Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 

Goodwyn, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 

RICKY C. WILLIAMS OPINION BY 

SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 

v. Record No. 081577 June 4, 2009 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 This appeal questions the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a conviction of possession of methadone with intent to 

distribute. 

Facts and Proceedings

 Applying familiar principles of appellate review, we will 

state the facts in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. On August 17, 

2005, Detectives McAndrew and Johnakin, of the Portsmouth 

Police Department, initiated a traffic stop of a station wagon 

because one of its brake lights was inoperative. The driver 

was a man named Clark. Seated beside him in the passenger seat 

was Ricky C. Williams. The detectives left their unmarked 

cruiser and approached the station wagon, McAndrew to the 

driver’s side and Johnakin to the passenger side. Detective 

Johnakin saw Williams look over his shoulder at the 

approaching Detective McAndrew and throw three plastic bags 

over his left shoulder with his right hand. They landed in 

the middle of the back seat. Detective Johnakin looked 
through the rear window and saw the plastic bags, one of which 

appeared to him to contain heroin capsules. Detective 

Johnakin opened the passenger door and placed Williams under 

arrest. When asked where he worked, Williams stated that he 

was unemployed. Detective McAndrew removed the three plastic 

bags from the back seat and identified their contents as what 

appeared to be heroin, cocaine and methadone, respectively. 

 Williams was indicted for several drug-related offenses 

and was convicted at a bench trial of (1) possession of heroin 

with intent to distribute (third offense), (2) possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute (third offense), and (3) 

possession of methadone with intent to distribute (third 

offense). At trial, the three plastic bags recovered from the 

back seat of the station wagon were identified as one plastic 

bag corner containing 38 capsules of heroin, one plastic bag 

corner containing 1.24 grams of powder cocaine, and one 

plastic bag corner containing ten white marked tablets. One 

of the white tablets was tested and found to contain 

methadone. 

 Detective R. M. Holley of the Portsmouth Police 

Department qualified, by stipulation, as an expert witness in 

the packaging, sale, use and distribution of narcotics in the 

City of Portsmouth. He testified that a “heavy user” of 

heroin would use five to seven capsules per day, that 38 

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capsules represented a five to seven-day supply for a heavy 

user, and that it was "very, very rare" that such a user would 

carry a quantity of capsules amounting to a five to seven-day 

supply of the drug on his person. 

 The “street price” of the capsules was $10 each, in 

Detective Holley’s opinion, so the heroin represented a value 

of $380 to a user. The “street value” of the cocaine was 

approximately $100 per gram, he testified, so the cocaine 

powder was worth about $120, while the methadone tablets sold 

for five to ten dollars each, adding $50 to $100 to the total 

value of the items seized in the station wagon. Detective 

Holley testified that in his experience, no user had ever been 

found in possession of all three of these drugs at any one 

time, and that the evidence was inconsistent with personal 

use. 

 On cross-examination, Detective Holley testified that the 

quantity of cocaine seized, taken alone, would be “borderline 

close” to being consistent with personal use, but in 

combination with the other drugs it was not. He said, “I 

don’t ever remember seeing three different drugs [carried] by 

a user together.” He added, without objection, that it was 

doubtful that a drug user who was unemployed would be carrying 

drugs of so much monetary value with him. 

3
 Detective Holley also was of the opinion that the mere 

combination of heroin and methadone was unlikely for a user, 

because both have the same effect, although the effect of 

methadone lasts for a shorter time. Methadone, he said, is 

available by prescription, but in that case, the law requires 

that it be kept in a prescription bottle; methadone is also 

dispensed by drug treatment programs in Portsmouth, but is 

only dispensed one tablet at a time. Detective Holley also 

thought the packaging of the methadone was inconsistent with 

personal use, stating “[t]o put them in a plastic bag corner 

is very unusual for a user of methadone.” 

 At the conclusion of the trial, Williams made no argument 

concerning the heroin charge and argued only the failure of 

the Commonwealth to prove intent to distribute cocaine and 

methadone, asking the court to find him guilty only of simple 

possession of those two substances. 

 Williams appealed his convictions to the Court of 

Appeals. That court denied his petition as to the heroin 

conviction but granted his petition as to possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of methadone 

with intent to distribute. A panel of the Court of Appeals 

heard those cases and, by opinion and order entered June 24, 

2008, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. We awarded 

Williams an appeal limited to a single assignment of error: 

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“The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s 

ruling that the defendant possessed methadone with the intent 

to distribute.” 

Analysis

 The judgment of the trial court, sitting without a jury, 

is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not 

be disturbed on appeal unless "plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it." Code § 8.01-680; Britt v. 

Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 573-74, 667 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2008).

 An appellate court does not “ask itself whether it

believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 318-19 (1979) (citation omitted). Rather, the relevant 

question is whether “any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. at 319. 

 Consistent with his position at trial, Williams does not 

dispute that he was in possession of the drugs that were found 

in the station wagon.1 His appeal rests entirely on his 

 1

 Williams took the stand at trial but was not asked about 

whether he was in possession of the drugs and said nothing on 

that subject. On brief, he argues that the vehicle had 

another occupant who might have possessed them. Because he 

asked the trial court to find him guilty of simple possession, 

we will not consider that argument. 

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contention that the trial court’s finding of intent to 

distribute methadone was unsupported by the evidence. 

 Absent a direct admission by the defendant, intent to 

distribute must necessarily be proved by circumstantial 

evidence. See Hunter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 569, 570, 193 

S.E.2d 779, 780 (1973). The circumstantial evidence in the 

present case was that Williams possessed three disparate 

drugs, a factor leading to the conclusion that he was engaging 

in the business of drug distribution. The quantity of heroin 

alone was inconsistent with personal use, as was the packaging 

of the methadone. In McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 

493, 545 S.E.2d 541, 547 (2001), we held that the packaging of 

drugs was an appropriate factor to consider as evidence of 

intent to distribute. The aggregate value of the drugs in 

Williams' possession was such that an unemployed person would 

be unlikely to be able to afford them if he were merely a 

user.2 We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support 

the trial court’s finding. 

 Williams’ principal contention on appeal is that because 

only one methadone tablet was tested, there is no evidence to 

 2

 When Williams testified as a witness, he was not asked 

whether he was a user of drugs and said nothing on that 

subject. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was 

consistent with personal use. There was no evidence that 

Williams was a user of drugs. 

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support the conclusion that he was in possession of ten 

methadone tablets. Therefore, he argues, a reasonable 

hypothesis of his innocence of intent to distribute that drug 

was not excluded by the Commonwealth’s evidence.3

 We do not reach Williams' argument concerning the number 

of tablets tested because of our conclusion that the totality 

of the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s 

finding that Williams had the intent to distribute all the 

drugs in his possession. That intent necessarily included the 

single tablet that was tested and found to contain methadone. 

In making its finding, the trial court was entitled to 

consider all the evidence and was not limited to relying on 

the number of methadone tablets in Williams’ possession. 

Conclusion

 We find no error in the Court of Appeals’ determination 

that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Williams’ 

conviction of possession of methadone with intent to 

 

3

 The certificate of analysis in evidence described the 

tablets as “ten (10) white marked tablets.” It further 

stated: “Visual examination determined that the physical 

characteristics are consistent with a pharmaceutical 

preparation containing Methadone.” Introduced in evidence, 

the tablets were examined by the trial judge who stated that 

they appeared to be identical and appeared to be 

"prescription-type tablets" with a line across them to 

facilitate breaking them in half. 

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distribute. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals. 

Affirmed.

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