Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

OVERSIGHT ★ INTEGRITY ★ GUIDANCE 

Management Advisory 

Memorandum for the Director of 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Regarding the Execution of Woods 

Procedures for Applications Filed 

with the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court Relating to 

U.S. Persons 

Audit Division 20-047 March 2020 
 

 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

March 30, 2020 

MANAGEMENT ADVISORY MEMORANDUM FOR: 

CHRISTOPHER WRAY 

DIRECTOR 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

FROM: MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ 

 INSPECTOR GENERAL 

SUBJECT: Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Execution of its Woods Procedures for Applications 

Filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 

Relating to U.S. Persons 

As you are aware, in December 2019 my office issued a report examining 

four Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) applications—an initial 

application and three renewal applications—targeting a U.S. Person and other 

aspects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) “Crossfire Hurricane” 

investigation (“December 2019 FISA Report”).1 As detailed in our report, 

among other things, we identified fundamental and serious errors in the 

agents’ conduct of the FBI’s factual accuracy review procedures (“Woods 

Procedures”) with regard to all four FISA applications. We found, for example, 

numerous instances where the Woods File did not include supporting 

documentation for factual assertions contained in the FISA applications, as 

required by FBI policy. Additionally, we determined that the Woods File did not 

contain, as also required by FBI policy, documentation from the Confidential 

Human Source’s (CHS) handling agent stating that the handling agent had 

reviewed the facts presented in the FISA application regarding the CHS's 

reliability and background, and that the facts presented were accurate. We 

further found that the FBI had failed to follow its policies for re-verifying factual 

1 DOJ OIG’s Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire 

Hurricane Investigation, Oversight & Review Division Report 20-012 (December 2019), 

https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/o20012.pdf. 

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assertions made in the initial FISA application that were also included in the 

three FISA renewal applications. 

As a result of these findings, in December 2019, my office initiated an 

audit to examine more broadly the FBI’s execution of, and compliance with, its 

Woods Procedures relating to U.S. Persons covering the period from October 2014 

to September 2019. As an initial step in our audit, over the past 2 months, we 

visited 8 FBI field offices of varying sizes and reviewed a judgmentally selected 

sample of 29 applications relating to U.S. Persons and involving both 

counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations. This sample was 

selected from a dataset provided by the FBI that contained more than 

700 applications relating to U.S. Persons submitted by those 8 field offices over 

a 5-year period. The proportion of counterintelligence and counterterrorism 

applications within our sample roughly models the ratio of the case types 

within that total of FBI FISA applications. Our initial review of these 

applications has consisted solely of determining whether the contents of the 

FBI’s Woods File supported statements of fact in the associated FISA 

application; our review did not seek to determine whether support existed 

elsewhere for the factual assertion in the FISA application (such as in the case 

file), or if relevant information had been omitted from the application. For all of 

the FISA applications that we have reviewed to date, the period of courtauthorized surveillance had been completed and no such surveillance was 

active at the time of our review. 

We reviewed these applications, and met with available case agents or 

supervisors who were responsible for them, to assess whether the FBI complied 

with its Woods Procedures for FISA applications submitted to the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). We also obtained and reviewed 

information from the FBI and the Department of Justice’s (Department or DOJ) 

National Security Division (NSD) about their FISA application oversight 

mechanisms. Specifically, in addition to interviewing FBI and NSD officials, we 

reviewed 34 FBI and NSD accuracy review reports covering the period from 

October 2014 to September 2019—which originated from the 8 field offices we 

have visited to date and addressed a total of 42 U.S. Person FISA applications, 

only one of which was also included among the 29 FISA applications that we 

reviewed. 

As a result of our audit work to date and as described below, we do not 

have confidence that the FBI has executed its Woods Procedures in compliance 

with FBI policy. Specifically, the Woods Procedures mandate compiling 

supporting documentation for each fact in the FISA application. Adherence to 

the Woods Procedures should result in such documentation as a means toward 

achievement of the FBI’s policy that FISA applications be “scrupulously 

accurate.” Our lack of confidence that the Woods Procedures are working as 

intended stems primarily from the fact that: (1) we could not review original 

Woods Files for 4 of the 29 selected FISA applications because the FBI has not 

2 
been able to locate them and, in 3 of these instances, did not know if they ever 

existed; (2) our testing of FISA applications to the associated Woods Files 

identified apparent errors or inadequately supported facts in all of the 

25 applications we reviewed, and interviews to date with available agents or 

supervisors in field offices generally have confirmed the issues we identified; 

(3) existing FBI and NSD oversight mechanisms have also identified deficiencies 

in documentary support and application accuracy that are similar to those that 

we have observed to date; and (4) FBI and NSD officials we interviewed 

indicated to us that there were no efforts by the FBI to use existing FBI and 

NSD oversight mechanisms to perform comprehensive, strategic assessments 

of the efficacy of the Woods Procedures or FISA accuracy, to include identifying 

the need for enhancements to training and improvements in the process, or 

increased accountability measures. 

During this initial review, we have not made judgments about whether 

the errors or concerns we identified were material. Also, we do not speculate 

as to whether the potential errors would have influenced the decision to file the 

application or the FISC’s decision to approve the FISA application. In addition, 

our review was limited to assessing the FBI’s execution of its Woods 

Procedures, which are not focused on affirming the completeness of the 

information in FISA applications. 

Nevertheless, we believe that a deficiency in the FBI’s efforts to support 

the factual statements in FISA applications through its Woods Procedures 

undermines the FBI’s ability to achieve its “scrupulously accurate” standard for 

FISA applications. We are providing you with this management advisory 

memorandum because we believe this information about our preliminary 

results will help inform the FBI in its ongoing efforts to address the 

recommendations included in our December 2019 FISA Report, and because 

we believe our audit work to date warrants additional OIG recommendations, 

which we have included in this memorandum. 

FBI Woods Procedures, “Woods Files,” and Certain Oversight Mechanisms 

The FBI implemented its Woods Procedures in 2001 following errors in 

numerous FISA applications submitted to the FISC in FBI counterterrorism 

investigations. The stated purposes of the Woods Procedures are to minimize 

factual inaccuracies in FISA applications and to ensure that statements 

contained in applications are "scrupulously accurate." FBI policy requires the 

case agent who will be requesting the FISA application to create and maintain 

an accuracy sub-file (known as a "Woods File") that contains: (1) supporting 

documentation for every factual assertion contained in a FISA application, and 

(2) supporting documentation and the results of required database searches 

and other verifications. Following the creation of the Woods File, the case 

agent signs the “FD-1079 FISA Verification Form” (Woods Form) to affirm “the 

accuracy of each and every factual assertion... and that back-up 

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documentation for each such fact has been retained” in the Woods File. The 

supervisory special agent is also required to sign the form, confirming that the 

supervisory special agent has reviewed the Woods File and determined that it 

contains supporting documentation for every factual assertion within the FISA 

application. This form must be completed prior to an application being 

submitted to the FISC. 

FBI policy also states that the FBI and DOJ’s NSD “have instituted two 

broad oversight mechanisms designed to ensure that FISA applications contain 

accurate and verified information.” Specifically, the FBI requires its Chief 

Division Counsel (CDC) in each FBI field office to perform each year an 

accuracy review of at least one FISA application from that field office. 

Similarly, NSD’s Office of Intelligence (OI) conducts its own accuracy review 

each year of at least 1 FISA application originating from each of approximately 

25 to 30 different FBI field offices. Both the FBI’s and NSD’s accuracy reviews 

are performed on applications that have already been submitted to and 

approved by the FISC. The agreed-upon procedures for these accuracy reviews 

are memorialized in a 2009 joint FBI-NSD memorandum. 

Concerns Related to FBI and DOJ National Security Division Accuracy 

Reviews 

As part of our initial audit work, we met with FBI and NSD officials about 

the current mechanisms that each organization has in place to review the 

accuracy of FISA applications. As noted above, FBI policy requires the CDCs in 

each field office to conduct an accuracy review each year of at least one 

application for an active FISA surveillance order from that field office. 

According to FBI Office of General Counsel (OGC) officials, these FBI CDC 

accuracy reports are sent to the FBI OGC at FBI headquarters. NSD OI 

officials reported that they are not provided with the FBI CDC reports. 

Separately, as noted above, NSD OI conducts its own accuracy review each 

year of at least 1 FISA application originating from each of approximately 

25 to 30 different FBI field offices. We requested that the FBI provide us with 

the reports from the FBI CDC and NSD OI accuracy reviews conducted from 

fiscal years 2015 through 2019. For the 8 field offices that we have visited to 

date, we received and reviewed a total of 34 FBI CDC and NSD OI reports 

addressing 42 separate U.S. Person FISA applications. 

According to interviews we conducted with FBI and NSD officials, the 

reviews these entities perform are not focused on assessing compliance with 

the Woods Procedures or the adequacy of the Woods File. Instead, these 

reviews are focused on determining whether support exists at the time of the 

FBI CDC or NSD OI review for each factual assertion in the FISA application 

under review. Thus, prior to the FBI CDC or NSD OI review, field offices are 

given advance notification of which FISA application(s) will be reviewed and are 

expected to compile documentary evidence to support the relevant FISA 

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application(s). While the field office can use, if available, a well-maintained and 

complete Woods File for this purpose, it is not required to do so. It follows that 

this method should identify fewer unsupported facts in the application than 

would result from only reviewing the Woods File (as the OIG has done in our 

audit) because the responsible personnel are aware of the upcoming review and 

given time to gather any existing documentation to support the factual 

assertions in the FISA applications. 

Our preliminary review of the 34 FBI CDC and NSD OI accuracy review 

reports covering the period from October 2014 to September 2019 for the 8 field 

offices we visited—which address a total of 42 U.S. Person FISA applications, 

1 of which was also included among the 29 FISA applications that we 

reviewed—revealed that these oversight mechanisms routinely identified 

deficiencies in documentation supporting FISA applications similar to those 

that, as described in more detail below, we have observed during our audit to 

date. Although reports related to 3 of the 42 FISA applications did not identify 

any deficiencies, the reports covering the remaining 39 applications identified a 

total of about 390 issues, including unverified, inaccurate, or inadequately 

supported facts, as well as typographical errors. At this stage in our audit, we 

have not yet reviewed these oversight reports in detail. Our compilation of the 

issues identified was produced by reviewing available summary information 

and did not include examining the specifics of the issues or determining if or 

how individual issues may have been resolved or mitigated during the review, 

such as by the case agent providing additional supporting documentation from 

the case file or if there was coordination with NSD OI and a correction to the 

application text was made in a subsequent application. 

The 2009 joint FBI-NSD policy memorandum states that “OI determines, 

in consultation with the FBI, whether a misstatement or omission of fact 

identified during an accuracy review is material.” The 34 reports that we 

reviewed indicate that none of the approximately 390 identified issues were 

deemed to be material. However, we were told by NSD OI personnel that the 

FBI had not asked NSD OI to weigh in on materiality determinations nor had 

NSD OI formally received FBI CDC accuracy review results, which accounted 

for about 250 of the total issues in the reports we reviewed. We noted that the 

joint FBI-NSD policy memorandum does not specifically require that all 

misstatements or omissions identified during the FBI CDC accuracy reviews be 

reported to NSD and FBI officials, but rather only requires that CDCs report 

potentially material misstatements and omissions. 

According to FBI OGC personnel, FBI CDCs record their results in a 

standardized report template that is submitted to FBI OGC at FBI 

headquarters. However, these submissions are tracked by FBI OGC only to 

ensure CDC compliance with the requirement to perform the reviews. While 

FBI officials have told us that corrective action or training may occur at the 

individual field office level based upon the results of the CDC reviews, no 

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comprehensive, strategic analysis of the cumulative results is performed at the 

FBI headquarters level. For NSD OI accuracy reviews, the results are reported 

in formal correspondence distributed to the head of the local FBI field office and 

CDC, as well as FBI OGC personnel and other FBI headquarters officials. 

Therefore, the results of FBI CDC and NSD OI oversight mechanisms 

have been available to relevant FBI officials responsible for ensuring the 

integrity of the FBI’s FISA program. FBI OGC personnel told us, however, that 

the FBI CDC and NSD OI accuracy review reports had not been used in a 

comprehensive, strategic fashion by FBI Headquarters to assess the 

performance of individuals involved in and accountable for FISA applications, 

to identify trends in results of the reviews, or to contribute to an evaluation of 

the efficacy of quality assurance mechanisms intended to ensure that FISA 

applications were “scrupulously accurate.” That is, the accuracy reviews were 

not being used by the FBI as a tool to help assess the FBI’s compliance with its 

Woods Procedures. 

An NSD official informed us that NSD OI has used its FISA accuracy 

review results in “trends reports.” This official further informed us that these 

trends reports include observations on the categories and types of errors 

identified in the reviews and that the review results are used to train new and 

experienced NSD OI attorneys on FISA application writing and to communicate 

notable issues as well as best practices. Our audit to date has been focused 

solely on the FBI and its execution of its Woods Procedures, and we have not 

yet received or reviewed these NSD OI trends reports. Also, we note that to 

date we have not identified or been told about any use by the FBI of these OI 

trends reports to make modifications or enhancements to the FBI’s Woods 

Procedures or other efforts at the FBI to ensure the accuracy of FISA 

applications. 

While the FBI CDC and NSD OI accuracy reviews do not have the stated 

purpose of confirming the efficacy of the FBI’s execution of its Woods 

Procedures, we believe that the FBI’s comprehensive, strategic examination of 

the results of these reviews would have put the FBI on notice that the Woods 

Procedures were not consistently executed thoroughly and rigorously for 

applications submitted during our review period so as to help ensure the FBI’s 

FISA applications were “scrupulously accurate.” In addition, the results of 

these reviews provide a significant amount of information that could be used to 

assess the FBI’s performance of the critical quality assurance measures in its 

Woods Procedures, and we recommend below that the FBI conduct such an 

effort in coordination with NSD. FBI OGC informed us that in response to the 

OIG’s December 2019 FISA Report, the FBI started, among other actions, 

analyzing data contained in the accuracy reviews and coordinating with 

NSD OI to gain more insight into NSD OI’s reviews. As our audit continues, we 

intend to examine these FISA oversight mechanisms in more detail, including 

6 
the process for ensuring that adequate corrective action is taken on individual 

applications reviewed for accuracy. 

Concerns Identified to Date in the OIG Audit of the FBI’s Execution of its 

Woods Procedures 

Although all 29 FISA applications that we selected for review were 

required by FBI policy to have Woods Files created by the case agent and 

reviewed by the supervisory special agent, we have identified 4 applications for 

which, as of the date of this memorandum, the FBI either has been unable to 

locate the Woods File that was prepared at the time of the application or for 

which FBI personnel suggested a Woods File was not completed. We, therefore, 

make a recommendation below that the FBI take steps to ensure that a Woods 

File exists for every FISA application submitted to the FISC in all pending 

investigations. 

Additionally, for all 25 FISA applications with Woods Files that we have 

reviewed to date, we identified facts stated in the FISA application that were: 

(a) not supported by any documentation in the Woods File, (b) not clearly 

corroborated by the supporting documentation in the Woods File, or 

(c) inconsistent with the supporting documentation in the Woods File. While 

our review of these issues and follow-up with case agents is still ongoing—and 

we have not made materiality judgments for these or other errors or concerns 

we identified—at this time we have identified an average of about 20 issues per 

application reviewed, with a high of approximately 65 issues in one application 

and less than 5 issues in another application. 

Moreover, although there are specific requirements related to FISA 

applications that utilize CHS reporting, we have observed that these 

requirements are not being consistently followed. Specifically, the Woods 

Procedures require that when a FISA application contains reporting from an 

FBI CHS, the Woods File must include documentation from the handling agent 

or CHS coordinator (or either of their immediate supervisors) stating that: 

(1) this individual has reviewed the facts presented in the FISA application 

regarding the CHS's reliability and background; and (2) based on a review of 

the CHS file documentation, the facts presented in the FISA application are 

accurate. About half of the applications we reviewed contained facts attributed 

to CHSs, and for many of them we found that the Woods File lacked 

documentation attesting to these two requirements. For some of these 

applications, the case agent preparing the FISA application was also the 

handling agent of the CHS referenced in the application, and therefore would 

have been familiar with the information in CHS files. Nevertheless, the FBI's 

policy does not specifically annul the requirement in these situations, and the 

required documentation was not included in the Woods File. 

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Our preliminary results also indicate that FBI case agents are not 

consistently following Woods Procedures requirements related to renewal 

applications. If continued FISA coverage on a U.S. Person is deemed 

necessary, the FBI must request from the FISC a renewal of its authorization 

every 90 days. According to FBI policy, the case agent is required to re-verify 

that statements of fact repeated in a renewal application from an initial FISA 

application remain true and must obtain supporting documentation for any 

new statements of fact included in the renewal application that goes to the 

FISC for approval. However, based on the results of our review of two renewal 

files, as well as our discussions with FBI agents, it appears that the FBI is not 

consistently re-verifying the original statements of fact within renewal 

applications. In one instance, we observed that errors or unsupported 

information in the statements of fact that we identified in the initial application 

had been carried over to each of the renewal applications. In other instances, 

we were told by the case agents who prepared the renewal applications that 

they only verified newly added statements of fact in renewal applications 

because they had already verified the original statements of fact when 

submitting the initial application. This practice directly contradicts FBI policy. 

We believe that the repeated weaknesses in the FBI’s execution of the 

Woods Procedures in each of the 29 FISA applications we reviewed to date— 

including the 4 applications for which the FBI could not furnish an original 

Woods File—raise significant questions about the extent to which the FBI is 

complying with its own requirement that FISA applications be supported by 

documentation in the Woods File as part of its efforts to ensure that 

applications are “scrupulously accurate.” Our concerns are supported by the 

fact that in four instances the FBI could not produce the original Woods File, 

that the Woods File deficiencies that we identified spanned all eight field offices 

in which we performed fieldwork, that case agents or supervisors whom we 

interviewed generally did not contest our results, and that the FBI CDC and 

NSD OI accuracy reviews conducted for the same period of our review identified 

similar deficiencies. As a result, we do not have confidence that the FBI has 

executed its Woods Procedures in compliance with FBI policy, or that the 

process is working as it was intended to help achieve the “scrupulously 

accurate” standard for FISA applications. 

As noted earlier in this memorandum, we have not made materiality 

judgments for these or other errors or concerns we identified. Also, we do not 

speculate as to whether the potential errors would have influenced the decision 

to file the application or the FISC’s decision to approve the FISA application. 

Our review was limited to assessing whether the FBI’s Woods Files included 

documentation to support the factual statements in its FISA applications as 

required by FBI policy; we did not review case files or other documentation to 

confirm FISA application accuracy or identify any relevant omissions. As our 

audit continues, we intend to provide the FBI with the details of issues we 

observed in each of the FISA applications we reviewed to date so that the FBI 

8 
can coordinate with NSD to assess whether any of the observed deficiencies 

were material, and to take action they deem appropriate. 

Continued Audit Work 

In connection with our ongoing audit, the OIG will conduct further 

analysis of the deficiencies identified in our work to date and of FBI FISA 

renewals. In addition, we are expanding the audit’s objective to also include 

FISA application accuracy efforts performed within NSD. Consistent with the 

OIG’s usual practices, we will keep the Department and the FBI appropriately 

apprised of the scope of our audit, and we will prepare a formal report at the 

conclusion of our work. 

In addition, we understand that, as a result of the OIG’s December 2019 

report on the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, the FBI is implementing 

changes to some of its FISA-related policies, procedures, and practices. The 

OIG’s assessment of whether those corrective actions are sufficient to address 

the recommendations in our December 2019 report will be conducted in 

accordance with the OIG’s usual practices for following up on 

recommendations. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the FBI institute a requirement that it, in 

coordination with NSD, systematically and regularly examine the results of 

past and future accuracy reviews to identify patterns or trends in identified 

errors so that the FBI can enhance training to improve agents’ performance in 

completing the Woods Procedures, or improve policies to help ensure the 

accuracy of FISA applications. 

We recommend that the FBI perform a physical inventory to ensure that 

Woods Files exist for every FISA application submitted to the FISC in all 

pending investigations. 

  

We provided a draft of this advisory memorandum to the FBI, and the 

FBI’s response can be found in Attachment 1. We intend to work with the FBI 

throughout our ongoing audit of the FBI’s execution of its Woods Procedures to 

monitor actions taken in response to the recommendations in this 

memorandum. 

Attachment 

cc: Honorable William P. Barr 

 Attorney General 

9 
Honorable Jeffrey Rosen 

Deputy Attorney General 

William Levi 

Chief of Staff 

Office of the Attorney General 

Bradley Weinsheimer 

Associate Deputy Attorney General 

Jarad Hodes 

Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General 

Honorable John C. Demers 

Assistant Attorney General 

National Security Division 

Patrick Findlay 

Special Counsel 

National Security Division 

Paul B. Murphy 

Chief of Staff 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Douglas A. Leff 

Assistant Director 

Inspection Division 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Scott B. Cheney 

Deputy Assistant Director 

Inspection Division 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Thomas G. Seiler 

Acting Section Chief 

External Audit and Compliance Section 

Inspection Division 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Louise Duhamel 

Acting Assistant Director 

Audit Liaison Group 

Internal Review and Evaluation Office 

Justice Management Division 

10 
ATTACHMENT 1 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE 

TO THE DRAFT MANAGEMENT ADVISORY MEMORANDUM 

11 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Federal Bureau oflnvestigation 

Office of the Associate Depllly Director Washington, D.C. 20535 - 0001 

March 23, 2020 

The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz 

Inspector Geμeral 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 20530 

Dear Inspector General Horowitz: 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 

Management Advisory Memorandum regarding the OIG's "Audit of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation 's Execution of its Wood Procedures for Applications Filed with the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Court Relating to US. Persons" (Memorandum). 

The FBI's work product and adherence to sound processes must meet the highest possible 

standard. Director Wray has emphasized that process rigor is at the core of the FBI's mission - to 

make sure that we always do the right thing, the right way. In December 2019, the OIG released a 

report titled, "Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire 

Hurricane Investigation." As you know, the FBI accepted all of the report's findings and the 

recommendations to the FBI, and the Director announced sweeping corrective actions, including 

foundational Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) reforms. Many of the corrective actions 

went beyond those recommended by the OIG. These remedial steps were intended, above all other 

things, to ensure that the FBI undertakes its work with painstaking rigor and that the FISA 

applications submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court are scrupulously accurate. 

The Bureau therefore appreciates the ongoing efforts of the OIG to evaluate whether the 

FBI compiled and maintained accurate, complete Woods files. The "preliminary results" detailed 

in the OIG Memorandum pertain to a sample of29 applications covering the five-year period from 

October 2014 through September 2019 for which court-authorized surveillance had concluded. As 

noted in the Memorandum, the OIG expressly took no position on the materiality of any identified 

error. Nor did the OIG evaluate the accuracy and completeness of the FISA applications 

themselves by, for instance, determining whether support existed in the case file, but not in the 
Woods file, for a factual assertion in the FISA application. Nevertheless, the OIG's :findings 

underscore the importance of the more than 40 corrective actions that Director Wray ordered late 

last year. 

Since that time, the FBI has been intensely focused on implementing these remedial 

measures with the goal of ensuring that our FISA authorities are exercised with objectivity and 

integrity. Among many other changes, we revised FISA request and verification (Woods) forms, 

developed a new confidential human source checklist, developed and released training on this 

checklist, developed and provided new training on revised FISA forms, and developed new FISA 

process rigor training. The revised Woods form now requires agents and supervisors to attest to 

their diligence in re-verifying facts from prior applications. All Woods forms, both for initial 

applications and renewals, must now be scanned and maintained in the electronic case file. These 

already-implemented changes will drive accountability, accuracy, and completeness in the FISA 

process. 

While we believe that the proce.ss errors identified in the OIG's preliminary findings will 

be addressed by Director Wray's previously ordered corrective actions, the FBI fully accepts the 

two recommendations set forth in the OIG's Memorandum. First, the FBI will, in coordination 

with the Department of Justice's National Security Division (NSD), build on existing FBI and 

NSD accuracy reviews to improve the results of those reviews and enhance compliance with the 

Woods Procedures. We agree that the lessons learned from accuracy reviews should be used to 

evaluate and enhance the FBI's adherence to the Woods Procedures, even though the OIG 

acknowledges that such reviews did not have that stated purpose. Indeed, the FBI formed a team 

to analyze accuracy and minimization review data as part of the corrective actions announced after 

the December 2019 OIG report. This team, led by the FBI's Office of Integrity and Compliance, 

is required to identify and propose audit, review, and compliance mechanisms related to the FBI's 

FISA processes, including Woods Procedures. This work will, as the OIG recommends, be used 

to enhance training to improve employee performance or improve policies as appropriate. 

Second, the FBI's General Counsel has directed every relevant division to account for and 

ensure the proper maintenance of all FISA Accuracy Subfiles for all dockets (including renewals) 

beginning on or after January 1, 2015. This action exceeds the OIG's recommendation that these 

steps be taken for pending cases. Divisions are required to identify and complete any remedial 

steps associated with these Accuracy Subfiles. 

2 

12 
As Director Wray has stressed, FISA is an indispensable tool to guard against national 

security threats, but we must ensure that these authorities are carefully exercised and that FISA 

applications are scrupulously accurate. The FBI remains grateful to the OIG for its independent, 

professional oversight. We look forward to continuing our commitment to strengthen the FBI as 

we uphold the Constitution and protect the American people. 

Sincerely, 

~ o OC2e::t::,, 

Paul Abbate 

Associate Deputy Director 

3 

13 
ATTACHMENT 2 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RESPONSE TO THE 

DRAFT MANAGEMENT ADVISORY MEMORANDUM 

14 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

Bradley Wei11sheimer IVashi11g1011, D.C. 20530 

Associate Deputy Attorney General 

MEMORANDUM 

TO: The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz 

Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

g. BretJle!j w~ 

FROM: Bradley Weinsheimer 

Associate Deputy Attorney General 

Office of the Deputy Attorney General 

DATE: March 27, 2020 

SUBJECT: Response to the Office of the Inspector General Management Advisory 

Memorandum on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Woods Procedures 

The Department of Justice (Department) appreciates the steps undertaken by the Office of 

the Inspector General (OIG) as part of its "Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 

Execution of its Woods Procedures for Applications Filed with the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court (FISC) Relating to U.S. Persons." The audit's initial review and work to date 

are described in a Management Advisory Memorandum (Memorandum) that the OIG has 

provided in final draft to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department. The 

Memorandum contains two recommendations, with which the Department and FBI both fully 

agree. 

The Department is committed to ensuring that Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

(FISA) applications the Government submits to the FISC are complete and accurate. The OIG 

rightly identified the importance of the FBI's Woods Procedures to its FISA application process. 

The FBI's Woods Procedures require FBI personnel to compile supporting documentation for 

each fact included in a FISA application for electronic surveillance or physical search that is 

submitted to the FISC. This process is an important part of the FBI's internal procedures 

designed to facilitate accuracy in FISA applications. 

As the FBI noted in its response to the draft Memorandum, the FBI has already 

undertaken many changes to improve FISA application processing. For example, the FBI 

revised its Woods Procedures form, developed a new confidential human source checklist, 

developed and released training on this checklist, developed and is working to provide new 

training on revised FISA fonns, and developed new FISA process rigor training. The revised 

Woods Procedures form now requires agents and supervisors to attest to their diligence in re-
verifying facts from prior applications. AJI Woods Procedures fo1ms must now be scanned and 

maintained in the electronic case file. 

The Depa1tment understands that your audit examined a sample of FISA applications 

targeting U.S. persons between October 2014 and September 2019 to determine whether the 

contents of the Woods files suppo11ed factual statements in the associated FISA applications. 

Your audit found deficiencies in the FBI's adherence to its Woods Procedures. Specifically, the 

audit work to date identified instances of missing Woods files, unsupported facts based on 

review of the Woods files, and other possible errors. TI1e audit did not examine any FISA 

applications fi led after implementation of the refonns described above. 

Although the audit is ongoing, the Memorandum sets forth two recommendations to the 

FBI. Those recommendations are that: (i) the FBI institute a requirement that it, in coordination 

with the Department's National Security Division (NSD), systematically and regularly examine 

the results of past and future accuracy reviews to identify patterns or trends in identified errors so 

that the FBI can enhance training to improve agents' performance in completing the Woods 

Procedures, or improve policies to help ensure the accuracy of FISA applications; and (ii) tl1e 

FBI perfom1 a physical inventory to ensure that Woods files exist for every FISA application 

submitted to the FISC in all pending investigations. As noted in the FBl's response to the 

Memorandum, the FBI has agreed to adopt these recommendations and has already taken steps 

to implement them. The Depa11ment also concurs with these recommendations. 

As set forth in the FBI's response to the draft Memorandum, the FBI already has fonned 

a team to analyze accuracy and minimization review data as part of the co1Tective actions 

announced after the December 2019 OIG repo1t. This team, led by the FBJ's Office oflntegrity 

and Compliance, is required to identify and propose audit, review, and compliance mechanisms 

related to the FBI's FISA processes, including its Woods Procedures. In addition, the FBI's 

General Com1sel has directed every relevant division to account for and ensure the proper 

maintenance of all FISA Accuracy Subfiles for all dockets (including renewals) beginning on or 

after January l, 2015. This action, as the FBI stated in its response to the draft Memorandum, 

exceeds the OIG's recommendation that these steps be taken only for pending investigations. 

NSD conducts analysis of trends based on its oversight work and has incorporated 

lessons teamed from accuracy reviews in how it drafts FISA applications and in training. 

Consistent with the draft Memorandum's recommendation, NSD will continue to systematically 

and regularly examine the results of past and future accm-acy reviews to identify patterns or 

trends in identified errors and will work with the FBI so that it can enhance training to improve 

compliance with the Woods Procedures and shape policies to help ensure the accuracy of FISA 

applications. 

FISA is an essential tool to guard against terrorism and other national security 

threats. The Department and FBI are committed to taking whatever steps are necessary 

to ensure the integrity of the FISA process, including strengthening existing policies, 

procedures, and training to facilitate accuracy in FISA applications. 

2 

15 
 

 

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) is a 

statutorily created independent entity whose mission is to detect and deter 

waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and to 

promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s operations. 

To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct regarding DOJ 

programs, employees, contractors, grants, or contracts please visit or call the 

DOJ OIG Hotline at oig.justice.gov/hotline or (800) 869-4499. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530-0001 

Website

oig.justice.gov

Twitter

@JusticeOIG

YouTube

JusticeOIG 

Also at Oversight.gov