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Joint Special Operations University

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem

President

Dr. Brian A. Maher

Vice President

Strategic Studies Department

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon

Director

James D. Anderson

Director of Research


JSOU Report 06-4

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2006

NARCOTERRORISM

in Latin America

A Brazilian Perspective

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the U.S. 

Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or the Joint Special 

Operations University. 

*******

Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. 

Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-

2763; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.

af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-02-4 NEED ISBN
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Brazilian Army Command, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, or 

the Brazilian Government. 

vii

Contents

Foreword ............................................................................ ix

1. Introduction: The Global Beast Narcoterrorism ............... 1

2. The Illegal Drug Trade ...................................................... 5

3. Narcotrafficking and Terrorist Organizations ................. 11

4. Colombia’s Stalemate .................................................... 17

5. FARC Connections in Paraguay and the Tri-Border Area . 35

6. Brazil Confronts the Beast ............................................. 47

7. Conclusion: Interagency Tasks with 

 International Dimensions .............................................. 63

About the Author ....................................................................

ix

Foreword

As the United States continues its Global War on Terrorism it 

is now looking beyond the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq 

to consider engaging in other regions where terrorism and attendant forms of lawlessness attack the basic freedoms surrounding 

representative government and economic development. The Middle 

East, Horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia come to mind. However, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro reminds us of the imminent threat of terrorism in our Western Hemisphere. The paper suggests that while 

continuing our counterterrorism initiatives elsewhere, the United 

States, with its friends, can leverage those capable countries in the 

region to pursue the terrorism threat at our doorstep.

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro is a source of expert advice for military planners in a time of great geostrategic complexity and evolving national vision for a world in flux. He is a former commander of 

Brazil’s 1st Special Forces Battalion, a capable, world-class unit that 

specializes in unconventional warfare and counterterrorism. Indeed, 

retired Major General Alvaro was directly engaged in close combat, 

successfully defeating terrorists and guerrilla fighters in two major 

campaigns. In the 1970s he fought against the Araguaia Guerrilla 

Force (FOGUERA) revolutionary movement in the Parrot’s Beak (Bico 

do Papagaio) area, now in the Brazilian state of Tocantins. In the 

1990s he commanded a special operations task force to destroy the 

FARC front known as the Simon Bolivar Command in operations 

along the Traíra River, on the border 

between Brazil and Colombia. All of 

this was facilitated by General Alvaro’s appreciation and implementation 

of unconventional warfare and civil 

military operations. While General Alvaro speaks from a decidedly Brazilian 

point of view, he offers North American 

readers insightful commentary about 

narcoterrorism in the Hemisphere.

Narcoterrorism in Latin America: A Brazilian Perspective builds a 

case for giving greater attention to the narcoterrorism threat. General 

Alvaro suggests that security conditions in Colombia and the Tri-Border Area (TBA), where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet, deserve 

While General Alvaro 

speaks from a decidedly 

Brazilian point of view, he 

offers North American 

readers insightful commentary about narcoterrorism 

in the hemisphere.
x

the immediate attention of security officials of the Hemisphere’s more 

capable countries. In this paper, General Alvaro provides a review of 

Colombia’s security situation—the history and current situation—

and details his thoughts about the United States’ support of the government of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez. President Uribe 

wants increased US support to provide more military resources, so 

the country can go on the offensive against the FARC and reestablish 

a government presence throughout Colombia. General Alvaro’s paper expresses his concern the United States might abandon Uribe’s 

“Plan Colombia” just as it is poised to make significant progress in 

the war against narcoterrorism. 

General Alvaro also details the situation in the TBA in great detail and describes FARC linkages within that area. The FARC’s initiative to create America’s Revolutionary Force (Força Revolucionária 

da América) may suggest an increasing narcoterrorism threat for the 

TBA and elsewhere. 

In the section “Brazil Confronts the Beast,” a concise summary 

is provided of Brazil’s strategy, force structure and disposition. Brazil has taken considerable measures to reorganize and modernize 

it forces (within budget constraints) to meet the new threats that 

it perceives are affecting the Amazon basin and the hemisphere in 

general. Here the reader will find the descriptions of the Calha Norte 

and Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia (SIVAM) projects especially 

interesting. Calha Norte is a long-standing project to ensure defense 

and development in border areas in north and west Brazil; SIVAM is 

a newly installed surveillance system for protecting the Amazon from 

unauthorized incursions. They are important to understand because 

they are tangible evidence of Brazilian strategic thinking. 

General Alvaro’s concludes that the narcoterrorism threat must 

be countered by regional cooperation among the Latin American nations that are most capable of taking meaningful action. He enjoins 

North Americans to respect each country as a unique entity, with its 

own expertise and capacities for countering narcoterrorism.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon

Director, Strategic Studies Department

Joint Special Operations University 
1

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

1. Introduction: 

 The Global Beast Narcoterrorism

The end of the last millennium witnessed the collapse of the 

Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Empire, and the termination of the Cold War. We are in a period characterized by the 

repudiation of totalitarianism, the resurgence of democracy and the 

geopolitics of the economic blocks. There have been many ruptures, 

clashes and changes resulting from fragmentation and globalism in 

the international environment. This paper focuses on the problem 

of narcoterrorism and its impact in the Western Hemisphere. It discusses broadly the illegal drug trade as it has evolved today and 

provides a view of narcoterrorist organizations. The situation in Colombia is addressed, and this is followed by a discussion of issues in 

the Tri-Border Area, where Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay meet. A 

detailed description of Brazil’s actions to face up to the challenge of 

narcoterrorism is provided. 

The beginning of the 21st Century, particularly since the tragedy 

of 11 September 2001, is demonstrating that the current threats are 

completely different from the former ones in nature and dimension. 

The warfare resources classically used to fight the dangers in the 

recent past are not enough to face the conflicts of the new century. 

Besides new technologies, it’s absolutely necessary to rethink the 

new global security environment.

The multipolar nature of today’s 

strategic environment is likely to continue into the next two decades. Regional powers are emerging onto the 

global scene as today’s driving forces 

move both developed and developing 

nation-states into global networks of economic interest. This fact creates a strategic framework for friction as cultures, religions, governments, economies, and people collide in a highly competitive global 

market. Today, there are over 190 nation-states worldwide, as many 

as 30 have the potential for failure as a consequence of their inability 

to meet the needs of their populations, or because of ethnic, cultural 

or religious conflict. 

The multipolar nature of 

today’s strategic environment 

is likely to continue into the 

next two decades.
2

 JSOU Report 06-4

Weak and failed states have become the primary source of international instability, and they have become shelters and breeding 

grounds for such transnational threats as terrorism, drug-trafficking, weapons smuggling, refugee generation, environmental degradation, and political and religious fundamentalism. There is no 

doubt that violence on a national, transnational, and subnational 

level will continue. The fact that failed states are the primary source 

of instability means that irregular wars, in the context of asymmetric 

conflicts, within weak states, rather than conventional wars among 

powerful states, will prevail.

Slide into Narcoterrorism

As the bipolar world crumbled and as the USSR was less and less 

able to subsidize anti-western terrorists, the classic groups exercising political violence had to look elsewhere for funding. A remarkable 

example of such a shift was the Provisional IRA’s (Irish Republican 

Army) large-scale 1980s move into the organized crime arena. While 

historically involved in minor protection-racket activities, as the Cold 

War drew to an end the Provisional IRA became more involved in illicit gambling, running game arcades and taxi firms, and even drug 

running. This diversification was simply a more sophisticated version of a slide into less-than-political activities mirrored elsewhere, 

most often in Latin America. In this context, three IRA agents were 

arrested in August 2001 in Bogotá, Columbia, suspected of teaching urban bombing techniques to the Revolutionary Armed Forces 

of Colombia (FARC—Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) 

narcoterrorists.1 The FARC in Colombia and remnants of the Shining 

Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru were rewarded by local drug lords 

in return for supplying plantation and supply route security, with 

financial payments exceeding the unpredictable and at times more 

dangerous kidnapping and bank robbery activities previously used 

to raise funds.

This new beast—narcoterrorism—has been identified globally: in 

Sri Lanka (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE), in Turkey 

(the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK), among warrior factions in Somalia, among ethnic groups fighting for independence from the Russian Federation in Chechnya, and in other countries. Drug traffickers and terrorists tend to thrive in chaotic countries characterized by 

failed states with ineffective governments that have been destabilized 

by war and internal conflict. International criminal networks have 
3

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

become politically powerful. Criminals not only buy the politicians’ 

protection but also appropriate for themselves the state’s government structure to defend their business. Currently, failed states are 

the paradise for drugs, arms and terrorism activities. Sometimes, the 

association between illegal business and the government’s activities 

are so strong that it is not possible to distinguish where one finishes and the other starts. There are countries or areas within them 

where traditional laws are not applicable and criminals make their 

own rules. A typical example is Transdniester, a region in the former 

Soviet Republic of Moldova, where the main exportation product is 

illegal arms.2

The spectrum of 

transnational narcoterrorism, characterized by the “lethal 

triangle”3 integrated 

by narcotraffickers, terrorists, and weapons smugglers, which underscore organized crime activities in the great urban centers already 

afflicted by the migration of minorities, emerged on the world stage 

as a new and very dangerous threat to human society. Coalitions 

of murderous, pseudo-revolutionary criminals, who receive billions 

of illegal dollars from producing and selling drugs, are taking advantage of the deregulation of the financial markets that currently 

facilitates cross-border money transfers through complex operations 

involving the Internet and complex financial schemes of money laundering that combine legal and illegal practices and institutions.

Regarding the Western Hemisphere, the diabolical union of domestic and Cuban-exported communist political insurgency in Colombia with drug trafficking, as a consequence of the end of the Cold 

War, is one of the most serious security challenges to international 

security. Communist guerrillas and rural bandit groups became 

completely integrated with highly expert criminal syndicates and, 

dramatically, the problem, with severe implications to neighboring 

states and to the remaining superpower—the United States of America—is far from being resolved.

The spectrum of transnational narcoterrorism 

... emerged on the world stage as a new and 

very dangerous threat to human society. 
4

 JSOU Report 06-4
5

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

2. The Illegal Drug Trade

People have used drugs to affect their health and alter their 

moods since the beginning of recorded history. From cures 

of disease and reduction of pain to religious ritual use and 

purely recreational intentions to alter the state of consciousness, 

drugs have been used both in responsible, medicinal ways and in 

physically, psychologically, and sociologically disreputable ways. To 

regulate the former and minimize the latter, societies have developed 

moral values and written laws governing the legal and illegal uses of 

drugs. 

Drug Use and International Trafficking

Unfortunately, the level of drug use in the world is increasing. According to the last report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

(UNODC), some 200 million people, or five percent of the world’s 

population age 15–64, have used drugs at least once in the last 12 

months. This is 15 million more than the last year’s estimate. The 

most-consumed illicit drugs are marijuana and hashish (160 million people or 4 percent of the global population age 15–64) followed 

of amphetamines and ecstasy (34 million), opiates (16 million) and 

cocaine (14 million). The study showed that opiates are the world’s 

most problematic drug in terms of demand for chemical dependence 

treatment. In Europe and Asia, opiates (mainly heroin) account for 

more than 60 percent of chemical dependence treatment. However, 

in North and South America the most problematic drug continues to 

be cocaine.4

International drug trafficking is a remarkable increasingly criminal activity that threatens democratic institutions, fuels terrorism 

and human rights abuses, and undermines economic development. 

While foreign narcotics cartels continue to make the United States 

their primary target, many countries worldwide are largely affected 

by drug use and its devastation. Drugs and weapons are inseparable 

components of the current transnational organized crime. This association brings crime to the streets, violence to communities, and 

drug abuses to towns and cities.

Rich, violent, and powerful drug syndicates pose a growing 

and fundamental threat to fragile democracies, and their economic 

growth. In these countries, drug related corruption and crime under-
6

 JSOU Report 06-4

mine public confidence in governmental democratic institutions. Using their resources and power to corrupt and intimidate, these drug 

syndicates can virtually destroy public safety organizations, paralyze judicial institutions, ruin banking and other key international 

businesses, and gain influence at the highest levels of government. 

Recent examples of related violence, corruption and political upheavals in countries as diverse as Russia, Colombia and Afghanistan, 

demonstrate how these threats can affect vulnerable democracies 

around the world.

Drug trade is extremely lucrative. Heroin, cocaine and cannabis 

(marijuana) are uncomplicated and 

cheap to produce, but because they 

are illegal, and therefore risky to 

supply, they can earn more than 

their weight in gold on the vast international black market. Global 

economic interests are compromised by the movement of billions of 

dollars of illicit drug money around the world annually. The UNODC 

World Drug Report of 2005 states that illicit drug businesses generate about $322 billion per year, equivalent to 0.9 percent of the 

worldwide Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This value is larger than 

the individual GDP’s of nearly 90 percent of the countries of the 

world.5 Also, because the drug trade is secretive, narcotrafficking 

and terrorists organizations can amass large amounts of cash without being detected by law enforcement agencies. 

This money flow creates unfair competition for honest business 

and can result in severe misallocation of resources toward unproductive ends in rich and poor countries. In addition, this flow can 

severely distort economic planning, particularly in weak economies 

that are struggling to grow, and it fosters global inflation. In addition, 

drug production in Asia, the Andes and elsewhere is causing serious 

environmental damage.6

Narcotraffickers and terrorists tend to thrive in failed states with 

ineffective governments that have been destabilized by war and internal conflict. For example, Colombia, a large, fragmented country 

in the throes of a decades-long conflict over power and resources, 

produces 50 percent of the world’s cocaine and 70 percent of the US 

heroin supply.7 Lebanon has been plagued by drug traffickers and 

Heroin, cocaine and cannabis 

(marijuana) are uncomplicated and cheap to produce, 

but because they are illegal, 

and therefore risky to supply, 

they can earn more than their 

weight in gold on the vast international black market. 
7

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

terrorist groups since its own harrowing 15-year civil war began in 

1975. In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of occupying Soviet troops in 

1990 left the economically devastated country vulnerable to control 

by warlords and Islamist extremists. Furthermore, by promoting violence, tax evasion, and lawlessness, terrorists and drug traffickers 

make it harder for a weakened state to form a stable central government.

Source, Consumption, and Transit Zone Countries

There are five main activities carried out by the criminal organizations: finance, production, processing, transportation, and distribution. To have a complete picture of the trafficking business, it is useful to split the countries worldwide into three categories: the source 

countries (producers), the consumption countries (consumers), and 

the transit zone countries.

Consumers. The three largest consuming markets of these substances are North America (United States, Canada, and Mexico), with 

44 percent of the total, Europe (33 percent) and Asia (11 percent).8

John P. Walters, Director of the US Office of National Drug Control 

Policy in 2002, has said that Americans spend over $60 billion a year 

to purchase illegal drugs, more than any other country.9

Producers. Colombia is currently the world’s principal producer and 

distributor of refined cocaine, the vast majority (70 percent) of which 

is exported to the US market. In 2004, Columbia refined approximately 390 metric tons of cocaine, roughly 50 percent of global production (Peru, 32 percent and Bolivia, 18 percent).10 The refined narcotic is usually snorted through the nasal passages, although it can 

also be injected intravenously. Crack is a derivative of cocaine that 

began to appear in the 1990s. The psychotropic and physiological 

effects of cocaine and crack cocaine are the same, but the intensity 

and duration of each can differ.11

In the past, most of the primary base used for Colombian cocaine 

production was imported from Peru and Bolivia. However, this has 

changed over the last few years. Currently, Colombia is primarily responsible for all stages of the cocaine production process, including 

initial harvesting.

Before 1994, the Cali and Medellin cartels had total control of the 

Colombian cocaine business. However, since the death of the Medellin kingpin Pablo Escobar in 1993, as well as the capture of the Cali 
8

 JSOU Report 06-4

cartel’s leaders, new syndicates have appeared, now operating in 

small and independent cells. Their drug trade operations also have 

been diversified into opiates. So, in addition to cocaine, Colombia 

became the Western Hemisphere’s largest producer and distributor 

of opium and its most hazardous derivative, refined heroin.12

In 2004, UNODC estimates showed Colombian poppy cultivation 

to be 7,500 hectares (18,500 acres), a crop capable of producing 

roughly eight tons of refined heroin.12 As with cocaine, the main target for the bulk of this opium derivative is the United States, accounting for 65 percent of all shipments that are exported from Colombia. In global terms, however, less than 2 percent of the world’s 

opium and refined heroin comes from Colombia. Most production 

takes place either in the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia (Burma, 

Thailand, and Laos) or the Golden Crescent of Southwest Asia (Iran, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan).14 Mexico is also a heroin producer with a 

brown powder form and the more common “black tar variety.”

Cannabis (marijuana) remains the most widely used illegal drug 

in the United States. Colombia is also the largest source of cannabis 

for a US user, providing approximately 40 percent of the total American supply. Mexico produces 25 percent, other countries 10 percent, 

and domestic US producers account for the rest of the US market, 

about 25 percent.15

Transit Zone Countries. Traffickers use several methods and routes 

to export cocaine, heroin, and marijuana to the main consumption 

countries, the US, and the countries of the European Union. The 

United States remains the largest and most reliable market for the 

Colombian narcotics trade. A large percentage of the shipments are 

trafficked along the coasts and over Central America, primarily Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, typical transit zone 

countries. Up to 70 percent of the illicit drugs that enter the United 

States are smuggled through Mexico, which acts as the main gateway 

to the North American market. Most consignments are then moved 

into the United States by syndicates based in the Tijuana, Nogales, 

Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, and Matamoros border regions.16

Considerable amounts of cocaine and heroine also enter the 

United States through Gulf Coast ports; Caribbean routes to Florida, 

Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands (directly or via Haiti, the Dominican Republic or the Lesser Antilles); both east and west coast 

ports of entry; and from Canada.17
9

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

Brazil, a Typical Transit Zone Country. According to the UNODC 

2005 Report, Brazil is a typical transit zone country with a level average consumption, if compared with other countries of the world. 

In a list of 15 countries, Brazil appears in seventh place in the consumption of ecstasy, tenth place in the consumption of cocaine and 

amphetamines, and twelfth place in the consumption of marijuana. 

In relation to its neighbors of the Southern Cone (Argentine, Chile, 

Paraguay and Uruguay), Brazil is first in the consumption of ecstasy, 

third in the amphetamine consumption, fourth in the cocaine consumption, and fifth in the cannabis (marijuana) consumption. The 

cocaine that arrives in Brazil is intended for internal consumption 

and for further transit to Europe’s drug market. It comes from Colombia (60 percent), Bolivia (30 percent), and Peru (10 percent). In 

2003, the country registered the fifth largest worldwide marijuana 

apprehension (166.2 tons) and the eighth largest worldwide cocaine 

apprehension (9.6 tons).
10

 JSOU Report 06-4
11

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

3. Narcotrafficking 

 and Terrorist Organizations

Twelve of the 28 groups classified by the US government as 

terrorists are actively engaged in drug trafficking.18 Regarding 

Latin America, the State Department has designated four terrorist groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO). Three of them 

are in Colombia: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Fuerzas (Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), and the United 

Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, 

AUC). The fourth is in Peru: the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, 

SL). All of them are deeply involved with the illicit drug trade. 

According to most experts, narcoterrorism refers to terrorist acts 

carried out by groups that are directly or indirectly involved in cultivating, manufacturing, transporting, or distributing illicit drugs. 

The term is also applied to groups that use the drug trade to fund 

terrorist organizations. Currently, it’s being used to refer to the increasingly close ties between powerful drug lords motivated by simple criminal profit and terrorist groups with political agendas, particularly in Colombia. Because of the reduction of funding by state 

sponsors to terrorist groups over the past decade, the co-operative 

relationship between previously separate entities, such as terrorists 

and drug barons, is evolving. Most 

terrorist groups operating worldwide today are highly dependent 

on self-financing through criminal 

activity. Therefore, the relationship 

between terrorism and criminality 

has taken on new importance.

The Italian economist Loretta Napoleoni, a terrorism expert, stated that there is now a global shock between two economic systems.19

The first one, dominant, is capitalism, and the other, emerging, is the 

new economy of terror, based upon the drug trade, weapons smuggling and money laundering. In her point of view, beyond the political 

or religious justification for terrorist attacks, there is an economic 

reality derived from the markets of goods and values supporting the 

anti-western radical Muslim project of Al Qaeda, the communist 

Most terrorist groups operating worldwide today are highly 

dependent on self-financing 

through criminal activity. 
12

 JSOU Report 06-4

project of the FARC, the separatist projects of ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) and the IRA (Irish Republican Army).

The reason why terrorist organizations turn to drug trafficking 

is because they need funding for weapons, explosives, computers 

and other information systems, equipment, training, transportation, 

bribes, safe houses, forged passports and other documents, and even 

payroll. Drugs are a handy way to get cash, lots of it.

Connections between Terrorists and Narcos

There are several ways to connect terrorist groups to the drug trade. 

Alliances exist at both ends of the continuum, with criminal groups 

forming alliances with terrorist organizations, and terrorist groups 

seeking alliances with criminal organizations. Alliances can include 

one-off, short-term, and long term agreements, and are usually used 

to gain expert knowledge, money laundering, counterfeiting, bomb 

making, operational support, and access to smuggling routes. The 

most common alliances exist in the field of international smuggling 

operations, evident in the cocaine for arms ties developed between 

Colombia’s FARC, Mexican and other countries’ drug trafficking 

groups, and Russian criminal groups.

Some criminal and terrorist groups have evolved beyond using 

terrorism and crime as respective operational tactics and now manifest characteristics of both terrorism and organized crime simultaneously. As a result, criminal groups are displaying political motivations in an effort to manipulate operational conditions present 

in the rising numbers of weak states. Terrorist groups are equally 

interested in criminal profits to replace lost financial support from 

state sponsors, but ultimately begin to use their political rhetoric as 

a façade for perpetrating solely criminal activities.

The final point of convergence among terrorists and criminal organizations is identified by the senior analyst Tamara Makarenko as 

the “black hole.” 20 At this point, the convergence between criminal 

and political motivations within a single group allows it to subsequently gain economic and political control over a state. The black 

hole contributes significantly to the production of a failed state—

such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Liberia—that lacks 

central authority, displays the characteristics of anarchy, or can produce a criminal state, such as North Korea, Myanmar, and potentially the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. 
13

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

Some groups, like Colombia’s FARC, collect taxes from people who 

cultivate or process illicit drugs on lands that they control and traffic 

in drugs themselves. Colombia’s ELN and AUC also traffic in drugs. 

Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley has for years been known as an equally fertile source of both opium poppies and terrorism for Hezbollah. Moreover, some terrorist groups are supported by states funded by the 

drug trade. Afghanistan’s former Taliban rulers, for instance, earned 

an estimated $40 million to $50 million per year from taxes related 

to opium. The drug trade is also a significant part of the economies 

of Syria, which has funded terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, 

the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command, 

and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Lebanon is a haven for numerous terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas.21 It is important to highlight 

that, technically, drug trafficking violates some Islamist terrorist religious or political beliefs. What happens is that some groups, including the Sunni Taliban and the Shiite extremists of Hezbollah, have 

decreed that Islam forbids taking drugs, such as opium, but permits 

producing and selling them.

According to the US Department of State, the following terrorist 

groups also participate in narcoterrorism.22

In Peru, when Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (Movimento Revolucionario 

Tupac Amaru), both radical leftist groups, headed toward the 

Huallaga Valley to establish the second subversive front (the 

first one was Ayacucho), they shifted their actions to defend 

the interests of coca cultivators in exchange for their subsequent imposition of conditions on production, trade and transportation activities. Through this agreement, the drug dealers 

provide the terrorist organizations with weapons and money 

in exchange for protection of their flights and actions that prevent the interference of security forces. Today, remnants of the 

Shining Path openly participate in all phases of drug traffic. 

Some members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a Sri 

Lankan separatist group, traffic in heroin, and the group reportedly has close ties to drug trafficking networks in Burma.

Hezbollah smuggles Latin American cocaine to Europe and the 

Middle East and has smuggled opiates out of Lebanon’s Bekaa 

Valley, the center of Hezbollah influence, although poppy cultivation there is declining. Officials in several countries have 

documented complicated trade patterns involving illicit ship-

•

•

•
14

 JSOU Report 06-4

ments of coca paste through the South American Tri-Border 

Area to the Bekaa Valley.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Marxist separatist group 

based in Turkey, taxes ethnic Kurdish drug traffickers, and individual PKK cells traffic in heroin.

The Real IRA, an Irish Republican Army splinter group that opposes the peace process in Northern Ireland, established a link 

to the FARC, and besides bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and robberies, it is suspected of trafficking 

drugs, although the extent of its involvement is unclear. 

The Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, 

ETA), a separatist group, was founded in 1959 with the aim 

of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist 

principles in Spain’s Basque Region and the southwestern 

French provinces of Labourd, Basse-Navarre, and Soule. Besides bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, robberies, and 

extortion it is reportedly involved in drug trafficking. During 

the 1980s, some ETA members allegedly have received sanctuary in Cuba and Nicaragua. There are intelligence reports that 

the ETA, after establishing links to the IRA, has contacted the 

FARC in order to provide diversified training for that organization. 

Al Qaeda is not a homogenous terrorist group but a network 

of terrorist groups scattered all over the world. The organization has global reach and presence in Europe, Asia, Africa, 

the Middle East, the Far East, Oceania, North America, and 

some parts of Central and South America. It is a flexible organization because, in spite of following a quite formal vertical structure, the horizontal integration between the different 

groups that are part of the network is completely sectorized 

and is totally informal. Al Qaeda is funded in several ways. 

Osama Bin Laden’s family runs a large construction company 

in Saudi Arabia and provides funds from his vast inheritance 

and has established income providing companies and charities 

that act as fronts for Al Qaeda. The October 2001 edition of the 

Russian magazine Top Secret is based upon sources linked to 

the Russian intelligence community and reported that there is 

a very well established connection between Al Qaeda and the 

Russian mafia.23 The point of contact for Bin Laden supporters 

would be [is?] one of the most dangerous criminals worldwide: 

•

•

•

•
15

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

Semion Mogilevich was born in 1946 in Kiev and is supposed 

to have a Russian, Ukrainian, Israeli and Hungarian citizenship. Mogilevich runs an organization that mixes the professionalism of the eastern block intelligence services with weapons smuggling, drug trafficking, money laundering, extortion, 

prostitution, and assassinations. His people are supposed to 

help Al Qaeda to get every kind of supply. That includes nuclear, chemical and biological material that would be shipped 

as contraband from Russia via Slovakia, the Czhek Republic, 

and Poland.

Drugs and Weapons

It’s important to keep in mind that drugs and weapons walk together. 

According to the United Nations, only 18 million (about 3 percent) of 

the 550 million small arms and light weapons currently circulating 

worldwide are used by government, military, or police. The illegal 

weapons trade accounts for more than 20 percent of the total small 

weapons trade and generates more than $1 billion yearly.24 In the absence of effective international legislation and enforcement, the laws 

of economics dictate the sale of more weapons at cheaper prices. In 

1968, an AK-47 in Kalawa, Kenya, cost 15 cows; today, it costs just 

4 cows.25 In an October 2002 interview on the National Public Radio 

show On Point, Jeffrey Goldberg, an expert in Hezbollah and author 

of In the Party of God, has told that during his three weeks in the 

Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), researching Hezbollah and its international funding and activities, he was offered an 

AK-47 for $375. The price even included a hotel delivery and some 

ammunition.

But this is just the tip of the illegal trade iceberg. It includes 

tanks, radar systems, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed more 

than a dozen cases of smuggled nuclear-weapons-usable material 

and hundreds of more cases have been reported and investigated 

over the last decade. The actual supply of stolen nuclear, biological, 

or chemical weapons materials and technology may still be small. 

But the potential demand is strong and growing from both would-be 

nuclear powers and terrorists.26

According to Ambassador Charles Shapiro, US Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs in his remarks 

to the Inter-American Defense College on 27 October 2005, strict 
16

 JSOU Report 06-4

import and export controls are particularly important in regards to 

man-portable air defense systems, commonly known as MANPADS.27

It is no surprise that man-portable air defense systems are attractive 

to terrorist because they are relatively inexpressive [inexpensive?], 

widely available, easy to use, and lethal to aircraft. Given the number of MANPADS in worldwide inventories, the inadequate control 

of stockpiles and their availability on the black arms market, it is 

mandatory to seek to deny these weapons to terrorists. Shapiro emphasized that the January 2004 arrest of its traffickers and the confiscation of MANPADS in Nicaragua highlighted the ease with which 

terrorists can acquire MANPADS in the Western Hemisphere. This 

threat has not gone unnoticed by the international community. The 

International Civil Aviation Organization and the United Nations underscored the threat to civil aviation posed by MANPADS by adopting 

resolutions calling on states to ensure that they are taking all steps 

necessary to protect citizenship and air travel from unauthorized use 

of these weapons. 

The Organization of American States (OAS) has added its voice 

to the chorus of international organizations working to address this 

pressing threat. On 7 June 2004, the OAS General Assembly (OASGA) 

adopted the “Recommended Guidelines on MANPADS Control and 

Security,” which identifies concrete measures that member states 

should take to ensure that MANPADS do not fall into the hands of 

terrorists. Shapiro highlighted that the facility with which terrorist 

can acquire MANPADS is an alarming reality today in the Western 

Hemisphere and that the full implementation of the OASGA resolution by the member states will be critical in addressing this threat. 

The ties between terrorist groups and criminal organizations have 

become a transnational threat more dangerous than ever.
17

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

4. Colombia’s Stalemate

Although the threat of external conventional military aggression is an extremely remote possibility in Latin America and the Caribbean, there exist severe situations in some nations 

that can create a crisis affecting the region’s stability and security. 

Transnational terrorism, narcoterrorism improved by guerrilla movements and their association with narcotrafficking, weapons smuggling, forgery and money laundering and a flow of mass migration 

difficult to control are conditions existing in some countries that can 

cause serious international problems.

The US State Department has designated four terrorist groups 

(three in Colombia: FARC, ELN and AUC, and one in Peru: SL) as 

Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and Cuba has been listed as a state 

sponsor of terrorism since 1982. According to the United Nations, 

Latin America and the Caribbean have become the world’s most violent regions, with 27.5 homicides per 100,000 people. Colombia 

leads the homicide ranking with a rate of 47 per 100,000 persons, 

followed by Honduras with 45.7 per 100,000 people. Kidnapping has 

become an epidemic problem in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Colombia also leads the kidnapping ranking. It’s used by criminal 

and narcoterrorist organizations to raise money and fund other illicit 

or terrorist activities. Latin America and the Caribbean account for 

75 percent of all kidnappings worldwide, a staggering figure when 

one considers that the region has less than 10 percent of the world’s 

population. The focus of the fight against narcoterrorism in the Western Hemisphere is in Colombia and because of the transnational 

nature of the threat, it radiates throughout the Andean Ridge.

41 Years of Insurgencies and Drugs

Located in the northwestern portion of South America, Colombia is 

a strategically important country that lies adjacent to Venezuela’s oil 

fields, the Panama Canal, and the Caribbean basin. Colombia has 

a very difficult geography, divided by three massive Andean chains, 

and the pattern of dispersed settlements, poor national integration 

and insufficient communications. Certainly, Colombia’s political trajectory will influence the direction of broader trends in the unstable 

Andean region and beyond. Colombian civilian elites historically 
18

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have preferred a weak central government and a weak military for 

fear that it would take political power. 

During the latter half of the twentieth century, Colombia suffered 

three major periods of conflict.

1. The first, La Violencia (The Violence), was an undeclared civil 

war that began in 1948 as a result of a polarized two-party 

political system, pitted Liberales (Liberals) versus Conservadores (Conservatives), and killed an estimated 200,000 people 

over the next 10 years, with few legitimate leftist alternatives, 

including having a weak Communist Party. In the 1960s, 

the two main political parties ended more than a decade of 

political violence and agreed to share power. In 1963, students, Catholic radicals, and left-wing intellectuals, hoping to 

emulate Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba, founded ELN. In 

1966, FARC was founded, bringing together communist militants and peasants. Although ELN is more ideological than 

FARC, both have similar programs. Both say they represent 

the rural poor against Colombia’s wealthy classes and oppose 

American influence in Colombia (particularly Plan Colombia), 

the privatization of natural resources, multinational corporations, and rightist violence. Notwithstanding the same ideological motivation, FARC and ELN are hard rival forces. Each 

one sees the other as a threat, and they often fight each other 

for territorial control. The other principal group was the Movimiento 19 Abril (M-19) formed in 1973 by Carlos Toledo Plata and Jaime Bateman, a former member of FARC. Its terrorist network commenced operations in 1976 comprising some 

10,000 guerrillas. But a few years later, M-19 disappeared 

and was absorbed by the FARC.

2. The second major period of conflict was launched by Pablo 

Escobar, the cocaine kingpin of the Medellin cartel, and other 

drug traffickers. With assistance from the United States and 

the Cali cartel, this challenge was defeated and Escobar was 

killed on 2 December 1993.28

3. The third and the most serious outbreak of violence revolves around the current insurgencies, especially that of the 

FARC. 

It is important to underscore that Colombia, notwithstanding 

that it can be considered a weak state (mainly because it doesn’t 

exercise a complete political authority over its whole territory), is not 

a typical failing state.29 It is an active member of the United Nations, 
19

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

the Organization of American States, and other multilateral organizations. According to the United Nations, its population is 43 million people; GDP $90 billion; GDP growth rates: 1.4 percent (2001), 

1.6 percent (2002); urban unemployment: 18.2 percent (2001), 17.6 

percent (2002); urban underemployment: 30 percent (2001), 33 percent (2002); poverty (means a person earns the equivalent of $2 per 

day): 54.9 percent (1999), 54.8 percent (2000), 54.9 percent (2001); 

indigence (means a person earns the equivalent of $1 per day): 26.8 

percent (1999), 27.1 percent (2000), and 27.6 percent (2001).30

But the Colombian state infrastructure of judicial system, police, military, schools, and communications is nearly absent in major 

portions of the national territory, precisely where the revolutionary 

movements occupy space, apply their de facto legal systems, and 

conduct foreign operations with traffickers, assorted criminals, gun 

runners, soldiers of fortune, international terrorists, and corrupt 

government officials of various countries. An estimated 40 percent 

of the national territory is not controlled by the government, both in 

rural and urban areas.31

Although communist guerrilla forces have been active in Colombia since the mid-1960s, it was not until the 1990s that Colombia witnessed an entirely new phenomenon: the linking of an armed 

Marxist insurgency with the country’s ubiquitous drug cartels. The 

collapse of the Soviet Union, which led a number of states and groups 

to cut back their economic support for insurgent movements, led to 

a dramatic change in the FARC’s nature. The death of the notorious 

drug lord Pablo Escobar, creating a vacuum of power in the Colombian drug business has also stimulated the FARC to fill the vacuum. 

This trend began when it became amply evident to Colombia’s rebel 

forces, particularly to its largest guerrilla organization, the FARC, 

that tapping Colombia’s drug related activities would provide them 

with the resources they needed to intensify their struggle. The FARC 

had traditionally imposed a “revolutionary tax” on coca growers and 

distributors, but in the 1990s they moved from protection rackets to 

direct production and distribution of cocaine. At the same time, their 

tactics, always violent, have become progressively less discriminating, as the FARC units began targeting innocent civilians and public 

places. In 2001, Colombian officials arrested three members of the 

IRA in Colombia, and later convicted them of teaching the FARC militants bomb-making techniques. In February 2003, the FARC set off 
20

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a bomb outside a social club in Bogotá killing 33 people, including 

six children.

Further compounding this problem has been the emergence in 

Colombia of illegal armed groups known as the AUC, radical rightist paramilitary groups funded by wealthy farmers. Carlos Castaño, 

the leader of the AUC, declared in 2000 that 70 percent of the AUC’s 

operational funding was derived from the drug trade. 

Weakened by the corruption sown by the cocaine cartels and more 

than 41 years of civil war, FARC, ELN and AUC, are recognized as 

foreign terrorist organizations by the US State Department and the 

European Union. They target elected government officials and civilians with their attacks. International human rights groups denounce 

the massacres, assassinations, kidnappings, forced displacements, 

and forced recruitment of minors. 

The largest, best trained, and 

best-equipped insurgent organization in Colombia is, undoubtedly, 

the FARC, currently estimated with 

9,000 to 12,000 members.32 It was 

established in 1964, founded by 

the terrorist Manuel Marulanda, well known as Tiro Fijo, as a ruralbased, pro-Soviet guerrilla army. It is organized along military lines 

and includes several urban fronts. It has been anti-United States 

since its inception. FARC operates in about half the country’s territory, mostly in the jungles of the southeast and the plains at the 

base of the Andean [Andes?] mountains. In 1999, during peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC, then 

President Andres Pastrana demilitarized five large rural municipalities, establishing a demilitarized zone (zona de despeje) to meet FARC 

conditions for peace talks. After three years of fruitless negotiations, 

Pastrana ended the peace talks in February 2002 and ordered Colombian forces to retake the FARC-controlled zone.

The smaller ELN, currently estimated to have 3,000 members 

(plus an unknown number of supporters), operates mainly in northeastern Colombia. It had its strength, size and support base severely 

damaged by AUC paramilitaries. The Pastrana administration also 

negotiated with the ELN but without the concessions made to the 

FARC.33

The AUC is currently estimated to have 8,000 to 11,000 members.34 It is comprised of several right-wing paramilitary groups supThe largest, best trained, 

and best-equipped insurgent 

organization in Colombia is, 

undoubtedly, the FARC
21

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

ported by wealthy landowners, drug cartels, and segments of the 

Colombia military. AUC forces have assassinated leftist guerrillas, 

politicians, and activists. Significant human rights violations are attributed to AUC. It presents a dilemma for all the other parties. The 

FARC and the ELN state that they cannot demobilize as long as the 

paramilitaries are not also demobilized. Because Colombia’s government has little control of any territory outside the country’s major 

cities, all three organizations have been able to expand their operations and prosper by trading in cocaine, opium, oil, gold, and emeralds. 

Regarding the peace settlement, authorities of the Colombian 

Government, the FARC leaders, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and European Community representatives tried but did not make headway in the peace negotiations. The 

extent of the concessions to be made to the FARC is extremely controversial. There is also great controversy regarding the true nature of 

the FARC and its objectives. The predominant view is that the FARC 

has become nothing more than drug traffickers and that their motivation is indistinguishable from those of criminals. There is no doubt 

that the FARC took great advantage of former President Pastrana’s 

peace negotiations. In September 2002, the European Community 

determined that the member countries leaned toward a negotiated 

solution to respect human rights. France was opposed to declaring 

the FARC a terrorist group and has offered it asylum, protection, 

and economic and logistical support. As a result of all this, the FARC 

enhanced its domestic and international stature and legitimacy and 

leveraged real strategic and operational advantages.

About the nature and extent of the FARC’s criminal financing, its 

leadership denies direct involvement in drug trafficking. That they 

just charge the drug dealers a tax, where the economic base is coca. 

Just as, in other regions, they tax cattle ranchers or sugar growers. 

There is growing evidence, however, that the payments are increasingly made in cocaine itself. Currently, it is crystal clear that the 

FARC involvement goes beyond protection of cultivation areas and 

laboratories to include the transportation of drugs and chemical precursors and even direct control of its own laboratories. 

There is much evidence that the FARC and the other insurgent 

group, the ELN, are receiving pure cocaine in payment for services 

provided to the drug traffic, and reselling it to international criminal 

organizations in return for armaments. In early November 2000, for 
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example, Carlos Ariel Charry Guzman, a Colombian physician, was 

arrested in Mexico City for allegedly attempting to arrange a drug deal 

with the Tijuana cartel. Mexican authorities discovered that Charry 

was working with the FARC in attempting to exchange cocaine for 

weapons. Similar arrangements involve Russian, Paraguayan and 

Brazilian criminal groups. Despite an estimated annual income of 

$500 million, FARC purchases significant amounts of weaponry with 

significant quantities of cocaine. Previous and current accounts of 

such deals have always involved Jorge Briceno (aka El Mono Jojoy), 

a FARC member very close to Manuel Marulanda (aka Tiro Fijo), the 

FARC’s principal leader, and El Negro Acasio, the 16th Front commander, believed to be in charge of weapons procurement and cocaine transactions. 

Photojournalist Carlos Villalon, in his article “Cocaine Country” 

in the July 2004 issue of National Geographic, detailed how the FARC 

fosters the cocaine trade. The process starts when a FARC dealer 

makes rounds through small towns in FARC controlled areas of Colombia at the end of each week, setting up a makeshift office near 

town. There is no way of estimating the specific amount of square 

miles that the FARC controls, however, credible estimates claim that 

the FARC has strong influence over one third of Colombian National 

territory which encompasses approximately 145,000 square miles, 

controlling roughly 260,000 people. Word is spread that a FARC 

dealer is buying cocaine base and farmers journey to the village to 

sell their product. Most farmers, on average, produce a kilogram of 

cocaine base a month. The dealer pays around $1,000 for each kilogram. The FARC collects a 30 percent tax from farmers each time 

they sell cocaine base to the dealers. The farmer, after expenses, will 

make around $325 per month. The cycle continues for most of the 

year, except for the dry season (January and February) where not as 

much coca leaf is grown and FARC dealers do not make rounds as 

often.

On 21 April 2001, as part of Operation Gato Negro (Black Cat), 

the Colombian Armed Forces captured Brazil’s top drug dealer, who 

reputedly controlled 70 percent of Brazil’s cocaine distribution.35

Luis Fernando da Costa, 33 years old, aka Fernandinho Beira Mar

was caught in the vicinity of Barrancominas, in the lightly populated 

Vichada Department of eastern Colombia, next to Venezuela and not 

far from the Brazilian border. The FARC’s 16th Front (Commander El 

Negro Acasio) used that department, along with Guainía and Guavi-
23

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

are, as a staging base for operations; a mobility corridor; and an area 

for coca cultivation, refining, and shipment into Venezuela and Brazil. The Colombian military reported that these three departments 

accounted for more than 80 percent of the cocaine that FARC itself 

produced. Beira Mar was the largest foreign trading partner of the 

FARC, swapping $10 million per month in guns and ammunition 

for cocaine. Within days, he was deported back to Brazil, reportedly 

because of fears that he could escape from a Colombian prison. Currently, he is under arrest at a top-security prison in Brazil. After his 

arrest, he revealed the following details about the intersection of the 

motivation of the FARC, ungoverned space, drugs, guns, and the 

international market:

The FARC are the richest and strongest guerrillas in the world. 

Their leaders live like millionaire capitalists; beautiful women, 

good food and liquor... In Colombia not a kilo of cocaine moves 

without the permission of the FARC. I was but a peon in the 

drug traffic in Brazil and Paraguay. For each kilo I sent, they 

paid me $3,000. The drug business is pretty good for the FARC; 

for each kilo that is ready to be shipped, they charge $500, 

for each flight $15,000. I paid the FARC $10 to 12 million a 

month. Each flight carried between 700 kilos and a ton of coca. 

Each pilot was paid $25,000 and the co-pilot $5,000 and a 

little bit was paid to the air controllers so they would not cause 

problems with the flights. Part of the payment for the coca was 

made to the FARC in 3,000 guns and three and a half million 

rounds of ammunition, which came from Paraguay.36

Another notorious Brazilian drug lord, Leonardo Dias Mendonça, was convicted in Brazil in January 2003 for flying cocaine from 

Colombia via the Amazon to Surinam. Dias Mendonça supplied the 

FARC with precursor chemicals and weapons. Actually, the FARC 

has an increasingly sophisticated financial infrastructure, supported 

by sophisticated money laundering schemes, using complacent Colombian banks. The laundered money is in accounts that are available electronically. Its current arsenal includes different types of 

weapons: AK-47s, HK G-3s, A-3s, Armalite 15s, Dragunov sniper 

rifles, Galil rifles, .50 and M60 machine guns, and anti-aircraft and 

anti-tank rockets. In the past, it received SA-14, SA-16, and RPG-7s 

from Russia as well as “Redeye” and “Stinger” missiles from Syria.

In August 2002, Colombia inaugurated a new President, Alvaro Uribe Velez, an independent, Oxford and Harvard trained former 

mayor and governor whose father was killed by the rebels and who 
24

 JSOU Report 06-4

has himself survived four assassination attempts. Uribe was elected 

with an unprecedented first round majority after Colombia’s peace 

process collapsed in February 2002. Sweeping into office on a hardline platform, the President promised to provide Colombians with a 

Política de Seguridad Democratica (Democratic Security Policy, DSP), 

meaning a frontal assault on the country’s two radical leftist guerrilla groups and also its right-wing paramilitaries as well. The Uribe 

administration has received overwhelming popular support with his 

approval rating near 80 percent, the highest in Colombian history.37

Philip McLean, Senior Associate for the Americas Program at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted in his 14 February 2003 “Colombia Alert” that, 

Uribe’s security strategy main points are: (1) provide more resources for the military and the police with the expectation that 

they will be more aggressive; (2) reestablish a government presence throughout the Nation; (3) involve citizens in their own 

protection; and (4) weaken the guerrillas by encouraging defections and capturing leaders. 

Actually, the DSP is being developed in order to provide a coherent long-term strategy to reduce Colombia’s security problems. The 

goal is to severely weaken and eventually defeat insurgents while 

strengthening fragile government institutions. The Embassy of Colombia in Washington, D.C. noted in its website that, 

... the basic principle behind the strategy is to establish and 

reinstate the rule of law in Colombia and protect the population. It takes into account this is not just a military matter. 

The strategic objective behind the policy is to weaken illegal 

narcoterrorist groups through a variety of political, economic 

and military means in order to force a negotiated settlement 

that leads to a lasting and democratic peace. 

Plan Colombia and the United States

Plan Colombia was developed in October 1999, as a response of the 

Pastrana Government to Colombia’s conflict.38 It involved a great 

number of proposals to deal with the political, socio-economic, and 

military aspects of the situation.

The original five year plan envisioned a total contribution of $7.5 

billion. The Colombian government undertook to provide $4 billion 

and obtain $3.5 billion in foreign assistance, largely from the United 
25

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

States. The United States started supporting the Colombian Government’s Plan in 2000, paying more than $700 million focused to combat narcotrafficking. On the other hand, the European Community 

has been reticent, and it only contributed $170 million, conditioned 

to the respect of the human rights in the region. Spain took part and 

sent $100 million. This Plan has cost the United States more than 

$3 billion in the past five years and made Colombia the third largest 

recipient of US foreign aid, after Israel and Egypt.

President Pastrana had received credit, even from political opponents, for having restored the cooperative relationship with the 

United States. Revelations that the Cali cartel had financed former 

President Ernesto Samper’s 1994 presidential election campaign led 

the Clinton administration to decertify Colombia from US counter 

narcotics assistance and aid between 1996 and 1997. On the other 

hand, there has been criticism that the Colombian government strategy was driven by political constraints in US policy that has justified 

aid to Colombia only in terms of counter-narcotics assistance.

The Plan provides for 800 US advisers, half of them military. None 

are permitted to engage in combat. The US troops, primarily Special 

Forces operators and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents, provide programs to train and equip Colombia’s military and police, interdict drug shipments, and help peasants cultivate crops other than 

the coca used to make cocaine. US Special Forces have trained three 

counternarcotics battalions as prototypes of an improved Colombian 

Army, which historically has been one of Latin America’s weakest. 

Security for the 500-mile oil pipeline that crosses Colombia has been 

improved because of this training.

 But US Congressional critics have blasted Plan Colombia 

for failing to reduce Colombia’s cocaine output, break ties between 

Colombia’s Armed Forces and the AUC’s paramilitary groups, wean 

coca-growing peasants from their deadly crop, get favorable resolution in the peace negotiations, and protect US citizens who, as 

private security contractors, conduct risky aerial drug eradication 

flights. The Bush administration with a more accurate perception 

of the alliance between the drug cartels and communism and the 

FARC, shifted Plan Colombia funding to focus not only on drugs but 

also on the rebel forces besieging the country’s weak central government. In August, 2002, President Bush signed antiterrorism legislation authorizing Colombia to use US aid previously earmarked for 
26

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counterdrug operations to directly combat the FARC, the ELN, and 

the AUC.39

On 30 October 2005, Colombian Army troops raided an AUC 

drug gang headquarters deep in the jungle, capturing John Eidelber 

Cano, major gang leader, after a short and violent firefight. Cano had 

a $5 million price on his head, and that brought out the information 

making the raid possible. The informant received the reward. This 

particular operation was scary for the drug gangs and rebels, for it 

demonstrated again that the rewards can reach deep inside criminal 

organizations, and that government troops can carry out these daring operations, anywhere in the country, taking advantage of the 

growing government helicopter fleet.40

On the other hand, the Uribe’s government has dealt with AUC 

since October 2005 to provide amnesty in return for AUC disarming and disbanding has hit some snags. Some factions of AUC are 

unwilling to give up their guns and their lucrative drug businesses. 

Another complication is the FARC groups trying to move into areas where the local AUC groups are disbanding. Some of those AUC 

members suddenly had second thoughts, because there is bad blood 

between the AUC and the FARC gunmen, who have been killing each 

other for years. Disarming makes many AUC members vulnerable to 

the FARC killers. Therefore, by the beginning of November 2005, only 

about 3,600 of 11,000 AUC members were disarmed, and many of 

those who have not, are quite hostile to the Army and the police.41

Plan Colombia is funded through 2005, with three quarters of the 

approximately $600 million per year in aid to Colombia earmarked 

for the military and the police. The remaining funds are for social, 

economic and humanitarian programs. The government of Colombia sent out an emergency appeal to the Bush administration for 

an extra $130 million to supplement the $600 million it expects to 

receive in 2006.42 The extra money, the Colombians insist, is needed 

for more aircraft to increase the government’s capacity to spray poison on the jungle patches where coca bushes grow. They also want 

more helicopters to protect the spray planes from being shot down 

by growers and guerrillas.

The appeal for emergency cash came in the wake of the details 

quietly released by the White House during the Easter holiday about 

last year’s spraying debacle. On 1 January 2004, US satellite pictures showed that 281,323 acres in Colombia were under coca. The 

target was to reduce that area by half, so nearly 340,000 acres were 
27

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

sprayed with poison—but in vain. In January 2005, the acreage of 

coca bushes had increased slightly to 281,694 acres. Consequently, 

as Congressman Bob Menendez, leader of the Democratic Party in 

the lower house and a critic of Plan Colombia, remarked, the international price of cocaine has stubbornly refused to rise, as it would 

have if the anti-drugs effort had reduced its availability worldwide.43

Nevertheless Uribe’s Colombian Government is making remarkable progress in the battle against terrorism and the restoration of 

security for the strengthening of its democratic institutions. In 2004, 

homicides decreased 16 percent, the lowest level since 1986. There 

was also a 25 percent decrease in robberies, a 46 percent decrease in 

kidnappings, and a 44 percent decrease in terrorist attacks nationwide.44 Fundamental to this policy has been the military component 

of the Plan Colombia, Patriot Plan (Plan Patriota). Defense spending 

as a percentage of GDP rose from 3.5 percent to 5 percent in 2004. According to US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) observers, the Colombian 

military has overcome its former state of 

inefficiency and ineffectiveness and has 

become a much better and more capable 

force against the FARC, the ELN, and 

the AUC, nearly doubling the number 

of terrorists captured while also seizing 

the initiative on the battlefield. In the 

past two and a half years, the FARC has 

been reduced from 18,000 to an estimated 12,500 members. The ELN, with 

approximately 3,500 members, has been marginalized, struggling to 

survive as an organization as combat losses and leadership divisions 

take their toll. And the AUC, with an estimated strength of 12,000 

members, is currently negotiating peace with the Colombian government. According to General Craddock, by 9 March 2005, 4,600 AUC 

members had been demobilized, and the removal of these combatants from the fight represents a victory for the government.45

Notwithstanding the relevant USSOUTHCOM support and the 

consequent Colombian military improvement, the currently estimated 160,000 Colombian uniformed security members are not enough 

to combat the FARC and the ELN, to replace the AUC, and also to 

protect the country’s vital facilities (power stations, bridges, dams, 

pipelines). 

... the Colombian military 

has ...become a much 

better and more capable 

force against the FARC, the 

ELN, and the AUC, nearly 

doubling the number of 

terrorists captured while 

also seizing the initiative 

on the battlefield. 
28

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President Uribe’s emphasis on the Democratic Security Policy has 

also aided Colombia’s economic recovery. Its GDP has grown since 

2002 from 1.8 percent to 3.9 percent in 2003 and 2004. The Nation’s 

unemployment rate eased from 15.1 percent in 2002 to 14.15 percent in 2003, to less than 13 percent in 2004. Inflation dropped from 

7.1 percent in 2003 to 5.9 percent in 2004.46

On 14 December 2005, in an unprecedented decision dealing 

with the FARC, President Uribe yielded to pressure to discuss, in 

a Colombian demilitarized zone (Department of Valle del Cauca, in 

the southeast of the country), the exchange of hostages under guerrilla custody for arrested rebels.47 The proposition was made to both 

sides by the governments of France, Spain and Switzerland. Uribe 

acknowledged that this decision is a remarkable change in policy. 

But he understands that notwithstanding being a concession, it does 

not threaten national sovereignty, and it might be a solution to end 

the suffering of many Colombians who have kidnapped relatives. 

There are about 500 FARC gunmen arrested by the security forces 

and 59 hostages kidnapped, among them Oscar Lizcano, a former 

Colombian congressman under the FARC custody for more than five 

years, and Ingrid Betancourt, a former presidential candidate when 

she was kidnapped in 2002. Because she is French, France is leading the mediation. In addition, Tom Howes, Marc Gonsalves, and 

Keith Stansell are officials of the US Department of Defense who 

were kidnapped during an anti-drug mission, in 2003. Alvaro Uribe 

also decided to start a dialogue with the ELN, in Havana, in order 

to demobilize the ELN remnants, having the Cuba’s government as 

mediator and the presence of international observers from Spain, 

Norway and Switzerland. 

On 27 December 2005, a Colombian Army report announced that 

three noncommissioned officers and 25 soldiers of the 12th Mobile 

Brigade (Brigada Móvil 12) were ambushed and killed in Playa Rica, 

rural area of Vista Hermosa, Departamiento de Meta, about 280 kilometers southeast of Bogotá.

48 The company (90 soldiers) was on a 

mission providing security to peasants involved in the eradication 

of coca leaf plantation. The attack was launched between 4:30 and 

7:30 AM by the Front 27 (Frente 27), 300 gunmen commanded by 

Luis Eduardo López Méndes (aka “Èfren”), Bloque Oriental (Eastern 

Block), elite of the FARC, whose Commander is Jorge Briceño (aka 

“Mono Jojoy”). The operation to rescue corpses was also extremely 

hard because the area was mined. This was the bloodiest attack car-
29

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

ried out during 2005. One week after this attack, the FARC, demonstrating its current political will, had rejected Uribe’s proposal to 

negotiate hostages. This attack also seems to be part of an offensive 

campaign to debilitate the President’s Democratic Security Policy, 

regarding the legislative and presidential elections of May 2006.

International observers saw these FARC activities as a severe government defeat. However, President Uribe’s credibility is still strong. 

According to recent public opinion polls, he is the favorite candidate 

for the next elections in May 2006. Actually, Alvaro Uribe’s leadership is a remarkable sign of hope for the Colombian people regarding 

the end of this violent internal conflict. Nonetheless, it’s clear that 

the situation is uncertain.

The critical question is how to conduct the successor to Plan Colombia when it ends in 2006—whether to continue the counterdrug 

policy focus or to implement a new program involving European and 

other countries in a broad strategy that links security and the drug 

war to economic development and institution building in Colombia. 

There are already talks of Colombianization, the process of decreasing US military assistance and handing over more responsibility to 

Colombian agencies and personnel. Those who support expanding 

assistance to Colombia warn that until drug use in the US and Europe drops dramatically, Colombia’s peasants will not stop growing 

illicit crops. Most analysts believe ending major assistance to Colombia would be a mistake because Colombia has become a cornerstone 

in the US war against drug trafficking and terrorism. With this point 

of view, the White House and Congress should strengthen management of security related assistance and fund it over a long period of 

time. However, there is some discussion in Congress about crafting 

a “US exit strategy” from Colombia. 

Colombia’s Neighboring Countries and Cuba

The terrorism supported by radical politico-ideological groups and 

drug-related organizations has undermined the economies and 

stability of the countries where they operate. The main illicit drug 

producing countries are Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. However, 

narcoterrorism is a problem in Colombia’s other neighboring countries, such as Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil, which are 

being used as routes for exporting drugs.

Panama has become a critical node in the Colombian narcoguerrillas’ support structure. Drugs transit Panama from Colom-•
30

 JSOU Report 06-4

bia in their transshipment to the United States and Europe, 

while arms and supplies move the other way. Panamanian security forces—a national police force that includes a specialized component with rudimentary light infantry training, and 

air and naval services—are no match for the heavily armed Colombian guerrillas. Therefore, they are not able to control the 

border or to confront the guerrillas that operate on the Panamanian side of the border. In this context, Panama is a critical 

area mainly because of the strategic position of the Canal.

Ecuador is an unstable country in the Andean region. It is 

also under the US assistance package to Colombia and the 

Andean region. There is in Ecuador a permanent fear that Colombian narcoguerrillas could move in force across the border 

and perhaps join forces with local dissidents. The Ecuadorians 

are also concerned about the influx of Colombian refugees. The 

Ecuadorian military has placed many of its best troops on its 

northern frontier and has established cross-border communications with the Colombian military.

Venezuela’s current political situation has created a big entanglement for the whole region. Hugo Chávez’ authoritarian 

tendencies, links to Fidel Castro, and his aggressive speech 

against the Bush administration have raised concerns about 

the direction of his government in this complex context. Nonetheless, Chávez states that Venezuelan Armed Forces are deployed on the border with Colombia in an effort to block the 

border against FARC elements, and the problem is that the Colombians are not doing enough to control their side of the border. Notwithstanding the supposed Venezuelan efforts against 

narcotics, there are indications that Venezuela has adopted 

an avoidance strategy toward the Colombia’s revolutionary 

movements. The FARC and the ELN consider the areas of the 

Venezuelan border with Colombia safe areas to rest, transship 

drugs and arms, and procure logistical supplies. The capture 

of senior FARC member Rodrigo Granda in Venezuela, carrying 

a valid Venezuelan passport and his possible connection to the 

kidnapping and killing of Cecília Cubas, the Paraguay’s former President Raul Cubas’ daughter, is of concern. Granda’s 

capture caused a significant diplomatic impasse, which was 

later mended by face-to-face meetings by Presidents Uribe and 

Chávez. Currently, the dialogue between the US and Venezu-

•

•
31

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

ela is extremely tense. The fact that Venezuela intends to be 

a member state of MERCOSUL (economic block led by Brazil) 

might facilitate political negotiations between the US and Venezuelan governments.

Peru is another country of concern. The Shining Path (Sendero 

Luminoso) insurgency is also designated as FTO by the US 

government. During the 1980s, the SL was a very powerful and 

aggressive Maoist revolutionary movement. It was significantly 

weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader Abimael 

Guzman. However, in 2001 and 2002 terrorist acts committed 

by the group increased from previous years. The SL was allegedly responsible for a March 2002 car bomb across from the 

US Embassy in Lima, the capital. Ten Peruvians were killed, 

including security personnel protecting the embassy. Eight SL 

members remain in custody for the bombing. After the beginning of 2003, however, there was an estimated 15 percent reduction in terrorist acts committed by the Sendero Luminoso. 

In December 2005, the month in which Mao Tsé-tung’s birthday 

is celebrated, 13 Peruvian policemen and one Ashaninka Indian were killed in two ambushes in the Departamiento cocallero 

de Huancayo, 316 kilometers from Ayacucho, the birthplace of 

the Maoist revolution in Peru.49 In order to stop the increasing 

instability, and regarding the next presidential and legislative 

elections in April 2006, President Alejandro Toledo decreed a 

state of emergency (including military offensive operations) for 

60 days in six cocalleras (coca growers) provinces where the SL 

was operating. In the last three years, the US government reduced the aid to eradication of the coca leaf plantation in Peru 

from $116 million to $97 million. 

In Bolivia, the poorest country of South America, the anarchical influence of the FARC is already producing fruit. The 

revolutionary cocalleros (peasants who survive from the coca 

leaf plantation) and union leaders formed an axis of violence 

between Cochabamba and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, during the 

riots that led to the resignation of President Gonzalo Sanchez 

de Losada, in 2003. In June 2005, President Carlos Mesa resigned in order to defuse large-scale protests. President of the 

Supreme Court Eduardo Rodriguez replaced Mesa and promised early elections. 

•

•
32

 JSOU Report 06-4

Notwithstanding Bolivia’s government efforts to eradicate coca 

plantations, according to the cocalleros’ native Indian socialist leader 

Evo Morales’ guidance, they will persist in maintaining 1,600 square 

meters of coca plantation for each one of the 35 thousand peasant 

families.50 On 18 December 2005, Morales was elected President of 

Bolivia with more than 50 percent of the 3 million registered votes 

available, a true record in Bolivia’s elections. Morales comes to power 

with the purpose of giving voice to Bolivia’s poor population (about 

65 percent), normally silenced by the oligarchies. He states that his 

policy will be “zero cocaine, zero trafficking” but, ambiguously, has added 

that this does not mean “zero coca, 

zero cocalleros.” According to the 

UNODC, currently 15,200 hectares of 

coca leaf plantation are recognized as 

legal in Bolivia for the traditional internal demand. In his electoral campaign, Morales said that he will increase that area. He also stated 

that “narcotrafficking cannot be an excuse for the United States to 

interfere in Bolivian internal affairs” and that “under the pretext to 

combat narcotrafficking, the Bolivian Armed Forces can’t stay subordinated to foreign armed forces.” In his most recent speeches, after 

the elections, he typically talks about “the dirty war made by George 

Bush against us. This is state terrorism,” Morales claims. He also 

says that he is going to nationalize the oil and gas resources. But, he 

adds that it is not his intention to confiscate properties from foreign 

countries that have invested in the country. Brazilian PETROBRAS is 

the largest foreign investor company in Bolivia. Morales went to Brazil in January 2006, before assuming the Presidency, and he stated 

that he intends to establish “brand new rules” about this matter, 

making clear that he wants partners to take advantage of the new 

incomes, create new jobs, eradicate illiteracy, and transform Bolivia 

into an industrial Nation. South America, of course, does not need a 

new Chávez. But the brand new President Evo Morales might be one 

more entanglement in this already troubled Andean ridge environment. 

The US Department of State includes Cuba among its list of six 

states sponsoring terrorism (the others are Iran, Libya, North Korea, 

Sudan and Syria). Cuba was added to the list in 1982 for its complicity with the former Colombian M-19 insurgent group. The CommuHe [Morales] states that his 

policy will be “zero cocaine, 

zero trafficking” but, ambiguously, has added that this 

does not mean “zero coca, 

zero cocalleros.” 
33

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

nist government led by Fidel Castro has a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa. 

Up to his death in Bolivia in 1967, Ernesto Che Guevara was the 

political leader in charge of the dissemination of the Cuban foquismo

(foco-military style). But in 1992, Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Most analysts 

accepted that Cuba’s policy did change, largely because the breakup 

of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of billions in subsidies. Cuba 

ratified all 12 international counterterrorism conventions in 2001, 

but it has remained opposed to the United States-led global coalition 

against terrorism and actively condemned many associated US policies and actions throughout 2003. 

There is much evidence about Fidel Castro’s support of Colombia’s narcoguerrillas. This is not anything new. Since Pablo Escobar’s

(the former Medellin cartel leader) time, Cuba’s government and the 

Latin American communist parties has supported the association 

between the drug dealers and terrorists. Besides, Cuba continued to 

host several members of the FARC and the ELN (and other FTOs as 

the ETA Basque) as well as US fugitives from justice.51

Cuba also presented itself as a mediator between the ELN and 

the Colombian Government. President Uribe has agreed, and on 16 

December 2005, in order to demobilize the ELN remnants started a 

dialogue with ELN in Havana, in the presence of international observers from Spain, Norway and Switzerland.52

Ambassador Charles Shapiro, US Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, said in his remarks to Inter-American Defense College, on 27 October, 2005, “Cuba is considered a state sponsor of terrorism for its unwillingness to cooperate in 

the war on terror and its willingness to harbor those who are terrorists.”53 However, there are critics of retaining Cuba on the terrorism 

list, stating that this is a holdover of the Cold War. They argue that 

domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list, 

and they maintain that Cuba’s presence on the list diverts US attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats.54

While this discussion has mainly centered upon narcoterrorism 

activities in Colombia and its environs, the following section describes how the FARC has extended its reach into other parts of the 

hemisphere. It suggests the importance of supporting counterterrorism efforts beyond the Andean Ridge and Amazon Basin to encompass the Southern Cone.
34

 JSOU Report 06-4
35

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

5. FARC Connections in Paraguay

 and the Tri-Border Area

Recent reports coming from Paraguay emphasize that the presence of the FARC is not restricted to the establishment of strategic bases for narcotrafficking and weapons trade in the 

Amazon region. Narcoguerrillas are training members of criminal 

organizations and radical leftist groups from different countries in 

Paraguay, in areas close to the border with Brazil. First an overview 

of the Tri-Border situation is provided, and this is followed by a description of the narcoterrorists’ activities in the region.

The Tri-Border Area

The Tri-Border Area (TBA) is defined by three closely grouped population centers, one in each of the three countries: 

the Argentine city of Puerto Iguazu

the Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu

the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Leste (formerly Puerto Presidente Stroessner). 

Ciudad del Leste is one of the free-trade Latin American areas 

with large Middle Eastern populations. Other areas include Colombia’s Maicao; Venezuela’s Isla Margarita; Chile’s Iquique; the Paraguayan city of Encarnación, on the border with Argentina; and the 

Uruguayan town of Chuy, on the border with Brazil. The TBA has a 

reputation for lawlessness and, for the past fifteen years, has become 

the cause of much concern for those countries and the intelligence 

agencies in the West, because of the presence of transnational terrorists. It’s indeed a center for many criminal activities that include 

drug trafficking, people, goods, weapons, as well as money laundering, prostitution, piracy of products, illegal gambling, etc. For decades, the region has been home to various terrorists, smugglers, 

drug traffickers, arms dealers, and organized crime figures from 

Russia, Japan, China, and Nigeria, among other countries.

Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Leste are regions where the first 

settlements of immigrants from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, 

and the Palestinian territories emerged about 50 years ago and have 

a high rate of religious Muslim activity. The last 20 years have also 

•

•

•
36

 JSOU Report 06-4

seen a significant immigration flow from China, Taiwan, and Korea.55

Foz do Iguaçu is the largest city in the region, population estimated of about 320,000 (Ciudad del Leste—250,000 and Puerto 

Iguazu—30,000). Many people leave Ciudad del Leste at night and 

cross the 303-meter President Tancredo Neves concrete bridge, also 

known as the Friendship International Bridge (Ponte Internacional 

da Amizade), to return to Foz do Iguaçu, where the quality of life is, 

undoubtedly, better than in Ciudad del Leste and Puerto Iguazu. Estimates of the size of the Arab community of immigrants in the TBA 

(mainly in Ciudad del Leste and Foz do Iguaçu) range from 20,000 to 

30,000, with most (about 15,000) residing in Foz do Iguaçu.56 This 

is Brazil’s second largest Arab community (city of São Paulo is the 

largest).57 Most Arabs are of Lebanese and Palestinian descent and 

maintain commercial outlets in Ciudad del Leste. Currently, Foz do 

Iguaçu is successfully exploiting the tourist potential of the Iguaçu 

Falls (Cataratas do Iguaçu). 

The region also has the largest hydroelectric plant in the world at 

Itaipu. Built by the Brazilian government and managed by a Brazilian-Paraguayan company, the Itaipu Binacional, the Itiapu plant has 

been operational since the beginning of the 1970s. This plant has 18 

turbines, nine on the Brazilian side and nine on the Paraguayan side 

of the Paraná River. Paraguay uses only 5 percent of the generated 

energy. Brazil exploits the remaining 95 percent by buying power 

very cheaply from Paraguay. Itaipu’s generated energy is responsible 

to supply Brasilia, the capital, and the whole south and southeast 

regions of the country, including the São Paulo State industrial park 

(the Brazilian main industrial park). Therefore, the Itaipu’s hydroelectric complex is Brazil’s most important strategic key point in the 

Southern Cone. 

Considering the security issues since the construction of the 

Itaipu’s hydroelectric plant, the Brazilian Army improved significantly the 34th Motorized Infantry Battalion in Foz do Iguaçu. The area, 

even before the creation of the Ciudad del Leste’s free trade zone (and 

its consequent problems), has been permanently monitored by Brazilian intelligence and security forces. Field tactical exercises carried 

out by the Brazilian Army’s Rapid Reaction Force (FAR – E) units are 

routinely conducted in that area.

The region’s main economic dynamic is business between Ciudad 

del Leste and Foz do Iguaçu. On normal days, an estimated 30,000 
37

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

to 40,000 people and 20,000 vehicles cross the Friendship Bridge 

between Brazil and Paraguay. Residents and tourists in Ciudad del 

Leste also regularly cross between Paraguay and Brazil on foot, often without documents. Border checks by authorities have generally been limited to simple spot checks, and less than 10 percent of 

personal baggage and vehicle loads are checked. Paraguay has been 

especially culpable in maintaining lax security and very poor border 

controls in the area, helping to fuel a huge underground economy. 

The traditional status of the TBA as a source of cheap goods has 

been severely restricted by new regulations issued by Argentina and 

Brazil. After Brazil implemented an integrated customs system to 

combat smuggling, commerce between Ciudad del Leste and Foz do 

Iguaçu reportedly decreased by 90 percent.58

The area is a haven for the outlaws who live and work among its 

law-abiding citizens. Political corruption, particularly on the Paraguayan side, allows for a multitude of criminal activities and illegal 

markets to overlap with legitimate economic activities.

Concerns about the Islamic terrorist element in the TBA date back to 

17 March 1992, when a car bomb exploded at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 people and injuring more than 200. With the embassy 

bombing still unsolved, two years later, 

on 18 July 1994 the Argentine-Israeli 

Mutual Association (AMIA) Jewish Center was bombed, killing 86 

people. The investigation of both attacks implicated Hezbollah, the 

Lebanon-based Shiite Muslim militant organization. At that time, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Israel, and the United States had focused 

the attention on the TBA. Argentine authorities believe that the attacks had been organized and planned in the TBA.59 In July 2002, 

a witness in the AMIA bombing, Abdolghassem Mesbahi, a former 

Iranian intelligence officer, testified to Argentine authorities that the 

Iranian government, the primary sponsor of Hezbollah, organized 

and carried out the AMIA attack and then paid to then Argentine 

President Carlos Saúl Menem $10 million to cover it up. The charges 

against Menem have never been substantiated and he vigorously denied them.60

Al Qaeda reportedly has had an interest and a presence in the 

TBA since at least the mid-1990s. Osama Bin Laden visited Foz do 

Concerns about the Islamic 

terrorist element in the TBA 

date back to 17 March 

1992, when a car bomb 

exploded at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires ...
38

 JSOU Report 06-4

Iguaçu in 1995 (the specific month is unclear), according to the leading Brazilian newsweekly magazine Veja. It cited an anonymous high 

official of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência Brasileira de Inteligência, ABIN) who reported a 28-minute videotape that shows Bin 

Laden participating in meetings at a mosque during his visit.61 There 

have been indications that terrorist elements with possible Al Qaeda 

connections have used mosques in the TBA for recruitment purposes. In 1999, agents from Argentina’s Secretariat of State Intelligence 

(SIDE) passed on a report that operatives from Al Qaeda were in the 

TBA coordinating actions with Hezbollah, something astonishing for 

most analysts who believed that Shiite Hezbollah and Sunni Al Qaeda would never cooperate.62

On 31 May 1996, the three TBA countries established a “Tripartite Command of the Tri-Border” in order to better control commerce and the large transient international population. But the biggest improvement came after the tragedy of 9/11/2001. In 2002, 

Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and the Unites States created the “3+1” 

Counterterrorism Dialogue, a mechanism focused on terrorism prevention, counterterrorism policy discussion, information sharing, 

increased cross-border cooperation, and mutual counterterrorism 

capacity building. Since then, the Organization of American States 

(OAS) Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) is committing resources to build on the success of the “3+1” Dialogue. The 

United States alone has contributed $1 million specifically for capacity building efforts in this region.63

Several counterterrorism advances have occurred and operations have been significantly successful since then. For example, on 

15 April 2002 Mohamad Ali Aboul-Ezz Al-Mahdi Ibrahim Soliman, 

member of the Egyptian terrorist organization Muslim Brotherhood 

(Al Gama’a al-Islammya) leadership, was arrested by Brazilian security forces in Foz do Iguaçu (where he had been living for seven 

years) under charges filed by the Egyptian government. Earlier, in 

1999, he had been arrested on charges of dealing with contraband 

merchandise.64 In September 2002, Ahmad Mohamed, a Lebanese 

naturalized in Paraguay, who used his 6,000 hectare ranch as the 

biggest FARC guerrilla elite’s haven in Brazil (located in the small city 

of Guaíra, southern part of the Paraná State at the Paraguay border, 

not too far from the TBA) was arrested by Brazil’s Federal Police.65

On 22 June 2002, Assad Mohamed Barakat, the Hezbollah financial 

kingpin in the TBA, was arrested by Brazilian security forces and 
39

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

in mid–December 2002, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court ruled 

to extradite Barakat to Paraguay to face charges of association for 

criminal purposes, abetment of crime, and tax evasion.66

The TBA is reportedly a conduit for the drug trafficking through 

Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which serve as transit countries 

for Andean cocaine. Despite the significant smuggling activity in the 

region, the TBA’s importance as a drug trafficking conduit may have 

declined in recent years as a result of increased surveillance by security forces of the three TBA countries. The “3+1” Group on Tri-Border 

Area security discussions and analysis of preventive actions against 

terrorism and other transnational crimes is making significant contributions to countering these crimes. The discussions are focused 

on joint activities, such as training, international counterterrorism 

obligations, and best practices for improving law enforcement cooperation, including combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

There are still some very complex problems to deal with. Paraguay 

has no antiterror law, which in many countries (like in Argentina and 

Brazil) allows for the seizure of terrorist funds and bans donations 

to terrorist organizations. In addition, many analysts believe that 

Paraguay is particularly hesitant to prosecute or conduct investigations into Middle Eastern terrorists because the TBA is the largest 

center of commerce in the country and the Arab community there is 

often described as the “pillar” of economic activity. If the Arab community abandons the region en masse, Paraguay’s already unstable 

economy would further deteriorate. Actually, Paraguay’s weak government, lack of democratic stability, and pervasive corruption leave 

the door open for criminal and terrorist activity. Bribes are paid to 

government authorities to procure passports and visas as well as to 

buy influence among leading legislators, police, and judges.

In the “Questions taken at the 9 February 2004 Daily Press Briefing,” a representative of the US Department of State, Office of the 

Spokesman, stated that “at this time, the US Government does not 

have credible information confirming an established Al Qaeda presence in the Tri-Border Area, nor have we uncovered information that 

would confirm terrorist operational planning ongoing in this region. 

Terrorist supporters in the TBA are primarily engaged in fundraising 

for Hezbollah and Hamas.”

On 6 and 7 December 2004, the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, 

Paraguay, and the United States met in the Washington D.C. in the 
40

 JSOU Report 06-4

framework of the “3+1” Group. After analyzing the points of the agenda, the delegations concluded that “according to currently available 

information, no operational activities of terrorism have been detected at the Tri-Border Area.” They also reiterated “their commitment 

to continue meetings with the four countries under this informal 

mechanism as the results achieved in this sphere are considered 

highly positive and auspicious.” Brazil announced the creation of a 

Regional Intelligence Center inside the newly established Federal Police headquarters in Foz do Iguaçu. Argentina and Paraguay made a 

commitment to designate focal points and liaison officers to this new 

center.67 Moreover, President George W. Bush and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva discussed the TBA during Bush ́s trip 

to Brazil in November 2005. 

The TBA is a very important geopolitical region for the Western 

Hemisphere because it is a key point from which diverse points of 

South and North America can be penetrated. Because of the joint 

efforts carried out by regional countries, there is no doubt that the 

Islamist organizations have decreased their level of activities and the 

transnational crimes are being severely hit. Still, TBA remains a very 

significant latent threat. It’s crystal clear that the fight against terrorism and transnational crime can be effective only if applied from a 

perspective of broad cooperation among all countries’ agencies concerned, in an effective multi-national effort. This may prove important because even the FARC has found Paraguay and the wider TBA 

to be an inviting operational area. 

The FARC Teaches Kidnapping 

to Brazilian Criminal Organizations

These were the headlines of the Brazilian Newspaper O Estado de 

São Paulo on 4 July 2005, when it published an interview with the 

Brazilian Federal Judge Odilon Oliveira in the city of Ponta Porã (border with Paraguay).68 He displayed evidence (including a videotape) 

that FARC members were carrying out training for outlaws belonging 

to the two largest Brazilian criminal organizations: First Capital’s 

Command (O Primeiro Comando da Capital, PCC) from the city of 

São Paulo and Red Command (O Comando Vermelho, CV) from the 

city of Rio de Janeiro. This training was specifically oriented to the 

conduct of kidnappings. According to Judge Oliveira, Brazilian narcotraffickers also had started to negotiate directly with the narcoguerrillas, eliminating Colombian intermediates, for the purchase of 
41

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

cocaine. The payment is made in dollars or weapons. Judge Oliveira 

highlighted two Brazilian gang leaders currently established in Paraguay: Luiz Carlos da Rocha (aka Cabeça Branca) and Carlos Roberto 

da Silva (aka Charles). The latter is used to bring the cocaine from 

Colombia to be stored in Paraguayan territory by seven of his own 

aircraft.

Drugs enter Brazil through the border of the Mato Grosso do Sul 

State in the vicinity of the cities of Ponta Porã and Corumbá and are 

taken to the São Paulo and Paraná states in order to be distributed in 

Brazil and to Europe and the US. Judge Oliveira stated that with the 

regulation of the “Destructive Shooting Law” and Brazilian Air Force 

repressive action, the Amazon region became sufficiently watched 

and, therefore, there was a change in the route to the south for the 

drug dealers’ aircraft, and that cocaine is increasingly crossing the 

border in cars or buses in packages from 10 to 50 kilograms. He added that the great Brazilian dealers had left the marijuana business, 

preferring cocaine because of its small volume and its large aggregated value. According to the Brazilian Federal Police, about 80 percent 

of the 18 thousand tons of marijuana produced in Paraguay goes to 

Brazil. This production is dominated by Brazilian drug lords. 

An example is Odacir Antonio Dametto, who has 19 farms in 

Paraguay producing both soybean and marijuana. Extradited from 

Paraguay, he is now in a top-security penitentiary in Campo Grande, 

capital of the state of Mato Grosso do Sul. Another Brazilian criminal 

arrested by Paraguayan authorities who would have been extradited 

to Brazil is Igor Fabricio Vieira, a former accomplice of the drug lord 

Fernandinho Beira Mar. But, Igor allegedly paid $50,000 as a bribe 

to escape from the Paraguayan prison that was holding him. Ivan 

Mesquita is another Brazilian drug kingpin established in Paraguay 

with a very strong relationship with the Front 16 of the FARC. Ivan 

was arrested and extradited to the United States to face international 

drug trafficking charges.

Oliveira has also tracked the narcos’ links with terrorist organizations of the Middle East. He ordered the arrest of two outlaws of 

Arab origin, Joseph and Jorge Rafael Toumani. “There is evidence of 

money laundering to support terrorism,” he said. To combat money 

laundering in the city of Ponta Porã, Judge Oliveira has carried out 

an extensive investigation. A former Brazilian bank manager deeply 

involved, Elesbão Lopes de Carvalho Filho, was condemned by the 
42

 JSOU Report 06-4

Judge to 172 years in prison and a fine of R$ 358,000 (Brazilian 

coin), the largest penalty yet applied for this crime.

Judge Odilon Oliveira presented to the press a videotape apprehended with the criminals who kidnapped and killed Cecília Cubas, 

daughter of former Paraguayan President Raúl Cubas, on 21 September 2004.69 Images show training for that kidnapping. Cecília’s body 

was discovered in a house in the outskirts of Asunción. According 

to the Paraguayan authorities, this kidnapping had been conducted 

by Osmar Martinez, leader of the Free Country Party (Partido Pátria 

Libre), a Paraguayan radical leftist party linked to the Peasant Movement (Movimiento Campesino), with the help of the FARC members. 

Judge Oliveira, who is marked to die by the cocaine barons from different countries, is, currently, the Judge of the 3rd Federal Court of 

the city of Campo Grande, capital of the Mato Grosso do Sul State.

The FARC Intends to Create a 

Força Revolucionária da América

The Brazilian Newspaper Correio Braziliense in its 31 October 2005 

issue, published classified reports from the Brazilian and Paraguayan Intelligence Services, produced in January 2005, disclosing that 

the FARC is using its guerrilla warfare experience trying to create 

America’s Revolutionary Force (Força Revolucionária da América, 

FRA).70 This organization intends to assemble representatives of radical leftist social movements and other associations from countries 

like Brazil, Paraguay, Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. Initially, FRA will try to disseminate among its collaborators a kind of 

revolutionary ideology and to get international financing.

In this context, guerrilla training is being carried out by the FARC 

for Brazilians from radical leftist social movements like the Landless 

Peasants Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra, MST). 

Although the Brazilian leadership of the MST denies this participation, there is evidence that three of those training events had been 

carried out in May, July, and August 2005. Those activities were 

conducted in the region of Salto del Guayrá, Ciudad de Pindoty Porã, 

Departamiento de Canindeyú, in Paraguay, on the border with the 

Brazilian states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Paraná. This region was 

selected because it has been used in the last two years as a strategic 

point for cocaine, marijuana, and weapons smuggling, which prosper 

with the convenience [connivance?] of some Paraguayan authorities 

and the benevolence of fragile Paraguayan legislation. According to 
43

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

the Brazilian Federal Police, the border departments of Concepción, 

Amambay and San Pedro, require special attention because they are 

also being used as trafficking routes by great criminal syndicates. 

The United States Recent Military Presence in Paraguay

On 1 June 2005, the Paraguayan Congress signed off on an agreement bringing over 400 US troops for “joint training and humanitarian operations.” This deal, which is slated to last 18 months, sparked 

criticism and speculation among officials of neighboring South American governments regarding possible motives behind the presence of 

US troops in such large numbers in a country long renowned for its 

crime, corruption, contraband, and rhetoric about terrorist threats 

in the Tri-Border Area. On 1 July 2005, fewer than 50 US military 

personnel arrived, and a new contingent of 45 soldiers followed on 

24 July. It seems that the initial reports that 400 troops would be 

arriving in Paraguay referred to the aggregate number of US troops 

being sent to the country over the 18 months. Actually, there is no 

clear information from the Pentagon regarding US military actions in 

Paraguay through 2006.

US officials say troops will operate in small numbers, for short 

periods of time, and will conduct some humanitarian missions along 

with Paraguayan units, according to a 7 July 2005 statement released by US Embassy officials in Asunción.

71 “US personnel in small 

numbers, generally between 10 to 20 people, will train with their 

Paraguayan military counterparts during periods from two to six 

weeks,” the statement said. “The US soldiers will not be deployed 

for extended periods of time and there will never be more than a 

few dozen US service members in Paraguay for more than 45 days.” 

The State Department also noted that the two countries have conducted joint exercises since 1943, usually involving less than 50 US 

troops at a time. Their mission in the country is to provide housing, road construction, educational and health services, and to train 

Paraguayan military counterparts. Nevertheless, there is a general 

impression among South American analysts from different countries 

that US officials have downplayed the deal, stressing that the combined exercises, which focus on counterterrorism, drug interdiction 

and humanitarian aid, are similar to past ones.

There is an airbase in Mariscal Estigarribia, which is 200 kilometers from the border with Bolivia, that may be utilized by the US 

military. This base was constructed in the 1980s for US technicians 
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hired by the Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner and is capable of 

housing 15,000 troops. A journalist writing for the Argentine newspaper Clarín recently visited the base and reported it to be in perfect 

condition, capable of handling large military planes. Its oversized for 

the Paraguayan Air Force, which only has a handful of small aircraft. 

The base has an enormous radar system, huge hangars, and an air 

traffic control air tower. The airstrip is larger than the one at the 

international airport in Asunción. Near the base is a military camp 

which has recently grown in size.72

Argentine Nobel Peace Prize laureate Adolfo Perez Esquivel commented on the situation in Paraguay, “Once the United States arrives, it takes it a long time to leave. And that really frightens me.” 73

“The national government has not reached any agreement with the 

United States for the establishment of a US military base in Paraguay”, states a communiqué signed by Paraguayan Foreign Minister 

Leila Rachid. The US Embassy in Paraguay has also released statements officially denying plans to set up a military base in the country.74

The Pentagon used this same language when describing its actions in Manta, Ecuador, now the home of an $80 million US military 

base. After a similar troop agreement with Quito in 1999, first they 

said the facility was a “dirt strip” which would be used for weather 

monitoring and would not permanently house US personnel. Days 

later, the Pentagon stated that Manta was to serve as a major military base tasked with a variety of security related missions.75

Theories have spread in regional media and on streets. One says 

the Pentagon wants to get close to vast natural gas reserves in Bolivia, a country where socialist political movements are, currently, in 

power. Another theory claims the United States wants to control the 

Guarani Aquifer. 

One of the world’s biggest underground aquifers, the Guarani 

occupies an area of 1,195,700 square kilometers. About 70 percent 

is under Brazilian territory, 19 percent in Argentina, 6 percent in 

Paraguay and 5 percent in Uruguay. Its capacity is sufficient to supply 360 million people, given that it replenishes itself up to 160 to 

260 Km3 per year. It could satisfy up to 21 percent of industrial 

demand for water in those four countries until 2025, according to a 

UN report warning of the scarcity of the precious liquid. No less than 

1 billion people have no access to potable water. Approximately 20 

percent of the world’s population does not have water, or has access 
45

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

to unhealthy water only. Considering that the world’s population is 

growing by 200,000 people a day, the problem is going to get worse. 

So, there is already a general awareness that future wars might be 

focused around taking over the potable water that still remains available. Water has become the “Blue Gold” of the 21st Century.

Under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense 

has sought to remake the US military into a quicker, lighter force 

that is less reliant on brute manual action and more inclined towards 

overwhelming speed and technological advantage. As its centerpiece, 

this strategy calls for the establishment of Cooperative Security Locations (CSL), previously known as Forward Operating Locations, in 

strategic locations around the world to allow for rapid mobilization 

and intervention at a moment’s notice. There are already various 

CSLs operating around the hemisphere, but none would have the 

strategic importance that a base in Paraguay could hold. This current military agreement, which notably includes immunity for US 

troops, has led many policy decision makers and analysts in South 

America to fear that the Mariscal Estigarribia landing facility could 

soon be converted into a major US permanent base.76

The US diplomatic offensive involving Paraguay did not go unnoticed by Asunción’s immediate neighbors. Just like the other MERCOSUL partners (Argentina and Uruguay), the 

Brazilian Government asked for explanations 

from Paraguayan President Nicanor Duarte’s 

Government. The diplomatic response seems 

to have been well accepted. Some South American social communication organizations had published that in July 

2005, coinciding with the arrival of the first US soldiers, “Brazil reportedly launched military maneuvers along the Paraguayan border,” 

a move seen as an expression of Brazilian discontent with Paraguay. 

Actually, the maneuver was a Brazilian Army Parachute Infantry Brigade field tactical exercise, programmed one year earlier. Military 

maneuvers in the frontier areas are usual in the training program 

of the Brazilian Army Strategic Rapid Reaction Force. Anyway, there 

are brand new geopolitical questions in the region regarding Washington’s intensified interests in previously all-but-ignored Paraguay.

The following section describes how Brazil confronts the beast—

various measures Brazil has taken to face up to narcoterrorism 

threats since the incursion of by the FARC during the Traíra InciThe US diplomatic 

offensive involving 

Paraguay did not 

go unnoticed by 

Asunción’s immediate neighbors. 
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dent in 1991 and more recent attacks on the national patrimony 

by narcoterrorists operating from outside Brazil. It outlins in some 

detail the in strategies and military dispositions tht Brazil has taken 

to counter threats to its vital interests. 
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6. Brazil Confronts the Beast

Drug trafficking has become a very significant threat to peace 

and stability in the countries of the Amazon region. This activity increases corruption and criminal rates and is considered a radical political and social destabilizing factor. The partnership involving the drug cartels and revolutionary movements allows 

their control of large areas of the territory and makes law enforcement very difficult. The constant discovery of new trafficking routes 

shows the extent of the problem.

The Traíra Incident

On 26 February 1991, about 40 gunmen who called themselves Comando Simon Bolivar of the FARC conducted a raid into Brazilian 

territory. They attacked a Brazilian Army jungle detachment at a 

semi-permanent camp on the bank of the Traíra River on the Brazil–Colombia border, 400 kilometers north of the Solimões Frontier 

Command/1st Special Border Battalion headquarters in Tabatinga, 

Amazonas State.77 Surprised by the intense automatic weapons fire, 

camp members tried unsuccessfully to react. During the action, 

the Brazilian 17-man unit suffered 12 casualties, three dead and 

nine wounded. Two Colombian miners detained at the camp also 

died. By the raid’s end, the Colombian guerrillas, suffering no losses 

themselves, had stolen the detachment’s long distance radio station, 

ammunition, uniforms, and all the post’s armaments. They carried 

5.56mm automatic weapons and various hunting rifles and wore 

light green uniforms and rubber boots. Two women who were identified among the attacking gunmen had previously been detained at 

the post.

This lawless situation was caused by a large number of illegal 

Brazilian and Colombian miners who arrived in Traíra after the deactivation of a Brazilian mining company. It was later proved that 

the FARC guerrillas were allied with Colombian cocaine dealers and 

illegal Colombian miners. The Colombian guerrilla action seemed to 

be a reprisal for previous counter guerrilla actions conducted by the 

Traíra Detachment in order to establish law and order in a region of 

Indian lands and illicit gold mining. 

The FARC attack against this detachment was unforeseen. Since 

the first Brazilian border platoons were established in the Amazon, 
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attacks like this had never occurred. The FARC attack led to the 

planning and execution of a combined operation staffed by the Armed 

Forces of Brazil and Colombia—Operation Traíra. This operation was 

the principal result of an extraordinary regional bilateral meeting 

held in Leticia, on 9 March 1991, between Brazilian and Colombian 

security authorities.

This meeting produced various combined accords and recommendations, and it defined the forces’ commitment to operate in 

their respective territories to maintain order and to pacify the border 

region. The coordinated actions by Brazilians and Colombians at all 

levels of planning were also established. An agreement was reached 

for the immediate and continuous exchange of intelligence related 

to subversion, terrorism, and narcotrafficking in order to neutralize 

possible threats. It was also recommended that the Brazilian and 

Colombian Armies should foster combined problem management to 

increase government presence in the area and support community 

development activities.

The retaliatory Brazilian–Colombian response was successful. 

The offending FARC unit was neutralized, several members of the 

guerrilla support network were imprisoned and most of the stolen 

military equipment was recaptured. Again, in November 1991, another operation, Operation Perro Loco was launched at the Colombian 

border to confront new latent FARC threats. This operation was conducted in the Iauaretê and Querarí regions, both in the Amazonas 

State Dog’s Head (Cabeça do Cachorro) region.78

Both operations, Traíra and Perro Loco, had successfully dissuaded the Colombian narcoguerrillas in the region from conducting 

incursions into Brazilian territory.79 In those operations, conducted 

under the Amazon Military Command (headquarters in Manaus, 

capital of the Amazonas State) there was the participation of jungle 

infantry troops, special operations forces (SOF), Army aviation helicopters, Air Force fighters, and also a Navy river patrol ship.

Security and Development of the Brazilian Amazon

The Brazilian National Defense Policy highlights the Amazon and 

South Atlantic (also known as the “Blue Amazon,” it includes the territorial sea and the Brazilian Economic Exploitation Zone, in an area 

of 3.6 million square kilometers). They are Brazil’s two top priority 

strategic areas. The Amazon is considered of utmost geopolitical importance for several reasons, including its vast size, its demographic 
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Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

emptiness, its long borders, its abundant natural resources (particularly water and mineral resources), its problems associated with Indians and gold prospectors, the presence of guerrilla movements associated with narcotrafficking in neighboring countries, the presence 

of the Landless Peasants Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores 

Sem Terra, MST), a social movement which may or may not have 

ideological connotations), and pressure imposed by international interests. All together, these factors give the region its particular complexity as an international geopolitical issue. 

The Brazilian Amazon’s geopolitical importance demands preservation of the natural environment and development of the area as 

part of the larger South American Amazon region. Geographically, 

the Amazon is a huge basin that drains an area of 7,300,000 square 

kilometers in the northern part of the South American subcontinent. 

It encompasses territory in eight countries besides Brazil: French 

Guyana, Suriname, Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador.

In 1978, Brazil took the initiative to bring eight neighboring countries into the Treaty of Amazonian Cooperation (Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica), also known as the Pan Amazonic Treaty. The 28 

articles emphasized the following:

Development of the region was the exclusive right of these 

countries

Preservation of natural resources was also part of their national sovereignty

Cooperation to achieve these two objectives

Harmony between development and ecological protection 

should be achieved

Cooperation on transnational crime, health care, river navigation, road building, scientific research, conservation and tourism

In February 2004, a cooperation agreement to combat 

narcotrafficking and other transnational illicit activities in the bordering rivers involving Brazil, Colombia and Peru was signed. In September 2004, there was an international meeting in Lima, Peru, involving all Defense Ministers of the Andean and Amazon regions. In 

this meeting, it was established that there would be two permanent 

bilateral defense working groups, Brazil–Peru and Brazil–Ecuador.

It’s important to highlight that over 60 percent of the South 

American Amazon is Brazilian territory. This accounts for 60 percent 

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of the total land mass of Brazil. Some of the specific characteristics 

of the Brazilian Amazon are:

[?] million square kilometers (3.6 percent of the world land 

mass)

Population density of about 7 inhabitants per square kilometer 

(17.5 million, about 14 percent of Brazil’s population)

1/3 of the world’s tropical forests

The largest biological diversity reserve on the planet (about 20 

percent of living species)

The largest fresh water basin in the world

One of the world’s richest subsoils in mineral wealth

Although the Amazon is disassociated from the rest of the Brazilian territory and demographically sparse, Brazil has historically 

resisted threats against its sovereignty over this important region 

to include recent attempts at interference in Amazonian affairs by 

international organizations. There are now new serious challenges 

to be overcome as Brazil pursues settlement and development of the 

Amazon.80

The Brazilian Military Strategic Concept 

and the Armed Forces’ Role

The objectives of the Brazilian National Defense Policy are to guarantee the sovereignty and the safety of the Brazilian national wealth, to 

guarantee rules of law and democratic institutions, maintain national unity, protect citizen rights and Brazilian interests abroad, provide 

for a more significant role in international affairs, and contribute to 

the maintenance of international peace and security.81 Notwithstanding some severe budget restrictions, the Brazilian Armed Forces are 

the second largest and most powerful (after the US) of the Western 

Hemisphere. Every year public opinion polls are carried out and the 

people respond with their opinion about the most reliable institutions of the country. The Brazilian military institution is apolitical 

and enjoys (differently of other Latin America countries) the highest 

confidence rating of any public institution (including the Church) as 

evidenced by those polls. 

The mission of the Brazilian Armed Forces as stated in the Constitution are to defend the homeland, guarantee Constitutional Powers (Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary) and, when requested by 

one of the Constitutional Powers, to guarantee law and order.82 Other 

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tasks are established by legislation and Presidential directives, such 

as to contribute to national development and civil defense; to participate in international operations; and to operate in the land frontier 

areas against transnational illicit activities. 

The guarantee of law and order is summarized as enforcing respect for established legal norms or those derived from them. It’s 

important to highlight that Armed Forces’ intervention will always 

be a last resort, when the federal and state law enforcement agencies (LEA) cannot maintain law and order and chaos becomes an 

imminent threat. So, it’s necessary to point out that the Brazilian 

Armed Forces do not have the mission to preserve the public order. 

Constitutionally, this is the mission of the Federal Police and the 

states’ LEAs. Primarily, the Armed Forces’ role is to provide LEA with 

logistics, intelligence and training support, when needed. Public security is a duty of the states and also a right as well as everyone’s 

responsibility. It is exercised to preserve order, to provide security to 

the people and their properties. For this assignment, the country has 

the Federal Police, the Federal Highway Police, the Federal Railroad 

Police, the states’ Civilian Police, the states’ Military Police, and the 

Military Firemen Corps.83 Air and maritime interdiction, carried out 

by the Air Force and the Navy, are considered military support to 

LEA. 

The preventive strategies of Presence and Deterrence have been 

selected as the primary means of avoiding conflict based on the analysis of current and future situations. The Brazilian Army is present 

in more than 500 cities and small towns in all states of the Brazilian 

Republic. This is what is meant by the preventive strategy of Presence. It means “showing the flag” in all parts of the country, especially in outlying regions where the Army is often the only federal 

presence.

Though Brazil is one of the 10 top economies of the world by Gross 

Domestic Product (GDP), representing roughly half the GDP and half 

the population of South America and the 15th largest defense budget 

of the world, it is among those countries with one of the smallest defense budget as a percentage of its GDP. So, it’s clearly impossible, 

in the short term, to increase significantly the current operational 

capabilities of the Brazilian Armed Forces. Therefore, certain prioritized activities have been chosen as vectors of the Armed Forces 

of the future, while at the same time maintaining a military force 
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 JSOU Report 06-4

capable of accomplishing the current tasks, including its strategy of 

deterrence. 

One of these prioritized vectors is the Brazilian Army’s Strategic 

Rapid Reaction Force (Força de Ação Rápida Estratégica, FAR-E). 

This Force, as well as the Marine Corps, is composed of professional 

troops, a high level of readiness, modern equipment, top training 

priority, and a strategic and tactical mobility that ensures their deployment ability anywhere in the country and their ability to serve 

as a ready response or core force in international commitments. The 

Strategic Rapid Reaction Force84 is composed of the Parachute Infantry Brigade (headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro State); the 

11th Light Infantry Brigade (recently activated and oriented to Guarantee of Law and Order Operations with headquarters in Campinas, 

São Paulo State); 12th Light Infantry Brigade – Air Assault (headquarters in Caçapava, São Paulo State); the Special Operations Brigade 

(headquarters in Goiânia, Goiás State)85; and four squadrons of the 

Army Aviation Command (headquarters and three helicopter squadrons in Taubaté, São Paulo State and one helicopter squadron in

Manaus, Amazonas State).

Currently, the Amazon region is the first strategic priority of the 

Armed Forces plans. This includes the preparation for rapid deployment of strategic forces of the three services, based outside the Amazon region. In order to develop the Amazon region and to defend vital 

national interests in the area, the Brazilian government is implementing the following strategies:

Increasing military presence in the area

Developing and operating the Amazon Surveillance System 

(Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia, SIVAM) as the main component of the Amazon Protection System (Sistema de Proteção 

da Amazônia, SIPAM)

Developing sustained economic activities

Improving access to new environmentally-friendly technologies 

that preserve the ecosystem and the environment

Applying resources from the reactivated North Path Project 

(Calha Norte Project) and other sources

To support this strategy the army has increased troops stationed 

in the Amazon from 6,000 in 1990 to 26,000 troops distributed in 62 

Amazon locations in 2006. The establishment of both the 4th Army 

Aviation Squadron and the 3rd Special Forces Company in Manaus

increased significantly the mobility, flexibility, and combat power 

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Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

of the Amazon Military Command. The following is a description of 

Brazil’s forces that are ready to defend the Amazon region against 

narcoterrorists and other threats.

Keeping in mind that the future is marked by undefined threats, 

in an environment in which uncertainty and unpredictability require 

a forces design suitable for any kind of mission, the Brazilian Armed 

Forces are developing concepts of a genuine national military strategy that will address the near, medium and long term requirements 

of the Nation, particularly in regards to the Amazon region.

The Brazilian Navy, besides its river patrolling mission and complementary development tasks, provides support to the Army for 

riverine operations (including deployment of Brazilian Marine Corps 

units). Currently, the Brazilian Navy has two main bases on the Amazon, at Belém, Pará State and at Manaus, Amazonas State, the two 

largest cities of the Brazilian Amazon. The Brazilian Air Force carries 

out the normal tasks related with air space control and supports the 

Army in close air support missions, fixed wing air transport, and 

complementary development tasks. 

The Brazilian Air Force has four main bases, at Belém, Manaus, 

and Boa Vista, Roraima State, and Porto Velho, Rondonia State. By 

the end of 2006 there will be three more bases at São Gabriel da Cachoeira, Amazonas State; Eirunepé, Amazonas State; and Vilhena, 

Rondonia State.

The Brazilian Army, which assumes the largest responsibilities 

through the Amazon Military Command (Comando Militar da Amazônia, CMA), currently has the 2nd Construction Corps of Engineers 

Group (headquarters at Manaus, commands four Corps of Engineers’ Battalions) and five Jungle Infantry Brigades (at about 4,500 

people each, 85 percent professional soldiers) in the Amazon region: 

the 1st (headquarters in Boa Vista, Roraima State), the 16th (in Tefé, 

Amazonas State), the 17th (in Porto Velho, Rondonia State), the 23rd

(in Marabá, Pará State), and, very recently, the 2nd (in São Gabriel da 

Cachoeira, Amazonas State).

The Jungle Warfare Training Center (Centro de Instrução de 

Guerra na Selva, CIGS) deserves special mention. It was created in 

March 1964 and activated in October 1966, in Manaus, to instruct 

experts and train troops for operations in the Amazon region. The 

CIGS is internationally known for its training standards as well as 

for advances in doctrine and research fields, as the best jungle warfare training school anywhere.86 To secure and helping the develop-
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ment of the Amazon, the Brazilian Army must carry out the following 

tasks:

Train to acquire the fundamental skills of jungle warfare

Operate, when needed, in order to safeguard Brazilian sovereignty and the integrity of the national patrimony

Carry out permanent surveillance on the border areas

Establish settlements, which entails settling civilian populations around the most remote military units

Promote education, in all frontier units, using state teachers or 

Army personnel; the norm is elementary school, junior high, 

and high school

Provide health care, an important responsibility because in 

several interior centers and in border areas only the Army is 

able to provide public health services(normally, care to Brazilian military personnel represents only 15 to 20 percent of 

care provided by Brazilian military doctors; the other 80 to 85 

percent are Indians, civilians and military personnel from bordering countries)

Improve transport, particularly through efforts of the 2nd Construction Corps of Engineers Group in building and maintaining roads throughout the Amazon region

In accomplishing its mission, the Brazilian Army (as well as the 

Navy and the Air Force) must coordinate with several governmental agencies. It faces some adverse factors, such as a vast frontier, 

the existence of organized guerilla groups associated with powerful narcotrafficking cartels in some neighboring countries, the demarcation of Indian reserves near the borders, and the presence of 

Brazilian and foreign gold miners near the borders with neighboring 

countries. Additional problems include the subversive action of foreign missionaries who are not engaged in religious matters and the 

subversive actions of different foreign groups of non-governmental 

organizations concerned with several issues such as ecology, Indian 

people affairs, internationalization of the region, and so forth. The 

illegal actions of the MST (Landless Peasants Movement) have been a 

problem in specific areas. 

The Brazilian government is aware that its security interests 

might be deeply threatened by the collapse of the Bogotá’s government authority and, therefore, has supported the Colombian government in its objectives. However, it is concerned that the military 

operations developed in Colombian territory might drive refugees, 

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Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

guerrillas, and drug traffickers across the border into Brazil. Despite 

all the difficulties, maintaining the control of the border is a high security priority and integration with the Colombian authorities is very 

well implemented. In September 2000, the Brazilian Armed Forces 

launched a three-year plan named Operation Cobra, increasing its 

presence on the border with Colombia. After Operation Cobra, Operations Timbó I, II and III were carried out in 2003, 2004 and 2005. 

All were joint operations involving the three services (with the cooperation of some other governmental agencies), under the command 

of the Amazon Joint Command, based in the Army’s Amazon Military 

Command in Manaus. Besides the deployment of the Navy’s fluvial 

patrolling ships, Air Force transportation aircraft and fighters, Army 

aviation helicopters, jungle infantry troops, SOF, and Federal Police 

agents were also involved.

One operational concept the Army uses successfully is to place 

16 jungle infantry platoons at strategic locations along the border. A 

small number of commissioned and noncommissioned officers man 

the locations. Most of the soldiers serving with them are Indians or 

their descendents, with a deep knowledge about the area’s operational environment. These border platoons (about 50 jungle warriors 

each) provide a point of contact, as well as health care and other 

necessities, to the region’s people. Because the border platoons’ positions are widely dispersed and cannot reinforce each other, detachments from the Jungle Infantry Battalions provide constant security, 

surveillance and direct action capabilities in the vast space of jungle 

between the outposts.

In February 2004, Brazil, Colombia and Peru signed a treaty to 

improve border coordination. US Army General Bantz J. Craddock, 

USSOUTHCOM Commander, in his Posture Statement before the 

109th Congress, stated that this was “a superb example of regional 

cooperation against common threats.” 87

In his visit to Colombia, in December 2005, Brazil’s President 

Lula in a Joint Statement with President Uribe, once again repudiated terrorism and signed several bilateral cooperation agreements, 

including combat on narcotrafficking and protection to common borders. Colombia recently bought 25 Super Tucano fighters made by 

the Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica (EMBRAER) and has received 

from the Brazilian Social and Economic Development National Bank

(Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, BNDES) 

a credit of $200 million in order to construct a road project in the 
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south of Colombia that will provide Brazil access to the Colombian 

Pacific.

Considering the enormous distances involved and the aggressiveness of the environment, Brazil is evidencing enormous progress 

in establishing order in its border areas. Two major national initiatives that complement Brazil’s security activities are the border areas 

development program (Calha Norte) and the new surveillance system 

for the Amazon region (SIVAM), described below. 

The Calha Norte Project

Concerned with the lawlessness in the border regions caused by illegal mining, logging, narcotrafficking, and the presence of neighboring guerrilla groups in Colombia and Peru, the government of thenPresident José Sarney approved in 1985 a project for bringing “order 

and progress” to the Amazon by settling people in the remote jungle 

areas.88 The idea of “sovereignty and settlement” which dates from 

the historic origins of the western Amazon region, in modern times is 

embodied by the Calha Norte Project.

The Calha Norte (North Path) Project is, currently, the Brazilian 

government’s most important strategy in securing the Amazon region. Its main goal is to promote the region’s socio-economic development and integrate the region with the rest of the Country. Initially 

seen as a high priority interagency effort, in recent years, because of 

budget restraints, the Project has been sparingly supported, and the 

Armed Forces (mainly the Army) have done most of the work. Under 

Brazil’s new National Defense Policy, the Calha Norte Project is being revitalized with the basic aim of settling and keeping control over 

Amazon borders.

The Calha Norte Project is located to the north of the Solimões 

and Amazonas Rivers and covers borders that separate Brazil from 

the Guyanas, Suriname, Venezuela, and Colombia. The Project involves a 16,000-kilometers-wide strip along those borders, an area 

of 700,000 square miles. This is equivalent to a quarter of Brazilian 

Amazon and about 15 percent of Brazil’s territory. Within that strip, 

which runs from Oiapoque, in Amapá State to Tabatinga, in Amazonas State, live 1.5 million people, a high percentage of whom are 

Indians or their descendents. The strip also contains important mineral resources. The Project was created to reach the following goals:

to strengthen bilateral relations, especially in the economic 

sphere, with neighboring countries

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to increase Brazil’s military presence in the area

to intensify the actions of Brazil’s National Foundation for the 

Indian (Fundação Nacional do Indio, FUNAI) among the indigenous population

to demarcate the area’s boundaries

to stem the loss of foreign exchange caused by the flow of contraband metals and precious stones over the border

to combat drug-trafficking and preclude use of the region as a 

transit area for narcotics

to develop basic social resources

to build economic development centers

The Calha Norte Project, through all its phases, is intended to 

support development processes in the Amazon without destroying 

the basic ecological characteristics of the area. The participation of 

the Armed Forces is fundamental in increasing Brazilian presence 

in the border area through engineering projects and in the establishment of a basic infrastructure supporting the region’s development.89

The SIVAM and the Destructive Shooting Law

The Amazon Surveillance System (Sistema de Vigilância da 

Amazônia, SIVAM) is a realization of the modernization of the Brazilian Brazilian Air Space Control and Air Defense System (Sistema 

de Defesa Aérea e Controle do Espaço Aéreo, SISDACTA), unique in 

Latin America. The SISDACTA is a responsibility of the Brazilian Air 

Force. In this context, it’s important to underscore that, in Brazil, all 

airspace controllers (including those who support commercial aviation in the domestic and international airports) are military and belong to the Air Force. Now, with the SIVAM fully operational, the SISDACTA covers the whole Brazilian territory. It’s something extremely 

relevant because the already effective Brazilian airspace control has 

improved greatly.

SIVAM started operations in 2002 and was fully operational by 

the end of 2004. It amalgamates data from a number of different 

sources: airborne radars (five aircraft R 99A AWACS, three aircraft 

R 99B remote sensors, all made in Brazil by EMBRAER), land-based 

fixed radar stations, mobile radar sites, and satellite information. 

The armed vectors are 76 Brazilian Air Force fighters ALX Super 

Tucano (also manufactured in Brazil by EMBRAER). Weather data—

from land, river and air—also is fed into the system and more than 

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700 ground stations allow scientists to feed information into the system. US defense contractor Raytheon designed the system that cost 

Brazil $1.5 billion. 

SIVAM is helping Brazil control its borders and tie the far-flung 

country together. SIVAM is operated by the Brazilian Air Force, and 

the system does provide significant military capabilities, providing 

radar coverage over the bordering areas. Narcotraffickers were using 

the Brazilian airspace—and sometimes landing strips—to smuggle 

drugs, money and weapons. The illegal aircraft usually proceed to 

the interior of Brazil (internal consumption) or to nearby countries, 

on their way to Europe and the United States. SIVAM also will help 

the search and rescue missions in the remote areas of the country. 

The system gives decision makers in Brasilia or the three other regional control centers in Brazil an invaluable military tool. 

But it’s not only the relevant military aspect that makes this system unique. What is unique is the way that SIVAM was adapted to 

the Amazon Protection System (Sistema de Proteção da Amazônia, 

SIPAM). SIVAM helps to protect the people and resources of the region and helps establish land management and use regimens. The 

system is concerned with deforestation, contacts with indigenous 

peoples, communications (medical experts have the chance to practice telemedicine) and providing government services over a wide 

part of Brazil. The data bank contains information on the flora and 

fauna of the Amazon River basin, the largest of the world. The scientific information includes weather conditions, river water levels at 

various places, lightning strike information, condition of the ground 

cover and much more. Government agencies are considering making 

the information available to the world on the Internet.

SIVAM is an ambitious undertaking that is filling a gap in Brazil’s 

defenses, and the way it has developed fits the security needs of the 

country. The Brazilian Code of Aeronautics defines the cases in which 

an aircraft may be subjected to detection, interdiction, or arrest by 

Air Force, Customs, or Federal Police authorities. It states that after all the legally prescribed coercive means have been adopted, an 

aircraft will be classified as hostile and thus under the possibility of 

destruction.90 However, notwithstanding this legal statement, before 

the Destruction Law was enacted, Brazilian Air Force fighter pilots 

responsible for patrolling the airspace were ignored by pilots of clandestine flights, who systematically disobeyed orders of identification 

and landing at a predetermined aerodrome, according to the legisla-
59

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

tion then in effect. On several occasions, even after a warning shot 

had been made, there was complete disobedience.

Under these conditions, the Brazilian society, through its legal representatives in Congress approved 

the Destructive Shooting Law, nicknamed Lei do Abate (Shooting Down 

Law) by the press. The law has come 

to fulfill an important gap, supporting 

policing measures within Brazilian 

air space, particularly over non-regular flights, suspected of being involved with illegal drug trafficking.

The law’s implementation has brought up new concepts, rendering it necessary to define expressions like “coercive means,” “hostile 

aircraft,” and “destructive measure.” Furthermore, it has become 

mandatory that the newly adopted solution should be applied under 

a framework of strict safety procedures, with full clarification of the 

procedures and the conditions under which the destructive measure 

may be carried out. All of these aspects demanded regulation of the 

legal decision, by means of a Presidential Decree.

Starting in April 2003, a think-tank group composed of representatives of the Ministries of Defense, Justice, Foreign Affairs, officials of the Presidency’s Institutional Security Cabinet (Gabinete da 

Segurança Institucional da Presidência), along with experts of the 

Brazilian Air Force Command, had a series of meetings with the objective of studying all the aspects concerning the implementation of 

the Destructive Shooting Law, such as procedures for air interception, civil aviation international laws, measures for the integration 

of procedures with neighboring countries, and the legislation of the 

countries interested in the theme. Presidential Decree Nr 5144, 16 

July 2004, regulated this indispensable instrument for fighting the 

criminality associated with international drug smuggling, defining 

all the adequate procedures for the policing of the Brazilian airspace. 

The text is a result of a series of exchanges made with neighboring 

countries in order to integrate the procedures of aircraft interception, and thus, minimizing the possibility of misunderstandings. The 

issue was widely debated with other friendly governments interested 

in the same theme. The results of the political exchanges indicate 

that enforcement of this law will not bring adverse effects to Brazil.

Under these conditions, the 

Brazilian society, through its 

legal representatives in Congress approved the Destructive Shooting Law, nicknamed 

Lei do Abate (Shooting Down 

Law) by the press.
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The regulation that has been approved covers only the case of 

aircraft suspected of being involved with international drug trafficking and does not address narcoterrorism as such. Based on what is 

stated in the United Nations Letter of Self-Defense, the Brazilian government deemed it necessary to limit the law to only narcotrafficking, 

taking into consideration the increasing threat against the security 

of the Brazilian society posed by the traffic of narcotics. 

There are two situations under which an aircraft can be considered suspect of trafficking narcotics and related drugs: 

1. An aircraft enters the Brazilian airspace without an approved 

flight plan, coming from regions which are recognized as production or distribution sources of illegal drugs

2. An aircraft omits information considered necessary to its 

identification by the air traffic agencies, or does not comply 

with instructions given by the same authorities when flying 

along a route presumably used for the distribution of illegal 

drugs

The Brazilian Air Force intercepting fighters are under the Brazilian Airspace Defense Command (Comando de Defesa Aeroespacial 

Brasileiro, COMDABRA), which is the Air Force command responsible for the accomplishment of the measures and all the procedures.

After an aircraft is considered suspect, it can be subjected to 

three stages of coercive measures progressively applied if success is 

not achieved by the prior one, and upon being considered “hostile,” 

to the final step of destruction of the aircraft.

1. “Investigation Measures” are the first stage, seeking to determine or to confirm the identification of the suspect aircraft and also to closely watch its behavior. They comprise 

“discrete identification,” “registration number verification,” 

“interrogation on international emergency frequencies,” and 

“exchange of visual communications” procedures.

2. If the suspect aircraft pilot does not respond to or does not 

obey any of the aforementioned procedures, the second stage 

of coercive measures will be “Intervention Measures” that 

require “route change” and “mandatory landing,” both procedures determined by the intercepting fighters, either via 

radio, through all frequencies available, or via visual signals established by international regulations of compulsory 

knowledge. 
61

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

3. The third stage of actions require are “Persuasion Measures,” 

carried out in case the suspect aircraft pilot does not obey 

any of the previous measures. It consists of the making lateral warning shots with tracer ammunition at the suspect 

aircraft in a way which is visible to the intercepted pilot and 

without hitting his aircraft. 

In total, there are eight procedural steps to be followed by the 

Brazilian Airspace Defense authorities. Only after the first seven initial procedures are ignored by the suspect aircraft, it will be classified as “hostile,” and then it can be subjected to a “Destruction 

Measure,” which means that the interception fighters will shoot at 

the intercepted aircraft (over non-populated areas) with the objective 

to deny the hostile aircraft the continuation of the flight.

It is important to highlight that the accomplishment of this extreme measure will only occur after all the procedures established 

by the law have been carried out, and that it will be the last resort 

for the country to prevent drug smuggling aircraft from transporting 

narcotics into the Brazilian territory. According to a public opinion 

poll carried out in the whole national territory, 87 percent were in favor of the Destructive Shooting Law (“a legitimate way to defend our 

sovereignty”) and 13 percent were against (“it should only be used in 

wartime”). 

In order to coordinate common airspace control procedures along 

with neighboring countries’ air forces, the Brazilian Air Force carried 

out “Operation PERBRA I”, from 24 to 27 August 2004, with the 

Peruvian Air Force; “Operation COLBRA I”, from 23 to 27 May 2005, 

with the Colombian Air Force; “Operation PARBRA I”, from 10 to 14 

June 2005, with the Paraguayan Air Force; and “Operation PRATA 

III”, from 27 Jun to 1 Jul 2005, with the Argentinean Air Force. In all 

those special air operations, the Brazilian Air Force took advantage 

of its Air Traffic Control and Air Defense System (SISDACTA) expertise and established the basic structure of synchronized systems 

of detection, communications and interception with its neighboring 

countries.

The results have been very successful. In November 2005, during 

Operation Closed Gate (Porteira Fechada), Brazilian Air Force fighters arrested 32 drug trafficking aircraft (all of them forced to land on 

Brazilian soil) and, in a demonstration of interagency coordination, 

the Brazilian Federal Police apprehended more than 500 kilograms 

of cocaine.91
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 JSOU Report 06-4

In addition to reinforcing military presence along its borders, after the approval of the Destructive Shooting Law, Brazil implemented 

a permanent Airbridge Denial Program. It has successfully prevented the use of Brazilian airspace by unauthorized aircraft. This has 

been a remarkable initiative in the context of the struggle against 

narcoterrorism in the Western Hemisphere, with positive results for 

the countries of the region. 
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Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

7. Conclusion: Interagency Tasks

 with International Dimensions

The new, rapidly changing global environment, characterized in 

the Western Hemisphere by regional political instability and 

unconventional threats, requires greater cooperation than ever 

before. In each country it demands interagency cooperation with international dimensions as well. In Brazil, at the strategic level, interdicting neighboring countries’ guerrillas, as well as combating drugs 

and weapons trafficking, money laundering, and transnational crime 

involves a broad range of government agencies. For Brazil it’s possible to highlight the following: 

Institutional Security Cabinet (Gabinete da Segurança Institucional, GSI), directly linked to the President of Republic

Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência Brasileira de Inteligência, ABIN), subordinate agency of GSI

Anti-drug National Secretariat (Secretaria Nacional Antidrogas), subordinate agency of GSI

Ministry of Finance (Ministério da Fazenda), mainly through 

Central Bank and Customs (relevant agencies against money 

laundering and contraband)

Ministry of Justice (to whom Federal Police is subordinated)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces Commands (Navy, Army 

and Air Force)

the state governments (with their law enforcement and other 

agencies)

Coordinated planning and synchronized actions at the strategic, 

operational, and tactical levels are fundamental to success. The interagency environment between civilian and military organizations is 

often complex. Unity of effort becomes difficult because of the various agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting policies, tactics, 

decision-making techniques, and procedures. When facing unconventional threats, civilian organizations often must operate in close 

proximity to military forces because their missions may fail without 

military support or protection.

Military commanders typically seek clearly defined, decisive, and 

attainable objectives and end states. Not all civilian agencies will 

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
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 JSOU Report 06-4

necessarily understand the need for clearly defined objectives. This 

sense of urgency characteristic is typical of military planners. It must 

be considered also that significant organizational differences exist 

between the military hierarchy and those of other organizations, particularly at the operational and tactical levels. In order to overcome 

differences like these and reach successful interagency operations, 

authorities in charge must involve representatives from all agencies 

engaged. It’s absolutely necessary to understand the roles and relationships among various federal agencies, military headquarters, 

state and local governments as well as other engaged organizations.

In the Amazon region’s operational environment, where military 

support to domestic civil authorities is very common in a variety of 

tasks (including law enforcement), it is possible to capitalize on institutional experiences. Those experiences include identifying and 

assessing the different agencies’ capabilities and core competencies, 

identifying specific procedures, and achieving unity of effort. Also in 

the Amazon region there are some operational environments, particularly in frontier areas, whose characteristics demand that a military 

headquarters act as the lead agency. 

In the frontier areas, the presence of foreign military and civilian 

organizations, in a multinational environment, is a very important, 

complicated factor. To overcome differing operational procedures, 

bureaucratic cultures and language, competent liaison officers become a necessary instrument for interagency and international cooperation. 

Operations conducted at frontier areas with Colombia, Peru, and 

Bolivia are, basically, special operations developed in jungle terrain. 

Search and destroy operations of this nature demand soldiers with 

special psychological and physical fitness characteristics, specifically trained to face, besides the enemy, jungle difficulties, adverse 

climate conditions, and the isolation provoked by overwhelming distances. The Amazon Military Command Jungle Infantry units are 

very much “SOF like.” This facilitates a lot of planning coordination, 

actions synchronization and maneuver along with SOF units of the 

Strategic Rapid Reaction Force (FAR-E). When needed, specifically 

trained law enforcement agencies personnel will be deployed along 

with both jungle infantry and SOF units. It’s absolutely mandatory 

that operations carried out against unconventional threats of this 

nature must be intelligence driven. In this context, notwithstanding 

the relevance of Signal and Image Intelligences (SIGINT), Human In-
65

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

telligence (HUMINT) is predominantly underscored. The Special Operations Forces (SOF) must be deployed always as a strategic asset, 

decisively focused to find, fix and destroy the enemy. Its role, among 

others, in covert reconnaissance and direct action against high valuable targets is absolutely indispensable.

One example of a very successful interagency and international 

coordinated effort carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the 

Ministry of Justice materialized by Air Force’s fighter interdictions 

and consequent arrests made by Federal Police on the ground.

Signs of International Cooperation and Support

In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New 

York and Washington, D.C., Latin American nations strongly condemned the attacks, and took action through the Organization of 

American States (OAS) to strengthen hemispheric cooperation. At a 

special session on 19 September 2001, in an initiative led by Brazil, 

OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 

Assistance , also known as Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories to 

the treaty to come to one another’s defense in case of outside attack. 

Another resolution approved on 21 September 2005, called on Rio

Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue , 

capture, extradite and punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance and support to the United 

States, as appropriate, to address the 11 September attacks, and 

also to prevent future terrorist acts.” In another resolution, the OAS 

established the Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) to 

identify urgent actions aimed at strengthening inter-American cooperation in order to combat and eliminate terrorism in the hemisphere. The CICTE has cooperated on border security mechanisms, 

controls to prevent funding of terrorist organizations, law enforcement and counterterrorism, and intelligence and information.

In June 2002, OAS members signed a newly completed InterAmerican Convention Against Terrorism. Signing the treaty for the 

United States, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that OAS had 

“produced the first new international treaty since 11 September targeted at improving our ability to combat terrorism.” 92 The convention, among other measures, would improve regional cooperation 

against terrorism, commit parties to sign and ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments and take actions against the financing of terrorism, 

and deny safe haven to suspect terrorists. President Bush submitted 
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 JSOU Report 06-4

the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism to the Senate on 

12 November 2002, for its advice and consent, and the treaty was 

referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Treaty Doc 107-

18). The Committee held a public hearing on the treaty on 17 June 

2004.93

At a January 2003 CICTE meeting in El Salvador, OAS members 

issued the Declaration of San Salvador, which condemned terrorism and pledged to strengthen hemispheric cooperation through a 

variety of border, customs, and financial control measures. At the 

conference, the United States pledged $1 million to the OAS to help 

the growth of CICTE “as a technical body devoted to increasing counterterrorism expertise in the Americas.” 94

In October 2003, the OAS held a Special Conference on Security

in Mexico City that focused on identifying new threats, concerns, and 

challenges facing the hemisphere and agreed on a cooperative approach toward addressing them. Among the threats identified in the 

adopted “Declaration on Security in the Americas” was “terrorism, 

transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, 

money laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons and the connections 

among those activities.” 95 At the February 2005 CICTE session held 

in Trinidad and Tobago, OAS members reaffirmed their commitment 

to deepen cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

 According to the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism96 in examining the relationship between the narcotics trade and 

terrorist groups in Latin America the following key points stand out: 

The indigenous terrorist groups in the drug producing areas of 

Colombia and Peru are heavily involved in the drug trade

Significant amounts of the drug related income derives from 

taxation of growers and traffickers

The groups are bartering cocaine and opium for weapons and 

other material from the drug cartels

The terrorists and drug smugglers use the same smuggling 

routes, similar methods of money laundering, and take of advantage of the same tendencies for official corruption

The use of forged travel documents, false customs declarations, 

trusted couriers, the Black Market Peso exchange and similar 

forms of illegal activity are common to both groups

There is no doubt that an increased regional cooperation is being carried out in the Western Hemisphere in order to face the current threats common to all the countries. In this context, the role of 

•

•

•

•

•
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Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

the remaining hegemonic superpower is relevant. There is a clear 

assumption that no solutions exist without United States decisive 

engagement, at least at the short term.

Regarding the Brazil–United States relationship, in the Joint 

Statement on the 5–6 November 2005 visit by President George W. 

Bush to Brazil, both President Bush and President Lula, “underscored the increasingly strong and close ties that Brazil and the United States enjoy, based on common values and objectives, including 

the promotion of democracy, development, economic growth, trade 

liberalization, international security and combating terrorism.” They 

also “agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation to combat the narcotics trade, trafficking in wildlife, terrorism, and money laundering, 

with an emphasis on information sharing between the two countries’ 

financial intelligence units and the design of mechanisms to recover 

assets derived from transnational crimes.”

US policy makers and authorities must keep in their minds two 

fundamental points. First, notwithstanding the leftist winds blowing, rarely in the history of US–Latin America relations have both the 

challenges and the opportunities been so great for the establishment 

of an effective cooperative security relationship. It is certainly not a 

time for indifference. 

Second, it is a great strategic mistake to look at Latin America as 

a whole—to believe that all Latin American (and Caribbean) countries 

are the same. Yes, there are common threats; however, the political, 

socio-economic, military and scientific-technological environments 

are different within each country. Therefore, the solutions are different and, most important of all, the countries’ potential are quite different. US government officials should acknowledge that they have to 

deal with each one of the 31 countries of Latin America as a unique 

entity, understanding its culture, language, historical contexts, and 

its special requirements.

Narcoterrorism, as a resultant of transnational terrorism, drugs 

and weapons trafficking and related illicit issues, is a great challenge 

to international security in the 21st Century. To face this challenge 

successfully in the Western Hemisphere, it is necessary for all countries to make a real commitment to international partnership, not 

only focused on security matters, but also on the collective socioeconomic well-being of the region. 
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69

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

Endnotes

 1. Daniel Morcate, “La Internacional Terrorista” (International Terrorist), La Otra Verdad News, Santiago de Chile, 23 Aug 2003, 

laotraverdad@yahoo.com.ar

 2. Moisés Naim, “Illicit – How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are 

Hijacking the Global Economy”, United States, 2005. Naim identifies 

those failed states as “geopolitical black holes”.

 3. The expression “lethal triangle” was used by Luis Alberto Villamarín 

Pulido in his book “Narcoterrorismo – La Guerra del Nuevo Siglo”

(Narcoterrorism – The War of the New Century), Spain, 2005, in order 

to identify the main players of narcoterrorism: terrorism, drugs and 

weapons.

 4. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and 

Analysis Section, “World Drug Report 2005”.

 5. Ibid. Antonio Maria Costa, UNODC Executive Director stated in the 

Preface of the “World Drug Report 2005” : “This is not a small enemy 

against which we struggle. It is a monster. With such an enormous 

amount of capital at its disposal, it is bound to be an extremely tenacious one. We know that there are few dimensions of human security 

that are not affected in some way by the illicit drug market”.

 6. Slash-and-burn coca and opium cultivation destroy hundreds of thousand acres of tropical forests every year, and the dumping of millions 

of gallons of the toxic chemicals used to make cocaine and heroin pollutes river systems and ground cover at an alarming rate.

 7. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Illicit Crop 

Monitoring Programme (ICMP), “Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region”/2005. 

 8. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and 

Analysis Section, “World Drug Report 2005”.

 9. John P. Walters, Director of the White House National Drug Control 

Policy, “Cutting the Drug-Terror Connection”, Drug Watch World News, 

Vol. VI; 2002, Number 2, http://www.drugwatch.org/DWNews_V6_

N2_2002.htm

 10. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Illicit Crop 

Monitoring Programme (ICMP), “Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region”/2005.

 11. “Cocaine Production, Manufacturing Methods, Equipment Used, Chemicals Needed. Drug Information for DARE Officers, Parents, Teachers, 

Students and Researchers.” http://www.mninter.net/-publish/

COKE/index2.htm

 12. US Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report”, 1995.

 13. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and 

Analysis Section, “World Drug Report 2005”.

 14. Ibid

 15. Ibid.
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 JSOU Report 06-4

 16. William W. Mendel and Murl D. Munger, “Strategic Planning and the 

Drug Threat”, a Joint Study Initiative by The National Interagency 

Counterdrug Institute, The Strategic Studies Institute / US Army War 

College and The Foreign Military Studies Office / Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, August 1997.

 17. Ibid.

 18. John P. Walters, Director of the White House National Drug Control 

Policy, “Cutting the Drug-Terror Connection”, Drug Watch World News, 

Vol. VI; 2002, Number 2, http://www.drugwatch.org/DWNews_V6_

N2_2002.htm

 19. Loretta Napoleoni, “Modern Jihad – Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Network”, presented on the Barcelona Forum, in July 2004.

 20. Tamara Makarenko, “A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relations”, Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, 30 July 2003, http://www.janes.com/security/

international _security/news/jir/jir030730_l_n.shtml

 21. Council on Foreign Relations in cooperation with Markle Foundation, 

“Terrorism: Questions&Answers”, http://cfrterrorism.org/

 22. Ibid.

 23. Jeffrey Nyquist, “The Russian Mafia and Al-Qaeda”, Financial Sense, 

http://www.financialsense.com/, http://www.jrnyquist.com/ ; Mídia 

Sem Máscara (Brazilian site), 06 April 2004, http://www.midiasemmascara.org 

 24. Moisés Naím, “The Five Wars of Globalization”, Foreign Policy, Jan/

Feb 2003.

 25. According to Moisés Naím, “The Five Wars of Globalization”, in 2001, 

the United States blocked a legally binding global treaty to control 

small arms, in part, because it worried about restrictions on its own 

citizens’ rights to own guns.

 26. Ibid. 

 27. Ambassador Charles Shapiro, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Western Hemisphere Affaiars, Remarks to Inter-American Defense 

College, “Seminar on threats to Westedrh Hemispehere Security,” Washington, D.C., October 27. 2005.

 28. Pablo Escobar, the former Medellin’s cartel leader, was considered the 

world’s greatest outlaw at that time. Mark Bowden in his book “Killing 

Pablo” tells the story of how US Army Intelligence and US Delta Force 

Commandos helped Colombian Police track down and kill Pablo Escobar.

 29. Gabriel Marcella, “The United States and Colombia: The Journey from 

Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity”, Strategic Studies Institute / US Army 

War College, May 2003.

 30. Ibid.

 31. Ibid.

 32. Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, Country 

Reports on Terrorism, Washington, D.C., April 2005, p. 108.

 33. Ibid., p. 105.

 34. Ibidl, p. 112.
71

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

 35. Ibid. For information on Operation Gato Negro, see Comando General, 

Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, “Operación Gato Negro”(www.fuerzasmilitares.mil.co/noticijs7.htm5).

 36. Ibid. “Semana” (Colombian Magazine), “Fernandiño comienza a hablar” 

(Little Fernand starts to talk), 30 April 2001; republished in Comando 

General, Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia, Noticias y Actualidad(htto://

www.fuerzasmilitare.mil.co/noticijs10htm).

 37. Julia E. Sweig, “What Kind of War for Colombia?”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003.

 38. “Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the 

State”, Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia, Bogotá, October 1999 

edition.

 39. Council on Foreign Relations in cooperation with the Markle Foundation, “Terrorism: Questions & Answers”, http://terrorismanswers.

com/havens/colombia.html

 40. Strategy Page, “Death From Above”, http://www.strategypage.com/

qnd/colombi/articles/20051106.aspx

 41. Ibid.

 42. Hugh O’Shaughnessy, “Plan Colombia Collapse?” , The Independent, 

17 May 2005.

 43. Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, Country 

Reports on Terrorism, Washington, D.C., April 2005, p. 112..

 44. General Bantz J. Craddock, US SOUTHCOM Commander, “Posture 

Statement Before the 109th Congress, House Armed Services Committee”, 9 March 2005.

 45. Ibid.

 46. Ibid.

 47. “Jornal do Brasil” (Brazilian Newspaper), Rio de Janeiro / Brasil, Internacional, Colômbia, “Uribe Aceita Trocar Rebeldes por Reféns” ( 

Uribe Accepts To Change Rebels for Hostages), 15 December 2005.

 48. “El Tiempo”(Colombian Newspaper), Bogotá / Colômbia, “Ataque que 

causó la muerte a 28 militares em Meta, el mayor revés militar en el Gobierno Uribe” (Attack that kill 28 military in Meta, the biggest Uribe’s 

Government military setback), 28 December 2005.

 49. Claudio Dantas, “Correio Braziliense” (Brazilian Newspaper), Brasília 

/ Brasil, “Sendero volta à ativa” (Sendero is back in business), 28 

dezembro de 2005.

 50. La Otra Verdad News, Santiago de Chile, “La Nueva Guerra al Terrorismo: Comunismo, Narcos y Plan Colombia” (The New War on Terrorism: Comunism, Narcos and Plan Colombia), October 2003, http://

ar.geocities.com/laotraverdad/colombia/plncolombia2003.html

 51. Mark P. Sullivan, “Latin America: Terrorism Issues”, Congressional 

Research Services (CRS) Report for Congress, RS 21049, March 29, 

2005.

 52. “Jornal do Brasil”, Rio de Janeiro / Brasil, Internacional, Colômbia, 

“Uribe Aceita Trocar Rebeldes por Reféns” (Uribe Accepts to Change 

Rebels for Hostages), 15 December 2005.
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 53. Ambassador Charles Shapiro, Remarks to Inter-American Defense 

College, “Seminar on Threats to Western Hemisphere Security”, Washington D.C., October 27, 2005.

 54. Mark P. Sullivan, “Latin American: Terrorism Issues”, Congressional 

Research Services (CRS), Report for Congress, RS 21049, March 29, 

2005.

 55. Ariel Raber, “The Triple Border Area: Myth or Threat?”, Panel : Tri-border Area, Immigration and Terrorism, Center for Hemispheric Defense 

Studies, October 28-30, 2003, Santiago / Chile.

 56. “A Gazeta do Iguaçu” (the highest circulation daily in Foz do Iguaçu), 

“Muçulmanos são maioria entre as religiões menores em Foz” (Muslims 

are majority among minor religions in Foz), 11 February 2003.

 57. Ibid.

 58. Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-border area (TBA) of South America”, July 

2003. “Vanguardia”, the highest circulation daily in Ciudad del Leste, 

“Commerce between Ciudad del Leste and Foz do Iguaçu drops 90%”, 3 

December 2002.

 59. Mario Daniel Montoya, Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Israel Takes Special Interest in Triple Border Area”, 13 December 2001. 

 60. Library of Congress, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the 

Tri-border area (TBA) of South America”. “New York Times”, “SlowMotion Justice in Argentina”, 11 March 2003. Larry Rohter, “New York 

Times”, “Iran Blew up Jewish Center in Argentina, Defector Says”, 22 

July 2002.

 61. “Veja” (Brazilian Weekly Magazine), “Ele esteve no Brasil” (He was in 

Brazil), 19 March 2003.“O Estado de São Paulo” (Brazilian Newspaper), “Bin Laden esteve em Foz do Iguaçu e até deu palestra em mesquita” (Bin Laden was in Foz do Iguaçu and gave lecture in Mosque),

16 March 2003.

 62. Daniel Santoro, “El Clarín” (Argentinean Newspaper), Buenos Aires, 

“Las huellas de Bin Laden que la SIDE encontró en la Triple Frontera”

(SIDE found Bin Laden tracks in Triple Border)16 September 2001.

 63. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Library of Congress 

report on Tri-border Area (Questions taken at the February 9, 2004 Daily Press Briefing)”, February 10, 2004.

 64. Mauri Konig, “O Estado de São Paulo”, São Paulo, “Egípcio preso em 

Foz do Iguaçu”(Egyptian arrested in Foz do Iguaçu), 16 April 2002. 

“Correio Braziliense”, Brasília, “Terrorismo: Egípcio é capturado pela 

PF” (Terrorism: Egyptian is captured by Federal Police), 16 April 

2002.

 65. Roberto Godoy, “O Estado de São Paulo”, São Paulo,“As FARC usam 

Brasil para abrigar elite da guerrilha”(FARC use Brazil to hide guerrilla 

elite), 1 March 2003.

 66. “ABC Color” (Paraguayan Newspaper), Asunción, “Supremo Tribunal 

Federal de Brasil Extradita Barakat” (Brazilian Federal Supreme Court 

ruled to extradite Barakat) , 20 December 2002.
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Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

 67. US Department of State, Counterterrorism Office, “Communiqué of the 

3 + 1 Group on Tri-border Area Security”, Washington D.C. , 6 December 2004.

 68. “O Estado de São Paulo” (Brazilian Newspaper), São Paulo / Brasil, 

“Vídeo mostra FARC ensinando Bandidos Brasileiros a Seqüestrar” (VT 

shows FARC teaching Brazilian bandits to kidnap), 4 July 2005.

 69. In accordance to the Brazilian journalist Maria Clara Prates, in her 

report “FARC preparam uma União pró-guerrilha” (FARC prepare pro 

guerrilla Union), “Correio Braziliense”, 31 October 2005, sources of the 

Agência Brasileira de Inteligência – ABIN (Brazilian Intelligence Agency) 

say that, at least, one meeting involving Osmar Martinez, members of 

the high command of the Partido Patria Libre (Anúncio Marti, Juan Arrom and Victor Cólman) and Rodrigo Gandra (a senior the FARC leader) 

had happened in the City of Foz do Iguaçú, in order to finalize the 

details of this crime which shocked the Paraguayan population. The 

videotape displayed by Judge Oliveira shows people training for that 

action. In it, is possible to hear the voice of a Brazilian. And although 

it is not possible to visualize his presence, it is possible to listen very 

clearly his voice.

 70. Maria Clara Prates, do “Estado de Minas” (Brazilian Newspaper), 

special correspondent in Paraguay, “Correio Braziliense”, “FARC preparam uma União pró-guerrilha” (FARC prepare pro guerrilla Union), 

31 October 2005. 

 71. Kelly Hearn, AlterNet, “Patrolling America’s Backyard?” Posted on November 4, 2005, Printed on January 3, 2005. http://www.alternet.

org/story/27775/

 72. Claudio Aliscioni, “Clarín”, “Los Marines de EE.UU. ponem un pie en 

Paraguay” (US Marines have a foot in Paraguay), 11 Septiembre 2005. 

http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/zona/2005/09/11/z-03615.

htm

 73. Alejandro Sciscioli, “US Military Presence in Paraguay Stirs Speculation”, Inter Press Service, 4 August 2005. http://www.oneworld.net/

article/view/116435/1/

 74. Ibid.

 75. Mary Donahue and Melissa Nepomiachi, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Washington Secures Long Sought Hemispheric Outpost”, 20 July 

2005, http://www.informationonclearinghouse.info/article9541.htm

 76. Julian Armington and You Lee Kim, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 

COHA Memorandum to the Press 05.116, “Perhaps with Manta in Mind, 

the U.S. Eyes Paraguay”, 7 December 2005, http://www.coha.org/

NEW_PRESS_RELEASES/New_Press_Releases_2005/05.116%2...

 77. In 1992, the five Special Border Battalions under the Amazon Military Command were reorganized into Jungle Infantry Battalions with 

greater combat capabilities, just like the other Infantry Battalions in 

the Amazon region.

 78. The “Cabeça do Cachorro” (Dog’s Head) is in the northwest region of 

the Brazilian Amazon bordering Colombia. The shape of this region, 
74

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which includes the villages of Iauaretê, Querarí and São Joaquim, gives 

rise to its name.

 79. For more details about the Traíra and Perro Loco Operations, see Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, “Guerrillas in the Brazilian Amazon”, Military 

Review, March-April 1996.

 80. For more information about security and development of the Brazilian 

Amazon, see Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro and Paulo Cesar Miranda de 

Azevedo, “A Vision of Brazilian National Security Policy on the Amazon”,

Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement , Volume 3, Winter 1994.

 81. Ministério da Defesa do Brasil (Brazilian Defense Ministry) “Política 

de Defesa Nacional” (National Defense Policy), Brasília/DF, 30 June 

2005.

 82. Brazilian Constitution, 142nd and 143rd articles.

 83. In Brazil, the Armed Forces Polices, with the same role of the MP in 

the US, are known by the Service name: Army, Navy and Air Force 

Police. The States’Civilian Polices, Military Polices and Military Firemen Corps are subordinated to the States’ governors. The Military Polices and the Firemen are organized in ranks and use uniforms. They 

are considered Auxiliary Forces of the Armed Forces, being a reserve 

force. Therefore, they are inspected by the Brazilian Army.

 84. Estado-Maior do Exército (Brazilian Army General Staff), “Concepção 

Estratégica da Força Terrestre” (Land Force Strategic Concept), Brasília/DF.

 85. The Brazilian Army Special Operations Brigade is unique in Latin 

America. It was activated in 27 June 2002. In September 2003, its 

base was transferred from Rio de Janeiro to Goiânia, State of Goiás. 

Its subordinates units started, officially, their current tasks, on January 1st 2004. It commands the Special Operations Training Center (the 

only unit to remain in Rio de Janeiro), 1st Special Forces Battalion, 1st

Commandos Actions Battalion, Psychological Operations Detachment, 

Special Operations Support Company, 1st Chemical Biological Nuclear 

Defense Platoon, 6th Military Police Platoon, and an Administrative 

Base.

 86. In its 40 years of existence, the Centro de Instrução de Guerra na Selva 

- CIGS (Jungle Warfare Training Center) has graduated Brazilian officers and NCOs making them highly specialized jungle experts, and 

military from friendly nations, including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Guatemala, Guyana, Mexico, 

Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Suriname and the United States. 

Law Enforcement agents are also trained at the CIGS.

 87. General Bantz J. Craddock, USSOUTHCOM Commander, “Posture 

Statement Before the 109th Congress, House Armed Services Committee”, 9 March 2005.

 88. “Ordem e Progresso” (Order and Progress) is the motto on the national 

flag adapted from European positivist thinking that the conservative 

value of “order” should live in harmony with the liberal value of “progress”. The flag was created at the time of transition from the Brazilian 
75

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

Empire under Dom Pedro II to the First Republic, proclaimed by General Deodoro da Fonseca, on 15 November 1889.

 89. For more information about the Brazilian Army’s role in the Amazon, 

see “Defense and Development in the Brazilian Amazon” by William W. 

Mendel, “blue paper” of the Foreign Military Studies Office / US Army 

Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, July 1997.

 90. “Código Brasileiro de Aeronáutica” (Brazilian Code of Aeronautics), instituted by the Law nr. 7.565, 19 December 1986 and modified by the 

Law nr 9.614, 5 March 1998, in its Article 30, deals with the cases in 

which an aircraft may be subjected to detention, interdiction or arrest 

by Air Force, Fiscal or Federal Police authorities. In the aforementioned Article, paragraph 2nd states: “After all the legally prescribed 

coercive means have been adopted , an aircraft will be classified as 

hostile, and thus under the possibility of destruction , in the cases 

established by this Article, and after authorized by the President of 

Republic or authority delegated by him.”

 91. Tenente Brigadeiro Luiz Carlos da Silva Bueno, Commander of the 

Brazilian Air Force, statement before the Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional (National Defense and Foreign Affairs Commission of the Brazilian Congress), on 14 December 2005. For further 

information about the Brazilian Air Force special air operations, see 

the Força Aérea Brasileira web site www.fab.mil.br

 92. US Department of State, International Information Programs, “Transcript: Powell Stresses Security at OAS General Assembly”, Washington 

File, June 3, 2002.

 93. Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, CRS Report 

for Congress, “Latin America: Terrorism Issues”, Mark P. Sullivan, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, March 29, 2005.

 94. US Department of State, International Information Programs, “US Donates $ 1 Million to Combat Terrorism in Western Hemisphere”, Washington File, January 22, 2003.

 95. Organization of American States, “Declaration on Security in the Americas”, October 28, 2003.

 96. Steven Monblatt, Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism Executive Secretary, “Terrorism and Drugs in the Americas: The OAS Response”.
76

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77

Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

About the Author

Major General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, Brazilian Army, Retired, is a graduate of the Brazilian Army Military Academy (Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras), Class of 1967. As 

an Infantry Lieutenant, he led rifle platoons in Motorized and Parachute Infantry Battalions. He was also a paratrooper, jump master, 

commando, special forces, and pathfinder, and he is military free 

fall and SCUBA qualified. In 1973, he 

attended a Special Forces Operations 

and Military Free Fall Training (HALO 

/ HAHO) at the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Special Warfare Center (JFKSWC) and the 7th SF Group Airborne, 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

As a Captain, he commanded a 

Special Forces Operational Detachment and served as instructor at the 

Brazilian Army Special Operations 

School and at the Agulhas Negras 

Military Academy. After graduating at 

the Infantry Advanced Course, Combined Arms School, he served as Motorized Infantry Battalion Operations 

Officer. As a Major, he was assigned 

instructor at the Combined Arms School, and in 1983 he graduated 

at the Command and General Staff College. As staff officer, he served 

as operations officer in a Motorized Infantry Brigade before returning 

to the Command and General Staff Officer Course as tactics instructor. As a Lieutenant Colonel, he was assigned Commander of the 

1st Special Forces Battalion (the Brazilian Army Unit specialized on 

unconventional warfare and counterterrorism) from January 1989 

to January 1992. Promoted to Colonel, he graduated at the Policy, 

Strategy and Army’s High Administration Course, Brazilian Army 

War College, and subsequently was assigned as a staff officer at the 

Land Operations Command. From June 1994 to June 1996, he was 

the Brazilian Liaison Officer to the US Army Combined Arms Center, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas advising the Combined Arms Center Commandant on the Brazilian Defense Policy and Latin America security 

issues. At that time he had the opportunity to support the Command 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro
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and General Staff College, Foreign Military Studies Office, National 

Simulation Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned, and the Battle 

Command Battle Laboratory. He also was the Consultant Editor of 

Military Review, Brazilian Edition. 

Returning to Brazil, he served as the Chief of the Peacekeeping Operations Branch at the Brazilian Army General Staff from Jul 

1996 to Jul 1998. In this position, he was in charge of numerous 

activities related to those operations, as follows:

General guidance, coordination and control of the Brazilian 

Army contingents on the following missions: UNAVEM III and 

MONUA (Angola); MINUGUA (Guatemala); UNFICYP (Cyprus); 

MARMINCA (Demining Supervisors in Central America) and 

MOMEP (Ecuador and Peru);

Coordinator of the Brazilian Army Studies Group for the United Nations Standby Arrangements and Rapid Deployment Mission Headquarters;

Chief of the Brazilian Delegation on the Third United Nations 

Peacekeeping Training Assistance Team Seminar (III UNTAT 

Seminar);

Co-director of the United Forces 97, peacekeeping training exercise involving the US SOUTHCOM, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia , Venezuela and the UN DPKO.

Promoted to Major General (Brazilian Army two-star General) on 

Jul 31, 1998, he was assigned Commandant of the Brazilian Army 

Operational Test and Evaluation Center. From December 1999 to 

January 2002, he was the Commandant of the Combined Arms 

School (“Home of the Captain”). His last position before retirement 

was the Third Deputy Chief of Staff (Doctrine, Plans and Strategy) at 

the Brazilian Army General Staff. MG Alvaro was the Brazilian Army 

representative on the “Gen Mark Clark – Gen Mascarenhas de Morais 

Lecture Exchange”, in 2001, when he lectured about Brazilian Army 

issues at the US Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the US Military Academy, West Point, New York, 

and the US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He was also 

the Chief of the Brazilian Delegation at the “XVIII US and Brazilian 

Armies Staff Talks” in 2002, at Fort Benning, Georgia. Retired on Jul 

15, 2002, Gen Alvaro lives in Rio de Janeiro, and is a Senior Military 

Analyst and Security Consultant, frequently invited to participate in 

lectures, conferences, strategic studies meetings in several military 

and civilian institutions. 

•

•

•

•
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Alvaro: Narcoterrorism in Latin America 

Currently, General Alvaro is a guest speaker for the Latin America Orientation Course of the Joint Special Operations University 

(JSOU) and USAF Special Operations School Hurlburt Field, Florida. 

He was also guest speaker at The Joint Operational Environment 

Global Seminar developed by the US Army TRADOC in Williamsburg, 

Virginia, 25-27 May 2004, and at the Brazil’s Defense Approach Toward a Changing Security Environment workshop developed by the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 

Fort McNair, 23-24 September 2004. 

Among others, Alvaro Pinheiro is the author of the following articles: “Vision of Brazilian National Security Policy on the Amazon,” in 

Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Winter 1994, Number 3; 

“Guerrillas in the Brazilian Amazon,” in Military Review, March-April 

1996, English, Spanish and Brazilian Editions; “Battle Command: 

Considerations at the Operational and Tactical Levels” in Military 

Review, 2nd Quarter 1996, Brazilian Edition. 

General Alvaro’s awards and decorations include the Brazilian 

Pacificator with Leaf (“Pacificador com Palma”) Medal for bravery in 

action and the Brazilian Military Merit Order (“Ordem do Mérito Militar”). He also has been awarded the US Meritorious Service Medal 

and the US Army Commendation Medal