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i

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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

UNITED STATES-GULF COOPERATION 

COUNCIL SECURITY COOPERATION 

IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Mohammed El-Katiri

October 2014

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iv

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ISBN 1-58487-641-7
v

FOREWORD

The ongoing impasse over development of nuclear 

and missile technologies by Iran highlights the continuing importance of U.S. security cooperation with 

Arabian Gulf states. Yet the rising economic strength 

and diplomatic assertiveness of some member states 

of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) combines with 

potential political fragility there to require sensitivity by the United States in ensuring that cooperation 

continues to thrive. 

In this monograph, British academic Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri analyzes the security and economic 

dynamics of the region as a whole, in order to assess 

the challenges to the security and military relationship 

between the GCC and the United States. He addresses the changing perceptions of U.S. military support 

among the local populations, and identifies a number 

of key areas where U.S. policy can adjust and add flexibility in order to pre-empt potential dilemmas. 

This monograph was completed in September 

2013, and therefore does not include mention of more 

recent developments such as the rise of the Islamic 

State or the November 2013 nuclear agreement with 

Iran. But the problems and themes it describes are permanent ones, and continue to present important considerations for protecting the interests of the United 

States and its allies in the region in the longer term.

The Strategic Studies Institute recommends this 

monograph to both the military and diplomatic policy communities as essential material to underpin 
sound policy decisions for the future of U.S. security 

relationships with the region.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vi
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MOHAMMED EL-KATIRI is a Director of MENA Insight, a political risk consultancy that focuses on the 

Middle East and North Africa, and a Senior Research 

Analyst at the United Kingdom’s (UK) Conflict Studies 

Research Centre (CSRC). Before joining CSRC, Dr. ElKatiri was a Research Fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and later served as a Political Risk Analyst at 

Eurasia Group and as a senior researcher at the Hague 

Institute for Global Justice. With more than 10 years 

of regional experience, his research interests include 

political and economic security in North Africa and 

the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, as well 

as North African relations with the European Union, 

and security policies around the Mediterranean. Dr. 

El-Katiri has published numerous internal and external UK Defence Academy reports, including reference 

papers on national and regional security issues in the 

GCC and the Mediterranean, and a monograph on the 

Algerian national oil and gas company Sonatrach. In 

addition, his publications include commentaries and 

research papers in a range of languages for research 

organizations in the UK and Europe, as well as various newspaper articles in and about the region. Dr. 

El-Katiri is a frequent commentator in media including the British Broadcasting Company, the Financial 

Times, and Al-Jazeera.

ix

SUMMARY

Profound changes in regional geopolitical dynamics in the Arabian Gulf since the early-2000s render 

the region a highly challenging environment for U.S. 

foreign policy and military engagement. At a time of 

continuing domestic instability in Iraq and an increasingly isolated Iran, the geopolitical weight of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council (GCC) states has risen dramatically over the past 10 years; the GCC states’ enormous 

economic power, coupled to some of the most stable 

political systems in the entire Middle East and North 

Africa region, call for continuously close U.S.-GCC relations in the security sphere as an important element 

in U.S. foreign policy.

But these fundamental shifts in the political environment coincide with changes in the regional perception of the United States as a security partner. The 

conflict in Iraq, resulting in yet another unstable state 

at the heart of the Middle East and in immediate proximity to the GCC, has left many former supporters of 

U.S. engagement in the region disappointed and cynical. Furthermore, ongoing U.S. defense budget adjustments have raised concerns among GCC leaders 

about the future of U.S. military capabilities and U.S. 

willingness and ability to engage in the region. In addition, U.S. responses to the Arab Spring sent important signals to the GCC about the potential durability of U.S. political and military support in the event 

of popular demand for more democratic rights and 

access to their countries’ economic resources. 

This monograph analyzes the security and economic dynamics of the region as a whole to assess the 

challenges to the security and military relationship 

between the GCC and the United States and to pro-
pose policy options for the United States to continue 

to derive maximum benefit from stable and reliable 

partnerships in the Gulf.

x
1

UNITED STATES-GULF COOPERATION 

COUNCIL SECURITY COOPERATION

IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

INTRODUCTION

For the United States, the Arabian Gulf region remains one of the most geostrategically important locations in the world. Home to over half of the world’s 

oil reserves and nearly a third of its natural gas,1

 the 

Gulf states continue to supply world markets with an 

important share of their energy supplies. Continuing 

to be one of the world’s largest regional suppliers of 

energy and holding much of the world’s spare capacity in crude oil production makes the region central to 

the stability of the global oil market. 

The Gulf region also hosts one of the world’s most 

important strategic choke points for global trade, the 

Straits of Hormuz, through which some 35 percent of 

global seaborne oil passes, in addition to natural gas 

and other trade goods.2 The Gulf region’s convenient 

location half-way between Europe and East Asia has 

given it further economic and strategic importance, 

with intensive cargo traffic passing through the sea 

passages of the region. The significance of the region 

is further increased because of its combined financial 

power in the form of savings and investment funds—

which have grown steadily during the 2000s owing to 

high oil prices and revenues—that form an increasingly important element in U.S. international trade and 

investment interests.

The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation 

Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 

Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—historically have been key U.S. partners in the region, help-
2

ing secure regional stability while balancing out the 

ambitious political and economic interests of neighboring Iraq and Iran. For the GCC states, U.S. political 

and military support has been critical for their own 

defense, making the United States, for decades, the 

most influential external security partner for most 

GCC countries. The U.S. military has been deployed 

in, and has defended, the GCC states against regional 

military threats, including training local armed forces and providing a wide range of modern arms and 

defense systems to all six GCC members.

Changing geopolitical and economic realities both 

within and outside the region, however, have begun to 

change the nature of U.S.-GCC relations, and as a result, the GCC countries’ geostrategic significance will 

likely raise the need for a reconsideration of the architecture of U.S.-GCC cooperation for the remainder of 

the 21st century. Regionally, the GCC economies today form the core center of economic and geopolitical 

power in the Gulf region, a status which has increased 

dramatically since the early-2000s with the removal of 

the Saddam regime in Iraq, and the increasing isolation of Iran in view of its controversial nuclear program and continuing destabilizing influence. 

At the same time, several small GCC countries 

have begun to seek a greater role in international diplomatic circles, countering the long-held dominance of 

Saudi Arabia as the most significant regional political 

player and foreign investor. These efforts make more 

coordination on a supra-national GCC level more difficult, and will reinforce the need for the United States 

to engage bilaterally, but with a greater number of increasingly ambitious, and financially influential Gulf 

monarchies. The GCC states also show an increasing 

interest in diversifying their economic and security 
3

relations with other foreign partners, primarily China, 

India, and East Asia in general. This diversification of 

foreign relations poses a threat to intrinsic U.S. interests, but also offers a chance to include a greater number of countries in U.S.-forged security alliances.

Finally, the events of the Arab Spring beginning 

in 2010, which swept away several governments and 

have led to sustained political protest and civil unrest across the wider Middle East and North Africa, 

have impacted citizen-state relations in the region 

profoundly, including in the Arab Gulf monarchies. 

While most Gulf monarchies were spared Egypt-like 

political unrest owing to generous welfare states, Bahrain has faced a lengthy cycle of dissent and public 

protest which has confronted the United States with a 

considerable policy dilemma. One of the largest challenges for U.S. foreign policy toward the Gulf region 

will hence consist increasingly not in the “when” 

and “what” of direct military intervention, but in the 

“how” of bilateral cooperation to assist the region in 

eliminating the causes of political unrest that may in 

the future destabilize the region as a whole. These 

challenges grow principally from the region’s economic issues, including those of increasing economic 

diversification and sustainable job creation; and from 

the need for good governance as a whole.

This monograph aims to review the likely challenges to the existing modus operandi of U.S.-GCC relations, and to suggest potential roads toward changing, 

yet maturing relations. This is done keeping in mind 

the other potentially constraining element in these relations, namely budgetary pressures in the U.S. and 

their impact on U.S. military strategies and priorities, 

which have raised concerns among GCC leaders about 

the future of U.S. security engagement in the region. 
4

The monograph is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the historical evolution of the 

US-GCC security partnership during the 20th century; 

Section 3 explores the new factors that have changed 

the region’s geopolitical architecture, challenging formerly established patterns in U.S.-GCC cooperation; 

and Section 4 discusses the implications for the shape 

of emerging relations over for the next decade. 

THE HISTORICAL SYSTEM: FROM TRUCIAL 

STATES TOWARD THE MODERN GCC

U.S. relations with the GCC states date back many 

decades, having evolved in line with the wider Gulf’s 

geopolitical shifts in regional power centers over time. 

Under the previous geopolitical configuration during 

and after World War II, the region was dominated 

by British interests, with de facto British protection 

for what were then called the “Trucial States,” an alliance of those Gulf sheikhdoms that today make up 

the UAE, plus Bahrain and Qatar. Neighboring emirates such as Kuwait, the sultanate of Oman, and the 

monarchies of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, were also 

Western allies relying to a greater or lesser extent on 

British protection against external and to some extent 

internal threats.3

Even prior to the discovery of oil in the region, the 

Gulf monarchies were strategically valuable allies owing to their pivotal location between Europe, Africa, 

and Asia. This offered British and allied trade and 

military vessels safe passage and naval facilities, and 

the Trucial coast also provided excellent and valuable 

harbor facilities to offload and transship merchandise 

aimed at the wider region and Central Asia, and to 

collect merchandise for European and Asian trade ves-
5

sels.4 This locational value further increased with the 

discovery of large oil deposits, first in Bahrain (1932), 

then Kuwait (1937), and Saudi Arabia (1938), at a time 

when the international shipping industry, including 

warships, was switching from coal to oil. The ensuing 

world war rendered secure oil supplies and bunkering locations decisive for military success.

The rapidly growing importance of oil production 

in the Arab Gulf monarchies accompanied similar 

oil production growth in neighboring Iran and Iraq, 

despite domestic political turmoil in those states. The 

attempted nationalization of Iran’s oil industry in 

1950 highlighted the vulnerability of these resources 

to domestic political change. Together with Iran and 

Iraq, the wider Gulf region increasingly assumed the 

role of the world’s most important regional oil producer and reserve holder, holding more than half of 

the world’s known oil reserves by the 1980s.5

 The Gulf 

as a region could only grow in importance as a potential strategic ally to all major post-war political blocs, 

and the Arab Gulf monarchies—due to their close historical ties with the British—soon evolved as the most 

reliable element in this system in its relations with 

Western allies.6

Thus with the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, the Gulf states became a strategically important region both for Soviet and U.S. 

interests. Their role as growing producers of oil, and 

their geostrategic value at the pivot point between 

Europe, South East Asia, and Central Asia, all fueled 

competition between the United States and the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).7

 From the earliest 

stages, Iran and Iraq formed an important part of the 

region’s security system, both of them being populous 

and geographically large states with well-developed, 
6

semi-industrialized economies, as opposed to what 

were in the majority small, only recently evolved desert sheikhdoms with small landmasses, populations, 

and during the 1950s still overwhelmingly nonurban 

societies.8

Twin Pillar Politics: Saudi Arabia and Iran.

For this reason, among others, it was American 

interest in neighboring Iraq and Iran that initially defined U.S. relations with what would later evolve as 

the GCC states. A complex regional security system 

in the Gulf evolved during the 1950s, which involved 

three realistic competitors for regional political dominance. These were, first, Iran and Iraq, both states 

with long-established socio-political histories, strong 

economies increasingly dominated by their oil industries, and with the greatest share of the entire region’s 

population of some 35.5 million by 1960; and second, 

Saudi Arabia, an Arab Gulf monarchy emerging as the 

region’s largest oil producer.9

The role of Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis other Gulf monarchies at the time had to do with the Arabian Peninsula’s geographic and economic make-up. Prior to 

the creation of the GCC in 1981, the Arab Gulf monarchies were a loose community of Gulf sheikhdoms 

and monarchies, which, except for Saudi Arabia, 

oversaw relatively small territories with populations 

not exceeding a few hundred thousand each. Economically, the discovery of large oil reserves in Saudi 

Arabia during the 1930s had begun to generate increasing revenue streams for the Saudi economy, with 

only Kuwait rivalling Saudi’s wealth by the 1950s.10

Similar oil discoveries in Abu Dhabi (part of today’s 

UAE) and Oman were then another few years away, 
7

while Qatar’s and Bahrain’s modest reserves began to 

be developed to generate significant income only after 

the end of World War II and did not challenge Saudi 

Arabia’s growing role as the region’s largest oil 

producer, and hence the focal point of international 

political attention.

U.S. and British interests in particular focused on 

the hereditary monarchical systems of Saudi Arabia 

and, at the time, Iran, where the Shah (later ousted 

from power in 1979) promised both stable relations 

and, like Saudi Arabia, relied to a certain extent on 

military protection through his Western allies. During the 1960s, a twin-pillar policy became the key U.S. 

strategy in ensuring the stability of the Gulf’s regional 

security system. Iran and Saudi Arabia, both regional 

emerging large powers, and both strongly allied to 

U.S. and Western governments, dominated the wider 

region, thus marginalizing any potentially threatening elements. Iranian-Saudi Arabian rivalry would 

also ensure that no one country would eventually end 

up significantly more powerful than the other, a fact 

which also corresponded to the intrinsic religious-sectarian differences between Sunni traditionalist Saudi 

Arabia, and Shiite (although, at the time secularoriented) Iran.11

This regional system was not only to preserve regional security and stability over a long period, but 

also turned the Gulf into a bulwark against the advance of Communism and Soviet Russian interests 

that made increasing inroads into nearby South Asia. 

Reflecting this additional, ideological element in U.S. 

policy toward the wider region, the Richard Nixon 

Doctrine in 1969 incorporated the Gulf into American 

policymaking as a pivotal point for U.S. interests in 

the wider Middle East.
8

The Politics of “Dual Containment.”

Nevertheless, evolving political developments 

in the region during the 1970s, and an escalation of 

regional Gulf tensions during the 1980s and 1990s, 

showed the limitations of the twin-pillar policy. The 

Arab oil embargos of 1973 and 1976, although of short 

duration, demonstrated to the Gulf states’ Western 

allies that the economic and political tide could turn 

against Western markets that, by the 1970s, overwhelmingly depended on Gulf oil. The nationalization 

of wider Middle Eastern oil industries, including inside the Gulf region, had already begun to change the 

regional power dynamics between previously dominant Western corporations and the newly emerging 

national oil companies. This time also coincided with 

the gradual withdrawal of British forces from previous close cooperation with the Trucial Coast, leaving 

the Trucial States to become new, independent states, 

most of them to reunite in the UAE.12

After Iraq fell prey to domestic political turmoil 

under various military governments, Iran and Saudi 

Arabia remained as the politically and economically 

most powerful states in the region. But the Iranian revolution in 1979 resulted in the ousting of the Shah and 

his replacement by an Ayatollah-led theocratic Shiite 

state. This abruptly removed a key American ally and 

turned Iran from a former U.S. client to one of its fiercest enemies (Grand-Ayatollah Khomeini thereafter 

referring to the United States as the “Great Satan”). 

With the Soviet Union in mind, President Jimmy Carter stated that “An attempt by any outside force to gain 

control of the Gulf region will be regarded as an assault 

on the vital interests of the United States of America, 
9

and such an assault will be repelled by any means 

necessary, including military force”13—but in this 

context the President seemed to overlook the fact that 

the Gulf’s most significant threat was no longer to be 

found in any “outside force”; its key security challenges since the 1980s arose entirely from its own, regional 

dynamics.

The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s 

cost more than one million lives over a period of 8 

years, during which the entire Arabian Peninsula began to realize the destructiveness of regional political 

disputes, and the military threat which lay virtually 

at the doorsteps of even the West’s close Gulf monarchy allies Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The creation of 

the GCC marked the first visible reaction of the Gulf 

monarchies to these threats, even though the GCC’s 

apparent long-term strategy consisted in economic 

rather than military cooperation. The aim was to 

create security through union rather than constructing yet another military opposition to the two raging 

Northern neighbors; while avoiding a union which 

would be politically and militarily dominated by its 

largest member state, Saudi Arabia. 

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, followed by the first 

Gulf War in 1990-91, caused the full-scale escalation of 

regional military conflict, and removed any remaining 

doubts as to whether neighboring Iran, or neighboring 

Arab-Sunni-ruled Iraq, could be relied upon as guarantors of regional stability—or, indeed, as political 

allies of the Western powers. Of further heightened 

concern for the GCC states was their own, very limited military capability for self-defense. This was compensated for by the first active military engagement of 

U.S. forces in the conflict to defend not only Kuwait, 

but also neighboring Arab Gulf monarchies from the 
10

advance of Iraqi troops into Saudi Arabia. While this 

form of U.S. engagement in the region marked a climax in U.S.-GCC military relations, it also showed the 

utter failure of previously held security paradigms for 

the region resting on Iranian-Saudi supremacy.

U.S. policy under the Clinton administration 

moved from twin-pillar politics toward a policy of 

actively containing both Iraq and Iran, both of which 

were weakened militarily and economically from a 

decade of mutual war. Iraq also suffered heavily from 

its military defeat by U.S. and Coalition forces, despite 

the political survival of the Saddam regime. With the 

two northern neighbors significantly weakened, the 

GCC states emerged as the most important U.S. political allies through variously close bilateral relations 

with all of its member states.14 U.S.-GCC military ties 

strengthened further as a result of the Gulf War. Several GCC states signed bilateral defense agreements 

with the United States, including Bahrain in 1991, Qatar in 1992, and the UAE in 1994. Access agreements 

for U.S. military forces followed, or were renegotiated 

to tie U.S. military troops stationed permanently in regional military bases, allowing for the training of local 

military forces in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE. 

Since the early-1990s, the GCC states have become a 

major military pillar for U.S. foreign policy not only 

in the Gulf region, but far beyond. For instance, the 

GCC states also provide much of the infrastructure 

and transit capability essential to U.S. missions in the 

wider region, including in Afghanistan.15 U.S. military 

forces have access to key bases such as Al Dhafra Air 

Base in the UAE, Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, Al Udeid 

Air Base in Qatar, and the Naval Support Activity in 

Bahrain. Kuwait hosts as many as 15,000 U.S. troops; 

Qatar some 7,300; and the UAE some 3,000.16 All GCC 

members are major staging hubs, operating training 
11

ranges, and offering logistical support for regional 

operations. Several GCC states also host U.S. Patriot 

missile batteries, such as Kuwait and the UAE.17

The GCC states have also emerged as premier 

markets for U.S. foreign military sales. Between 2007 

and 2010, total U.S. weapons exports and defense 

services to the GCC states totaled over $26.7 billion, 

more than any other region in the world.18 Reports for 

Fiscal Year 2011 include a fighter aircraft sale to Saudi 

Arabia worth some $29.4 billion, the single largest 

arms sale in American history,19 rendering the GCC a 

formidable military client.

THE GULF’S CHANGING GEOPOLITICS 

DURING THE 2000s

The time since the early-2000s has dramatically reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the Gulf, and in 

parallel U.S.-Gulf relations. The events of September 

11, 2001 (9/11), when 19 armed Islamist terrorists hijacked four U.S. aircraft and flew them into New York 

City’s World Trade Center’s twin towers and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, demonstrated an emerging 

threat from within the Gulf region not only to the region itself, but to the United States as the main backer 

of its political systems. Of the 19 hijackers, 15 were 

Saudi citizens, the others coming from Egypt, Lebanon, and the UAE. They were born, raised, and allegedly radicalized in states which were considered key 

U.S. allies.20

While the event marked American relations with 

the wider Arab world for many years, it also precipitated a series of defining U.S. military interventions 

in and around the region, in the form of the U.S.-led

invasion of Afghanistan, deposing the radical, theo-
12

cratic-tribal Taliban regime under whose leadership 

al-Qaeda had been able to train at least some of the 

9/11 hijackers; and in the case of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, deposing long-term President Saddam 

Hussein and his Baathist regime. Relations with some 

of the GCC states, Saudi Arabia in particular, were 

strained for a number of years by the strong Saudi element among the hijackers, allegedly radicalized inside 

Saudi mosques, while growing pressure within Saudi 

Arabia against U.S. “infidel” forces resulted in withdrawals of U.S. troops. 

Iraq and the Surging Menace of Internal Conflict.

Undoubtedly one of the most important changes 

to the Gulf geopolitical landscape in the last 2 decades 

has been the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. invasion of 

Iraq. Once a Sunni regime and the main geopolitical competitor to both Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 

wider Gulf region, since 2003, Iraq has been characterized by a volatile political situation, insecurity, and a 

weak economy that can neither feed nor employ Iraq’s 

young and mostly educated population. This leaves 

the government reliant almost entirely on oil export 

revenues for the running of the country. The country’s oil sector itself has developed disappointingly, 

with no signs that Iraq, which holds the world’s fifth 

largest oil reserves, can move its production capacity 

anywhere near its previously held targets. This means 

the prospects for Iraq to compete with neighboring 

Saudi Arabia in oil production seem remote at present, as are prospects for Iraq’s presumably large but 

underexplored and underdeveloped gas reserves. 

This means that, despite resource potential, Iraq’s hydrocarbon production remains of relatively little geopolitical consequence at present.
13

Iraq’s volatile political situation has had far greater 

repercussions on the region as a whole. Political, sectarian, and ethnic struggles have characterized Iraq’s 

political life since 2003, when U.S. forces first put in 

place a transitional government aimed at unifying 

the country.21 Iraq’s Shiite majority—economically 

and politically marginalized under the Sunni minority-based Saddam regime—has since gained political 

influence and constitutes the largest single sectarian 

voter bloc inside Iraqi politics, proving decisive for the 

election of current Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Reflecting the Saddam regime’s former reliance 

on Sunnis, Iraq today more than ever has turned into 

a political battle field between rivalling Sunni-Shiite 

factions, which have become increasingly tied to the 

country’s political system.22 In parallel to the growing 

Sunni-Shiite split, Iraq’s Kurds continue to live in a de 

facto separate Kurdish state, whose interactions with 

the central Iraqi government are complicated by the 

location of a large share of Iraq’s oil and gas inside 

Kurdish territories.23

For the GCC states, the weakening of Iraq and political predominance of Shiite factions have deprived 

the Arab regimes in the Gulf of an important Sunni 

partner in their ideological and geostrategic competition with Iran. Iraq’s continuingly unstable domestic 

political climate has given rise to a state of permanent 

insecurity, and daily clashes between sectarian groups, 

resulting in many thousands of dead Iraqis each year 

owing to terrorist attacks on homes, cars, hospitals, 

and even mosques; while Iraqi Kurdistan has drifted 

further away from the center owing to the continued 

violence between different sectarian branches of Iraq’s 

Arabs.24 Internationally operating terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda have since found Iraq a fertile 
14

ground for new recruits and terrorist operations, exacerbating internal instability while posing a threat 

also to other countries, including the neighboring 

GCC states. It is Iraq’s status as a source of domestic 

instability, the exacerbation of sectarian and ethnic 

conflict in a country so close to the GCC, coupled with 

the apparent inability of various allied forces such as 

U.S. troops and advisers to pacify Iraqi politics that 

have rendered Iraq a glaringly negative case study in 

the Gulf.

An even more problematic development seen in 

Iraq is the rise of domestic, regional menaces in the 

form of growing political instability, giving rise to increasingly radical forms of political Islamism, ethnic 

and sectarian tensions which also form an increasing 

part of wider Middle East political dynamics. Prolonged development of this kind could well render 

Iraq a very severe threat to regional security as a basis for radicalism to spread across the Gulf, and help 

revive long-held sectarian-political rivalries between 

Iran and Iraq on the one hand, and between Sunnis 

and Shiites across the Gulf countries themselves on 

the other. This means that in reality, the U.S. mission 

in Iraq is far from over, but also that it seems clear that 

purely military force engagement does not in itself resolve this situation. Here, too, a more systematic focus 

on institution-building and the application of intelligent mechanisms to encourage a strategic legislative 

solution to the continued deadlock between regions 

and their claim on Iraqi oil and gas resources may 

contribute significantly more to the solution of internal strife than continued reliance on military presence. 

In the GCC, too, sectarian and ethnic minorities exist, 

although to a lesser degree than in Iraq, with the exception of the largely disenfranchised expatriate pop-
15

ulation. However, the menace of escalating sectarian 

conflict within the GCC is real, particularly in Saudi 

Arabia and Bahrain, countries with somewhat larger 

Shiite populations; and the spillover of domestic turmoil from neighboring Iraq may yet constitute one of 

the most important threats to political stability in the 

GCC from within.

For the United States, this means most likely that 

future ways of engaging with the GCC to ensure domestic stability will need to entail more than mere military and technical means. They will include increasing 

cooperation in areas such as good governance, which 

is essential to strike the balance between domestic 

minorities so as to avert any outbreak of sectarian 

violence, as well as domestic political reform toward 

greater popular participation and government accountability; political transparency and fair media relations; and domestic economic reform, including the 

further diversification of the GCC economies toward 

more inclusive and sustained economic growth that 

offers employment opportunities for all GCC citizens. 

All of these goals form an intrinsic part of the interests 

of all GCC states, and the United States as a political 

and economic partner has an essential role to play.

Iran and the Politics of Nuclear Armament.

Of parallel significance, and with potential longterm consequences for the geopolitical situation of the 

wider Gulf region, has been the continuously worsening international confrontation over Iran’s nuclear 

program. In pursuit of nuclear power for more than 40 

years dating back to pre-Islamic Republic times, Iran 

has had a multi-decade history of nuclear controversy. 

U.S. doubts as to the possibility of a secret parallel nu-
16

clear weapons program have been voiced repeatedly 

since the mid-1970s, mainly based on U.S. intelligence 

reports.25 Reports resurfaced in the 1980s during the 

Iran-Iraq war, and in the mid-1990s when U.S. intelligence stated that Iran was “aggressively pursuing a 

nuclear weapons capability and, if significant foreign 

assistance were provided, could produce a weapon 

by the end of the decade.”26 Iran has repeatedly stated 

that it intended to use its nuclear program for civilian 

purposes only.27

The current controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear program began to escalate in 2002, when an Iranian 

exile organization claimed that Iran had built nuclear 

facilities that had not been declared to nuclear inspectors sent to Iran by the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) the year before. Some of the claims, 

which later proved unsubstantiated, triggered substantial international attention and prompted additional visits to relevant sites by IAEA inspectors. Their 

report concluded that Iran “had engaged in a variety 

of clandestine nuclear-related activities, some of which 

violated Iran’s safeguards agreement” including plutonium separation experiments, uranium enrichment 

and conversion experiments, and importing various 

uranium compounds.28 Subsequent agreements with 

the IAEA and the E3 countries (Britain, France, and 

Germany) resulted in the supposed suspension of 

enrichment activities, but the presidential election of 

Mahmoud Ahmadinajad in August 2005 involved a 

change of mind and the restatement of Iranian nuclear 

enrichment activities since then.29

Relations between Iran, the United States, and other international bodies such as the IAEA have since 

deteriorated continuously, and have triggered a series 

of gradually tightening sanctions to add to the exist-
17

ing sanctions arsenal the United States and some other 

Western nations have maintained against Iran since 

the mid-1980s. In June 2010 the U.S. Congress adopted 

the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and 

Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) which substantially 

amends and extends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996; in 

the same month, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1929, the fourth in a 

series imposing sanctions on Iran. Further sanctions 

followed in November 2011 by the United States, and 

in July 2012 by the European Union (EU), targeting 

the export of Iranian oil with the aim of deterring Iran 

from further enrichment activities.30

The result has been an increasingly isolated Iran 

both politically, vis-à-vis most Western states and 

within the UNSC, and economically, particularly 

since 2012 with the implementation of oil-sector targeted sanctions. This is not to say that Iran has been 

struck as hard economically as the sanctions regime 

intended. While the Iranian government has been reported to have lost significant revenue streams particularly since the start of energy sector-related sanctions 

in mid-2013, various accounts suggest the country’s 

economy is nowhere near a breaking point.31 This is 

further evidenced by the continuation of Iranian oil 

exports to key Asian markets, including China, India, 

and South Korea, which have reduced but maintained 

their energy trade with Iran in spite of the sanctions. 

While the success of the current sanctions regime in 

convincing Iran to suspend its nuclear program is so 

far meager—if not counterproductive—the increasing 

sanctions regime has arguably contributed to Iran’s 

growing political and economic isolation inside and 

outside the Gulf region.
18

For the GCC states, the Iranian question is not only 

a major geopolitical headache but also a severe threat 

to the region’s long-term stability. Immediately, a 

nuclear-armed Iran in their immediate neighborhood 

offers reason for concern, even under what seems (despite the international sanctions regime) a de-escalating strategy by most Gulf states and the relatively slim 

possibility of a direct nuclear attack by Iran against 

GCC neighbors (which would probably also impact 

Iran itself owing to its geographic proximity). However, nuclear arms in Iran may lead to domestic calls 

within the GCC for reciprocal action in the form of a 

GCC-based nuclear arms program, and hence cause 

a nuclear arms race in the Gulf, which many regional 

observers see as potentially highly destabilizing.32

A regional nuclear arms race would leave the 

United States with no good policy options. If providing political or technological support, the United 

States would itself become a party to the race, fuelling 

a growing rift with Iran and reinforcing the latter’s 

turn toward the alternative political spectrum ranging 

from Russia to China and North Korea. U.S. refusal to 

support GCC nuclear arms acquisitions, on the other 

hand, would spare America this scenario, but would 

likely create another rift between the United States 

and its GCC allies, which would themselves turn 

toward partners willing to supply the technology, 

thereby sidelining America as a key security partner. 

Both scenarios will hardly help strengthen rather than 

undermine regional stability in the longer term.

Perhaps of most immediate concern for the GCC 

states, however, is the geostrategic consequences of an 

armed escalation between outside forces, such as U.S. 

and Israeli strikes against Iran. The Iranian mainland 

is in immediate proximity to GCC neighbors UAE, 
19

Qatar, and Bahrain, at its closest point merely some 40 

kilometers away.33 Both Iran and the GCC members 

share the Gulf as a main offshore oil and gas producing space, and the Straits of Hormuz as their main 

shipping route, through which close to 90 percent of 

all petroleum exported from the Gulf passes, including to key customers in Asia, Europe, and the United 

States.34 Military attacks against Iran, even if directed 

against land-based infrastructure, would likely lock 

up the Straits of Hormuz for hydrocarbon transport 

for security reasons, as well as isolating a large part of 

the entire Gulf region’s oil and gas production in the 

first place. 

Iran itself has threatened multiple times to close 

the Straits of Hormuz if further sanctions are introduced or in the case of a military attack on the country, potentially by means of placing sub-sea mines 

across the Straits, stopping tanker traffic from the 

Gulf, which would target external oil markets but at 

the same time impact the GCC oil and gas exporters 

themselves. Even in the event of a time-limited military strike that would only involve the closure of the 

Straits for a couple of days, the economic short- and 

long-term consequences for Gulf hydrocarbon exports 

would be enormous in terms of monetary losses and 

political risk reassessments. The worst case scenario 

could result in a permanently weakened Iran enduring similar political chaos such as in neighboring Iraq, 

and creating a two-state instability problem at the 

doorstep of the Arab Gulf monarchies. 

But the GCC states are also threatened by other 

Iranian weapons of influence, namely Iranian influence over Shiites living inside the GCC, with small 

but possibly disruptive minorities living in Saudi 

Arabia and the UAE, and a Shiite majority in Bahrain. 
20

An internationally outlawed Iran, which responds by 

stirring domestic unrest via Shiite communities inside 

the GCC has been a long-term concern for many Gulf 

states, and may yet evolve as a major source of discontent between the two sides of the Gulf. All of these 

scenarios underline the enormous vulnerability of this 

small geographical area in case of any escalation of a 

conflict between Iran and outside players; and the difficulty for both the GCC and the United States as a key 

GCC ally in choosing the right strategy toward Iran.

A “Golden Age” of the GCC States? The Emergence 

of the GCC as an Economic Power Center.

Iran’s political and economic isolation, however, 

has also held unexpected opportunities for the GCC. 

Together with Iraq’s current political volatility, Iran’s 

isolation largely eliminated two key regional players 

from the region’s geo-economic sphere at the beginning of the 2010s. Rising oil prices since the early2000s, contrasting with declining prices during the 

late-1980s and 1990s, provided the oil exporting Gulf 

monarchies with considerable windfall revenues of 

historical size, contributing to more than a decade of 

stable revenue rises, budgetary surpluses, and, in most 

cases, stable economic growth rates.35 At the receiving 

end of this near-unprecedented revenue stream since 

the last oil price shock of the early-1980s, the GCC 

monarchies have weathered the trend for economic 

decline and political turmoil everywhere else across 

the Middle East during the 2010s (and during the late2000s in Europe and North America).36

With the influence of two powerful neighbors attenuated on the Gulf’s political and economic scene, 

this leaves the Gulf monarchies, collectively, as the re-
21

gion’s by far most significant economic power center, 

not only in the Gulf but also in the economically weakened remaining wider Middle East. Their enormous 

oil revenues have also put the GCC monarchies into 

the fortuitous position of remaining the Gulf’s only 

politically stable U.S. allies (political turmoil in Bahrain in 2012 taken aside), with growing political and 

economic influence beyond their own borders. The region’s economic power has started to shift decisively 

from the region’s former heavyweights, Iran and Iraq, 

toward the rising Gulf monarchies. 

Important dynamic changes have also characterized the relationship of the GCC states with each 

other. While during the 1980s and 1990s, stagnant economic growth and mutual small-scale border disputes 

shaped GCC relations and hampered various shared 

projects, the time since the early-2000s has been characterized by considerably greater shared concerns, 

both external (Iraq, Iran) and internal (terrorism, Islamist radicals, Shiite-Sunni grievances, employment 

creation for nationals). The economic abundance induced by the 2000s oil revenue windfalls meant that 

considerable time and funds have been spent on economic diversification and employment-generating 

activities and generous welfare programs for GCC 

citizens. This mostly shared policy focus has rendered 

intra-GCC relations during the 2000s considerably 

less conflictive, and more harmonic, despite the maintenance of various, but mostly inconsequential political differences on international affairs issues.

A notable shift has also been taking place in the 

diversification of GCC economic and financial power 

away from formerly dominant Saudi Arabia toward 

various centers of economic power and interest also in 

the GCC’s smaller member states. With populations of 
22

just a few million each, some of the GCC’s small monarchies—Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait—have found 

themselves among the world’s wealthiest countries on 

a per capita basis. Storming ahead with post-modern 

skylines, and rapidly growing nonoil sectors such 

as tourism, culture, real estate, and finance, many 

GCC members are now economic political brands in 

their own right, ranging from Dubai’s metropolism 

to Qatar’s knowledge cities. Many GCC states’ oil 

wealth has also translated into extensive interests in 

external economic and political engagement, beyond 

Saudi Arabia. 

The GCC states’ strengthened economic position 

in several cases has also been tied to rising geopolitical 

ambitions by its smaller members, contrary to the past 

when such ambitions had been largely limited to Saudi Arabia. Qatar and the UAE have emerged as diplomatic centers in their own right, entertaining interests 

in foreign politics and mediating roles, in addition to a 

growing number of high-profile domestic projects including Qatar securing the games for the 2022 football 

World Cup. Qatar has diplomatically been involved 

in a number of outside conflicts, playing roles in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria.37 Al-Jazeera, Qatar’s news 

channel, now assumes an important role in the crossArab media landscape, participating briskly—and not 

impartially—in political debates, including in the context of Egypt’s 2011 revolution and the 2013 ousting of 

the country’s Muslim Brotherhood-led government.38

Qatar and Saudi Arabia have not shied away from 

becoming agents of political change such as in Egypt 

and Syria, engaging directly via financial and media 

support for elements within the political process.39 The 

UAE, on the other hand, sent their own troops to Afghanistan in 2003 and pledge to keep troops deployed 
23

after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014, 

supported rebels in Libya and Syria and the GCCbrokered power change in Yemen, and have become a 

key U.S. partner in implementing significant economic and political sanctions against Iran.40 Significantly, 

the UAE has bought the most sophisticated missile 

defense system sold by the United States as part of the 

country’s efforts in assembling a regional defense system against Iran.41 With plans for four nuclear power 

reactors by 2020, the UAE will further host GCC’s and 

the Arab world’s first civilian nuclear program, relying on Korean and U.S. technology partners as well as 

long-term U.S. political support.42

GCC financial power is now not only tangible in the 

region, but beyond in the form of direct investments 

and acquisitions made by the GCC multiple investment funds and their older brothers, the GCC states’ 

Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). The sheer scale of 

these funds is unprecedented. A 2013 KPMG study estimates the value of the Kuwait Investment Authority 

at U.S.$296 billion; Saudi Arabia’s Monetary Agency 

(SAMA) foreign holdings at U.S.$533 billion; and Abu 

Dhabi Investment Authority at U.S.$627 billion.43 A 

2013 UN estimate suggests wealth accumulated by 

GCC SWFs could have reached U.S.$1.8 trillion, or 

around a third of assets accumulated by SWFs worldwide.44 Their investments are increasingly global in a 

range of sectors such as mines, infrastructure, agriculture, and industries. 

On the other hand, a rising number of requests by 

international organizations, including most recently 

the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for the GCC 

economies to contribute a rising share into economic 

rebuilding packages for Europe and North America 

show by now the inevitable economic significance of 
24

the GCC economies for the functioning of the U.S. 

economy. The GCC economies’ influence extends to 

their role in upholding U.S. capital markets through 

their vast assets, which continue to be held overwhelmingly in U.S. dollars. Having lost more than 20 

percent of their asset value during the financial crisis 

of 2008-09, the GCC economies have been just as dependent on U.S. fiscal stability as the U.S. market is 

to GCC asset strength, for any systematic disinvestment of GCC capital assets held in U.S. dollars toward 

alternative markets in Asia and Africa, and shifts in 

currency preferences, would have significant effects 

on the value of the U.S. dollar.45 This growing financial interdependence is a new development, and one 

unlikely to reverse over the next decade in view of the 

continued importance of oil exports for the GCC economies—priced overwhelmingly in U.S. dollars—and 

the U.S. market’s continued need for foreign investment to finance its growing fiscal deficits. 

Investment relations are mirrored by the increasing significance to the region of U.S. trade in commodities. Total two-way trade between the United States 

and the GCC states in 2011 totaled over U.S.$100 

billion, turning the GCC into currently the 10th largest U.S. export market, a position reflected by a new 

framework agreement between the United States and 

the GCC signed in September 2012 to expand trade 

and strengthen economic ties with each other.46

Growing Influence of Asia.

The United States is no longer the GCC’s only, neither its most important, trade and investment partner. 

Asian economies now account for a rising share in 

Gulf trade, both as an export destination for Gulf oil 
25

and natural gas, and as a technology partner and the 

origin of much of the GCC’s food and other merchandise imports. This shift in GCC market orientation 

largely reflects the rise in Asian economic power.47

Asian economies are expected to account for a vast 

share in global energy demand growth well into the 

2030s, contrasting with declining growth in demand 

for conventional fossil fuels in the former key markets, Europe and North America.48 The latter’s expected oil and gas self-sufficiency by 2020 further reduces 

the weight of the U.S. energy market for GCC decisionmaking, shifting the focus instead toward those 

markets where most growth is expected: Asia.

Already today, Asian markets account for approximately 40 percent of global energy consumption, and 

a rapidly rising share of GCC oil and gas production.

Asia receives over 50 percent of Saudi Arabia’s crude 

oil exports in addition to nearly all of its refined products exports; while over 90 percent of crude oil exports 

by the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar go to Asia.49 The market for GCC exports in liquefied natural gas—coming 

from Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Oman—is even more 

concentrated, where above 95 percent of all exports go 

to Asia—most of them under long-term contracts with 

durations of 15 to 20 years.50

The importance of Asian economies for individual 

GCC trade relations outperforms that of traditional 

trade partners Europe and North America. China 

alone accounted for over 10 percent of total GCC 

trade in 2011, surpassed only by India with 11 percent; 

while the combined share in trade volume between 

the GCC and the U.S./EU declined from around 40 

percent at the beginning of the 1990s, to merely 20 

percent in 2011.51 While strong U.S.-Saudi trade relations and the weight of Saudi Arabia within the GCC 
26

market still maintain a critical U.S. role as an important overall GCC trade partner, for many of the GCC’s 

smaller economies the most significant trade relations 

are now dominated by Asian economies, with a declining role for U.S. trade (see Table 1). With the onset 

of the financial crisis that struck the United States and 

Europe in 2008, additional impetus has been given to 

those GCC market analysts who have seen the future 

of GCC energy trade and financial investment increasingly shifting toward Asia.52

Country Trading Partners (Percent of Foreign Trade)

Saudi Arabia 1° EU27 (15.2%), 2° United States (13.1%), 3° China 

(12.8%)

Bahrain 1° Saudi Arabia (8.9%), 2° EU27 (6.7%), 3° United States 

(4.4%), 4° India (3.1%), 5° Japan (3%)

United Arab 

Emirates

1° India (17.8%), 2° EU27 (12.3%), 3° Japan (10.1%) 

Kuwait 1° South Korea (14%), 2° Japan (13.9%), 3° India (12.8%), 

4° EU27 (11.3%), 5° United States (10.4%), 6° China 

(10.4%)

Qatar 1° Japan (24.4%), 2° EU27 (18.7%), 3° South Korea 

(13.2%), 4° India (7%), 5° Singapore (6.1%), 6° United 

States (4.6%), 7° China (3.7%)

Oman 1° China (19%)

Source: A. Molavi, “’The New Silk Road’, ‘Chindia’, and the GeoEconomic Ties that bind the Middle East and Asia,” B. Wakefield, S. L. Levenstein, eds., China and the Gulf, Washington, DC: 

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011.

Table 1. Main Trade Partners of the 

GCC States, 2010.
27

In turn, Asian investors are keen to access GCC 

markets for a variety of their goods, ranging from food 

and household commodities, to high technology and, 

increasingly, direct investment into the GCC countries’ energy sectors themselves. This interest stems 

from the by now high dependence of many East Asian 

economies on Middle East and GCC hydrocarbon exports: Oil from the GCC economies and Iran account 

for over 85 percent of Japanese and South Korean 

crude oil imports (Japan being the world’s third largest net consumer), while nearly a quarter of Chinese 

oil imports is covered by just three countries, Saudi 

Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE. GCC exporters supply 

more than a quarter of Japanese and Korean liquefied 

natural gas (LNG), and around a fifth of Chinese LNG 

supplies.53

Unsurprisingly, Asian national oil companies 

(NOCs) have shown increasing interest in GCC oil 

and gas production, where Chinese, Japanese, and 

South Korean companies have since the early-2000s 

dramatically raised their presence.54 Asian companies have secured highly sensitive technology-based 

agreements, most significantly through selection of a 

Korean partner to set up the UAE’s nuclear program, 

which includes four reactors by 2020, introducing 

civilian nuclear power to the region outside Iran.55

Asian companies also dominate other energy market 

sub-segments, such as the growing GCC-based renewables sector through sales and technology transfer 

of solar technology, in which Chinese companies are 

now world leaders.56

While much of the visible relations between the 

GCC and Asian countries are concentrated around 

economic issues, there is a realistic chance that such 

relations may turn at any point of time in the future 
28

into full-fledged security relations that are likely increasingly to rival those between individual GCC 

states and the United States. Increasingly frequent 

high-level state visits and a growing number of mutual cooperation agreements, loans, gifts, and more, 

all of which have intensified throughout the 2000s and 

2010s, show an obvious desire on both sides to maintain close ties. Although no direct military agreements 

are publicly known and do not necessarily follow 

from visits of this kind, Asian partners in principle 

offer alternative sources for military training, as well 

as weapons exports.57 The firm plans of the UAE and 

Saudi Arabia to develop indigenous defense industries, as part of their security strategy and economic 

diversification plans, could lead both countries to seek 

technology and expertise transfers from Asian partners. For instance, in the UAE, Tawazun is the government’s main investment vehicle to achieve the country’s defense industry ambitions. Over recent years, 

Tawazun has established strategic partnerships with 

several international defense and security firms.58

Evaporating Alliances? US-GCC Relations and the 

“Arab Spring.”

The political turmoil that has swept across the 

Middle East and North Africa since the end of 2010, 

popularly known as the “Arab Spring,” was an unexpected test to U.S.-GCC relations. Popular protest removed from power the long-term regimes of Ben Ali 

in Tunisia (January 2010), Hosni Mubarak in Egypt 

(January 2011) and Muammar Gaddhafi in Libya 

(October 2011). Protests also led to a GCC-brokered 

handover of power by Yemen’s president for more 

than 30 years, Ali Abdallah Saleh, in February 2012; 
29

the outbreak of de facto civil war in Syria between 

Syrian President Bashar Asad’s regime and opposition forces in 2012; and the eventual removal of Mohamed Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood-led government 

in Egypt in July 2013. The events since 2010 mark a 

dramatic shift in political power in the Arab world, 

removing both long-term dictators and, in the cases of 

Tunisia’s Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak, long-held political allies both of America and the GCC.

The Arab Spring has affected different GCC members in different ways, with some shared opportunities and concerns. The ousting of long-established political regimes in many of the Arab world’s republics 

removed political friends and foes of GCC states alike. 

The Mubarak regime in Egypt, largely seen as a key 

political ally for both the United States and most of the 

GCC states, stood for more than 2 decades for the stability of one of the Arab world’s political and cultural 

core centers, particularly after the political disintegration of rivalling Iraq; while some regime changes, such 

as the removal of the long-isolated Gaddhafi regime in 

Libya and the ongoing struggle against the Alawite 

Asad regime in Syria are widely seen as a welcome, 

even if not applauded, development for most GCC 

states. Qatar, by contrast, has seemed to support the 

downfall of the Mubarak regime and supported the 

subsequent Muslim Brotherhood-led government—

a notably contrasting political stance to neighboring 

Saudi Arabia.

The Arab Spring has arguably repositioned the 

GCC monarchies vis-à-vis the rest of the Arab world. 

Facing a largely unstable Arab world in which many 

republics have been on the brink of political and 

economic collapse, the Arab Gulf monarchies have 

been largely spared from political uproar, in large 
30

part thanks to their enormous economic wealth and 

a decade-long track record of comparably generous 

welfare states and employment-oriented economic 

growth policies. Bahrain taken aside, the Arab Spring 

has left the GCC states in the paradoxical position of 

having become the Arab world’s last remaining bulwark against political protest, a status shared with the 

two other remaining Arab monarchies, Morocco and 

Jordan. Geopolitically, the GCC as a region has gained 

significantly since the early-2011s owing to the effective removal of previous alternative economic and 

political power centers in the Middle East: most importantly Egypt—now politically torn by post-revolutionary domestic struggles and decreasing oil and gas 

exports; and Syria—torn by domestic political conflict 

resembling ever more closely an evolving long-term 

civil war. With Iraq weakened and Iran isolated politically and economically, this leaves the GCC with 

its growing oil wealth as something of a “last region 

standing,” displaying a remarkable resilience to the 

otherwise region-wide raging Arab Spring.

At the same time, the perceived U.S. abandonment of the Mubarak regime, a shared key ally of the 

GCC and Egypt, sent important signals to the GCC 

about the potential durability of U.S. political and 

military support in the event of popular demand for 

more democratic rights and access to their country’s 

economic resources. This intrinsic U.S. dilemma in the 

region has since further risen in the aftermath of the 

events in Bahrain in early-2011, when for the first time 

significant protest waves began to hit a Gulf monarchy, and one most vulnerable to protest owing to preexisting sectarian cleavages between the Sunni royal 

family and the majority Shiite Bahraini population. 
31

In February and March 2011, Bahrain experienced 

unprecedented peaceful mass protests, which were 

met by brutal repression, resulting in more than 30 

dead (mostly protesters or bystanders), jail sentences 

for prominent opposition leaders as well as, in subsequent months, bloggers, journalists, and others expressing political dissent with the government; and 

severe infrastructure and economic damage in the 

aftermath of the protests.59 Subsequent months were 

characterized by smaller-scale protest but entailed 

more seriously a growing polarization of Bahrain’s 

society along sectarian lines. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain’s 

most important regional ally, was reportedly involved 

in the military reaction and clampdown of initial protests, alarmed by the prospect of protests similar to 

those in Egypt and Tunisia reaching the GCC states 

and the additional complications associated with the 

existing Sunni-Shiite split in Bahrain.60

The United States was faced with a formidable political dilemma; long-term support to protect Bahrain’s 

security and stability had been assured by successive 

U.S. governments and had stood at the core of U.S. 

security support for the entire GCC region. Bahrain 

hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet, and the Bahraini army has 

received U.S. military training. The events of February 2011 left U.S. forces literally watching from the 

front row the evolving escalation of domestic Bahraini 

politics between different sectarian fronts (a scenario 

more than anything else seen as the ultimate red line 

for multiple GCC governments), protestors calling for 

more democracy, greater governmental transparency 

and jobs, all of this merely a few kilometers away from 

neighboring Qatar and the UAE. The alleged involvement of Iran further charged the political situation and 

demonstrated the fine line between democratic protest 
32

and the escalation of protest into sectarian struggle, 

involving not only nationals but foreign intervention.

Protest in favor of democratic reform, however, 

and the Bahraini government’s subsequent reactions 

in brutally repressing protest and imprisoning opposition politicians, also resulted in mounting pressure 

by human rights groups and democracy supporters in 

the United States for it to step up its stance against 

the Bahraini government.61 The perceived U.S. role as 

a bystander to conflict rang alarm bells in and around 

Bahrain; would similar protests in the future, and their 

potential escalation, again entail a passive American 

role? Will U.S. allies stand by GCC governments in 

the case of systematic imprisonment of political opponents to Egyptian or Tunisian dimensions? Will U.S. 

support for human rights and democratic movements 

lead to a change of heart by U.S. policymakers against 

former ally governments in the GCC?

LESSONS AND OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 

TOWARD THE GCC

The Gulf region’s changing overall security system, 

tied to the continuing instability of Iraq, the threat of 

an evolving nuclear Iran, and an economically rising 

GCC (including beyond the GCC’s formerly dominant 

economic player, Saudi Arabia) has meant that the 

U.S. role as a political and military partner has been 

similarly changing and is likely to continue to evolve. 

“Twin pillar” politics and the policy of “dual containment” seem both to have failed in offering the region 

stability, while the limitations of U.S. political strategy 

not only in the Gulf region, but indeed the wider Middle East, in providing security for the United States 

itself were demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks. 
33

At the same time as these profound challenges 

await strategists both in the United States and the 

GCC states themselves, the United States as a military 

partner has been changing as well. The enduring Iraq 

debacle, which has resulted in yet another unstable 

state at the heart of the Middle East and in immediate 

proximity to the GCC, has left many former supporters of U.S. engagement in the region disappointed and 

cynical. The large financial and human cost of U.S. military engagement in the region appears to have worn 

out support among different political groups within 

U.S. policy circles which was previously consistent 

for decades; while the onset of North America’s and 

Europe’s most profound financial crisis for many decades in 2008 has meant that financial means for U.S. 

military interventions has been reduced significantly. 

The ongoing U.S. defense budget adjustments have 

raised concerns among the GCC leaders about the future of U.S. military capabilities, and U.S. willingness 

and ability to engage in the region. Although the U.S. 

Government reaffirmed in a strategic military document in 2011 its commitment to assuring the security 

and stability of the Middle East, the GCC countries 

remain worried about the future.62

This raises questions as to the future shape of U.S. 

security cooperation in the region, which has from the 

beginning been a cornerstone of U.S.-Gulf relations. In 

what follows we suggest those cornerstones that may 

form part of a future U.S.-GCC relationship in view of 

all these developments.
34

From Militant Unilateralism Toward 

Candid Multilateralism.

The past decade has demonstrated like no other 

time that the United States is no longer alone in the 

Gulf. Several European countries are strengthening 

their positions as the GCC’s strategic partners. French 

involvement in the region, after setting up a military 

base in Abu Dhabi in 2009,63 is likely to increase in the 

future, particularly after listing the stability in the Gulf 

region as one of the French government’s top priorities.64 The current United Kingdom (UK) government 

is keen to strengthen its presence in the region and 

reforge strategic alliances with all GCC countries.65

Growing Asian interests in line with growing Asian 

energy needs and increasing dependence on Gulf 

oil and gas has resulted in a multitude of new, politically and economically significant partners for the 

GCC members. In the economic sphere, Asian companies, both private and state-backed, now compete 

increasingly with U.S. and partner companies over 

market access, with particular significance in the case 

of company access to the oil and gas sectors. Continued Asian engagement with sanctioned Iran further 

implies growing Asian influence in those neighboring 

countries that American diplomacy no longer reaches. 

In view of this, the importance of Asian intermediaries and of Asian ties to both sides of the Gulf is likely 

only to increase over the coming years, and American 

foreign policy will need to come to terms with this 

reality in as a constructive way as possible.

The United States will likely face a Gulf region 

whose interest in more diversified security partners will entail a role for Asian countries, including 

through weapons purchases and the transfer of sensi-
35

tive technology, including nuclear. The space for U.S. 

engagement nevertheless remains large, particularly 

in view of the long-established historical ties between 

U.S. and GCC militaries, and the continued stationing 

of U.S. forces and ships at the coasts of several GCC 

partners. It would seem unlikely that any of the GCC 

states would wish to invite the military presence of 

various different foreign partners, thus rendering a 

stable U.S. presence in the Gulf a likely continuing pillar of GCC-U.S. relations. A U.S. strategy that continues to ensure the durability of this presence appears 

advisable in this context as long as GCC partners wish 

for such; while the financially strong position of many 

GCC states would arguably allow for new arrangements over the financial burden-sharing of such presence that would alleviate pressure on the U.S. side in 

view of current budgetary constraints.

Not only foreign security partners have changed; 

the United States faces an increasingly self-confident 

array of wealthy Gulf monarchies whose economic 

power and political ambition has made the GCC a 

group of states that no longer is simply on the receiving end of U.S. military assistance in return for security of oil supplies. Many GCC nations aspire to acquire strategic ways of thinking, rather than primarily 

foreign technology and military protection, to pursue 

their own security strategies along with their own diplomatic efforts in the wider Middle East as part of a 

new self-understanding following their own, regional 

political ideals. The heterogeneity of the GCC states 

is nowhere more visible than in the partly opposing 

political standpoints between Saudi Arabia—with a 

more traditional outlook and strategy—and Qatar, 

described as a country whose foreign policy successes 

constitute a “’branding’ strategy that seeks to showcase Qatar as uniquely able to influence Arab and 
36

regional politics, well above what might be expected 

based on its relatively small size.”66

Accommodating the emerging geopolitical ambitions of several GCC member states may at first pose a 

greater challenge to regional security cooperation than 

to relations with the United States itself. With several 

keen new international actors, particularly Qatar, but 

also member states with more individualist policies 

such as Oman, the main challenge will undoubtedly 

consist in generating consent for closer political and 

economic coordination at the GCC level. Declining 

support for a common currency is perhaps one of the 

most illustrative examples of what appears to be a 

mounting lack of interest by many GCC members in 

cooperating at the economic and political level. This 

situation calls for a U.S. role that could be supportive of cross-regional cooperative efforts, particularly 

in view of the challenges that are shared by all GCC 

states in the form of domestic dissent and sectarian 

tensions.

On the other hand, individual GCC states’ key interests in other Arab countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia, 

Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, mean that a security partnership between the United States and the GCC states 

may increasingly entail an element of foreign policy in 

proxy countries. This picture is complicated by variously different, sometimes opposing foreign policy 

views by different GCC states, with differing views 

by Qatar and Saudi Arabia on Egypt being a prime 

example. Nevertheless, it is sensible to remember that 

any of the regimes that have fallen, or may yet fall 

prey to the political turmoil of the Arab Spring, may 

be a client, friend, or foe of GCC states; and that U.S. 

policy in these countries will likely affect the security 

relationship with the GCC states themselves. 
37

This is a situation of no first best policy option—

political realism would dictate a U.S. foreign policy 

toward the region that carefully weighs between ideological and pragmatic political standpoints. However, 

if anything, this problem set suggests an important 

role for communication between U.S. and GCC security partners in a proactive manner. It reflects possibly what Fawaz A. Gerges ascribes to the first Barack 

Obama administration’s Middle East policy: 

Obama seized on the desire evident both in the United 

States and across the world to see America move away 

from militant unilateralism and return to the traditional multilateralism in international affairs that had 

steered the nation through the first decade following 

the end of the Cold War. . . . Now more than ever, 

[President Obama] said, diplomacy and engagement 

are critical to rebuilding ‘our alliances, repairing our 

relationships around the world, and actually making 

us more safe in the long term’.67

The Limits of a Unitary Strategy.

The Bahrain uprisings nevertheless have illustrated a particular policy dilemma in the Gulf: whether 

or not U.S. security cooperation should entail the unconditional support of political regimes in the GCC 

irrespective of their domestic actions. Human rights 

and the support of democratic movements form an 

essential part of American self-understanding, and 

while the GCC monarchies have never been considered formal democracies (as was Iran’s Shah regime 

or Egypt’s Mubarak regime for instance), the events 

in Bahrain in 2011 re-raised the question of how far 

U.S. support in such a case would go. Would U.S. 

forces support the Bahraini government or other 

GCC governments in a similar position over the long 
38

term? Would U.S. democracy movements take sides 

with protesters? Would U.S. inaction allow one GCC 

state to fall into chaos, potentially in favor of protest 

movements but with the consequence of potentially 

destabilizing other GCC states?

The answer to such questions will likely become an 

important element in the evolving security relationship between the United States and the GCC states. It 

may entail a much more pluralistic U.S. policy among 

the GCC states, or one in which a strengthened GCC 

institution itself redefines its responses to mutually 

shared domestic threats. A sensible U.S. policy response will also entail a greater role for providing 

training in “soft” military strategies, such as the use of 

intelligence and strategic communication by domestic 

governments to respond to, but also listen to domestic 

sources of discontent. Such strategic tools once again 

highlight the continued importance of U.S. and European security partners in the region owing to their 

considerable experience with such nontraditional 

security tools.

Security Cooperation and the Use of

Unconventional Tools.

Not only in the Bahraini context, the GCC states’ 

increasing geopolitical weight, and their own structural advantages and challenges mean the nature of 

threats to their national security has been transformed 

tremendously, to include a myriad of unconventional 

menaces such as domestic economic and political unrest, sectarian tensions, and the side effects of looming 

conflict in neighboring countries. From the U.S. perspective particularly, political pro-democracy movements inside the Gulf countries make it clear that con-
39

ventional military strategy alone will not be able to 

help. All of these challenges require a very different 

arsenal of policy and security responses, away from 

heavy artillery and missiles toward domestic dialogue, inclusive political responses to real economic 

grievances, and an improved level of communication 

between governments and their citizens.68

U.S. cooperation with the GCC states may benefit 

from more weight being placed on those intangible 

security assets such as intelligence and communication that enable states not only to engage in traditional 

situations of warfare, but in countering domestically 

induced conflict and political uprisings. Several GCC 

countries are keen to develop their own unmanned 

aerial vehicle capabilities, to be used for purposes 

ranging from surveillance to offensive operations. 

Political level exchange, but also research cooperation 

and communication via shared forums and institutions over a variety of domestic security-sensitive topics may form part of this, most importantly encouraging domestic reform in the economic and political 

spheres. Obama’s comments on wider U.S. foreign 

policy and engagement with foreign partners may 

entail this in a basic message:

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and 

communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with 

sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor 

does it entitle us to do as we please.69

Moreover, any U.S. security strategy in the wider 

Gulf region will need to pay growing attention toward 

efforts that focus on other areas of GCC economic stability. They should help GCC governments plan and 

carry through necessary economic reforms, maintain 
40

an open, trade-conducive domestic climate and support the GCC economies in diversifying their domestic 

industries and private sector development to help foster self-sustained economic growth and employment 

as the basis for GCC domestic stability. U.S. security 

interests and the growing interdependence between 

GCC and U.S. capital markets also imply an important role for the management of U.S. capital resources, 

and fiscal and dollar stability, to counteract growing 

concerns in the GCC over the stability of the dollar, 

and hence of its strategic financial assets. 

Regional challenges, the outlook for economic decline should oil prices decline over a sustained period 

of time, and rising regional economic grievances or 

sectarian tensions all pose important challenges to the 

GCC states and demand long-sighted policy responses. An increasingly important U.S. role could thus involve mediating and forging such continued cooperative efforts, including in the area of pressing economic 

reform that could best be dealt with at a regional level. 

Engaging here entails a growing diplomatic, rather 

than U.S. military role, and will require delicate skills 

to avoid any sort of economic-ideological “interference,” and may involve the dissemination of research 

and cooperative work in addition to plain policy 

assistance.

Time for New Regional Security Arrangements?

There is an argument that security in the Gulf region would be best served by a regionalized security 

forum in the shape of a strengthened GCC that further 

reinforces mutual security sector cooperation, or in 

the shape of a wider regional Gulf forum that includes 

other non-GCC member states as well. One suggested 
41

mechanism includes a Helsinki-style security forum, 

with the aim of developing regional conflict resolution 

mechanisms and of reducing regional tensions.70 Such 

a forum could include the GCC members as well as 

Iraq, Iran, and Yemen, under an organizational umbrella not very different from that of the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum 

(ARF), but with greater focus on military and security 

cooperation than in the ASEAN context. 

Yet, taking into account the current and enshrined 

animosities between Iran and a few GCC countries, 

this suggested forum may be unrealistic, and in any 

case is far from being materialized in the foreseeable 

future. On the one hand, Iranian assertive diplomatic 

and security postures in the Middle East worry the 

GCC countries. On the other, the presence of U.S. 

military forces in the Gulf region only increases Iran’s 

threat perception. The likelihood of Saudi Arabia and 

Iran working together remains remote. Previous rapprochement attempts between Saudi and Iran have 

failed to ease their tensions. Both countries, with opposing ideologies, have been competing for influence 

in the region and have engaged in many proxy wars. 

However, what is realistic is to create a regional security entity that groups the GCC countries with their 

strategic Western partners, namely the United States, 

the UK, and France. Such a forum could entail regular 

meetings to discuss regional security matters, and to 

foster cooperative efforts such as shared military and 

security training. It would help in reconciling views 

on security and foreign policy matters of common interest, as well as increasing the efficiency of use of all 

the resources available to stabilize the region. 
42

CONCLUSION

The profound changes in regional geopolitical 

dynamics in the Gulf since the early-2000s render the 

region a highly challenging environment for U.S. foreign policy. Still the world’s single most important 

producer region of oil, the Gulf states remain a region 

of essential economic and political interest for the 

United States. The GCC economies form the most important, and so far most stable block of countries within the region that have consistently been tied to their 

U.S. partnership, despite disagreements and variously 

fluctuating relations between individual GCC states 

and the United States. The geopolitical weight of the 

GCC states at a time of continuing domestic instability in Iraq, and an increasingly isolated Iran, has risen 

dramatically over the past 10 years; the GCC states’ 

enormous economic power, coupled to some of the 

most stable political states in the entire Middle East 

and North Africa region, call for continuously close 

U.S.-GCC relations in the security sphere, as well as in 

terms of financial investment and trade as an important element in U.S. foreign policy.

The 2000s saw the rise of internal radical trends, 

drawn across religious and sectarian lines within the 

Gulf region, and of the growing confrontation with 

nuclear Iran in parallel with the political eclipse of 

turbulent Iraq. At the same time, smaller GCC states 

increased in economic power and escaped the shadow of Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia as the dominant 

geopolitical players. In this context, the nature of U.S.-

GCC security relations may well evolve to include a 

range of different policy instruments, other than traditional forms of cooperation through direct military 

protection and training, and the sale of U.S. weapons 
43

to the GCC states. These should increasingly involve 

cooperation and training in areas such as formal intelligence, media, and communication management, including strategic communication to ameliorate rather 

than exacerbate potential domestic conflict as a threat 

to all Gulf monarchies alike. It may also involve a more 

frequent exchange over wider education and training 

methods, and research enabling the GCC states to 

diversify further their economies and to create lasting and inclusive wealth reaching all parts of their 

populations. For while in the past U.S.-GCC security 

relations have often been reduced to outright military 

protection, it has been the 2000s that have marked the 

growing importance of the idea that for the United 

States, losing hearts and minds in the wider Arab region constitutes a threat to national security at home. 

For this reason, it is to be hoped that U.S.-GCC relations by the 2020s will look very different from today.

ENDNOTES

1. International Energy Statistics, Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2013, available from www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/

IEDIndex3.cfm. 

2. “World Oil Transit Checkpoints,” EIA, 2013, available from 

www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics2.cfm?fips=WOTC. 

3. For a detailed history, see J. Crystal, Oil and Politics in the 

Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, Cambridge, UK: 

Cambridge University Press, 1995; Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The 

Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 

Arab Emirates, and Oman, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998; Frauke 

Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in 

Transition, London, UK: Motivate, 2005.

4. Crystal; Heard-Bey.
44

5. EIA, International Energy Statistics. 

6. James Onley, ‘‘Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971: 

The Politics of Protection,’’ Occasional Paper, No. 4, Washington, 

DC: Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown 

University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2009, available from 

repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/558294/

CIRSOccasionalPaper4JamesOnley2009.pdf?sequence=5.

7. Robert John Schneller, Anchor of Resolve: A History of the U.S. 

Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet, Washington, DC: Naval 

Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 2007; Martin Indyk, 

“U.S. Policy Priorities in the Gulf: Challenges and Choices,” International Interests in the Gulf Region, Abu Dhabi, UAE: Emirates 

Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004, p. 2.

8. Crystal; Heard-Bey.

9. The population of the Gulf region, including Iran and Iraq 

by 1960 stood at 34.4 million, of which Iran had a population 

of almost 22 million; Iraq 7.3 million; and Saudi Arabia, 4 million, compared with less than a million inhabitants in all other 

Gulf sheikhdoms. World Development Indicators, Washington, DC: 

World Bank, 2013, available from data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/

world-development-indicators. 

10. Tim Niblock, ed., State, Society, and Economy in Saudi 

Arabia, Abingdon, UK: Taylor & Francis, 1982.

11. The Gulf Security Architecture: Partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council, A Majority Staff Report prepared for the use 

of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, June 19, 2012, 

pp. 7-8; Indyk.

12. The United Arab Emirates are a federation of the seven 

emirates: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras Al-Khaimah, 

Sharjah, and Umm Al-Quwain.

13. Jimmy Carter, ‘‘The State of the Union Address Delivered before a Joint Session of the Congress, January 23, 1980,’’ 

The American Presidency Project, Santa Barbara, CA: University 
45

of California, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.

php?pid=33079#axzz1spb4HZYc. 

14. Indyk. 

15. U.S. Congress, p. 19.

16. Ibid., pp. 12, 15, 17.

17. Ibid.

18. Paul Kerr, based on numbers from Foreign Military Sales, 

Foreign Military Construction Sales and Other Security Cooperation, 

Historical Facts as of 30 September 2010, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2012,

p. 28, available from www.dsca.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/

FiscalYearSeries-2010.pdf, and www.sipri.org/research/armaments/

transfers/transparency/national_reports/united_states/us_

dscafacts_2010.pdf.

19. “2011, Special Joint Press Briefing on U.S. Arms Sales to 

Saudi Arabia,” Press Release, U.S. Department of State, December 29, 2011, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/12/

179777.htm. 

20. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, New York: 

W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, available from govinfo.library.

unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. 

21. For instance, see M. Ottaway and D. Kaysi, “The State of 

Iraq,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, February 2012, available from carnegieendowment.org/files/

state_of_iraq.pdf; C. Pascual and K. M. Pollack, “The Critical Battles: Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Iraq,” The Washington 

Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2007, pp. 7-19.

22. G. Bruno, “Iraq’s Political Landscape,” Washington, DC: 

Council on Foreign Policy Relations, 2009, available from www.

cfr.org/world/iraqs-political-landscape/p18411; T. Dodge, “State and 

Society in Iraq Ten Years after Regime Change: The Rise of a 
46

New Authoritarianism,” International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2, 2013, 

pp. 241–257. 

23. S. Kane, “Iraq’s Oil Politics. Where Agreement Might be 

Found,” Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2010, 

available from www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/iraq_oil_

pw64.pdf; “Iraq Report: Political Fragmentation and Corruption 

Stymie Economic Growth and Political Progress. A Minority Staff 

Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 

Senate,” Washington, DC: U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, 

2012, available from www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.

24. H. A. Hamoudi, “Identitarian Violence and Identitarian 

Politics: Elections and Governance in Iraq,” Harvard International 

Law Journal, Vol. 51, 2010, pp. 82-95; F. Hadad, “The Politics of 

Sectarianism in Iraq,” C. Spencer, J. Kinninmont, and O. Sirri, 

eds., Iraq Ten Years On, London, UK: Chatham House, 2013.

25. “Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Special National Intelligence Estimate, August 23, 1974, p. 38, 

available from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/snie4-1-74.pdf. The precise 

nature of concern at this time seems to be hypothetical, as the 

report emphasizes that Iran’s nuclear program is still entirely in 

its planning phase and merely states the assessment that there is 

no doubt, however, of the Shah’s ambition to make Iran a power 

not to be reckoned with. If he is alive in the mid-1980s, if Iran 

has a full-fledged nuclear industry and all the facilities necessary 

for nuclear weapons, and if other countries have proceeded with 

nuclear weapons development, we have no doubt that Iran will 

follow suit.

A similar tenor is expressed in various other memos and 

notes, e.g., “Memorandum for the Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs: Department of State Response to NSSM 

219 (Nuclear Cooperation with Iran),” April 18, 1975; see also 

Paul Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, 2012, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/

RL34544.pdf. 

26. The Weapons Proliferation Threat, Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Nonproliferation Center, March 1995, p. 12, available from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/

GetTRDoc?AD=ADA338686. 
47

27. Sharon Squassoni, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006, available 

from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRD

oc.pdf&AD=ADA477711. Newly elected Iranian President Hassan 

Rouhani again reaffirmed this in August 2013. J. Warrick, “Iran’s 

Nuclear Program Is Making Steady Gains but Is Staying Below 

‘Red Line,’ Report Says,” The Washington Post, August 28, 2013.

28. Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” p. 6.

29. The IAEA’s latest available report also confirms the continuation of Iranian enrichment activities at the time of writing. 

IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 

Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in 

the Islamic Republic of Iran, May 22, 2013, p. 3, available from www.

iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-6.pdf.

30. U.S. sanctions against Iran are listed under U.S. Department of the Treasury, available from www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/pages/iran.aspx. For an overview, see 

M. Kinaci, “Tightening Oil Sanctions on Iran,” Journal of Energy 

Studies, August 7, 2012.

31. Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” pp. 24-26; IAEA Board of 

Governors; “Sanctions Cost Iran $40Bn in 2012, IEA Says,” Middle 

East Economic Survey, Vol. 56, No. 7, February 15, 2013.

32. Author’s personal interview with local security staff and 

local intelligentsia, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, April-May 2013, and 

London, UK, July 2013. See also C. Ferris-Ley, “Saudi Prince 

Warns of Middle East Nuclear Arms Race,” Arabian Business, 

January 26, 2012. For a recent perspective, see S. Maloney, 

“Thinking the Unthinkable: The Gulf States and the Prospect of

 Nuclear Iran,” Middle East Memo, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 2013, available from www.brookings.edu/~/media/

Research/Files/Papers/2013/1/25%20iran%20maloney/0125_iran_

maloney.pdf.

33. “Straits of Hormuz” in World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 

Washington, DC: EIA, 2011, available from www.eia.gov/countries/

regions-topics.cfm?fips=WOTC#hormuz. 
48

34. “Global Oil Choke Points,” Montgomery, AL: Lehman 

Brothers Global Equity Research, January 18, 2008; “Dire Straits,” 

LNG Intelligence, January 11, 2011; Jean-Paul Rodrigue, “Straits, 

Passages, and Chokepoints: A Maritime Geostrategy of Petroleum Distribution,” Les Cahiers de Géographie du Quebec (Geography 

Papers of Quebec), Vol. 48, No. 135, 2004; Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time. Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” 

International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1, Summer 2008, pp. 82–117; D. 

Blair and K. Lieberthal, “Smooth Sailing: The World’s Shipping 

Lanes Are Safe,” Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2007.

35. Individual country statistics show the rising value of oil 

revenues, which account for between 70 and 98 percent of GCC 

countries’ total governmental revenues. For example, see for 

Saudi Arabia’s case: Annual Statistics 2012, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: 

Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 2013, available from www.sama.

gov.sa/sites/samaen/ReportsStatistics/statistics/Pages/YearlyStatistics.aspx. For regional perspectives, see Global Economic Prospects. 

Navigating Strong Currents, Vol. II, Washington, DC: World Bank, 

2011, pp. 95-105. 

36. The 5-year compound average growth rate between 2007 

and 2011 for the GCC economies was 4.6 percent, about half of developing Asia’s 8.8 percent over the same period, but more than 

five times the growth in the EU ( 0.6 percent) and other advanced 

economies (0.7 percent). QNB, GCC Economic Insight 2012, available from www.qnb.com.qa/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=

application2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1

35549637828&ssbinary=true, p. 13. See also IMF, World Economic 

Outlook 2010. Rebalancing Growth, Washington DC: International 

Monetary Fund, 2010, pp. 61-67; IMF, World Economic Outlook 

2013. Hopes, Realities, Risks, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2010, pp. 59-64.

37. B. Haykel, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution,” Gulf Analysis Paper, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, February 2013; L. Khatib, “Qatar’s Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism,” International Affairs, Vol.

89, No. 2, 2013, pp. 417–431.
49

38. Khatib; Christopher Blanchard, Qatar: Background and U.S. 

Relations, Report RL31718, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 16, 2011; Haykel.

39. Haykel. In august 2013, the Saudi King called for the international community to abstain from interfering in Egypt’s domestic affairs after the military deposed Muslim Brotherhood-backed 

President Morsi. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, “Al-Saudiyah tada`u almujtama` al-dawli li-tafham mudhamin risalat khadim al-haramain haula misr” (“Saudi Arabia calls on International Community to Understand the content of the Custodian of the two Holy 

Mosques’ letter regarding Egypt”), August 20, 2013.

40. K. Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues 

for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013.

41. Ibid.

42. The UAE’s nuclear reactors stand under strict IAEA safeguards; among other commitments, the UAE will not enrich 

uranium itself, relying instead on imported, enriched fuel. “Abu 

Dhabi Moves Ahead With Nuclear Program,” Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. 55, No. 34, August 20, 2012; D. Knott, “UAE 

Secures $2Bn Ex-Im Bank Loan To Buy U.S. Nuclear Equipment,” 

Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. 55, No. 38, September 14, 2012.

43. “KPMG Emerging Trends in the Sovereign Wealth Fund 

Landscape. Middle East,” p. 4, available from www.kpmg.com/AE/

en/Documents/2013/Emerging_trends_in_the_regional_SWF_landscape.pdf. These numbers appear in line with other previous estimates, for instance, Brad Setser and Rachel Ziemba, “GCC Sovereign Funds Reversal of Fortune,” Working Paper, Washington, 

DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, p. 2.

44. P. Kohler, “GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds: Leveraging Local Economic Development?” World Economic Situation and Prospects Weekly Highlights, 2013, available from www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_wh/wesp_wh16.pdf. 

45. Nader Habibi and Eckart Woertz, “US-Arab Economic Relations and the Obama Administration,” Middle East Brief, No. 

34, Waltham, MA: Brandeis University, February 2009.
50

46. G. Hussain, “Will the Middle East End Up Missing ‘U.S. 

Imperialism’?” The Commentator, June 6, 2013.

47. For instance, see “IMF Regional Economic Outlook: Asia 

and Pacific. Shifting Risks, New Foundations for Growth,” Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2013, available from 

www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2013/APD/eng/areo0413.pdf. See 

also “IMF World Economic Outlook 2013,” Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2013, pp. 19-24, available from www.

imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/pdf/text.pdf. 

48. “IEA Global Energy Outlook 2012,” Paris, France: International Energy Agency, 2012.

49. “EIA Country Analysis Briefs for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman, and Qatar,” available from www.eia.gov/

countries/. 

50. Bassam Fattouh and Jonathan Stern, Natural Gas Markets 

in the Middle East and North Africa, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

Press, 2011, available from www.oxfordenergy.org/shop/natural-gasmarkets-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/. 

51. A. A. Aluweisheg, “The GCC Turns East,” Arab News, 

December 9, 2012.

52. Ibid.

53. EIA Country Analysis Briefs for China, Japan and South Korea, 

available from www.eia.gov/countries/.

54. E.g., see Christopher Davidson, “Persian Gulf—Pacific 

Asia Linkages in the 21st Century: A Marriage of Convenience?” 

London, UK: London School of Economics and Political Science, 

Kuwait Program on Development, Governance and Globalisation 

in the Gulf States, 2010; Thierry Kellner, “The GCC States of the 

Persian Gulf and Asia Energy Relations,” IFRI Note, Brussels, Belgium: French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), 2012.

55. C. Stanton, “Abu Dhabi Signs Nuclear Power Deal with 

South Korean Group,” The National, December 28, 2009.
51

56. M. Al-Asoomi, “China Breaks West’s Solar Monopoly,” 

Gulf News, May 24, 2012.

57. Davidson, p. 2.

58. Michael Peel and Camilla Hall, “Abu Dhabi Pushes for 

Homegrown Defence,” Financial Times, February 25, 2013, available from www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1ac60098-7f2d-11e2-89ed-00144feabd

c0.html#axzz2dTNxSJGc; James Doran, “Home-Grown Defence 

Companies at Abu Dhabi’s Tawazun Industrial Park,” The 

National, February 19, 2013, available from www.thenational.ae/

business/economy/home-grown-defence-companies-at-abu-dhabis-tawazun-industrial-park.

59. Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): 

Bahrain’s Rocky Road to Reform, Middle East Report No. 111, Vol. 

12, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group (ICG), pp. 3-9, 

available from www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-northafrica/iraq-iran-gulf/bahrain/111-popular-protest-in-north-africa-andthe-middle-east-viii-bahrains-rocky-road-to-reform.aspx. The event 

was also investigated under a separate commission: Bahrain 

Independent Commission of Inquiry (2011), Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Presented in Manama, 

Bahrain, November 23, 2011, available from www.bici.org.bh/

BICIreportEN.pdf.

60. ICG, pp. 3, 21. 

61. The U.S. Government did react in some ways, condemning individual acts and sending delegates and commissioners to 

Bahrain in addition to direct phone calls, including by Obama, 

urging Bahrain toward “meaningful reform that is responsive to 

the aspirations of all Bahrainis.” See U.S. State Department’s daily 

press releases for April 30, 2013 (“President Obama’s call with the 

King of Bahrain”), March 30, 2011 and April 18, 2013, available 

from www.state.gov. 

62. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of 

the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense. 
52

63. Edward Cody, “First French Military Base Opens in the 

Persian Gulf,” The Washington Post, May 27, 2009, available from 

articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-05-27/world/36882134_1_rafalefrench-soldiers-first-military-base. 

64. “Livre Blanc Defence et Securite Nationale” (“White Paper 

on Defence and National Security”), Direction de l’information 

légale et administrative (Directorate of Legal and Administrative 

Information), Paris, France, 2013, available from www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/134000257/0000.pdf. 

65. Frank Gardner, “East of Suez: Are UK forces Returning?” 

BBC News, April 23, 2013, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk22333555. 

66. Haykel, 2013.

67. Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Obama Approach to the Middle 

East: The End of America’s Moment?” International Affairs, Vol.

89, No. 2, 2013, pp. 299–323, especially p. 301. The presidential 

quote is taken from Part 3 of a CNN Democratic presidential debate, CNN, January 21, 2008.

68. For more on this topic, see Mohammed El-Katiri, The Future of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Age of Uncertainties, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2013. 

69. Office of the Press Secretary, “President Barack Obama’s 

inaugural address,” Washington, DC: The White House, 

January 21, 2009, available from www.whitehouse.gov/blog

/inaugural-address/. 

70. Indyk, p. 27; see also K. M. Pollack, “Security in the Persian Gulf: New Frameworks for the Twenty-First Century,” Middle East Memo, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 2012, 

available from www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/06/middleeast-pollack. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil