2024 IL App (1st) 240363-U 

FIRST DIVISION

May 6, 2024

No. 1-24-0363B 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

 ) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellee ) Cook County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 19 CR 0993102 

 ) 

KIRBY BRAME, ) Honorable 

 ) Nicholas Kantas, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

 ) 

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Lavin and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying pretrial release. 

¶ 2 The defendant-appellant, Kirby Brame, appeals from the circuit court’s January 31, 2024 

order, granting the State’s petition for denial of his pretrial release pursuant to section 110-6.1(a) 

of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) as recently amended by Public Acts 101-652, 

§ 10-255 and 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1), (6) (West 2022)), and 
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commonly referred to as “the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act” 

or the “Pretrial Fairness Act” (Act). See also Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023); Rowe v. 

Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). On 

appeal, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

he committed an eligible detainable offense and poses a real and present threat to the safety of the 

community, and that no conditions of release can mitigate the risk of that threat. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 3 II. BACKGOUND

¶ 4 This appeal stems from the June 22, 2019, shooting on the 3900 block of West Lexington 

Street, in Chicago, which resulted in the death of one victim and serious injuries to another. 

Together with codefendant Maurice Myers, the defendant was charged with first degree murder 

(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2018)) and aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-

1.2(a)(2) (West 2018)) based on accountability principles for his involvement in this shooting. 

¶ 5 Initial bond hearings were held on June 24, 2019, and July 19, 2019.1 At the July 19,

hearing the State proffered that at about 6 p.m. on June 22, 2019, the 28-year-old defendant was 

working at a Boost Mobile cell phone store located at Harrison Street and Pulaski Road in Chicago, 

when the 22-year-old codefendant Myers came into his store agitated and upset. Codefendant 

Myers told the defendant to “let me get that.” The defendant then went to the back of the store, 

retrieved a fanny pack, which contained a .38 caliber handgun and gave the handgun to the 

codefendant. Codefendant Myers put the handgun in his waistband, received a black hooded 

sweatshirt from the defendant, put it on, and exited the store. Codefendant Myers then walked

1 The June 24 hearing was premised solely on the aggravated discharge of a firearm charge and resulted in denial of 

bond. After one of the victims succumbed to his injuries and the State additionally charged the defendant with first 

degree murder based on accountability principles, the parties proceeded with the July 19, 2019, bond hearing.
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south to the vicinity of 3939 West Lexington Street and began shooting east toward the 3900 block 

of West Lexington Street. A witness observed the codefendant firing these shots. The shots struck 

one victim, 18-year-old Demetrius Parks, in the head. The people that were at the 3900 block of 

West Lexington Street, then returned fire toward codefendant Myers and struck the second victim,

56-year-old Grana Milton, in the buttock. 

¶ 6 The State proffered that Parks subsequently died as a result of his injuries, and that Milton 

had to undergo an operation to have a portion of his colon removed as a result of his gunshot 

wound. 

¶ 7 According to the State, after the shooting, codefendant Myers fled north and returned to 

the Boost Mobile store. Surveillance video footage recovered from that store showed codefendant 

Myers handing the gun back to the defendant, and the defendant subsequently hiding the gun and 

the codefendant in the back of the store. After Chicago police officers obtained entry into the store, 

they found codefendant Myers with two other individuals in the back. The officers placed all four 

men, including the defendant, into custody. 

¶ 8 The State further proffered that the officers recovered a .38 caliber handgun from the store

and that that shell casings retrieved from the scene of the shooting were consistent with having 

been fired from that recovered gun.

¶ 9 The State also proffered that both the defendant and codefendant Myers made videotaped 

confessions to the police. In his videotaped statement, the defendant admitted that he gave the gun 

to codefendant Myers and later hid it. Consistently, codefendant Myers stated that he had seen 

someone who had robbed him earlier, so he went, got the gun, and shot at them. 

¶ 10 After the proffer, the State discussed the defendant’s criminal background, which included: 

(1) an active order of protection, which was set to expire on January 2022; (2) a 2018 felony
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conviction for unlawful restraint from Dekalb County, for which the defendant received 18 

months’ probation, which had not yet terminated; (3) a 2017 misdemeanor conviction for resisting 

arrest from Kendall County; and (4) a 2010 misdemeanor conviction for false imprisonment from 

Nashville, Tennessee. 

¶ 11 The circuit court next asked for the recommendation of a representative from “pretrial 

services,” who indicated that the defendant’s “new criminal activity” score was six out of six, and 

his “failure to appear” score was five out of six. The defendant also had a violence flag. 

Accordingly, the “pretrial services” recommendation was for “maximum conditions.” 

¶ 12 In mitigation, defense counsel argued that the defendant should be released on bail because 

he was a family man and a life-long resident of the Chicagoland area. According to defense counsel 

the defendant’s fiancée and father were in the courtroom. The defendant had five children with a 

sixth on the way and had worked for Boost Mobile for over three years prior to the offense

supporting his family. According to defense counsel the defendant had no reason not to come to 

court, and instead sought a reasonable bond so that he could fight his case, while providing for 

them. 

¶ 13 After hearing the parties’ arguments, the circuit court denied bond. The court stated that it 

had considered the nature and circumstances of the charged offense, the possible sentence upon 

conviction, the likelihood of conviction and the weight of the evidence. In addition, it had 

considered the “maximum conditions” recommended by “pretrial services” based on the 

defendant’s new criminal activity flag. On this basis, the court found that the proof was evident 

that the defendant had committed the non-probationable offenses with which he was charged, and 

that he posed a real and present threat to the physical safety of the community. 

¶ 14 On April 27, 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, defense counsel filed a motion to 
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reduce bond and for release of the defendant on his own recognizance, arguing that the defendant 

should be released from prison pending trial because he suffered from extreme asthma and was at 

a higher risk of death while in prison.2 

¶ 15 On May 1, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on that motion. There, defense counsel 

argued that the defendant had suffered from asthma his entire life, that he was having trouble 

obtaining inhalers in jail and that he was therefore at an extremely high risk of health complications 

and death while in jail. Defense counsel asked the court to grant pretrial release with electronic 

monitoring or an I-bond. 

¶ 16 The court stated that while it understood the dangers faced by the defendant in jail, based 

on the allegations and the defendant’s background, he posed a real and present threat to the safety 

of the community and no condition or combination of conditions could “reasonably ensure” that 

he would “adhere.” The court therefore held that no bail was appropriate and denied the 

defendant’s motion to reduce bond.

¶ 17 After the recent passage of the Pretrial Fairness Act, on January 18, 2024, the defendant 

filed a petition for pretrial release pursuant to sections 110-5(e) and 110-7.5(b) (725 ILCS 5/110-

5(e), 7.5(b) (West 2022)). Therein, he reasserted that he should be released pending trial because 

he suffers from asthma and his family needs his financial support. 

¶ 18 On January 31, 2024, the State filed the instant verified petition seeking to deny the 

defendant’s pretrial release pursuant to sections 110-2, and 110-6.1(a)(1), (a)(1.5) of the Act (725 

ILCS 5/110-2, 110-6.1(a)(1), (a)(1.5) (West 2022)). Therein, the State alleged that the defendant 

2 While this motion is not part of the record on appeal and is instead included as an exhibit to the State’s response to 

the defendant’s appeal in this case, we may take judicial notice of it as it is a public document filed in the circuit 

court. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 288 Ill. App. 3d 760, 764 (1997) (“This 

court may take judicial notice of public documents that are included in the records of other courts.”) 
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was being charged with a non-probationable forcible felony and that his pretrial release posed a 

real and present threat to the safety of the community because he tendered a gun to codefendant 

Myers, who then used that gun to kill someone. The State further asserted that based on the specific 

and articulable facts of that case, no condition or combination of conditions that the court could 

impose would mitigate the risk of that threat.

¶ 19 On January 31, 2024, together with codefendant Myers, the defendant appeared in court 

for a hearing on the two petitions. 

¶ 20 At that hearing, defense counsel argued that the State could not overcome the presumption 

that the defendant should be released pretrial because the defendant’s participation in the instant 

offense was minor as he was not present for the shooting. Specifically, according to defense 

counsel the defendant at most aided and abetted codefendant Myers by tendering him the murder 

weapon and then subsequently trying to stop the police from entering the store to apprehend the 

codefendant. In addition, defense counsel pointed out that the defendant suffers from asthma, is 

married, and has three children, who depend on him financially and who he was supporting by 

working as a manager at the cell phone store prior to his arrest. 

¶ 21 In response, and in support of its petition seeking pretrial detention, the State reiterated the 

underlying facts of this case. Specifically, the State proffered that at around 6 p.m. on June 22, 

2019, the defendant was working inside the Boost Mobile store when codefendant Myers entered

and informed him that he had just been robbed “by a group of people known to the area.” 

Codefendant Myers then instructed the defendant to retrieve a gun. The defendant went to the back 

of the store, and returned moments later with a zipped bag, from which he removed a firearm. 

Codefendant Myers took the firearm and began to leave the store, but the defendant stopped him 

and suggested that he wear a hoodie to cover the gun. Codefendant Myers then retrieved a hoodie, 
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which was too small and then selected a larger one, which he put on and used to cover the firearm 

before leaving the store. 

¶ 22 The State further proffered that codefendant Myers then met up with another individual, 

who was eventually charged with possession of a controlled substance (hereinafter the PCS 

codefendant). The two of them then walked toward the 3900 block of West Lexington Street. 

Standing on the corner of Pulaski Road, and facing east onto Lexington Street, codefendant Myers

opened fire on the people that he believed to be responsible for the robbery. After these unknown 

individuals returned fire, codefendant Myers ran back to the Boost Mobile store, where he 

informed the occupants of his actions. The defendant took the gun from codefendant Myers and 

the two went to the back of the store. 

¶ 23 The PCS codefendant then entered the store irate and began calling codefendant Myers

names before proceeding to the back of the store with him. The defendant then emptied the store 

of all occupants except for codefendant Myers, the PCS codefendant, and another witness and a 

baby that was inside a car seat on top of the counter. The four men then went to the back of the 

store and hid. After a while, the defendant returned to the front of the store to speak with the police.

The defendant blocked the officers’ access to the store and told them that no one was inside.

However, the police were able to contact the store owner and eventually gained access from the 

back alley. 

¶ 24 The police detained all of the individuals inside the store, and recovered two guns, two 

hoodies and video evidence. Five shell casings recovered from the scene of the shooting matched 

the caliber of firearm which the police recovered from the back of the store and which the 

defendant handed to codefendant Myers. 

¶ 25 The State further proffered that neither of the two victims of the shooting, one of whom 
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subsequently died of his injuries, was directly linked to the alleged robbing of codefendant Myers. 

¶ 26 The State also proffered that both the defendant and codefendant Myers gave incriminating 

statements to the police, which were videotaped. 

¶ 27 The State next published a series of ten video clips showing portions of those confessions, 

and the defendant’s actions inside the store prior to and after the shooting. These video clips, 

however, are not part of the record on appeal. 

¶ 28 After introducing the video evidence, the State discussed the defendant’s prior criminal 

background. Once again, the State noted that the defendant had one prior felony conviction for 

unlawful restraint and domestic battery from 2018 for which he received 18 months’ probation, 

and which terminated unsatisfactorily. The State further noted that the defendant had four prior 

misdemeanor convictions, including: (1) a 2017 conviction for resisting a peace officer, for which 

he was sentenced to six months; (2) 2014 convictions for domestic battery and unlawful use of a 

weapon without a Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) card, for which he received probation; 

and (3) 2010 convictions for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, false imprisonment and a 

domestic related assault, from Nashville, Tennessee. 

¶ 29 After hearing all the evidence, the circuit court first found that the State met its burden in 

proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the charged offenses. The 

court observed that the State’s proffered evidence establishing that the defendant handed over the 

firearm to the shooter was corroborated by the video evidence. The court noted that the video 

evidence showed that the defendant acted “nothing short of nonchalant” when handing over the 

weapon to codefendant Myers. As the court observed, within “mere seconds” the defendant had 

the gun “ready to go.” “He [went] in the back and hand[ed] it over.” The court further noted:

“I can’t even imagine how much conversation could have possibly gone to warrant a going 
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and grabbing a gun but it was not a lot, no matter what the substance of it was, it didn’t 

take much prompting for [the] defendant *** to go and get a gun and hand it over.” 

¶ 30 The circuit court next found that the defendant posed a real and immediate threat to the 

safety of the community. The court noted that as a result of the defendant’s actions, codefendant 

Myers shot at a group of people in the street, resulting in the death of one victim and serious 

injuries to the other. As the court stated:

“I cannot stress more how dangerous it was to be shooting a loaded gun on the streets of 

Chicago at 6 o’clock in summer, nothing is more evident to that than the fact that two 

people were shot, one person was killed.” 

The court also found relevant that according to the video evidence, the defendant did not seem to 

appreciate the gravity of his own conduct. As the court explained: 

“The only person that actually acted alarmed by really any of this is this other individual 

who was arrested for PCS who came in wearing the white tank top, he seemed pretty 

outraged by what had happened, but the defendant[] and [codefendant] Myers didn’t appear 

to me to seem too concerned about what had happened.” 

¶ 31 The circuit court next found that despite the mitigating evidence offered by defense 

counsel, which it had considered, there was no condition beyond detention that could mitigate the 

defendant’s real and present threat to the community “based on the egregious nature of the facts 

of this case.”

¶ 32 Accordingly, the circuit court granted the State’s petition and ordered that the defendant 

be detained pretrial. The defendant now appeals. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023). 

¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 34 On appeal, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that he committed an eligible detainable offense and poses a real and present threat to the 

safety of the community, and that no conditions of release can mitigate the risk of that threat. For 

the following reasons, we disagree with the defendant.

¶ 35 At the outset we set forth the relevant pretrial-release provisions of the new statute. 

Pursuant to sections 110-2-1(a) and 110-6.1(e) of the Act, all defendants are presumed eligible for 

pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1(e) (West 2022). The State may detain an accused if 

it establishes that the charged offense is eligible for detention and then proves that: (1) the proof 

is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed an offense which qualifies him 

for pretrial detention; (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any specific 

person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case; and (3) no 

condition or combination of conditions can mitigate that real and present threat. 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(e) (West 2022). 

¶ 36 The State must prove each and every one of these three elements by clear and convincing 

evidence. Id. Clear and convincing evidence is “that quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable 

doubt in the mind of the fact finder about the truth of the proposition in question.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) In Re Tiffany W., 2012 IL App (1st) 102492-B, ¶ 12. It “is more than a 

preponderance but less than is required to convict an individual of a criminal offense.” Id. If the 

State fails to carry its burden on any of these three elements, the presumption of release remains, 

and the detention is unlawful. 725 ILC 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022).

¶ 37 At present, our courts disagree as to the appropriate standard of review. Some appellate 

decisions have concluded that all aspects of detention hearings under the Act are subject to abuse 

of discretion (see People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶¶ 18-19; People v. Inman, 2023 
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IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11) while others have exclusively utilized the manifest weight of the 

evidence standard (see People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 12; People v. Rodriguez,2023 

IL App (3d) 230450, ¶ 8). Other courts have adopted a mixed approach, under which the circuit 

court’s determinations that the State has proved by “clear and convincing evidence” that the 

defendant committed a qualifying offense, and that he is dangerous, is reviewed for the manifest 

weight of the evidence, while the ultimate decision regarding detention, or the imposition of 

conditions of release are subject to abuse of discretion review. See People v. Parker, 2024 IL App 

(1st) 232164, ¶ 50; People v. Saucedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232020, ¶¶ 31-36; People v. Hodge, 

2024 IL App (3d) 230543, ¶ 8; People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 10; People v. 

Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13; People v. Reed, 2023 IL App (1st) 231834, ¶ 24, 31. Still 

others have concluded that appeals under the Act should be reviewed de novo. See People v. Battle, 

2023 IL App (1st) 231838, ¶ 18; Saucedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232020 (Ellis, J., specially 

concurring); see also People v. Herrera, 2023 IL App (1st) 231801, ¶¶ 22-24 (declining to decide 

what standard of review applies, but suggesting that even under de novo review, the case could be 

resolved based on legal error). 

¶ 38 While we would affirm the instant detention order under any standard, we agree with the 

rationale of those decisions that hold that detention orders under the Act should be reviewed for 

an abuse of discretion. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807(B), ¶¶ 18-19; People v. Inman, 2023 

IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court’s “ ‘ruling is 

arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by 

the circuit court.’ ” In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 24 (quoting Blum v. Koster, 235 

Ill. 2d 21, 36 (2009)); see People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (3d) 190582, ¶ 8. In addition, as the 

reviewing court, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court merely because 
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we would have analyzed the appropriate factors differently. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 

11. 

¶ 39 Turning to the merits of the defendant’s contentions, we begin by addressing whether the 

State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great 

that the defendant committed the charged offenses. In this respect, the defendant contends that 

while in prior hearings before other judges in the circuit court the State indicated that the defendant 

was charged with first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, for purposes of the 

instant petition, the State never identified the eligible detainable offenses either in the petition, on 

the record, or at the pretrial detention hearing. We disagree.

¶ 40 Contrary to the defendant’s position, a review of the record reveals that the circuit court, 

and all the parties to the petition were well-aware that the defendant was charged with first degree 

murder, which is a detainable offense under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022) (first- and second-degree murder are both detainable offenses under the 

Act). The criminal disposition sheet, containing the circuit court’s prior orders clearly lists the 

defendant’s charges, which include two counts of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) 

(West 2018)) and one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 

2018)). Moreover, during the instant hearing, in arguing that the defendant’s involvement in the 

case was “minor,” since he was not the shooter, defense counsel explicitly acknowledged that this 

was a murder case. 

¶ 41 What is more, at the hearing on the instant petition, the State proffered that the defendant 

gave codefendant Myers a handgun and a sweatshirt to conceal that gun, after which codefendant 

Myers walked down the street and shot at a crowd of people killing a man. The State further

proffered that the defendant ran back to the store, where he returned the gun to the defendant. The 
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defendant then hid the gun and codefendant Myers in the back of the store and actively tried to 

conceal him when the police arrived. Based on this proffer and the video evidence corroborating 

it, the circuit court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident 

and the presumption great that the defendant had committed the charged detainable offense of 

murder even though he himself was not the shooter. We find nothing arbitrary, fanciful, or 

unreasonable in this conclusion. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11.

¶ 42 We next address whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the 

defendant was a real and present threat to the safety of the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (2) 

(West 2022). The Act provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that the circuit court may consider 

in assessing the defendant’s “dangerousness” including, inter alia: (1) the nature and 

circumstances of the offense; (2) the defendant’s criminal and social history; (3) the defendant’s 

access to weapons; and (4) whether the defendant committed any offense while on some form of 

release from custody. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022).

¶ 43 In the present case, on appeal, the defendant asserts that the State failed to meet its burden 

because it never argued that the defendant posed any threat to any particular person or the

community in general and merely relied on the allegations against codefendant Myers to support 

the position that the defendant was equally dangerous. We disagree. 

¶ 44 Contrary to the defendant’s position, the circuit court’s findings did not merely “lump” the 

defendant with codefendant Myers. Instead, the majority of circuit court’s oral pronouncement 

was spent on discussing the defendant’s own conduct. Specifically, in finding that the defendant 

posed a real and immediate threat to the safety of the community, the circuit court not only relied 

on the defendant’s access to and delivery of the firearm to codefendant Myers, but also on his 
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nonchalant attitude to arming the codefendant and his subsequent concealment of both the murder 

weapon and the shooter. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022).

¶ 45 In finding that the defendant posed a threat to the community, the circuit court noted that 

according to the video evidence the defendant acted “nothing short of nonchalant” when handing 

over the weapon to codefendant Myers. As the court observed: 

“[W]hen the shooter comes in, tells him whatever, mere seconds pass[] and he has that gun 

ready to go. He goes in the back and hands it over. I can’t even imagine how much 

conversation could have possibly gone to warrant a going and grabbing a gun but it was 

not a lot, no matter what the substance of it was, it didn’t take much prompting for [the] 

defendant *** to go and get a gun and hand it over.” 

¶ 46 The court further found that the defendant did not seem to appreciate the gravity of his 

actions, which resulted in codefendant Myers “shooting a loaded gun on the streets of Chicago at 

6 o’clock in the summer” hitting two and killing one person. Instead, he focused on hiding his 

involvement by “block[ing] the police from entering” the Mobile Boost store “to help secrete and 

hide” codefendant Myers. As the court observed:

“[t]he only person that actually acted alarmed by really any of this is this other individual 

who was arrested for PCS who came in wearing the white tank top, he seemed pretty 

outraged by what had happened, but the defendant[] *** didn’t appear to me to seem too 

concerned about what had happened.” 

¶ 47 Under this record, and in light of the statutory factors considered by the circuit court, we 

fail to see how the court’s determination that the defendant posed a safety risk to the community 

could be construed as “unreasonable, fanciful or arbitrary.” In re Marriage Heroy, 2017 IL 

120205, ¶ 24. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
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the defendant posed a real and present danger to the community, requiring pretrial detention. 

¶ 48 Lastly, we address whether any conditions of release could have mitigated the risk of that 

threat. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (3) (West 2022). Section 110-5 of the Act lists the factors that the 

circuit court may consider in determining the conditions of release. 725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2022).

These factors mirror those the court can consider in determining the defendant’s “dangerousness” 

and include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against 

the defendant, and whether the defendant was on parole at the time of the offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-

5(a)(1), (2), (3)(b) (West 2022); People v. Saucedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232020, ¶ 49; People v. 

Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 32; People v. Reed, 2023 IL App (1st) 231834, ¶ 31.

¶ 49 In addition, section 110-10 of the Act (725 ILCS 6/110-10(b) (West 2022)) sets forth 

potential conditions for pretrial release, including reporting in person, refraining from possessing 

a firearm, refraining from communicating with particular persons, refraining from going to certain 

areas, and being under home supervision with or without electronic monitoring. All of these 

conditions require that a defendant be able and willing to comply with and respect the government 

actors and property necessary to enforce them. See People v. Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232275-

U, ¶ 44. 

¶ 50 In the present case, the defendant contends that the State offered no evidence or discussion 

regarding why less restrictive means beyond detention could not mitigate the purported risk posed 

to the community by his pretrial release. In support, the defendant cites People v. Stock, 2023 IL 

App (1st) 231753. For the following reasons, we disagree and find that decision inapposite. 

¶ 51 In Stock, the appellate court reversed the defendant’s detention order because the State 

failed to present any evidence regarding conditions of release and instead relied only on the basic 

elements of the offense—aggravated battery based on the defendant’s alleged firing of a gun at his 
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wife and injuring her as she attempted to remove her belongings from the marital home while 

seeking a divorce—as the backbone for its argument supporting the defendant’s detention. Id. This 

is simply not the case here. 

¶ 52 In the present case, the State presented evidence, and not mere conclusory statements, that 

showed why no less restrictive conditions would mitigate the defendant’s risk to the community. 

After proffering evidence that the defendant had provided codefendant Myers with the firearm that 

was subsequently used to indiscriminately shoot at a crowd of people in the street, killing one 

person and seriously injuring another, the State presented evidence of the defendant’s prior 

criminal history, which included the fact that the defendant was on parole for a violent offense at 

the time he committed the instant crime. The defendant’s criminal background also included the 

defendant’s prior illegal possession of firearms. Thus, unlike in Stock, here the State explicitly 

offered evidence of the defendant’s inability to conform his behavior to legal requisites which 

would be necessary for his compliance with any conditions of release set by the court. 

¶ 53 Having heard this evidence, the circuit court found that despite the mitigating evidence 

offered by defense counsel, there was no condition of release that could mitigate the defendant’s 

threat to the public based on the “egregious nature of the facts of this case.” In articulating those 

facts, among other things, the court focused on the dangerousness of the defendant’s nonchalant 

delivery of the firearm to codefendant Myers, and his subsequent lack of concern regarding his 

actions. Under this record, we find nothing “arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable” in the circuit 

court’s assessment. In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 24. 

¶ 54 For these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident and the 

presumption great that the defendant committed the charged detainable offense of murder, that he 
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posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community, and that there were no conditions 

that would mitigate against that threat. Accordingly, we affirm the order of pretrial detention. 

¶ 55 Affirmed.