2024 IL App (1st) 230134

No. 1-23-0134 

Opinion filed March 8, 2024 

Sixth Division

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

GAIL GALICH, as plenary guardian for the 

Estate of Steven Butts, a disabled person, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ADVOCATE HEALTH AND HOSPITAL 

CORPORATION, d/b/a Advocate 

Trinity Hospital Group; ADVOCATE HEALTH 

AND HOSPITALS CORP., an Illinois 

Corporation, d/b/a Advocate Medical Group and 

Advocate Lutheran; ADVOCATE HEALTH 

PARTNERS, an Illinois Corporation, d/b/a 

Advocate Physician Partners; and MICHAEL 

SOO-YOUNG JOO, M.D., 

Defendants-Appellants. 

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Appeal from the Circuit Court 

of Cook County. 

No. 19 L 11525 

The Honorable 

Robert E. Senechalle, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justice C.A. Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Tailor specially concurred, with opinion. 

 OPINION

¶ 1 Steven Butts went to an emergency room with a broken jaw. The emergency room doctor 

allegedly failed to properly intubate Butts, depriving him of oxygen and causing permanent 
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brain damage. After a 10-day trial, a jury returned a verdict for Butts, awarding $45.3 million 

in damages. The trial court granted Butts $2.8 million in prejudgment interest. 

¶ 2 The judge instructed the jury to decide whether any one of four actions or omissions that 

Butts alleged the emergency room doctor did or failed to do breached the standard of care and 

proximately caused his injuries. The trial court also instructed the jury that its verdict must be 

unanimous. During deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the judge, asking whether they

needed to have unanimity regarding any of the four findings and indicating they did not. The 

trial judge responded in writing to both questions, “[Y]ou must make a unanimous decision 

that Dr. Joo was negligent. You do not need to be unanimous as to which one of the *** 

possible acts constitute the negligence.” 

¶ 3 Advocate Health and Hospital Corporation, d/b/a Advocate Trinity Hospital Group, and 

Advocate Physician Partners, a managed care corporation and its affiliated entities

(collectively, Advocate), and emergency room physician, Dr. Michael Soo-Young Joo, argue 

that (i) the trial judge’s answers to the jury questions deprived it of its constitutional right to a 

unanimous jury verdict and constitutes reversible error and (ii) the statute mandating 

prejudgment interest in personal injury and wrongful death cases, section 2-1303(c) of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) (West 2022)), is unconstitutional. 

¶ 4 We affirm. The trial court properly instructed the jury that to find for Butts, they needed to 

agree Dr. Joo was negligent unanimously, which is all that the well-established law regarding 

medical negligence requires. Further, we hold section 2-1303(c) of the Code constitutional. 

¶ 5 Background 

¶ 6 Gail Galich drove her 30-year-old son, Steven Butts, to Advocate Trinity Hospital’s 

emergency room, after he fell from a second-floor balcony. Butts suffered facial injuries, 
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including bilateral fractures of his jaw, and complained of a headache, but he was walking, 

talking, and breathing without difficulty. According to his medical history, Butts, who had 

been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan years earlier, had a history of hypertension, posttraumatic stress disorder, and a traumatic brain injury.

¶ 7 Emergency room physician Dr. Michael Soo-Young Joo examined Butts and observed a 

missing tooth, a lacerated chin, and bleeding from the face. Butts’s heart rate, respiration rate, 

and blood oxygen levels were within normal ranges, and he was alert and well-oriented. Dr. 

Joo’s exam was limited because Butts could not fully open his mouth, due to pain from his 

broken jaw. Dr. Joo reported that Butts was confused and uncooperative. Believing Butts may 

have life-threatening neck and back injuries, Dr. Joo decided to transfer him to an affiliated 

hospital, Advocate Christ Medical Center, a level-one trauma hospital. Dr. Joo advised Butts 

he wanted to intubate him to prevent his airway from destabilizing during the ambulance 

transfer. Butts consented. 

¶ 8 Before attempting to intubate Butts, Dr. Joo administered paralyzing medicine at 5:31 a.m., 

which prevented Butts from breathing on his own. The testimony varied as to what happened 

next. Dr. Joo testified he opened Butts’s mouth and used a glidescope to move his tongue out 

of the way so he could insert an endotracheal tube into his airway (trachea). But blood in 

Butts’s mouth obscured his view of Butts’s vocal cords, which he needed to see to intubate 

him. Dr. Joo tried a second time without the glidescope, but again was unsuccessful. Dr. Joo 

claimed he never placed the endotracheal tube into Butts. At 5:38, Dr. Joo paged 

anesthesiology for assistance and gave Butts oxygen using a laryngeal mask airway (LMA)

and a bag valve mask (referred to as “bagging”). Butts went into pulseless electrical activity 
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and cardiac arrest at about 5:45 a.m., necessitating a “code blue.” Dr. Joo and his team 

performed chest compressions on Butts and gave him cardiac medication. 

¶ 9 Nurse anesthetist Vivian Willis, who responded to Dr. Joo’s page, testified that when she 

arrived at Butts’s bedside, she suctioned his airway, examined him, and saw an endotracheal 

tube in his esophagus rather than his trachea. Willis removed the endotracheal tube and inserted 

it into Butts’s airway at 5:49, about 18 minutes after Dr. Joo began the intubation. Butts’s code 

blue ended at 5:56 a.m. Placed on a ventilator, an ambulance transferred Butts to the University 

of Chicago Medical Center. 

¶ 10 Galich, who was in the exam room, agreed that Dr. Joo tried twice to intubate her son 

before asking someone to call anesthesia for assistance. She also agreed Butts went into a “code 

blue” until nurse Willis arrived and placed the endotracheal tube in his airway. Galich said she 

did not see Dr. Joo use an LMA to give Butts oxygen. She also said someone was bagging her 

son after the second failed intubation but could not recall if anyone tried after the first attempt. 

¶ 11 The parties disagree about the cause and nature of Butts’s injuries but agree he has 

permanent brain damage, requires 24-hour nursing care, and resides in a nursing home. 

¶ 12 Galich, as Butts’s guardian, filed a complaint against Dr. Joo, alleging negligence, as well 

as vicarious liability claims against Advocate. Galich claimed Butts suffered oxygen 

deprivation and catastrophic brain injury as a result of Dr. Joo’s negligence. She alleged Dr. 

Joo was negligent in (i) attempting a rapid sequence intubation on Butts, (ii) failing to consult 

anesthesia before attempting to intubate, (iii) positioning an endotracheal tube in Butts’s 

esophagus, (iv) failing to discover that the endotracheal tube was placed in his esophagus, (v) 

failing to check the endotracheal tube placement with an X-ray, (vi) failing to check 

endotracheal tube placement with a monitoring device, and (vii) failing to listen to breath 
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sounds after positioning the endotracheal tube. Galich also asserted that one or more of those 

negligent acts proximately caused Butts’s injuries. 

¶ 13 Trial

¶ 14 At trial, in addition to testimony from Galich and Dr. Joo, each side presented expert 

witnesses to opine whether Dr. Joo complied with the standard of care. (Other expert witnesses 

testified as to Butts’s quality of life and damages.) Testifying for Galich, Dr. John Downs, an 

anesthesiologist and critical care physician, opined that Dr. Joo should have examined Butts’s 

airway before administering the paralytic and sedative medications. He acknowledged that Dr. 

Joo could not thoroughly examine Butts’s airway due to his inability to open his mouth without 

pain. Still, Dr. Downs testified that the standard of care required giving Butts morphine, 

fentanyl, or other pain-relieving medication before administering paralyzing drugs, so he could 

open his mouth to ensure his airway was clear.

¶ 15 Dr. Downs also testified that placing the endotracheal tube into Butts’s esophagus alone 

was not a deviation from the standard of care. Dr. Joo’s negligence, however, was his failure 

to recognize his mistake, remove the tube, and put it into Butts’s airway. Regardless of 

misplacing the endotracheal tube, according to Dr. Downs, Dr. Joo violated the standard of 

care by giving Butts inadequate oxygen after administering the paralyzing and sedative 

medications. Dr. Downs opined Dr. Joo’s negligence in depriving Butts of sufficient oxygen 

was the sole cause of his brain damage. 

¶ 16 Galich’s other expert witness, Dr. Christopher Baugh, M.D., an emergency medicine 

physician, opined that Dr. Joo violated the standard of care by (i) failing to examine Butts’s 

airway before trying to intubate him, (ii) failing to place the endotracheal tube in the correct 

place, and (iii) failing to recognize sooner that the endotracheal tube had gone into the 
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esophagus and not the airway. Dr. Baugh also opined that Dr. Joo violated the standard of care 

by giving Butts insufficient oxygen while he was sedated, which, after a prolonged period, 

caused permanent brain damage. 

¶ 17 Advocate called three expert witnesses. Dr. Edward Ward, an emergency medicine doctor, 

opined it was appropriate and within the standard of care for Dr. Joo to try to intubate Butts 

without first calling for assistance. He acknowledged that blood obstructed Dr. Joo’s view of 

Butts’s airway, but Dr. Joo followed the correct course of action by placing a LMA and calling 

anesthesia for assistance after two unsuccessful intubation attempts. Dr. Ward disagreed that 

Dr. Joo left an endotracheal tube in Butts’s esophagus as it made “no sense” for Dr. Joo to call 

for assistance had he already intubated the patient. 

¶ 18 Dr. Asokumar Buvanendran, an anesthesiology expert, opined that Dr. Joo complied with 

the standard of care by calling anesthesiology for assistance after unsuccessfully attempting to 

intubate Butts and using an LMA to oxygenate Butts in the interim. 

¶ 19 Dr. Joel Meyer, a neuroradiology expert, testified that Butts did not incur a hypoxicischemic brain injury while under Dr. Joo’s care. Dr. Meyer explained that a hypoxic-ischemic 

brain injury occurs when insufficient blood flow or oxygen causes brain tissue to die. Dr. 

Meyer reviewed diagnostic images taken at the University of Chicago Medical Center on July 

21 and 28, 2019, including magnetic resonance imaging and computed tomography scans. He 

testified that the July 21 images were normal and did not show signs of hypoxic brain injury. 

Further, if that injury had occurred while Butts was in the emergency room, it would have 

appeared on the image. Moreover, the July 28 imaging was “very abnormal,” showing 

extensive swelling in Butts’s brain, consistent with toxic leukoencephalopathy, and not 
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hypoxic- ischemic brain injury. Dr. Meyer concluded that Butts’s brain injury occurred 

between July 21 and July 28 at the University of Chicago hospital. 

¶ 20 Jury Instructions and Questions 

¶ 21 During the jury instruction conference, the parties agreed on the instructions the judge 

would give the jury. Neither party requested special interrogatories. Relying on Illinois Pattern 

Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 20.01 (revised Aug. 2023), the trial court instructed the jury that 

Butts alleged that Dr. Joo was “negligent in one or more of the following respects” by failing 

to: (i) properly examine his airway prior to administering the paralytic; (ii) timely recognize

that he was not receiving proper oxygenation; (iii) adequately oxygenate him; and (iv) timely 

correct improper intubation. And Butts “further claims that one or more of the foregoing was 

a proximate cause” of his injuries. Using Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 21.02 

(approved Dec. 8, 2011) on the burden of proof, the court instructed that Butts had the burden 

of proving “the defendants acted or failed to act in one of the ways claimed by the plaintiff as 

stated to you in these instructions and that in so acting or failing to act the defendants were 

negligent.” The court also told the jury, “Your verdict must be unanimous.” 

¶ 22 During deliberations, the jury submitted a written question to the trial court, stating: “[w]e 

understand that only one of the findings of negligence needs to be found in order to proceed. 

Do we need unanimous agreement on any one of the findings in order to proceed?” Over 

Advocate’s objection, the trial court responded, “[i]n order to proceed, you must make a 

unanimous decision that Dr. Joo was negligent. You do not need to be unanimous as to which 

one of the four possible acts constitute the negligence.” 

¶ 23 The jury sent a “follow up” question to the trial court stating: “We have no unanimity as to 

any of the four findings that Dr. Joo was negligent. We have a split decision as to one of the 
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counts. We have a majority decision as to one of the counts. We are unanimous that on two of 

the counts that Dr. Joo was not negligent. With the majority vote on one, do we proceed?” The 

trial court proposed telling the jurors they should refer to its answer to their first question as 

well as the written jury instructions. Butts’s counsel again agreed. Advocate’s counsel 

suggested the trial judge instruct the jury to “refer to the jury instructions only.” Over 

Advocate’s objection, the court answered the jury’s second question as follows: “ ‘[t]he answer 

to your “follow up” [question] is this: Please refer to my answer to your first question along 

with the written jury instructions I have given you.’ ” 

¶ 24 Deliberations continued, and a short time later, the jury returned a verdict for Butts, 

awarding him $45.3 million in damages. 

¶ 25 Posttrial Proceedings 

¶ 26 Advocate moved for a new trial, arguing, in part, that the trial court’s answers to the jury’s 

questions were reversible error, as they deprived defendants of their constitutional right to a 

unanimous jury verdict and a fair trial. For support, Advocate relied on Schiff v. Friberg, 331 

Ill. App. 3d 643 (2002). In Schiff, also a medical negligence case, the jury instructions listed 

three separate acts by the defendant that the plaintiff contended the evidence proved. During 

deliberations, the jury sent a note asking: “ ‘To find for plaintiff does it require a una[ni]mous 

vote for at least one item (of 3)?’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 659. The trial judge responded, 

“ ‘You must be unanimous that the Defendant was negligent in one or more of the respects set 

out in the instructions—and the Plaintiff was injured—and the negligence of the Defendant 

was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the Plaintiff. Remember, you must consider 

the instructions as a whole, not picking out one instruction and disregarding others.’ ” 
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(Emphases omitted.) Id. at 660. The appellate court held that “the trial court did not commit 

error in its responses to the jury questions.” Id.

¶ 27 Advocate asserted, “Schiff—binding Illinois authority—squarely decided this issue and 

found jury unanimity is required on ‘one or more’ of the theories presented in the jury 

instructions.” The trial court disagreed, finding the trial court’s response in Schiff did not 

answer the jury’s question but “merely repeated portions of the instructions already given to 

the jury.” Further, the court concluded the appellate court held that the trial court “did not 

commit error” but without addressing, let alone answering, the substantive question of law. 

The court said, “The Appellate Court in Schiff said not one word about the issue of unanimity 

being required or not required as to which of several separate acts of defendant underpin the 

jury’s finding of negligence.” Indeed, the trial court concluded that “[n]o Illinois civil case 

expressly answers the question posed by the jury.” 

¶ 28 The trial court found a “clear answer” in criminal cases, holding that unanimity applies to 

the ultimate issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the crime charged. Unanimity is not 

required for the alternative means or ways the crime can be committed. See People v. Travis, 

170 Ill. App. 3d 873 (1988); People v. Harper, 251 Ill. App. 3d 801, 807 (1993); People v. 

Dunbar, 2018 IL App (3d) 150674, ¶ 29. 

¶ 29 The trial court also cited to Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Dunleavy, 129 Ill. 132 

(1889), for its conclusion that the jury needs unanimity that all of the elements of the cause of 

action have been met, not which, from among possible alternative acts, proved an element. In 

addition, the trial court cited cases from other jurisdictions, holding that jurors who agree on 

the verdict (even if under 12) must be unanimous that the defendant was negligent. Still, 

unanimity among them on which specific act or omission constituted negligence is not 
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required. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Wong, 701 P.2d 1301, 1309 (Kan. 1985); Stoner v. Williams, 

54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243, 252 (Ct. App. 1996). 

¶ 30 The trial court concluded that “[t]he jury need not unanimously agree as to which of several 

alternative acts of the defendant constituted the negligence, as long as the jury unanimously 

agrees that the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant was negligent.” Finding no 

error in its instruction, the court denied Advocate’s posttrial motion. 

¶ 31 The court also granted Butts’s motion to amend the judgment to add statutory prejudgment 

interest of $2,833,153.13 for a total judgment of $48,139,119.54. 

¶ 32 Analysis 

¶ 33 Unanimous Verdict 

¶ 34 Advocate contends the trial court deprived it of its constitutionally guaranteed right to a 

unanimous jury verdict (Sinopoli v. Chicago Rys. Co., 316 Ill. 609, 617-18 (1925)) by twice 

instructing the jurors they must unanimously agree Dr. Joo was negligent but did not need 

unanimity regarding which possible acts constituted the negligence. Advocate asks that we 

reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial. 

¶ 35 We generally review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a jury instruction for an abuse 

of discretion. Studt v. Sherman Health Systems, 2011 IL 108182, ¶ 13 “ ‘The standard for 

determining an abuse of discretion is whether, taken as a whole, the instructions are sufficiently 

clear so as not to mislead and whether they fairly and correctly state the law.’ ” Id. (quoting 

Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505 (2002). Where, as here, we are considering 

the legal question of whether the instruction accurately conveyed the applicable law our review 

is de novo. Id. (citing Barth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Ill. 2d 163, 170 (2008)). 

Ultimately, a reviewing court should grant a new trial only where the trial court’s refusal to 
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give a tendered jury instruction results in serious prejudice to the party’s right to a fair trial. 

Bailey v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 2021 IL 126748, ¶ 42 (citing Heastie v. Roberts, 

226 Ill. 2d 515, 543 (2007)).

¶ 36 As an initial matter, Butts contends Advocate forfeited its argument regarding jury 

unanimity by failing to suggest to the trial court an alternative answer to the jury’s questions 

and cannot now argue the court gave the wrong answer or should have given a different answer. 

For support, Butts relies on Van Winkle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 291 Ill. App. 3d 

165, 174 (1997), where a panel “pronounc[ed] a new rule” “that when jurors raise a question 

during deliberations, counsel must submit—in writing—the specific response counsel wants 

the court to give the jury.” As Advocate notes, the Illinois Supreme Court has neither indicated 

it agrees nor have other appellate decisions adopted or cited VanWinkle for that proposition. 

Significantly, counsel for neither party submitted a proposed answer to the jury’s question in 

writing, as Butts contends they should have. 

¶ 37 Butts’s attorney agreed with the trial judge’s proposed answer. Advocate’s counsel did not, 

instead suggesting that the judge instruct the jury to refer to the jury instructions only. Contrary 

to Butts’s argument, trial judges often give jurors Advocate’s suggestion that the jury be 

referred to the jury instructions. So, we reject Butts’s contention that Advocate waived the 

issue.

¶ 38 Turning to the merits, Advocate argues that in a medical malpractice case, when a plaintiff 

makes several allegations of negligence, the jurors must agree unanimously on at least one of 

the allegations. Advocate asserts that two notes from the jurors indicate that the jury was not 

unanimous, particularly the second note revealing no unanimity on any single allegation and 

the speed with which the jury returned the verdict after the judge answered the second question. 
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Advocate asserts the trial judge gave improper answers to the jurors’ questions because it 

allowed the jury to rule for Butts without unanimity as to at least one of his negligence 

allegations. Advocate asserts the trial judge should have referred the jury to the jury 

instructions or, as its attorney suggested at oral argument, given a different answer, namely, 

that the jurors need to be unanimous as to one of the allegations of negligence. 

¶ 39 Butts asserts that the trial judge’s answers were proper because a jury need not agree on a

single negligence allegation so long as they unanimously agree that the defendant’s negligence 

caused the injuries. 

¶ 40 Section 2-1108 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1108 (West 2022)) states that “[u]nless the 

nature of the case requires otherwise, the jury shall render a general verdict.” Within the 

discretion of the court, the jury may be asked in writing to find specially on material questions 

of fact. Any party may request special interrogatories. As noted, neither party requested special 

interrogatories, and the jury returned a general verdict. 

¶ 41 Our supreme court has held “[w]hen there is a general verdict and more than one theory is 

presented, the verdict will be upheld if there was sufficient evidence to sustain either theory, 

and the defendant, having failed to request special interrogatories, cannot complain.” Witherell 

v. Weimer, 118 Ill. 2d 321, 329 (1987); see Curry v. Burns, 626 A.2d 719, 721 (Conn. 1993) 

(the “ ‘general verdict rule provides that, if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and 

no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every 

issue in favor of the prevailing party’ ”); Christopherson v. St. Vincent Hospital, 384 P.3d 

1098, 1108 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, 

and no party requests interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every 

issue in favor of the prevailing party). Butts presented multiple alternative allegations of 
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negligence; the trial court presented four of them to the jurors. Given the jury’s general verdict 

and having failed to request a special verdict, Advocate cannot now complain. 

¶ 42 Special interrogatories aside, Advocate’s argument does not persuade us. To succeed on a 

medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove (i) the standard of care a medical provider 

should have followed, (ii) the defendant failed to meet the standard of care, and (iii) the 

plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by the defendant’s failure to meet the standard of 

care. Guerra v. Advanced Pain Centers S.C., 2018 IL App (1st) 171857, ¶ 30. 

¶ 43 Advocate argues that if, as here, a plaintiff alleges a medical provider was negligent in 

multiple ways, the plaintiff must present evidence to satisfy all three elements on at least one 

allegation, particularly for medical negligence cases as opposed to ordinary negligence cases. 

According to Advocate, in ordinary negligence cases, a plaintiff needs only to demonstrate the 

defendant violated a standard of care by failing to act as an ordinary and reasonably prudent 

person, citing Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (1996). Advocate contends 

that the jurors indicated they did not unanimously agree that Dr. Joo was negligent in at least 

one of the ways Butts alleged. Specifically, Advocate points to the jurors’ second note that 

they (i) agreed Dr. Joo was not negligent on two of Butts’s allegations, (ii) had a “split” 

decision on another negligence allegation, and (iii) had a “majority” decision on the remaining 

negligence allegation. Thus, Advocate argues, the jurors did not unanimously agree that Dr. 

Joo breached the standard of care as to a single alleged act of negligence, but improperly 

“mixed and matched” negligence allegations to reach a patchwork consensus. 

¶ 44 As it did in the trial court, Advocate argues that Schiff, 331 Ill. App. 3d 643, supports 

reversing the judgment. Advocate argues the trial court should have followed Schiff, which 

held that jurors must all specifically agree that, at a minimum, one act of alleged negligence 
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caused the plaintiff’s injury and erred by finding Schiff did not address or answer the legal 

question—whether the jury must unanimously agree that at least one act satisfied all three 

requirements for proving medical malpractice.

¶ 45 We agree with the trial court. Although Schiff involved a similar jury question, the appellate 

court held that the trial court did not err in responding to the jury’s question. As significant, 

the case does not address the substantive question of whether the jury must unanimously agree 

that one of the alleged acts constituted negligence. Schiff is not dispositive. 

¶ 46 Similarly, Dunleavy, 129 Ill. 132, on which Butts relies, does little to advance his position. 

Issued more than 130 years ago and rarely, if ever, cited on the issue of jury unanimity, the 

language that Butts (and the trial court) rely on does not speak directly to that issue. While 

Dunleavy held that the jury’s verdict must be unanimous, what the court meant by “method of 

reasoning” and “successive steps” leading to the judgment can be widely interpreted. Id. at 

144-45. 

¶ 47 Consideration of Criminal Law 

¶ 48 Aside from Schiff, in the absence of Illinois civil cases, much less medical malpractice 

cases, addressing jury unanimity, the trial court looked to criminal cases from Illinois and other 

jurisdictions for guidance. We disagree that criminal law bestows guidance on the issue here. 

The fundamental purposes of the two legal realms differ. Criminal law seeks punishment; civil 

law aims for compensation or specific remedies. Criminal defendants receive protections, 

especially constitutional protections, not afforded to civil defendants. The burden of proof is 

higher in criminal cases, requiring evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, while civil cases have 

a lower standard—preponderance of the evidence. And most tort law is derived from common 

law precedents; criminal law is statutory. Besides, attempting to apply criminal precedents 
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overlooks the unique principles, particulars, and nuances of both areas of the law. Nevertheless, 

we briefly address the criminal law cases, which we consider neither relevant nor helpful. 

¶ 49 Advocate cites People v. Scott, 243 Ill. App. 3d 167, 168 (1993), where the defendant was 

charged with three counts of delivering controlled substances to “three undercover police 

officers in three unconnected transactions.” The State tendered an instruction furnishing the 

jury with six verdict forms, one “guilty” and one “not guilty” for each count. Id. But the trial 

court modified the instruction to require two verdict forms, “guilty” and “not guilty.” Id. The 

jury found defendant guilty of one count. 

¶ 50 The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that verdict forms for only one of the 

three counts violated defendant’s constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. Id. at 169. 

The court stated that four jurors might believe the defendant delivered a controlled substance 

to one officer, four other jurors might believe he delivered it to a second officer, and four jurors 

might believe he delivered it to a third officer: “[t]his scenario, which is plausible given the 

facts of this case, permits a unanimous guilty verdict to have been rendered without all 12 

jurors agreeing that defendant delivered a controlled substance to a particular recipient as set

forth in each count of the indictment.” Id. at 169-70. 

¶ 51 In a more recent case, People v. Filipiak, 2023 IL App (3d) 220024, the defendant was 

charged with predatory sexual assault against two victims. The trial court gave the jury verdict 

forms for three counts, with counts I and III involving one victim and count II another victim. 

Id. ¶ 3. Counts I and III purportedly involved two separate acts against the first victim on the 

same day but in different locations; yet the verdict forms contained identical language. Id. ¶ 9. 

The jury was not instructed about differences between counts I and III or that they needed 

unanimity regarding the specific conduct for each count. Id. The jury convicted defendant of 
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counts I and II and acquitted on count III. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was 

denied his right to a unanimous jury verdict, arguing the State’s failure to distinguish between 

conduct alleged in counts I and III and acquittal on count III made it impossible to determine 

if the jury was unanimous in finding him guilty of specific conduct. Id. ¶ 12. The appellate 

court reversed the conviction on count I, finding it could not reasonably ascertain if the jury 

unanimously agreed whether the defendant committed either offense. Id. ¶ 18. 

¶ 52 Advocate also cites cases from other jurisdictions, reaching similar conclusions. See, e.g., 

State v. Boots, 780 P.2d 725 (Or. 1989) (en banc) (unanimity rule requires jurors to 

unanimously agree on facts required to satisfy elements of criminal code violation); Gomez v. 

State, 498 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (juror unanimity requires specific 

agreement that defendant committed same act violating criminal law statute); Jenkins v. 

Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 448-49 (Ky. 2016) (instruction allowing jury to convict on 

one crime based on two separate and distinct criminal acts violating same criminal statute is 

“duplicitous” instruction). 

¶ 53 Advocate argues that, like the defendants in Scott and Filipiak, Butts alleged Dr. Joo 

committed four separate acts, each of which could support a negligence claim. The trial court 

then instructed the jury that it need not agree on which of those acts of negligence caused 

Butts’s injury to return a verdict in his favor. Citing Scott and similar cases from other 

jurisdictions, Advocate asserts the trial court should have instructed the jury that they must 

unanimously agree that at least one act or omission by Dr. Joo was negligent and the possibility 

the jury instead had a “patchwork” verdict requires reversal. 

¶ 54 We disagree with Advocate. In Scott and Filipiak and the cases from other jurisdictions,

the defendant was charged with separate and distinct criminal code violations, each with a 
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separate punishment. The State had to prove all elements of each violation, but the jury 

instructions failed to state that the jury must agree the State proved each element of each 

separate charge. 

¶ 55 Conversely, to establish a claim for medical negligence, Butts had to prove (i) the standard 

of care, (ii) that Dr. Joo did not meet it, and (iii) proximate cause. The specific allegations of 

Dr. Joo’s acts or omissions are not separate elements of the claim on which the jury must 

unanimously agree, provided they agree his failure to meet the standard of care caused Butts’s 

injuries. 

¶ 56 The jury’s verdict indicated they unanimously agreed Dr. Joo’s negligence caused Butts’s 

brain injury. That is all the law requires. We affirm the judgment. 

¶ 57 Prejudgment Interest 

¶ 58 Advocate argues the statutory amendment that mandates prejudgment interest is 

unconstitutional because it (i) burdens a defendant’s right to a jury trial, (ii) is not narrowly 

tailored to stated legislative purpose, (iii) violates due process by penalizing defendants for 

litigation delays, (iv) constitutes special legislation and violates equal protection, and 

(v) violates the separation of powers. Advocate also contends that the General Assembly 

violated the three readings rule in amending the statute and cannot constitutionally govern a 

cause of action that occurred before it was enacted. 

¶ 59 We review Advocate’s constitutional challenges to the prejudgment interest amendment 

de novo. Kakos v. Butler, 2016 IL 120377, ¶ 9. Statutes carry a strong presumption of 

constitutionality, and we construe a statute to preserve its constitutionality if reasonably 

possible. Walker v. Chasteen, 2021 IL 126086, ¶ 30. The party challenging constitutionality 

bears the burden of establishing the statute’s invalidity. Id.
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¶ 60 The Right to a Jury Trial

¶ 61 Advocate argues the prejudgment interest statute puts a prohibitive cost on a defendant’s 

fundamental right to a jury trial and, under strict scrutiny standard, should not be upheld unless 

necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to accomplish that 

interest. Advocate asserts that even if the legislature’s purpose of compensating plaintiffs is 

valid, the financial strain placed on defendants for exercising their right to a jury trial 

constitutes an unconstitutional burden. 

¶ 62 The Illinois Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial as it existed at common law and 

at the time of the 1970 constitution’s adoption. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 13 (“The right of trial 

by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.”). The right to a jury trial attaches to all 

rights of action known at common law, including claims for negligence, and preserves the right 

to have a jury decide all facts in controversy, including damages. Interstate Bankers Casualty 

Co. v. Hernandez, 2013 IL App (1st) 123035, ¶¶ 24-25; see also Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 

179 Ill. 2d 367, 412 (1997) (among jury’s essential functions in tort cases is determination of 

damages). If a jury finds for a plaintiff on liability, it must then determine the amount of 

damages that reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 

Civil, No. 30.01 (approved Dec. 8, 2011) (IPI Civil No. 30.01). 

¶ 63 The prejudgment interest amendment neither encroaches on a jury’s calculation of damages 

nor penalizes a defendant who elects a jury trial. Under the statute, if a defendant fails to make 

a settlement offer within one year of a claim’s filing, the trial court imposes prejudgment 

interest on the entire judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) (West 2022). Conversely, if the jury’s 

verdict exceeds the highest settlement offer, prejudgment interest is calculated against the 

difference. Id. Should a jury find for a defendant on the issue of liability, the trial court never 
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assesses prejudgment interest. Thus, the method by which the jury calculates damages remains 

unchanged. See IPI Civil No. 30.01. The jury decides the facts and awards monetary damages 

but has no role in calculating or awarding prejudgment interest. Indeed, calculating and 

awarding prejudgment interest amounts to a ministerial function for the trial court, akin to 

awarding costs, imposing postjudgment interest, or setting off the verdict to account for funds 

received from settling defendants. Cotton v. Coccaro, 2023 IL App (1st) 220788, ¶ 49. Because 

the prejudgment interest amendment does not impinge on a fundamental constitutional right, 

strict scrutiny does not apply. See Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 

U.S. 37, 54 (1983) (where government action does not impinge on fundamental right, it “need 

not be tested by the strict scrutiny”). 

¶ 64 Courts in other states faced with similar arguments have upheld their statutes as 

constitutional and consistent with the right to a jury trial. See Oden v. Schwartz, 71 A.3d 438, 

456-57 (R.I. 2013) (concluding prejudgment interest statute was rationally related to legitimate 

state interest and did not affect right to trial by jury because prejudgment interest was not 

“damages”); Galayda v. Lake Hospital Systems, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ohio 1994)

(prejudgment interest statute “does not violate the fundamental constitutional right to trial by 

jury”). We find no constitutional basis for striking down the prejudgment interest statute. 

¶ 65 Narrowly Tailored

¶ 66 Advocate contends the statute has not been narrowly tailored to achieve the legislative 

interest by allowing prejudgment interest on future damages, such as future medical care and 

treatment and future pain and suffering, rather than limiting compensation to what the plaintiff 

already incurred. Notably, Advocate cites no cases or other authority, thereby forfeiting the 

issue under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Even so, the argument 
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lacks merit. When construing a statute, our primary objective involves ascertaining and giving 

effect to the legislature’s intent. People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 279 (2003). 

In doing so, we first look at the statute’s plain language. In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 372 

(2005). Moreover, “we presume that the legislature, in its enactment of legislation, did not 

intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice.” Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of 

Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415 (2006). The legislature articulated in section 2-1303(c) of 

the Code its intent for recovery of prejudgment interest “on all damages,” including future 

damages. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) (West 2022). The statute is narrowly tailored to achieve 

that goal. 

¶ 67 Due Process

¶ 68 Next, Advocate asserts that the prejudgment interest statute violates due process by 

penalizing a defendant for litigation delays, even if caused by the plaintiff. 

¶ 69 The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that “assessment of interest is neither a penalty nor 

a bonus, but instead a preservation of the economic value of an award from diminution caused 

by delay.” Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 157 

Ill. 2d 282, 301 (1993). Regardless of the cause of the delay, in the absence of a prejudgment 

interest award, a defendant benefits economically from retaining those funds until judgment, 

and a plaintiff bears a corresponding burden from the loss of those funds. Cotton, 2023 IL App 

(1st) 220788, ¶ 58.

¶ 70 The statute limits the amount of prejudgment interest a plaintiff can receive. Further, by 

setting prejudgment interest at 6% and postjudgment interest at 9%, a plaintiff is incentivized 

to proceed with litigation expeditiously. In short, the prejudgment interest statute reflects the 

legislature’s intent to incentivize parties to settle and prevent either from profiting by delay.
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¶ 71 Special Legislation

¶ 72 Advocate contends that awarding prejudgment interest to personal injury and wrongful 

death plaintiffs to the exclusion of other tort victims violates the prohibition on special 

legislation in the Illinois Constitution. Plus, the amendment violates equal protection by 

placing the corresponding burden to pay prejudgment interest on personal injury and wrongful 

death defendants. 

¶ 73 The special legislation clause prohibits the General Assembly from conferring special 

benefits or privileges to a select group: “The General Assembly shall pass no special or local 

law when a general law is or can be made applicable.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13. We review 

a special legislation challenge under the same standards applicable to an equal protection 

challenge. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 393. Because the challenged classifications here do not burden a 

fundamental right or implicate a suspect class, we review whether they are rationally related 

to a legitimate governmental interest. Piccioli v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Retirement 

System, 2019 IL 122905, ¶ 20.

¶ 74 The General Assembly enacted the prejudgment interest statute to recompense tort 

plaintiffs for the time value of money and incentivize settlement. Ensuring a more complete 

recovery, promoting settlement, and easing the burden on crowded court dockets embrace 

legitimate legislative goals. And personal injury and wrongful death claims comprise a 

significant portion of the case-types, creating a backlog on civil docket. See Admin. Office of 

the Ill. Courts, Illinois Courts: Statistical Summary—2021, 20, 

https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/54868468-989e45f4-8bb8-c3882ed3b175/2021%20Annual%20Report%20Statistical%20Summary.pdf 

[https://perma.cc/CM4G-J5U2] (statistically significant increase in number of all law cases 
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filed versus disposed). The General Assembly could reasonably focus reform efforts on these 

cases to the exclusion of other tort cases. A legislature need not choose the most comprehensive 

reform and often elects to enact measures piecemeal. Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 319 

(1979).

¶ 75 Moreover, because a plaintiff suffers unique challenges while seeking compensation, 

treating personal injury and wrongful death plaintiffs differently from other litigants is 

reasonable. Frequently, personal injury plaintiffs have incurred life-altering damages for which 

prompt resolution avoids great financial hardship in addition to the injuries themselves. 

Wrongful conduct has violated their bodily integrity in a way victims of property or 

reputational torts do not suffer. These special characteristics represent a reasonable basis for 

the legislature to permit prejudgment interest to this class of plaintiffs. First Midwest Bank v.

Rossi, 2023 IL App (4th) 220643, ¶ 219.

¶ 76 Separation of Powers

¶ 77 Advocate insists that the prejudgment interest statute violates the separation of powers by 

“intruding on the judicial sphere of authority over litigation and trial” by requiring a trial court 

to “mechanically” add interest to a judgment to achieve a general legislative purpose without 

regard to the facts of a specific case. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1 (“The legislative, executive 

and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to 

another.”). 

¶ 78 The General Assembly has the authority to enact laws providing prejudgment interest. See 

Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, 222 Ill. 2d 218, 256 (2006) (“ ‘The recovery of 

interest in this State’ ” “ ‘is purely statutory.’ ” (quoting Blakeslee’s Storage Warehouses, Inc.

v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 480, 483 (1938))); Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Ryan, 268 Ill. App. 
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3d 268, 277-78 (1994) (legislature, not jury, decides legal consequences of jury’s factual 

findings). Likewise, the prejudgment interest statute does not usurp the judiciary’s power 

because trial courts in money judgment cases lack the discretion to impose prejudgment 

interest absent a statutory mandate. See, e.g., Stanphill v. Ortberg, 2020 IL App (2d) 190769, 

¶ 9 (application of interest under section 2-1303 is mandatory; trial court has no discretion to 

refrain from imposing interest on money judgment). 

¶ 79 Three-Readings Rule

¶ 80 Advocate argues that the General Assembly violated the Illinois Constitution’s threereadings requirement. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d) (“A bill shall be read by title on three 

different days in each house.”). The enrolled bill doctrine “provides that once the Speaker of 

the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate certify that the procedural 

requirements for passing a bill have been met, a bill is conclusively presumed to have met all 

procedural requirements for passage,” which certification precludes judicial review. Friends 

of the Parks v. Chicago Park District, 203 Ill. 2d 312, 328-29 (2003). Advocate notes that the 

enrolled bill doctrine requires courts to defer to the certification of House and Senate leaders 

that a bill has met all procedural requirements (Geja’s Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition 

Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 260 (1992)). We cannot disregard the Illinois Supreme Court’s 

binding precedent. See Yakich v. Aulds, 2019 IL 123667, ¶ 13. Moreover, Advocate 

acknowledges it raises the issue to preserve it for appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, which 

stated that “[i]f the General Assembly continues its poor record of policing itself, we reserve 

the right to revisit this issue on another day to decide the continued propriety of ignoring this 

constitutional violation” (Geja’s Cafe, 153 Ill. 2d at 260). 

¶ 81 Retroactive Application
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¶ 82 Advocate poses that because the common law did not permit the recovery of prejudgment 

interest when Butts’s injury occurred and his complaint filed, the statute violates its vested 

right to raise a defense against the imposition of prejudgment interest that it possessed, like a 

property interest, but that the legislature “destroyed” in enacting the statute.

¶ 83 We disagree. No one has a vested interest in a rule of law, nor is entitled to insist the law 

remain unchanged for their benefit. Wingert v. Hradisky, 2019 IL 123201, ¶ 33 (opinion of 

Thomas, J., joined by Karmeier, C.J., and Garman, J.). The General Assembly may change or 

abolish remedies without infringing on a constitutional right. Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport 

Co., 412 Ill. 179, 190, (1952) (“[N]o constitutional right is necessarily violated by changing or 

abolishing a remedy available at common law.”). Also, Advocate’s reliance on Lazenby v. 

Mark’s Construction, Inc., 236 Ill. 2d 83, 98-99 (2010), is misplaced. Lazenby considered 

retroactively imposing a new legal duty on the defendant, rather than a remedial change.

¶ 84 Assuming Advocate had a vested right to avoid prejudgment interest, the statute does not 

apply retroactively to violate that right. Under the plain text, it applies prospectively: “For any 

personal injury or wrongful death occurring before the effective date of this amendatory Act 

***, the prejudgment interest shall begin to accrue on the later of the date the action is filed or 

the effective date of this amendatory Act ***.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) (West 2022). 

¶ 85 Butts filed his complaint in October 2019. The statute states that he could recover 

prejudgment interest beginning on the statute’s effective date, July 1, 2021, to the date of the 

judgment on September 25, 2022. Because the statute provides for prejudgment interest only 

in the years after its enactment, it does not apply retroactively. 

¶ 86 Affirmed. 

¶ 87 JUSTICE TAILOR, specially concurring:
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¶ 88 The majority affirms the judgment against Advocate and Dr. Michael Soo-Young Joo, 

holding that the trial court’s response to the jury’s question was correct—that is, in order to 

find for Steven Butts, the jury need only unanimously agree that Dr. Joo was negligent, not 

unanimously agree that Dr. Joo was negligent in at least one of the four separate and distinct 

ways alleged by Butts. I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm but do so on the basis that 

Advocate forfeited its claim of error. Therefore, I would not reach the merits of the substantive 

legal question Advocate raises in this appeal. I also agree with the majority’s decision rejecting 

Advocate’s constitutional challenges to the prejudgment interest statute.

¶ 89 To review, the case was tried on four allegations of negligence, each of which was alleged 

to have proximately caused Butts’s significant brain injury. Following a jury instruction 

conference, the parties agreed that the jury would be instructed using Illinois Pattern Jury 

Instructions, Civil, No. 20.01 (revised Aug. 2023) and No. 21.02 (approved Dec. 8, 2011). The 

parties also agreed that the jury be instructed using Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No.

45.03 (approved Dec. 8, 2011), as modified, which informed the jury, in relevant part, that 

“[y]our verdict must be unanimous” and that the jury would only be provided two verdict 

forms. The jury was further instructed that it should “fill in and sign” either verdict form A, if 

the jury found “in favor of the Plaintiff and against Defendants,” or verdict form B, if the jury 

found “in favor of Defendants, and against the Plaintiff.” Advocate did not indicate at any time 

that a general verdict form was insufficient in any way or that the facts of the case required 

more specificity than the general verdict forms provided. Likewise, Advocate did not request 

special interrogatories.

¶ 90 During deliberations, the jury submitted a written question to the trial court stating: “[w]e 

understand that only one of the findings of negligence needs to be found in order to proceed. 
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Do we need unanimous agreement on any one of the findings in order to proceed?” There is 

no record of the discussion between the court and counsel regarding this first question. 

However, after the jury sent a second question, it appears that, in an attempt to make a record, 

the trial judge summarized his interaction with the parties. The court stated:

“And we weren’t on the record at the time of the first question, and both sides stated 

what their position was. The plaintiff—the Court proposed an answer which was ‘[i]n 

order to proceed, you must make a unanimous decision that Dr. Joo was negligent. You

do not need to be unanimous as to which one of the four possible acts constitute the 

negligence.’ 

The plaintiff agreed that I should give that answer and the defendant disagreed and 

said I should not give at least that answer the way I gave it.” 

According to Advocate’s bystander’s report, Advocate requested that the court “tell the jury to 

read the jury instructions.” 

¶ 91 The jury’s second question stated: 

“We have no unanimity as to any of the four findings that Dr. Joo was negligent. We 

have a split decision as to one of the counts. We have a majority decision as to one of 

the counts. We are unanimous that on two of the counts that Dr. Joo was not negligent. 

With the majority vote on one, do we proceed?” 

The trial court proposed telling the jurors they should refer to its answer to their first question 

as well as the written jury instructions. Advocate’s counsel stated that “the proper answer 

would be please refer to the jury instructions only. That’s my recommendation.” Butts’s 

counsel disagreed and stated that the court should “tell them about the previous answer to the 

previous question and this is in follow up.” The court noted the disagreement between the 
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parties on how it should answer the second question and then answered the question as follows: 

“[t]he answer to your ‘follow up’ question is this: ‘Please refer to my answer to your first 

question along with the written jury instructions I have given you.’ ” Neither party objected to 

the court’s ultimate answer. Shortly thereafter, the jury returned a general verdict for Butts and 

against Advocate.

¶ 92 Advocate argues that the trial court’s answers to the jury’s questions were wrong as a 

matter of law and violated its constitutional right to juror unanimity. Specifically, Advocate 

faults the trial court for improperly instructing the jury that it must unanimously agree that Dr. 

Joo was negligent, but that it need not unanimously find against Dr. Joo on any single act of 

alleged negligence.

¶ 93 Insomuch as Advocate now attempts to argue that the court should have answered the 

jury’s question in a way that Advocate did not propose, I would find these arguments forfeited. 

See Koehler v. Neighbors, 322 Ill. App. 3d 440, 448 (2001). The only answer that Advocate 

put forward to the jury’s questions—refer to the instructions that were already given—was no 

answer at all because those instructions are silent on the jury’s legal question. Id. (“Allowing 

the jury to stand on the original instructions when faced with a direct question on a legal matter 

is clearly contrary to the law of the State of Illinois.”). Indeed, by urging the court to answer 

the jury’s question by referring it to the pattern instructions that were already given, 

instructions which do not answer the question of law identified by the jury, Advocate 

effectively told the court that it should not answer the jury’s question. Only belatedly in its 

post-trial motion and now on appeal does Advocate contend that the court should have 

instructed the jury that it was required to unanimously find that Dr. Joo was negligent in at 

least one of the four ways asserted by Butts. “[I]t is fundamental to our adversarial process that 
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a party forfeits his right to complain of an error where to do so would be inconsistent with the 

position taken by that party in an earlier court proceeding.” Givens v. City of Chicago, 2023 IL 

127837, ¶ 77.

¶ 94 This court has gone so far as to require parties to submit specific written responses to jury 

questions proposed during deliberations, reasoning that “in the midst of jury deliberations after 

a vigorously contested trial, a question from the jury deserves as much—if not more—

thoughtful consideration as did the original instructions.” Van Winkle v. Owens-Corning 

Fiberglass Corp., 291 Ill. App. 3d 165, 173-74 (1997) (citing Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

239(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 239(c)). I may not go so far as to require a written proposed response to 

a jury question in every case, but if a party objects to the court’s answer to the jury’s question, 

then counsel must at the very least offer its proposed answer orally, and on the record, to 

properly preserve the issue for appeal. See Koehler, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 448 (“If the parties 

disagree with the trial court’s proposed method of dealing with a jury question, then the 

objecting party needs to make the appropriate suggestion. The situation is really no different 

from when a party complains on an appeal that the trial court should have given an instruction 

to the jury and that instruction was never proposed by the complaining party. No relief is 

warranted in that situation.”); Cf. Cipolla v. Village of Oak Lawn, 2015 IL App (1st) 132228, 

¶¶ 28-29 (rejecting forfeiture argument when party’s counsel orally made of record his 

preferred answer to a jury question).

¶ 95 Advocate alternatively asks that we reach the merits because forfeiture only binds the 

parties, not the court. Maniez v. Citibank, F.S.B., 404 Ill. App. 3d 941, 948 (2010). I see no 

good reason not to honor Advocate’s forfeiture, particularly where it consistently failed 

throughout the trial to raise the legal issue it now presses on appeal. As the majority points out, 
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Advocate consented to a general verdict by agreeing to the jury instructions and verdicts forms 

as given and by failing to request special interrogatories. See McMath v. Katholi, 191 Ill. 2d 

251, 255 (2000) (“A party cannot complain of error which he induced the court to make or to 

which he consented.”). If a party does not object to jury instructions or verdict forms at trial, 

any objections are forfeited on appeal. Compton v. Ubilluz, 353 Ill. App. 3d 863, 869 (2004); 

see also Christopherson v. St. Vincent Hospital, 384 P.3d 1098, 1108 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016) 

(“[U]nder the general verdict rule, we assume that all seven theories of negligence are 

supported by the evidence and that the *** jury’s verdict therefore could validly rest on any 

one (or more) of those bases.”); Dillard v. Texas Electric Cooperative, 157 S.W.3d 429, 434 

(Tx. 2005) (“Under broad-form submission rules, jurors need not agree on every detail of what 

occurred so long as they agree on the legally relevant result. Thus, jurors may agree that a 

defendant failed to follow approved safety practices without deciding each reason that the 

defendant may have failed to do so. [Citation.] Similarly, the jurors here could have 

unanimously found Bumstead negligent, even if half believed the negligent act was 

overloading his truck and half believed it was failing to warn oncoming traffic—acts that 

preceded two different collisions.”). And then when confronted by the jury’s binary questions, 

Advocate balked by urging the court to refer the jury to the IPI instructions already given. 

Thus, the court’s answers to the jury’s questions were based on the very instructions and verdict 

forms that Advocate agreed to.

¶ 96 Moreover, we should honor Advocate’s forfeiture because the answer to the question is 

likely to have a cascade effect on jury deliberations that we have not been able to consider. To 

be sure, the level of jury specificity that is required will potentially affect other types of claims 

or defenses alleging multiple allegations of negligence, including, for example, cases where a 
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defendant asserts contributory negligence or affirmative defenses against a plaintiff or where 

a defendant seeks contribution from a co-defendant or a third-party defendant. And the level 

of jury specificity could affect cases involving multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants.

¶ 97 I express no opinion on the merits of whether the principle of jury unanimity requires that, 

in order to find for a plaintiff who alleges multiple acts or omissions of negligence, each of 

which proximately caused his injury, the jury must unanimously find that the defendant 

committed at least one act or omission of negligence. Compare Christopherson, 384 P.3d at 

1105-08 (jury need only unanimously agree that doctor was negligent, not unanimously agree 

that he was negligent in at least one of the seven ways alleged by plaintiff), with Elizabeth A. 

Larsen, Specificity and Juror Agreement in Civil Cases, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 379 (2002) 

(advocating that juries be required to agree on specific facts).