/CR-4829, UCID-20733. Prepared by Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Division of Reactor System

Safety, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Washington, DC.

Hanna, S.R., et al. 1994. Technical Documentation of HGSYSTEM/UF6 Model. Earth

Technology Corporation, Concord, MA.

Johnson, P.E., and R.D. Michelhaugh 2000, Transportation Routing Analysis Geographic

Information System (WebTRAGIS) User’s Manual. ORNL/TM-2000/86. Prepared by Oak

Ridge National Laboratory, Computational Physics and Engineering Division, Oak Ridge, TN,

for U.S. Department of Energy, National Transportation Program, Albuquerque, NM. April.

McGuire, S.A. 1991. Chemical Toxicity of Uranium Hexafluoride Compared to Acute Effects of

Radiation, Final Report. NUREG-1391. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of

Nuclear Regulatory Research, Washington, DC. Feb.

Negin, C.A. and G. Worku 1992. MicroShield, Version 4, User’s Manual. Grove 92-2. Grove

Engineering, Inc., Rockville, MD.

Neuhauser, K.S., and F.L. Kanipe 1992. RADTRAN 4: Volume 3, User Guide. SAND89-2370. 

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.

Neuhauser, K.S., and F.L. Kanipe 1995. RADTRAN 4: Volume 2, Technical Manual. 

SAND89-2370. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
Appendix C

C-27

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 1977a. Calculation of Annual Dose to Man from

Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, Rev. 1. Regulatory Guide 1.109. Washington, DC.

NRC 1977b. Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by

Air and Other Modes. NUREG-0170. Washington, DC.

NRC 1994. “10 CFR Part 19, et al., Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants, Final Rule,

discussion on Section 76.85, ‘Assessment of Accidents.’” Federal Register

59(184):48954-48955, Sept. 23.

Ostro, B., and L. Chestnut 1998. “Assessing the Health Benefits of Reducing Particular Matter

Air Pollution in the United States.” Environmental Research A 76:94-106.

Policastro, A.J., et al. 1997. Unpublished information. Argonne National Laboratory,

Argonne, IL.

Post, L. 1994a. HGSYSTEM 3.0, User’s Manual. TNER.94.058. Shell Research Limited,

Thornton Research Centre, Chester, United Kingdom.

Post, L. (ed.) 1994b. HGSYSTEM 3.0, Technical Reference Manual. TNER.94.059. Shell

Research Limited, Thornton Research Centre, Chester, United Kingdom.

Saricks, C., and T. Kvitek 1994. Longitudinal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics for

Carriers of Interstate Freight. ANL/ESD/TM-68. Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL. 

July.

Saricks, C., and M. Tompkins 1999. State-Level Accident Rates of Surface Freight

Transportation: A Re-Examination. ANL/ESD/TM-150. Argonne National Laboratory,

Argonne, IL.

Sprung, J.L., et al. 2000. Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates. 

NUREG/CR-6672, SAND2000-0234. Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,

Washington, DC.

USEC (United States Enrichment Corporation) 1999. The UF6 Manual, Good Handling

Practices for Uranium Hexafluoride. USEC-651, Rev. 8. Jan.

Wilmot, E.L. 1981. Transportation Accident Scenarios for Commercial Spent Fuel. 

SAND80-2124. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM.
Appendix C

C-28

 

 
Appendix D

D-1

APPENDIX D:

SOCIOECONOMICS
Appendix D

D-2
Appendix D

D-3

APPENDIX D:

SOCIOECONOMICS

This appendix (1) discusses the methods and briefly describes the data sources that were used

to perform the socioeconomic analyses for this environmental impact statement (EIS) 

(Section D.1) and (2) presents fiscal data collected from each of the counties, cities, and school

districts in the region of influence (as defined below) (Section D.2).

D.1 Impact Assessment Methods

The socioeconomic analysis for a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (the proposed MOX

facility), including its supporting facilities, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF)

and the Waste Solidification Building (WSB), at the Savannah River Site (SRS) assessed

impacts at two geographic scales. A regional economic area (REA) was used to assess

impacts on employment and income for the various alternatives. An REA is a broad market

area defined by the economic linkages among the regional industrial and service sectors and

the communities within a region. In this case, the REA consists of 15 counties in South Carolina

and Georgia (see Table D.1). A region of influence (ROI) that consists of the four counties in

which the majority (90%) of the SRS employees live was used to assess impacts on population,

housing, community services, and traffic (see Table D.1).

D.1.1 Impacts on Regional Employment and Income

The assessment of projected impacts of the proposed facilities on regional employment and

income was based on the use of regional economic multipliers. These multipliers capture the

indirect (off-site) effects of on-site activities associated with construction and operation.

To estimate employment impacts of the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB at the

SRS, direct and indirect employment impacts associated with construction and operation were

taken from data provided in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) EIS (DOE 1999,

Appendix F, Section 9.2). The indirect (off-site) employment impacts were estimated from

these data by using the relationship between direct and indirect employment of the facilities in

the REA at the SRS as estimated in the SPD EIS. By using direct (on-site) facility employment

data taken from the project Environmental Report (ER)(DCS 2002) as the basis for calculation,

the indirect employment impacts were estimated for the peak year of construction and for the

first year of operations.

The impact of facility construction and operation on regional incomes was estimated by using

facility employment impact estimates together with average regional income multipliers for the

REA taken from Intelligent Multi-Resource Planning (IMPLAN) regional economic data (MIG,

Inc., 2001). IMPLAN input-output economic accounts show the flow of commodities to 
Appendix D

D-4

Table D.1. Jurisdictions included in the

regional economic area and ROI 

at the SRS

Regional Economic Area

Georgia South Carolina

Counties Counties

 Burke Aiken

 Columbia Allendale

 Glascock Bamberg

 Jefferson Barnwell

 Jenkins Edgefield

 Lincoln

 McDuffie

 Richmond

 Warren

 Wikes

Region of Influence

Georgia South Carolina

Counties Counties

 Columbia Aiken

 Richmond Barnwell

Cities Cities

 Augusta Aiken

 Blythe Jackson

 Grovetown New Ellenton

 Harlem North Augusta

 Hephzibah Wagener

School Districts School Districts

 Columbia County Aiken County

 Richmond County Barnwell #19

 Barnwell #29

 Barnwell #45
Appendix D

D-5

industries from producers and institutional consumers. The accounts also show consumption

activities by workers, owners of capital, and imports from outside the region. The IMPLAN

model contains 528 sectors representing industries in agriculture, mining, construction,

manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, utilities, finance, insurance and real estate, and

consumer and business services. The model also includes information for each sector on

employee compensation; proprietary and property income; personal consumption expenditures;

federal, state, and local expenditures; inventory and capital formation; imports; and exports.

Impacts on employment are described in terms of the total number of jobs created in the region

in the peak year of construction and in the first year of operation. The relative impact of the

increase in employment in the REA was calculated by comparing total facility construction

employment over the period in which construction would occur with baseline REA employment

forecasts over the same period. Impacts are expressed in terms of the percentage point

difference in the average annual employment growth rate with and without facility construction. 

The forecasts were based on data from the U.S. Department of Commerce (U.S. Bureau of the

Census 1992, 2002b).

D.1.2 Impacts on Population

An important consideration in assessing potential impacts of the proposed facilities was the

number of workers, families, and children who might move into the ROI (in-migrate), either

temporarily or permanently, with construction and operation of the proposed facilities. The

capacity of regional labor markets to provide sufficient workers in the appropriate occupations

required for facility construction and operation is closely related to the occupational profile of

the REA and to occupational unemployment rates. To estimate the in-migration that would

occur to satisfy direct labor requirements, the analysis developed estimates of available labor in

each direct labor category on the basis of REA unemployment rates applied to each

occupational category. In-migration associated with indirect labor requirements was derived

from estimates of available labor in the REA economy as a whole able to satisfy the demand for

labor by industry sectors in which facility spending would initially occur. The national average

household size was used to calculate the number of additional family members who would

accompany direct and indirect in-migrating workers.

Impacts on population are described in terms of the total number of in-migrants arriving in the

region in the peak year of construction and in the first year of operation. The relative impact of

the increase in population in the REA was calculated by comparing total facility construction inmigration over the period in which construction would occur with baseline REA population

forecasts over the same period. Impacts are expressed in terms of the percentage point

difference in the average annual population growth rate with and without project construction. 

The forecasts were based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Bureau of the Census

2002a).
Appendix D

D-6

D.1.3 Impacts on Local Housing Markets

The in-migration of workers that would occur during construction and operation would have the

potential to substantially affect the housing market in the ROI. The analysis considered these

impacts by estimating the increase in demand for rental housing units in the peak year of

construction and for owner occupied housing in the first year of operation that would result from

the in-migration of both direct and indirect workers into the ROI. The impacts on housing are

described in terms of the number of rental units required in the peak year of construction and

the number of owner occupied units required in the first year of operations. The relative impact

on the existing housing in the ROI was estimated by comparing the calculated facility-related

housing demand with the forecasted number of vacant rental housing units in the peak year of

construction and the forecasted number of vacant owner occupied units in the first year of

operations. The forecasts were based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Bureau of

the Census 1994, 2002a).

D.1.4 Impacts on Community Services

In-migration associated with construction and operation of the facilities could increase demand

for educational services and for other public services (e.g., police and fire protection, health

services) in the ROI. Estimates of the total number of in-migrating workers and their families

for facility construction and operation were used as a basis for calculating the potential increase

in public service demands in the core ROI counties in which the majority of new workers would

be expected to locate. Impacts of the facilities on county, city, and school district revenues and

expenditures were also calculated on the basis of baseline data provided in the jurisdictions’

annual comprehensive financial reports. Impacts were forecasted for the peak year of

construction and in the first year of operations on the basis of per capita revenues and

expenditures for each jurisdiction. The population forecasts were based on data from the

U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a).

Impacts of facility-induced in-migration on community service employment were also calculated

for the core ROI counties. The estimated numbers of in-migrating workers and families were

used to calculate the numbers of new sworn police officers, firefighters, and general

government employees required to maintain the existing levels of service for each community

service. Calculations were based on the existing number of employees per 1,000 population for

each community service. The analysis of the impact on educational employment estimated the

number of teachers in each school district required to maintain existing teacher-student ratios

across all student age groups. Impacts on health care employment were estimated by

calculating the number of physicians in each county required to maintain the existing level of

service. The estimated impacts are given in terms of the number of additional physicians and

the number of additional staffed hospital beds required to maintain the existing levels of service

(expressed in terms of number of doctors and number of staffed hospital beds per

1,000 population). Information on existing employment and levels of service was collected from

the individual jurisdictions providing each service.
Appendix D

D-7

D.1.5 Impacts on Traffic

Impacts on traffic in the ROI are described in terms of the effects of the increase in traffic from

the facilities on the “levels of service” of major road segments used to commute to and from the

site by existing site employees. The analysis allocated trips made by construction workers to

individual road segments on the basis of the residential distribution of existing site workers. 

The impact on the existing annual average number of daily trips was then calculated, and the

impact on the level of service provided by each individual segment was estimated. Traffic

information used in the analysis was collected from state and county transportation

departments.

D.1.6 Impacts of Accidents

The impacts of accidents associated with a MOX facility on agriculture, water, and fisheries

resources, and subsequently on the economies of communities surrounding SRS, were not

estimated in the EIS because it is not expected that the impacts from an accident would be

significant. In the case of the most serious accident, potential damage to crops under the

plume in the event of an airborne release and the subsequent damage to water resources from

the associated runoff would be small because the amount of radioactive material deposited per

unit area would be relatively small. Dilution of runoff would occur fairly rapidly in the affected

rivers and streams and would not cause any significant risk to the economies of the

communities downstream of the location of the proposed facility. Any interdiction of crops as a

result of the deposition of radioactive material would be a limited, one-time event, and if it were

to occur at all, only would affect a small number of farm communities. Emergency response

activities associated with a release from the facility would be handled by local emergency

response and health authorities already prepared for accidents at SRS, with no resulting

additional burden on local community financial resources.

D.2 Region of Influence Fiscal Data

Financial data for local governmental bodies and school districts in the ROI for the facilities are

presented in Tables D.2 and D.3.
Appendix D

D-8

Table D.2. ROI local government financial data ($ millions)

Columbia County, Georgia

Category

Columbia

County

Town of

Grovetown

Town of

Harlem

Revenues

 Taxes 23.4 0.7 0.9

 Licenses and permits 0.3 0.0 0.0

 Intergovernmental 1.6 1.0 0.0

 Charges for services 1.1 0.4 0.2

 Fines and forfeits 1.6 0.2 0.1

 Miscellaneous 0.9 0.1 0.0

 Total 28.9 2.5 1.3

Expenditures

 General government 8.1 0.7 0.2

 Public safety 11.8 0.7 0.4

 Highways and streets 3.3 0.3 0.2

 Health, welfare and

 sanitation

0.9 0.4 0.1

 Culture and recreation 2.5 0.0 0.0

 Debt service 0.0 0.0 0.0

 Intergovernmental 0.0 0.0 0.0

 Other 0.9 0.0 0.0

 Total 27.5 2.1 1.0

 Revenues less

 expenditures

+1.4 +0.3 +0.3
Appendix D

D-9

Table D.2. Continued

Richmond County, Georgia

Category

City of

Augusta/

Richmond

County

City of

Blythe

City of

Hephzibah

Revenues

 Taxes 55.9 0.1 0.8

 Licenses and permits 2.3 0.0 0.0

 Intergovernmental 3.0 0.0 0.0

 Charges for services 12.8 0.0 0.0

 Fines and forfeits 9.0 0.0 0.0

 Miscellaneous 3.0 0.1 0.1

Total 86.0 0.2 0.9

Expenditures

 General government 26.3 0.1 0.1

 Public safety 34.2 0.1 0.4

 Highways and streets 6.1 0.0 0.0

 Health, welfare and

 sanitation

5.2 0.0 0.0

 Culture and recreation 9.3 0.0 0.0

 Debt service 2.0 0.0 0.0

 Intergovernmental 2.4 0.0 0.0

 Other

Total 85.5 0.2 0.5

Revenues less expenditures +0.5 0.0 +0.4
Appendix D

D-10

Table D.2. Continued

Aiken County, South Carolina

Category

Aiken

County

City of

Aiken

Town of

Jackson

Revenues

 Taxes 16.0 6.4 0.2

 Licenses and permits 0.6 4.6 0.1

 Intergovernmental 7.7 1.5 0.0

 Charges for services 2.0 3.7 0.2

 Fines and forfeits 3.2 0.6 0.2

 Miscellaneous 1.0 11.0 0.0

Total 30.5 27.8 0.7

Expenditures

 General government 12.1 1.6 0.5

 Public safety 10.6 5.4 0.1

 Highways and streets 3.7 1.9 0.0

 Health, welfare and

 sanitation

1.7 2.4 0.1

 Culture and recreation 2.4 2.3 0.0

 Debt service 0.0 0.3 0.0

 Intergovernmental 0.0 0.0 0.0

 Other 0.0 11.8 0.3

Total 30.5 25.7 0.9

Revenues less expenditures 0.0 +2.1 -0.2
Appendix D

D-11

Table D.2. Continued

Aiken County, South Carolina

Category

Town of

New

Ellenton

City of

North

Augusta

Town of

Wagener

Revenues

 Taxes 0.3 3.7 0.1

 Licenses and permits 0.1 2.0 0.1

 Intergovernmental 0.1 0.6 0.0

 Charges for services 0.2 0.8 0.1

 Fines and forfeits 0.1 0.5 0.0

 Miscellaneous 0.0 0.3 0.1

Total 0.8 7.9 0.4

Expenditures

 General government 0.2 1.5 0.2

 Public safety 0.4 3.4 0.1

 Highways and streets 0.1 0.8 0.0

 Health, welfare and

 sanitation

0.1 0.0 0.1

 Culture and recreation 0.1 1.7 0.0

 Debt service 0.0 0.0 0.0

 Intergovernmental 0.0 0.0 0.0

 Other 0.0 0.3 0.0

Total 0.9 7.7 0.4

Revenues less expenditures -0.1 +0.2 0.0
Appendix D

D-12

Table D.2. Continued

Barnwell County, South Carolina

Category

Barnwell

County

City of

Barnwell

Town of

Blackville

Town of

Williston

Revenues

 Taxes 3.0 1.2 0.4 1.1

 Licenses and permits 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0

 Intergovernmental 1.6 0.2 0.1 0.2

 Charges for services 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0

 Fines and forfeits 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0

 Miscellaneous 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total 8.9 2.1 1.0 1.3

Expenditures

 General government 2.5 0.4 0.1 0.2

 Public safety 2.0 0.9 0.5 0.6

 Highways and streets 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.2

 Health, welfare and

 sanitation

1.1 0.2 0.1 0.2

 Culture and recreation 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0

 Debt service 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0

 Intergovernmental 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

 Other 2.0 0.0 0.1 0.1

Total 8.6 1.7 0.9 1.3

Revenues less expenditures +0.3 +0.4 +0.1 0.0

Sources: Columbia County, annual financial report, June 30, 2000; City of

Grovetown Financial Report, December 31, 2000; City of Harlem Annual Financial Report,

December 31, 2000; City of Augusta/Richmond County, Annual Financial Statements,

December 31, 1999; City of Blythe, Annual Financial Report, December 31, 2000; City of

Hephzibah, Financial Statements and Independent Auditors Report, June 30, 2000; Aiken

County, Annual Financial Report, June 30, 2000; City of Aiken, Annual Report, June 30, 2000;

Town of Jackson, Financial Statements, June 30, 2000; Town of New Ellenton, Financial

Statements, June 30, 1999; City of North Augusta, Annual Financial Statements,

December 31, 2000; Town of Wagener, Financial Statements, June 30, 1999; Barnwell

County, Audited Financial Statements, June 30, 2000; City of Barnwell, Financial Statements,

September 30, 2000; Town of Blackville, Audited General Purpose Financial Statements,

June 30, 2000; Town of Williston, Financial Statements, June 30, 2000.
Appendix D

D-13

Table D.3. ROI school district financial data ($ millions)

Georgia South Carolina

Category

Columbia

County

Richmond

County Aiken County

Barnwell

Countya,b

Revenues

 Local sources 32.8 81.2 31.5 8.9

 State sources 64.4 134.6 66.5 20.0

 Federal sources 0.1 16.1 0.1 0.1

 Other 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0

 Total 99.5 231.9 98.1 29.0

Expenditures

 Administration 

 and instruction 65.5 161.1 65.0 17.7

 Services 27.9 48.0 34.6 8.3

 Debt service 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0

 Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2

 Total 93.4 209.1 99.8 28.2

 Revenues less

 expenditures +6.1 +22.8 -1.6 +0.8

a

Includes Williston School District #19, #29, and #45.

b

Revenue data estimated based on South Carolina Department of Education, 2001 School and

District Report Cards, and Williston School District #29, Financial Statements, June 30, 2000.

Sources: Columbia County Board of Education, General Purpose Financial Statements,

June 30, 2000; Georgia Department of Education, Local, State and Federal Revenue Report Fiscal

Year 2001, available at http://dbl.doe.k12go.us:8001/ows-bin/owo/fin_pack_revenue.display.proc;

Consolidated School District of Aiken County Financial Statements, June 30, 2000; South Carolina

Department of Education, 2001 School and District Report Cards, available at

http://www.unyscschools.com/reportcard/2001/; DCS 2002; Williston School District #29, Financial

Statements, June 30, 2000.
Appendix D

D-14

D.3 References for Appendix D

DCS (Duke Cogema Stone & Webster) 2002. Mixed Oxide Fabrication Facility Environmental

Report, Revision 1 & 2. Docket Number 070-03098. Charlotte, NC.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 1999. Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental

Impact Statement. DOE/EIS-0283. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Washington, DC.

MIG, Inc. 2001. “IMPLAN Data Files.” MIG, Inc., Sillwater, MN.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992. County Business Patterns, 1990. Washington, DC. 

Available at http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994. City and County Data Book, 1994. Washington, DC.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a. U.S. Census American Fact Finder. Washington, DC. 

Available at http://factfinder.census.gov/.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002b. County Business Patterns, 2000. Washington, DC. 

Available at http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html.
Appendix E

E-1

APPENDIX E:

HUMAN HEALTH RISK
Appendix E

E-2
Appendix E

E-3

APPENDIX E:

HUMAN HEALTH RISK

This appendix provides detailed information concerning the input data and assumptions used in

the chemical and radiological human health risk assessments performed for this Mixed Oxide

(MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility Environmental Impact Statement. For chemicals, only

accidents are addressed in this appendix; the evaluation of health impacts from chemical

exposures during normal operations is discussed in Sections 3.10, 4.2.2, and 4.3.1.

E.1 Chemical

Impacts from the accidental release of chemical materials were assessed for Savannah River

Site (SRS) workers outside the restricted area of the facility (“SRS employees”) and members

of the public. Impacts to facility workers would be sensitive to the specific circumstances of

each accident and are not estimated in this assessment.

About 30 MOX process chemicals were identified for use in the proposed MOX facility and

support facilities. A chemical was eliminated from the analysis if it had a very low volatility

(i.e., vapor pressure <1 Pa (7.5 x 10-3 mmHg), had a low toxicity (i.e., a temporary emergency

exposure limit 1 [TEEL 1] >15 mg/m3

, was stored in small quantities (maximum container

quantity <38 L [10 gal]), or was stored and used as a solid. Impacts of a chemical release with

these characteristics would be expected to be minimal. Chemicals eliminated from evaporative

spill analysis because of very low vapor pressures at ambient temperatures were

(1) manganese nitrate, (2) oxalic acid, (3) silver nitrate, (4) uranyl nitrate, (5) sodium hydroxide,

(6) aluminum nitrate, and (7) phosphoric acid. Chemicals eliminated because of low toxicity

were (1) aluminum sulfate, (2) isopropanol, (3) sodium carbonate, (4) sodium sulfite, and

(5) zirconium nitrate. Chemicals eliminated because they are solids were azodicarbonamide,

sodium nitrite, and zinc stearate. All other material inventories were analyzed in detail. A spill

of sulfuric acid at the PDCF was also eliminated from further analysis based on the assumption

that it would contain a concentration of less than 30% sulfur trioxide (i.e., not fuming) and would

therefore not pose a toxic inhalation hazard.

The quantity of material released to the atmosphere was determined on the basis of the

available physical properties of the spilled chemical (e.g., vapor pressure, mass transfer

coefficient), meteorological conditions (e.g., wind speed), and the chemical storage conditions

(e.g., temperature, pressure) (see Table E.1). This quantity defined the source term, which was

determined either by estimating chemical evaporation rates or pressurized release rates and

the associated release durations. The evaporative source term was used as input to the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Areal Locations of Hazardous

Atmospheres (ALOHA) dispersion model (Reynolds 1992). Impacts from pressurized releases

were simulated with the HGSYSTEM model.
E-4

Appendix E

Table E.1. Chemical inventory, spill quantity, concentrations, and mole fraction (MF) calculationsa

Concentrations

Density

N

Pure Mpure (moles/

Facility and MWsolute MWsol Compound Solution [100%] M L x #_H

 Chemical name Formula (g/mole) (g/mole) (kg/m3) (kg/L) (moles/L) (moles/L) (%) atoms)

MOX (BAP and BRP)Dodecane C12H26 170.34 170.3 750 0.75 4.4 4.4 100 44.28Nitrogen tetroxide N O2 4 92.01 92 1,450 1.45 15.76 15.76 100 15.76

Hydrazine H N6 O 32.05 50.1 1,030 1.01 32.14 11.25 2 35 67.5

Hydrazine-NaOH mixture N H2 4-NaOH 32.05 72.0 1,030 1.03 32.14 0.03 0.10 0.16Hydrazine/hydroxylamine nitrate mixture

H N4 O2 4 – N H2 4 32.05 128.1 1,030 1.54 32.14 0.15 0.47 0.6

Hydroxylamine nitrate (HAN) H N4 O2 4 96.05 114.1 1,540 1.29 16.03 1.90 11.8 7.6Hydrogen peroxide H O2 2 34.02 52 1,440 1.27 42.33 14.82 35 29.6

Tributyl phosphate (TBP) C12H27O P 266.36 266.4 980 0.98 3.68 3.68 4 100 99.3

Nitric acid (13.6 M) HNO3 63.01 81 1,380 1.28 21.90 13.6 62.1 13.6

Nitric acid (2.1 M) HNO3 63.01 81 1,380 1.20 21.90 2.1 9.6 2.1WSBNitric acid (10.1 M) HNO3 63.01 81 1,276 1.18 15.74 10.1 64 10.1

PDCFb

Chlorine (gas) Cl2 70.91 70.9 1,491 1.49 21.03 21.03 100 21.03
E-5

Appendix E Table E.1. Continued Inventory Spill moles Spill mass Spill volume Process tank nsolvent msolvent

Facility and fill quantity Solution nsolute (water) nsolution msolute (x or H O) m 2 sol.

Chemical name (kg) (ga)l (gal) (L) (moles) (moles) (moles) MF (kg) (kg) (kg)

MOX (BAP and BRP)Dodecane 511 180 180 681 2,998.5 0 2,998.5 1 510.8 0.00 510.8Nitrogen tetroxide 1,317 240 240 908 14,315.2 0 14,315.2 1 1,317 0.00 1,317Hydrazine 491 126 126 478 5,371.4 3,491 8,862.8 0.6061 268.9 62.90 331.8Hydrazine-NaOH mixture 1,497 384 384 1,455 46.6 46,725 46,771.3 0.0010 4.4 841.75 846.1

Hydrazine/hydroxylamine nitrate mixture

2,445 627 627 2,376 356.4 76,012 76,368.8 0.0047 45.7 1,369.36 1,415.0

Hydroxylamine nitrate (HAN) 1,166 200 200 758 1,440.2 1,270 2,709.7 0.5315 138.3 22.87 161.2Hydrogen peroxide 300 55 55 208 3,088.6 2,008 5,096.2 0.6061 105.1 36.17 141.2

Tributyl phosphate (TBP) 467 126 126 478 1,757.0 0 1,757.0 1 468.0 0.00 468.0Nitric acid (13.6 M) 841 161 161 610 8,298.6 3,145 11,443.8 0.7252 522.9 56.66 579.6Nitric acid (2.1 M) 6,901 1,321 1,321 5,007 10,514 9,506 20,020 0.5252 662.5 171.24 833.8WSBNitric acid (10.1 M) 1,690 350 350 1,327 13,365 4,811 18,176 0.7353 842.1 86.67 928.8PDCFb

Chlorine (gas) 430 240 240 911 19,158 0 19,158 1 430 0.00 430 

aIn general, chemicals used, concentrations, and process tank fill quantities for the proposed MOX facility were obtained from DCS (2004b, Table 8-2a

and DCS 2003a, 2004a); values for the PDCF were obtained from DOE (1999, Appendix E). Concentrations obtained from these sources are in bold italics;

others are calculated values.

bSulfuric acid was also listed for this facility with an annual usage of 470 kg. The concentration was not given, so quantitative spill modeling was not

performed. If dilute, the solution would have low volatility and would present minimal hazards from accidental spills. However, if it was a concentration of 30%or more sulfur trioxide, sulfuric acid is highly water reactive and could present inhalation risks to facility workers or SRS employees if spilled.

Abbreviations: MOX: proposed MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility; BAP: Aqueous Polishing Area; BRP: Reagent Processing Building; WSB: Waste SolidificationBuilding; PDCF: Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility.
Appendix E

E-6

For modeling potential impacts to the general public at the SRS site boundary (approximately

8.2 km [5.1 mi] from the proposed MOX facility), the estimated source term was used as input

to the ALOHA dispersion model. For modeling potential impacts to SRS workers (assumed to

be located a minimum of 100 m [330 ft] from the proposed MOX facility), the ARCON96 model

(Ramsdell and Simonen 1997) was used because this model accounts for near-field

concentrations affected by low wind speeds, plume meander, and building wake effects. This

model is also used to be consistent with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidance

regarding control room habitability during a hazardous chemical release (NRC Regulatory

Guide 1.78 (NRC 2001). ARCON96 was used for modeling impacts for all receptors (SRS

workers and general public) for uranium dioxide powder releases, similar to the modeling done

for accidental releases of other radionuclides.

Two of the MOX process chemicals, nitrogen tetroxide and chlorine, are stored as pressurized

liquids. Impacts from accidental releases of these two compounds were estimated with the

HGSYSTEM model (Post 1994a,b).

Evaporative releases can be considered as either the “puddle” or “direct” source release mode

in ALOHA. To use the puddle option, physical properties of the spilled chemical must be

known. These properties, such as vapor pressure and molecular weight, are required in

estimating evaporation rates. Physical properties are included for approximately 800 pure

chemicals in ALOHA’s chemical library. Because only two of the 13 MOX chemicals are

included in the library and because the effect of dilute solution adjustments to vapor pressure

are not allowed in ALOHA, the direct source release option was used to assess impacts for

11 evaporative spill scenarios. A simple evaporation algorithm, similar to ALOHA and other

source evaporation codes, such as ADAM (Raj and Morris 1987; Kawamura and MacKay

1987), was incorporated into a spreadsheet along with the necessary physical properties for

each of the eight chemicals. A brief description of the spreadsheet algorithm and its limitations

and assumptions are given below:

(E-1)

where

Ap = pool area (m2

),

km = mass transfer coefficient (m/s),

MWm = molecular weight of chemical (g/mole),

Psat = saturation vapor pressure of chemical (Pa),

R = Universal Gas Constant (= 8314.472), and

Tp = pool temperature (K).
Appendix E

E-7

P

MF P MW e

MF MW

mixvap

i vapi i

kP t

i

n

i i

i

n

vap

=

−

=

=

∑

∑

***

*

1

1

The evaporation rate from spilled chemical pools is conservatively assumed to be constant,

along with the pool temperature and saturation vapor pressure, for the entire release duration. 

The saturation vapor pressure is set equal to the partial pressure over the pool. The saturation

vapor pressure or the partial pressures of the vapors emanating from the pool are a function of

the pool temperature through use of chemical-specific Antoine or Harlacher coefficients for

inorganic compounds, and through the use of the Clausius-Clapeyron equation for organic

compounds (e.g., tributyl phosphate [TBP]). In addition to the assumption that the saturation

vapor pressure is equal to the vapor pressure of the chemical at ambient release conditions, the

pool temperature is assumed equal to the ambient temperature for the entire release duration. 

Two ambient cases were assessed, one representing the 95th percentile temperature during the

day and the other the 95th percentile during the night (see discussion of the full set of assumed

weather conditions below). In cases where temperature-specific data (e.g., Antione coefficients

and equations) were not available, temperature-dependent Pvap adjustments from a reference

level (e.g., STP) were made using the ratio of vapor pressures (reference level to compound

value at specified temperature) for compounds with similar physical properties for which these

pressures were known at two representative temperature levels.

Two of the chemical compounds in the inventory are binary mixtures. The vapor pressure of

mixtures was estimated using the following equation (CCPS 1996):

(E-2)

where

MFi = mole fraction of component i,

Pvapi = vapor pressure of component i,

k = kmAp/nTRT,

nT = total number of moles of mixture,

MWi = molecular weight of component i, and

t = 1.

Raoult’s Law was used to make additional adjustments to spill vapor pressures to account for

dilute solutions(such a solution lowers the vapor pressure of the solvent below that of the solute

in proportion to the mole fraction of the solute). Table E.1 gives the computed mole fractions

used in the analysis, along with the assumed spill volumes and the given chemical inventories

and concentrations. 
Appendix E

E-8

= < 0 664 320 000 13 12 . , / / N N for N Sc Re Re

=− ≥ 0 037 15 200 320 000 13 08 . [ ,] , . / . N N for N Sc Re Re

The mass transfer coefficient (km), used in most evaporative release models, is computed by

one of two main methods used in source emission models, as shown in Equations E-3 and E-4

below. Both values were calculated for each chemical in the analysis and the expression giving 

the largest mass transfer rate between the liquid and the vapor was used in estimating the

chemical-specific evaporative rate:

 NShDma km = ______ (E-3)

 dp 

km2

 = 0.0048 u7/9

10 d -1/9p N -2/3Sc (E-4)

where

Dma = molecular diffusivity;

dp = pool depth;

u10 = wind speed at 10-m level;

υm = kinematic viscosity of the chemical;

NRe = Reynolds number,

= u10dp/υm;

NSc = Schmidt number,

= υm/Dma;

and

NSh = Sherwood number,

Chemical-specific molecular diffusivities (i.e., of chemical in air) and kinematic viscosities were

used in all cases where data were available. In the absence of data (about one-third of the

cases), the molecular diffusivity of water or the kinematic viscosity of air were used as

substitutes. This estimate was made to be conservative (i.e., use of Graham’s Law to estimate

molecular diffusivity would produce a value smaller than that of water).

Pressurized releases (i.e., nitrogen tetroxide and chlorine) were modeled with HGSYSTEM’s

SPILL, AEROPLUME, and HEGADAS modules. To estimate the effects of building 
Appendix E

E-9

aerodynamic influence, the WAKE module was also run, assuming winds perpendicular to the

largest building width. The source term was generated from the SPILL module, which

simulates the transient liquid release from a pressurized vessel. AEROPLUME is a

multicomponent, two-phase thermodynamic aerosol jet model that simulates steady-state

release rates from a rupture or a leaking pressurized vessel and the near-field vapor cloud

development of the flashed vapor and aerosol components in expelled jet release. Upon

formation of the flow field from the release point and establishment of a heavy aerosol laden

cloud, the release is linked to the HEGADAS module to simulate dense vapor cloud dispersion

and entrainment of ambient air as the cloud moves and disperses downwind. For the buildinginfluenced case, the WAKE module uses the source term from the SPILL module and simulates

the aerodynamics in the wake of structures and neutrally buoyant vapor cloud dispersion

beyond the wake. In the near-field, WAKE also simulates the concentration field of a release

that may get trapped with the cavity recirculation region close to the building. It can also

account for air entrainment and escape of vapors initially captured in the cavity region in back of

the building, and the transport and dispersion of contaminants in the far wake and beyond. 

Site-specific data used are from a 60-m meteorological tower in the H-Area, relatively close to

the proposed MOX location. Hourly wind speed and direction and related fluctuating parameters

at the 60-m level were available for a 5-year period from 1992 through 1996. The data were

preprocessed at the SRS Plant and sent to Argonne for use in the MOX environmental

evaluation. The data were reported in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and were adjusted in the

analysis for local time. Winds at the 60-m level were adjusted to 10 m with a power-law

equation.

As mentioned previously, two sets of meteorological conditions, representative of daytime and

nighttime conditions and producing conservative emissions and dispersion, were simulated for

each evaporative release scenario. Although daytime releases would have more favorable

dispersion conditions than nighttime releases, a larger release rate would occur because of

higher ambient temperatures and higher near ground-level wind speeds. Both cases needed to

be examined in order to determine the controlling, or “worst-case,” site-specific weather

conditions.

To be consistent with the ARCON96 model, the 95th percentile daytime and nighttime winds

were computed from the 5 years of tower data. Wind speeds were adjusted from the measured

60-m level to the 10-m level by using the standard power-law wind profiles employed in most

EPA models (e.g., ISC). The 95th percentile day and night winds are representative of winds

that occurred over the measurement period. By definition, 95% of all measured day and night

wind speeds at the site would cause more plume dispersion. Similar computations were

performed to derive the 95th percentile temperatures, defined as ambient temperatures

producing reasonable upper-bound evaporative emission rates. Because higher wind speeds

also tend to increase pool evaporation, the 5th percentile wind speeds (i.e., the 5th percentile

here is defined as representing the largest wind speeds measured in the 5-year period studies)

were also computed. Each of the meteorological cases, including the 95th percentile

concentration ARCON case used for estimating 100-m downwind involved worker exposures,

is summarized in Table E.2. In addition to wind speed and temperature, the complete set of

meteorological parameters used in the ALOHA simulations and the temperatures and wind
Appendix E

E-10

speeds used in the evaporative spreadsheet calculation tool are summarized in the table. A 

fourth set of conditions, typical during sunrise or sunset (given in the table), was also run to see

if the larger wind speed and neutral conditions would result in more conservative impacts.

These conditions resulted in lower impacts and are not further discussed.

Surface roughness was assumed to be 50 cm, which is representative of a good portion of the

SRS (Weber 2002). This roughness is large enough to switch the ALOHA computed dispersion

coefficients to that representative of urban environments, which will enhance the horizontal and

vertical spread of released contaminant as it is advected downwind.

The spill scenario assumed that a forklift punctured a liquid storage tank containing the

chemical. Estimates are needed for three key parameters used in determining the evaporation

rates (Equation E-1). These parameters are the ambient temperature (Ta), pool area, and

vapor pressure. Varying stability conditions, temperatures, and wind speeds were modeled to

determine worst-case emission and dispersion conditions. Unlimited mixing was assumed to be

consistent with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) models (e.g., TSCREEN, ISC) for

these conservative nighttime dispersion conditions. The maximum mixing height value, set as a

default in ALOHA, is 1,524 m (5,000 ft).

All of the tanks were assumed to be cylindrical in shape with the puncture hole assumed to be

located near the tank bottom. Tank dimensions varied depending on the specific chemical

inventories. The calculated spill quantities were conservatively assumed to be the full contents

of each liquid storage container. The spilled liquid was assumed to spread out on a concrete

surface, with a surface roughness of around 3 cm (1.2 in.), to a pool depth of 2.54 cm (1 in.). 

The final pool area and diameter were computed by assuming a circular pool with a uniform

Table E.2. Scenario meteorologya,b

Parameter

Day

(95% temp/

95% winds)

ARCON

(95% conc.,

ARCON)

Night

(95% temp/

95% winds)

Sunrise/

Sunset

(95% temp/

5% winds)

Ta (K) 304.0 299.2 299.2 299.2

Ta (o

F) 87.5 78.5 78.5 78.5

u10 (m/s) 1.3 2.2 1.3 4.7

Stability D F F D

Frequency 27% n/a 11% 100%

zi

 (m) 416 n/a Unlimited Unlimited

Cloud cover 7/10 Clear to 4/10 Clear to 4/10 Clear to 4/10

RH (%) 85% 65% 65% 65%

Insolation Slight Night Night Slight

a

Ta = ambient temperature, u10 = wind speed at 10 m, zi = mixing height, 

RH = relative humidity.

b

zo = surface roughness = 50 cm, season = summer.
E-11

Appendix E Table E.3. Evaporative release modeling results Maximum Hazard distance evaporation Release SRS rate durationa worker TEEL1 TEEL2 TEEL3

exposure

Q td @100 m Passive Dense Passive Dense Passive Dense

Chemical MET (kg/h) (h) (mg/m3) (km) (km) (km) (km) (km) (km)

Dodecane Day 0.51 1,000 < 0.01 0.016 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01

ARCON 0.96 6.1 0.16 -b - - - --

Night 0.31 2,200 0.064 0.054 0.012 0.011 < 0.01 < 0.01

Hydrazine Day 11.5 28.8 0.41 0.84 0.13 0.26 0.05 0.1

ARCON 17.4 19.1 2.9 - - - - - -

Night 8.8 37.5 0.93 1.3 0.26 0.4 0.1 0.15

Hydrazine/NaOH Day 0.13 18,000 0.032 NAc 0.01 NA < 0.010 NA

ARCON 0.098 23,000 0.02 - - - - - -

Night 0.11 15,000 0.064 NA 0.020 NA < 0.010 NA

Hydrazine/HAN Day 30.0 69.8 0.381 NA 0.117 NA 0.045 NA

ARCON 12.8 163.4 2.2 - - - - - -

Night 23.3 116.5 0.855 NA 0.233 NA 0.086 NA

Hydroxyl-aminenitrate (HAN)

Day 7.7 20.9 0.07 0.135 0.053 0.101 0.024 0.044

ARCON 11.6 13.9 2.0 - - - - - -

Night 5.9 10.0 0.135 0.206 0.102 0.151 0.045 0.063

Hydrogen peroxide Day 0.70 202.6 0.023 0.044 < 0.010 0.02 < 0.010 0.011

ARCON 1.44 155.7 0.2 - - - - - -

Night 0.7 108.4 0.050 0.075 0.022 0.033 0.016 0.022

Tributyl phosphate(TBP)

Day 6.51 71.8 0.103 NA 0.079 NA 0.014 NA

ARCON 9.81 47.7 1.7 - - - - - -

Night 6.6 26.1 0.233 NA 0.178 NA 0.031 NA

Nitric acid 13.6 M Day 9.9 58.3 0.197 0.388 0.08 0.146 0.022 0.032

ARCON 12.9 44.8 2.2 - - - - - -

Night 7.9 38.5 0.417 0.616 0.158 0.223 0.042 0.041

Nitric acid 2.1 M Day 34.9 23.9 0.378 0.752 0.151 0.282 0.041 0.06

ARCON 49.5 16.8 8.4 - - - - - -

Night 27.8 11.7 0.86 1.2 0.310 0.412 0.079 0.072

Nitric acid 10.1 M Day 18.1 46.6 0.269 0.536 0.108 0.204 0.03 0.043

ARCON 23.5 35.9 4.0 - - - - - -

Night 14.4 58.6 0.586 0.837 0.217 0.299 0.056 0.054
E-12

Appendix E

Table E.3. Continued

Health index Downwind

concentration concentration

at SRS boundary

TEEL 1 TEEL 2 TEEL 3 (8.2 km)

Chemical (mg/m3) (mg/m3) (mg/m3) (mg/m3

)

Dodecane Day 7.5 60 750 < 0.7

ARCON -

Night < 0.7

Hydrazine Day 0.7 6.6 40 0.004

ARCON -

Night 0.009

Hydrazine/NaOH Day 0.6 6 40 NSd

ARCON -

Night NS

Hydrazine/HAN Day 0.6 6 40 NS

ARCON -

Night NS

Hydroxyl-aminenitrate (HAN)

Day 15 26 125 NS

ARCON -

Night NS

Hydrogen peroxide Day 12.5 60 125 NS

ARCON -

Night NS

Tributyl phosphate(TBP)

Day 6 10 300 NS

ARCON -

Night NS

Nitric acid 13.6 M Day 2.5 15 200 NS

ARCON -

Night 0.009

Nitric acid 2.1 M Day 2.5 15 200 0.011

ARCON -

Night 0.028

Nitric acid 10.1 M Day 2.5 15 200 NS

ARCON -

Night 0.015

aReported duration is based on maximum spill volume and evaporation rate. However, the

ALOHA model restricts the maximum release duration to one hour. At constant wind speed, thehighest concentration would occur in this first hour.

b"-" = not applicable.cNA = not available.dNS = not significant (less than 0.001 mg/m3).
Appendix E

E-13

depth along with the spill volume. The pool size for each of the spill scenarios ranged from

8 m2

 (hydrogen peroxide spill outside the MOX BRP building) to 435 m2 (nitric acid spill at the

WSB).

As previously mentioned, the vapor pressures, as well as other the physical properties required

in estimating the evaporation rate from Equation E-1, were computed by using chemicalspecific coefficients in Antione or equivalent equations, or (in the absence of temperature

dependent data) obtained directly from published literature (e.g., Linde 1999; Perry and Green

1984; NIST 2001; DIPPR 1989). Adjustments for dilute solutions were accounted for by

multiplying by the computed mole fraction, the ratio of the number of moles of a substance to

the total amount of that substance in a mixture. The physical properties, including the mole

fraction adjusted vapor pressures, and the computed chemical specific nondimensional

numbers used in computing evaporation rates (e.g., Reynolds Number), are summarized in

Table E.4.

Accident consequences for evaporative releases, expressed as the ambient concentration at

specified downwind distances, are reported in Table E.3. These concentrations are compared

with (TEEL) values, criteria levels for accidental exposures adopted by the DOE Subcommittee

on Consequence Assessment and Protective Action (SCAPA) (Craig 2002). TEEL values are

available for about 2,000 substances; they are derived by using a hierarchy of other available

criteria values (Craig et al. 2000). If Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs)

developed by panels of toxicologists for the American Conference of Governmental Industrial

Hygienists (ACGIH) are available, these are used for the TEEL values. If ERPGs are not

available, TEELs usually are based on emergency planning and other guideline levels

developed for the protection of workers (Craig 2002). TEEL values are developed for evaluation

of different levels of effects, ranging from no or very slight adverse effects to life-threatening

effects (see text box in Section 4.3.5.3 for definitions).

To assess impacts for SRS employees, concentrations greater than TEEL-3 levels at 100 m for

any chemical were defined as high consequence, and levels less than TEEL-3 but greater than

TEEL-2 were defined as moderate consequence. To assess impacts for the general public,

SRS boundary concentrations greater than TEEL-2 levels for any chemical were defined as

high consequence, and levels less than TEEL-2 but greater than TEEL-1 were defined as

moderate consequence. In addition, the hazard distances (i.e., maximum distances from the

release point to which chemical TEEL-1, TEEL-2, and TEEL-3 air concentrations could extend)

were estimated with the ALOHA model and are listed in Table E.3.

The impacts to SRS workers, located 100 m (330 ft) from the spill, were estimated by

multiplying the ARCON96 95th percentile chi/Q value (0.00061 s/m3

) by the estimated

evaporation rate, assuming the same wind speed that produces the ARCON96 95th percentile

chi/Q (2.2 m/s) and the 95th percentile site-specific temperature (78.5o

F) derived from 5 years of

data from the meteorological tower in the H-area. For evaporative releases, there would be no

worker exposures above the TEEL-2 level. However, spills of hydrazine, hydrazine/HAN

mixtures, and nitric acid have the potential to expose SRS employees above the TEEL-1 levels. 

The resulting health impacts would be temporary and mild. The 100-m (330-ft) concentration 
Appendix E

E-14

Table E.4. Physical property data

Chemical/

propertya Dodecane

Nitrogen

tetroxide

(N2O4)

Nitric acid

(HNO3)

Hydrazine

(H6N2O)

HANb

(H4N2O4)

MW 170.4 92.0 63.1 50.06 96.04

l

 (kg/L) 0.75 1.443 1.383 1.03 1.54

v (kg/m3

) –c 3.2-998.9d 2.012 0.95 0.981

km (m/s) – NAe 2.67 × 10-4 to

5.76 × 10-4

5.26 × 10-3 6.17 × 10-3

Dm (m2/s) 7.15 × 10-6 NA 1.19 × 10-5 1.65 × 10-5 1.63 × 10-5

k (m2/s) – NA 5.84 × 10-4 1.28 × 10-5 6.65 × 10-6

PVap (Pa) 

(78.9 o

F)

2,039 2,038.5 4,540.8 to

6,269.9f

1,235.5 281.5

PVap (Pa)

(87.5 o

F)

2,720 2,701.9 5,800.2 to

8,008.9f

1,637.5 373.1

NSc – NA 49.7 0.909 0.923

Nsh – NA 271 to 458 593 829

NRe – NA 12,307 to

35,254

423,749 534,226

Chemical/

propertya

HydrazineHAN

(H4N2O4-N2H4)

HydrazineNaOH

(N2H4-NaOH)

Tributyl

phosphate

(C12H27O4P)

Hydrogen

peroxide

(H2O2)

Chlorine

(Cl)

MW 128.09 93.99 266.36 34.02 70.91

l

 (kg/L) 1.54g 2.13 0.979 1.44 1.49

v (kg/m3

) – – – 2.72 4.72 to

432.5d

km (m/s) 3.82 × 10-4 5.26 × 10-3 8.86 × 10-4 5.07 × 10-3 NA

Dm (m2

/s) – – – 1.62 × 10-5 NA

k (m2/s) – – – 7.92 × 10-4 NA

PVap (Pa) 

(78.9 o

F)

289.7 2.2 134.8 1,912.2 8.02 × 105

PVap (Pa)

(87.5 o

F)

379.0 2.6 135.3 1,978.0 9.37 × 105
Appendix E

E-15

Table E.4. Continued

Chemical/

propertya

HydrazineHAN

(H4N2O4-N2H4)

HydrazineNaOH

(N2H4-NaOH)

Tributyl

phosphate

(C12H27O4P)

Hydrogen

peroxide

(H2O2)

Chlorine

(Cl)

NSc 0.625 0.625 0.625 48.9 NA

Nsh 1,439 1,090 524 177 NA

NRe 945,897 1,251,896 424,029 5,307 NA

a

l

 = liquid density, v = vapor density, km = mass transfer coefficient, Dm = molecular

diffusivity, Pvap = vapor pressure, k = kinematic viscosity, NSc = Schmidt number, NSh =

Sherwood number, NRe = Reynolds number.

b

Hydroxylamine nitrate.

c

– = not available.

d

Aerosol vapor mixture density from jet release is initially very high; it is diluted over time

to its vapor density at ambient conditions.

e

NA = not applicable, modeled as a pressurized release.

f

Nitric acid (1.21 N) [4,540.8 (78.9F), 5,800.2 (89.5F)]; Nitric acid (7.9 N) [5,764.2

(78.9F), 7,362.9 (89.5F)]; Nitric acid (13.6 N) [6,269.9 (78.9F), 8,008.9 (89.5F)].

g

No published value available, set equal to the HAN published density at STP.

reference level for SRS employees is consistent with the SRS Emergency Response Plan (SRS

2001), which defines the facility boundary as follows:

“Generally, the facility boundary is the fence line for a property, protected area or

a limited area, depending upon the facility. When a physical boundary is

unavailable, the distance of 100 meters from the point of release or edge of the

spill is used. Area/facility-specific Emergency Preparedness Hazard

Assessment Documents identify facility boundaries and should be referenced.”

Since the wind speed and atmospheric stability generating the upper-bound impacts for

nighttime conditions were 1.3 m/s with stable conditions (i.e., PG Class F), the plume transport

time or the time it would take the release to reach the nearest SRS boundary (8.2 km

downwind) would be almost 2 hours. Because ALOHA restricts the maximum release duration

and plume transport time to one hour or less, ALOHA impact estimates at the SRS boundary

could not be made for the low wind speed assumed in the simulations. Therefore, maximum

impact estimates at the SRS boundary were made by using a formula for a ground-level release

producing maximum ground-level concentrations (i.e., on the plume centerline at the surface),

similar to that used in ALOHA. Ground-level centerline passive plume concentrations were

estimated using the following formula, derived from the standard Gaussian equation:
Appendix E

E-16

C(x,0,0) = Q/ u y z. Dense gas estimates at the fence line were estimated by increasing the

wind speed from 1.3 to 2 m/s to shorten the transport time to the fence line to less than

one hour. The ALOHA-estimated concentration was then multiplied by 1.3 [chi/u(2) x u(1.3)] to

arrive at the estimated SRS boundary concentration. The highest concentrations at this

distance occurred subsequent to transition to a purely passive plume (i.e., no negative

buoyancy influences from density effects). Estimates at 100 m using the above expression

compared well (no more than a 1 to 2% difference) with the ALOHA estimate at the same

location.

The ALOHA estimated hazard distances are also given in Table E.3 for evaporative plumes

exhibiting dense vapor cloud dispersion. These plumes disperse downwind to a transition point

at which ambient air entrainment into the cloud sufficiently dilutes concentrations so that the

plume continues to disperse from that point downwind as a neutrally buoyant plume. The

releases considered that initially behave as dense clouds produced the largest hazard distance. 

The largest potential health hazard was shown to extend 1.3 km (0.8 mi) downwind for an

accidental spill of 478 L (126 gal) of 35% hydrazine.

Releases of two materials, nitrogen tetroxide and chlorine, were modeled as pressurized

releases. The analysis showed that these pressurized releases would potentially produce very

large exposures to SRS workers at a distance of 100 m (330 ft) because the concentrated

dense gas plume could extend to this distance for a short time. The concentrations within the

jet plume would approach 10,000 and 1,500 mg/m3

 at 100 m (330 ft) for nitrogen tetroxide and

chlorine, respectively. The TEEL-2 hazard distance for accidental releases of both substances

could extend to 4 km (2.5 mi) from the release location. The high concentrations close to the

source are primarily due to the release of a pressurized, two-phased vapor-aerosol, which

forms a dense vapor cloud. It should be noted that building influences on the heavy vapor

cloud are not accounted for in the AEROPLUME and HEGADAS simulations. Such influences

on passive releases are accounted for in the WAKE model, but not the combination of building

aerodynamics and density effects. The estimated 100-m (330-ft) exposure calculated with the

WAKE model approached 1,600 mg/m3

 and 500 mg/m3 for nitrogen tetroxide and chlorine,

respectively. The actual concentrations would likely fall between the two modeled results for

each chemical.

E.2 Radiological

Risks from radioactive materials were assessed for workers involved in facility operations

(“facility workers”) at the proposed MOX facility, the PDCF, and the WSB; other SRS workers

outside the restricted area of the facility site (“SRS employees”); and members of the public.
Appendix E

E-17

E.2.1 Normal Operations

E.2.1.1 Facility Workers

For facility workers, external radiation from the direct handling of radioactive materials and/or

the close working distances to radiation sources would be the primary exposure pathway. 

Radiation exposures through inhalation and incidental ingestion of contaminated particulates

would be possible but for the average worker would be expected to be very small compared

with exposures to external radiation.

Operations that could result in potential airborne radiological emissions would be conducted

under fume hoods or in gloveboxes. Even if airborne releases from the gloveboxes did occur,

the use of high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and protective air circulation systems

would reduce the airborne pollutants in the working place to a minimal level. Exposures from

inhalation could also be prevented by implementation of as-low-as-reasonably-achievable

(ALARA) practices, such as requiring workers to wear respirators while performing activities

with potential for generating airborne emissions. Potential exposure from incidental ingestion of

particulate matter could be reduced by workers’ wearing gloves and exercising good working

practices. 

For the proposed MOX facility, radiation exposure was estimated on the basis of exposures

received during operation of a similar facility, the MELOX plant in Marcoule, France. External

dose rates at the MELOX plant were extrapolated on the basis of the plutonium composition of

the MELOX MOX fuel (8.5%) and proposed facility MOX fuel (5%) (DCS 2001b). Scaling was

done by using the ratios of the photon and neutron intensities for the two concentrations. An

annual collective external dose of 0.10 person-Sv (10 person-rem) was estimated for the

processing area. An additional annual external dose of 0.02 person-Sv (2 person-rem) was

assumed for the aqueous polishing area because no data were available (DCS 2001b). Thus,

an annual external exposure of 0.12 person-Sv (12 person-rem) was estimated for facility

workers.

Facility workers may also receive an internal dose. At the MELOX plant, from 1996 through

July 2001, 41 individuals had received an internal radiation exposure: 30 had received <10% of

the annual limit on intake (ALI), 10 ranging from 10% to 33.3% ALI, and 1 ranging from 33.3%

to 100% ALI. With an intake of 100% ALI, an individual receives a dose of 0.05 Sv (5 rem). 

Because design and management measures at the MELOX plant are similar to those planned

for the proposed facility, a MOX facility worker MEI may receive a dose of 0.017 Sv (1.7 rem),

corresponding to a 33% ALI, in a year. The total dose of 0.13 person-Sv (13 person-rem) over

this 5-year period results in an average internal dose of less than 0.03 person-Sv (3 personrem) per year (assuming the full 50-year dose commitment in the year of exposure) (DCS

2001b). Thus, the annual collective facility worker exposure is estimated to be 0.15 person-Sv

(15 person-rem), the sum of the estimated external and internal exposures.

For the PDCF and WSB, no historical operational experience is available to provide a

reasonable estimate of the worker exposures. Because these two facilities would be owned
Appendix E

E-18

and operated by the DOE, individual facility worker exposure would be maintained below

0.005 Sv/yr (0.5 rem/yr), the SRS site guideline, which is below the DOE administrative limit of

0.02 Sv/yr (2 rem/yr) (DOE 1994). However, using best practices under the ALARA principle,

the average individual dose should be kept close to or lower than the average SRS radiological

worker dose of 0.00048 Sv/yr (0.048 rem/yr) (DOE undated).

The information on radiation sources, worker activities, and number of required workers is

subject to a large degree of uncertainty, as are the estimated collective and MEI worker doses. 

However, the radiation dose to the individual worker would be monitored and maintained below

the NRC annual occupational total effective dose limit of 0.05 Sv (5 rem) (Code of Federal

Regulations, Title 10, Part 20 [10 CFR 20]).

E.2.1.2 SRS Employees

Inhalation of contaminated particulates and external exposure to the plume of routine airborne

releases from the plant and to soil contaminated by deposition of those airborne releases were

considered for SRS employees. Because they would be located farther from the radiation

sources handled in the three facilities than would facility workers, those SRS employees would

not be exposed to direct external radiation from those sources. However, secondary external

radiation would be possible from the deposited radionuclides on ground surfaces and from

airborne radionuclides when the emission plume from the stack of the facilities passed the

locations of the SRS employees. 

The GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988) was used to estimate radiological impacts to the

SRS employees on the basis of emissions data shown in Table E.5. GENII has been used for

the same application in several previous environmental impact statement projects, such as the

Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Managing

Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste (WM PEIS) (DOE

1997). The GENII code uses either site-specific or representative meteorological data (joint

frequency data) selected to estimate the air concentrations at downwind locations. The code

implements the internal dosimetry models recommended by the International Commission on

Radiological Protection (ICRP) in Publication 26 (ICRP 1977) and Publication 30 (ICRP 1979). 

The GENII code considers the transport of radioactive material in air, soil, water, and food

sources to the human body.

The SRS employee population distribution used to estimate the SRS employee dose is given in

Table E.6. This distribution is centered at the proposed MOX facility and involves a total

population of 13,295 site workers. A stack height of 37 m (121 ft) (as specified in Section 3.1.1

of DCS 2002a) was used as the release height for normal emissions from the proposed MOX

facility. WSB emissions were included in the proposed MOX facility estimates (DCS 2002a,b). 

An estimated stack height of 35 m (115 ft) was used as the release height for emissions from

the PDCF (LANL 1998). Five years of weather information in the form of joint frequency data

(1992-1996 average [as shown in Table E.7]) was used for the air dispersion calculations. On

an annual basis, the total time of external exposure to the plume and contaminated soil for all

SRS employees was assumed to be 0.5 year (NRC 1977). Resuspension of contaminated soil 
Appendix E

E-19

Table E.5. Estimated annual radiological

releases from the facilities during normal

operations

Airborne releases (Ci/yr)a

Isotope

Proposed MOX

facility and WSBb PDCFc

Plutonium-236 1.3 × 10-8 9.3 × 10-11

Plutonium-238 8.5 0.065

Plutonium-239 91 0.69

Plutonium-240 23 0.18

Plutonium-241 101 0.69

Plutonium-242 6.1 × 10-3 4.8 × 10-5

Americium-241 48 0.37

Uranium-234 5.1 × 10-3 NAd

Uranium-235 2.1 × 10-4 NA

Uranium-238 0.012 NA

Tritium NA 1.1 × 109

a

To convert from microcuries (Ci) to

becquerels (Bq), multiply by 3.7 × 104

 (or 37,000).

b

Source: DCS (2002a).

c

Source: DOE (1999).

d

NA = not applicable.

was not considered, and the soil was assumed to be previously uncontaminated. Ingestion of

contaminated foodstuffs was not considered because food is not grown on-site and consumed.

The maximally exposed individual (MEI) for the SRS employees was assumed to be within the

SRS boundary (but outside the facility site) at a location that would have the maximum air

concentration and would thus yield the largest radiation dose. On an annual basis, the total

time of annual external exposure to the plume and contaminated soil for the MEI was assumed

to be 0.7 year. For the inhalation pathway, an exposure time of 1 year was assumed

(NRC 1977).

E.2.1.3 Members of the Public

The GENII code was used to assess radiation exposures of members of the public outside the

SRS boundaries. The exposure pathways analyzed included inhalation of contaminated

particulates, external radiation from deposited radionuclides and from airborne radionuclides,

and ingestion of contaminated food products (plants, meat, and dairy products). Plants grown

in the area where the emission plume passed could become contaminated by deposition of 
Appendix E

E-20

Table E.6. SRS employee population distribution

centered at the proposed MOX facility on the SRS

Population by distance (mia

)

Direction 0 to 1 1 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 5 5 to 10 Total

S 1,191 0 225 171 0 397 1,984

SSW 592 0 0 0 0 7 600

SW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

WSW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

W 0 0 1,728 110 0 0 1,839

WNW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NW 0 0 0 0 2,408 897 3,305

NNW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

N 00000 0 0

NNE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ENE 0 0 18 0 0 5 23

E 0 438 1,863 0 0 0 2,300

ESE 0 722 754 0 0 0 1,476

SE 70 101 26 0 0 25 221

SSE 282 0 0 1,164 0 100 1,547

Total 2,135 1,260 4,614 1,446 2,408 1,432 13,295

a

To convert from miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.61.

Source: Birch (2001), Attachment A.10.

radionuclides on the leaves or ground surfaces. Radionuclides deposited on leaves could

subsequently translocate to the edible portions of the plants, and those deposited on ground

surfaces could subsequently be absorbed by plant roots. Livestock and their products could

become contaminated if the livestock ate the contaminated surface soil and plants.

The off-site population distribution out to 80 km (50 mi), centered at F-Area, for the SRS area

used in the assessment is given in Table E.8. The annual time of external exposure to the

plume and contaminated soil for the general public off-site was assumed to be 0.5 year (NRC

1977). No credit for shielding was given for inhalation exposure. Ingestion parameters are

provided in Table E.9. Food production data for the area surrounding the SRS are provided in

Table E.10.

For the public, the location of the MEI was considered to be at the SRS boundary as a

conservative assumption. Table E.11 lists the distance from the proposed MOX facility to the

SRS boundary for the 16 compass directions from which the MEI was determined. Because of

the close proximity of the PDCF and WSB to the proposed MOX facility, the same MEI receptor

locations were used for these facilities. The annual external exposure to the plume and

contaminated soil for the public off-site MEI was assumed to be 0.7 year (NRC 1977). No credit

for shielding was given for inhalation exposure. Ingestion parameters are provided in

Table E.9.
E-21

Appendix E Table E.7. Joint frequency distribution used for calculation of receptor dose from facility air emissions Wind speed (m/s) Stability class Wind direction S SSW SW WSW W WNW NW NNW N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE SSE

A 0.25 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.21B 0 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02

C 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01

0.89 D 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03

E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00

F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00

G 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00

A 0.88 0.73 0.92 1.04 1.06 0.79 0.70 0.55 0.74 0.78 1.12 1.37 1.19 0.82 0.56 0.57B 0.24 0.36 0.43 0.44 0.35 0.25 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.24 0.34 0.38 0.29 0.25 0.16 0.16

C 0.15 0.39 0.73 0.50 0.39 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.49 0.34 0.28 0.23 0.18

2.46 D 0.09 0.25 0.59 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.22 0.26 0.21

E 0.01 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.13

F 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04

G 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

A 1.03 0.66 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.30 0.26 0.20 0.37 0.43 0.60 0.70 0.71 0.48 0.24 0.36B 0.21 0.57 0.65 0.67 0.32 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.31 0.33 0.55 0.75 0.55 0.36 0.16 0.18

C 0.16 0.69 1.49 0.86 0.67 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.52 0.58 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.57 0.27 0.14

4.47 D 0.12 0.52 1.64 0.95 0.81 0.70 0.84 1.12 1.48 1.05 1.26 1.27 1.01 0.88 0.50 0.20

E 0.06 0.64 1.08 0.81 0.62 0.62 0.82 0.98 1.20 1.10 1.06 1.12 0.63 0.47 0.42 0.24

F 0.02 0.22 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06

G 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

A 0.21 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.09B 0.02 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.09 0.03

C 0.00 0.18 0.46 0.21 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.41 0.46 0.73 0.62 0.13 0.01

6.93 D 0.00 0.09 0.19 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.46 0.43 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.00

E 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.19 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00

F 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00

G 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

A 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01B 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.00

C 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.18 0.10 0.02 0.00

9.61 D 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00

E 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00

F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

G 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
E-22

Appendix E

Table E.7. Continued

Wind

speed

(m/s)

Stability

class

Wind direction

S SSW SW WSW W WNW NW NNW N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE SSE

A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 0B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 0

C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 0

11.2 D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 0

F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 0

G 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 0

Source: DCS (2002a).
Appendix E

E-23

Table E.8. Projected off-site population distribution at the SRS

for the public for the year 2030

Population by distance (milesa)

Direction 0 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 30 30 to 40 40 to 50 Total

S 0 0 920 2696 11,367 6,013 20,996

SSW 0 15 1,317 3,692 8,115 4,376 17,515

SW 0 186 1,978 7,732 3,535 4,579 18,010

WSW 0 171 2,572 7,553 4,368 10,385 25,049

W 0 407 10,186 17,766 15,109 11,753 55,221

WNW 0 2,331 8,556 219,212 54,849 24,980 309,928

NW 0 1,861 25,692 137,243 15,851 5,567 186,214

NNW 0 1,978 33,320 18,925 11,627 5,648 71,498

N 0 3,500 36,210 15,530 11,294 17,670 84,204

NNE 0 397 3,010 3,515 6,925 28,857 42,704

NE 0 14 2,609 4,611 8,850 19,325 35,409

ENE 0 0 5,535 7,865 8,764 53,785 75,949

E 0 2 8,061 8,590 18,423 9,310 44,386

ESE 0 14 3,658 4,352 5,466 488 13,978

SE 0 0 951 7,673 7,409 17,619 33,652

SSE 0 0 615 1,154 1767 4,234 7,770

Total 0 10,876 145,190 468,109 193,719 224,589 1,042,483

a

To convert from miles to kilometers, multiply by 1.61.

Source: DCS (2002a).

E.2.2 Accidents

For the proposed MOX facility, four accident events were considered for detailed analysis, as

discussed in Section 4.3.5.1. In each case, the amount of material released to the atmosphere

was determined by multiplying the amount of material present (material at risk [MAR]) by the

fraction of material involved in the event (damage ratio), fraction of material released that is

airborne and respirable, and the fraction of material transported through a confinement

mechanism (leak path factor). The values used for these parameters and the initial amount of

plutonium material assumed to be present for each accident considered are given in

Table E.12. Table E.13 lists the activity by radionuclide estimated to be released to the

environment for each hypothetical accident. 

Accident events considered for the PDCF and the WSB were discussed in Section 4.3.5.1. 

Six accident events were considered for the PDCF as taken from DOE (1999). Three accident

events for the WSB were considered (DCS 2002a,b; Bowling 2002; DCS 2003b). Table E.13

lists the activity by radionuclide estimated to be released to the environment for each

hypothetical accident.
Appendix E

E-24

Table E.9. Ingestion parameters used in GENII

for calculation of radiological exposure of the public

for normal and accidental air emissions

Value

Parameter

Maximally

exposed

individual Population

Terrestrial food

 Consumption rate (kg/yr)a

 Leafy vegetables 43 21

 Root vegetables 92 66

 Fruit 120 60

 Grain 64 67

 Crop yield (kg/m2

)

b

 Leafy vegetables 1.5 1.5

 Root vegetables 4 4

 Fruit 2 2

 Grain 0.8 0.8

 Hold time between harvest and storage (days)b

 Leafy vegetables 1 14

 Root vegetables 5 14

 Fruit 5 14

 Grain 180 180

Animal products

 Consumption rate (kg/yr)

 Beefa 81 43

 Milka 230 120

 Poultryb 18 8.5

 Eggsb 30 20

 Holdup time (days)b

 Beef 15 34

 Milk 1 3

 Poultry 1 34

 Eggs 1 18

 Production rate (kg/yr) NAc -

d

 Diet fraction for animal food sourcesb

 Stored feed

 Beef 0.25 0.25

 Milk 0.25 0.25

 Poultry 1 1

 Eggs 1 1

 Fresh forage

 Beef 0.75 0.75

 Milk 0.75 0.75
Appendix E

E-25

Table E.9. Continued

Value

Parameter

Maximally

exposed

individual Population

 Growing time for animal food sources (days)b

 Stored feed

 Beef 90 90

 Milk 45 45

 Poultry 90 90

 Eggs 90 90

 Fresh forage

 Beef 45 45

 Milk 30 30

 Yield of animal food sources (kg/m3

)

b

 Stored feed

 Beef 0.8 0.8

 Milk 2 2

 Poultry 0.8 0.8

 Eggs 0.8 0.8

 Fresh forage

 Beef 2 2

 Milk 1.5 1.5

 Storage time for animal food sources (days)b

 Stored feed

 Beef 180 180

 Milk 100 100

 Poultry 180 180

 Eggs 180 180

 Fresh forage

 Beef 100 100

 Milk 0 0

a

Source: Arnett and Mamatey (2001).

b

GENII default values.

c

NA = not applicable.

d

See Section E.1.3 and Table E.8.
Appendix E

E-26

Table E.10. Food production data used in GENII for calculation

of radiological ingestion exposure of the public

for normal and accidental air emissions

Product/

direction

Production (kg/yr) by distance (mia

)

0 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 30 30 to 40 40 to 50

Leafy vegetables

 S 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

 SSW 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

 SW 0 3.4 x 105 0 0 0 1.1 x 103

 WSW 0 3.7 x 102 3.3 x 101 0 1.6 x 103 8.8 x 103

 W 0 1.3 x 103 1.3 x 102 0 2.8 x 103 4.1 x 103

 WNW 0 1.4 x 103 3.4 x 103 00 0

 NW 0 1.4 x 103 6.3 x 103 4.7 x 103 0 0

 NNW 0 1.3 x 103 6.9 x 103 8.7 x 103 8.6 2.4 x 103

 N 0 1.1 x 103 6.9 x 103 1.2 x 104 1.1 x 104 4.8 x 104

 NNE 0 5.9 x 102 6.9 x 103 1.2 x 104 3.1 x 105 9.6 x 105

 NE 0 4.6 x 101 6.0 x 103 3.1 x 104 2.5 x 105 7.7 x 105

 ENE 0 0 7.6 3.2 x 104 1.6 x 105 2.1 x 105

 E 0 0 0 0 2.3 x 104 1.3 x 105

 ESE 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

 SE 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

 SSE 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

Root vegetables

 S 0 0 1.8 x 106 3.1 x 106 4.1 x 106 6.3 x 106

 SSW 0 3.1 x 103 2.1 x 106 3.4 x 106 4.3 x 106 6.7 x 106

 SW 0 9.7 x 107 2.2 x 106 3.6 x 106 4.8 x 106 5.8 x 106

 WSW 0 1.1 x 105 2.1 x 106 3.6 x 106 5.3 x 106 8.0 x 106

 W 0 1.8 x 105 2.3 x 105 1.3 x 106 3.4 x 106 4.4 x 106

 WNW 0 1.9 x 105 5.0 x 105 1.1 x 105 5.4 x 104 3.2 x 105

 NW 0 2.0 x 105 8.8 x 105 8.2 x 105 4.0 x 105 1.4 x 105

 NNW 0 1.9 x 105 9.6 x 105 1.3 x 106 7.3 x 105 1.2 x 106

 N 0 1.5 x 105 9.6 x 105 1.6 x 106 1.7 x 106 2.4 x 106

 NNE 0 8.1 x 104 9.6 x 105 1.6 x 106 2.5 x 106 3.8 x 106

 NE 0 6.3 x 103 1.2 x 106 2.6 x 106 4.2 x 106 5.1 x 106

 ENE 0 0 3.4 x 106 6.3 x 106 7.8 x 106 9.9 x 106

 E 0 0 3.6 x 106 6.3 x 106 7.9 x 106 1.0 x 107

 ESE 0 0 3.3 x 106 6.6 x 106 8.4 x 106 5.3 x 106

 SE 0 0 6.4 x 107 6.8 x 106 8.8 x 106 9.2 x 106

 SSE 0 0 3.8 x 107 3.0 x 107 6.7 x 106 7.8 x 106

Fruit

 S 0 0 3.9 x 105 1.1 x 106 1.7 x 106 2.5 x 106

 SSW 0 6.9 x 102 4.5 x 105 8.7 x 105 1.4 x 106 2.3 x 106

 SW 0 3.3 x 107 4.8 x 105 7.9 x 105 1.2 x 106 1.2 x 106

 WSW 0 4.4 x 104 4.7 x 105 7.9 x 105 1.0 x 106 8.8 x 105

 W 0 1.1 x 105 4.5 x 104 2.7 x 105 4.4 x 105 3.9 x 105

 WNW 0 1.2 x 105 2.8 x 105 1.1 x 103 2.3 x 102 1.3 x 103

 NW 0 1.2 x 105 5.3 x 105 2.8 x 106 6.6 x 106 2.2 x 106

 NNW 0 1.1 x 105 5.8 x 105 2.8 x 106 1.2 x 107 1.4 x 107

 N 0 9.0 x 104 5.8 x 105 9.7 x 105 5.1 x 106 4.8 x 106

 NNE 0 4.9 x 104 5.8 x 105 9.7 x 105 1.0 x 106 7.4 x 105

 NE 0 3.9 x 103 5.3 x 105 8.9 x 105 1.0 x 106 7.5 x 105

 ENE 0 0 2.5 x 105 4.9 x 105 8.5 x 105 1.1 x 106
Appendix E

E-27

Table E.10. Continued

Product/

direction

Production (kg/yr) by distance (mia

)

0 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 30 30 to 40 40 to 50

 E 0 0 2.6 x 105 3.4 x 105 1.6 x 105 7.0 x 105

 ESE 0 0 2.4 x 105 4.0 x 105 1.8 x 105 5.6 x 104

 SE 0 0 4.3 x 106 3.1 x 105 3.7 x 105 3.1 x 105

 SSE 0 0 2.6 x 106 2.0 x 106 1.1 x 106 1.0 x 106

Grains

 S 0 0 2.6 x 106 7.4 x 106 1.1 x 107 1.5 x 107

 SSW 0 4.5 x 103 2.9 x 106 6.0 x 106 1.1 x 107 1.4 x 107

 SW 0 1.1 x 108 3.1 x 106 5.1 x 106 8.2 x 106 1.0 x 107

 WSW 0 1.4 x 105 3.0 x 106 5.1 x 106 8.1 x 106 1.5 x 107

 W 0 2.1 x 105 6.4 x 105 2.2 x 106 6.1 x 106 7.9 x 106

 WNW 0 2.2 x 105 7.6 x 105 7.2 x 105 2.6 x 105 6.5 x 105

 NW 0 2.2 x 105 1.0 x 106 1.2 x 106 7.5 x 105 3.3 x 105

 NNW 0 2.1 x 105 1.1 x 106 1.6 x 106 1.3 x 106 2.0 x 106

 N 0 1.7 x 105 1.1 x 106 1.8 x 106 2.3 x 106 4.1 x 106

 NNE 0 9.3 x 104 1.1 x 106 1.8 x 106 2.7 x 106 3.6 x 106

 NE 0 7.3 x 103 1.3 x 106 3.6 x 106 6.1 x 106 6.9 x 106

 ENE 0 0 4.0 x 106 8.7 x 106 1.4 x 107 1.8 x 107

 E 0 0 4.2 x 106 9.0 x 106 1.6 x 107 1.9 x 107

 ESE 0 0 3.9 x 106 8.9 x 106 1.6 x 107 1.2 x 107

 SE 0 0 8.2 x 107 1.1 x 107 1.5 x 107 1.7 x 107

 SSE 0 0 5.2 x 107 5.2 x 107 1.3 x 107 1.6 x 107

Beef

 S 0 0 1.2 x 105 4.6 x 105 7.3 x 105 9.9 x 105

 SSW 0 2.2 x 102 1.5 x 105 3.4 x 105 6.9 x 105 9.3 x 105

 SW 0 6.0 x 104 1.5 x 105 2.5 x 105 4.6 x 105 6.1 x 105

 WSW 0 1.0 x 104 1.5 x 105 2.5 x 105 4.1 x 105 7.9 x 105

 W 0 2.1 x 104 4.0 x 104 1.2 x 105 3.4 x 105 5.1 x 105

 WNW 0 2.2 x 104 7.0 x 104 5.0 x 104 9.5 x 104 1.8 x 105

 NW 0 2.3 x 104 1.1 x 105 1.4 x 105 1.6 x 105 2.1 x 105

 NNW 0 2.2 x 104 1.1 x 105 1.8 x 105 2.3 x 105 3.5 x 105

 N 0 1.7 x 104 1.1 x 105 1.9 x 105 3.1 x 105 6.5 x 105

 NNE 0 9.6 x 103 1.1 x 105 1.9 x 105 2.5 x 105 2.9 x 105

 NE 0 7.5 x 102 1.0 x 105 2.6 x 105 4.3 x 105 5.0 x 105

 ENE 0 0 2.4 x 104 2.2 x 105 8.2 x 105 1.1 x 106

 E 0 0 2.6 x 104 1.4 x 105 5.2 x 105 8.8 x 105

 ESE 0 0 2.4 x 104 8.2 x 104 3.4 x 105 4.5 x 105

 SE 0 0 4.8 x 105 6.4 x 104 2.0 x 105 5.2 x 105

 SSE 0 0 3.6 x 105 5.8 x 105 4.3 x 105 6.7 x 105

Poultry

 S 0 0 0 0 0 5.4 x 104

 SSW 0 0 0 0 0 6.7 x 104

 SW 0 4.7 x 107 0 0 0 4.5 x 101

 WSW 0 5.1 x 104 4.5 x 103 0 6.1 x 101 3.5 x 102

 W 0 1.7 x 105 1.8 x 104 0 1.1 x 102 1.6 x 102

 WNW 0 1.9 x 105 4.6 x 105 0 0 5.1 x 103

 NW 0 1.9 x 105 8.6 x 105 6.4 x 105 0 3.0 x 105

 NNW 0 1.8 x 105 9.4 x 105 1.2 x 106 1.2 x 103 5.4 x 105

 N 0 1.5 x 105 9.4 x 105 1.6 x 106 1.7 x 106 3.6 x 106

 NNE 0 8.0 x 104 9.4 x 105 1.6 x 106 1.3 x 106 5.4 x 103
Appendix E

E-28

Table E.10. Continued

Product/

direction

Production (kg/yr) by distance (mia

)

0 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 30 30 to 40 40 to 50

 NE 0 6.3 x 103 8.2 x 105 1.2 x 106 9.7 x 105 0

 ENE 0 0 1.1 x 103 00 0

 E 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

 ESE 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

 SE 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

 SSE 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

Milk

 S 0 0 5.5 x 105 6.2 x 105 6.5 x 105 7.6 x 105

 SSW 0 9.7 x 102 6.4 x 105 2.9 x 106 7.9 x 106 8.1 x 106

 SW 0 3.2 x 106 6.7 x 105 1.1 x 106 3.8 x 106 2.9 x 106

 WSW 0 2.2 x 104 6.6 x 105 1.1 x 106 2.0 x 106 4.4 x 106

 W 0 1.2 x 104 4.9 x 104 3.8 x 105 1.8 x 106 3.5 x 106

 WNW 0 1.3 x 104 3.1 x 104 0 4.7 x 104 1.2 x 106

 NW 0 1.3 x 104 5.8 x 104 4.4 x 105 1.1 x 106 7.9 x 105

 NNW 0 1.2 x 104 6.4 x 104 4.3 x 105 2.0 x 106 3.3 x 106

 N 0 9.9 x 103 6.4 x 104 1.1 x 105 1.9 x 106 7.4 x 106

 NNE 0 5.4 x 103 6.4 x 104 1.1 x 105 3.9 x 105 9.7 x 106

 NE 0 4.2 x 102 5.5 x 104 6.9 x 105 1.7 x 106 1.8 x 106

 ENE 0 0 7.0 x 101 1.1 x 106 4.6 x 106 5.6 x 106

 E 0 0 0 9.6 x 105 4.2 x 106 5.7 x 106

 ESE 0 0 0 3.2 x 105 2.6 x 106 1.6 x 106

 SE 0 0 2.4 x 104 1.2 x 104 4.2 x 104 1.2 x 105

 SSE 0 0 2.0 x 105 3.2 x 105 3.5 x 105 3.9 x 105

Eggs

 S 0 0 6.3 x 102 0 0 8.3 x 104

 SSW 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

 SW 0 6.2 x 105 0 0 0 9.1 x 101

 WSW 0 0 0 0 1.2 x 102 7.0 x 102

 W 0 0 0 0 2.2 x 102 3.3 x 102

 WNW 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

 NW 0 0 0 1.2 x 105 3.2 x 105 1.1 x 105

 NNW 0 0 0 1.0 x 105 5.9 x 105 6.4 x 105

 N 0 0 0 0 1.7 x 105 2.9 x 101

 NNE 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 x 105

 NE 0 0 4.1 x 103 4.0 x 103 1.6 x 102 1.2 x 102

 ENE 0 0 4.3 x 104 5.5 x 104 5.0 x 102 6.3 x 102

 E 0 0 4.5 x 104 5.6 x 104 7.1 x 101 4.0 x 102

 ESE 0 0 4.2 x 104 5.8 x 104 1.2 x 102 0

 SE 0 0 6.3 x 105 1.2 x 103 0 0

 SSE 0 0 3.1 x 105 00 0

a

To convert from miles to kilograms, multiply by 1.61.

Source: DCS (2002a).
Appendix E

E-29

E.2.2.1 SRS Employees

SRS employees downwind of an accident might be exposed to

airborne radioactive contamination. Exposure would result

primarily from external radiation from the radioactive

contamination in the passing plume (cloudshine) released from

the accident location and inhalation of the airborne

contaminants. Short-term exposure to external radiation from

ground-deposited radionuclides (groundshine) might also

occur.

The GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988) was also used

to assess the radiological impacts to the sitewide population of

SRS employees for each accident considered. The SRS

employee population distribution used for the accident analysis

is given in Table E.6, and the joint-frequency weather data are

given in Table E.7. A ground-level release (1-m [3.3-ft]

release height) was assumed for all accidents. To provide a

conservative estimate for the impacts, 95% meteorology

(meteorological conditions that produce impacts that are not

exceeded 95% of the time) was used. Employees were

assumed to be unshielded during passage of the contaminant

plume from an accident. Both the inhalation and external

exposure pathways were considered. Further external

exposure to ground contamination for a period of 5.6 hours

(8 hours with a shielding factor of 0.7) after the accident was also considered. Resuspension of

contaminated soil was not considered, and the soil was assumed to be previously

uncontaminated. Ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs was not considered because food is not

grown on-site and consumed. Accident impacts to the SRS employee population are presented

in Section 4.3.5.2 (see Table 4.13).

Table E.12. Source terms for detailed accident analyses

Hypothetical

accident event

Quantity of

plutonium 

at risk (kg)

Damage

ratio

Respirable

release

fraction

Leak 

path 

factor

Internal fire 62 (polished) 1 0.0006 0.0001

Load handling 254 (polished) 1 0.0006 0.0001

Explosion 75 (unpolished) 1 0.01 0.0001

Criticality 41.5 (unpolished) 1 0.0005a 0.0001b

a

For particulate matter, respirable release fraction = 1 for gases.

b

For particulate matter, leak path factor = 1 for gases.

Sources: DCS (2002a, 2004a); Brown (2001).

Table E.11. Centerline

distance to site

boundary from the

proposed MOX facility

stack for the primary

16 compass directions

Direction

Distance

(m)

S 20,480

SSW 17,700

SW 12,130

WSW 15,000

W 9,490

WNW 9,930

NW 9,070

NNW 9,720

N 10,680

NNE 13,060

NE 16,520

ENE 19,040

E 19,150

ESE 20,030

SE 21,130

SSE 20,580
E-30

Appendix E

Table E.13. Radionuclide quantities (Ci)a released to the atmosphere for each accident type

Proposed MOX facility WSB

Isotope

Internal

fire

Load

handling Explosion Criticality

Loss of

confinement Fire Earthquake

Pu-238 2.2 × 10-5 9.2 × 10-5 4.5 × 10-4 6.0 × 10-13 1.2 × 10-5 2.4 × 10-4 2.5 × 10-4

Pu-239 1.9 × 10-4 7.7 × 10-4 3.8 × 10-3 5.0 × 10-12 8.0 × 10-5 1.6 × 10-3 1.6 × 10-3Pu-240 4.6 × 10-5 1.9 × 10-4 9.2 × 10-4 1.3 × 10-12 3.0 × 10-5 5.7 × 10-4 6.0 × 10-4Pu-241 3.4 × 10-3 1.4 × 10-2 6.8 × 10-2 9.0 × 10-11 1.4 × 10-3 2.8 × 10-2 3.0 × 10-2Pu-242 1.3 × 10-8 5.3 × 10-8 2.6 × 10-7 3.5 × 10-16 NAb NA NA

Am-241 NA NA 2.0 × 10-3 2.1 × 10-12 NA NA NA

U-234 NA NA NA NA 5.2 × 10-4 1.0 × 10-2 1.1 × 10-2

U-235 NA NA NA NA 9.2 × 10-6 1.8 × 10-4 1.9 × 10-4U-238 NA NA NA NA 1.4 × 10-4 2.7 × 10-3 2.9 × 10-3Kr-83m NA NA NA 1.1 × 102 NA NA NA

Kr-85m NA NA NA 7.1 × 101 NA NA NAKr-85 NA NA NA 8.4 × 10-4 NA NA NAKr-87 NA NA NA 4.3 × 102 NA NA NAKr-88 NA NA NA 2.3 × 102 NA NA NAKr-89 NA NA NA 1.3 × 104 NA NA NAXe-131m NA NA NA 1.0 × 10-1 NA NA NAXe-133m NA NA NA 2.2 NA NA NAXe-133 NA NA NA 2.7 × 101 NA NA NAXe-135m NA NA NA 3.3 × 103 NA NA NAXe-135 NA NA NA 4.1 × 102 NA NA NAXe-137 NA NA NA 4.9 × 104 NA NA NAXe-138 NA NA NA 1.1 × 104 NA NA NATe-134 NA NA NA NA NA NA NAI-131 NA NA NA 2.8 NA NA NAI-132 NA NA NA 2.9 × 102 NA NA NAI-133 NA NA NA 4.1 × 101 NA NA NAI-134 NA NA NA 1.1 × 103 NA NA NAI-135 NA NA NA 1.1 × 102 NA NA NAH-3 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
E-31

Appendix E Table E.13. Continued PDCF Isotope Criticality Earthquake Explosion Fire Leak/spill Tritium release

Pu-238 NA 2.62 × 10-6 2.15 × 10-5 8.06 × 10-8 2.62 × 10-8 NA

Pu-239 3.5 × 10-8 2.22 × 10-5 1.82 × 10-4 6.82 × 10-7 2.21 × 10-7 NAPu-240 3.3 × 10-8 5.43 × 10-6 4.45 × 10-5 1.67 × 10-7 5.40 × 10-8 NAPu-241 8.3 × 10-7 4.04 × 10-4 3.31 × 10-3 1.24 × 10-5 4.00 × 10-6 NAPu-242 6.1 × 10-11 1.55 × 10-9 1.27 × 10-8 4.76 × 10-11 1.53 × 10-11 NAAm-241 2.0 × 10-7 1.20 × 10-5 9.82 × 10-5 3.68 × 10-7 1.18 × 10-7 NAU-234 NA NA NA NA NA NAU-235 NA NA NA NA NA NAKr-83m 1.3 NA NA NA NA NAKr-85m 3.0 NA NA NA NA NAKr-85 NA NA NA NA NA NAKr-87 1.9 × 101 NA NA NA NA NA

Kr-88 5.5 × 101 NA NA NA NA NAKr-89 NA NA NA NA NA NAXe-131m NA NA NA NA NA NAXe-133m NA NA NA NA NA NAXe-133 4.5 × 10-1 NA NA NA NA NAXe-135m 2.8 × 101 NA NA NA NA NAXe-135 8.0 NA NA NA NA NAXe-137 NA NA NA NA NA NAXe-138 3.5 × 102 NA NA NA NA NATe-134 2.1 × 101 NA NA NA NA NAI-131 4.3 × 10-2 NA NA NA NA NAI-132 3.5 × 10-1 NA NA NA NA NAI-133 7.5 × 10-1 NA NA NA NA NAI-134 9.5 NA NA NA NA NAI-135 2.5 NA NA NA NA NAH-3 NA NA NA NA NA 1.90 × 105

aTo convert from curies (Ci) to becquerels (Bq), multiply by 3.7 × 1010.

bNA = not applicable.
Appendix E

E-32

Radiological impacts to an MEI of the SRS employee population were assessed by assuming

that the MEI was located outside the facility boundary, 100 m (330 ft) from the accident

location. Inhalation exposure and external exposure from the passing radioactive cloud were

evaluated. The ARCON96 computer code (Ramsdell and Simonen 1997) was used to estimate

contaminant air concentrations at the MEI receptor location following an accidental release.

ARCON96 was designed to model air dispersion in the vicinity of buildings. The code uses

hourly meteorological data in order to estimate relative air concentrations of atmospheric

releases. Ten years, 1987 to 1996, of hourly meteorological data and a building area of

6,580 m2

 (70,825 ft2) (DCS 2001a) were used as input to the code. The 95th percentile relative

concentration, the air concentration that is more than what might be expected 95% of the time,

in any given direction for the 0- to 2-hour averaging period was conservatively used to estimate

impacts. This 95th percentile relative concentration was calculated to be 6.1 x 10-4 s/m3

. 

An inhalation rate of 3.47 x 10-4 m3

/s (NRC 1972), which includes consideration of an 8-hour

shift, was then used in conjunction with inhalation dose conversion factors from Federal

Guidance Report (FGR) 11 (Eckerman et al. 1988) to estimate inhalation exposure. The most

conservative (largest) dose conversion factor among the clearance classes for each

radionuclide was used. For external exposure, the external dose conversion factors from FGR

12 (Eckerman and Ryman 1993) were used. Estimated impacts to the SRS employee MEI are

presented in Table 4.13 (Chapter 4) of this EIS. With the exception of the criticality accidents,

inhalation exposure was the dominant impact. External exposure to cloudshine from the

passing radioactive cloud after the criticality accident accounted for approximately 93% of the

estimated dose to the MEI.

E.2.2.2 Members of the Public

Radiation exposures to members of the off-site public were assessed for hypothetical

accidental releases. Impacts from a short-term exposure and one-year exposures (with and

without ingestion) were evaluated for each accident. Exposure pathways evaluated for shortterm exposures were inhalation, cloudshine, and groundshine. For 1-year exposures with

ingestion, ingestion of contaminated crops was considered in addition to the short-term

exposure pathways.

The GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988) was used to assess the radiological impacts to

the collective off-site population (members of the public) for each accident considered. The offsite population distribution used for the accident analysis is given in Table E.8, and the

joint-frequency weather data are given in Table E.7. A ground-level release (1-m [3.3-ft]

release height) was assumed for all accidents. To provide a conservative estimate for the

impacts, 95% meteorology (weather conditions that produce impacts that are not exceeded

95% of the time) was used. For the short-term exposure, no credit was given for shielding for

the inhalation and external exposures to the passing airborne plume. Exposure to groundshine

was evaluated for 8 hours, but a shielding factor of 0.5 (NRC 1977) was used.

For the 1-year exposure periods, the length of time of external exposure to contaminated soil

was 0.5 year (NRC 1977), and no credit was given for shielding for the inhalation exposure and
Appendix E

E-33

external exposure to the passing airborne plume. For the 1-year exposure period with

ingestion, ingestion parameters are provided in Table E.9. Food production data for the area

surrounding the SRS are provided in Table E.10. The estimated impacts for each accident in

the short term and after 1 year of exposure are presented in Table 4.14 (Chapter 4). No

mitigative actions were assumed.

Accident impacts to an MEI member of the public were determined using the GENII code for

both short-term and 1-year exposures following an accidental release. Potential MEIs were

assumed to live at the site boundary, one at each of the 16 compass directions, as given in

Table E.11. Exposure pathways considered in the analysis included inhalation, external

exposure from the passing plume and contaminated soil, and, in the case for 1-year exposure

with ingestion, ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs. The same release height and meteorology

conditions as used for the population accident impacts were used for the MEI analysis. The

amount of time of external exposure to contaminated soil was 8 hours (with a 0.7 shielding

factor) and 0.7 year (NRC 1977) for the short-term and 1-year exposure periods, respectively. 

No credit for shielding was given for the inhalation and external exposures to the passing

airborne plume. As a conservative assumption, potential MEIs were assumed to consume

locally grown food for the 1-year exposure period with ingestion. Ingestion parameters are

provided in Table E.9. The estimated impacts for each accident are given in Table 4.15

(Chapter 4) for the short-term and 1-year exposure periods. No mitigative actions were

assumed.

E.3 References for Appendix E

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Appendix E

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Appendix E

E-36