This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-1345

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Byron Dean Sayers,

Appellant.

Filed April 25, 2016

Reversed and remanded

Reyes, Judge

Hubbard County District Court

File No. 29-CR-14-256

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donovan D. Dearstyne, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for 

respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Klaphake, 

Judge.



 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

REYES, Judge

Appellant Byron Sayers challenges his probation revocation, arguing that the 

district court did not make sufficient fact findings on any of the necessary factors under 

State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 1980). Because the district court did not make 

adequate findings regarding the second and third Austin factors, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

In 2014, Byron Sayers was on probation and living with his fiancée, B.M. B.M.’s 

adult son came to stay with the couple and brought his three firearms with him. The 

firearms were stored in an unlocked closet in the couple’s bedroom. On March 7, 

Sayers’s probation officer and several police officers arrived at the home to conduct a 

check because they had received information that he was keeping a shotgun in his 

bedroom closet. Sayers admitted to the officers that the firearms were in his closet, and 

the state subsequently charged him with one count of possession of a firearm by an 

ineligible person in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) 

(2012). He pleaded guilty to the charge in exchange for a stay of adjudication and ten

years of probation. 

Almost three months after the entry of his plea, Sayers admitted to violating the 

terms of his probation by drinking alcohol. The district court ordered Sayers to serve 90 

days’ local incarceration and reinstated the stay of adjudication. Several weeks after he 

was released from jail, police were called to B.M.’s residence on a report of domestic 

violence. Hubbard County deputy sheriff Shane Plautz testified at a contested omnibus 
3

hearing on Sayers’s third-degree assault charge that when he arrived at the home he 

found Sayers in the kitchen. Sayers appeared to be very intoxicated, but there was no 

indication that Sayers had assaulted B.M. The deputy testified that Sayers became 

belligerent and attempted to enter the bedroom where B.M. was located. The deputy 

tried to block Sayers’s path, prompting Sayers to shove the deputy into the refrigerator 

and throw a punch at his head. The deputy pursued Sayers into the bedroom and tackled 

him onto the bed and on top of B.M. Another officer helped subdue Sayers by tasing 

him, and Sayers was placed under arrest. Deputy Plautz suffered a dislocated shoulder as 

a result of the altercation. 

Based on this incident, Sayers was charged with third-degree assault, fourthdegree assault, and obstructing legal process with force. Sayers’s probation officer also 

filed a report alleging that he violated his probation because he failed to abstain from 

alcohol, failed to submit to drug and alcohol testing, and failed to remain law abiding. 

Sayers pleaded guilty to obstructing legal process with force and admitted that he 

violated his probation by drinking alcohol and by failing to remain law abiding. At his 

sentencing hearing, Sayers submitted a chemical-dependency assessment that 

recommended inpatient alcohol treatment, and he requested that the court give him an 

opportunity to attend a treatment program. The district court judge stated that he would 

take the issue under advisement. 

At his probation revocation hearing before the same judge, the parties 

acknowledged that Sayers had admitted to violating the terms of his probation on two 

different occasions since the stay of adjudication had been granted. The district court 
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decided to revoke Sayers’s probation and vacate the stay of adjudication, enter a 

judgment of conviction, and sentence Sayers to 63 months in prison, stating:

All right. I am going to vacate the stay of adjudication, Mr. 

Sayers. Those two violations here, both were um, underscored 

by your use of alcohol. And the most recent one, there was an 

emergency call placed, law enforcement responded based on 

allegations of assaultive behavior toward [B.M.]. I know you 

pled guilty to an obstructing charge rather than the assault 

charge. An officer was injured in the course of taking you into 

custody. But, more importantly, I’m seeing an escalation of 

your behaviors. No showing that you are taking the restrictions 

and terms of your probation seriously. You were granted an 

extremely[] huge opportunity by getting the stay of 

adjudication. And I understand the background of the case that 

the guns were somebody else’s. [B.M.’s] son or step-son. But 

nonetheless, they were in your possession. You were 

convicted of that–you pled guilty to that offense. I did not enter 

adjudication at that time, based on a joint request. And so, you 

had the support of the State at that time. They thought that was 

a reasonable way to address this. You have the support of 

probation, even at the time of the first violation. Ms. Welk, as 

I recall, did not think, at that point, your use of alcohol should 

result in you going to prison. But when I look at the whole 

history of this case, I see an escalation and therefore, I am 

going to revoke the stay of adjudication. 

The district court judge did not address Sayers’s earlier request to attend inpatient 

alcohol treatment. Sayers now appeals.

D E C I S I O N

When a probationer violates a term of his probation, the district court has the 

option to continue probation, revoke probation and impose a stayed sentence, or order 

intermediate sanctions. Minn. Stat. § 609.14 subd. 3 (2014). The district court “has 

broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and 

should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d 
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at 249-50. But before revoking probation, the district court must “1) designate the 

specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was 

intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies 

favoring probation.” Id. at 250. We review de novo whether the district court has made 

the required Austin findings. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005).

Sayers argues that the district court erred by revoking his probation without 

making any of the necessary Austin findings. When performing the Austin analysis, the 

Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the district court must make specific findings that 

convey the “substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon,” and may 

not simply “recit[e] the three factors and offer[] general, non-specific reasons for 

revocation.” Id. at 608. The district court need not issue a written order, but it must 

“create [a] thorough, fact-specific record[] setting forth [its] reasons for revoking 

probation.” Id. & n.4. Even if the evidence is sufficient to support the revocation, failure 

to address all three Austin factors requires reversal and remand. Id. at 606-08 (reversing 

and remanding because the district court did not address the second and third Austin

factors). Because the record here does not indicate that the court sufficiently considered 

the second and third Austin factors, we reverse and remand. 

I. The First Austin Factor

To satisfy the first Austin factor, the district court must designate which specific 

probation conditions were violated. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. Sayers admitted to 

violating the terms of his probation by drinking alcohol on two occasions and by failing 

to remain law abiding. At his probation-revocation hearing, both parties acknowledged 
6

on the record that these admissions were made. Because the district court’s analysis

references those violations, the record is sufficient for us to conclude that the court 

accepted Sayers’s admissions and implicitly found the first Austin factor to be satisfied. 

II. The Second Austin Factor

Under the second Austin factor, the district court must find that the probationer’s 

violations were intentional or inexcusable. Id. Here, it is not evident that the district 

court made the necessary findings. Although the district court appears to have 

recognized Sayers’s admissions that he violated his probation, this is a separate inquiry 

than whether those violations were intentional or inexcusable. The district court’s 

analysis does not contain any statements with regard to Sayers’s reasons for the

violations. Because there is no unequivocal statement by the court, Modtland’s 

requirement that the court “create [a] thorough, fact-specific record[]” stating the reasons 

for the revocation is not satisfied. 695 N.W.2d at 608.

III. The Third Austin Factor

The third Austin factor requires the district court to consider whether the need for 

confinement outweighs the policies favoring continued probation. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 

250. The district court “must bear in mind that ‘policy considerations may require that 

probation not be revoked even though the facts may allow it’ and that ‘[t]he purpose of 

probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort when 

treatment has failed.’” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 606 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250). In making this determination, the district court considers

whether:
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(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from 

further criminal activity by the offender; or

(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which 

can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or

(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the 

violation if probation were not revoked.

Id. at 607 (quotation omitted).

The district court here did not explicitly consider any of the three subfactors, did 

not make any findings on the policies favoring probation, and did not make an explicit 

finding as to whether the need for Sayers’s confinement outweighed the strong policies 

favoring probation. In determining that Sayers’s probation should be revoked, the court 

noted what it believed was an “escalation” in his behavior in that his most recent 

probation violation involved the injury of a police officer. It also expressed the opinion 

that Sayers was not “taking the restrictions and terms of [his] probation seriously.” 

Although these findings relate generally to the need to confine Sayers, this is only part of 

the necessary analysis. Austin requires the district court to go further and weigh that need 

against the policies in favor of probation. Here, the district court did not address the 

policies favoring probation, including rehabilitation and whether treatment has failed. In 

particular, it failed to address Sayers’s earlier request to attend inpatient chemicaldependency treatment. Without any consideration of whether such treatment could have 

helped Sayers, or why this course of action was inferior to revocation, we lack a 

sufficient record to review whether the district court abused its discretion in choosing to 

revoke. See id. at 608 (“[I]t is not the role of appellate courts to scour the record to 

determine if sufficient evidence exists to support the district court’s revocation.”). 
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Because the record is inadequate with regard to the second and third Austin factors,

including the three subfactors, we reverse and remand for additional findings.

Reversed and remanded.