Strykers in Afghanistan

1st Battalion,

17th Infantry Regiment

in Kandahar Province

2009

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Kevin M. Hymel

Strykers in Afghanistan

1st Battalion,

17th Infantry Regiment

in Kandahar Province

2009

Volume IV of the Vanguard of Valor series

Kevin M. Hymel 

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Strykers in Afghanistan

1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment

in Kandahar Province, 2009

Vanguard of Valor IV 

1. Afghan War, 2001---Campaigns. 2. Counterinsurgency--Afghanistan. 

3. United States. Army--History--Afghan War, 2001- 4. Afghanistan--

History, Military--21st century. 

Hymel, Kevin M. 

DS371.412.V362 2012

958.104’742--dc23 

2014

CGSC Copyright Registration #14

0686 C/E

0687 C/E

0688 C/E

0689 C/E

Editing and layout by Carl W. Fischer, November 2014

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Foreword

The US Army’s first deployment of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team 

to Afghanistan in 2009 created expectations similar to those common in 

2004, when four Stryker-equipped battalions replaced four brigades from 

the 101st Airborne Division in northern Iraq. In 2009, soldiers and leaders at all levels expected Stryker-equipped formations to replicate their 

successes in Iraq, where they had “forged a reputation . . . for moving 

fast and attacking enemy strongholds all over” that country. Indeed, as 

the Army Times reported, planners and senior leaders in Kabul believed 

that introducing one or more SBCTs would perhaps revolutionize the fight 

against the Taliban and other insurgent groups.* And in fact, enemy forces 

in southern Afghanistan did struggle to find a workable response to the 

Strykers’ speed, mobility, and high number of dismounted infantry. 

Those who seek a definitive answer to the question of whether the 

enemy successfully adapted to the Strykers’ presence or why the SBCT 

mission was changed before its effects against insurgent concentrations 

became permanent will be disappointed by this work. That question lies 

beyond the scope of this project. Readers will, however, find a detailed 

study of the initial operations of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment. 

Nicknamed the Buffaloes, the unit’s operational maneuver tempo early in 

its deployment more than justified the brigade’s deployment to Afghanistan. Shrinking time and space in the Arghandab River Valley in ways previous units could only dream of, 1-17’s companies blanketed their areas of 

operations and significantly degraded enemy effectiveness, but at a much 

higher cost than originally anticipated. Despite this, the battalion made a 

solid contribution to the fight against the Taliban and associated elements, 

demonstrating again the Army’s wisdom in adopting the Stryker as combat 

platform. More than a technical validation of the Stryker, however, 1-17’s 

combat record demonstrated again that superior training, discipline, and 

creative leadership at the squad, platoon, and company level are critical 

factors in determining the outcome of a given engagement. 

 Colonel Thomas E. Hanson

 Director, Combat Studies Institute

* Michelle Tan, “Pioneering Stryker unit preps for Afghanistan; BCT will be first 

of its kind in country,” in Army Times, 

Apr. 20, 2009 [http://www.armytimes.com/article/20090420/NEWS/904200316/

Pioneering-Stryker-unit-preps-Afghanistan]

iii

v

Contents

Title Page ...............................................................................................................i

Foreword..............................................................................................................iii

Table of Contents.................................................................................................. v

Figures..................................................................................................................vi

Chapter 1: Introduction......................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2: Securing the Election..................................................................... 11

Chapter 3: The Election and Beyond.............................................................. 41

Chapter 4: OPPORTUNITY HOLD: Establishing a Foothold in the 

Arghandab......................................................................................................... 53

Chapter 5: Conclusion ........................................................................................ 79

Glossary .............................................................................................................. 91

About the Author................................................................................................. 93
vi

List of Figures

Figure 1. A Mobile Gun System Stryker fires........................................... 2

Figure 2. Major Ryan O’Connor checks locations .................................. 3

Figure 3. Map of Kandahar Province........................................................ 6

Figure 4. Map of 5/2 Stryker Dispositions ............................................... 7

Figure 5. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan T. Neumann .............................. 12

Figure 6. The Arghandab Area of Operations......................................... 13

Figure 7. Bravo Company engages the enemy ....................................... 19

Figure 8. First Lieutenant Victor Cortese and Captain James Pope........ 20

Figure 9. First Lieutenant Daniel Berschinski ........................................ 22

Figure 10. Stryker after an IED............................................................... 42

Figure 11. 3d Platoon, Charlie Company fights an ambush.................... 44

Figure 12. Operation OPPORTUNITY HOLD....................................... 55

Figure 13. A Stryker delivers supplies.................................................... 56

Figure 14. Bravo Company Soldiers enter orchard ................................ 57

Figure 15. Bravo Company Soldiers traverse a river.............................. 60

Figure 16. Operation OPPORTUNITY HOLD advance south............... 67

Figure 17. A Stryker makes its way down River .................................... 68
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

A staggered line of ten Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles moved across 

the Afghan desert at 20 miles per hour, kicking up dust as they closed 

on the town of Buyana in Shah Wali Kot District. On 18 August 2009, 

US leaders had discovered that Taliban insurgents were gathering in the 

small town located about 25 miles north of the city of Kandahar. American 

Soldiers, with their rifles and grenade launchers at the ready, stood in the 

Strykers’ air guard hatches. They could see insurgents firing their weapons 

from rooftops and around corners. The center vehicle stopped at the town’s 

western corner, while other vehicles rolled up to form a “V” Formation. 

The men inside the Strykers fired their mounted heavy machine guns and 

automatic grenade launchers, pouring rounds into the buildings while 

Stryker ramps lowered and teams of Soldiers dismounted to engage the 

enemy. Others stayed in the hatches, adding their fire to the mounted 

heavy weapons. The overwhelmed insurgents quickly fled the town. They 

had not anticipated such a quick attack. The assault marked the first time 

Strykers were used in conventional operations in Afghanistan.1

At the dawn of the 21st Century, the US Army adopted a new vehicle 

for infantry mobility, one designed to carry more Soldiers than either the 

M113 armored personnel carrier or the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 

protected by better armor, adaptable as a weapons platform, capable of a 

variety of missions, and yet light enough to deploy by aircraft. The new 

vehicle was the M1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier.2 Born of Army Chief of 

Staff General Eric Shinseki’s vision for Army transformation, the eightwheeled Stryker with medium armor, could deliver nine infantrymen to 

the battlefield. It was armed with the remote operated weapons system 

mounted with either a M2HB .50 caliber machine gun or a MK 19 40-mm 

automatic grenade launcher, allowing the gunner to fire from within the 

vehicle. Air guard hatches in the rear and a commander’s hatch in the front 

allowed the passengers to fire their weapons while mounted. 

A Stryker could carry two more Soldiers than the tracked Bradley, 

weighed approximately 10 tons less, and could travel 25 miles an hour 

faster on open roads. The Stryker could also switch from two-wheel 

drive to eight-wheel drive, saving fuel in urban areas or flat terrain. The 

Stryker’s armor could protect its passengers from small arms fire and 

artillery bursts, while add-on slat armor—a grid of hardened steel bars 

surrounding the Stryker like a cage—protected it from rocket-propelled 

grenades (RPGs). In addition to the infantry carrier, the Army developed 

a number of variants of the vehicle including a mortar carrier, an engineer 

vehicle, and the Mobile Gun System (MGS) that was equipped with a 105 
2

mm gun for direct fire support.3 All versions of the vehicle could fit in the 

Air Force’s C-130 Hercules aircraft for rapid deployment. Strykers were 

designed to be part of a new medium combat formation that could deliver 

a brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours and 

five divisions in 30 days. These brigades would provide more firepower 

and maneuverability than light infantry forces and more mobility in urban 

areas than heavy armored forces.4

Figure 1. A Mobile Gun System Stryker fires its 105mm cannon.

Photo courtesy US Army

While the Stryker provided an array of advanced systems to enhance 

situational awareness, the concept of delivering infantry quickly to the 

battlefield was not new. In World War II, halftracks—open-top trucks with 

caterpillar tracks instead of rear tires—accompanied tanks and delivered 

infantry to the battlefront. Fully-tracked vehicles replaced the half-track as 

infantry carriers during the Cold War and culminated in the Bradley, a new 

class of carrier known as an “Infantry Fighting Vehicle.” Strykers returned 

to an all-wheel design and could provide a base of fire for dismounted 

infantry in a close fight, either from the Infantry Carrier Vehicle’s mounted 

weapons or the MGS’s 105mm cannon. By providing a base of fire against 

enemy positions, dismounted squads could maneuver and retain the 

initiative. Once the troops dismounted, Strykers could be left in place, 

displace to another location, or move to a laager site to be called upon for 

linkup.5

Stryker brigades consisted of six battalions and five separate 

companies. The battalions included a reconnaissance, surveillance and 

target acquisition (RSTA) squadron; an artillery battalion; a support 

battalion; and three infantry battalions. Separate companies included 
3

anti-tank, engineer, military intelligence, and signal, as well as a brigade 

headquarters and headquarters company. Each infantry battalion consisted 

of three rifle companies, each of which had 14 Strykers, an MGS platoon, 

a mortar section with 60mm mortars, and a sniper team. The battalion’s 

headquarters and headquarters company consisted of a scout platoon, a 

fire support platoon, a mortar platoon equipped with four 81mm mortars, 

a sniper squad, and a medical platoon.6

Many soldiers in the Stryker brigades were also equipped with the 

Land Warrior system, a battery-powered ensemble worn by key leaders 

with battlefield communications, situational awareness and command 

and control. A lens attached to the helmet flipped down over one of the 

wearer’s eyes to provide real time maps. A thin cable connected the lens 

to batteries on the Soldier’s back. Using a toggle switch—a pistol grip 

device with thumb-operated cursor—that hung underneath the wearer’s 

armpit, Soldiers could plot enemy and friendly locations, or mark a trail 

on the map, by dropping virtual markers on certain locations—red for the 

enemy, blue for friendly forces and yellow for trails. Other Soldiers using 

Land Warrior could see the dropped makers in their helmet lenses and act 

accordingly.

Figure 2. Major Ryan O’Connor checks the locations of the battalion’s 

dismounted units with his Land Warrior system. He also wears a PSV14 night 

vision device over his left eye.

Photo courtesy of Major Ryan O’Connor, US Army

To further enhance battlefield awareness, Stryker vehicles were 

equipped with communications packages which automatically sensed 

and displayed friendly forces locations in real time. The system provided 

every vehicle commander with a common picture of the battlefield, text 
4

messaging, and downloadable maps with varying degrees of resolution.7

Conceptually, Strykers made sense, but they still had to prove 

themselves in the field. During a 2002 exercise at the US Army’s National 

Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, Stryker performance exceeded 

expectations. One Army study reported, “Soldiers of the National Training 

Center’s Permanent Opposing Force, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

noted that the Stryker went places at greater speeds and with less noise 

and more agility than any vehicle they had previously encountered. The 

vehicle’s digital communications suite also permitted it to quickly call for 

a lethal array of supporting fire.”8

Strykers first saw combat when the 3d Stryker Brigade, 2d Infantry 

Division (3/2 Stryker), deployed to Iraq in December 2003. The brigade 

completed its trek from Kuwait to Iraq’s Sunni Triangle without the use 

of the semi-trucks and flatbed heavy equipment transports used to move 

M1 Abrams tanks or Bradley Fighting Vehicles over long distances. Next 

assigned to Mosul, elements of the brigade conducted night raids and 

trained the Iraqi army. With violence growing south of Baghdad, a Stryker 

battalion was attached to a 1st Infantry Division brigade and sent to the 

city of Najaf. The enemy ambushed the convoy en route and five RPGs 

slammed into a Stryker, yet it drove out of the kill zone and completed 

the journey. When insurgents tried to choke off Baghdad by attacking 

logistic convoys, Strykers were assigned to provide convoy security. For 

two months Strykers escorted convoys, losing only four supply trucks to 

ambushes, compared to eighty-eight trucks prior to the escort mission. 

In the city of Tal Afar, west of Mosul, Strykers came under increasing 

RPG fire from insurgent forces, but the vehicles’ slat armor defeated most 

rounds. When insurgents shot down an OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter, 

Stryker troops raced to the area, secured the helicopter and its injured 

pilots, and fought off repeated attacks until the helicopter was removed.9

In Iraq, Soldiers in Stryker units came to appreciate the vehicle’s quiet 

engines which allowed them to stealthily approach targets. The vehicle 

also held a greater load capacity and provided better protection than the 

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV or Humvee). 

While the 3d Brigade lost 13 Soldiers to combat during its deployment, 

none were killed inside Strykers that ran over IEDs or came under fire. One 

Stryker battalion officer reported, “The Soldiers gained a lot of confidence 

in their vehicles when they realized they had a platform that could take a 

lot of punishment.”10
5

While Stryker units performed well in Iraq, a new battlefield called. 

On 16 February 2009, the Obama Administration ordered two combat 

brigades to Afghanistan to provide security for the country’s upcoming 

national election in the fall. One of those units was the 5th Stryker Brigade 

Combat Team (SBCT), 2d Infantry Division (5/2 Stryker), which was 

preparing to deploy to Iraq. Instead, it was reassigned to Kandahar city 

and the surrounding area where Major General Mart de Kruif of the Royal 

Netherlands Army, the commander of the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) Regional Command-South (RC-South), lacked sufficient 

troops to deal with an enemy who seemed to be surging in Kandahar 

and its environs.11 General de Kruif needed more boots on the ground. “I 

actually didn’t care whether these troops were Marines, light, medium or 

mechanized infantry,” de Kruif later wrote, “as long as they brought these 

boots with them.”12

While Kandahar City was de Kruif’s priority, he also wanted to disrupt 

the enemy’s lines of communication that ran from Pakistan through 

Kandahar to central Helmand Province. To do this, he planned to deploy 

a brigade-size US Marine Expeditionary Unit in Helmand Province, the 

5/2 Stryker in Kandahar Province, and use Afghan National Security 

Forces within Kandahar City. De Kruif knew that widely-accepted 

counterinsurgency doctrine called for deploying forces where the bulk of 

the people lived, but the lines of communications, tribal politics and his 

understanding of the local insurgency led him to this unique deployment. 

“It was clear that there was a strong political will to hand over the lead 

in counterinsurgency to the Afghans as soon as possible,” explained de 

Kruif, who wanted to take the long-term approach. “The priority for the 

deployment [in Kandahar City] of forces should be on indigenous forces, 

and not the ISAF.” 13

The 5/2 Stryker, commanded by Colonel Harry Tunnell IV, arrived 

in Kandahar in the summer of 2009 to secure the city’s approaches. He 

deployed his four maneuver battalions in and around the city. The 2d 

Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment (2-1 IN) was retained under RC-South 

as the Regional Reserve Force in Kandahar; Task Force Zabol, which 

included the 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry, and the Romanian 280th Battalion, 

deployed to Zabol Province along the Pakistani border to secure the routes 

leading southwest from that province into Kandahar; the 8th Squadron, 1st 

Cavalry (8-1 CAV) deployed to the south of the city; and the 1st Battalion, 

17th Infantry Regiment (1-17 IN) secured the northern approaches into the 

city through the verdant Arghandab River Valley and mountainous Shah 

Wali Kot districts. 
6

Figure 3. Map of Kandahar Province.

Source: author/CSI generated
7

Figure 4. The city of Kandahar and surrounding districts.

Source: author/CSI generated

Each of the brigade’s battalions operated in difficult terrain against 

enemy forces determined to prevent any Coalition gains in the region. 

In the Arghandab Valley and the Shah Wali Kot District, however, 1-17 

IN faced complex landscapes that had become well-established insurgent 

bases. In the middle of August 2009, just two weeks after their arrival 

in Afghanistan, Coalition commanders directed the battalion to conduct 

BUFFALO STAMPEDE, a major operation to secure polling sites for 

the presidential election. Once the elections were complete, 1-17 IN 

immediately launched OPPORTUNITY HOLD to clear the enemy from 

the west bank of the Arghandab River Valley and establish two combat 
8

outposts for future operations. In both missions, Soldiers maneuvered 

on roads and pathways sown with lethal Improvised Explosive Devices 

(IEDs), engaged experienced and committed insurgent forces in fields, 

orchards, and villages, all in temperatures that exceeded 100 degrees 

Fahrenheit. This book recounts the actions of the 1-17 IN in these two 

operations that tested the Stryker unit’s organization and equipment as 

well as the resolve of it Soldiers.
9

Notes

1. In 2005, the 2d Battalion, 75th Regiment (Ranger) used a small number 

of Strykers in non-conventional operations.

2. Mark Reardon and Jeffrey A. Charleston, From Transformation 

to Combat: The First Stryker Brigade at War (Center of Military History: 

Washington, D.C., 2007), 19.

3. The Stryker came in nine other variants to provide a mix of capabilities 

on the battlefield: (1) the M1127 Reconnaissance Vehicle provided situational 

awareness by gathering and transmitting real-time intelligence; (2) the M1128 

Mobile Gun System (MGS) mounted a 105mm main gun for direct fire support; 

(3) the M1129 Mortar Carrier contained a 120-mm mortar; (4) the M1130 

Commander’s Vehicle possessed advanced communications systems; (5) 

the M1131 Fire Support Vehicle provided enhanced surveillance and target 

acquisition along with identification, tracking, and designation abilities; (6) 

the M1132 Engineering Squad Vehicle towed a Mine Clearing Line Charge 

(MICLIC), employed equipment such as mine rollers, mine plows and a lanemarking system; (7) the M1133 Medical Evacuation Vehicle could carry six 

ambulatory patients or four litter patients; (8) the M1134 Anti-Tank Guided 

Missile Vehicle mounted an elevated tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireguided (TOW) missile; and (9) the M1135 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

(NBC) detected NBC threats. The common chassis reduced maintenance as well 

as the inventory of repair parts and logistical requirements, allowing for rapid 

overseas deployment with a reduced logistical footprint.

4. John Sloan Brown, Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S. 

Army, 1989-2005 (Center of Military History: Washington, D.C., 2011) 196, 

197, 202; “M1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle” Gary’s Combat Vehicle 

Reference Guide, http://www.inetres.com/gp/military/cv/inf/M1126.html; 

“M1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle” Gary’s Combat Vehicle Reference 

Guide, http://www.inetres.com/gp/military/cv/inf/M2.html; Reardon and 

Charleston, 17.

5. Department of the Army, Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 

(ATTP) 3-21.9, SBCT Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad (Headquarters, 

Department of the Army: Washington, DC, December, 2010), 3-18 to 3-20.

6. Raun Watson, “Stryker Brigade Combat Teams” Briefing, October 

2009, slide 4. 

7. Brown, 266.

8. Reardon and Charleston, 14.

9. Reardon and Charleston, 27, 32, 35, 39, 47, 53, 57.

10. Robert Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight?: Organizational and 

Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years 

to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Combat Studies Institute: Fort Leavenworth, 
10

2010) 512; Reardon and Charleston, 46, 65, 70; Master Sergeant Troy Favor, 

interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

18 September 2012, 7.

11. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for 

Afghanistan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012)51, 52, 158; Bob Woodward, 

Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2010) 96-98. 

12. Lieutenant General Mart de Kruif, e-mail to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 August 2013.

13. Lieutenant General Mart de Kruif, e-mail to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 August 2013.
11

Chapter 2

Securing the Election

The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry (1-17 IN), known as the Buffaloes, 

had a lot to accomplish in its first operation but little time in which to 

do it. Arriving at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Frontenac, 30 miles 

north of Kandahar Airfield (KAF) in southern Afghanistan on 7 August 

2009, the battalion had only two weeks to prepare for its security role 

during Afghanistan’s presidential election. The march from KAF to FOB 

Frontenac, its occupation, and all other tasks leading up to the elections 

were components of the battalion’s security mission, Operation BUFFALO 

STAMPEDE.

The 1-17 IN traced its lineage back to the American Civil War, in 

which the 17th Infantry Regiment fought under the Army of the Potomac. 

The unit then participated in the Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, 

the Philippine-American War, and the Punitive Expedition into Mexico. 

During World War II, the unit, assigned to the 7th Infantry Division, fought 

in the Pacific Theater, where it conducted amphibious assaults on Attu 

and Kwajalein islands, the Philippines and Okinawa. When the Korean 

War broke out, the unit landed at Inchon with the rest of the 7th Infantry 

Division and remained in the field for its duration. It was in Korea that the 

unit received the “Buffalo” designation, after Colonel William “Buffalo 

Bill” Quinn, the unit’s commander. A single company of the unit fought in 

Vietnam. The battalion also participated in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

from 2005 to 2006.1

Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Neumann commanded the Buffaloes in 

Afghanistan. A 1989 graduate of the US Military Academy, Neumann had 

seen combat as a platoon leader in the 82d Airborne Division in Operation 

DESERT STORM. In Iraq in 2004, he had served as a battalion executive 

officer for the 25th Infantry Division’s 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, also a 

Stryker unit. He took command of the 1-17 IN almost two years before 

it deployed to Afghanistan and trained it at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, 

Washington. At six feet two inches tall, Neumann towered over most of 

his Soldiers as well as most Afghans. With a shaved head, he stood out 

whenever he took off his helmet.2
12

Figure 5. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan T. Neumann (Left) commanded the 1st 

Battalion, 17th Infantry, during its deployment to Afghanistan in 2009-2010.

Photo courtesy Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Neumann

While based at FOB Frontenac, Neumann’s area of operations (AO) 

included the parts of the Kakhrez District to the northwest, the Shah Wali 

Kot District to the northeast and the Arghandab District to the southwest. 

Kakhrez and Shah Wali Kot were mountainous, desert areas, while the 

Arghandab was mostly desert except along the Arghandab River, where 

the irrigated land supported pomegranate orchards, grape fields and heavy 

vegetation, all cut by canals or separated by earthen walls. The dense 

foliage made for excellent defensive positions and hampered line-of-sight 

radio transmissions, making situational understanding at times difficult. 

The Soldiers referred to the lush Arghandab Valley as the “Green Zone.” 

Highway 617, designated Route BEAR, connected the three districts with 

FOB Frontenac and Kandahar city. Route BEAR, the only paved road in 

the area, ran northeast to southwest and entered Kandahar city from the 

west. Route RED DOG, an unpaved road, ran parallel to Route BEAR, 

west of the Arghandab River. The two routes merged eight kilometers 

south of FOB Frontenac.
13

Figure 6. Key terrain of the Arghandab “Green Zone.”

Source: author/CSI generated

GOVERNMENT CENTER
14

Between 1979 and 2009, the Arghandab River Valley saw intense 

combat. During the Soviet-Afghan War, both the Soviets and the 

Mujahideen mined the fields around Kandahar city, forcing most of 

the civilian population in and around the city to flee to Pakistan. In 

the summer of 1987 the Soviet Army and its Democratic Republic of 

Afghanistan (DRA) allies attempted to push the Mujahideen out of their 

well-established fighting positions in the towns of Babur and Jelawur. 

For a month, Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) tried 

to penetrate the grape fields and orchards while airstrikes and artillery 

pounded strong points. Mujahideen fighters, hunkered down in bunkers 

with a few scouts positioned outside, waited for the bombardment to pass, 

and then engaged the DRA. When the DRA troops closed to within 10 

meters, the Mujahideen would fire, ensuring that the DRA soldiers could 

not escape. By the end of the campaign, the Mujahideen had killed some 

250 Soviet and DRA soldiers, wounded approximately 800, captured more 

than 100 vehicles, and accepted 2,500 defectors from the DRA into their 

ranks.3

After the Soviets withdrew in 1989, the country gradually fell into 

a civil war three years later. In the spring of 1994, as rival tribes and 

warlords fought each other, the newly-formed Taliban captured Kandahar 

City under the leadership of a charismatic cleric named Mullah Omar. 

As the Taliban made gains on the battlefield, it also welcomed foreign 

fighters into its ranks. Osama Bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization came to 

Afghanistan in 1996 and moved to Kandahar the following year, setting up 

a training camp near the Kandahar Airfield.4

When the United States and its allies launched Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM on 7 October 2001, American bombers pounded Taliban 

bases and infrastructure while the Northern Alliance, with the help of 

Army Special Forces, drove them from the country. Kandahar fell on 7 

December, but both Mullah Omar and Osama Bin Laden escaped. In Bonn 

two days earlier, a United Nations conference nominated Hamid Karzai, 

an anti-Taliban Pashtun, to head a provisional Afghan administration. For 

the next four years, Kandahar Province remained relatively calm as the 

United States kept its forces low in Afghanistan. But during this period, 

the Taliban slowly regrouped and infiltrated back from Pakistan—many 

returned to their homes in Kandahar Province. By 2006, when a Canadian 

battalion assumed responsibility for the province, its soldiers found the 

enemy ensconced in Kandahar’s districts. Insurgents ambushed Canadian 

patrols or planted roadside IEDs, while both sides fought pitched battles 

west of the city. The next year the Taliban shattered the local militia 
15

blocking their entrance to Kandahar city from the north. The number of 

civilians killed either by suicide bombers or caught in crossfire in the 

city rose. The security situation eroded further in 2008 when the Taliban 

attacked the Sarposa Prison and freed 1,100 inmates, many of whom were 

captured Taliban fighters. Making matters worse, the Arghandab District 

police chief was wounded, forcing his evacuation. In his absence, police 

leadership fell apart. The firefights, suicide bombings and IEDs continued 

unabated into 2009.5

This was the situation around Kandahar City when the Buffaloes

arrived. To make matters worse, Lieutenant Colonel Neumann learned that 

the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers’ enlistments in his AO were 

about to expire. They had been operating for a long time far from their 

homes in northern Afghanistan without leave. “They were kind of burned 

out,” explained Neumann.6

 Adding this problem to the loss of the local 

police chief and an ineffective local militia, Neumann decided he had “a 

perfect storm” of trouble on his hands.7

The 750-strong American battalion replaced a 72-man Canadian 

reconnaissance troop and a Canadian Operational Mentor Liaison Teams 

(OMLT, pronounced “omelet”) that advised ANA units, half of which had 

been based at FOB Frontenac. “[The Canadians] just kind of had their finger 

in the dike,” said Neumann.8

 The Canadians did have one thing in common 

with their American cousins: they were equipped with Light Armored 

Vehicles (LAVs), the same basic vehicle as the Stryker. Unfortunately, the 

relief in place did not go smoothly. The Canadians provided the Buffaloes

with written briefings, radio transcripts and anything else to learn about 

the enemy and conditions on the ground; however, almost everything was 

written in French. During the relief in place process, the RC-South Staff 

briefed 5/2 Stryker that there were only approximately 30 or 40 Taliban 

in the area. Yet when they conducted combined reconnaissance missions 

down Route BEAR during the transition period, the Canadians would 

point into the thick green fields that bordered the road and explain to the 

Americans that, because of the small size of their force, they did not go 

into those areas.9

In order to accomplish their mission, the Americans planned to go 

where the Canadians had not. Operation BUFFALO STAMPEDE’s goal 

was to provide security for the national elections scheduled for 20 August 

2009. Neumann first needed to identify the approximately 25 polling sites 

to protect while supporting the Afghan Security forces. It would not be 

easy. The list of sites provided by the brigade was incomplete, containing 

grid coordinates for some locations but not others. Some villages lacked 
16

names. “Some are easy to find,” said Major Ryan O’Connor, the battalion 

operations officer, “others are almost impossible.”10 The Buffaloes would 

serve as a quick reaction force (QRF) for the ANA and Afghan National 

Police (ANP) because, as Neumann later said, “nobody wanted to see 

American Soldiers guarding polling places.”11

The upcoming elections were vital to Afghanistan’s future. The first 

national election in 2004 drew a 75 percent voter turnout. Hamid Karzai, 

then the interim president, was elected with 55.3 percent of the vote. Now, 

with a resurgent Taliban bent on keeping people away from the polling 

booths, Coalition forces had to ensure a safe election. During the 2004 

election the Taliban controlled only 30 of Afghanistan’s districts. In 2009 

they controlled 164. 12 The Buffaloes would have to guarantee voters safe 

passage through a wave of enemy activity. 

Neumann’s battalion contained four companies: Captain John 

Hallett’s Alpha (“Attu”) Company, Captain James “Jamie” Pope’s Bravo 

(“Bayonet’) Company, Captain Joel Kassulke’s Charlie (“Chosin”) 

Company, and Captain Joshua Glonek’s Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company (HHC). All the company commanders were West Point 

graduates. Neumann sent Hallett’s Alpha Company north to Shah Wali Kot 

District. He sent Pope’s Bravo and Kassulke’s Charlie companies south 

to the Arghandab Valley. Bravo Company would patrol the west side of 

the Arghandab River, based out of Combat Outpost (COP) Jelawur, while 

Charlie Company patrolled the east side from the Arghandab Joint District 

Control Center. Glonek’s HHC coordinated security for FOB Frontenac. 

Since Alpha Company had the largest AO but the smallest population, 

Neumann used it as his economy of force and peeled off that company’s 

assets to assist Bravo and Charlie companies whenever needed. To ensure 

election security, Neumann ordered his units to scout out the enemy’s most 

likely avenues of approach to the polling sites, then set up observation 

posts and blocking positions.13

For this first operation, the companies lacked mine detectors and 

bomb sniffing dogs, to the frustration of the men. Other equipment of 

dubious value to their mission was in abundant supply. “We had too much 

equipment,” explained Captain Glonek, who was given a nine-pound 

underwater camera during the deployment.14 Other pieces of equipment 

required training for which the men did not have time. “I’d say I don’t 

want it and I was told ‘it doesn’t matter, you have to sign for it.’” 15

While the Buffaloes’ rifle companies were ready to operate, Neumann’s 

tactical operations center (TOC) was not. Seven equipment containers were 
17

missing, all filled with communications and support materials. Neumann’s 

staff adapted by working from paper maps or writing on the battalion 

headquarters’ walls with dry-erase markers. They also worked out of their 

tactical command post (TAC) Strykers. The lack of equipment would 

hinder Neumann’s ability to see and understand what was happening with 

his companies temporarily as the election drew near. 16 

First Contact

With the clock ticking down to the election, Captain Pope’s Bravo 

Company conducted an area reconnaissance in the Arghandab on 10 

August. His AO included ten ANP checkpoints along Route RED DOG.17

The lushness of the Green Zone, with so many mud walls separating the 

grape rows and pomegranate orchards, proved frustrating to the Soldiers. 

“We’re talking about a maze,” explained Pope. 18

To ensure safe travel down Route BEAR, a route clearance platoon 

from the 562d Engineer Company—referred to as a Route Clearance 

Package (RCP)—preceded Bravo Company, checking for IEDs. The 

journey did not last long. Two hours into the mission, just outside the 

town of Shuyen-e Sofla, the lead Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV), a Stryker 

equipped with a mine roller, fell victim to a command-detonated IED. The 

explosion destroyed all eight tires and injured two engineers, one with a 

broken arm and the other with a leg injury. Pope called for a MEDEVAC, 

which flew the two men out of danger. The engineers were on edge as they 

continued searching, but had only traveled about 50 feet when another 

Stryker triggered a second IED. No one was injured but the company 

stopped while Pope waited for trucks to tow the two damaged vehicles 

back to FOB Frontenac.19

The men found the control wire for the first IED leading into a 

pomegranate orchard. Pope ordered two squads, one from First Lieutenant 

Daniel Boirum’s 3d Platoon and one from First Lieutenant Daniel 

Berschinski’s 2d Platoon, to dismount and move into Shuyen-e Sofla to 

question villagers while the rest of the Soldiers guarded the vehicles. 

Boirum’s men led the way through the empty town, finding only a small 

group of children playing in an orchard. When the pilot of an OH-58 Kiowa 

Warrior helicopter flying overwatch reported a group of 11 military-aged 

males on the south end of town, Pope directed Boirum and Berschinski to 

move toward their location. He then joined the two units.20

Boirum’s men pushed south through the town and an adjacent open 

field until they reached a narrow road between mud walls. A pomegranate 

field and a canal were to their left. As the Soldiers approached an L-shaped 
18

turn with another wall to their front, they heard a loud “ka-chunk,” the 

sound of a PKM machine gun’s bolt hammering forward, but failing to 

fire.21 Insurgents then opened up with AK-47 rifles from behind the wall 

to the Americans’ front. Specialist Richard Thibeault took a round to the 

chest from only 20 feet and dropped to his knees. Staff Sergeant Joshua 

Meyers grabbed him and threw him behind cover while returning fire. 

Everyone else opened fire at the enemy muzzle flashes. Despite his pain, 

Thibeault emptied his magazine at the enemy and, as he reloaded, slipped 

his hand underneath his body armor. When he didn’t see any blood he 

shouted to Meyers that he was okay and continued to fight.22

Boirum shouted for Berschinski to move up. The Soldiers behind him 

shouted to pull back. “No!” Boirum shouted, “Move up! Get on line!”23

But Berschinski, to his surprise, had no one available to reinforce Boirum. 

His squad was missing. When the enemy first opened fire, Berschinski’s 

men charged across the open field and found protection against a wall at a 

90-degree angle from Boirum’s engagement. Captain Pope, who was with 

Berschinski, wanted to act but his options were limited. He couldn’t go 

left because of the canal and he couldn’t go forward because of the enemy. 

His Land Warrior System, however, showed him a number of alleyways 

on his right flank, so he called for Staff Sergeant Daniel Rhodes to follow 

him and took off for the alley. Rhodes, who had just crossed the open field, 

led the squad after Pope. This was when Berschinski, unaware of Pope’s 

action, turned around and noticed his entire squad gone.24

First Lieutenant Victor Cortese, the company fire support officer, stood 

near Pope but close enough to Boirum that, when he heard Boirum shout 

and saw the desperation in his eyes, he joined the fight to the front. An 

enemy RPG ricocheted off the wall in front of Boirum and shot up into the 

air, temporarily deafening him. At that same time, two of Boirum’s men, 

who were at the front and armed with M-203 grenade launchers, bounded 

back to Boirum’s position to gain the grenades’ minimum arming distance 

of approximately 25 meters. “They ended up going through their entire 

loads of 203 HE [high explosive] rounds,” recalled Boirum.25 Enemy fire 

tapered off as the rounds exploded, allowing Boirum’s men to consolidate 

and find better cover.26 
19

Figure 7. Bravo Company engages the enemy in Shuyen-e Sofla.

Source: author/CSI generated
20

Figure 8. First Lieutenant Victor Cortese (left) checks a map while 

Captain James Pope (right) uses his Land Warrior system during a 

patrol in the Arghandab’s Green Zone.

Photo courtesy of Major James Pope, US Army

Meanwhile, Pope led Rhodes’ squad down the alley. He 

contacted a Stryker to support Boirum with its machine guns, but 

the Stryker’s vehicle commander could not see through the maze 

of buildings to where the fire was coming from, 500 meters away. 

The vehicle commander ended up following Pope’s men as close 

as the terrain allowed. Pope turned the corner around a building 

and suddenly ran into a barricade not marked on his Land Warrior 

system. His force circled around a wide compound and through a 

maze of alleys and mud walls, while he placed men in positions 

to suppress enemy fire and continue advancing. He could hear the 

40-mm rounds fired by Boirum’s men exploding to his left, but 

buildings, walls and barricades prevented his men from engaging 

the enemy. When a Taliban truck pulled up behind the insurgents 

on the opposite side of the canal, Rhodes tried to suppress the 

insurgents around it while Pope tried to push the men forward, 

but they were stopped by the canal and another barricade. Finally, 

Rhodes bounded across the canal, continually firing at the enemy 

as they retreated.27
21

At Boirum’s position, rounds flew in between Boirum, his radio 

telephone operator (RTO) and his squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunner, 

Specialist Andrew Bellach. Two enemy fighters had flanked Boirum on his 

left. Bellach returned fire with his SAW, hitting one of the insurgents in the 

chest. The wounded man went down while his companion ran off. With his 

hearing slowly returning, Boirum got on the radio and called his Strykers 

forward, but he still could not hear a response and prepared to pull his men 

back to First Lieutenant Berschinski’s position.28

Berschinski meanwhile, had radioed for a Stryker to pick him up and 

marked his location with a smoke grenade. Unfortunately, the vehicle 

went the wrong way, and once the driver corrected himself, hit a berm, 

ripping off his front left tire. An engineer Stryker then arrived to pick up 

Berschinski. He and his RTO jumped inside and Berschinski ordered the 

driver to take him to Boirum’s position. At the same time, First Sergeant 

Tony Holcomb drove up to Boirum in a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

(MRAP) vehicle equipped with a .50-caliber machine gun. But he did not 

need the weapon; once the enemy saw the vehicle they withdrew. As the 

engineer Stryker with Berschinski arrived, Pope showed up with Rhodes’ 

squad. The fight was over. A few Soldiers assisted Thibeault into the 

MRAP, while the rest mounted their Strykers and returned to the damaged 

engineer vehicles.29

At battalion headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Neumann monitored 

the entire action. He decided not to involve himself personally with the 

firefight, trusting Pope’s leadership, even though the battalion stood ready 

to provide additional resources upon Pope’s request. “Captain Pope was 

aggressively reacting to combat,” Neumann later explained, “and [he] 

didn’t need either our help or our injection of a bunch of questions that 

would slow down his actions.”30

Pope’s company secured the disabled engineer Strykers as the men 

waited for the arrival of recovery vehicles. Berschinski’s platoon took up 

a position on the edge of the town facing a pomegranate orchard. Instead 

of ordering his men into the overgrown orchard, Berschinski had them 

fire their machine guns into it. Nothing happened so the men stayed in 

place until ordered to pull back. Before leaving, Berschinski had his men 

sweep all the empty casings and water bottles into the canal to keep the 

enemy guessing about his position. “I didn’t want to leave any signs that 

we had been there,” Berschinski later explained.31 The next day, Pope’s 

men continued to secure the area, even driving a Stryker through a wall, 

giving the men access to the orchards. Canadian engineers finally arrived 

and removed the three disabled vehicles.32
22

The engagement revealed an important shortcoming: the Buffaloes did 

not have the equipment required to recover damaged or destroyed Strykers 

and had to rely initially on the Canadians for catastrophic vehicle extraction. 

Later, 1-17 IN received a recovery package from a US support unit that 

included two wreckers and a flatbed truck. Throughout their training in 

the United States, the Buffaloes had trained for vehicle recovery, but the 

“disabled” vehicle always had at least two operable wheels. In combat, 

IEDs often blew all the wheels off a Stryker. Only the Canadians, who had 

been dealing with destroyed LAVs since 2006, were prepared to deal with 

the situation.33

In order to counter any Taliban operations aimed at disrupting the 

election, Captain Pope tried to be proactive. Two days later he sent First 

Lieutenant Berschinkski’s 2d Platoon on a dismounted night patrol to 

identify enemy infiltration routes. Pope picked what he thought was a 

good site on a map and Berschinski led his men out into the darkness. 

They walked through numerous fields and climbed over walls trying to 

find the location, only to be channelized by walls and buildings. Finally, 

after almost five hours of searching, Berschinski contacted Pope, reporting 

that the terrain was horrible and that he was in danger of getting ambushed. 

“Someone’s going to toss a grenade over a wall and take out my platoon 

because we can’t see anything.” Pope agreed and called Berschinski back.34

Figure 9. First Lieutenant Daniel Berschinski, standing in his Stryker’s 

commander’s hatch, leads his platoon out of FOB Frontenac. A Mobile Gun 

System (MGS) Stryker is in the background to the right.

Courtesy First Lieutenant Daniel Berschinski, US Army 
23

The Scouts Enter the Fray

On 14 August, once the battalion headquarters was in place at FOB 

Frontenac, Lieutenant Colonel Neumann ordered elements of his scout 

platoon to check out the area around the base. Captain Adam Swift led 

the scout platoon. A graduate of the Air Force Academy, Swift had instead 

chosen an Army commission. “I was going to be an intel[ligence] officer 

in the Air Force and I figured that was going to be kind of boring,” he 

explained.35 So he set his sights on the Army. There would be no lack of 

excitement in Afghanistan.

Swift was leading a four-vehicle Stryker patrol west of FOB Frontenac 

when an IED detonated directly beneath his Stryker, penetrating the 

hull and ripping off all eight tires. Swift, who had been standing in the 

commander’s hatch, awoke upside down on the floor. The blast cracked his 

pelvis and shredded the legs of both Sergeant Tanner Kuth and Specialist 

Derek Ford, who had been sitting across from each other. The driver, 

Private First Class Joshua Seaver, was knocked unconscious. Men yelled 

and screamed inside the Stryker as alarms went off. Dust and smoke filled 

the vehicle. “There was blood and stuff everywhere,” recalled Swift.36

The second Stryker immediately pulled up and dropped its ramp. 

Scouts and snipers poured out and set up a security perimeter while the 

wounded men were pulled out of the damaged Stryker. One sniper team 

positioned themselves atop a ridge. Inside the damaged Stryker, Seaver 

awoke, opened his hatch and spotted armed men on the ridge. Thinking they 

were insurgents, he aimed his rifle at them. Using his Advanced Combat 

Optical Gun Sight, he drew a bead on the Soldiers, but as he clicked off the 

rifle’s safety, he realized he was looking at American snipers.37 He then 

ran up the hill and asked the snipers if they needed any help. They made 

him sit down and checked his eyes for signs of a concussion, or as Seaver 

remembered it, “seeing if I wasn’t crazy because I just got blown up and 

knocked out.”38

The platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Bryan Wells, in the last 

vehicle, called for a MEDEVAC and organized security. He came 

across Swift, who was trying to take charge of the situation despite a 

heavy concussion. “I really didn’t know what was going on,” Swift later 

confessed.39 Wells told Swift that he had everything under control and sat 

him down. As the men set up a pick-up zone for the helicopter, Captain 

Glonek arrived with elements of Hatchet Company, escorting a Stryker 

ambulance. Swift wanted to stay with his men, but Glonek insisted he see 

the medics and offered that he could come back in the morning. The three 

men were loaded into the ambulance. Kuth would eventually have a leg 

amputated while Ford suffered fractured ankles. The rest of the Soldiers 
24

spent a quiet night guarding the damaged Stryker. The next morning a 

Canadian team, driving an oversized wrecker and trailer, arrived and pulled 

the Stryker onto the trailer’s bed.40 Between Bravo Company’s engagement 

with the enemy in Shuyen-e Sofla and the Scout’s experience outside FOB 

Frontenac, the Buffaloes were quickly learning that the enemy was quite 

proficient in using mines to blunt 1-17’s combat power. 

Two Fights at Once: Alpha and Bravo Companies in Combat

With the election only two days away, on 18 August First Lieutenant 

Zachary Osborne learned from the ANP that insurgents were gathering 

in a town called Buyana, southeast of the Shah Wali Kot District Center. 

Osborne, the 2d Platoon leader for Alpha Company, led his platoon out 

of the district center in four Strykers. Three carried his three squads and a 

sniper section, while the fourth was an M1129 Mortar Carrier. Since the 

ANA and ANP were familiar with the area, Osborne let them take the lead 

in their Ford pickup trucks. When they reached the town around 1500, the 

ANP occupied a large hilltop south of the village while Osborne and Staff 

Sergeant Robert Montez positioned their two Strykers on the west side of 

the hill and Sergeant First Class Troy Faver and the mortar carrier stopped 

on the east side, approximately 300 meters from Osborne and Montez.41

Osborne dismounted and led a rifle squad into the town where he met 

with the town elder, who told him that his people had beaten the Russians 

with picks and shovels. Sergeant Pedro Colunga did not like the sound of 

that and warned Osborne that something was wrong, but Osborne told him 

they still needed to search the village.42 The meeting had only gone on for 

a few minutes when Osborne heard a rifle shot. He looked at the elder and, 

through a translator, asked, “Is that Taliban?” The elder responded, “Yeah, 

probably.”43

Osborne ran back to his Stryker as the enemy, hiding in a curved wadi

to the north, engaged the Americans with automatic weapons and RPGs. 

Soon, the insurgents began firing mortars at the ANP on top of the hill, 

wounding two Afghans. The ANP fired wildly in response, expending 

almost all their ammunition in just a few minutes. Sergeant First Class 

Faver sent Staff Sergeant Rick Briolla and a medic out to help the ANP, 

but as they climbed the hill enemy mortar rounds began exploding around 

them and they quickly returned to their Stryker. One round exploded near 

Sergeant Colunga, knocking him to the ground. He immediately checked 

his legs and was relieved to discover they were still attached. The ANP, out 

of ammunition, ran down the hill, climbed into their vehicles, and roared 

away. The ANA joined them.44
25

Osborne dispatched his sniper team to a side of the hill to fire down 

onto the enemy, then deployed the mortar Stryker to maintain rear security 

while Faver anchored the right side of his position on the hill with his 

Stryker. The Strykers returned fire with their M240 machine guns and 

Mk19 grenade launchers while Soldiers stood and fired from the Strykers’ 

hatches. In Faver’s Stryker, Briolla stood in an air-guard hatch firing 

rounds when he suddenly yelled at Faver, “RPG! RPG!” just as the round 

screeched over his head. Faver immediately began conducting survivability 

drills—moving his Stryker in bursts every few minutes to prevent the 

enemy from locking on to his position—and he directed the other vehicles 

to do the same. Faver’s gunner, Specialist Benjamin Swaing, wanted to 

unload his Mk 19 at the village, but Faver refused. “[Not] Unless we have 

positive ID on the enemy,” he told Swaing, “we’re not going to engage.”45

Swaing saw an insurgent crawling low by a house and fired grenades at 

him until the man stopped moving.46 

The snipers engaged the enemy within the town and the surrounding 

brush. While two snipers suppressed insurgents with their M24 rifles, 

Sergeant Keith Brantley fired his M110 rifle. Osborne’s Stryker circled 

around the left side of the hill, shooting down at the enemy to their right 

until they came under fire from the high ground to the left. The enemy’s 

fast movement surprised Osborne. “It was extremely quick,” he recalled, 

“how they adjusted to our maneuvers—they had a group encircle us.”47

The enemy was so close that the Americans were throwing hand grenades 

out of their hatches.48

Enemy fire intensified. Two RPGs impacted on Staff Sergeant Montez’s 

Stryker but failed to explode. When Montez’s MK19 grenade launcher ran 

out of grenades, he climbed onto the deck of his Stryker to reload it and 

caught shrapnel in his face when an enemy bullet smashed into the gun 

mount. The impact threw him down into the Stryker, but he climbed back 

up and completed reloading, receiving additional wounds to his hands. 

Enemy fighters began to encircle the sniper team on the hill, their shots 

getting closer. Sergeant Brantley called a Stryker to his position to gun 

down insurgents advancing on his right flank.49 The enemy’s proximity to 

the Stryker surprised Colunga, firing from the hatch of Montez’s Stryker. 

“I looked at [one of our] snipers,” said Colunga, “he was shooting really 

close to us.”50 Osborne was standing in his hatch and could hear the snap of 

bullets overhead when his vehicle commander shouted, “Hey, get down!” 

and pulled him into the Stryker.51

Even though Osborne had a mortar Stryker in his element, he did not 

possess the authority to use it as the coordinates he relayed to the crew 
26

were too close to structures, which might contain civilians.52 “We were 

getting attacked on three sides at that point,” Osborne explained.53 He 

requested air support but none was available due to enemy action in Bravo 

Company’s AO.54

While Osborne slugged it out with the enemy in Buyana, Captain 

Pope, more than forty kilometers to the south in the Arghandab, prepared 

Bravo Company to conduct another reconnaissance after the previous 

night’s failure. “If we want to find the enemy,” Pope reasoned, “let’s just 

start where we had enemy contact the first time.”55 Pope’s company had 

been bolstered by the addition of Alpha Company’s 3d Platoon, led by 

First Lieutenant Brian Zangenberg. Pope sent Zangenberg’s platoon and 

Berschinski’s 2d Platoon to patrol up north while Bravo Company’s 1st 

and 3d platoons rehearsed their security plan for polling sites with the 

ANA and ANP in the town of Jelawur.56

Zangenberg and Berschinski developed their plan together. 

Zangenberg would leave COP Jelawur first and head north through the 

desert paralleling Route RED DOG to avoid IEDs. Just south of the town 

of Babur, Zangenberg’s men would dismount, cross RED DOG to the 

east, and head into the orchards. Once in the orchards they would turn 

north and head into Babur. Berschinski would leave a half hour after 

Zangenberg, follow his same route, pass Zangenberg’s dismount point, 

and then dismount near Shuyen-e Sofla, where he would head east into the 

orchards, then south to link up with Zangenberg. Once the two lieutenants 

linked up, they would lead their platoons back to their Strykers. The entire 

mission was planned to take about three hours.57

At 1500, while Osborne was under fire in Buyana, Pope’s two platoons 

headed north, paralleling RED DOG. Zangenberg’s men dismounted at 

their designated location and moved into the orchards while a few men 

stayed behind to maintain security and overwatch the orchards. The men 

in the orchard soon turned north and crossed into the town of Babur. They 

advanced through the maze of buildings and walls until they reached more 

orchards to the north. Sergeant Troy Tom then walked point across a small, 

concrete footbridge. He had just crossed the bridge when an IED exploded. 

Tom was killed instantly as the enemy opened fire from the south, behind 

Zangenberg’s platoon. Those not knocked down by the blast took a knee. 

Fortunately, the men were walking 10 meters apart, spaced far enough so 

that not everyone was affected. “The spacing is what saved us,” explained 

Specialist Guillermo Garcia.58

The enemy fired five unaimed rifle shots near the Strykers. The men 

guarding the Strykers returned fire. Sergeant First Class Rande Henderson 
27

popped off ten rounds while Staff Sergeant Justin Prince, the company’s 

fire support NCO, laid down and fired his rifle. The enemy fire ceased. At 

the explosion site, everyone did a head count but Tom did not respond. 

Sergeant First Class Bobby Ciman rushed to Tom’s location with two 

medics, but he was nowhere to be found. Zangenberg called Pope, “We’ve 

encountered one IED,” Zangenberg reported, “one possible casualty.”59

The men began searching the area and walking the canal looking for Tom. 

They only found ID tags and parts of his equipment.60

Meanwhile, First Lieutenant Berschinski’s men had just dismounted 

their Strykers, passed through an empty Shuyen-e Sofla and were moving 

toward an orchard when they heard the IED explosion to the south, 

followed by small-arms fire. They saw the plume of smoke. Berschinski 

ordered his men to halt and listened to his radio as Zangenberg called in 

his report. Realizing that Zangenberg was in trouble, Berschinski called 

for his men to move back through the town. When he heard civilians 

cheering in the distance, he knew the situation was bad. He needed to 

get to Zangenberg quickly, so he called for his Strykers to move south as 

he moved dismounted south. He saw Zangenberg’s position on his Land 

Warrior map, but the image kept popping in and out intermittently. When 

he saw a trail on his paper map leading through the orchards to where he 

thought Zangenberg was, he directed his Soldiers to a footbridge. As one 

squad secured the far side of the bridge, Berschinski crossed with his RTO, 

Specialist Roger Garcia. Private First Class Jonathan Yanney was crossing 

behind the two men when an IED exploded on the near side of the bridge.61

The powerful blast knocked everyone to the ground, blinding them 

with dust. An enemy fighter in front of the platoon engaged the lead 

soldiers, and those who could, returned fire. Berschinski crawled forward, 

sweeping his hands in front of him until he found Garcia, who was lying 

on his back. He checked Garcia for blood but found none. As the dust 

started to clear, Berschinski pulled his face up to Garcia’s to tell him he 

was okay, but Garcia just yelled, oblivious to his lieutenant. The blast had 

deafened him. The men up front shouted back that they had engaged the 

enemy fighter and he had broken contact. Berschinski ordered his men to 

cease firing and began a head count. Like Tom minutes before, Yanney 

did not respond when his name was called. Shredded bits of Yanney’s 

map fluttered down from the sky. The men looked up and saw twisted 

fragments of his radio antennae caught in the tree branches. The explosion 

gouged a two-foot deep crater where Yanney had been walking. With 

Yanney unaccounted for, Berchinski’s platoon shifted its mission from 

reinforcing Zangenberg’s men to searching for Yanney.62
28

Berschinski pulled all his men back to the western side of the canal and 

set up a security perimeter. He then called Captain Pope but did not know 

how to explain the situation. “We just took an IED,” he reported. “Yanney 

is missing but I’m pretty sure he’s KIA [killed in action].” Berschinski 

had never before called in a missing person, known as a Duty Status 

Whereabouts Unknown (DUSTWUN), and did not want to broadcast what 

had happened. “I knew that everyone was listening over the radio.”63

While Bravo company dealt with its casualties, First Lieutenant 

Osborne continued his fight outside Buyana. With so much enemy fire 

coming into his position and unable to use his mortars, Osborne decided 

to break contact. His snipers bounded to the Strykers under fire. Once 

onboard, the vehicles roared out of the area. Insurgents followed on foot, 

continuing to fire. When the M240 machine gun on one Stryker ran out 

of ammunition, a Soldier popped out of the hatch and fired his M-203 

grenade launcher. He hit an insurgent in the leg, but a motorcycle with a 

bin on the back quickly carted the wounded man away, using a wadi as 

an escape route. As the Strykers departed, the insurgents on the roofs of 

buildings celebrated, firing their rifles into the air.64

Osborne’s four Strykers drove 1,000 meters into the desert and 

stopped to form a 360-degree security perimeter. Each Stryker faced out in 

a different direction with its rear ramp lowered so the Soldiers inside could 

communicate directly with others in their vehicles. The men reloaded their 

weapons and were preparing to reengage when their company commander, 

Captain John Hallett, drove up with the 1st Platoon, led by First Lieutenant 

Seth Wilkin, as the company QRF. The ANA and ANP had also returned. 

When Hallett had passed the ANP headquarters on the way to Buyana, 

he had picked them up. Hallett asked for a situation report and then 

directed his two platoons to mount an attack back into Buyana. A force 

of ten Strykers now charged forward in a line, surprising the Taliban who 

thought the Americans had retreated for good. As the company pushed 

forward, one of Wilkin’s Strykers hit a large rock and broke an axle.65

The Strykers formed a Vee formation as they rolled up on a corner of 

the village. One insurgent fired an RPG that flew 10 feet over one Stryker 

while another insurgent fired an RPG from a building doorway, which 

streaked between two other vehicles. The crews immediately returned fire 

with machine guns and Mk 19 grenade launchers, setting the building on 

fire. Enemy rounds pinged off the Strykers. Some of the men dismounted 

their vehicles and engaged the insurgents, who were firing RPGs and 

machine guns while retreating northwest through the town. First Sergeant 

Eugene Hicks could see the enemy moving from building to building 
29

and escaping into a wooded area. He wanted to enter the buildings but 

Hallett refused, preferring that the Afghan Security Forces be used for this 

purpose.66 Hicks dismounted his vehicle anyway and closed on a building 

where the enemy fired RPGs. From a distance of only 15 feet, Hicks 

opened fire on four men. “I think I hit one guy twice,” explained Hicks, 

“but he was just kind of lurching forward. He wasn’t going to stop.”67

Hallett learned that Kiowa helicopters were inbound. When they 

arrived Osborne fired tracer rounds from his rifle to point out enemy 

locations. When the insurgents saw the helicopters, they retreated along 

a wadi. The men later found a number of blood trails but no bodies. The 

firefight was over, but because the Soldiers had to recover two damaged 

vehicles, it took the company until 2200 to return to FOB Frontenac.68

The men were pleased with their first performance against the enemy but 

wondered why it took so long to get helicopter support. They found out 

when Captain Hallett explained what happened to Tom and Yanney in the 

Arghandab Valley. “Everybody was pretty much on cloud nine,” recalled 

Staff Sergeant Forbes, “[but] that kind of ruined the elation real quick.”69

Dealing with Two DUSTWUNS in the Arghandab

In the Arghandab, Captain Pope was rehearsing election security at 

COP Jelawur when he first learned about Tom and Yanney. Pope called 

First Lieutenant Boirum, whose 3d Platoon was his QRF, and told him to 

go to Readiness Condition-1 (REDCON-1), meaning his platoon needed 

to be alert, mounted in their vehicles with their weapons loaded. Pope then 

loaded the few men with him into a Stryker and an MRAP and headed 

north to First Lieutenant Berschinski and First Lieutenant Zangenberg’s 

positions.70

At the battalion headquarters, Neumann monitored the situations with 

both Alpha and Bravo Companies. He was concerned that the enemy had 

captured Yanney. When Boirum’s men reported finding some IV bags and 

bloody bandages in a house, Neumann thought the enemy had given Yanney 

first aid. “No,” Boirum radioed, “there’s zero chance that that happened.”71

Boirum had seen the blast site, Yanney’s destroyed equipment and a few 

of his human remains. He knew what had happened to his Soldier. With 

the dense vegetation making communications difficult, Neumann was 

not clear on exactly what had happened to Yanney. When Pope reported 

that he could not account for all his men, Neumann made up his mind. 

“That was the trigger,” he explained.72 Leaving Major Darren Jennings, 

the battalion’s executive officer, to manage Alpha Company’s situation, he 

took his three Strykers that made up his TAC, including Major O’Connor 

and the battalion scouts, to Pope’s position.73
30

Boirum was ready for Pope’s call. He had heard the first IED 

explode some four kilometers away while he was leading a foot patrol 

through Jelawur, with his Strykers paralleling him outside the town. He 

immediately had his men go to REDCON-1. As the men climbed into the 

Strykers and loaded their weapons, the second IED went off and Pope’s 

order came in. Boirum raced to Berschinski’s position and found it in 

trouble. “The platoon was in a state of shock,” recalled Boirum. “First 

Lieutenant Berschinski was heavily concussed.”74 Boirum got Berschinski 

to sit down and ordered Berschinski’s men to establish security while his 

men helped search for Yanney in the adjacent buildings. Men kicked in 

doors and searched rooftops. Others walked shoulder-to-shoulder through 

the orchards. Boirum and Staff Sergeant Joshua Meyers climbed into the 

canal and walked upstream with their fingers probing the bottom. The 

men found only Yanney’s empty boot, a twisted M4 rifle grip and some 

body parts. Medics arrived and evacuated the deaf Specialist Garcia and 

Sergeant Kevin Deas, who had taken shrapnel in his bicep.75

With First Lieutenant Berschinski not wanting everyone to know what 

happened to Yanney, Staff Sergeant Justin Prince, the fire support NCO, 

called in two DUSTWUNs using the fires net, which put him in direct 

contact with the battalion headquarters with fewer Soldiers listening in. 

DUSTWUN calls usually meant the enemy had captured a soldier and 

triggered a lockdown to seal off the area until that Soldier could be found. 

Colonel Tunnell, the brigade commander, passed the Buffaloes as many 

assets as possible to find Tom and Yanney. A US Special Operation Force 

(SOF) element was sent to the area along with fixed- and rotary-wing 

aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles to search for the two men. The 

brigade reserve moved to Pope’s location to block the area from the south, 

while Captain Joel Kassulke’s Charlie Company, on the eastern side of the 

Arghandab River, set up blocking positions along various checkpoints, 

inspecting vehicles at entry control points along Route BEAR.76 At a 

bridge between Bravo and Charlie companies, one of Kassulke’s squads 

set up a second checkpoint across from one of Pope’s. “Everybody got 

checked by them,” recalled Corporal Chad Cannon of Charlie Company, 

“and then checked again by us.”77

While Boirum and Berschinski continued their searches, Captain Pope 

arrived on Route RED DOG near sundown and requested an escort into 

First Lieutenant Zangenberg’s position. Through a miscommunication, 

Boirum and Berschinski thought Pope wanted them to stop their search 

for Yanney and assist with the search for Tom. Both platoons departed the 

area, mounted their Strykers and drove to Pope’s position. The large escort 
31

surprised Pope but he could not send them back. “Night’s falling and I 

need to get into defensive positions,” he later explained.78 From there they 

escorted the captain to Zangenberg’s location, getting lost along the way, 

adding to everyone’s frustration.

A Dangerous Night at Babur

By the time Pope’s platoons accomplished their link up, all the officers 

and men of Bravo Company were exhausted and frustrated. Some were in 

shock from the day’s events. First Lieutenant Zangenberg reported that 

his men had cleared all the compounds in his area so Pope assigned each 

platoon a specific compound to bed down for the night. After letting the 

men consolidate the compounds, Pope called a huddle with his key leaders. 

The lieutenants and a few NCOs met on the roof of Pope’s building. “I 

was running ragged,” Pope later confessed.79 He was supposed to be 

preparing for an election and running patrols, but instead he was leading 

a DUSTWUN recovery operation. He reviewed the situation and told the 

officers that they would resume the search for Tom at daylight, and then 

search for Yanney.80

The meeting broke up around midnight and the men returned to their 

compounds. First Lieutenant Berschinski walked with Specialist Nick 

Torres back to his platoon’s compound. As they neared it, Berschinski called 

to the men guarding the walls of the compound, “Friendly coming in!” Just 

then, an IED detonated.81 The blast threw him into the air, destroying his 

legs, lacerating his left arm, and breaking his jaw. He bounced off a wall 

and landed head first into the crater. “Guys, guys, I need your help,” he 

called out as Soldiers raced to him. “I hit a bomb, I don’t have any legs.”82

Three medics applied tourniquets, inserted an IV and wrapped hemostatic 

control (HemCon) bandages on his legs to stop the hemorrhaging. Captain 

Pope arrived and slapped Berschinski’s face to try to keep him conscious 

and reminded him of his parents. Berschinski cursed in response. Pope 

then told him “Stay with me. The birds are going to be here.”83

Staff Sergeant Prince had radioed for a MEDEVAC and was told it was 

five minutes out, then ten minutes, then five minutes away. When an onstation Kiowa helicopter offered to MEDEVAC Berschinski, Prince called 

a circling US Air Force AC-130 Gunship to clear a helicopter landing 

zone. Using its 25mm Gatling gun and 40mm auto cannon, the gunship 

blasted an area of 400 meters in only two minutes. The Kiowa then landed 

and the co-pilot got out. The men tried to cram Berschinski into the seat, 

but realized he might bleed to death before reaching a hospital. As they 

debated what to do next, a US Air Force Para-Rescue Jumper HH-160 

Black Hawk helicopter pilot radioed that he was two minutes out. The 
32

helicopter landed quickly, took Berschinski on board, and flew him to a 

hospital in Kandahar city. The men on the ground had waited almost an 

hour for Berschinski’s evacuation. 84

Berschinski survived. He credited his survival to hitting the wall and 

falling into the crater, where he could be easily found. “The medics did 

an incredible job,” he said. “The guy who pretty much everyone credits 

with keeping me alive is [medic] David Luketti.”85 Just as the Black Hawk 

departed, Lieutenant Colonel Neumann’s TAC reached Pope’s Strykers 

but could not raise the company commander on the radio. Neumann had 

been delayed when his small convoy passed a vehicle with a body in the 

trunk and stopped to inspect it only to discover it was a local Afghan, not 

one of his men. Upon Neumann’s arrival he climbed into one of Pope’s 

Strykers and used its radio. He then learned for the first time that both Tom 

and Yanney were officially DUSTWUNs.86

Neumann went to work. He realized that the platoon sergeant in charge 

of Bravo Company’s Strykers had not moved his Strykers, something that 

invited an enemy attack. The sergeant had also done little to maintain 

security or communications with other Strykers and small units. Neumann 

ordered Master Sergeant Mark Hamil, the battalion’s operations sergeant 

major, to take charge. Hamil organized the company’s ten Strykers into a 

cohesive defensive position and reestablished communications. Neumann 

then conferred with Pope and ordered him to consolidate and reorganize 

his company to allow both Bravo and all the Buffaloes to better set the 

conditions for the search come sunrise. With Major O’Connor, Neumann 

coordinated with the rest of the battalion, as well as the brigade and other 

units assisting in the DUSTWUN.87

Activity dominated the night. Helicopters roamed the skies, searching 

for the two missing Soldiers. Enemy radio chatter revealed an imminent 

attack, so the Soldiers divided up the ammunition and prepared a 

counterattack. “If they’re coming,” thought Specialist Guillermo Garcia, 

“it’s going to be a good fight.”88 But the attack never came. When aerial 

assets spotted a man with a weapon conferring with a group of men 

near a van, Pope obtained permission to drop a bomb on their position, 

with unexpected results, “There were huge secondary explosions off in 

the distance,” he said.89 The men were obviously working with IEDs. 

Before sunrise, the troops heard movement outside their position and an 

occasional clanging of a bell. They fired at the sounds, which turned out to 

be a donkey. The braying animal fell over into a canal.90
33

Continuing the Search 

The next morning Captain Pope continued the search for his two 

missing Soldiers. Around 1000 the men found Sergeant Tom’s body in 

the canal, close to where they had searched the day before. They put a 

stretcher underneath him, lifted him out of the water and brought him to a 

nearby compound to account for his gear and remove any sensitive items. 

The men called for a helicopter but none was available. Because Tom was 

a DUSTWUN, with so many resources committed, Lieutenant Colonel 

Neumann needed to personally verify the body. The exhausted men carried 

Tom through grape rows, a swamp, and a canal. On the way out, Staff 

Sergeant Prince spotted two insurgents holding weapons in the distance 

and called in two Kiowa Warrior helicopters, which swooped in and fired, 

not only killing the men but also setting off a weapons cache. “There 

were five minutes’ [worth] of secondary explosions,” said Prince.91 Once 

Neumann positively identified Tom’s body, a helicopter arrived. Neumann 

then patted Pope on the back, told him he did a good job and ordered 

his platoon back to Alpha Company at FOB Frontenac. Neumann would 

substitute another Alpha Company platoon, First Lieutenant Osborne’s 2d 

Platoon, for 3d Platoon during the election.92

With Tom found, Pope could now concentrate his search for Private 

First Class Yanney. He knew the enemy had likely prepared for this 

movement. “Past success equals future performance for the enemy,” Pope 

later explained.93 The search became a battalion operation with Bravo 

Company designated as the main effort. Neumann gave Pope an engineer 

platoon to breach the IED belt located on the edges of the orchards that 

made up the borders of the green zone. Also joining Pope were his 1st 

Platoon under First Lieutenant Ryan Fadden and his Mobile Gun System 

Platoon under First Lieutenant Fiorenzo Iaconangelo. While enough had 

been found to confirm Yanney as KIA, the officers wanted the rest of his 

body. “We owed it to both him and his family to get back to the blast site 

and see if there was anything else to recover,” Neumann later explained.94

The MGS platoon provided overwatch as the attack began. They loaded 

with an anti-personnel canister round to penetrate the dense orchards. 

The engineers led the way into the Green Zone, breaching the IED belt. 

They were followed by the MGS, 2d and 1st platoons, all mounted in 

their Strykers. The engineers combed the grape fields and pomegranate 

orchards for an hour until their platoon leader reported to Pope that the 

area was clear. Then the engineer lieutenant reported two armed males in 

the area and Pope ordered, “Engage, engage!”95
34

As the engineers took the enemy under fire, multiple vehicles pushed 

into the orchards. An MGS Stryker rolled forward and was engaged by a 

command-detonated IED. The explosion rocked the vehicle, injuring its 

driver, immobilizing the vehicle and knocking out its electrical power. 

Inside the MGS, Sergeant First Class Edward Weig ordered his gunner to 

return fire with manual controls, then extracted the driver from his seat and 

pulled him atop the vehicle. An engineer Stryker vehicle pulled up next to 

the MGS and the engineers pulled the crew onto their vehicle. When the 

enemy opened fire at the two crews, Weig climbed back inside, traversed 

the MGS’s turret, and fired a cannister round at the enemy. The powerful 

blast peeled back the trees. “There was nothing of the enemy left,” said 

Staff Sergeant Prince, the fire support NCO.96

With enemy fire suppressed, Pope ordered the remnants of First 

Lieutenant Berschinski’s 2d Platoon forward, since they knew where 

Yanney had been. As the unit advanced, concealed insurgents engaged the 

men with machine guns and AK-47s. The enemy ran behind buildings, 

tree lines and walls. “They were everywhere,” explained Prince.97 While 

the Americans returned suppressive fire, Prince jumped into Sergeant First 

Class Tony Dimico’s Stryker and said he needed to get as close to the 

engagement as possible to call in fire support. Dimico drove forward, at 

times coming under enemy fire. Prince climbed on top of the Stryker and 

called in gun runs by Kiowa Warrior helicopters, which shot up a tree 

line and targeted two- and three-man enemy teams who were trying to 

converge on Pope’s company. When the helicopters’ gun runs failed to 

take out an enemy bunker, Prince backed the men 25 meters away and 

used a Predator drone to fire a Hellfire missile, which destroyed it.98

Prince spent most of the battle standing atop Dimico’s Stryker, calling 

in helicopters and only ducking down when enemy fire got too close. He 

would then immediately return fire and stand back up to resume his duties. 

“Rounds were bouncing off the Stryker right bedside us and hitting the 

dirt right beside us, [and] passing over our heads,” he later explained.99 His 

work with the aerial assets impressed First Lieutenant Fadden: “He did a 

pretty incredible job of calling in air support,” said Fadden. “He probably 

had about five or six different layers of air assets stacked on top of each 

other.”100 First Lieutenant Boirum succinctly summed up the engagement, 

“The enemy took a lot of casualties.”101

During the engagement, Lieutenant Colonel Neumann and his TAC 

monitored the situation from right behind the engineers’ breach point, 

while simultaneously overseeing the other companies, scouts, mortars and 

air assets. When the enemy fired at the TAC Strykers, they returned fire and 
35

conducted survivability drills, so as to prevent a full-on engagement while 

coordinating the various assets. Neumann’s staff relayed target information 

to Bravo Company’s security elements on the friendly side of the breach, 

allowing them to engage the enemy while Neumann concentrated on the 

larger fight.102

When the engagement ended, Bravo Company established a foothold 

where Yanney had been. The engineers swept with mine detectors while 

others resumed the search. One enemy fighter continuously fired rounds 

from across the canal. The search was slow and deliberate but the sun 

was setting and the election was the next day. Pope reported to Lieutenant 

Colonel Neumann that they had found body parts of and bits of Yanney’s 

equipment.1*

 Neumann in turn reported to Colonel Tunnell, who called off 

the DUSTWUN. Neumann continued the search, not wanting to stop until 

he could really verify for himself that Yanney was dead.

Finally, Neumann realized his men were not going to find anything 

more of Yanney, and not wanting to risk any more casualties in a night 

defense, he recommended to Colonel Tunnell that the search be called off. 

The brigade commander concurred. “That was a tough call,” Neumann 

later admitted, “because we live by the ethos that [we] never leave a fallen 

comrade.”103 For two years the unit had ended every battalion formation by 

reciting the Soldiers’ Creed, which included the line: “I will never leave a 

fallen comrade,” but in the violent underbrush of the Green Zone, Neumann 

knew his men could not recover every bit of their fallen brother.104 Major 

Jennings defended Neumann’s decision. “We would have lost more people 

if Colonel Neumann hadn’t made the recommendation to pull out.”105 In 

the darkness, Pope’s men departed the orchard, remounted their Strykers, 

and raced back to COP Jelawur. They had only a few hours until the polls 

opened.106

* A month later at a border crossing into Pakistan, Afghan National Police 

stopped a man with confiscated photocopied documents that had been in 

Yanney’s wallet. 
36

Endnotes

1. Shelby Stanton, World War II Order of Battle (Mechanicsburg: 

Stackpole Books, 1984), 203; Shelby Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle

(Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2003), 143.

2. Colonel Jonathan Neumann, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 April 2012, 1-2. 

3. Ali Ahmad and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: 

Mujahideen Tactics and the Soviet-Afghan War (Quantico: Marine Corps 

Combat Development Command, 1995), 311-316; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: 

Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale 

University Press, 2010), 20.

4. Rashid, 1, 25, 133, 257; Murray Brewster, The Savage War: The 

Untold Battle of Afghanistan (Ontario: John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd., 2011) 

XIII. 

5. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 283; Rashid, 220-221, 229-230, 

230; Brewster, 71-72, 206, 226-227.

6. Neumann, interview, 121.

7. Neumann, interview, 119.

8. Major James Pope, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 March 2012, 3-4; Neumann, interview, 115.

9. Major Ryan O’Conner, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 April 2012, 7-9; Neumann, interview, 116.

10. O’Conner, interview, 16 April 1012, 5.

11. Neumann, interview, 4.

12. Rashid, 227, 234.

13. Neumann, interview, 6, 10; Captain Michael Kovalsky, interview by 

Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 March 

2012, 3.

14. Glonek, interview, 61.

15. Glonek, interview, 61.

16. Lieutenant Colonel Darren Jennings, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 July 2012, 9; Major 

Ryan P. O’Connor, e-mail to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 01 November 2012.

17. Captain Daniel Boirum, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 May 2012, 4; Pope, interview, 10.

18. Pope, interview, 7.
37

19. Pope, interview, 10, 13, 21; Boirum, interview, 5; First Lieutenant 

Dan Berschinski, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 27 March 2012, 9, 10; Major James Pope, e-mail to Kevin 

Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 August 2012.

20. Boirum, interview, 6, 8; Pope, interview, 14.

21. Pope, interview, 14.

22. Boirum, interview, 9-11, 19.

23. Boirum, interview, 12.

24. Pope, interview, 15-16; Pope, e-mail, 09 July 2012.

25. Boirum, interview, 15.

26. Boirum, interview, 12, 14-15; Department of the Army, Field Manual 

(FM) 3-22.31 (), 40-MM Grenade Launcher, M-203 (Headquarters, Department 

of the Army: Washington, DC: 2003), 3-3.

27. Pope, interview, 14, 16, 17; Major James Pope, e-mail to Kevin 

Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 August 2012; 

Major James Pope, e-mail to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 9 July 2012.

28. Boirum, interview, 11, 16-18.

29. Boirum, interview, 20, 21; Berschinski, interview, 14; Berschinski, 

e-mail, 10 July 2012 (2), 1.

30. Colonel Jonathan Neumann, e-mail to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 January 2013.

31. Berschinski, interview, 23.

32. Pope, interview, 28; Berschinski, interview, 23; Berschinski, e-mail, 10 

July 2012, 1; Jennings, interview 11.

33. Jennings, interview, 11-12; Murray Brewster, The Savage War: The 

Untold Battles of Afghanistan (Ontario, John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 14.

34. Pope, interview, 28; Berschinski, interview, 23-25.

35. Captain Adam Swift, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 April 2012, 2.

36. Swift, interview 6,-8, 14; Sergeant Joshua Seaver, interview by Kevin 

M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 March 2012, 3.

37. Seaver, interview, 3.

38. Seaver, interview, 5.

39. Swift, interview, 26.

40. Major Joshua Glonek, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 April 2012, 8-9, First Sergeant Brian Wells, 
38

interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

20 March 2012, 3-7; Swift, interview, 10, 79; Sergeant Julian Galez, interview 

by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 March 

2012, 3-4; Charlie Company, 1-17 IN, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 March 2012, 13.

41. First Lieutenant Zachary Osborne, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 April 2012, 5; Osborne, 

interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 22 August 2012, 1-4; Master Sergeant Troy Faver, interview by Kevin M. 

Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 September 2012, 4.

42. Attu Company, 1-17 IN, group interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 March 2012, 82.

43. Osborne, interview, 24 April 2012, 6-7.

44. Faver, interview, 7.

45. Faver, interview, 9.

46. A/1-17 IN, group interview, 85, 86; Faver, interview, 9-10.

47. Osborne, interview, 24 April 2012, 9.

48. 2d Infantry Division, 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 17th Infantry, 

1st Battalion, “Bronze Star Medal with Valor Citation, SGT Keith Brantley.”

49. 2d Infantry Division, 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 17th Infantry, 

1st Battalion, “Bronze Star Medal with Valor Citation, SSG Robert E. Montez”; 

2d ID, 5th SBCT, 17th Infantry, 1st Battalion, “Bronze Star Medal with Valor 

Citation, Sergeant Keith Brantley.”

50. A/1-17, group interview, 82, 84.

51. Osborne, interview, 24 April 2012, 15.

52. Provisions of the tactical directive issued by the Headquarters, 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in July 2009 authorized use of 

indirect fires against residential compounds in “very limited and prescribed 

conditions.”

53. Osborne, interview, 24 April 2012, 10.

54. Osborne, interview, 24 April 2012, 11, 15-16; Osborne, interview, 22 

August, 4-5.

55. Pope, interview, 30.

56. Pope interview, 30.

57. Berschinski, interview, 33-34.

58. Staff Sergeant Michael Brown, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 June 2012, 6; A/1-17, group 

interview, 47.
39

59. First Lieutenant Brian Zangenberg, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 April 2012, 5.

60. Sergeant First Class Rande Henderson, interview by Kevin M. 

Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 March 2012, 9; 

Zangenberg, interview, 5, 6, 8; Sergeant First Class Justin Prince, interview by 

Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 May 

2012, 5.

61. Berschinski, interview, 34-36.

62. Berschinski, interview, 37-39; Boirum, interview, 30. 

63. Berschinski, interview, 40-41.

64. A/1-17, group interview, 84-85.

65. A/1-17, group interview, 16; Osborne, interview, 22 August, 8; Faver, 

interview, 15.

66. The July 2009 ISAF Tactical Directive ordered that Afghan National 

Security Forces conduct all entries into Afghan houses.

67. First Sergeant Eugene Hicks, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 April 2012, 8.

68. A/1-17, group interview, 5, 15, 65-66; Osborne, interview, 24 April 

2012, 12, 15-16, 18-20; Hicks, interview, 4-6; Staff Sergeant Van Forbes, 

interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

22 March 2012, 5.

69. Forbes, interview, 6.

70. Pope, interview, 33.

71. Boirum, interview, 32.

72. Neumann, interview, 13.

73. Neumann, interview, 14, 20.

74. Boirum, interview, 27.

75. Boirum, interview, 26-29; Berschinski, 42-43.

76. Prince, interview, 8; C/1-17 IN, group interview, 3, 62; O’Connor, 

interview, 8 August 2012, 28.

77. C/1-17, group interview, 88, 89; Jennings, interview, 21.

78. Pope, interview, 34.

79. Pope, interview, 35.

80. Pope, interview, 36-37; Zangenberg, 10; Boirum, interview, 38; 

Berschinski, interview, 49.

81. Berschinski, interview, 49.
40

82. Berschinski, interview, 51.

83. Pope, interview, 38; Berschinski, interview, 53.

84. Berschinski, interview, 57; Prince, interview, 10-13; Boirum, 

interview, 42; Brown, interview, 23.

85. Berschinski, interview, 55.

86. Neumann, interview, 18, 20.

87. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

88. A/1-17, group interview, 47.

89. Pope, interview, 42.

90. Brown, interview, 24.

91. Neumann, interview, 18.

92. Neumann, interview, 22; Brown, interview, 27; Zangenberg, interview, 

16; Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

93. Pope, interview, 45.

94. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

95. Pope, interview, 50.

96. Pope, interview, 47-50; O’Connor, interview, 8 August, 30-31; 

2d Infantry Division, 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 17th Infantry, 1st 

Battalion, “Bronze Star Medal with Valor Citation, SFC Edward Weig”; Prince, 

interview, 14.

97. Prince, interview, 15.

98. Prince, interview, 16-17, 57-58; Boirum, interview, 49-50.

99. Price, interview, 21.

100. First Lieutenant Ryan Fadden, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 April 2012, 11.

101. Boirum, interview, 50.

102. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

103. Neumann, interview, 30; O’Connor, interview, 8 August 2012, 33.

104. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

105. Jennings, interview, 29.

106. Pope, interview, 56.
41

Chapter 3

The Election and Beyond

Before sunrise on 20 August, Neumann’s companies fanned out to 

secure the polling places. At COP Jelawur, Lieutenant Osborne of 2d 

Platoon, Alpha Company, greeted Captain Pope. Osborne, fresh from his 

engagement at Buyana, was unfamiliar with the Arghandab. Pope briefed 

the platoon leaders on the numerous polling sites along Route RED DOG 

and one in a schoolhouse deep in the Green Zone. He assigned Osborne the 

schoolhouse. After Pope left, Lieutenant Boirum briefed Osborne again in 

more detail, advising him to stay off the roads. With little sleep, the men 

headed out on their new mission.1

Osborne’s Strykers dropped his platoon close to the Green Zone and 

the men trekked two kilometers, through irrigation ditches and orchards, 

and over seven-foot-high walls to reach the schoolhouse. The Soldiers 

were weighed down with equipment and a lot of water, since they would 

be without resupply for the entire day. “It was probably one of the hardest 

movements that I’ve done,” recalled Sergeant First Class Faver.2 Once 

at the schoolhouse, Osborne saw enemy mortar rounds exploding on the 

district center in Charlie Company’s AO. He located the mortar firing 

position and called in Kiowa helicopters, which dropped smoke on the 

site and then hit it with rockets. The pilots reported four enemy killed. 

Later in the day, after only three people had showed up to vote, the ANA 

commander told Osborne he wanted to shut down the polls early. Osborne 

argued with the commander until he learned why: officials inside the 

schoolhouse were stuffing the ballot box. Osborne and the commander 

stopped the illegal action and closed the site.3

Once Osborne’s election duties were over, his 2d Platoon pulled out of 

the schoolhouse and returned to their Strykers. On their way back to COP 

Jelawur, his men noticed that people were staying off the roads. The Strykers 

reached a choke point between an ANA compound and some houses with 

little room to maneuver. The first vehicle rolled through without incident 

but the second vehicle, holding Staff Sergeant Montez and seven other 

Soldiers, detonated an IED. The explosion violently rocked the Stryker 

and blew one of its front left tires into the air. “I remember screaming 

and smoke and being hit,” recalled Sergeant Pedro Colunga, who was 

temporarily blinded by the blast.4

 With communications out, Montez 

assessed everyone’s condition, then climbed out of the commander’s hatch 

and gave the thumbs-up to men in the other Strykers. No one had been 

killed but Colunga was wounded and shrapnel had lacerated Montez’s 

face. Both men also suffered concussions.5
42

Figure 10. Staff Sergeant Robert Montez’s Stryker after its left tire was blown off 

by an IED. 

Courtesy Captain Zac Osborne, US Army

Elsewhere in Bravo Company’s AO, the election ran smoothly. 

Lieutenant Ryan Fadden spent a relatively quiet day at a polling station 

along Route RED DOG. As he returned to Jelawur, however, an IED 

exploded underneath his Stryker. The bright orange explosion knocked 

Fadden down into the vehicle and broke his driver’s ankle. Sergeant James 

Knowler had dozed off in the back of the Stryker when the IED detonated. 

“I woke up to what seemed like a million pounds of sand in my mouth,” 

he recalled.6

 Specialist Wesley Pfreil immediately fired the Mk 19 grenade 

launcher at the two triggermen and killed them.7

Up in the Shah Wali Kot District, Captain Hallett personally delivered 

ballots to his remaining two Alpha Company platoons securing numerous 

polling sites. One site came under a brief mortar attack, but no one was 

hurt.8

 The next morning, Lieutenant Zangenburg’s platoon and some ANA 

soldiers were sleeping on the roof of the Shah Wali Kot District Center 

when the enemy opened fire with RPGs and AK-47s. Some of the RPG 

rockets landed within 20 meters of the platoon’s parked Strykers below. 

The men on the roof returned fire for approximately 10 minutes. When the 

firing stopped, Zangenburg found an RPG tail fin embedded in one of his 

Strykers.9
43

At battalion headquarters, the staff monitored updates, ready to send 

reinforcements to any site in the AO. Lieutenant Colonel Neumann’s most 

important decision that day was not committing to any engagements and 

letting the Afghan Security Forces follow the plan of securing the polling 

sites. “We intended to stay ready to react,” Neumann later said, “but 

basically stay out of sight.”10

Throughout these actions, the Buffalos had done their best to provide 

a secure election process. Yet they could not make people show up to vote, 

only ensure their safety once they got to a polling site. Voter turnout in 

Kandahar Province was estimated at between one and five percent. Only 

men voted. “I don’t think in our area, a single woman approached any of 

the polls,” said Neumann.11 Only a few people showed up to vote in the 

Bravo Company’s sector. They had either been chased away or intimidated 

by the Taliban. Across Afghanistan, only half as many people voted as 

had in the 2004 elections. President Karzai won reelection but there were 

numerous accusations of fraud. Ahmed Rashid, a specialist on Afghan 

affairs, later criticized the legitimacy of the election, contending that, “The 

fraud and ballot stuffing by Karzai’s supporters was on an epic scale.”12

Ambush in Jeleran

With the election over, the Buffalos continued to establish themselves 

in their AO. Lieutenant Colonel Neumann decided to extend BUFFALO 

STAMPEDE a few days to continue gathering information on the area. 

Captain Kassulke’s Charlie Company patrolled around the Arghandab 

District Center, looking for potential future outpost locations.13 On 25 

August, with temperatures hovering around 120 degrees, Lieutenant 

Joshua Bobbitt’s 3d Platoon patrolled the southern end of the town of 

Jeleran, southwest of the District Center. After the Strykers dropped the 

men off on the northern side of a pomegranate orchard, the Soldiers headed 

south along a trail until reaching a corner where the trail led west. Open 

fields faced them to the south and east. A tree line bordered the eastern 

field, while a brick wall, running east to west, bordered the southern field. 

Two berms, one to the east and one near the bend in the trail, were the only 

terrain features on otherwise flat open spaces. To the west ran a north-tosouth wall, protecting several compounds. The men had just turned west 

on the trail when insurgents opened fire with rifles and machine guns from 

behind the southern wall. The Americans dove for cover and returned fire. 
44

Figure 11. 3d Platoon, Charlie Company fights an ambush.

Source: author/CSI generated

Bobbitt ordered his 3d Squad forward to establish a base of fire and 

deployed the rest of his men to gain fire superiority. Sergeant First Class 

Andrew Munch, the platoon sergeant, bounded forward with a fire team 

and a machinegun team. The fire team consisted of Staff Sergeant Kenneth 

Weiss, Sergeant Joe Griffin, SAW gunner Specialist Tyler Walshe, and 

rifleman Specialist Brandon Sloan while the gun team consisted of Sergeant 

Jarrett Brown and Private First Class Thomas Hill, the 240B machine 

gunner. The two teams headed to the eastern berm, laying down covering 

fire as they went. Along the way, heat exhaustion overwhelmed Specialist 

Hill. Sergeant Brown grabbed Hill’s 240B and fired at the enemy while 
45

carrying the fatigued Hill forward. “He was basically dragging [Hill] 

with him and shooting at the same time,” recalled Staff Sergeant Nikola 

Tersiev.14 Once at the berm, the two teams focused their fire at the muzzle 

flashes across the 200-meter field, while Hill fired Brown’s M4. The berm 

offered little protection. “[Brown’s] gun team was probably the most 

exposed,” recalled Weiss, “just because they were on that little mound.”15

As the two sides exchanged fire, Specialist Sloan aimed an AT-4 rocket 

at a PKM machine gun firing from across the field. He pressed the trigger 

but the weapon did not fire as he had forgotten to pull the safety pin. 

Sergeant Weiss reached over and pulled it out for him and then checked to 

make sure the back blast area was clear. While Weiss put his hands over 

his ears, Sloan pushed the trigger again. This time the round blasted out of 

the tube and exploded on the PKM position, killing its crew.16

Bobbitt tried to call for air support and artillery but the dense orchard 

interfered with communications. As the enemy fired from three sides—

west, south, and east—Bobbitt realized he had few options for maneuver, 

“unless we wanted to just run straight at them through a 200-meter bound 

in an open field,” he later explained, which would only result in American 

casualties.17 After 20 minutes of intense fighting, Bobbitt made a tough 

decision. He ran over to his squad leaders and told each of them, “Hey, 

we’ve got to break contact.”18

While Munch, Brown, and Hill remained at the berm providing 

suppressive fire, the fire team and the rest of the platoon headed back 

north. Weiss and Bobbitt were discussing the situation when enemy rounds 

smacked into some nearby pomegranate trees, showering both men with 

tree bark. They looked at each other and dropped to one knee. “Wow! 

That’s pretty close,” said Weiss.19 The men continued to move back until 

they found a metal door in the western wall. They hoped it might lead them 

to a better position. “We just broke it and went through into a compound,” 

recalled Tersiev.20 As the men passed through the compound, they noticed 

a woman holding a baby, oblivious to the fighting around her. From this 

surreal scene, the men passed through another door on the opposite side of 

the compound and headed south to a wall but there was no alternate exit 

from the battlefield so the men returned to the path. 

With the platoon pulling out, Sergeant Weiss ran back to retrieve the 

gun team. Fortunately, there was a lull in the fighting. “Hey, we gotta go!” 

he told Munch, Brown, and Hill.21 The men were so exhausted that he had 

to help them to their feet. Seeing their withdrawal, the enemy opened fire 

but the men quickly returned suppressive fire and were able to successfully 

rejoin the platoon. 
46

The platoon then headed north through pomegranate orchards until 

Bobbitt ordered a security halt. The men took a knee and faced out. Some 

drank water while others just caught their breath or used the break to 

develop the situation. “To use Ranger school doctrine,” explained Bobbitt, 

“it was a place to conduct SLLS (Stop, Look, Listen and Smell).”22 A 

Kiowa helicopter arrived on station and Bobbitt contacted the pilot. During 

the initial contact, when Bobbitt could not raise anyone on his radio, the 

Stryker crews that had dropped off his platoon received his signals and 

relayed them to Captain Kassulke who had requested the air support. 

Sergeant First Class Munch now popped smoke to signal the platoon’s 

position to the helicopter. The halt over, the men stood up and resumed 

their march to the road leading back to the district center. As the platoon 

moved north in a staggered formation, a single shot rang out from the 

west followed by small arms fire from a tree line. “[I] could actually see 

at least five or ten muzzle blasts about five seconds after that first round,” 

said Tersiev.23 Bobbitt maneuvered his men to a piece of high ground some 

300 meters above the enemy position and opened fire. He then contacted 

the Kiowa helicopter which made two gun runs on the enemy position. “It 

felt like [it] was right on top of us,” recalled Bobbitt, “it was close.”24 The 

Kiowa’s gun runs, combined with the platoon’s fire, neutralized the enemy 

squad-sized force. By the time the platoon returned to the district center, 

many of the men needed IVs to replenish their fluids.25

While there were no confirmed kills, Sergeant First Class Munch 

believed Private First Class Sloane’s AT-4 shot killed between three and 

five insurgents, while the second ambush resulted in at least nine killed or 

mortally wounded. The enemy removed their dead and wounded from the 

battlefield before the platoon could conduct any battle damage assessment. 

Throughout the day’s action, Lieutenant Bobbitt felt his men performed 

well—immediately finding cover, returning fire, and listening to their 

leaders. “They did what was expected of them and instinctively reacted 

from what they learned in training.26

Bobbitt also learned an important lesson. Prior to the engagement, 

the ANP had stressed to him that orchards were the equivalent to an 

American’s backyard. Trying to be culturally sensitive, he kept his men 

on trails, which allowed the enemy to track his platoon’s movements and 

establish an ambush position. Afterwards, Bobbitt always moved through 

orchards. “After that firefight I made the decision that I would never 

sacrifice my platoon down a trail and we would always go through the 

orchards when patrolling.”27
47

Deadly IED in Shah Wali Kot

While Bobbitt’s platoon fought in the Arghandab that day of 25 

August, Lieutenant Colonel Neumann decided to send Captain Hallett’s 

Alpha Company south to the Arghandab Valley and replace it in the Shah 

Wali Kot with Captain Glonek’s Hatchet Company. When Glonek met 

with Hallett to review the relief in place, Hallett told him he was on his 

way there to check out a reported cholera outbreak and invited him along 

to see the route. Eight Strykers and an MRAP rolled out of FOB Frontenac, 

headed for the Shah Wali Kot District Center. Included in Hallett’s Stryker 

were the battalion’s Physician Assistant (PA), Captain Cory Jenkins, and 

Sergeant First Class Ronald Sawyer as medic. Along the way, the convoy 

crossed over several culverts beneath the road. Denial systems—metal 

grates—were in place on many of the culverts to prevent the enemy from 

placing bombs underneath the road, but Glonek, riding in the MRAP, did 

not notice any on this part of the route. “Do you see any denial systems 

on any of the culverts?” Glonek asked his gunner, who said he did not.28

Glonek thought it odd but knew that Alpha Company had been using the 

route for a couple of weeks. 

At the district center, the Americans toured the local medical facility, 

where doctors and staff explained the outbreak and how their own 

government had not provided them any needed medication. Hallett knew 

he was not supposed to give the locals any medical supplies, but when 

he saw the staff’s desperation, he told his medics, “go out and get that 

medication.”29 When they brought him the supplies, he turned it all over to 

the staff telling them, “We’re not just here to give you a few promises, we 

really want to help out.”30

With the situation assessed and aid provided, the Americans loaded 

onto their Strykers and departed the facility. The convoy split into two 

elements for the drive back, each with five vehicles. The first element 

included Captain Glonek in the second vehicle and Hallett in the third. Their 

column had driven approximately five kilometers south from the district 

center when an IED detonated under Hallett’s Stryker. The powerful blast 

threw the rear of the Stryker into the air, completely flipping the vehicle. 

“It was a massive hit,” explained Glonek, who watched the explosion from 

his MRAP’s side-view mirror.31 The column halted and Glonek established 

a security perimeter while several soldiers ran to the overturned Stryker 

which had started to burn. 

First Sergeant Eugene Hicks jumped out of his vehicle and raced to 

Hallett’s Stryker calling, “Get a stretcher! Get extinguishers!”32 Hicks 
48

entered the rear of the burning Stryker and pulled out the company’s 

Afghan interpreter, who seemed unharmed. He then saw a Soldier named 

Pannell climbing towards him, so he grabbed him by his vest and pulled 

him out. Hicks could see that Captain Jenkins, the PA, was dead, hanging 

upside down in his seatbelt, so he called for Captain Hallett but got no 

response. Fire started to spread within the vehicle. Staff Sergeant Jorge 

Banuelos joined Hicks and the two men crawled into the Stryker, trying to 

cut Sergeant First Class Sawyer out of his seat. Just then ammunition began 

cooking off inside the vehicle. Hicks ordered everyone out. Killed inside 

were Captains Hallett and Jenkins, along with Sawyer, and the Stryker’s 

driver, Private First Class Dennis Williams. Pannell and the interpreter 

survived but were seriously injured.33

As flames engulfed the Stryker, Glonek called for a MEDEVAC and 

requested fire extinguishers with the QRF. First Sergeant Hicks spotted 

the suspected triggerman hiding behind a rock hut. An Apache helicopter 

arrived on station and Hicks called the TOC and received an order to fire. 

The pilot fired a missile at the hut, destroying it and killing the triggerman. 

The men then cleared a helicopter landing zone (HLZ) and a MEDEVAC 

flew out the wounded.34

When Lieutenant Colonel Neumann arrived on the scene with the 

QRF, Glonek took him aside and told him who was in the Stryker. “I was 

just looking at this Stryker that’s just absolutely one big ball of flames,” 

recalled Neumann, “and then it registered to me what a terrible situation it 

was.”35 Neumann told Glonek to sweep the area. One of Glonek’s scouts 

found the command wire that led to the IED and followed it to a tent in a 

nearby nomad campsite. Glonek found bomb parts inside the tent but no 

evidence of the enemy.36 The QRF assisted in other ways. Master Sergeant 

Mark Hamil, the battalion operations sergeant major, noticed that Hicks 

was visibly shaken, so he helped him maintain his composure. “I knew he 

was hurting, I knew he was struggling,” explained Hamil. Hicks had been 

the company’s first sergeant for less than six months. Hamil, who had been 

the company’s first sergeant before him, spoke to as many men as he could, 

making sure they were all right and refocusing on their responsibilities.37

Captain Glonek later reflected on the accuracy of the attack. He 

realized that the enemy knew that American commanders always rode in 

the middle of the column. “The best guess if you don’t know,” Glonek 

explained, “[is to] hit one of the vehicles in the middle, there might be 

somebody really important in there.”38 Major O’Connor felt that the 

IED was retaliation for Hallett’s success at Buyana. The incident also 

recalibrated the Soldiers’ understanding of their Strykers’ protection. No 
49

Soldier had been lost inside a Stryker in Iraq but Afghanistan presented a 

much more lethal set of challenges.39

The QRF stayed overnight, protecting the burned Stryker until an 

Angel Flight—a helicopter used for removing fallen Soldiers—and 

recovery vehicles could arrive the next morning. Captain Swift’s scout 

platoon set up a bypass to allow local traffic flow around the Stryker. 

Around midnight, a small convoy of trucks approached from the south 

and stopped approximately 800 meters away. Swift saw a sports utility 

vehicle pull up behind the trucks and men moving around. “It looked pretty 

shady,” he recalled.40 Swift continued to monitor the situation until he got 

word from one of his Soldiers using a Stryker’s Long-Range Advanced 

Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3) that one of the men had an IED. As 

Swift tried to figure out who it was, the man suddenly blew himself up. 

“He screwed up,” explained Swift.41

The blast wounded three other men, who had now revealed themselves 

as insurgents. A scout opened fire with a Stryker-mounted .50-caliber 

machine gun for about three minutes, then Swift led his snipers to the 

trucks while the insurgents dragged bodies into cars and drove away. “We 

found all of the blood trails,” said Swift. “We found their shoes, [and] 

pieces of the guy that blew himself up.”42 They also discovered holes the 

enemy had drilled into the road to place mortar shells. Swift and his men 

felt like they had gotten a little payback for their fallen comrades. “We 

were pretty happy,” Swift explained, “thinking that we had possibly gotten 

the guys that had done it.”43

After the election and its aftermath, Lieutenant Colonel Neumann 

realized that his battalion was not up against some 30 to 40 insurgents in 

the Arghandab River Valley but an estimated 300. He also realized that 

the Shah Wali Kot was not an infiltration route into the Arghandab and 

then into Kandahar but that the Arghandab was itself an insurgent base. 

The thick vegetation provided cover and concealment where insurgents 

could operate free from Coalition interference. “They couldn’t be seen 

from the air,” explained Neumann. “They could move freely and get away 

with it.”44 In fact, the Taliban had reinforced and entrenched its position 

in the Arghandab months before the Buffalos arrived, moving additional 

forces to the area and sending foreign fighters to train locals in IED 

manufacturing.45 To secure the area, Neumann realized, the enemy would 

have to be forced out of his well-entrenched safe havens. Fortunately, he 

and his brigade commander had been developing an operation that would 

achieve exactly this outcome.46
50

Notes

1. Captain Zachary Osborne, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 April 2012, 22, 23, 27; Captain 

Brian Zangenburg, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 April 2012, 19.

2. Master Sergeant Troy Faver, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 September 2012, 25.

3. Osborne, interview, 24 April 2012, 29, 30, 31; Attu Company, 1-17 

IN, group interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 22 March 2012, 75.

4. A/1-17, group interview, 77.

5. A/1-17, group interview, 78; Faver, interview, 27, 28.

6. Sergeant First Class James Knowler, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 22 March 2012, 17.

7. Fadden, interview, 16, 19, 20, 21; Knowler, interview, 19.

8. Zangenburg, interview, 18; Captain Matthew Quiggle, interview by 

Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 April 

2012, 8.

9. Zangenburg, interview, 21, 22, 23.

10. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

11. Colonel Jonathan Neumann, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 April 2012, 33, 34.

12. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in 

Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 234, 235.

13. Neumann, interview, 39, 40.

14. Charlie Company, 1-17 IN, group interview by Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 March, 2012, 11.

15. Staff Sergeant Kenneth Weiss, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 July 2012, 13.

16. Weiss, interview, 19.

17. Captain Joshua Bobbitt, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 March 2012, 6.

18. Weiss, interview, 29.

19. Weiss, interview, 28.

20. C/1-17, group interview, 12.

21. Weiss, interview, 28.

22. Captain Joshua Bobbitt, e-mail to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 December 2012.
51

23. C/1-17, interview, 16.

24. Bobbitt, interview, 11.

25. Bobbitt, interview, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12; Weiss, interview, 35; Captain 

Joshua Bobbitt, e-mail to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 19 July 2012.

26. Bobbitt, e-mail, 19 July 2012; Captain Joshua Bobbitt, e-mail to Kevin 

M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 December 2012.

27. Bobbitt, e-mail, 17 December 2012.

28. Major Joshua Glonek, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 May 2012, 14.

29. Glonek, interview, 54.

30. Glonek, interview, 54.

31. Glonek, interview, 17; First Sergeant Eugene Hicks, interview by 

Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 April 

2012, 19.

32. Hicks, interview, 19.

33. Glonek, interview, 18, 22; Attu Company, 1-17, group interview by 

Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 March 

2012, 36. “9 Fort Lewis Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan in 2 Weeks,” Kirotv.com, 

2 September, 2009. http://www.kirotv.com/news/news/9-fort-lewis-soldierskilled-in-afghanistan-in-2-w/nKT9n/

34. Glonek, interview, 19, 24; Hicks, interview, 24; Major Ryan O’Conner, 

interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

8 August 12, 40, 41.

35. Neumann, interview, 48.

36. Neumann, interview, 48, 49; Glonek, interview, 24.

37. Master Sergeant Hamil, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 April 2012, 23, 24; Benjamin 

Tupper, Greetings From Afghanistan, Send More Ammo: Dispatches from 

Taliban Country (New York: NAL Caliber, 2010) 73.

38. Glonek, interview, 27.

39. Major Ryan O’Conner, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 April 2012, 25, 26.

40. Captain Adam Swift, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 April 2012, 20.

41. Swift, interview, 20.

42. Swift, interview, 21.
52

43. Swift, interview, 23.

44. Neumann, interview, 113.

45. Carl Forsberg, The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar (Washington, 

DC: The Institute for the Study of War, 2009) 54.

46. Neumann, interview, 111, 112, 113.
53

Chapter 4

OPPORTUNITY HOLD

Establishing a Foothold in the Arghandab

During the elections, Colonel Tunnell and his staff began planning 

an operation designed to seize the initiative from the enemy. That 

operation, called OPPORTUNITY HOLD, was a brigade-level action 

with two objectives: establish two permanent combat outposts and gather 

information on the enemy. Neumann’s battalion would be the main effort, 

clearing the west bank of the Arghandab River from Babur to Shuyen-e 

Olya, covering the same areas where he had lost Tom and Yanney. In the 

town Shuyen-e Sofla south of Shuyen-e Olya, his men would establish the 

first outpost.1

While Neumann’s men combed through this area, Lieutenant Colonel 

Jeffrey French’s 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry (2-1 IN), known as Task Force 

Legion, would keep the enemy busy to the southwest. French’s battalion 

would attack from Nagahan, southwest of the Arghandab District Center, 

and drive northeast along the Arghandab River, disrupting the enemy south 

of the 1-17 IN’s AO and preventing the insurgents from reinforcing their 

counterparts under assault by the Buffalos’ main effort. They would also 

establish the second outpost south of the town Khosrow-e Olya.2

 With the 

two new outposts, Neumann would have a solid foothold in the Arghandab 

Valley while the intelligence gathering would help isolate the insurgent 

sanctuaries from the district government and population if they tried to 

return.

On Neumann’s recommendation, Colonel Tunnell chose Captain 

Mike Kovalsky to replace Hallett as the commander of Alpha Company. 

Kovalsky was relatively new to the brigade and junior to many other 

captains, but as the assistant operations officer for the battalion and a battle 

captain, he had participated in planning OPPORTUNITY HOLD. “He 

knew the plan better than anybody,” said Major Jennings.3

 Kovalsky, who 

had served two previous tours in Iraq, introduced himself to the men of 

Alpha Company by explaining that he was proud to serve with them but it 

was obviously not the way he wanted to assume command. He concluded 

by telling them he would do everything in his power to defeat the enemy 

and make them pay for killing Captain Hallett and the three others who 

died in his Stryker.4

For the first phase of OPPORTUNITY HOLD, Neumann planned 

for Bravo Company to advance out of COP Jelawur and proceed to the 

town of Babur, four kilometers to the northwest between Route RED 
54

DOG and the Arghandab River. Charlie Company, the main effort, would 

follow Bravo and pass through it at Babur, then proceed to clear northeast 

through the villages of Shuyen-e Sofla, Shuyen-e Vosta, and Shuyen-e 

Olya, in that order. At the same time, Alpha Company would advance 

southwest from FOB Frontenac, drive through the desert then pivot east 

to serve as a blocking force against any enemy trying to flee west from 

the advancing Bravo and Charlie companies. Alpha would be the anvil to 

Bravo and Charlie companies’ hammer. As the brigade’s main effort, 1-17 

IN received Captain Mathew Quiggle’s Alpha Troop from 8th Squadron, 

1st Cavalry (8-1 CAV), to screen the east bank of the Arghandab River. 

Neumann knew the enemy had sewn IEDs along Route RED DOG, 

expecting his forces to use the road and then approach from the west. 

He hoped that by approaching the villages from the southeast, he would 

surprise the insurgents.5

With the cavalry troop acting as the battalion’s eyes and ears, Neumann 

placed his scouts near Checkpoint 18, an ANP station at a bridge over the 

Arghandab River on Route BEAR approximately 11 kilometers north of 

Babur (see Figure 12). The checkpoint stood astride one of the enemy’s 

main infiltration/exfiltration lanes into the Arghandab River Valley where 

insurgents attacked the ANP almost nightly. Neumann tasked the scouts 

with providing early warning and possible target acquisition.6

On the morning of 28 August, Alpha Company, now under Captain 

Kovalsky, along with Captain Quiggle’s Alpha Troop, departed FOB 

Frontenac. Alpha Company raced south through the desert, driving parallel 

to, but west of, Route RED DOG, then crossed the road and arrived north 

of Shuyen-e Olya, setting up blocking positions.7

 Alpha Troop set up on 

the opposite side of Babur in the Arghandab River. “[The riverbed] offered 

great mobility,” Quiggle explained, “and initially it was dry.”8 Where 

there was water, it was split into numerous channels and sandbars for 

easy travel. Quiggle sent some of his troops up a hill, where they watched 

Alpha Company cut across the desert.9
55

Figure 12. Operation OPPORTUNITY HOLD, the push north, advancing on 

Babur.

Source: author/CSI generated
56

Bravo Company’s morning advance started off poorly. As Lieutenant 

Ryan Fadden’s 1st Platoon drove through the desert toward Route RED 

DOG, the men noticed a mother with a baby and two children, ages six 

and ten, walking south along the route. The family was about 200 meters 

away when one of them stepped on an IED. The explosion tore through 

the whole family. Soldiers quickly dismounted their Strykers and raced to 

help. The blast badly lacerated the mother’s face and left shrapnel wounds 

in her baby’s arms, legs, and head. Staff Sergeant Prince took the baby to 

the medical evacuation Stryker, where he wiped dirt out of its mouth and 

gave it water.10 Fadden tried to put a tourniquet on the six-year-old who 

had lost both arms. The tourniquet was too big but that was unimportant. 

“The heat of the blast had immediately cauterized the wound,” recalled 

Fadden.11

Figure 13. A Stryker delivers supplies across the Arghandab River in southern 

Afghanistan.

Photo courtesy of Major Ryan O’Connor, US Army

When Sergeant James Knowler saw the medic doing a poor job of 

applying a tourniquet on the ten-year-old boy, he shoved the medic aside 

and did it himself. The boy’s right leg had been ripped open but that wound 

had also cauterized. Knowler placed the tourniquet as high as he could, but 

as he picked up the boy, he noticed severe lacerations in the boy’s right 

shoulder and a fractured arm. Knowler put another tourniquet underneath 

the boy’s armpit, and pulled tight. “I could hear his shoulder breaking, I 
57

was squeamish” he recalled but he had to stop the bleeding. Staff Sergeant 

Kenneth Rickman encouraged him, “You got it.”12 Knowler continued to 

tightened the tourniquet and the bleeding stopped. 

As the troops assisted the family to the medical evacuation Stryker, 

Captain Pope reported the casualties. Fadden’s men set up a security 

perimeter and searched the blast area, picking up body parts. Thinking 

that the village elders might blame the Americans, Pope then ordered his 

men to take pictures of the wounded so the elders would know of what the 

Taliban were responsible. The woman’s husband arrived and the Soldiers 

explained what happened. When the MEDEVAC helicopter landed, they 

permitted the husband to depart with his family. Despite the severity of the 

wounds, the entire family survived. The incident confirmed for Lieutenant 

Colonel Neumann the existence of an IED belt along Route RED DOG.13

The civilian casualties delayed Bravo Company approximately 90 

minutes and slowed Pope’s approach to Babur. Having previously lost 

Soldiers to IEDs, he wanted to make sure his men advanced cautiously. 

During their dismounted movement into the Green Zone, the men stayed 

off trails, forded canals, and breached walls until another casualty slowed 

Pope’s progress. His Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) noncommissioned Officer (NCO) went down with heat exhaustion in the 

130-degree heat. Pope sent him to the rear with an escort. “So I lose my 

EOD team right off the bat,” he later related.14

Figure 14. Bravo Company Soldiers enter a typical pomegranate orchard in the 

Arghandab’s Green Zone.

Photo courtesy of Major James Pope, US Army
58

As Bravo and Charlie companies pushed north, Alpha Company 

intercepted military-aged males streaming through their location in the 

desert. There were no women and children. Almost every male they 

encountered wore sneakers, a telltale sign that they were Taliban fighters 

(most civilian males wore sandals). The Soldiers detained anyone with 

more than one cell phone, put them in flex-cuffs, and handed them over to 

a human intelligence (HUMINT) unit for questioning. The detained men 

almost always claimed to be simple farmers.15 The Soldiers also scanned 

the faces, eyes, and fingerprints of military-aged males with biometric 

recording equipment to discover if the individuals had previously been 

identified as insurgents. However, the devices were not perfect, finding 

some of the detainees to be likely insurgents but unable to confirm that 

identification. One man tested positive for explosives but the test proved 

inconclusive because it could not differentiate between fertilizer and 

explosives so the Soldiers let him pass.16 Similarly, Alpha Troop posted 

in the shallow river, intercepted old men and women along with children. 

Many were in cars or on motorcycles, some accompanied by their 

livestock. The cavalry soldiers worked with local ANP and a HUMINT 

team but they gathered little useful information. Most claimed that the 

Taliban had come into their houses and demanded their food. “We don’t 

want them here,” they told the Americans.17

The Buffalos used every possible asset during the operation. To try to 

draw the enemy out of the orchards, Sergeant First Class Stephen Muzchka, 

the electronic warfare NCO, worked with the battalion intelligence officer 

to create messages insulting the enemy’s fighting ability. They gave them 

to pilots to broadcast while flying over the battlefield. “So instead of hiding 

in the orchards, [we hoped] they would actually fight us because they’d be 

so mad,” explained Muzchka, “and that’s when we’d overwhelm [them] 

with superior firepower.” Muzchka made at least 50 recordings during the 

operation but the enemy never took the bait.18

As Bravo Company pushed toward Babur, the enemy shadowed 

the Soldiers and reported their positions to their superiors on hand-held 

radios. The Americans engaged the elusive enemy wherever they could. 

“We showed them it’s not a good idea to get close,” explained Lieutenant 

Boirum.19 By 1600, Lieutenant Fadden’s platoon reached the outskirts of 

the village and began clearance operations, during which his men found 

huge caches of RPGs. Charlie Company, behind Bravo, pushed briskly 

north in the thick of the Green Zone. Captain Kassulke, concerned that 

his men could be easily ambushed, wanted to get them to a defensible 

position before the sun set. Pope’s men, seeing movement behind them 
59

and having monitored enemy communications, opened fire, assuming 

they were Taliban. “Cease fire!” Pope called out, realizing they were firing 

on Charlie Company.20 Fortunately, no one was injured and Kassulke’s 

company spent the night in a small wadi south of Babur.21

Clearing to the North

The next day, 29 August, Bravo and Charlie companies experienced 

more confusion in the thick vegetation. A CH-47 Chinook helicopter 

flew in to drop pallets of water for Bravo Company but the pilot had 

communications trouble and ended up dropping the supplies close to 

Charlie. Not knowing Charlie Company’s exact location, soldiers from 

Lieutenant Fadden’s platoon worked their way to the pallets and saw 

movement in the bushes. They fired two grenades at the threat before 

realizing the other men were their comrades. Fortunately, like the day 

before, no one was injured.22

The two friendly fire incidents infuriated Lieutenant Colonel Neumann. 

He felt he had provided substantial instructions and clear control measures 

for the two companies to advance in close proximity to each other but the 

company commanders had become accustomed to operating independently. 

In the operation, they had not maintained situational awareness outside 

their units and had not adjusted fire control measures accordingly. Almost 

immediately after the incidents, Neumann provided very accurate and 

restrictive control measures, forcing both Pope and Kassulke to use icons 

on their Land Warrior Systems to mark their locations. Neumann also had 

Pope draw an updated company boundary between the two companies. 

Finally, Neumann ordered both commanders to verbally confirm their 

locations to the TAC. After the two incidents he avoided, whenever 

possible, moving his companies in such close proximity. Neumann took 

responsibility for both incidents. “It was a battalion-level operation and 

my fault for not ensuring this type of incident didn’t happen.”23

Pope’s men spent the next two days clearing the deserted town of Babur. 

They preceded their entry into buildings with explosives to detonate any 

IEDs. The crater where Berschinski lost his legs served as a grim reminder 

of the importance of finding every IED. One Soldier tried to break down 

a gate by firing a grenade at it but the round caromed off the metal, soared 

high and landed near an engineer Stryker in Alpha Company’s AO. Seeing 

the round land, Sergeant First Class Bobby Ciman walked over to some 

engineers and told them, “You might want to come take care of this.”24

The men often waded through canals. “The insurgents can’t waterproof 

IEDs,” explained Pope.25 The treks through the chest-deep, stagnant water 
60

were not pleasant. “[It was] just nasty, smells and got crabs,” said Sergeant 

Prince, “[but] it feels pretty good when its 130 degrees outside.”26 The men 

also carried small ladders to climb over walls. To breach walls quietly, the 

men used a Halligan bar, or as they called it, a “hooligan bar” or “hooli 

tool”—a crow-bar like device to separate the bricks in walls. Because 

they did not have mine clearing line charges (MICLICs), which were fired 

into mine fields and then detonated to destroy any buried IEDs, the men 

created their own by tying one end of detonating cord—a thin plastic tube 

packed with explosives—around a rock, then throwing the rock as far as 

possible down a path with the cord trailing behind like a tethered kite. 

After detonating the cord and allowing the dust to clear, the men would 

check for pressure plates.27

Figure 15. Bravo Company Soldiers traverse a canal in the Arghandab River 

Valley.

Photo courtesy of Major James Pope, US Army

On the night of 30 August, Bravo Company occupied a compound 

in Babur when Pope received a message from Charlie Company that 

personnel with weapons were heading in his direction. From their rooftop 

positions, some of Pope’s men spotted figures approaching. First Sergeant 

Tony Holcomb jumped up and opened fire. The enemy was so close that 

some of Pope’s men were throwing hand grenades from their machine-gun 

posts. Pope contacted Captain Eric Livengood, the battalion fire support 
61

officer, and requested support from his company 120mm mortars against 

the insurgents. However, when he reported the target, Livengood told 

Pope he needed to clear the air space first. Pope did not see anything in 

the sky above. “We’re in contact right now, people are shooting at us, and 

we’re shooting at them,” he told Livengood.28 Neumann’s staff questioned 

Pope’s need for mortars. “[Pope is] in a firefight at 75 meters [from the 

enemy] in the orchards,” Major O’Connor, who was with Livengood, later 

said, “Everyone’s in covered and concealed positions. They’re using small 

arms. Why do you feel the need to call in 120 mm mortars?”29

From Pope’s perspective, the skies were clear and the enemy was 

close, so he decided to open fire without the battalion’s permission. The 

mortars came streaking in but landed in a flooded field and failed to 

detonate. The men only heard a sucking sound. Pope then called for a 

high explosive round with a proximity fuse, which would detonate with 

an air burst. The round exploded on the opposite side of a wall 75 meters 

from Pope’s position. “We’re danger close,” Pope explained, “but I’ve 

got numerous mud walls in between us.”30 Even so, shrapnel flew over 

the men’s heads. The rounds ended the engagement. Pope later found out 

that the mortars had killed at least one insurgent. The incident taught two 

important lessons: proximity fuses worked best in the Arghandab and that 

mortars ended contacts quickly. Staff Sergeant Kyle Crump defended the 

need for mortars, saying, “We all knew we couldn’t catch the Taliban on 

foot, or really maneuver effectively in that mess, in that heat, with all that 

[equipment] on.”31

While Pope’s men cleared Babur, Kassulke’s men passed through 

Bravo Company and cleared north through to Shuyen-e Sofla and Shuyen-e 

Vosta. Like Babur, the Shuyen-e villages were ghost towns. Kassulke’s 

men also stayed off trails and breached holes in walls in random places. 

“You never take the easy way,” explained Lieutenant Bobbitt of 3d Platoon, 

“you don’t ever do that.”32 In Shuyen-e Sofla, Kassulke’s men cleared a 

compound that would become one of the two new combat outposts, later 

named Brick Two.

While Pope and Kassulke cleared their empty towns, Captain 

Kovalsky pushed Alpha Company into Shuyen-e Olya. What he and his 

men found surprised them. “Families and kids were playing in the river,” 

said Kovalsky, “just splashing around, having a good time.”33 The children 

were a good omen. The men knew if something bad were going to happen, 

the children would have been evacuated from the area. The Soldiers, 

however, did not hand out anything to the kids. Lieutenant Osborne did 

not allow it. “We didn’t give out candy to the kids, because that can be 
62

counterproductive, for them and for us,” Osborne later explained. “It can 

potentially put them in danger.”34 The men met with the village elders 

who were not happy with the Americans’ presence. They did not want to 

be in the middle of a war zone. The Soldiers searched the village and a 

pomegranate orchard but found nothing.35

Clearing the Shuyen-e Villages

On the morning of 31 August, Captain Kassulke’s 3d Platoon, led 

by Lieutenant Bobbitt, patrolled down a pomegranate orchard trail in 

Shuyen-e Sofla when the troops found a hole in a wall. Supposing the 

ANA ahead of them had blown it, the Soldiers decided to go through. The 

first man passed with no trouble but as Specialist Tyler Walshe climbed 

through, he was engulfed in an explosion. Bobbitt immediately set up a 

perimeter but the enemy did not fire. The men searched the 10-foot wide 

crater for Walshe and found his body 75 meters away. An engineer element 

moving with Charlie Company cleared the area, ensuring there were no 

other IEDs.

Later that day, as the sun sank on the horizon, Bobbitt’s Platoon 

finished clearing the town while Lieutenant Brian Giroux’s 2d Platoon 

maneuvered to link up with him. Giroux’s 3d Squad found itself walking 

through an area they had been through repeatedly. The men’s Land Warrior 

system had failed, leaving them literally in the dark, even though they 

knew they were close to Bobbitt’s patrol base where they were scheduled 

to link up. Knowing that the enemy emplaced IEDs where the Americans 

had recently passed, Staff Sergeant William Taylor ordered the men to 

start back and find a different angle of approach. At that moment, Private 

First Class Jordon Brochu stepped on an IED. The blast tore off Brochu’s 

legs and an arm. It also killed Specialist Jonathan D. Welch, who was 

walking near Brochu. Four other soldiers were wounded.36

Those not wounded, began treating their comrades. Canadian medics 

attached to the platoon rushed over and applied tourniquets to Brochu’s 

wounds and gave him CPR as Sergeant Julian Galaz, the company senior 

medic, went from soldier to soldier monitoring their conditions. The blast 

was so powerful that debris landed near Captain Kassulke, 100 meters to 

the rear, who ran to the scene. Giroux requested a MEDEVAC helicopter 

while Staff Sergeant Jason Chase crossed a canal and set up a HLZ but 

Brochu died before the MEDEVAC arrived. The four other wounded men 

survived, thanks to the efforts of Galaz and the efficient Canadian medics.

Giroux and his men spent hours dealing with the deadly situation. When it 

was over, they continued their patrol, although the day’s casualties left the 
63

men of Charlie Company shaken. “We took care of our fallen and then we 

drove on with our operation,” said Kassulke. “No matter how bad things 

got for us, we knew there was always the next part of the mission.”37

Lieutenant Colonel Neumann and part of his TAC showed up while 

the wounded were evacuated. Neumann reassured the men that, despite 

their losses, they were doing everything that needed to be done on the 

objective and for their fallen comrades. He also shared the battalion’s IED 

threat assessment. The enemy had prepared multi-layered ambush sites 

and anti-personnel IEDs along the orchard-edge of the villages in hopes of 

drawing the Americans in after penetrating the anti-vehicle IED belt along 

RED DOG. Neumann then told Kassulke to assume every orchard-side 

entrance to a compound and every footbridge over a canal that bordered 

an orchard was mined. He wanted to make sure Kassulke understood the 

enemy’s intent. “For small units on the ground it’s sometimes hard to look 

past the individual blast sites (which can seem very random) and see the 

bigger template of the enemy methods,” Neumann later explained.38

Scout Operations at Checkpoint 18

On 1 September, while the Buffalo’s rifle companies cleared Babur 

and the Shuyen-e villages, the battalion scouts departed FOB Frontenac 

in three Strykers for their mission of setting up observation posts at 

Checkpoint 18, where they would provide early warning and possible 

target acquisition for the battalion. Hoping to avoid IEDs, the scouts drove 

through the desert and approached the bridge from the west as the sun 

set. Three miles from the bridge, the men witnessed a firefight between 

the ANP and insurgents in a pomegranate orchard. Captain Swift reported 

the contact to Lieutenant Colonel Neumann then stopped his Strykers to 

monitor the engagement.39

The scouts watched the engagement for 90 minutes until they detected 

four individuals walking back and forth along RED DOG, approximately 

1,000 meters away. One had a RPG slung over his shoulder, another 

carried a weapon. They seemed to be carrying equipment from a house. 

Some of the men were goose stepping, possibly measuring distances. 

Staff Sergeant Isaik Matheson volunteered to get closer on foot. He led 

two sniper teams out of their Stryker, across several wadis and crawled 

to a spot 200 meters from the men. Using the night-vision scopes on their 

rifles, they could clearly see the men were planting an IED. Swift radioed 

them, “I’m going to consider this PID (positive identification). He’s got 

a weapon, he’s putting in an IED. If you can get a shot, you take it.”40

Neumann, who had been monitoring the situation, came on line. “Roger 

PID, engage if you can.”41
64

Neumann gave the order to engage to relieve Swift of having his 

decision later questioned. Neumann was concerned that his subordinate 

commanders, after making a tough call that could be later called into 

question, might second guess themselves, or worse, waste precious time in 

a future firefight unnecessarily weighing options while their Soldiers were 

at risk. “I wanted them to know I trusted their judgment and was ready to 

back them up.” Neumann’s situational awareness also helped him override 

any of the ground commanders’ emotions at the point of an engagement. 

The activity confirmed Neumann’s intelligence that the enemy had been 

active at Checkpoint 18 for the past month. “I knew immediately they 

needed to engage.”42

It took three minutes for the snipers to set up their shots using the 

buddy method, resting their rifles on their spotters’ shoulders. Three shots 

popped off and three men went down. The fourth man ran back into the 

house. The snipers remained in place, waiting for him to return and drag 

away his comrades. As they waited, the firefight in the distance tapered 

off. “Whoever was playing was done for the night,” Swift later said.43 He 

ordered the snipers back to the Strykers, telling them they would try to find 

another location to overwatch the area. As Staff Sergeant Matheson’s team 

disengaged, the enemy opened up with machine guns from the orchard. 

The snipers bounded back, returning fire as tracers whipped by their legs. 

The Strykers raced forward, closing the gap with the snipers while laying 

down suppressing fire with two .50-caliber machine guns, two Mk-19 

grenade launchers, and four M-240 machine guns. “The more firepower 

we put down on them, the more would come back at us,” recalled Private 

First Class Joshua Seaver. 44 Rounds ricocheted off the Strykers as they 

braked and dropped their ramps. The snipers climbed aboard.

While the Strykers pulled out, a RPG sailed overhead. The men stopped 

firing their weapons so the enemy could not track them but the insurgents 

continued to fire RPGs as the vehicles drove away. The rounds were so 

close that some of the men suspected that the enemy possessed nightvision devices.45 The Strykers headed north to the village of Damaneh, 

five kilometers away along Route RED DOG where the men reloaded 

their weapons and reorganized. They were excited with their success and 

gave each other high-fives. The platoon then headed south again, taking 

a different path, and set up in a different location. For an hour, the scouts 

monitored the road with their LRAS3, then witnessed two men walk out of 

an orchard and begin digging in the road. They were three kilometers away, 

too far to engage. So Swift contacted two Kiowa Warriors. The helicopters 

circled above while Swift pinpointed their location. The two insurgents, 
65

hearing the noise overhead, stopped digging and hid under a tree. It did not 

offer them the protection they sought. The Kiowas made a gun run, firing 

.50-caliber rounds and rockets. Swift, watching the action on the LRAS3, 

saw both men drop in a cloud of dust. Approximately an hour later, two 

more men showed up and began digging in the same spot. “It was pretty 

much the same scenario,” said Swift.46 The helicopter circled, the men 

ran to a tree only to be gunned down. The scouts and snipers remained in 

their position until daybreak but the area remained quiet. Before the scouts 

could return to post, however, they were called to provide security for an 

engineer Humvee that had hit an IED further south.47

After securing the engineers, the scouts returned to FOB Frontenac. 

Their success encouraged them to conduct more night patrols. They headed 

out again on 5 September. As they drove south, they noticed a man digging 

holes behind them in their tire tracks. They drove a bit further, with Swift 

watching the man on his LRAS3. He called in a Kiowa helicopter. The 

man ran into a grape hut as Swift directed the helicopter to the target, 

where it opened fire with its .50-caliber machine gun. After sunrise, Swift 

found the man dead inside with an AK47 rifle. 

Their patrol complete, the scouts headed back to FOB Frontenac, but 

as they drove by a hostile town through a small river bed, Swift’s Stryker 

ran over an IED. The explosion ripped off the two right front tires and 

destroyed the engine. The explosion proved less intense than the one that 

knocked Swift down into his Stryker on 14 August. Concerned about a 

possible ambush, Swift ordered the Stryker behind him to ram his vehicle 

and push it out of the kill zone. The rear Stryker drove forward and plowed 

Swift’s vehicle ahead 150 meters. The men inside Swift’s Stryker were 

jostled around but no worse than a usual drive through the Arghandab’s 

bumpy terrain. Once everyone was safely away from the point of impact, 

the men hooked the damaged Stryker to another Stryker using tow cables 

(the terrain was too rough for towbars). Swift ordered everyone out of 

his Stryker for the rest of the journey since personnel were not allowed 

to remain in towed vehicles. None of Swift’s men were seriously injured 

in the attack but the platoon took an extra hour to return to the FOB. “We 

were kind of embarrassed that we got blown up again,” Swift recalled.48

The scouts and snipers accomplished their mission of providing 

early warning and possible target acquisition for the battalion during 

OPPORTUNITY HOLD. In addition, their actions helped Lieutenant 

Colonel Neumann wear down the enemy. While the battalion still could 

not pinpoint the insurgents’ exact disposition, composition, or strength, 

the Buffalos were taking the fight to the enemy and keeping them off 
66

balance. “We made it an unsafe area for them to operate,” said Neumann.49

The scouts and snipers provided the battalion the time and space to travel 

through the area, supported operations on the west side of the Arghandab 

River, and helped build a better outpost at Checkpoint 18. “Overall,” 

Neumann later explained, “it was an outstanding example of maximizing 

our capabilities: advanced optics, communications, combined arms 

integration, [and] tactical and technical excellence at the specialty platoon 

level.”50

The Drive South

The first phase of OPPORTUNITY HOLD was a success. The Buffalos 

had cleared their AO and established the first outpost. While the scouts 

performed their mission on 1 September, Neumann returned most of 

Alpha Company to Shah Wali Kot and ordered Captain Pope to turn south 

and clear the three villages of Ali Kalay, Khosrow-e Olya, and Khosrow-e 

Sofla. Captain Quiggle, stationed in the river, had noticed insurgents 

running though the tree lines near the three towns during the push north 

and Neumann wanted them cleared. He also wanted to support Bravo 

Company with more troops. His staff worked the problem for two days 

and concluded the best way to advance south was to have Quiggle’s troop 

drive down the shallow Arghandab River. To test the theory, they tasked 

Quiggle with traversing the length of the river in Strykers. He sent out a 

reconnaissance platoon to ensure that even the deeper parts of the river 

were trafficable. “I didn’t want to risk getting a vehicle mired during the 

insertion,” Quiggle recalled.51 Once the platoon identified a usable route, 

the staff briefed Neumann on the plan. He liked the idea and added 3d 

Platoon from Alpha Company to Quiggle’s troop.52 “We figured we could 

get speed and surprise coming from the east,” explained Major O’Connor, 

“We figured nobody had tried that one before, and they hadn’t.”53

Neumann sent Bravo Company south on 2 September, first to clear 

east towards the river, and then south into Ali Kalay. Meanwhile, Quiggle 

arrived east of Ali Kalay after a night advance down the river. As predicted, 

the enemy did not expect the Americans to use the river to maneuver 

and were caught off guard by the sudden presence of so many troops. 

The battalion TAC led by Major O’Connor accompanied Quiggle. As 

the cavalry troop traveled down the Arghandab and neared the village, it 

came across something unexpected – hordes of civilians leaving the area. 

Undaunted, the troop dismounted and headed west into the village, leaving 

their Strykers in the riverbed for fire support. Alpha Troop’s Strykers were 

soon joined by Bravo Comapny’s Strykers. Unable to accompany their 

own Soldiers, Lieutenant Matthew Kuecker, Bravo Company’s executive 
67

officer, led the company’s Strykers north, and then entered the river, 

driving south until they caught up with Alpha Troops’ Strykers.54

Figure 16. Operation OPPORTUNITY HOLD, the advance south.

Source: author/CSI generated

Meanwhile, Pope had climbed a tree to observe his company’s 

dismounted advance south through Ali Kalay. Boirum’s 3d Platoon was 

on his right, Fadden’s 1st Platoon on the left. When insurgents opened fire 

on Fadden’s men, they returned fire while Boirum’s men swung left and 

joined the firefight, pressing the enemy from two sides. Quiggle’s troop 

with 3d Platoon from Alpha Company, coming up from the river, closed 

in from the south, trapping the insurgents between themselves and Bravo 

Company.55 A Kiowa Warrior helicopter chased an insurgent carrying a 

PKM machine gun into a hut. Because the Soldiers on the ground were 

so close to the structure, the Kiowa overflew the target to obtain positive 

identification, then circled around and fired rockets, destroying the hut. 

During the engagement, Quiggle’s Soldiers held their fire. “Had we 

returned fire we probably would have shot into [Bravo] Company’s lines,” 

explained Staff Sergeant Michael Brown.56 When it ended, Sergeant Ciman 

of Alpha Company walked up to Sergeant First Class Holcomb of Bravo 

Company and asked him, “How come every time we roll with you we get 

shot at?”57
68

Figure 17. A Stryker makes its way down the Arghandab River.

Photo courtesy Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Neumann, US Army

While the firefight raged, a group of insurgents made their way to 

the tall grass along the river and opened fire on the TAC’s vehicles with 

RPGs, AK47s, and PKM machine guns. Staff Sergeant Nick Furfari was 

hammering his OE-254 antenna stakes into the sand when the enemy 

opened fire. Everyone else dove into the vehicle, but he remained, banging 

away at the stakes until the antenna array was complete. Major O’Connor 

fired a few rounds from his M4 rifle but the .50-caliber machine guns 

from Alpha Troop and Bravo Company’s Strykers quickly dispatched the 

insurgents attacking the TAC.58

In the village, Quiggle’s troops found few people. One man came 

down the road from another village and spoke to Quiggle’s interpreter. 

Staff Sergeant Brown was convinced the man was Taliban but since he 

had no weapon, he was not detained. Later, Quiggle’s men were passing 

through a breach in a wall and were about a third of the way across a field 

when insurgents opened up with RPGs and machinegun fire. One RPG 

rocket flew four feet above Quiggle’s head. While men in the lead element 

retuned fire and moved back to cover, Quiggle pushed the rest of his men 

up to the wall and returned fire with rifles and M-240 machineguns. Bravo 

Company’s Staff Sergeant Ryan Sharp saw the engagement, stood up 

on a mud wall, and told his men not to shoot. Using his M-203 grenade 

launcher, he lobbed ten rounds over the cavalrymen’s heads and into the 

enemy.59 Quiggle called in a nearby F-18 Hornet fighter jet to fly in as low 

as possible to scare the insurgents. The plane roared in and dropped flares. 

“That guy came in about 50 feet off the bank and scared us as much as he 
69

probably did the enemy,” said Quiggle.60 In fact, one of the Soldiers in the 

TAC Stryker heard the F-18 and shouted “RPG!” and hit the deck.61 The 

F-18 had the desired effect and the enemy disengaged. The firefight lasted 

only five minutes before the enemy withdrew and the troop went back to 

searching buildings. 

During this action, Pope pushed his company past a road intersection 

and set up a blocking position in a grape field. When Boirum’s platoon 

took fire from the field and a grape hut, Pope called in mortar rounds while 

he ran toward the position. Unfortunately, he made a mistake. “While 

running,” he later admitted, “I read the wrong grid.”62 Captain Livengood 

and Major O’Connor received Pope’s request and realized he was calling 

in a strike on a Land Warrior friendly icon marker. Livengood denied 

the mission, then pointed the problem out to Neumann, who got on the 

net and told Pope to check his fire and rework his data. Pope, exhausted 

from days of fighting and frustrated that his request was being denied, 

complained, but Neumann stood firm. Captain Livengood called the guns 

directly, telling them, “Do not fire!” 63 Finally, Pope reworked his numbers 

and reported them to the TAC. Neumann, satisfied that the mission was 

safe, released the mortars and Pope fired the mission.64

To Neumann, the incident proved that the system worked. Staff 

members who maintained their situational awareness and a focused eye 

on all indirect fires could help an exhausted ground commander. It also 

proved the value of the Land Warrior System, which alerted Neumann and 

his staff to a potential friendly fire incident. Without the system, explained 

Neumann, “we could not have checked the work of a very tired company 

commander and prevent[ed] troops from being put in danger.”65

Once the mortars hit the area, Pope ordered Boirum to work his 

way through a grape row toward the hut from which his unit was being 

engaged. Meanwhile, the rest of Pope’s men provided covering fire. Two 

Kiowa helicopters flew over the area and the insurgents stopped firing. 

Pope directed the pilots to the hut. The first pilot fired two 2.75 mm rockets 

while the second fired 20 rounds from his .50 caliber machine gun. The 

rockets collapsed the roof, trapping an insurgent. The pilot circled the 

hut and, instead of firing another rocket, pulled out an M4 rifle and shot 

the insurgent.66 “My Soldiers were like, ‘damn, that was a good shot,’” 

recalled Pope.67

Enemy fire died down but Pope still wanted suppressing fire on the 

remnants of the insurgent force in a nearby orchard. He contacted the 

mortar unit and requested a new fire mission. Unfortunately, the mortars 
70

had not been registered so he and Prince discussed the risks of firing. When 

Prince told Pope, “It should be safe,” they called in the mission.68 The 

rounds exploded 30 meters from Boirum’s men. Although the Soldiers 

were protected by grape rows and huts, they were furious. In spite of this, 

Pope called in more mortar fire, adding 100 meters to their distance. Fifteen 

explosions followed in the orchard, enabling Boirum’s men to finally clear 

what was left of the building.69 Pope later discovered that the mortar that 

had fired the initial round had not been seated on its base plate and had 

fired cold, reducing the weapon’s range.

As dusk loomed, the wind increased, preventing helicopters from flying 

overwatch. Both Bravo Company and Alpha Troop were dangerously low 

on water. More importantly, Captain Quiggle was about to lose another 

asset. The ANA Soldiers with 3d Platoon, Alpha Company, refused to patrol 

after 1600 in honor of Ramadan. “I remember our platoon getting upset 

[and asking] why are we stopping?” said Quiggle.70 Quiggle’s cavalrymen 

were strewn out in the fields and orchards. The troop commander knew he 

was in a bad place, so he turned to one of his platoon sergeants and told 

him, “This is a stupid place to spend the night.”71 He found two houses and 

put his men in them. Pope also used a compound for his bed-down site, 

breaching a hole in a mud wall that surrounded the compound and putting 

two of his platoons in an adjacent orchard.72

As the Soldiers bedded down in Khosrow-e Olya, Lieutenant Colonel 

Neumann drove south to join Major O’Connor at the TAC. After passing 

a firefight between the ANA and insurgents at Checkpoint 18, Neumann 

radioed Quiggle to send a Stryker to lead his column down the river. “I 

didn’t want to bang down the river and all of a sudden hit a soft spot and 

get stuck,” explained Neumann.73 When he finally reached the TAC that 

night, O’Connor reported to him that the operation had achieved surprise, 

evident from the people fleeing the village.74

Night Actions

It was not a quiet night for Bravo Company. Taliban scouts probed 

Pope’s perimeter, using dog-like howls to signal each other when they 

had reached the American lines. Sergeant Matthew Dick heard the howls 

and went out to the perimeter with an M-203 grenade launcher equipped 

with a night-vision device. He spotted a man coming over a berm near 

him, howling and holding his hand to his ear to listen for other howlers. 

Dick’s night sight indicated that the insurgent was 130 meters away. He 

aimed and fired. The round exploded on the man’s chest and the howling 

stopped.75
71

Elsewhere on Lieutenant Fadden’s perimeter, Staff Sergeant James 

Knowler positioned himself behind a berm with a Claymore mine facing 

toward the enemy. He should not have been there. Fadden had picked a 

different spot for an observation post (OP) but Knowler had checked it 

out and judged it too vulnerable to ambush and too far from the platoon’s 

perimeter. He relocated to a more defensible position, set up there, and 

then asked Fadden for permission. The lieutenant agreed. Knowler, a 

superstitious man, had picked the midnight shift because he did not want 

to stand guard on 2 September. “My birthday is September 5,” he later 

explained, “[and] there’s no way I’m going to die on an even number.”76

About 10 minutes into his shift he heard the sound of tree branch snapping 

under a foot. Instinctively, he knew that no animal weighed enough to do 

that. He closed his eyes and cocked his left ear toward the noise, holding 

the Claymore’s trigger in his hands. When he heard a second snap, he 

squeezed the firing device, exploding the Claymore. After the detonation, 

a Soldier near Knowler whispered, “That stick didn’t even finish snapping 

and you hit it.”77 Knowler listened again and this time heard some rustling 

by a tree where he was supposed to have set up his original OP. He fired 

five rounds at the sound and heard a thud and someone grunting, followed 

by coughing. Knowler knew he was listening to someone with a punctured 

lung. 

First Sergeant Tony Holcomb appeared and wanted to know who 

fired the Claymore. Knowler acknowledged responsibility and Holcomb 

calmed down because he trusted Knowler. However, when Holcomb 

wondered aloud if an American squad was in the field, a shocked Knowler 

let loose with a string of curses until Holcomb finally confirmed there 

were no Americans outside the perimeter. Captain Pope dropped mortar 

rounds on the suspected insurgent but Knowler still heard coughing. Every 

time he did, he closed his eyes, listened for another cough and fired at the 

sound. He knew that if he had set up his OP where Fadden wanted, he 

would be dead. The next day a Soldier told Knowler he was a pretty good 

shot. When Knowler asked him why, the man explained, “Because I saw 

three shots in a tree that were centimeters from each other, and saw a little 

bit of blood.”78

The End of the Operation

That morning, 3 September, the enemy reminded the Americans that 

they were still around. Captain Quiggle had just sent one of his squads 

and Lieutenant Zangenburg’s platoon to get water from the Strykers in 

the river when insurgents opened up with machine gun fire from the same 

orchard as the day before. Simultaneously, insurgents opened fire on 
72

the units retrieving water. The Strykers provided suppressing fire while 

Quiggle’s men on the rooftop also returned fire.

Quiggle ran to the rooftop where he saw Staff Sergeant Marco Marsalis 

firing at the enemy in the orchard. “Machine gun, 200 meters,” Marsalis 

told Quiggle while pointing west.79 Quiggle radioed Pope, who dropped 

20 60-mm mortar rounds on the orchard. The enemy disengaged as some 

of Quiggle’s men ran through the breached wall and cleared the orchard, 

finding numerous blood trails. The engagement had lasted 10 minutes.80

Quiggle linked up with Pope and the two tied in their flanks and 

so together they cleared south through the fields and orchards. Bravo 

Company advanced on the west while Alpha Troop advanced on the east 

with the Strykers in the riverbed paralleling the cavalrymen and preventing 

the enemy from escaping east. As they swept through the area, Pope’s men 

noticed a red ribbon in a tree and a tree branch lying across the road. 

Pope stopped the column and the men discovered a buried IED, which 

they detonated with C4 explosives. “We were trying to figure out how the 

civilians knew to walk up and down the trails and not step on an IED,” 

said Pope.81 From then on, the men always looked at the trees for clues on 

IED placement.

As the troops pushed south, Quiggle spotted a garden shed and told 

his men to search it. They found RPG warheads, rocket motors, and other 

weapons. Quiggle decided to destroy it. He cleared the airspace, contacted 

Pope about his plans, and got his men under cover. His attached Air 

Force EOD team then set explosives and detonated the cache. The huge 

explosion destroyed the building and knocked down walls. A rocket motor 

that had not been destroyed spun towards the men. “Nothing will get your 

blood pumping like having an EOD tech running away from the scene of 

an explosion, screaming ‘Get down!’” recalled Quiggle.82 The motor had 

not been armed with a warhead and did not detonate. The weapons cache 

was now nothing but a huge crater. Later, Pope’s men found an IED placed 

eye-level in a gate between fields, which the EOD team also detonated. 

Both groups also discovered medical supplies. Pope’s men found the 

supplies hanging in bags from trees, while Quiggle’s men found a Taliban 

medical aid station.83 At the end of the day, both Pope and Quiggle set up 

observation posts on the tops of buildings around their positions. 

By the next morning, 4 September, supplies were running low. The 

men were down to one MRE per day and a bottle of water. Nevertheless, 

they pushed on, clearing buildings, fields and orchards. Bravo Soldiers 

encountered goat herders and families who offered no information about 
73

insurgents. As the sun went down, the men occupied several empty 

compounds for the night. Pope and Quiggle spent the night sharing lessons 

learned.84

On the morning of 5 September, the two units headed out again, finding 

only small arms caches. Quiggle radioed the TAC at 1500, asking Major 

O’Connor if he wanted Alpha Troop to continue clearing south. O’Connor 

said no. “I think you’re done at this point.”85 With that, Quiggle maneuvered 

his unit to the river, where the cavalrymen mounted their waiting Strykers 

and left the area. As the operation drew to a close, Lieutenant Colonel 

Neumann moved the TAC upriver about three kilometers to some high 

ground where he could have better overall communications with his entire 

battalion. He then decided on a culmination point for Bravo Company and 

Lieutenant Colonel French’s 2-1 IN.86

Bravo Company finally linked up with a company from 2-1 IN south 

of Khosrow-e Olya. French’s men turned a large compound over to Pope’s 

1st Platoon, which the men named COP Outlaw, and later, Patrol Base 

Brick One, to go along with Charlie Company’s Brick Two in Shuyen-e 

Sofla. Before occupying the compound, Pope’s men discovered and 

disarmed 18 surrounding IEDs. With the link-up accomplished, and two 

permanent positions established on the west bank of the Arghandab, 

Lieutenant Colonel Neumann called an end to OPPORTUNITY HOLD 

and recommended a change of mission to Colonel Tunnell. 87

Aftermath

By the time the nine-day operation came to an end, the men of the 

battalion were exhausted. When not engaging the enemy, they had spent 

their days walking, hunched over through overgrown pomegranate 

orchards. Their uniforms were in tatters. Most men wore out the crotches 

of their uniforms. To remedy the situation, many either used duct tape to 

patch holes, or just draped a t-shirt over the front of their belts. “But most 

of the people just largely didn’t give a damn,” said Lieutenant Boirum.88

The men hadn’t bathed in days, save the times they waded through canals 

and with water in such short supply the men hadn’t shaved either. They 

looked as hard as they had fought.89

The operation cost one more American life. Upon returning to FOB 

Frontenac, Alpha Troop’s Staff Sergeant Robert Gordon felt ill and 

reported to the Troop Medical Clinic. Originally diagnosed with food 

poisoning, Gordon actually suffered from Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic 

fever, a rare disease spread by ticks.90 He went into a coma and was flown 

to the Army’s Regional Medical Center in Landstuhl, Germany, where he 

died on 16 September 2009.91
74

The 1-17th completed its assigned mission in OPPORTUNITY 

HOLD – the battalion now had several combat outposts in the Arghandab. 

They had established a foothold in enemy territory. The operation also had 

an important psychological effect on the battalion’s Soldiers. The losses 

of Tom, Yanney, and Captain Hallett’s Stryker crew during BUFFALO 

STAMPEDE had hurt morale. However, OPPORTUNITY HOLD’s 

offensive nature, characterized by fighting the enemy, destroying weapons 

caches, and aiding civilians, reminded the men of what they were there for. 

“It got us back in the fight,” said Major Jennings.92
75

Endnotes

1. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Neumann, e-mail to Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 January 2013.

2. Major Ryan O’Connor, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 April 2012, 32.

3. Major Darren Jennings, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 July 2012, 63.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Neumann, interview by Kevin M. 

Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 April 2012, 53; 

Zangenburg, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 17 April 2012, 26; Kovalsky, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 22 March 2012, 2; Jennings, interview, 63. Favor, interview, 

32.

5. Neumann, interview, 56, 57, 58, 59; O’Connor, interview, 16 April 

2012, 35.

6. Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Neumann, email to Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 October 2012.

7. Kovalsky, interview, 12, 14.

8.

 Captain Matthew Quiggle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 

April 2012, 14.

9. Quiggle, interview, 14, 16, 17.

10. Sergeant First Class Justin Prince, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 16 May 2012, 27, 28.

11. Captain Ryan Fadden, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 16 April 2012, 24.

12. Sergeant First Class James Knowler, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 22 March 2012, 11, 12, 13, 14.

13. Major James Pope, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 March 2012, 75; Fadden, interview, 25; 

Pope, interview, 76; Neumann, e-mail, 3 January 2013.

14. Pope, interview, 76, 81, 82.

15. Staff Sergeant Michael Brown, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 7 June 2012, 39.

16. Brown, interview, 40.

17. Quiggle, interview, 18, 19.

18. Sergeant First Class Stephen Muzchka, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 22 March 2012, 9, 10.
76

19. Captain Daniel Boirum, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 23 May 2012, 55.

20. Pope, interview, 85.

21. Pope, interview, 84, 85, 86; O’Connor, interview, 8 August 2012, 52.

22. Boirum, interview, 57.

23. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

24. Zangenburg, interview, 28.

25. Pope, interview, 79.

26. Prince, interview, 36.

27. Pope, interview, 78, 80, 81, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96; O’Connor, interview, 8 

August 2012, 57.

28. Pope, interview, 88.

29. O’Connor, interview, 8 August 2012, 54.

30. Pope, interview, 88.

31. Pope, interview, 88, 89, 90, 92; Staff Sergeant Kyle Crume, e-mail 

to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 June 

2013.

32. Captain Joshua Bobbitt, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 16 March 2012, 19.

33. Kovalsky, interview, 15.

34. Captain Zachary Osborne, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 22 August 2012, 13.

35. O’Connor, interview, 8 August 2012, 52.

36. Charlie Company, 1-17 IN, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 173.

37. Staff Sergeant Kenneth Weiss, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 12 July 2012, 40, 41; Sergeant Julian Galez, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 March 2012, 7; Captain Brian Giroux, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 March 2012, 2, 3, 4; Major 

Joel Kassulke, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 April 2012, 

37, 38, 39.

38. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

39. Captain Adam Swift, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 April 2012, 25.

40. Swift, interview, 28.

41. Swift, interview, 28.
77

42. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

43. Swift, interview, 30.

44 Swift, interview, 28, 29, 30, 31; Sergeant Joshua Seaver, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 March 2012, 10, 11, 12.

45. Seaver, interview, 13.

46. Swift, interview, 34.

47. Swift, interview, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37.

48. Swift, interview, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44; Seaver, interview, 8; 

Captain Adam Swift, email to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 27 January 2013.

49. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

50. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

51. Captain Matthew Quiggle, e-mail to Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 August 2012.

52. Captain Brian Zangenburg, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 17 April 2012, 30; O’Connor, interview, 8 August 2012, 52; 

Quiggle, e-mail.

53. O’Connor, interview, 16 April 2012, 40.

54. O’Connor, interview, 16 April 2012, 41; Quiggle, interview, 22, 23; 

Neumann, interview, 65.

55. Pope, interview, 103, 104.

56. Quiggle, interview, 21; Boirum, interview, 59.

57. Zangenburg, interview, 33.

58. O’Connor, interview, 16 April 2012, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81; O’Connor, 

interview, 8 August 2012, 71, 72.

59. Brown, interview, 56; Knowler, interview, 31.

60. Quiggle, interview, 22, 26; Fadden, interview, 31; Pope, interview, 

106.

61. O’Connor, interview, 8 August 2012, 74.

62. Captain James Pope, email to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 April 2013.

63. O’Connor, interview, 8 August 2012, 55.

64. Neumann, e-mail, 3 January 2013.

65. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

66. Captain James Pope, email to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 April 2013; Captain Daniel Boirum, email 
78

to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 April 

2013.

67. Pope, interview, 110.

68. Prince, interview, 38, 39.

69. Pope, interview, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112.

70. Zangenburg, interview, 23.

71. Quiggle, interview, 31.

72. Pope, interview, 112, 113.

73. Neumann, interview, 68.

74. Neumann, interview, 66, 67, 68, 71; O’Connor, interview,16 April 

2012, 47.

75. Pope, interview, 114, 115; Knowler, interview, 40, 41.

76. Knowler, interview, 36.

77. Knowler, interview, 37.

78. Knowler, interview, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41.

79. Quiggle, interview, 39.

80. Quiggle, interview, 35, 36, 37, 39.

81. Pope, interview, 119.

82. Quiggle, interview, 41.

83. Pope, interview, 121; Quiggle, interview, 40, 41.

84. Knowler, interview, 45; Pope, interview, 122; Quiggle, interview, 42.

85. Quiggle, interview, 33, 34.

86. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

87. Pope, interview, 70; Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

88. Boirum, interview, 51; O’Connor, interview, 16 April 2012, 28.

89. Pope, interview, 99.

90. Quiggle, interview, 47.

91. Quiggle, interview, 47; “Virus Claims Local Soldier,” The Andalusia 

Star-News, 17 September 2009, http://www.andalusiastarnews.com/2009/09/17/

virus-claims-local-soldier/ (accessed 02 August 2012)

92. Jennings, interview, 72.
79

Chapter 5

Conclusion

OPPORTUNITY HOLD had an immediate impact on security in the 

Arghandab River valley. The new COPs established in Shuyen-e Sofla and 

Khosrow-e Olya allowed for periodic patrols by small units and increased 

contact by Coalition and Afghan security force leaders with local Afghans. 

Better relations led to the discovery of weapons caches, IEDs, and a 

reduction in firefights. After OPPORTUNITY HOLD, operations mounted 

from the two newly established OPs frustrated the insurgents and enabled 

Coalition forces to seize the initiative. Insurgent radio transmissions 

intercepted by the Coalition revealed a steep decline in enemy morale, 

with Taliban commanders in the district asking their superiors in Pakistan 

for permission to withdraw early, before the fighting season ended. 1 More 

than one insurgent commander was relieved of command. “We think 

most of the [senior] leadership actually [exfiltrated],” explained Major 

O’Connor, “and left their lower leaders there to fight it out.”2

There were other signs of success. People began moving back into the 

empty villages along the Arghandab. During the four months following 

OPPORTUNITY HOLD, Coalition-sponsored agriculture programs hired 

more than 3000 residents of the district. The US Agency for International 

Development (USAID) completed 18 projects in the area. Some local 

residents joined a program that gave villagers an active role in defending 

their homes alongside Afghan security forces.3

 The Buffaloes now had a 

foothold in the Arghandab. The enemy that remained, however, continued 

to engage patrols and plant IEDs. Battalion leaders countered these actions 

by paying local Afghans for information on the locations of the devices. 

“It’s better to buy it than step on it,” explained Captain Pope, who after 

OPPORTUNITY HOLD did not lose another man to an IED.4

Out of the Arghandab 

In mid-November, Regional Command-South changed 5/2 Stryker’s 

mission. Consequently, Colonel Tunnell shifted 1-17 IN from the 

Arghandab to the districts of Tarin Kot and Shah Wali Kot to the north. 

The Buffaloes’ new mission was to secure the major roadways between 

Kandahar and the city of Tarin Kot, some 100 road kilometers north of 

FOB Frontenac. British Lieutenant General Sir Nicholas Patrick Carter, 

the commander of RC-South who had replaced Dutch Major General 

Mart de Kruif, sent 2d Battalion, 508th Infantry (2-508 IN), 82d Airborne 

Division, into the Arghandab. Carter felt light infantry was better suited 

for the confined terrain of the Arghandab while Strykers, with their tactical 
80

mobility and their capability to transport and dismount Soldiers quickly, 

were the logical fit for the open terrain that characterized the Shah Wali 

Kot District. “What a Stryker Brigade brings you, in terms of capability, 

is ... tactical mobility,” explained General Carter. “It gives you firepower 

and, critically, it gives you connectivity across the brigade in a way that’s 

almost unsurpassed in terms of any of our armies.”5

Because 1-17 IN moved into Shah Wali Kot in late Fall, it had an 

advantage over the insurgency in that district. As usual, the Taliban 

significantly scaled back its activities during the winter. That allowed 

the Buffaloes time to shape the battlefield and become familiar with the 

human terrain in the district. The battalion established a combat outpost 

near the district center and vehicle patrol bases (VPBs) along Route 

BEAR (Highway 617) to establish freedom of movement on that key 

road, conducted numerous shuras with local Afghan leaders, and generally 

familiarized itself with its new area of responsibility. 

In May 2010, intelligence collection efforts indicated the enemy 

planned to overrun an American base along Route BEAR in the Shah Wali 

Kot’s Baghtu Valley, 45 kilometers north of FOB Frontenac. To counter 

the enemy’s plans, Neumann and his staff planned Operation BLOW 

FISH, a spoiling attack designed to take the fight to the insurgents massing 

near one of the battalion’s main patrol bases. For three days, the Buffaloes

mauled insurgents east of Route BEAR, preventing them from assaulting 

the patrol base.

At the close of that operation, 1-17 IN’s tour of duty in Afghanistan 

came to an end. The unit’s deployment had taken a significant toll on the 

men of the battalion. By the end of its tour, the battalion had suffered 66 

Soldiers wounded in action and 21 Soldiers killed in action.6

 The worst 

incident occurred in October 2009 near the town of Jeleran where a massive 

18,000-pound IED detonated under a Stryker from Charlie Company 

killing 7 Soldiers. Two other fatalities occurred during the 1-17 IN’s time 

in Afghanistan: Staff Sergeant Robert Gordon, who died from CrimeanCongo hemorrhagic fever; and Sergeant Antony Paci, who was killed in 

a vehicle roll-over. To help Soldiers cope with the losses, the battalion 

chaplain set up a tent with a buffalo painted on it at FOB Frontenac. Inside 

was a photo of each fallen Soldier and a place for visitors to kneel and 

reflect.7
81

BUFFALO STAMPEDE and OPPORTUNITY HOLD in 

Retrospect

In conducting Operations BUFFALO STAMPEDE and OPPORTUNITY HOLD, the Soldiers of 1-17 IN successfully accomplished their goals 

of providing security at the polls and establishing a Coalition foothold 

in the Arghandab River Valley. This success, however, was not achieved 

without significant difficulties including the casualties suffered by the battalion. Yet any objective assessment of these two operations must consider 

the larger context. The most important factor shaping that context was the 

timing of BUFFALO STAMPEDE. Senior Coalition leaders directed 5/2 

Stryker to begin that operation within weeks of arriving in Afghanistan. 

The unit made first contact with the enemy only days after consolidating 

at its new forward operating base. “We were in contact from day one,” 

explained Lieutenant Colonel Neumann, “and we were in sustained contact for a long time.”8

 For many of the young Soldiers and junior leaders, 

the deployment to Kandahar Province was their first combat tour. The extremely limited time available to 1-17’s soldiers to become accustomed to 

the new area of operation before BUFFALO STAMPEDE, however, was 

a challenge for even the most experienced Soldiers. “We got there one day 

and then headed out ten days later,” said Major Jennings. “That’s really 

not enough time to get your feet wet.”9

 Even when BUFFALO STAMPEDE ended, the unit was still familiarizing itself with the terrain and the 

people. “There were an awful lot of things that we were still discovering,” 

explained Lieutenant Colonel Neumann.10

Compounding the challenges posed by the timeline was the fact that 

1-17 IN was part of the first Stryker brigade to operate in Afghanistan. 

While previous deployments of Stryker brigades in Iraq had helped refine 

general techniques and procedures of Stryker-equipped units, the Afghan 

setting offered a unique set of political, military, social, and cultural 

challenges. Moreover, the Buffaloes had been given an area of operation 

that included the Arghandab Valley. The terrain of that district - a densely 

vegetated region of fields and orchards crisscrossed by mud walls – posed 

a nearly insurmountable mobility challenge for a unit built around its 

Stryker vehicles. Far more critical, however, was the fact that this area 

was the base for hundreds of well-armed and committed insurgents. By 

many measures, it was one of the most dangerous districts in Afghanistan. 
82

1-17 IN’s operations in the Arghandab and the Shah Wali Kot offer 

more than just a compelling narrative of one battalion’s experience 

in Afghanistan. These actions also reveal key insights about how the 

unit’s organization, doctrine, equipment, and technology – as well as the 

insurgent enemy – shaped the Buffaloes campaign in fall 2009.

Organization & Doctrine

The Army had established Stryker units based on the need for a 

medium infantry-centric unit that achieved balance between lethality, 

survivability, and mobility. These units had to be able to deploy by air 

relatively quickly and would rely on advanced digital technologies to gain 

and retain the initiative over any adversary. The doctrinal mission of a 

Stryker battalion like 1-17 IN was straightforward: close with the enemy 

by fire and movement to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault 

by fire, close combat, and counterattack.11 The doctrine also emphasized 

mobility as the key to the Stryker battalion’s success, stating that the 

Stryker vehicle allowed the battalion to maintain effectiveness in complex 

terrain and made it possible to conduct noncontiguous combat operations 

at the platoon- and company-levels. 

In these operations, company leaders would rely on dismounted 

infantry elements to destroy the enemy. The inclusion of the Mobile Gun 

System (MGS) platoon and the Mortar section in the Stryker infantry 

company greatly enhanced the company commander’s ability to employ 

organic direct and indirect fires in support of dismounted maneuver. The 

Stryker vehicle itself could also provide fire support to dismounted infantry 

but doctrine emphasized the vehicle’s role in moving forces quickly to the 

fight and providing tactical flexibility. 

In BUFFALO STAMPEDE and OPPORTUNITY HOLD, 1-17 IN’s 

organization and operations generally conformed with well-established 

practices regarding the simultaneous employment of mounted and 

dismounted infantry. Overall, unit Soldiers were impressed with the 

vehicles. “You can run 50 miles an hour across the desert when nobody 

else can keep up with you,” said Staff Sergeant Prince.12 First Lieutenant 

Boirum noted. “The amount of firepower and infantry that [the carriers] 

can put on the table and the air-guard hatches and RWSs (Remote Weapons 

Systems), make that an unstoppable vehicle in a shootout.”13

In both operations, there were moments when the carriers played a 

significant role. During BUFFALO STAMPEDE, the Stryker’s firepower 

was telling in the assault on the village of Buyana in the open terrain of 

the Shah Wali Kot district. The massing of fires from the vehicle coupled 
83

with the maneuver of dismounted elements forced an experienced 

insurgent force to retreat from the village. More decisive was 1-17 IN’s 

use of the carrier during OPPORTUNITY HOLD. In the second phase of 

the operation, the battalion staff saw an opportunity to use the Stryker’s 

mobility to surprise the insurgents in the village of Ali Kalay. Using the 

cover of night, a cavalry troop and an infantry platoon moved down the 

Arghandab riverbed and assaulted Ali Kalay while a dismounted infantry 

force attacked the village from the opposite side. The maneuver caught 

the insurgents unprepared. Unable to escape the assault, they became 

decisively engaged in a battle that raged for several more days, during 

which the Stryker carriers provided heavy fires in support of dismounted 

elements. Ultimately, the Buffaloes’ success against the Taliban in the Ali 

Kalay region of the Arghandab allowed the battalion to establish a combat 

outpost from which they mounted follow-on operations.

The Arghandab Valley, however, was not ideal terrain for Stryker 

units. The many densely-planted orchards, stone walls, and narrow roads 

hindered the carriers’ utility. In at least one case during BUFFALO 

STAMPEDE, orchards prevented the carriers from directly supporting the 

maneuver of a platoon from Bravo Company. The platoon had to leave 

Soldiers to secure the carriers before it began dismounted movement, 

decreasing the combat power available for the maneuver element. 

OPPORTUNITY HOLD placed Bravo and Charlie companies in a similar 

situation, requiring their infantrymen to move dismounted through very 

complex terrain without direct support of the carriers. 

In the wake of OPPORTUNITY HOLD, with so many Strykers unable 

to penetrate the Arghandab Valley’s Green Zone or traverse the area’s 

narrow roads, Neumann tried to retain the mobility offered by the carriers 

by removing the slat armor from some of the Strykers in Bravo and Charlie 

companies. The slat armor had made the Strykers broader, adding 18 inches 

to each side of the vehicles. Because enemy RPG fire was considered too 

inaccurate, the removal of the slat armor was considered a reasonable risk. 

Neumann left the slat armor on Alpha Company’s Strykers because the 

Shah Wali Kot district offered the insurgents better fields of fire where 

RPGs would be more effective. Without the slat armor, the Strykers had an 

easier time maneuvering through the Arghandab River Valley.14

In retrospect, no military vehicle designed to carry men into battle 

would have proven completely suitable for use in the Arghandab Valley, 

much like the difficulties faced by tracked armored vehicles in the jungles 

of Vietnam. However, the Buffaloes learned how to maximize the vehicles’ 

value by using the high mobility corridors like riverbeds (wadis) and open 
84

desert to move forces quickly. “When we started going across the desert 

and going through the wadis the [Strykers] did pretty well,” explained 

Staff Sergeant Michael Brown.15 For Lieutenant Colonel Neumann, the 

carriers’ ability to place dismounted infantrymen in position to begin 

decisive maneuver was the vehicle’s most important capability: “Strykers 

in the Arghandab for us were a platform to get us to a dismount point. We 

would swing wide in the desert, try to approach somewhere that we would 

then dismount, come ... from the desert where maybe they wouldn’t 

expect us.”16 Despite these tactics, as noted above, the decision to move 

1-17 IN out of the Arghandab Valley in late fall 2009 resulted partly from 

the realization that the terrain in the valley did not allow the Buffaloes to 

take full advantage of their vehicles’ mobility and firepower.

Equipment and Technology

While the Stryker vehicle offered 1-17 IN a significant amount of 

tactical mobility, the Buffaloes also found that they could become a liability. 

In multiple cases, vehicle recovery became a major tactical operation. 

In training the battalion’s Soldiers had always towed damaged Strykers 

with Stryker Recovery Vehicles, using tow bars to connect vehicles. In 

Afghanistan, they dealt with overturned vehicles, vehicles without tires, 

and vehicles on fire. After relying on the Canadians for vehicle recovery, 

Major Jennings eventually obtained a flat-bed truck and wrecker, and 

trained some of his maintenance personnel in their use.17 Despite this, 

recovery usually took 24 hours. The enemy almost invariably targeted 

the Americans securing an inoperable Stryker, forcing them to fight a 

defensive battle. A damaged Stryker fixed a unit in place until it could be 

recovered. Like a beacon, a Stryker on fire at night invited enemy attack. 

Lieutenant Colonel Neumann told the helicopter pilots supporting 1-17 IN 

that they needed to treat a damaged Stryker like a downed pilot. “You need 

to come running with helicopters,” he told them, “and you need to stay 

with us until we get those vehicles loaded on a truck and we drive away.”18

The Land Warrior system helped Soldiers maneuver across the 

battlefields and allowed them to pinpoint friendly units.19 When Captain 

Pope mistakenly almost called mortars onto his own location, the battalion 

was able to check his position with Land Warrior and prevent a catastrophe. 

“Despite how heavy and awkward it was to wear, this incident sold me 

on the benefits of Land Warrior System,” explained Lieutenant Colonel 

Neumann.20 The men, however, did not like the device’s weight or short 

battery life. When the Buffaloes first arrived in country, the extra batteries 

were lost, leaving the men to carry their systems around for days without 

power. The system also stuck out about six inches from a Soldier’s back 
85

and chest. When combined with other equipment, entering and exiting 

Strykers’ hatches became difficult.21

The system was never designed to provide perfect situational 

awareness of terrain or enemy dispositions. When Captain Pope used it to 

flank the enemy at Shuyen-e Sofla, for example, the maps could not detect 

enemy barricades, impeding his scheme of maneuver. Despite this wellknown and accepted limitation, Land Warrior had other maddening flaws. 

When the system was not run down from overuse, for example, it still 

might turn off at inconvenient times. In one case during OPPORTUNITY 

HOLD, the Land Warrior equipment shut down on the men of Chosin 

Company’s 2d Platoon while they were trying to find 3d Platoon’s position 

in the dark. “We couldn’t see anything anymore,” explained Specialist 

John Diaz, “nothing was on our screens, nothing whatsoever.”22 At least 

some of these problems were caused by Land Warrior’s design as a lineof-sight system. Major terrain features and distances blocked or degraded 

its signal, a tremendous shortcoming in anything other than ideal terrain. 

Major Jennings contended that there might be a relatively straightforward 

solution to this shortcoming: “If it was satellite based, that would be ideal, 

because you would never be out of contact with your other personnel.”23

The Insurgency in Southern Afghanistan

Like most US Army maneuver units that deployed to Afghanistan, 1-17 

IN conducted a campaign that combined non-lethal actions to further the 

legitimacy of the Afghan government (and its security forces) with lethal 

operations against insurgent forces. In the Shah Wali Kot and Arghandab 

districts of Kandahar Province, the campaign waged by the Soldiers of 

1-17 IN leaned decisively toward lethal actions against a shadowy foe. 

The Stryker battalion certainly brought more firepower to the battlefield 

than the Taliban could muster. The insurgents responded by avoiding 

pitched firefights whenever possible. “They couldn’t fight us in a small 

arms fight,” explained Captain Joshua Glonek, “they had to defeat us with 

IEDs.” 24 Especially in the Arghandab, the battlefield was heavily shaped 

by IEDs. The magnitude of the IED threat was made clear just days into the 

1-17 IN’s operations when an IED detonation flipped over Captain Hallet’s 

Stryker. By the fall of 2009, insurgents in the Arghandab had enjoyed years 

of freedom to experiment with trigger systems and explosive charge sizes 

needed to catastrophically destroy a medium armored vehicle, an effort 

that started when Canadian forces began operating with LAVs in the valley 

in 2006. Medium armored vehicles may have been new to the US Army, 

but not to Afghanistan. The insurgents in Kandahar Province were able 

to create large IEDs partly because of their development of homemade 
86

explosives (HME). This meant that the IEDs in Afghanistan were far more 

lethal to the Stryker vehicles than those encountered in Iraq. 

Taliban IED tactics were very sophisticated, even if the devices 

themselves were not. The insurgents constantly came up with new ideas 

for IED placement, often in response the tactics and techniques used by 

the Buffaloes. Captain Glonek recalled, “every measure we would take 

to kind of counter something they were doing, they would come back 

with something else.” 25 Once the Americans had discerned a particular 

method of triggering, the enemy developed a new technique, such as 

placing pressure plates a few meters in front of an IED so a mine roller 

would pass over the explosives and trigger the pressure plate, detonating 

the bomb underneath the Stryker. Insurgents also learned to trigger IEDs 

in the middle of Stryker columns, where a commander was most likely be 

located.26

The IED threat also affected dismounted tactics in significant ways. 

The Buffaloes began to question every path they took. They had to assume 

mines were planted at every choke point, every footpath, every gate, and 

every bridge. This often meant taking a less direct path over walls, through 

dense vegetation, or through canals, routes that exhausted the Soldiers in 

their heavy gear. Certainly, the IED threat disrupted maneuver. But the 

junior leaders in the battalion adapted quickly. As Lieutenant Colonel 

Neumann put it, much of the reaction was mental: “You’ve got to think: 

‘What’s [the enemy] trying to stop me from doing? It’s not random. That’s 

what you unravel: what was the enemy trying to do?”27

Ultimately, the Buffaloes were impressed with the enemy. “The Taliban 

are trained fighters and they are good at what they do,” explained Staff 

Sergeant Brown.28 The enemy, hardened and experienced from decades 

of war, understood the tactical advantages of ambushes and surprise 

attacks. “If you walk into a situation and you go ‘wow, this looks like a 

place for an L-shaped ambush,’ chances are the Taliban thought the same 

thing,” added Brown.29 The enemy also demonstrated a commitment to 

quick evacuation of their wounded from the battlefield. “As soon as you 

hit someone they never wanted you to find their casualties or know how 

many people got hurt,” explained Staff Sergeant Colunga.30 “As soon as 

the MK-19 [grenade launcher] was hitting people, they were picking up 

pieces or, right away the kids would come and pick the remains.”31 The 

children were only 13 or 14 years old, yet old enough to drag a grown 

man.32 Because of these actions and a more general respect for tenacity of 

the Taliban, there was no question in the minds of Buffaloes that they were 

pitted against a group of dedicated fighters, deeply committed to holding 

on to the Arghandab Valley.
87

*********

The deployment of the 5th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division was a pivotal 

moment in the history of the campaign in Afghanistan. In the spring of 

2009, the US Government had announced a troop increase in Afghanistan 

designed to oppose growing Taliban resistance. 5/2 Stryker was one of 

the first units designated as part of this surge. Not surprisingly, Coalition 

leaders decided to deploy the brigade in southern Afghanistan where the 

Taliban resurgence threatened the key city of Kandahar. Stryker brigades 

had proven themselves in Iraq and that experience suggested that 5/2 

Stryker would be able to use their enhanced capabilities in speed, mobility, 

and situational awareness to gain the initiative against the Taliban. The two 

operations that began 1-17 IN’s deployment in the Kandahar area showed 

both the potential and the limitations of the Stryker units. As this study 

shows, however, it was the adaptability, discipline, and courage of the 

battalion’s Soldiers that made a difference against an implacable enemy 

defending some of the most difficult terrain in Afghanistan. 
88

Endnotes

1. Major Ryan O’Connor, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 April 2012, 63, 71.

2. O’Connor, interview, 16 April 2012, 62.

3. O’Connor, interview, 16 April 2012, 62; “Governance, Reconstruction 

& Development, Interim Report: The First Six Months (Unclassified)” (5th 

Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, 15 January 2010), 2.

4. Major James Pope, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 March 2012, 131, 137.

5. Lieutenant General Nick Patrick Carter, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 May 2012, 2 -4. 

6. Colonel Jonathan Neumann, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 April 2012, 106.

7. First Lieutenant Brian Giroux, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 March 2012, 9-10, 18-20, 21; 

Colonel Jonathan Neumann, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 April 2012, 84, 104-107; Don Kramer, 

“Vice President Grieves with Fort Lewis for Fallen Stryker Soldiers,” Army.mil,

10 November 2009, http://www.army.mil/article/30206/Vice_President_grieves_

with_Fort_Lewis_for_fallen_Stryker_Soldiers/ (accessed 06 November 2012).

8. Neumann, interview, 213.

9. Lieutenant Colonel Darren Jennings, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 73.

10. Neumann, interview, 36.

11. HQ Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-21.21, The Stryker 

Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion (April 2003), 1-1.

12. Sergeant First Class Justin Prince, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 May 2012, 58.

13. Captain Daniel Boirum, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 May 2012, 81.

14. Neumann, interview, 26, 27, 28; Colonel Jonathan Neumann, e-mail 

to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 

September 2012.

15. Staff Sergeant Michael Brown, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 June 2012, 75.

16. Neumann, interview, 126.

17. Jennings, interview, 12-13.

18. Neumann, interview, 134 -135.
89

19. First Sergeant Eugene Hicks, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 April 2012, 50.

20. Neumann, e-mail, 2 January 2013.

21. Berschinski, interview, 36; Knowler, interview, 46.

22. Chosin Company, 1-17 IN, group interview by Kevin M. Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, KS, 20 March 2012, 172.

23. Jennings, interview, 3.

24. Major Joshua Glonek, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 May 2012, 28.

25. Major Joshua Glonek, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 May 2012, 28.

26. Glonek, interview, 62.

27. Neumann, interview, 212.

28. Staff Sergeant Michael Brown, interview by Kevin M. Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 June 2012, 77.

29. Brown, interview, 78.

30. A/1-17, group interview, 86.

31. A/1-17, group interview, 86.

32. A/1-17, group interview, 86.

91

Glossary

ANA Afghan National Army 

ANP Afghan National Police 

AO Area of Operations 

APCs Armored Personnel Carriers

COP Combat Outpost

DRA Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 

DUSTWUN Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ESV Engineer Squad Vehicle

FOB Forward Operating Base

HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company

HLZ Helicopter Landing Zone 

HMMWV or Humvee High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IEDs Improvised Explosive Devices

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

KAF Kandahar Airfield

LAVs Light Armored Vehicles

LRAS3 Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System

MGS Mobile Gun System 

MICLICs Mine Clearing Line Charges

MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

NCO Non-commissioned Officer

OMLT Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (“omelet”)

OP Observation Post

PA Physician Assistant

PID Positive Identification

QRF Quick Reaction Force

RCP Route Clearance Package

RC-South Regional Command-South

REDCON-1 Readiness Condition-1

RPGs Rocket-Propelled Grenades

RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target

 Acquisition

RTO Radio Telephone Operator 

SAW Squad Automatic Weapon 
92

SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team

SLLS Stop, Look, Listen and Smell

TAC Tactical Command Post 

TOC Tactical Operations Center
93

About the Author

Kevin M. Hymel served on the Afghanistan Study Team at the Combat 

Studies Institute and previously worked for a number of military and 

military history magazines as a researcher, editor, and writer. He is the 

author of Patton’s Photographs: War As He Saw It and coauthor of Patton: 

Legendary World War II Commander with Martin Blumenson. He holds 

an MA in History from Villanova University.


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