alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
§ 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011 (the Report), as
filed by Novatel Wireless, Inc. (the Company) with the Securities and Exchange Commission, each of the undersigned officers of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to such officers knowledge:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.



|                   |  |                                                  
|------------------ |  | -------------------------------------------------
|Date: May 10, 2011 |  | /s/    PETER
LEPARULO                            
|                   |  | Peter Leparulo                                   
|                   |  | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer             
|                   |  | (principal executive officer)                    
|                   | 
|                   |  | /s/    KENNETH
LEDDON                            
|                   |  | Kenneth Leddon                                   
|                   |  | Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|                   |  | (principal financial officer)                    

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________

No. 22-7172 September Term, 2023

1:22-cv-03433-DLF

Filed On: October 12, 2023

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for

Option OneMortgage Loan Trust 2005-2,

Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-2,

Appellee

v.

Janice Wolk Grenadier,

Appellant

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BEFORE: Wilkins, Katsas, and Walker, Circuit Judges

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia and on the brief filed by appellant. See Fed. R. App. P.

34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s November 17, 2022 order

remanding the case to state court be reversed and the case be remanded for further

proceedings. Because the district court’s remand order was not “based on a timely

raised defect in removal procedure or on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” this court

has jurisdiction to review the remand order. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,

516 U.S. 124, 127–28 (1995); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)–(d). For essentially the

same reason, we conclude that the district court’s remand order was premature. The

district court did not conclude that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case,

and its remand order was issued sua sponte rather than in response to a timely motion

asserting a procedural defect in removal. And we cannot determine based on the

limited record whether that error was harmless. Cf. Buchanan v. Manley, 145 F.3d 386,

388–89 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). We express no opinion on venue, timeliness, or

any other arguments that appellee might raise on remand. We likewise express no

opinion on whether transfer, rather than remand, of the case is available or warranted

under the circumstances.
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________

No. 22-7172 September Term, 2023

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk

is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution

of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App.

P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.

Per Curiam

Page 2
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  in  connection  with the  filing of the  Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the Quarter Ended  September 30, 2003 (the  "Report") by
Brilliant Digital Entertainment,  Inc.  ("Registrant"),  each of the undersigned
hereby certifies that:

1.       to the  best of our  knowledge,  the  Report  fully  complies  with the
         requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act
         of 1934; and

2.       to the best of our knowledge,  the information  contained in the Report
         fairly presents, in all material respects,  the financial condition and
         results of operations of Registrant.


Dated:  November 14, 2003                          /S/ KEVIN BERMEISTER
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  Kevin Bermeister
                                                  Chief Executive Officer


Dated:  November 14, 2003                          /S/ TYLER TARR
                                                  ------------------------------
                                                  Tyler Tarr
                                                  Chief Financial Officer
**Exhibit 12.1**

 

**STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OFRATIOS**

 
| ** **                                 | ** ** | **Period from  Inception to** | ** ** | **Fiscal Year  Ended** | ** ** |
|--------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------|------------|------------------------|------------|
| **(dollars in thousands)**                 | ** ** | **2002**                      | ** ** | **2003**               | ** ** | **2004** | ** ** | **2005** | ** ** |
| ** **                                 | ** ** | ** **                    | ** ** | ** **             | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** |
| **Earnings:**                              |       |                          |       |                   |       |   |   |   |   |
| Net Income/(Loss)                          |       | $                             | (2,961     | )                      | $          | 49,957 |   | $ | 84,709 |   | $ | 45,569 |   |
| Amortization of capitalized interest       |       |                          |       | 51                     |       | 68 |   | 68 |   |
| (Less) Amount of interest capitalized      |       | —                        |       | (1,416                 | )          | (654 | ) | (5,054 | ) |
| Fixed Charges                              |       | —                        |       | 16,932                 |       | 34,356 |   | 95,420 |   |
| Total earnings available for fixed charges |       | $                             | (2,961     | )                      | $          | 65,524 |   | $ | 118,479 |   | 136,003 |   |
| ** **                                 | ** ** | ** **                    | ** ** | ** **             | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** |
| **Fixed Charges:**                         | ** ** | ** **                    | ** ** | ** **             | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** |
| Interest expense                           |       | —                        |       | 15,515                 |       | 33,702 |   | 90,366 |   |
| Interest capitalized                       |       | —                        |       | 1,416                  |       | 654 |   | 5,054 |   |
| Total Fixed Charges                        |       | —                        |       | 16,932                 |       | 34,356 |   | 95,420 |   |
| **Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges**     | ** ** | **—**                    | ** ** | **3.9**                | **x**      | **3.4** | **x** | **1.4** | **x** |
|                                            |            |                               |            |                        |            |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

 

----
### §125. Nonseverability

If a court of competent jurisdiction enters a final judgment on the merits that—

(1) is based on Federal law;

(2) is no longer subject to appeal; and

(3) substantially limits or impairs the essential elements of sections 116 through 126 of this title,

then sections 116 through 126 of this title are invalid and have no legal effect as of the date of entry of such judgment.

(Added Pub. L. 106–252, §2(a), July 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 632.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date; Application of Amendment

Section effective July 28, 2000, and applicable only to customer bills issued after the first day of the first month beginning more than 2 years after July 28, 2000, see section 3 of Pub. L. 106–252, set out as a note under section 116 of this title.
§ 553.62 What are the designated applicant's notification obligations regarding a claim? If you are a designated applicant, and you receive a claim for removal costs and damages, then within 15 calendar days of receipt of a claim you must notify: ( a ) Your guarantors; and
( b ) The responsible parties for whom you are acting as the designated applicant.
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**

September 3, 2014

No. 04

- 14

- 00567

- CV

EX PARTE Tad Dana PERRY

Original Habeas Corpus Proceeding 1

ORDER

On August 8, 2014, relator filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court has considered relator’s petition and the record submitted to this court and is of the opinion that the requested relief should be granted in part. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED IN PART. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.8(c ). The Order Committing Respondent to the Medina County Jail rendered by the County Court at Law, Medina County, Texas on July 28, 2014 in Cause No. 07

- 06

- 4710

- CCL, styled In the Interest of T.S.P., A Child is modified as follows:

The provision on page 4 of 5, “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent not be given good conduct time credit for time spent in the county jail” is STRICKEN.

All other relief requested in relator’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

It is so ORDERED on September 3, 20 14

.

_____________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 3rd day of September, 2014

.

_____________________________ Keith E. Hottle, Clerk

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 07

- 06

- 4710

- CCL, styled In the Interest of T.S.P., A Child , pending in the County Court at Law, Medina County, Texas, the Honorable Vivian Torres presiding.
### Cretaceous deposits of the eastern Gulf region and species of Exogyra from the eastern Gulf region and the Carolinas

By: L. W. Stephenson

                            https://doi.org/10.3133/pp81

#### Links

-                                                                                                                             Document:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  **Report**                                                                                                     (15161 pdf)                                                                                                                                     
- Plate:  **Plate 9**                            (4475 pdf)                        
- NGMDB Index Page:  **National Geologic Map Database Index Page**
- Download citation as:  RIS                         |                         Dublin                            Core

#### Abstract

No abstract available.

#### Study Area

Part or all of this report is presented in Portable Document Format                        (PDF). For best results viewing and printing PDF documents, it is recommended that you download                        the documents to your computer and open them with Adobe Reader. PDF documents opened from your                        browser may not display or print as intended. Download the latest version of Adobe Reader, free of charge. More information                        about viewing, downloading, and printing report files can be found at the common download problems FAQ.
### UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON DC
United Airlines, Inc
. Complainant, 

### v. The Port of Authority of New York

and New Jersey Respondent. FAA Docket No. 16

- 14-13

ORDER On February 18 , counsel for Complainant, United Airlines, Inc., filed a Motion pursuant to 14 CFR 

### § 16.19, requesting an exten sion oftime to March 27, to Answer Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment (Reply). Counsel advised that the Complainant needs the additional time in order to adequately respond to the Respondent's allegations, assertions, and reliefrequested in the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing the Complaint. Counsel further advised that the Respondent does not oppose this request for an extension oftime. Part 16 is intended to expedite s ubstantially the handling and disposition ofairport-related complaints. [See, 

### Rules of Practice for Federally-AssistedAirport Enforcement Proceedings, Final Rule , 61 Fed
. Reg. 53998 (October 16, 1996).] The rule provides that an extension oftime may be granted where necessary or appropriate for a fair and complete consideration ofmatters before the agency. See 14 CFR 

### § 16.11 (a). An extension oftime is reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, Complainant is hereby granted an extension oftime in which to file its Reply. The Complainant's Reply is now due on March 27 , 20 15. Respondent may file a Rebuttal to the Reply, as applicable within 10 days ofthe date of service ofthe Complainant's Reply.

Randall S. Fiertz Date 

## r I Director, Office ofAirport Compliance and Management Analysis

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 20 , 2015, I caused to be placed in the United States mail (first class, postage paid) or personally delivered a true copy ofthe foregoing Order addressed to:
Counsel for Respondent Carlene V. Mcintyre, Assistant General Counsel Arnold D. Kolikoff, Attorney Faith Tabafunda, Attorney THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY Law Department 225 Park Avenue South, 14th Floor New York, NY 10003 Counsel for Complainant Keith J. Harrison, Esq. Gerald F
. Murphy, Esq. Steven 

### J. Seiden, Esq. CROWELL 

### & MORING LLP 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 RobertS. Span, Esq. Alan K. Steinbrecher, Esq. Sophy Chen, Esq. STEINBRECHER & SPAN LLP 1155 F Street, N.W., Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004
Hand-Delivered to: FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket (AGC-600) FAA Office ofAirport Compliance and Management Analysis, ACO

- l 00

# ~v~ Claudia Roberts Office ofAirport Compliance and Management Analysis
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-2479WA

_____________ Carolyn Joyce Windham, * * Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Western * District of Arkansas. City of Lowell, Arkansas; William * James Kruse, police officer, Individually * [UNPUBLISHED] and in his official capacity, * * Appellees. *

_____________ Submitted: December 23, 1997

Filed: January 5, 1998

_____________ Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

_____________ PER CURIAM. CarolynJoyce Windham appeals the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the City of Lowell, Arkansas (City), and former police officer William James Kruse. Windham was seriously injured when a car driven by Kruse struck the vehicle Windham was driving. At the time of the collision, Kruse was attempting to join the high-speed pursuit of another vehicle. Windha m brou ght this action contending Kruse violated her substantive due process rights b y affirmatively placing her in a position of danger, and the City violated her rights by-2-

faili ng sufficiently to train its police officers about high-speed pursuits. The distric t court gra nted summary judgment to Kruse and the City, concluding Windham ha d failed as a m atter of law to show a substantive due process violation. Windha m appeals. We review a grant of

summary judgment de novo, and will affirm if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Windham, shows there is no genuine issue o f material fact, and the City and Kruse are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See DeBord v. Board of Educ. of Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist. , 126 F.3d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1997).
While other circuits have set fort h various formulations of the minimum level of culpability required to sustain a claim under section 1983 for a denial of s ubstantive due process, we have declined to do so. See Gregory v. City of Rogers , 974 F.2d 1006 , 1012 (8th C ir. 1992). We have held gross negligence does not implicate the du e process clause. See Myers v. Morris , 810 F.2d 1437, 1468 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 484 U.S. 828 (1987). After careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wind ham, we believe Kruse's actions fail as a matter of law to constitute a denial of substantive due process. Cf. Roach of City of Frederickstown , 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989). In the absence of an underlying constitutional violation by Kruse, the City cannot be li able for inadequate training. See id. at 298. Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
### [§41740. Repealed. Pub. L. 118–63, title V, §561(i), May 16, 2024, 138 Stat. 1216]

Section, Pub. L. 103–272, §1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1152; Pub. L. 108–176, title IV, §403, Dec. 12, 2003, 117 Stat. 2543, related to joint proposals by 2 or more air carriers for providing air service or air transportation under this subchapter.
§ 100.5 Determination of penalty amount; special assessment. ( a ) MSHA may elect to waive the regular assessment under § 100.3 if it determines that conditions warrant a special assessment.
( b ) When MSHA determines that a special assessment is appropriate, the proposed penalty will be based on the six criteria set forth in § 100.3(a). All findings shall be in narrative form.
( c ) Any operator who fails to correct a violation for which a citation has been issued under Section 104(a) of the Mine Act within the period permitted for its correction may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $9,571 for each day during which such failure or violation continues.
( d ) Any miner who willfully violates the mandatory safety standards relating to smoking or the carrying of smoking materials, matches, or lighters shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $404 for each occurrence of such violation.
( e ) Violations that are deemed to be flagrant under section 110(b)(2) of the Mine Act may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $323,960. For purposes of this section, a flagrant violation means “a reckless or repeated failure to make reasonable efforts to eliminate a known violation of a mandatory health or safety standard that substantially and proximately caused, or reasonably could have been expected to cause, death or serious bodily injury.”
[72 FR 13635, Mar. 22, 2007, as amended at 73 FR 7210, Feb. 7, 2008; 74 FR 68919, Dec. 29, 2009; 77 FR 76408, Dec. 28, 2012; 81 FR 43456, July 1, 2016; 82 FR 5383, Jan. 18, 2017; 83 FR 14, Jan. 2, 2018; 84 FR 220, Jan. 23, 2019; 85 FR 2299, Jan. 15, 2020; 86 FR 2970, Jan. 14, 2021; 87 FR 2336, Jan. 14, 2022; 88 FR 2218, Jan. 13, 2023; 89 FR 1818, Jan. 11, 2024]
Editorial Note on Part 1206
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 1206 (formerly part 206) appear at 67 FR 19111, Apr. 18, 2002.

§ 206.253 Coal subject to royalties—general provisions. ( a ) All coal (except coal unavoidably lost as determined by BLM under 43 CFR part 3400) from a Federal lease subject to this part is subject to royalty. This includes coal used, sold, or otherwise disposed of by the lessee on or off the lease.
( b ) If a lessee receives compensation for unavoidably lost coal through insurance coverage or other arrangements, royalties at the rate specified in the lease are to be paid on the amount of compensation received for the coal. No royalty is due on insurance compensation received by the lessee for other losses.
( c ) If waste piles or slurry ponds are reworked to recover coal, the lessee shall pay royalty at the rate specified in the lease at the time the recovered coal is used, sold, or otherwise finally disposed of. The royalty rate shall be that rate applicable to the production method used to initially mine coal in the waste pile or slurry pond; *i.e.,* underground mining method or surface mining method. Coal in waste pits or slurry ponds initially mined from Federal leases shall be allocated to such leases regardless of whether it is stored on Federal lands. The lessee shall maintain accurate records to determine to which individual Federal lease coal in the waste pit or slurry pond should be allocated. However, nothing in this section requires payment of a royalty on coal for which a royalty has already been paid.
#### PEOPLE ex rel. LUES v. McADOO, Com’r.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

February 10, 1905.)

Proceedings by the people of the state of New York, on the relation of Louis Lues, against William Mc-Adoo, as commissioner. E. W. Stuart, for relator. T. Connoly, for respondent. No opinion. Writ dismissed, and proceedings affirmed, with costs.
#### § 57.20014 Prohibited areas for food and beverages.

No person shall be allowed to consume or store food or beverages in a toilet room or in any area exposed to a toxic material.
§ 990.105 Applicability. ( a ) *Applicability of this part.* ( 1 ) With the exception of subpart I of this part, this part is applicable to all PHA rental units under an Annual Contributions Contract (ACC). This includes PHAs that have not received operating subsidy previously, but are eligible for operating subsidy under the Operating Fund Formula.
( 2 ) This part is applicable to all rental units managed by a resident management corporation (RMC), including a direct-funded RMC.
( b ) *Inapplicability of this part.* ( 1 ) This part is not applicable to Indian Housing, section 5(h) and section 32 homeownership projects, the Housing Choice Voucher Program, the section 23 Leased Housing Program, or the section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Programs.
( 2 ) With the exception of subpart J of this part, this part is not applicable to the Mutual Help Program or the Turnkey III Homeownership Opportunity Program.