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The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency and US military communities.

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JSOU Report 06-8

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2006

Special Operations 

Aviation in NATO

A Vector to the Future

Richard D. Newton
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 

850-884-2763; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, 

at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-16-4
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy 

or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

USSOCOM, or the Joint Special Operations University.
Previous Publications of the JSOU Press

2004–2005 JSOU/NDIA Essays, April 2005

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, June 2005

Russian Special Forces, August 2005, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

The Evolving Requirements of the Canadian Special 

Operations Forces, September 2005, J. Paul de B. Taillon

Operationalizing COIN, September 2005, Joseph D. Celeski

Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks, 

October 2005, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005, James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

Executive Report, JSOU First Annual Symposium (2–5 May 2006)

One Valley at a Time, August 2006

Adrian T. Bogart III, with Introduction by Walter M. Herd
v

Preface

Rick Newton’s perceptive paper on the need to develop a 

prudent and workable “vector” for NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) air (airplanes) and aviation (helicopters) 

components is timely. It can be argued that the historic relationship 

between the United States and its traditional NATO allies is at a crossroads. A Fulda Gap type scenario of NATO fighting a major theater 

war is not only unlikely without a credible conventional threat but 

also untenable given the current political and public-opinion environment within Europe. Therefore, NATO operations for the foreseeable future will entail operations like those conducted over the past 

decade in the Balkans or its current mission in Afghanistan—smaller 

scale military operations. 

These operations will consist primarily of conventional military 

forces. However, the role of SOF will be extremely important, especially as NATO operates outside its traditional European zone of 

operations. The need to work with non-NATO forces and allies will 

increasingly require SOF capabilities. These SOF requirements will 

operate across the full spectrum of SOF capabilities and, logically, 

will need to include a robust and capable air component. 

Rick’s cogent argument regarding the complexity and technological prowess required of this SOF air and aviation capability is 

especially important to comprehend when discussing SOF air development. All NATO members will not need to produce SOF air and 

aviation that can operate on the cutting edge of technology. They will 

need to develop SOF air and aviation with the right emphasis on dedicated air assets, specialized selection and training of air personnel, 

and integration into the respective country’s other SOF operations. 

This will expand NATO SOF capability and improve the alliance’s 

performance in the types of mission it is most likely to face in the 

future. 

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

Foreword

Special operations air/aviation in NATO is coming of age. 

Within the alliance, NATO member nations have devoted 

significant resources to enhance the capabilities and maintain the relevance of their ground and maritime Special Operations 

Forces (SOF). That has not always been the case with the special 

operations air and aviation elements, though. The good news is that 

times are changing. It is encouraging to note that air-oriented SOF 

within NATO are growing in numbers and in capabilities. This bodes 

well for our alliance as we transform defense capabilities to enable 

an expeditionary force. 

Out-of-area military operations by NATO and its member states 

in the past half decade—for example, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and 

Sudan—have demonstrated the need for organic special operations 

air/aviation forces. But they have also shown that not all special 

operations air assets need to be highly capable, complex airplanes 

and helicopters. Many missions can be safely accomplished by 

highly trained crews using conventional, unmodified aircraft. Time 

and again, SOF aviators have reaffirmed the validity of a SOF truth, 

“Humans are more important than hardware.” It was SOF aviators, 

flying conventional aircraft better than their non-SOF counterparts—

more precisely, in harsher environments, mitigating the risks, and 

using conventional equipment in innovative ways—that proved it is 

the person, not the technology, that defines special operations.

This monograph offers one path to consider as NATO’s air and 

aviation forces develop their special operations capabilities. Organic, 

technologically sophisticated aircraft are expensive to purchase and 

maintain. The people who fly and maintain these complex aircraft 

also become highly specialized resources that are difficult to sustain. 

“A Vector to the Future” suggests a measured approach to developing a NATO SOF air capability. It proposes a minimum standard for 

a nation to certify its proffered aviation resources as special operations, yet acknowledges that some nations will choose to invest in 

sophisticated aircraft and specially trained crews. The monograph 

shows how the minimum standard facilitates interoperability and 

sets a course (vector) for development. 

This monograph raises questions and proposes solutions, but it 

is not the final answer. Much more work admittedly remains. It will 

vii
viii

be the SOF airmen who create the doctrine, interoperability guides, 

NATO standardization agreements, and tactical planning guides who 

will complete development. This monograph begins that process. It 

remains to NATO’s SOF airmen to do the hard, often thankless, work 

that ensures air/aviation becomes a mature element of NATO’s joint 

special operations team. 

Colonel David Heaver, Royal Marines

Chief, Special Operations Branch

Allied Command Operations

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
ix

About the Author

Richard Newton teaches irregular warfare and special operations planning and force integration for the Joint Special Operations University. His specialty areas include counterinsurgency, campaign planning, command and control, and special 

air warfare. An adjunct faculty member at the U.S. Army School 

for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and 

the Joint Advanced Warfighting School at Norfolk, Virginia, Mr. 

Newton also teaches joint special operations theory, doctrine, and 

planning at the Service Staff Colleges and the NATO School. 

Mr. Newton is a graduate of the 

U.S. Air Force Academy, Army Command and General Staff College, 

and Army School for Advanced Military Studies. He holds a Master’s 

of Military Art and Science. Before 

his retirement from active duty as a 

U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel, he 

served as Director of Operations of 

the 6th Special Operations Squadron and the U.S. Air Force Special 

Operations School. Earlier military 

duties included operational flying 

assignments (both special operations and combat rescue) in Korea, 

Florida, New Mexico, and Iceland; 

he has 2,500 flying hours in the 

CH/HH-3 Jolly Green Giant, UH-1 Huey, Alouette, and Gazelle. 

Mr. Newton is the author of numerous articles on unconventional 

air operations and doctrine, including “A Question of Doctrine” and 

“A U.S. Air Force Role in Counterinsurgency Support,” both published in Air Power Journal. He also wrote Reinventing the Wheel: 

Structuring Air Forces for Foreign Internal Defense, the lead paper in 

the U.S. Air Force Future of the Air Force series and “The Second 

Chindit Expedition: A Case Study in Tactical Air Supply” in Airlift

magazine. 

1

Newton: Special Operations Aviation in NATO

Special Operations Aviation in 

NATO—A Vector to the Future

Special operations forces are able to achieve relative superiority over the enemy if they prepare a simple plan, which is 

carefully concealed, repeatedly rehearsed, and executed with 

surprise, speed, and purpose.

 — William McRaven, Spec Ops, Case Studies 

in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice1

Introduction

What defines special operations aviation and what should be its role in NATO? How might the member nations collaborate to develop equipment, standardize tactics and procedures, and 

create the command and control structure needed to ensure that 

SOF aviation properly supports NATO’s Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) and conventional air forces? How might the nations balance 

national needs versus alliance requirements? Difficult questions 

all, but issues the community of special operations airmen must 

address in order to optimize scarce defense resources and improve 

NATO’s collective abilities to combat global terrorism. This paper 

proposes a vector to the future of special air warfare in a NATO 

Figure 1. EH-101 

Special Operations 

Version. The Agusta 

Westland EH-101 

is being considered 

by a number of 

nations as their 

future special 

operations helicopters due to its 

large capacity (30 

combat troops or 

5 tons), long range 

(750 nautical miles), aft ramp, advanced avionics, and aerial refueling capability. 

(Source is www.agustawestland.com.) 
2

JSOU Report 06-8

context, suggesting both an azimuth and an incremental series of 

steps along that azimuth, for the nations of the alliance to improve 

SOF air capabilities and thereby effectively support joint operations.2

In the past 10 years, the nations of the trans-Atlantic alliance 

have made significant and often bold commitments to their ground 

and maritime SOF. Special operations aviation, however, has lagged 

behind for reasons that range from policy concerns and bureaucratic 

inertia to resource constraints. NATO’s reorientation toward expeditionary operations, the war on terrorism, and increased recognition 

of SOF’s special utility in many crisis and contingency operations 

have led many nations’ political leaders to re-examine their defense 

priorities. National and alliance leaders are starting to recognize that 

the very capable ground and maritime SOF their nations created 

are of limited utility when confined to garrison because appropriate 

transportation assets are unavailable or do not exist. The components of SOF are interdependent—what we do and how we do it are 

inherently joint, and success results in large measure because of the 

trust each component has in the other. 

Defining Special Operations Aviation

NATO defines special operations as “... activities conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military forces to 

achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by 

unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.” 3 MC 437/1, NATO Special Operations Policy, goes on 

to describe the differences between conventional and special operations in terms of the operational techniques employed, the modalities of employment, and the degree of physical and political risk. 

The fact that MC 437/1 does not use technological sophistication as 

the determining factor is important as we attempt to set an azimuth 

for special operations aviation. Furthermore, the MC 437/1 definition and corresponding characteristics of special operations are not 

limited to any one environment—land, sea, or air. Still, conventional 

wisdom in many of the member nations has led to a perception that 

SOF are only those specialized forces in the ground and maritime 

components.4
3

Newton: Special Operations Aviation in NATO

Correspondingly NATO defines special air operations as “... air 

activities conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped 

forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means ... during peace, crisis, and 

conflict, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional or in support of special operations forces.” 5 This reference to 

special air operations is the only one to be found in current NATO doctrine, and it is listed in the Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01(B), NATO 

Joint Doctrine “Air Operations” chapter, rather than in the “Special 

Operations” chapter or in MC 437/1. Future NATO doctrine, notably 

AJP 3.5, Special Operations (draft), must address this shortfall. MC 

437/1, AJP 01(B), and the range of NATO doctrinal and policy documents must adequately address special air operations—an easy, but 

necessary, first step along the SOF aviation vector to the future.

AJP 01(B) defines supporting air operations as enhancing all 

types of joint operations and in all environments.6 That distinction 

serves as an important point of departure in the process of defining 

the special operations 

environment. Special air

operations are considered 

a subset of supporting 

air operations. Additional 

subcategories of supporting air operations include surveillance and 

reconnaissance, air transport, air-to-air refueling, 

and combat search and 

rescue (CSAR)—all potential special air operations, 

though not always special 

air operations conducted 

by aircraft. Some air-centric special operations are conducted by battlefield airmen7 who provide the necessary linkage between ground 

and air activities, ensuring that the contributions of air power are 

appropriately integrated into the ground fight. Notably, although not 

considered a supporting air operation by AJP 01(B), close air support 

or air attack by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft in a special operations 

context can also be included as a supporting air activity. 

Special

Reconaissance

& Surveillance 

Direct Action

Air

Transport

CAS or

Attack Helo

Surveillance

& Recon 

Air-to-Air

Refueling

Figure 2. SOF Supporting Air Operations. 
4

JSOU Report 06-8

If one combines the generalized definition of special air operations 

from AJP 01(B) with the principle tasks assigned to SOF, then adds 

the required capabilities for a troop-contributing nation to qualify 

as a NATO special operations force found in MC 437/1, it is not difficult to determine the characteristics and required capabilities for 

NATO’s special operations aviation. (See Figure 2.) The challenge, 

though, is specifying NATO’s desired special air warfare capabilities 

in a forum easily accessed and utilized by member nations seeking 

guidance to develop their special operations aviation. The community of SOF airmen needs to establish the minimum capabilities and 

standards that will define SOF air in the future—another step along 

the vector.

Defining the Current and Future Environment

SOF aviation conducts supporting air operations to enable other ground and maritime special operators to conduct the three 

principle tasks of NATO special operations—direct action, special 

reconnaissance and surveillance, and military assistance. SOF air 

and aviation also has a role performing those same three principle 

missions. This is where the divergence between flying operations and 

supporting air operations often occurs. 

The supporting air activities for special operations tend to be very 

generic in character and include activities such as drop zone and 

landing zone reconnaissance and certification, airfield surveys, forward refueling and rearming, terminal attack control of joint fires, 

advanced trauma and pararescue medical support for CSAR, and 

air traffic control. What makes these activities “special” is that they 

are conducted in the same hostile, denied, or austere environments, 

alongside and in support of ground and maritime SOF. 

Airmen in this ground-centered environment must demonstrate 

the same levels of physical and tactical capability as their counterparts. This tends to be the easy part of special air operations, however. NATO member nations have shown they know how to select, 

train, and sustain specialized forces. It is the airmen’s technical 

skills, combined with their ability to seamlessly integrate into the tactical teams that make them special operators. Thus, the suggestion 

is that the simplest contribution by airmen to special operations, in 

an alliance context, should be in the realm of air-to-ground coordina-
5

Newton: Special Operations Aviation in NATO

tion—joint terminal attack controllers, drop zone and landing zone 

reconnaissance and certification, pararescue medical support, and 

forward area refueling and rearming. Special operations battlefield 

airmen can, and should, be the integrating element that brings the 

full weight of airpower to bear in any special operation. As was demonstrated over and over again during operations these past 5 years in 

Afghanistan, the addition of special operations battlefield airmen to 

the SOF patrols, teams, or detachments yields awesome results.

The flying part of special operations aviation is the most difficult to achieve because of resources, manpower, and fiscal considerations. MC 437/1 requires that a national special operations 

task group possess the ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate using air

[emphasis added], land, and sea means into and out of the operational area, ideally utilizing organic transportation assets in order 

to qualify as a NATO special operations force.8 This statement does 

not specify any standards for those transportation methods, though. 

Depending upon one’s view, this statement might be interpreted in a 

purely technological sense and thus is limited to only those aircraft 

with all the “bells and whistles” that allow airplanes and helicopters 

Figure 3. Special Operations C-130 and Chinook. C-130 transloads fuel and 

personnel to a Chinook at an austere landing zone. (Used by permission 

from U.K. MOD.)
6

JSOU Report 06-8

to fly extremely long distances, at night, low level, in high threat 

environments, undetected, and protect themselves from all manner 

of defenses that would seek to prevent such intrusion. 

Sadly, this perception is not uncommon. One must ask, though, 

whether the MC 437/1 requirement for organic air transportation 

capable of successfully infiltrating, resupplying, and extracting Special Forces teams is better defined, not in terms of technology but 

rather by the operational techniques, modalities of employment, 

and the degree of risk. As with most issues in the special operations 

business, the answer is, “It depends.” SOF operate in and amongst 

a range of threats and environments, so logically SOF aviation 

resources could reasonably span the range of tactical and technological capabilities. To illustrate this point, it is interesting to look at 

the course the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 

has taken. 

The U.S. has invested heavily in modified C-130 Hercules, adding 

terrain following/terrain avoidance radar, threat warning and countermeasures systems, forward looking infrared systems, in-flight 

refueling systems, and a strengthened airframe for high speed, low 

level precision airdrops. The crews train extensively to be able to 

fully utilize the capabilities of their technologically advanced aircraft. The resulting MC-130 Combat Talons are technological marvels capable of successfully inserting and resupplying Special Forces 

teams in a sophisticated air defense environment. But these Combat 

Talons are also expensive to procure, to operate, and to maintain. 

Looking at the same issue from a personnel perspective, the program to convert a qualified Hercules aircrew member into a Combat 

Talon crew member is time consuming and expensive. Even when 

just considering equipment and people costs, one can understand 

why a nation like the U.S. can only sustain a relatively small fleet of 

Combat Talons when compared to the total number of C-130s flown 

by the U.S. Air Force. 

Because Combat Talons are organic special operations aircraft, 

SOF commanders tend to use “their” MC-130s for the entire range of 

airlift missions to support SOF. What has been discovered, however, 

is that after years of flying at a wartime operational tempo, AFSOC 

is “flying the wings off” its Combat Talons. Examining the missions 

being flown, a statistically significant number could have easily been 

done by non-SOF Hercules or other conventional cargo aircraft. The 
7

Newton: Special Operations Aviation in NATO

problem, though, is the understandable desire to support special 

operations brethren using organic resources rather than pushing 

non-special operations air support requirements into the theater 

airlift system. The unintended consequence of the “we take care of 

our own” attitude is that the specialized mission aircraft are wearing out. 

To address the conventional intratheater airlift needs of the joint special operations force, AFSOC recently 

added a squadron of C-130s and a 

squadron of light support aircraft, 

U-28s, to the 16th Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field.9 The 

resulting mix of specialized and conventional aircraft demonstrates 

AFSOC’s ability to fulfill the policy guidance in MC 437/1, but saves 

the specialized aircraft for the most demanding, high threat missions 

and environments. 

In order for land or maritime Special Forces to conduct special 

reconnaissance and direct action operations in hostile, denied, or 

politically sensitive areas, SOF aviation must be capable of conducting supporting air operations—air transport (AT), close air support/

attack helicopter (AH), surveillance and reconnaissance (SR), and 

air-to-air refueling (AAR) in those same hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. While most would begin by defining hostile and 

denied areas in terms of the threats posed by enemy air defense 

systems, recent operations have shown that environmental extremes 

can sometimes present more difficult challenges to special air operations than adversaries’ weapon systems. 

As an example, conducting air transport operations to meet the 

Special Forces’ primary needs of insertion, extraction, and resupply in the extreme altitudes of Afghanistan’s Hindu Kush Mountains has proven to be a daunting environmental challenge and has 

highlighted severe shortfalls in current and projected special operations aircraft. Aircraft, especially helicopters, optimized for operations on the plains of Central Europe, find it very difficult to fly at 

these extreme altitudes and high temperatures. Likewise, the operating ranges required during recent operations have led many NATO 

nations to reevaluate the requirement for in-flight refueling capabilities on their special operations helicopters. 

The unintended consequence 

of the “we take care of our 

own” attitude is that the 

specialized mission aircraft 

are wearing out. 
8

JSOU Report 06-8

Capabilities Required to Qualify as NATO SOF

The capabilities required to qualify as NATO SOF aviation must be based upon the criteria from MC 437/1, Annex D, and also 

stated in terms of the supporting air operations previously described. 

Special air operations must first be able to support the principle special operations tasks: special reconnaissance and surveillance (SRS) 

and direct action (DA). Air support to SRS and DA is the most technologically and environmentally challenging. The issues associated 

with military assistance in an aviation context are beyond the scope 

of this paper, but must be addressed in the future as special operations aviation matures and grows in the alliance. 

The defining characteristic of special operations aviation is rightly 

our ability to successfully conduct discreet, covert, or low visibility 

operations throughout the depth and breadth of the battlespace. The 

most difficult requirement for special operations aviation to meet is 

the ability to perform their supporting air operations—AT, AH, SR, 

and AAR—in a medium to high threat tactical environment, either 

through the use of on-board defensive systems and/or specialized 

tactics. 

To qualify as NATO SOF aviation, the recommendation is to 

require the ability to fly fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, low level, in 

formation, to a precise location, meeting strict time-on-target criteria, using night vision devices (NVD). In addition, fixed-wing special operations aircraft must be capable of landing and taking off 

from austere airfields with minimum runway lighting using NVDs. 

This standard for operational techniques and modalities of employment enables special air operations in low to medium threat environments. As a vector for the future, this minimum standard for special 

air operations provides the rationale for dedicated aircraft, rigorous 

training programs, additional flying hours, aircraft modifications, 

committed aircrews, and many other training, personnel, and equipment issues associated with special air operations. 

NATO’s special operations airmen owe it to the rest of the special 

operations community to establish and sustain a standard for operations and employment that sets them apart from the conventional 

forces and one the entire special operations community can depend 

on. In addition, establishing a standard is something that needs 

to be done quickly. My personal experience with European special 
9

Newton: Special Operations Aviation in NATO

operators from most of 

the member nations and 

all the different armed 

services in the past 

4 years indicates that 

they want and need published NATO standards, 

whether in AJPs or in 

NATO Standardization 

Agreements (STANAGs) 

to guide the member 

nations’ leadership as 

they develop and equip 

air and aviation forces 

for special operations.

If the minimum standard for special air and aviation forces in 

NATO is defined by the performance of the aircrews (multi-aircraft 

formations, at night, low level, using NVDs, to a strict time-on-target 

criteria), then a second, higher level of capability would be defined 

by the defensive and extended range systems that enable successful 

flight operations in medium to high threat air defense environments. 

If a nation chooses to invest in sophisticated avionics, defensive systems, and extended range equipment, the alliance is enhanced, but 

the added capability is not based upon an alliance requirement and 

does not establish a new, higher standard or category of national 

special operations air and aviation contributions. Better capability is 

desired and encouraged, but it cannot be a limiting standard when 

qualifying national aviation contributions to SOF. What the recommended minimum NATO standard does provide is a requirement 

for future SOF aviation STANAGs to address interoperability and 

employment considerations when employing aircraft with dissimilar 

capabilities. 

The likely future operating environment, characterized by a distributed, non-contiguous battlespace, will not require every special 

operations aircraft to possess the full suite of defensive systems and 

airspace penetration aids. It is reasonable to assume that NATO and 

its member nations will take some risk and accept a range of defensive capabilities among special operations aircraft, from a basic systems capability of flares and chaff to very sophisticated electronic 

Figure 4. Battlefield Airmen in Action. Special 

operations terminal attack controller marking 

a target for a strike by conventional air power. 

(Used by permission.) 
10

JSOU Report 06-8

countermeasures. While taking such risks will likely necessitate a 

recurring commitment for aviation task groups from those member 

nations possessing the more sophisticated aircraft, this is not unlike 

the situation the alliance already finds itself with conventional aviation. For example, among fighter aircraft, some alliance members 

still fly 1960s era F-4 Phantoms while others fly the most modern 

F-16s. It is the joint force commander’s senior airman who apportions aircraft to missions based upon threat and aircraft capabilities. The same would be true for SOF aircraft—the senior special 

operations airman would be responsible for matching SOF aircraft 

with missions, optimizing aircraft capabilities against threats and 

environmental conditions. 

Fielding a diverse force will require NATO standards for interoperability and employment, yet it also offers great opportunities. It 

becomes the task of the special operations planners, airmen, and 

commanders to effectively employ the range of capabilities found 

among the special operations aviation task groups contributed by 

the nations to an operation.

Figure 5. Agusta Westland NH-90 Special Operations Version. The NH-90 gives 

nations the ability to lift 20 combat loaded troops. It is being produced in a special 

operations version. (Source is www.agustawestand.com.) 
11

Newton: Special Operations Aviation in NATO

Aircraft, especially helicopters, suffer at high altitudes and high 

temperatures. For example, to safely operate in altitudes typical of 

the Himalayas or the Andes or in the extreme temperatures found in 

Saharan deserts or Southeast Asian jungles, aircraft are often forced 

to sacrifice range or payload. Planners and leaders must balance the 

requirements for capacity with the need for specialized capability. At 

times, the special operations community has proven to be its own 

worst enemy. For example, when aircraft designs have been optimized for high altitude and high temperature performance, special 

operators have shown a tendency to add avionics, electronic support 

systems, and armament to increase capability, but in the process 

they sacrifice capacity. This tendency is another reason the nations 

should consider a range of performance and capabilities for special 

operations. Less technologically sophisticated aircraft, in some situations, may be the equipment of choice when operating at the extreme 

limits of aircraft performance. 

Expanding on the theme introduced in McRaven’s book, Spec 

Ops, it will be the specially selected, trained, and sustained airmen

who train extensively and realistically, rehearse repeatedly, and thus 

fly their equipment better than anyone else to execute their tasks 

with surprise, speed, and purpose. Those dedicated and committed 

special operators (who happen to be airmen) then achieve extraordinary results when less capable airmen would have failed.

How Much is Enough and How Do We Get There?

Developing and sustaining a special aviation force is neither easy nor inexpensive. The collective experience of the U.S. and the 

U.K. provide ample evidence of this claim. Over the years, however, 

certain truths have emerged. First, special air operations require 

specially selected and trained aviators. Special air operations are not 

missions any aviator can perform. Whether fixed wing or rotary wing, 

and flying the most capable or conventional aircraft, the demands 

of special operations can only be met by people who want to do this 

work and are willing to sacrifice to do it better than anyone else. 

There are countless anecdotes of extraordinary airmen who 

pushed themselves and their aircraft to the limits in order to achieve 

special operations success. Jimmy Doolittle’s Tokyo Raiders, the U.S. 

Army Air Corps air commando’s 1944 assault into Burma to support 
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the British Chindits, and the glider pilots who landed the German 

assault teams on Ft Eban Emael in Belgium are three of these special operations conducted by airmen who found innovative solutions 

to seemingly impossible problems. They did not have the advantage 

of Combat Talons or SOF Chinooks. 

Instead, they trained and rehearsed 

to such high standards that when it 

came time to execute their missions, 

they flew their airplanes, helicopters, 

or gliders better than anyone ever 

thought possible. Therefore, I would 

also recommend that organic special 

operations air and aviation units have dedicated airmen and aircraft 

that train to higher standards and meet the minimal qualifications 

for special operations aviation (fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, in formation, to a precise location, low level, meeting strict time-on-target 

criteria, using NVDs). 

Setting these two factors as the minimum standard for qualification as special operations aviation has direct impact on all the 

supporting air operations for SOF. The air transport implications are 

fairly simple to understand as this is the only aviation requirement 

specified in MC 437/1. If, however, a nation chooses to invest in 

the other supporting air operations for SOF—AH; AAR; SR; intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR); 

or CSAR—then the minimum standard to be considered SOF still 

applies. Any other aircraft and airmen dedicated to SOF by their 

nations must meet the same two conditions specified above to qualify 

as NATO SOF. The price of entry into the special operations “club” 

is meeting these standards. As we have seen in the U.S., U.K., and 

France, the challenge is selecting the best aviators through a rigorous assessment and selection program, then developing a demanding sustainment program with the commensurate additional flying 

time and logistics support. 

The NATO military establishment’s responsibilities include placing airmen on strategic and operational level NATO special operations 

staffs, publishing allied joint doctrine and STANAGs, and sponsoring 

both field and command post exercises that provide opportunities 

to strengthen the bonds between and interoperability of our different national SOF. If the contributing nations develop robust tacticalInstead, they trained and 

rehearsed to such high 

standards that ... they flew 

their airplanes, helicopters, 

or gliders better than anyone 

ever thought possible. 
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Newton: Special Operations Aviation in NATO

level special air operations capabilities, NATO must design, develop, 

and field the necessary means of commanding and controlling the 

proffered SOF aviation resources at the theater level. 

The process begins with placing SOF airmen on the joint special operations staffs at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

(SHAPE). This first step is easy, but results in minimal, if any, operational capability to integrate special operations air and aviation into 

a theater-wide operation. The increase in operational planning and 

integration will come as the special operations staffs at the joint 

force commands and NATO’s future Special Operations Component 

Command (SOCC) headquarters are supplied with SOF airmen who 

can articulate the functions, requirements, command and control, 

and potential of SOF air and aviation during contingency operations 

planning, operation plan development, and execution of operations. 

The command and control of special air operations will be exercised through a Special Operations Air Task Group (SOATG). The 

role, functions, organization, and command authority of the SOATG 

is currently being addressed in the draft AJP 3.5 (Special Operations). The SOATG will provide the special operations component 

commander a single air manager to optimize the employment of 

assigned and augmenting air assets. 

One key aviation staff function that will need attention (and 

resources and manpower) soon is the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). 

It was a hard lesson, but the U.S. learned that the special operations 

liaison to the JFACC cannot be done with an ad hoc team. In order 

to learn from and apply the lessons of the U.S. experience, NATO 

needs a small cadre of special operations airmen who live with the 

air component commands day to day during peacetime and serve as 

the NATO special operations component commander liaison. 

During contingency operations, this standing cadre forms the 

nucleus around which a robust special operations liaison element 

is formed after augmentation by the troop-contributing nations. The 

return for NATO’s investment of people and resources to a standing SOLE will nearly always be better support from the conventional 

airmen, usually the result of the goodwill and working relationship 

established during routine activities and exercises. 

The U.S. model for the SOLE is instructive; Special Operations 

Command Europe has a four-person SOLE stationed with the 16th 
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Air Force at Ramstein Air 

Base, Germany and the warfi ghting headquarters for the

JFACC in U.S. European 

Command. If NATO were to 

adopt this model, its SOLE 

could be collocated with 

CC-Air10 at Ramstein Air 

Base. SHAPE is in the initial 

stages of developing a SOCC 

headquarters. The requirement for a NATO SOLE is 

best identifi ed now, as an 

integral part of the SOCC 

headquarters, rather than 

trying to add it as an additional requirement later. 

Conclusion

What then should be the vector for SOF air 

and aviation? The azimuth 

should be the two elements that defi ne special operations aviation 

and achieve parity with the ground and maritime forces: 1) fl ying 

aircraft in formation, low level, to a precise location, meeting strict 

time-on-target criteria, using NVDs and 2) dedicated aircraft and 

aircrew members. These minimum and generalized standards provide suffi cient guidance for nations to develop assessment, selection, and training programs for special operations airmen and to 

design, develop, and fi eld specialized aircraft. This approach does 

not detract from a nation’s desire to fi eld a small nucleus of organic, 

very sophisticated aircraft as a core around which to develop an 

array of SOF aviation capabilities. Quite the contrary, it encourages 

a group of highly trained and specially managed aviators who can be 

called upon to support special operations to a SOF standard when 

the threat or the environment might not justify the utilization of the 

most technologically advanced aircraft. 

SOF Air C2 Lessons Learned

During NATO Exercise Allied Action 05, 

NATO’s 10-person SOLE was divided 

among three locations: with the JFACC, 

at the JFACC-Rear, and with the JFACCForward in the deployed Combined Air 

Operations Center. Dividing the small 

staff among three locations made it 

nearly impossible to conduct 24-hour 

operations and to ensure SOF representation at all the required meetings, 

working groups, and boards. 

The Combined Joint Special Operations 

Task Force (CJSOTF)/J3-Air, staffed by 

non-SOF airmen, served as the commander’s advisors for the tasking and 

employment of SOF air assets. The SOLE 

director, a SOF airman but a liaison 

offi cer and not in the chain of command, 

was forced to intervene on occasion to 

ensure appropriate utilization of joint 

special operations aviation resources.11

•

•
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Newton: Special Operations Aviation in NATO

The incremental steps (the velocity in the aeronautical definition of a vector) would begin with selecting and training battlefield 

airmen to fight alongside the ground and maritime SOF and who 

would bring the full range of conventional and special operations air 

power to bear in support of DA and SRS missions. A second step, 

or concurrently as a parallel first step, would be the selection and 

training of airmen able to fly their aircraft to meet or exceed the 

minimum standards recommended for inclusion in MC 437/1, AJP 

01(B), and any future special operations STANAGs. The third level 

of magnitude along the SOF aviation vector is growing a technologically more sophisticated level of aviation capability. Recognizing that 

this has serious resource implications, it will be difficult for some 

nations to attain and sustain this echelon. This stage is also the 

break between national and alliance responsibilities. Establishing 

a level of aircraft capabilities, initially determined by compatibility 

with night vision systems, but also having the secure communications and information sharing tools, such as Have Quick radios and 

Link data terminals, will go a long way towards establishing, equipping, and manning a NATO SOF air and aviation force.

The final two levels of scale along the vector—embedded SOF 

airmen on NATO staffs and establishing a permanent NATO SOLE—

are in the realm of the joint force commands and a SOCC headquarters. Ensuring that SHAPE and the joint force commands have 

SOF airmen integrating special operations into plan development, 

Figure 6. 

Vector for 

SOF Air and 

Aviation. 

1. Formation, low level, precise 

 navigation, time-on target, NVDs

2. Dedicated airmen and aircraft

Rigorous aircrew

selection & training 

Battlefield

Airmen 

Organic aircraft

Embedded SOF

airmen in staffs 

NATO SOLE
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force structure decisions, and transformation is the necessary initial step towards developing special operations air as an operational 

level capability. Creating and resourcing a NATO SOLE completes 

the vector to the future. This course achieves parity of capability 

among all the special operations elements in NATO and ensures the 

alliance has the wherewithal to employ SOF as the joint force it is 

intended to be.
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Newton: Special Operations Aviation in NATO

Endnotes

 1. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations 

Warfare: Theory and Practice, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995, page 

381.

 2. The word vector is intentional as it indicates both a heading and a 

magnitude. The intent of this paper is to offer readers a viable vector 

for capable special operations aviation in the alliance. The proposed 

answer suggests a range of capabilities, rather than an all-or-nothing 

solution.

 3. MC 437/1, NATO Special Operations Policy, April 2006, page 1-1, 

paragraph 4.

 4. Of the 26 member-nations in NATO, only the U.S., U.K., France, and 

Italy have dedicated organic aircraft and units to conduct or support 

special air operations (as of July 2006). These personnel assigned to 

these units train to a higher standard, fly more often than their conventional counterparts, and are kept in a higher state of readiness in 

order to maintain their skills at the higher level and respond to unforeseen national requirements.

 5. AJP 01(B), Allied Joint Doctrine, December 2002, page 7-5, paragraph 

0704f(5). Although a bit dated, it remains the only NATO document 

currently defining special air operations. While AJP 3.3, Joint Air and 

Space Operations Doctrine, does address special air operations, it is 

out of date (July 2000) and does not reflect current employment concepts and doctrinal focus of SOF. The future AJP 3.5, Special Operations doctrine, will address special operations aviation and special air 

operations.

 6. AJP 01(B), paragraph 7-4, paragraph 0704f.

 7. “Battlefield airmen” is a convenient U.S. term that describes those 

airmen focused on integrating air support into the operations of 

ground units. Typically, the skill sets considered as battlefield airmen 

in the special operations community include special operations terminal attack controllers, combat controllers, and pararescue specialists, 

although nations may choose to include other career fields in order to 

meet national requirements. 

 8. MC 437/1, Annex D, page D-1.

 9. The U-28A is the military version of the Pilatus PC-12, a single engine 

utility aircraft with short field landing and takeoff capabilities. Source 

is 319th Special Operations Squadron fact sheet, found at www.hurlburt.af.mil/library.

 10. CC-Air at Ramstein AB, Deutschland, is one of two air component 

commands in NATO. The other is CC-Air at Izmir, Turkey. These are 

NATO operational level headquarters charged with planning, coordinating, and directing conventional air operations for the alliance.

 11. Based upon the author’s observations as Chief of Plans in the SOLE 

during Allied Action 05.