The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. 

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: 

Document Title: Evaluation of the Juvenile Breaking the Cycle 

Program

Author(s): Pamela K. Lattimore; Christopher P. Krebs;

Phillip Graham; Alexander J. Cowell 

Document No.: 209799 

Date Received: May 2005 

Award Number: 1999-IJ-CX-0032 

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to

traditional paper copies.

 

Opinions or points of view expressed are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice.
November 2004 

Evaluation of the 

Juvenile Breaking the Cycle Program 

Final Report 

Pamela K. Lattimore 

University of South Carolina 

RTI International 

Christopher P. Krebs 

Phillip Graham 

Alexander J. Cowell

RTI International 

3040 Cornwallis Road 

Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 

RTI Project Number 07572 

This project was funded by the National Institute of Justice under grant number 1999-IJCX-0032. Points of view are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 

views of the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of 

Justice. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Acknowledgements 

We would like to acknowledge the help of many individuals who made completion of this 

project possible. First, we would like to thank the National Institute of Justice and Janice 

Munsterman for their support throughout this evaluation. We would also like to thank our 

subcontractor, NPC Research, for their work in collecting the survey and treatment data. In 

particular, Drs. Michael Finigan and Juliette Mackin played key roles in the organization and 

coordination of the data collection activities, and Mr. Lance Schnacker directed the survey data 

collection. 

We would also like to thank the administration and staff of the Lane County, Oregon, 

Department of Youth Services for their assistance and cooperation. In particular, we would like 

to thank Rob Selven, Lisa Smith, Linda Wagner, and Patty Davis for their support and 

assistance. The cooperation and support of the evaluation participants and their parents are also 

gratefully acknowledged. 

ii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Contents

Acknowledgements......................................................................................................................... ii 

Contents.........................................................................................................................................iii 

List of Exhibits............................................................................................................................... iv 

Executive Summary.................................................................................................................... 1 

Lane County Juvenile Breaking the Cycle Program................................................................... 1 

Impact of Lane County JBTC Program ...................................................................................... 6 

1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 9 

1.1 Background: The Rationale for JBTC .......................................................................... 10 

1.2 The JBTC Model in Lane County................................................................................. 13 

1.3 Evaluation Overview .................................................................................................... 18 

1.3.1 Research Hypotheses............................................................................................ 18 

1.3.2 Methods................................................................................................................. 19 

2 JBTC Process Evaluation...................................................................................................... 27 

2.1 Process Evaluation Background ................................................................................... 27 

2.2 Planning and Implementation—Building on the Youth Intervention Network............ 29 

2.3 Program Components and Assessment......................................................................... 30 

2.3.1 Management Information System (MIS).............................................................. 30 

2.3.2 Urinalysis (UA) Testing........................................................................................ 32 

2.3.3 Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) Abuse Treatment............................................... 33 

2.3.4 Mental Health (MH) Services............................................................................... 34 

2.3.5 Sanctions, Incentives, and Rewards...................................................................... 36 

2.3.6 Judicial Oversight and Juvenile Supervision ........................................................ 38 

2.4 Barriers to Collaboration and Program Implementation............................................... 41 

2.5 Summary....................................................................................................................... 42 

3 JBTC Outcome Evaluation ................................................................................................... 44 

3.1 JBTC Program Evaluation Participants........................................................................ 44 

3.2 Multivariate Analyses................................................................................................... 56 

3.2.1 AOD Treatment .................................................................................................... 59 

3.2.2 AOD Use............................................................................................................... 60 

3.2.3 Recidivism ............................................................................................................ 65 

3.2.4 Educational Performance and Family Relationships............................................ 69 

3.3 Summary....................................................................................................................... 72 

4 JBTC Cost-Effectiveness Evaluation Results....................................................................... 73 

4.1 Perspective and Method................................................................................................ 73 

4.1.1 Cost Estimation..................................................................................................... 74 

4.1.2 Cost Results: Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................... 75 

4.1.3 Cost Results: Multivariate Analyses..................................................................... 78 

4.1.4 Combining Cost and Effectiveness....................................................................... 79 

4.1.5 Summary............................................................................................................... 81 

5 Conclusions........................................................................................................................... 83 

References..................................................................................................................................... 86 

Appendix 1. Response Bias Analyses.......................................................................................... 88 

Appendix 2. Cost Data and Utilization Sources .......................................................................... 91 

iii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
List of Exhibits

Exhibit E-1. Juvenile Breaking the Cycle Program Summary Model........................................... 2 

Exhibit 1-1. Juvenile Breaking the Cycle Program Summary Model. ........................................ 14 

Exhibit 1-2. Identification of JBTC participants.......................................................................... 15 

Exhibit 1-3. Juvenile Breaking the Cycle Program Services and Outcomes................................ 17 

Exhibit 1-4. JBTC Process Evaluation Data Collection Strategies............................................... 20 

Exhibit 2-1. Lane County JBTC Program..................................................................................... 28 

Exhibit 3-1. Descriptive Data on the JBTC Evaluation Sample................................................... 45 

Exhibit 3-2. Self-Reported Lifetime Substance Use..................................................................... 50 

Exhibit 3-3. Previous Six-Month, Self-reported Substance Use.................................................. 52 

Exhibit 3-4. Previous 30 Days, Self-Reported Substance Use. ................................................... 53 

Exhibit 3-5. Administrative Reports of AOD Treatment Received in the Previous Six Months. 60

Exhibit 3-6. Logistic Regression Model of Receiving Substance Abuse Treatment.................... 60 

Exhibit 3-7. Self-Reported Alcohol Use In The Previous Six Months......................................... 61 

Exhibit 3-8. Logistic Regression Model of Alcohol Use.............................................................. 62 

Exhibit 3-9. Self-Reported Marijuana Use in the Previous Six Months....................................... 63 

Exhibit 3-10. Logistic Regression Model of Marijuana Use ........................................................ 63 

Exhibit 3-11. Self-Reported Use of Illicit Drugs Other Than Marijuana in the Previous Six 

Months. ................................................................................................................................. 64 

Exhibit 3-12. Logistic Regression Model of Use of Illicit Drugs Other Than Marijuana ............ 65 

Exhibit 3-13. Percentage Arrested One or More Times in the Previous Six Months. (The baseline 

measure excludes the arrest associated with inclusion in the study.) ................................... 66 

Exhibit 3-14. Logistic Regression Model of Likelihood of Re-arrest .......................................... 67 

Exhibit 3-15. Average Number of Arrests in the Previous Six Months. (The baseline measure 

excludes the arrest associated with inclusion in the study.).................................................. 68 

Exhibit 3-16. Negative Binomial Model of Number of Re-arrests............................................... 69 

Exhibit 3-17 Response Combinations and Overall Trend for Positive Outcomes........................ 70 

Exhibit 3-18. The Proportion of JBTC and Non-JBTC Youth Who Reported Doing Better, The 

Same, and Worse in Terms of Educational Performance ..................................................... 71 

Exhibit 3-19. The Proportion of JBTC and Non-JBTC Youth Who Reported Doing Better, The 

Same, and Worse in Terms of Family Relations.................................................................. 72 

Exhibit 4-1. Average Costs (and Standard Deviations) by Domain and JBTC Status: Six Months 

before Baseline...................................................................................................................... 75 

Exhibit 4-2. Average Costs (Standard Deviation) By Domain and JBTC Status: Baseline to SixMonth Follow-Up ................................................................................................................. 76 

Exhibit 4-3. Average Costs (Standard Deviation) By Domain and JBTC Status: Six-Month To 

Twelve-Month Follow-Up.................................................................................................... 77 

Exhibit 4-4. Incremental Cost (Standard Deviation) of JBTC Program....................................... 79 

Exhibit 4-5. Cost-Effectiveness Ratio Estimates for JBTC Program ........................................... 80

Exhibit 4-6. Implied Reductions in the Number of Youth Who Avoid Arrest and Marijuana Use 

from Spending $10,000 on JBTC....................................................................81 

iv 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Executive Summary 

In 1998, the Lane County, Oregon Department of Youth Services (DYS) was awarded a 

cooperative agreement from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to implement a Juvenile 

Breaking the Cycle (JBTC) program. The Lane County JBTC was designed as a demonstration 

with a juvenile arrestee population of the Breaking the Cycle (BTC) model demonstrated with 

adult arrestees in Birmingham, AL; Tacoma, WA; and Jacksonville, FL. In 1999, NIJ awarded a 

grant to RTI International to evaluate the effectiveness of the JBTC program. This report 

provides the results of the JBTC evaluation, including those from the process evaluation, the 

outcome evaluation, and the cost-effectiveness evaluation. 

Lane County Juvenile Breaking the Cycle Program 

The Lane County JBTC is an ambitious effort to effect major changes in the lives of 

juvenile arrestees by enlisting a spectrum of county and state agencies to provide (1) immediate 

identification of substance abuse problems at the time of arrest (or apprehension), (2) assessment 

to establish the degree of the substance abuse problems and the presence of other psychological 

or criminogenic risk factors, (3) the integrated delivery of services, and (4) the systemic use of 

sanctions, incentives, and rewards to encourage compliance with treatment and desistance from

criminal involvement. The program was designed to take advantage of what had been learned 

from research on the development and evaluation of multifaceted interventions to address the 

complex configuration of problems that many drug-involved juvenile offenders have. In 

particular, JBTC built upon what had been learned about the implementation and effects of 

programs that attempt to integrate substance abuse treatment with other programmatic 

interventions (mental health, family, etc.) and monitoring activities (urine analysis, court 

monitoring, etc.). 

A summary logic model for the JBTC program is shown in Exhibit E-1. As can be seen, 

JBTC is designed to effect system change, leading to better coordination, the integration of 

services, and enhanced service delivery. The JBTC program outcomes are the implementation of 

activities across multiple domains. These domains include intake and processing, assessment 

and case management, urinalysis (UA) testing, court monitoring and DYS supervision, and 

treatment and services. Services and treatment domains include substance abuse treatment, 

1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
mental health services, education services, and family and social services. Sanctions, incentives, 

and rewards (SIRs) are used to punish negative behaviors and encourage positive behaviors. 

These activities are intended to produce improved individual outcomes, including increased 

participation in treatment, reduced delinquency and substance use and improved mental health, 

school performance, and family relationships. Successful attainment of these individual 

outcomes among large numbers of delinquent youth, in turn, could lead to improvements that 

would be measurable at the community level, including less drug use and delinquency, reduced 

social costs, and a safer more stable community. 

Juvenile

Breaking

the Cycle

Program

System

Outcomes

Improve

Coordination

Integrate

Services

Enhance

Service

Delivery

Community Outcomes

Reduced juvenile crime/arrest rates

Reduced juvenile drug and alcohol use

Reduced truancy & school dropout rates

JBTC Outcomes

-Intake

-Processing

-UA Testing

-Assessment

-Case management

-Court monitoring

-Supervision

-Treatment

-Services

-Sanctions

-Incentives

-Rewards

Individual

Outcomes

-Increased

treatment

-Less AOD use

-Reduced

delinquency

-Improved

mental health

-Improved

school

performance

-Reduced

family

problems

Exhibit E-1. Juvenile Breaking the Cycle Program Summary Model. 

2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Consistent with the BTC program model, youth are identified as substance involved 

(alcohol and/or other drug or AOD) shortly following an encounter with police that led either to 

an arrest or a citation. Following the police encounter, a youth is either turned over to DYS or 

cited and released. Those sent to DYS are processed by intake personnel, who administer a risk 

assessment. If the assessment identifies the youth as having AOD problems and as high risk, the 

youth is assigned to JBTC. Only those with AOD problems and who have been determined to be 

high risk assessments are candidates for JBTC. 

The Lane County JBTC program was coordinated by the JBTC Policy Board, a Steering 

Committee composed of representatives from the Juvenile Court, the DYS, and members of 

various community sectors, including law enforcement, non-profit organizations, schools, state 

and local government, social/human services, substance abuse treatment providers, and mental 

health services providers. The Policy Board provided oversight and direction for the program

implementation. Key components of the Lane County JBTC are:

• Implementation of a management information system (MIS) to provide easy access to 

data by all participating agencies. 

• Drug testing and risk assessment of all juvenile offenders upon entry into the juvenile 

justice system. 

• Placement of the offenders into appropriate treatment and provision of services. 

• Monitoring of and compliance with treatment conditions imposed by the court. 

• Imposition of a range of sanctions, incentives, and rewards (SIRs) to increase and 

reinforce compliance. 

A simple model of the JBTC system is shown in Exhibit E-2. The linkages between the 

Juvenile Court, DYS and the community of services providers indicate both the organizational 

relationships and the flow of data through the MIS to describe assessments, needs, treatment 

progress, compliance with requirements, and SIRs. 

3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
JBTC Policy Board

Juvenile Court

DYS

Treatment &

Service

Providers

AOD Treatment

Mental Health

Treatment

Other Services

Assessment

Service

Coordination UA Testing

Supervision

Sanctions,

Incentives,

Rewards

Sanctions,

Incentives,

Rewards

Oversight

Exhibit E-2. Lane County JBTC Program. 

Lane County was successful in implementing many of the key components of the JBTC 

program, although some work remains to be done. DYS staff members and representatives of 

the services community indicated during interviews and focus groups that JBTC had improved 

communication and coordination between agencies working with high risk youth. JBTC was 

also viewed as having increased the availability of appropriate services—particularly AOD 

treatment—to which youth could be referred and to have resulted in better services for girls. 

Staff felt that improvements were still needed in the types of family and mental health services to 

which youth could be referred and that more services were needed for the rural areas of the 

county. 

The increased use of urinalysis to detect illicit drugs and to hold youth accountable for 

their substance use was also viewed as a significant benefit of the JBTC program. Adjustments 

4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
were made to the administration of testing during JBTC implementation to improve its 

usefulness. These changes included changing from a structured testing schedule to a randomtesting schedule and increasing testing from five to seven days a week. These changes were 

implemented towards the end of or after data collection for the evaluation had been completed 

and therefore likely did not impact our findings. Sanctions, incentives, and rewards also were 

viewed favorably, with respondents feeling that they were effective—although some expressed 

the need for greater standardization and noted that occasionally parents were concerned by the 

rewards and incentives, viewing them as rewarding criminal behavior. 

The JBTC MIS system was an integral component of the Breaking the Cycle program. Its 

importance has implications both for the JBTC program and the replication of similar projects in 

other juvenile justice systems. The MIS functioned as the central communication portal that 

connected DYS service coordinators, probation counselors, and other juvenile justice staff

internal to Lane County DYS with service providers (e.g., substance abuses treatment facilities) 

outside the agency. The MIS allowed for more efficient coordination of services to JBTC youth 

and increased accountability of those agencies providing specific treatment services. More 

efficient coordination was achieved through DYS staff’s ability to review each others’ staff 

notes, and case notes entered into the MIS by court supervisors (e.g., juvenile court judge) and 

other DYS staff. Accountability was achieved through the review of detailed and concise 

treatment notes that were entered by service providers via the MIS. Treatment provider 

information also allowed for the appropriate remuneration for services rendered that were linked 

to the provision of treatment notes and service delivery dates provided in the MIS. 

The successful implementation of any program similar to JBTC is likely to be dependent 

on the availability of a well-designed MIS that supports program operations and management. 

JBTC benefited from the development, implementation, and refinement of an MIS that was 

developed prior to the implementation of JBTC with funds secured from a similar, although less 

comprehensive, 5-year project. This aspect of MIS design and development suggests that any 

replication of a similar project must allot sufficient time to develop a system prior to 

programmatic implementation of services to juvenile offenders. An alternative approach would 

require the acquisition and modification of an existing system to minimize delays in 

programmatic implementation. 

5 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The RAP Court program, which operated as a juvenile drug court in concert with the JBTC 

program, was also seen as highly effective in managing the behavior of high risk youth. A 

deficiency of the RAP Court program is capacity, as the court can serve only 25 youth. There is 

also a need to carefully select the judicial administrator(s) of such a component to ensure their 

judicial demeanor is appropriate for this type of program. 

Impact of Lane County JBTC Program 

A quasi-experimental design with a non-equivalent comparison group was used to evaluate 

the impact of the JBTC program. Although Lane County originally expected to have sufficient 

numbers of eligible JBTC participants to allow random assignment to the JBTC program, a 

decline in the number of referrals to DYS that occurred concurrently with program

implementation eliminated the option of a true experimental design for the JBTC outcome

evaluation. During the initial planning phase of the evaluation, a variety of alternative designs 

were considered. Ultimately, the decision was made to recruit subjects from the population of all 

youth who received a risk assessment at DYS. 

We fully expected that this decision would result in significant differences between our 

treatment group (the JBTC participants) and comparison group (non-JBTC participants). Unlike 

many studies where selection bias looms as a potential threat to findings because treatment 

subjects are ‘better’ on important measures than comparison subjects, if DYS adhered to their 

plan to take only the highest risk youth into JBTC, we expected that JBTC participants on 

average would be more serious on a variety of measures than those who were not referred to the 

program. To accommodate the expected selection bias, we identified a statistical approach that 

used our repeated measures of outcomes to control for both the expected selection bias and 

maturation bias. 

The impact of JBTC was assessed by evaluating the outcomes of a sample of 306 youth 

who were risk assessed by DYS between April 2000 and November 2001. Of the 306 youth 

recruited into the evaluation, 149, or 49%, were enrolled in JBTC and 157 were not enrolled in 

the JBTC program. The JBTC participants differed from the non-JBTC participants on many of 

the measures that historically have been associated with higher rates of recidivism and substance 

abuse. The JBTC subjects were assessed as higher risk than the non-JBTC participants and had 

more extensive and more serious criminal histories. JBTC participants were more likely to 

6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
report AOD use and to have begun use at a younger age. These subjects were also more likely to 

have been in treatment or a shelter prior to assessment and to have family members with criminal 

records and serious alcohol or drug problems. Finally, the JBTC youth were more likely to report 

being diagnosed with a mental health problem. These findings suggest that DYS implemented 

intake into JBTC as planned. In particular, the differences between the JBTC participants and 

those who were not included in JBTC are consistent with DYS’s plan to target the program to 

those youth deemed highest risk. 

The statistical approach used for the outcome evaluation corrected for the selection bias 

that resulted from our quasi-experimental design and for maturation bias that occurs if the 

phenomenon of interest is likely to change over time without intervention. Results of these 

models suggest that JBTC resulted in the following outcomes for participants when compared 

with those who did not participate. 

• Increased access to substance abuse treatment 

• Reduced use of marijuana 

• Reduced likelihood of arrest during the second of two 6-month follow-up periods 

• Reduced average number of arrests during the second of two 6-month follow-up 

periods 

Additionally, descriptive data from the 6- and 12-month follow-up interviews suggest that JBTC 

may have improved school outcomes and family relationships for participants. Participation in 

JBTC did not appear to effect alcohol use or the use of illicit drugs other than marijuana. 

For our cost-effectiveness analysis, we estimated the cost per youth from the taxpayer 

perspective, and calculated the incremental impact of JBTC on costs while controlling for a 

variety of factors. The results show that on average at the 6-month follow-up, a youth in JBTC 

required $1535 more tax-payer resources during the previous 6 months than a youth who was not 

in JBTC. At the 12-month follow-up, on average, a youth in JBTC incurred $457 in additional 

costs during the previous 6 months than a youth who was not in JBTC. 

The greatest cost drivers were treatment and detention. As youth were referred to the 

treatment system, case management costs also increased. Over the two follow-up periods, the 

incremental cost associated with treatment and detention fell markedly, which in turn reduced the 

incremental total cost for the later period. 

By combining the incremental cost estimates with the results of effectiveness analyses, we 

estimated the additional funds necessary to avert youth from marijuana use and arrest. The cost7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
effectiveness ratio estimates indicated that at the 6-month follow-up, if the only impact of JBTC 

had been the reduced use of marijuana, the cost of diverting a youth from using marijuana was 

$4,739. Reflecting an overall decrease in incremental costs from the first to the second followup, this cost at 12 months fell to $1,590. The cost at 12 months of diverting a youth from being 

arrested was $3,751, again under the assumption that only arrests were affected (and, e.g., not 

marijuana use). 

8 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
1 Introduction 

In 1997, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) began a demonstration project to test the 

effectiveness of early intervention in the ‘criminal careers’ of drug-involved offenders. The 

Breaking the Cycle (BTC) program was marked by identification of drug use at the time of 

arrest, followed by drug testing and treatment to eliminate drug use and, hopefully, drug-related 

criminal offending. The first three programs targeted adult arrestees and were located in 

Birmingham, AL, Jacksonville, FL, and Tacoma, WA. The results of an evaluation of these 

three programs were recently published by the Urban Institute (Harrell et al., 2003) and were 

somewhat mixed, but showed reduced drug use in two sites, lower self-reported criminal activity 

in all three sites, lower arrest rates in two sites, and reduced family problems in all sites. These 

findings were observed in spite of implementation problems in all sites. Perhaps most 

significantly, Harrell and her colleagues reported that “BTC had an important and lasting effect 

on the demonstration sites. BTC innovations generated considerable local political support and 

are continuing with substantial local funding in all three sites.” (Harrell et al., 2003, p 2). 

Subsequently, NIJ funded a demonstration of a BTC program directed at juvenile 

offenders. The Juvenile BTC (JBTC) program proposed by Lane County, OR, was funded by 

NIJ beginning in 1998. The Lane County JBTC is an ambitious effort to effect major changes in 

the lives of juvenile arrestees by enlisting a spectrum of county and state agencies to provide (1) 

immediate identification of substance abuse problems at the time of arrest (or apprehension), (2) 

assessment to establish the degree of the substance abuse problems and the presence of other 

psychological or criminogenic risk factors, (3) the integrated delivery of services, and (4) the 

systemic use of sanctions, incentives, and rewards to encourage compliance with treatment and 

desistance from criminal involvement. The impact of the delivery of JBTC is expected to result 

in changes to the juveniles participating in the program, to the agencies developing, 

implementing, and delivering JBTC, and to the community within which these changes occur. 

RTI International, along with its subcontractor NPC Research, Inc., was funded by NIJ in 

1999 to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the JBTC program. The evaluation included 

process, outcome, and cost-effectiveness components. The process evaluation was designed to 

examine JBTC program implementation, specifically assessing the degree to which program

elements were implemented and identifying the impediments to implementation. The outcome

evaluation was designed to identify the effects of JBTC on interim and longer term outcomes 

9 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
such as adherence to program requirements, results of urine testing, school performance, and 

rearrest for new offenses. Finally, the cost-effectiveness study was designed to assess the value 

of outcomes achieved by JBTC considered in the context of program costs. This report provides 

the results of the JBTC evaluation. 

In the remainder of this section, we provide background on the rationale for JBTC, a 

description of the Lane County JBTC program as conceptualized, and an overview of the 

evaluation design. In subsequent sections, we provide the results of the process evaluation 

(Section 2), the outcome evaluation (Section 3), and the cost-effectiveness evaluation (Section 

4). Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Section 5. 

1.1 Background: The Rationale for JBTC 

There is extensive evidence that juvenile offenders are often involved with alcohol and/or 

drugs, and that substance use is one of the etiological factors contributing to delinquent behavior. 

At the time JBTC was under consideration by NIJ, the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring 

(ADAM) program conducted urine testing of juveniles recently arrested in 12 cities. For the year 

1997, 42% to 66% of the juveniles arrested in these cities were found to have drugs in their urine 

(National Institute of Justice, 1998). Most of the detected drug use was for marijuana, but 4% to 

15% of the youth in the 12 cities were positive for cocaine use, and from 4% to 21% were found 

to have two or more drugs in their urine at the time of arrest. Moreover, juveniles were involved 

in 14% of all drug arrests in 1996, and juvenile drug arrests increased by 120% between 1992 

and 1996 (Snyder, 1997). 

Juvenile offenders who come to the attention of the juvenile justice system tend to 

disproportionately abuse alcohol and other drugs (Howell, Krisberg, Hawkins, & Wilson, 1995; 

Snyder & Sickmund, 1996; NIJ, 1999). Further, they often have multiple problems in addition to 

their illegal behavior, such as educational difficulties, family problems, and mental health 

disorders (Brown, Gleghorn, Schuckit, Myers & Mott, 1996; Donovan & Jessor, 1985; Elliott. 

Huizinga, & Menard, 1989; Huizinga, Loeber, & Thornberry, 1993, 1997; McKay & Buka, 

1994). For these reasons, the JBTC program with its substance abuse focus and its inclusion of 

several other legal and social service interventions was developed to provide a comprehensive 

yet focused approach for dealing with juvenile offenders. 

Many characteristics of the JBTC model are featured in effective treatment and 

rehabilitation programs that were developed for juvenile offenders who are likely to have 

10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
multiple psychological and behavioral problems. One example is the Multisystemic Therapy 

(MST) intervention that was implemented and evaluated in Missouri and South Carolina, also 

known as the Missouri Delinquency Project and the Family and Neighborhood Services Project, 

respectively (Henggeler et al., 1991; Henggeler, Melton, & Smith, 1992). The MST intervention 

was developed as an alternative to incarceration, hospitalization, or residential treatment for 

serious juvenile offenders and featured case management through intensive individual and family 

counseling by clinical psychologists. MST was implemented in South Carolina through a 

cooperative effort between the Juvenile Court, the Department of Mental Health, and the 

Department of Youth Services. The MST evaluations indicated lower rates of rearrest and 

substance abuse for intervention participants than for youth who were assigned to a control 

group, who refused to participate, or who dropped out of the MST intervention. A subsequent 

cost-effectiveness study revealed that MST was somewhat more expensive than incarceration, 

hospitalization, or residential treatment, but that the additional costs would be offset by lower 

rates of recidivism (Schoenwald et al., 1996). 

Another example is a two-month residential and aftercare intervention that was 

implemented and evaluated in Maryland (Sealock, Gottfredson, & Gallagher, 1997). The 

residential treatment program featured case management through individual counseling and 

cognitive/behavioral skills training, while the aftercare component included family therapy and 

support groups. Evaluation results indicated that youth who participated in the residential 

treatment program were significantly less likely to report drug use and delinquency. Further, 

program participants demonstrated a longer period of time from entry into the study until rearrest

than comparison youth. However, the aftercare component of the intervention did not appear to 

have any beneficial effects on participants. 

Results for the MST and the Maryland residential treatment studies provide support for the 

JBTC model as they both found positive effects of individualized case management approaches 

with additional services for the families of drug-involved juvenile offenders. However, these 

studies did not focus on the effectiveness of several important features of the JBTC model: 

regular drug testing, graduated sanctions and incentives, and court supervision of offenders’ 

progress towards rehabilitation. In general, few studies carefully examine the effectiveness of 

these key components of the JBTC model (McBride, VanderWaal, VanBuren, & Terry, 1997). 

11 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
A survey of juvenile detention centers revealed that the majority (73%) of survey 

participants were not using drug testing (e.g., urinalysis) to identify youth with substance abuse 

problems and to assess their treatment needs and progress towards rehabilitation (Crowe, 1998). 

The limited use of drug testing prompted the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention (OJJDP) to develop training and technical assistance curricula for juvenile courts and 

other agencies that provide substance abuse treatment services for juvenile offenders (Crowe, 

1998). The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) also promoted drug testing through the Juvenile 

Drug Court Grant Program, administered through the Drug Courts Program Office (Roberts, 

Brophy, & Cooper, 1997). Through this grant program and with training and technical 

assistance, many Juvenile Courts and treatment agencies began using drug testing for 

identification of drug-involved juvenile offenders and for planning their treatment and 

rehabilitation. 

Some small-scale studies have been conducted and provide limited support for the 

effectiveness of drug testing in the treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. For 

example, Miller, Scocas, and O’Connell (1998) evaluated a Juvenile Drug Court Diversion 

Program in Delaware that featured case management through individual, group and family 

counseling and random urinalysis for youth with misdemeanor drug arrests and little criminal 

history. Juveniles in the drug court compliance group had significantly less frequent and severe 

criminal activity than youth in a comparison group both during the program and after 3, 6, 9, and 

12 months. The recidivism rate was also significantly lower for youth in the compliance group 

(23% vs. 43%). 

Like drug testing, research on the effectiveness of graduated sanctions and incentives has 

been limited. Although a number of promising approaches to the treatment and rehabilitation of 

juvenile offenders (e.g., MST) have been classified as “immediate” or “intermediate” sanctions 

programs (Krisberg et al., 1995), evaluative studies have failed to determine whether graduated 

sanctions and incentives, per se, are effective. What can be determined from studies with 

juvenile offenders is that graduated sanctions and incentives are difficult to implement 

consistently because of the heavy caseloads of juvenile court counselors and other caseworkers 

and treatment providers (Krisberg et al., 1995). Even with consistent implementation, graduated 

sanctions may fail if treatment services are not faithfully implemented and do not meet the 

specific needs of drug-involved juvenile offenders. However, a recent study on the effectiveness 

12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
of both graduated sanctions and drug testing in the Washington, D.C. Adult Drug Court program

(Harrell, 1998) found that the rearrest rates among sanctions program participants were 

substantially lower than rearrest rates among defendants in a control group after 100 days (2% 

vs. 6%), 200 days (3% vs. 11%), and one year (11% vs. 17%). Interestingly, there was a high 

rate of attrition (60%) from the substance abuse treatment program, suggesting that the graduated 

sanctions and drug testing program alone had a significant effect on subsequent arrests. 

1.2 The JBTC Model in Lane County 

JBTC was implemented in 1998 by the Lane County Department of Youth Services 

(DYS). DYS was responsible for identifying potential JBTC participants, providing case 

management, conducting urinalysis tests, and coordinating services. The program was designed 

to take advantage of what had been learned from research on the development and evaluation of 

multifaceted interventions to address the complex configuration of problems that many drug 

involved juvenile offenders have. The JBTC model was expected to be an improvement upon 

existing treatment and rehabilitation interventions for drug-involved juvenile offenders because 

juvenile offenders tend to have co-occurring psychological and behavioral problems that require 

multi-faceted approaches (Elliott, Huizinga, & Menard, 1989; McKay & Buka, 1994; McBride, 

VanderWaal, VanBuren, & Terry, 1997). In particular, JBTC built upon what had been learned 

about the implementation and effects of programs that attempt to integrate substance abuse 

treatment with other programmatic interventions (mental health, family, etc.) and monitoring 

activities (urine analysis, court monitoring, etc.). 

A summary logic model for the JBTC program is shown in Exhibit 1-1. As can be seen, 

JBTC is designed to effect system change, leading to better coordination, the integration of 

services, and enhanced service delivery. The JBTC program outcomes are the implementation of 

activities across multiple domains. These domains include intake and processing, assessment 

and case management, urinalysis (UA) testing, court monitoring and DYS supervision, and 

treatment and services. Services and treatment domains include substance abuse treatment, 

mental health services, education services, and family and social services. Sanctions, incentives, 

and rewards (SIRs) are used to punish negative behaviors and encourage positive behaviors. 

These activities are intended to produce improved individual outcomes, including increased 

participation in treatment, reduced delinquency and substance use and improved mental health, 

school performance, and family relationships. Successful attainment of these individual 

13 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
outcomes among large numbers of delinquent youth, in turn, could lead to improvements that 

would be measurable at the community level. If JBTC is effective at the individual level and if

the program could be provided broadly to all at-risk youth in Lane County, ultimately the JBTC 

could bring about community-wide improvement as a result of individuals and systems being 

changed, through less drug use and delinquency, reduced social costs, and a safer more stable 

community. 

Juvenile

Breaking

the Cycle

Program

System

Outcomes

Improve

Coordination

Integrate

Services

Enhance

Service

Delivery

Community Outcomes

Reduced juvenile crime/arrest rates

Reduced juvenile drug and alcohol use

Reduced truancy & school dropout rates

JBTC Outcomes

-Intake

-Processing

-UA Testing

-Assessment

-Case management

-Court monitoring

-Supervision

-Treatment

-Services

-Sanctions

-Incentives

-Rewards

Individual

Outcomes

-Increased

treatment

-Less AOD use

-Reduced

delinquency

-Improved

mental health

-Improved

school

performance

-Reduced

family

problems

Exhibit 1-1. Juvenile Breaking the Cycle Program Summary Model.

Consistent with the BTC program model, youth were to be identified as substance involved 

(alcohol and/or other drug or AOD) shortly following an encounter with police that led either to 

14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
an arrest or a citation. Exhibit 1-2 shows the case flow that was established by DYS to identify 

potential JBTC participants. 

Youth-Police Encounter

DYS

Cite & Release

Intake & Assessment

Police Report To DYS

YES

AOD Use?

High Risk?

non-JBTC

NO

Diversion or Other

Action

NO

JBTC

YES

Serious &

Chronic

Offender?

Exhibit 1-2. Identification of JBTC participants. 

As shown in Exhibit 1-2, following a police encounter, a youth is either turned over to 

DYS or cited and released. Those sent to DYS are processed by intake personnel, who 

administer a risk assessment. If the assessment identifies the youth as having AOD problems 

and as high risk, the youth is assigned to JBTC. Only those with AOD problems and who have 

been determined to be high risk assessments are candidates for JBTC. The requirement that 

15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth be ‘high risk’ was a deviation from the adult BTC model that sought to provide BTC to all 

AOD-involved arrestees if they were released pre-trial. In the Lane County JBTC program, 

those with only AOD problems or those assessed only as high risk are not considered for JBTC, 

although they may still receive other programs or services. For those cited and released, a police 

report is sent to DYS. If the subsequent DYS review determines the youth is a ‘serious and 

chronic’ offender, he/she is sent for intake and assessment. If these youth are identified with 

AOD problems and assessed as high risk, they are also candidates for JBTC; those who do not 

meet these criteria are not considered for JBTC. 

Exhibit 1-3 shows the comprehensive JBTC intervention that is intended to identify and 

provide services from local juvenile justice, social service, and educational systems to impact 

individual outcomes for high-risk, substance-using youth. Collaboration and coordination are 

integral to assuring that a comprehensive response to needs is provided. Specific components of 

the model include justice system oversight (court monitoring, urinalysis testing, and imposition 

of sanctions, incentives, and rewards), substance abuse treatment, mental health services, 

educational services, and family/social services. The fully implemented JBTC program includes: 

• drug use monitoring with urine testing and continuing assessment of an individual’s drug 

use; 

• judicial monitoring of testing and the use of sanctions, incentives, and rewards; and 

• coordinated substance abuse treatment, mental health, and social services with case 

management, and integration of services across multiple agencies. 

 

Integral to the JBTC model is a management information system (MIS) through which 

information is collected and exchanged across multiple systems to monitor progress and assess 

effectiveness. These activities are expected to improve individual outcomes including 

delinquent/criminal behavior, substance use, mental health, educational attainment, and 

interpersonal relationships. 

16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
AODinvolved,

high-risk

youth

Intake &

Processing

UA testing

Assessment

Case management

Justice Interventions

Court monitoring

UA testing

Incentives

Sanctions

Substance abuse

treatment

Mental health

services

Education services

Alternative schools

Mentoring

Family & social

services

Reduce delinquency

Reduce alcohol &

drug use

Improve mental

health & positive

behaviors

Improve school

attendance &

performance

Reduce conflict,

abuse & neglect

JBTC Activities Individual Outcomes

Exhibit 1-3. Juvenile Breaking the Cycle Program Services and Outcomes. 

In competing for the JBTC Program, Lane County proposed to build upon its existing 

Youth Intervention Network (YIN) program. The Lane County YIN program was funded by the 

Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) to foster collaboration and cooperation between 

government and community-based agencies, including the Department of Youth Services (DYS) 

and Juvenile Court, Police Department, treatment service providers, and public schools in Lane 

County. The JBTC model both extended and expanded the services for drug-involved juvenile 

offenders that had been provided through the YIN. Key improvements to the YIN program

provided by JBTC included regular drug testing, systematic implementation of graduated 

sanctions, incentives, and rewards, and regular court supervision of offenders’ progress. 

JBTC treatment and services include AOD treatment, mental health services (if indicated), 

educational services, and family/social services. Sanctions, incentives, and rewards are provided 

by all components of the program. Active court oversight was reserved for only a relatively small 

subset of the JBTC cases. In addition to the impact on individual outcomes, another goal of 

17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
JBTC is to improve the coordination among the agencies providing services to the youth. The 

implementation of the Lane County JBTC program is discussed in Section 2. 

1.3 Evaluation Overview 

Exhibits 1-1 through 1-3 provide the framework for the evaluation of the Lane County 

JBTC. Our process, outcome, and economic analyses were designed to assess the extent to which 

JBTC was successful in facilitating change in the delivery of services—including better 

integration and coordination—and in positively affecting individual outcomes, including 

substance use and delinquency. The research hypotheses for the evaluation are discussed in 

section 1.3.1. Section 1.3.2 describes the evaluation methods. 

1.3.1 Research Hypotheses 

The research hypotheses underlying the JBTC evaluation encompass the delivery of 

services (process evaluation), individual-level outcomes (outcome evaluation), and cost 

effectiveness (economic evaluation). Case management and court monitoring, following initial 

assessment, provide the core of the JBTC approach—coordinating the responses of the criminal 

justice system, substance abuse providers, mental health services, the educational system and 

family and social services to assure that there is continuity and a comprehensive approach to 

meeting substance abuse and other needs of drug-involved juvenile delinquents. The 

relationships among the agencies providing these services are to be coordinated and integrated—

formally through the development of agreements including memoranda of understanding and 

operationally through case management and the sharing of data and other client-level 

information. The systems-level hypothesis, which was tested by the process evaluation, is the 

following: 

• JBTC will improve coordination between the relevant agencies and providers, 

resulting in higher levels of integrated services and enhanced service delivery. 

Additional program-level hypotheses were also tested that relate to JBTC implementation 

of specific program components and intermediate outcomes, including: 

• Urine testing/surveillance will increase. 

• Sanctions, incentives, and rewards will be developed and implemented. 

• Substance abuse treatment participation, retention, and completion rates will 

increase. 

• Use of appropriate mental health services will increase. 

18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
• Use of educational services, including alternative schools and mentoring, will 

increase. 

• Use of family and social services, including, for example, family preservation 

services and programs such as the Center for Family Development’s Youth in 

Recovery program, will increase. 

Exhibit 1-3 indicates the core hypotheses to be tested with respect to individual outcomes. 

Specifically, JBTC and the component services are expected to produce the following results for 

participants in the program: 

• Reduced delinquency. 

• Reduced alcohol and drug use. 

• Improved mental health and positive behavior. 

• Improved school attendance and performance. 

• Improved family relations, including reduction in abuse and neglect where 

indicated. 

To the extent that JBTC is effective in improving outcomes for participants, it is important 

to determine whether JBTC is also cost effective. The economic analysis addressed the following 

hypothesis: 

• JBTC will generate cost savings for Lane County. 

 

1.3.2 Methods 

Process evaluation data were collected through key stakeholder interviews, focus groups, 

and surveys of key stakeholders. The outcome evaluation was based largely on data collected 

through interviews conducted by NPC Research staff with JBTC participants and other youth 

under DYS supervision. The interview data were augmented with DYS administrative records 

and treatment records (primarily counseling sessions) obtained from the Oregon Client Process 

Monitoring System (CPMS). The cost-effectiveness analyses used outcome data supplemented 

with detailed cost data gathered by RTI economists. Details of these data collection activities are 

provided in this section. 

1.3.2.1 Process Evaluation Approach 

The process evaluation focused on the first 18 months of the project. This component of 

the evaluation allowed for the identification of initial and subsequent systems outcomes through 

three separate but interrelated process evaluative phases: 

19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
1. a formative phase that incorporated the systematic use of empirical procedures as a 

way of providing ongoing information to influence decision-making, resource 

allocation, and program operations (McClintock, 1987); 

2. a process phase in which data were collected to assess and document the fidelity of 

program implementation; and 

3. a program description phase in which descriptive and qualitative data were 

collected to augment the interpretation of outcome evaluation findings. 

To guide the collection and use of process information, the FORECAST (FORmative 

Evaluation, Consultation, and Systems Techniques) system was employed. Developed at the 

University of South Carolina, the FORECAST system requires the development and subsequent 

repeated testing of a program’s logic model (Goodman & Wandersman, 1994). All data (e.g., 

the observation of meetings, interviews, focus groups, surveys, and document reviews) were 

evaluated as a part of the evolving logic model of the JBTC program components as well as their 

translation into specific program activities. Within the FORECAST system, conceptual models 

of the problem and of program action were developed through reviews and revisions by the 

JBTC program staff and the evaluation team. 

A number of data sources were queried for the process evaluation. The data collection 

activities for the process evaluation are shown in Exhibit 1-4. 

Exhibit 1-4. JBTC Process Evaluation Data Collection Strategies 

Data Collection Timing Source Administration Objective 

1. Logic Model Spring 2000 JBTC

supervisory

staff 

Face-to-face 

Interview 

Develop a JBTC logic 

model 

2. Barriers to 

Collaboration 

Survey

Spring 2000 JBTC Policy

Board 

Telephone Survey Assess early impressions 

regarding the collaborative 

effort. 

3. Drug Court 

(RAP Court) 

Observation 

Quarterly

beginning

the Spring of 

2000 

Drug Court 

and MIS 

database 

Record 

Abstraction from

MIS 

Document the drug court 

processes 

4. Key

Informant 

Interview 

Fall 2000, 

Fall 2001 

DYS staff, 

Treatment 

providers 

Face-to-face 

Interview 

Assess implementation of 

the JBTC program model 

5. Collaboration 

Survey 

Fall 2000,

Fall 2001 

JBTC Policy

Board 

Mail Survey Assess the extent to which 

the JBTC partners have 

collaborated 

20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Data Collection Timing Source Administration Objective 

6. Integration 

Survey 

Fall 2001 Treatment 

Providers 

Mail survey Assess implementation and 

coordination of JBTC 

services 

7. Collaboration 

Interview 

Spring 2001 JBTC 

Executive 

Committee 

Face-to-face 

Interview 

Assess the extent to which 

the JBTC partners have 

collaborated 

8. Focus Groups Spring 2001 Drug Court 

Team (DC), 

JBTC youth 

Focus Groups Assess Drug Court Team’s

and JBTC participants’ 

perceptions 

As can be seen in the exhibit, the process evaluation incorporated both quantitative and 

qualitative techniques to collect data from the following sources: 

• JBTC program participants and staff members via focus groups; 

• policy board members via survey questionnaires; 

• mental health and substance abuse treatment agencies via service integration 

survey questionnaires; and 

• key informants such as service providers via face-to-face interviews.

The process evaluation findings are presented in Section 2 of this report. 

1.3.2.2 Outcome Evaluation Approach 

A quasi-experimental design with a non-equivalent comparison group was used to evaluate 

the impact of the JBTC program. Although Lane County originally expected to have sufficient 

numbers of eligible JBTC participants to allow random assignment to the JBTC program, a 

decline in the number of referrals to DYS that occurred concurrently with program

implementation eliminated the option of a true experimental design for the JBTC outcome

evaluation. During the initial planning phase of the evaluation, a variety of alternative designs 

were considered. Ultimately, the decision was made to recruit subjects from the population of all 

youth who received a risk assessment at DYS. 

We fully expected that this decision would result in significant differences between our 

treatment group (the JBTC participants) and comparison group (non-JBTC participants). Unlike 

many studies where selection bias looms as a potential threat to findings because treatment 

subjects are ‘better’ on important measures than comparison subjects, if DYS adhered to their 

plan to take only the highest risk youth into JBTC, we expected that JBTC participants on 

average would be more serious on a variety of measures than those who were not referred to the 

21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program. To accommodate the expected selection bias, we identified a statistical approach that 

used our repeated measures of outcomes to control for both the expected selection bias and 

maturation bias. (See Section 3 for details.) 

Recruitment for the evaluation began April 15, 2000.1

 This enrollment period initially was 

set at 12 months but was later extended to 19 months (through November 15, 2001) to increase 

the sample. Contact information for each potential subject was provided shortly after risk 

assessment to the interview data collection staff members who were located in an office at DYS.2

 

Parental consent was obtained prior to interviews and the youth were also asked to assent to the 

interview. We conducted three waves of interviews with and collected administrative data on a 

baseline sample of 306 recruited youth. The first interview occurred within about one month of 

the youth receiving a risk assessment at DYS. The second interview was conducted 

approximately six months after the baseline interview, and the third interview was conducted 

approximately six months after the six-month follow-up interview, or 12 months after the 

baseline interview. Interviews were conducted in person by trained NPC researchers. The 

baseline interview took about 30 minutes and the follow-up interviews took between 1 hour and 

1.5 hours to complete. Respondents were given gift certificates for local shopping malls as 

compensation for their participation ($15 card for completion of the baseline interview, $20 for 

completion of the 6-month interview, and $25 for completion of the 12-month interview). 

Of the 925 youth who were administered risk assessments by DYS during the evaluation 

study recruitment period, we received contact information on 587 youth (62%) from DYS in a 

timely manner (i.e., immediately after risk assessment).3

 We actively recruited these 587 youth 

and were able to successfully recruit and interview 306 or 52%. The inability to locate a parent in 

order to obtain parental consent and to find the youth accounted for the majority of non-

 

1

 The final design for this evaluation was the only feasible design available at the start of the evaluation. Reduced

numbers of referrals to DYS limited the target population of potential eligible JBTC participants and eliminated the 

possibility of a true experimental design. As the program was getting underway at the time the evaluation grant 

award was made, a pre-program comparison group could not be identified and interviewed. 2

 During the early stages of the evaluation, this notification was less routine than had been designed, resulting in

some subjects being ‘missed’ for inclusion in the evaluation. Discussions with DYS eventually resolved this issue. 3

 The procedures established to obtain referrals and information on risk-assessed youth soon after intake and risk

assessment were inadequate, particularly during the early part of the evaluation. Multiple DYS staff members had to

provide the information and coordination between these staff and the field interview staff was difficult to establish in

a manner that assured that cases weren’t lost to the evaluation. These communication issues were resolved as the 

evaluation progressed. 

22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
participants. Of the 281 youth we were not able to recruit, 55% could not be located and 45% 

refused to participate or had parents who refused to provide consent. . 

We conducted a response bias analysis to assess the extent of any differences between 

those we were able to recruit and those we were unable to recruit. For this analysis, we 

compared those youth who were recruited into the study to all other youth who were risk 

assessed during our recruitment period, regardless of whether DYS provided their information to 

us or whether they had an actual opportunity to participate in the evaluation study. This 

comparison was appropriate since our target population was youth who were risk assessed by 

DYS. 

During the baseline recruitment period, approximately 925 youth were administered risk 

assessments by DYS. Of these, 306 (33%) were approached and agreed to participate in the 

JBTC program evaluation study. We interviewed 50% (146 of 290) of the youth who were in 

JBTC and 25% (160 of 635) of those who were not. We obtained administrative data from DYS 

on these 925 subjects and conducted a response-bias analysis to compare the characteristics of 

those who participated in the study with those of those who did not. Overall, those who were 

recruited into the study differed significantly from those who were not. In particular, study 

participants as a group were younger and had higher risk assessment scores than those who did 

not participate.4

 These differences are not surprising if the JBTC participants were the highest 

risk youth since our sample included a disproportionately large number of JBTC participants. 

Also, those who participated in the study were more likely to be female than those who did not. 

The gender differences are somewhat surprising—but less so given reports from interviewers 

that girls were more compliant in terms of willingness to participate and showing up for 

interviews. 

We subsequently stratified the population by JBTC status to examine for differences 

between study participants and non-participants. The purpose of these analyses was to determine 

how typical the participating JBTC youth were compared with the non-participating JBTC youth, 

as well as how typical the participating non-JBTC youth were compared with the nonparticipating non-JBTC youth. The results of these analyses inform our ability to draw inferences 

 

4 Discussions with staff and with the field interviewers suggest that the outcome of our recruitment was expected. 

Specifically, the lowest risk youth have the least exposure to DYS and are more likely to have parents who view the

DYS experience as an aberration and who prefer to remove the youth from any reminder of the event that led them

to DYS, increasing their reluctance to allow the youth to participate in interviews. 

23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
from the outcome evaluation. Specifically, if we found few or no differences between 

participants and non-participants in each group, we could confidently conclude that observed 

differences in outcomes could be properly allocated to all JBTC participants when compared 

with all other DYS-assessed youth. 

These stratified analyses suggest that the participating JBTC subjects were similar to the 

non-participating JBTC subjects in terms of age and risk assessments; the gender difference 

remained, with girls disproportionately represented in the study. For the non-JBTC youth, the 

analyses suggest that study participants were younger and had higher risk scores (except for the 

substance abuse subscale); there was no difference in the gender representation between 

participants and non-participants in this group. 

We provide additional detail on these analyses in Appendix 1. Given that JBTC was 

targeting higher risk youth in Lane County, the fact that the study recruited the riskiest subjects 

among the non-JBTC youth suggests that the quasi-experimental comparison group may be more 

comparable to the JBTC group than it otherwise may have been. Nonetheless, the results of the 

recruitment process, reflected in our response-bias analyses, suggest that our comparisons using 

interview data should be interpreted as how well JBTC participants fared in comparison with the 

riskier DYS youth who did not participate in JBTC.

We collected administrative data and interview data from those who agreed to participate 

in the interviews. Administrative data, including demographic characteristics, and risk

assessment scores were obtained from DYS for all; additional data on criminal history were 

obtained for those from whom consent was obtained. In addition, administrative data describing 

treatment episodes were obtained from CPMS for those who participated in the interviews. The 

CPMS data include basic information on substance abuse and mental health counseling episodes 

funded by Oregon’s health system. 

We conducted 306 baseline interviews, 208 six-month follow-up interviews, and 183 

twelve-month follow-up interviews (subject retention rates of 68% and 60% at 6- and 12 months, 

respectively).

5

 An analysis of the factors associated with retention in the study showed that only 

 

5

 During the course of the data collection, we received information suggesting that one of the interviewers had been

falsifying interviews. NPC Research conducted a thorough investigation of these charges and used a variety of 

collateral information to verify the validity of individual interviews. As a result of this investigation, we removed 

interview data from the project dataset. In total, 64 interviews were removed (20 baseline interviews, 28 6-month

follow-up interviews, and 16 12-month follow-up interviews). A total of 42 youth had at least one interview 

removed, and of these, 25 youth were removed from the study and 17 youth were retained in the study. 

24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gender was significantly associated with retention. In particular, girls were more likely than 

boys to complete 6- and 12-month interviews. 

The reasons for attrition were diverse. Many of the youth involved in the evaluation were 

considered to be high-risk and lived somewhat unstable lives, which made locating them for 

follow-up interviews challenging. We often encountered disconnected telephone numbers or 

discovered that respondents had moved out of the area, despite our best efforts to keep track of 

such events. Two respondents died during the course of the evaluation and one sustained a brain 

injury that precluded him from continuing to participate. Some respondents went away to 

college and others ended up in the adult justice system, incarcerated in other parts of the state. 

For the outcome evaluation (Section 3), we estimated models using only administrative 

data in addition to models that relied upon the survey data. The models estimated from 

administrative data were not impacted by sample attrition. Section 3 presents additional 

information on the study participants and the results of the outcome evaluation. 

1.3.2.3 Cost-Effectiveness Study Approach 

Cost-effectiveness analysis involves collecting and analyzing cost data, collecting and 

analyzing effectiveness data, and then combining the results from the cost and effectiveness 

analyses. The chosen perspective of the analysis determined which agencies’ and organizations’ 

cost data we collected and analyzed. Identification of the perspective is important as this 

perspective determines the relevant cost domains and how they should be measured (Gold et al., 

1996; Hargreaves et al., 1998). 

The cost-effectiveness analysis was conducted from the perspective of the taxpayer. Thus, 

we included costs incurred by publicly funded agencies and organizations that are directly 

involved with the JBTC program and participants. We categorized these agencies and 

organizations into the following domains: police; assessment; detention; treatment; case 

management; supervision; and incentives, and rewards. We did not include costs directly 

incurred by youth in JBTC nor did we include any costs incurred by the youth’s families. All 

data captured employee benefits and, to the extent possible, administrative overhead. This 

overhead reflects support services, such as secretarial support, as well as maintenance and utility 

costs that would vary with the resources directly provided to youth participating in the program. 

25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
We collected data on each study participant’s use of resources. Multiplying this measure 

of utilization by the cost per unit of resource produced an estimate of the cost incurred for each 

youth. 

The effectiveness analyses used the results from the outcome evaluation. The cost data 

were combined with the effectiveness results to estimate a cost-effectiveness ratio for each 

statistically significant effectiveness outcome. The cost-effectiveness ratio expresses the cost of 

achieving a one unit change in the effectiveness measure. For example, consider the outcome of 

rearrest within one year. The cost-effectiveness ratio generates an estimate of the additional cost

necessary to avert one more youth from being arrested within one year. 

Additional information on the development of the cost data and the cost-effectiveness 

results are included in Section 4.

26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
2 JBTC Process Evaluation 

The purpose of this section is to provide the results of the process evaluation that examined 

the system level and service delivery components of JBTC. This comprehensive process 

evaluation relies on data gathered through interviews with key community stakeholders, 

interviews with JBTC staff, interviews with staff at the Department of Youth Services, focus 

groups with JBTC staff, focus groups with JBTC participants, surveys of community 

stakeholders and service providers, and the review of quarterly reports, program documents, and 

various databases (such as the Management Information System). Although the findings from the 

process evaluation can serve multiple purposes, the two major purposes are to provide feedback 

to DYS for program modification and improvement, and to provide context for appropriately 

interpreting findings from the outcome evaluation. Thus, this section of the report provides a 

synthesis of the process evaluation-related data collection activities and findings, including 

analysis of the planning and implementation process; a description and analysis of each JBTC 

component; an identification of challenges and barriers to collaboration and program

implementation; and an assessment of model fidelity. 

2.1 Process Evaluation Background 

The JBTC strategy represents the integration of a systems model and a service delivery 

approach designed to improve substance abuse, delinquency, and other related outcomes among 

juvenile offenders (see Exhibit 1-1). The systems model incorporates the policies, processes, 

and procedures developed by Lane County for juvenile offenders managed by the Department of 

Youth Services. The service delivery approach refers to the specific activities and services 

available and the mechanisms that provide access to those activities and services. The 

underlying theory guiding the implementation of JBTC is that early identification of AOD use, 

close supervision, and ongoing treatment will reduce AOD use and criminal behavior among 

juvenile offenders. 

The Lane County JBTC program was coordinated by the JBTC Policy Board, a Steering 

Committee composed of representatives from the Juvenile Court, the DYS, and members of 

various community sectors, including law enforcement, non-profit organizations, schools, state 

and local government, social/human services, substance abuse treatment providers, and mental 

27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
health services providers. The Policy Board provided oversight and direction for the program

implementation. Key components of the Lane County JBTC are:

• Implementation of a management information system (MIS) to provide easy access to 

data by all participating agencies. 

• Drug testing and risk assessment of all juvenile offenders upon entry into the juvenile 

justice system. 

• Placement of the offenders into appropriate treatment and provision of services. 

• Monitoring of and compliance with treatment conditions imposed by the court. 

• Imposition of a range of sanctions, incentives, and rewards (SIRs) to increase and 

reinforce compliance. 

A simple model of the JBTC system is shown in Exhibit 2-1. The linkages between the 

Juvenile Court, DYS and the community of services providers indicate both the organizational 

relationships and the flow of data through the MIS to describe assessments, needs, treatment 

progress, compliance with requirements, and SIRs. 

JBTC Policy Board

Juvenile Court

DYS

Treatment &

Service

Providers

AOD Treatment

Mental Health

Treatment

Other Services

Assessment

Service

Coordination UA Testing

Supervision

Sanctions,

Incentives,

Rewards

Sanctions,

Incentives,

Rewards

Oversight

Exhibit 2-1. Lane County JBTC Program. 

28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
2.2 Planning and Implementation—Building on the Youth Intervention 

Network 

The implementation of JBTC in Lane County was influenced substantially by an earlier 

project—the Youth Intervention Network. In 1996, DYS in Lane County was one of three sites 

selected to receive a five-year cooperative agreement from the Center for Substance Abuse 

Treatment (CSAT) to implement the YIN, a program designed to deliver services to substanceusing youth in the juvenile justice system. The goals of the Lane County YIN site were to: (1) 

identify and provide necessary services to juvenile offenders with substance use/abuse problems; 

(2) improve the effectiveness of AOD treatment for juvenile offenders through a coordinated 

system of care for the youth and their families; and (3) reduce juvenile crime rates. 

Under the administration of the Oregon Office of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Programs and 

the Lane County DYS, the YIN facilitated substance use screening, assessment, and referral 

services; risk assessments for recidivism; the development of diversion programs; and the 

delivery of treatment to juvenile offenders with identified substance use/abuse issues. These 

services were delivered by a number of collaborating agencies, including five adolescent AOD 

treatment programs, mental health service providers, schools, community-based health centers, 

private and public employment agencies, recreational services providers, and other community 

institutions such as the police department. DYS served as the initial point of contact for 

juveniles and housed the project management, assessment, and case management staff, as well as 

the YIN Management Information System (MIS), an ancillary but critical component. 

Results of the YIN project included improvements in the screening and assessment of 

juvenile offenders, development of a coalition of the substance abuse treatment providers, and 

increases in the range of services available to adjudicated youth in Lane County (YIN Evaluation 

Team, 2001). These results provided a substantial basis on which to build the JBTC program. 

The JBTC process evaluation examined the transition from the YIN to JBTC. Informants 

interviewed during focus groups and in-depth, face-to-face interviews suggested that the YIN 

was beneficial to JBTC and that JBTC was a successful follow on to the YIN. According to 

these informants, the transition from the YIN to the JBTC model was not a difficult transition, 

especially because the “foundation had already been laid by the YIN.” One respondent 

indicated, “YIN seems to have made the planning and implementation process more efficient.” 

29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Another stated, “JBTC is the benefactor of the YIN.” However, most DYS staff and managers 

perceived the transition from the YIN to JBTC as a welcome one. Each recognized and 

considered JBTC as an opportunity to improve upon the system-level processes and services 

developed under the YIN. 

2.3 Program Components and Assessment 

The JBTC program components were developed and implemented in Lane County in 

accordance with DYS policies and screening goals. All activities associated with each program

component were documented and collectively archived in a Management Information System

(MIS). Like the intervention and service-oriented components, the MIS is considered an 

essential component of the JBTC model and its presence would be expected in any replication of 

the program. The program components described and evaluated below are: 

• urinalysis testing, 

• substance abuse assessment and treatment, 

• mental health assessment and services, 

• case management that includes supervision by a probation counselor and service 

coordination by a service coordinator, and 

• judicial oversight (including drug court for some participants). 

Below, we describe each of the components, provide staff perceptions, and discuss the extent to 

which each component was implemented with fidelity. Fidelity is defined as the degree to 

which the actual program implementation in Lane County replicates the conceptual model that 

the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) had envisioned. Evaluations often include assessment of 

two types of fidelity: content and process. Content fidelity describes the extent to which some

prescribed program or activity occurred as planned (e.g., all program components or treatment 

sessions were completed as planned) and process fidelity assesses whether a program or activity 

was implemented in the intended manner (e.g., pedagogical style). For this evaluation, we 

examined the content fidelity of each JBTC component and when possible the process fidelity of 

some components. 

2.3.1 Management Information System (MIS) 

The MIS is an electronic information management system maintained on a computer 

network that is designed to effectively and efficiently collect and store information on JBTC 

youth. The MIS allows for the retrieval of data by DYS staff (e.g., service coordinators, 

30 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
probation counselors) and personnel at other agencies (e.g., program supervisors, and service 

providers) who are involved in the supervision or treatment of these juvenile offenders. At 

intake, a client record is created for all youth scheduled to be screened and assessed. This record 

includes the youth’s name, Juvenile Justice Information System (JJIS) number, demographic 

information, and the nature of the charge. The MIS also contains a standardized risk assessment 

to determine if an offender is at “risk to re-offend.” If the risk screen and the assessment indicate 

that an offender is high risk with AOD issues, additional sections of an AOD assessment are 

completed and entered into the MIS. Once an offender is referred to an AOD treatment program,

treatment information is entered in the MIS, and is available to the DYS probation 

counselor/case manager, service coordinator, and the juvenile court. Other examples of 

treatment information included in the MIS are attendance and progress notes, which are also 

available to the case manager, service coordinator, and the court. Likewise, information is 

entered by the court clerk at each court appearance of the youth. Specific information entered 

includes appearance date, program notes, and outcomes. Other data stored in the MIS include 

results of the urine tests and information about the administration of and youth’s responses to 

sanctions, incentives, and rewards. 

DYS staff reported that data access and retrieval were greatly improved because of the 

MIS. Staff also reported that the MIS provided a system of accountability and “checks-andbalances”; served as a “one-stop-shop” for the retrieval of different kinds of information from

multiple sources; and greatly improved communication within the DYS and between the DYS 

and the outside service-provider community. 

These positive reports were balanced by concerns that data entry into the system was time 

consuming and that the MIS was a separate system that was not integrated with the statewide 

information system (i.e., JJIS). DYS personnel enter data in JJIS for all youth and enter data into 

the JBTC MIS for JBTC participants. These two systems house some of the same data, but also 

contain different information. Because these systems are not fully integrated, staff had to access 

both systems to retrieve comprehensive information on offenders. Furthermore, Probation 

Counselors (probation officers) reported spending more time utilizing the JJIS, while Service 

Coordinators most often utilized the JBTC MIS. Most respondents expressed a desire to 

integrate the systems to ensure complete data. 

31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Despite these concerns, the MIS represents the cornerstone of managing an effort like 

JBTC and in this context was developed as intended with a strong degree of fidelity. A thorough 

review of the system and interviews with key users of the system suggests that JBTC 

implementation was significantly improved by the MIS. However, other communities may have 

difficulty implementing a comparable MIS since the development of Lane County’s MIS began 

during the implementation of the five-year YIN program and prior to the implementation of 

JBTC. For other sites to replicate this component of the model would require allocation for the 

time and resources needed to develop, test, and implement a similar system. 

2.3.2 Urinalysis (UA) Testing 

UA testing is a major component of the JBTC model that allows DYS to identify and 

monitor drug use and inform intervention and treatment strategies. DYS staff and treatment 

providers regularly administer drug tests to all JBTC program participants. The frequency of UA 

testing depends on the program phase in which the youth is involved and can be as frequent as 

twice weekly. The results of each test are entered into the MIS and reported to the JBTC youth, 

his/her parents or legal guardians, and sometimes reported to the Rehabilitation and Progress 

(RAP) Court (the JBTC drug court) judge. This program component not only facilitates timely 

drug testing following arrest, but it allows for continual assessment of drug use during a youth’s 

involvement with the juvenile justice system. 

DYS staff expressed overwhelmingly positive perceptions of the UA testing implemented 

in conjunction with the JBTC program. Testing was unanimously viewed as one of the most 

effective system enhancements for JBTC youth because it allows for more comprehensive 

screening, which better informed intervention strategies and treatment planning. Testing allows 

for continuous monitoring of drug use during participation in JBTC. The staff also reported that 

the UA testing requirement motivated youth to reduce marijuana use to avoid sanctions. Staff 

members also reported receiving requests from parents to test their child in circumstances such 

as the youth exhibiting strange behaviors or not returning home overnight. 

Although the UA testing requirement of the JBTC model is viewed positively by the JBTC 

staff, its implementation presented some unanticipated challenges and unintended consequences. 

A substantial challenge was to identify procedures for conducting the large increase in UA tests 

required by JBTC procedures. Depending on a youth’s substance-using history, as many as two 

UA tests could be required each week. As caseloads increased, UA testing administration 

32 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
became more difficult to coordinate and manage. However, through collaborative efforts, the 

probation counselors have partnered with the service coordinators and the treatment providers to 

manage the increased UA testing load. 

Staff also had to modify procedures to thwart youth who were trying to alter their urine 

specimens (e.g., by adding water to the sample or by using someone else’s urine). Staff 

members are not permitted to directly supervise a youth urinating to provide a urine sample, 

which affords youth the opportunity to tamper with or adulterate their specimen. Once concerns 

about potential tampering of UA samples occurred, DYS implemented the use of temperature 

strips that signal that a specimen is not at the proper temperature and likely has been altered. 

A final challenge was to establish procedures that would minimize the opportunities for 

youth to manipulate their drug use to avoid detection. During the early stages of JBTC 

implementation, drug tests were scheduled so that youth could anticipate when they would be 

tested. Concern by staff that youth were timing their drug use to avoid detection led to the 

implementation of a random (or more random) testing schedule. 

Another important unintended consequence of the UA testing program reported by staff 

and some youth was that some youth switched from using drugs that are detectable by UA tests 

for several days (e.g. marijuana) to alcohol or other illicit substances, which are not detectable in 

urine for more than 12-36 hours. 

The urinalysis drug testing was reported to have had significant impact on marijuana use. 

However, some youth reported that they changed their AOD use, switching to alcohol and illicit 

drugs that do not remain detectable as long as marijuana. This behavior—substituting alcohol or 

certain illicit drugs for others—may have resulted from the non-random administration of the 

UA tests during the early implementation of JBTC. With non-random testing, some youth may 

have used illicit drugs (e.g., methamphethamine) between scheduled UAs that would cycle out of 

their system prior to their next scheduled testing. Case managers and probation counselors 

detected these patterns and changed to a more random UA administration schedule to detect 

more illicit drug use. 

2.3.3 Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) Abuse Treatment 

The JBTC program requires that youth be screened for substance use and abuse during 

intake. If AOD use or abuse issues are identified, a service coordinator is assigned who is 

33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
responsible for contacting and referring the youth to a treatment provider whose program best 

meets the youth’s needs. Such treatment services can be provided in an inpatient or outpatient 

program setting. Service coordinators also try to ensure that services are gender-specific, as well 

as culturally relevant. 

In general, staff perceptions of the AOD treatment services were mixed. Positive staff 

perceptions of AOD treatment services were associated with JBTC providing a clearly identified 

set of service providers and agencies that specialize in AOD treatment for adolescents. In 

addition, staff viewed the funding resources provided through JBTC as helpful. Most 

respondents also credited the JBTC model with the development of female-specific programs

and services, including the provision of inpatient AOD treatment beds for females that were 

funded exclusively with JBTC funds. 

Both DYS staff and service providers reported that as a result of JBTC they developed and 

have maintained positive working relationships. According to service providers, these positive 

working relationships are an improvement over the quality of these relationships during the YIN 

project, when service providers were in intense competition with each other for DYS clients.6

 

Although JBTC resulted in improvements in the provision of AOD treatment, concerns 

remain about the limited availability of some needed services. These services include inpatient 

treatment slots/beds and transitional housing. In addition, staff members expressed concerns 

about the lack of service providers and agencies in the county’s rural areas. Additionally, staff 

and service providers reported inadequate services for dually diagnosed offenders. These 

limitations resulted in some staff expressing frustration in their inability to match client needs 

with appropriate services and the need to “go to the next best thing” when they were unable to 

secure the most appropriate services.

2.3.4 Mental Health (MH) Services. 

During intake processing, each youth receives a mental health screening. If mental health 

issues are identified or suspected, the youth is referred to a mental health specialist for a 

 

6

 During the YIN project, agencies were asked to provide comprehensive services to adolescents and their families 

in an effort to empower consumers by providing multiple choices for services. Multiple agencies responded to this 

request by developing new programs for substance-using juvenile offenders. Some agencies had “specialized” in

providing such services for a number of years prior to implementation of the YIN. These agencies felt betrayed by 

the YIN, while the “new” service providers felt they invested resources into the development of programs and

services and did not receive the number of clients they anticipated. Since JBTC, such issues appear to have been 

resolved. 

34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
comprehensive mental health assessment. Similar to the AOD process, DYS staff members use 

the assessment as the basis for referrals of JBTC youth to a treatment provider whose program

best meets the youth’s mental health needs. Treatment options include inpatient and outpatient 

program settings. Each provider is granted access to the MIS so they can review relevant 

information on the youth and enter treatment-related information (e.g., progress notes). 

Staff perceptions regarding MH treatment services are similar to those regarding AOD 

treatment services. There is consensus that mental health assessments are adequately 

administered to JBTC participants. Staff members indicate that the JBTC model facilitates 

mental health assessment administration and generates resources to fund needed MH services. 

The MH specialist conducts comprehensive assessments and provides comprehensive reports 

that outline multi-systemic and multi-level perspectives for understanding the client’s MH status

and needs. 

However, staff members also cited dissatisfaction with the MH services available to JBTC 

youth. In particular, there were concerns that available MH services seem to focus on 

medicating clients, monthly contact appointments, and prescription refills. In the opinion of 

some of the JBTC staff members, the efficacy of this approach from a follow-up and treatment 

perspective is questionable. These staff members consider the Lane County MH service-delivery 

model to be awkward and not equipped to meet the needs of juvenile offenders. 

Although the provision of mental health assessments represented a marked increased in 

mental health-related services, those assessments did not necessarily translate into the provision 

of specialized mental health services. Staff indicated that the JBTC model increased the use of 

assessments and resources for MH services. Much of this improvement was credited to the onsite presence of a mental health specialist who provided comprehensive reports that outlined 

multi-systemic and multi-level perspectives on a client’s MH status and needs. For these stated 

reasons, it was determined that the provision of mental health services was implemented with 

moderate success and fidelity. 

For example, Multi-Clinical Treatment (MCT) was identified as a mental health service 

included in the constellation of services available to JBTC youth. The MCT model includes inhome services that use a family-centered approach to facilitate behavioral change. Many of 

these services are provided by a behavioral specialist trained in this particular modality. Because 

MCT was provided by one of the treatment providers, the evaluation was unable to assess it in 

35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
terms of content fidelity. Instead we examined the process fidelity or the extent to which 

treatment providers delivered the services within the appropriate conceptual framework. 

Some JBTC staff members stated that MCT was unavailable to JBTC youth and their 

families and that the program was not clearly understood. On the other hand, some JBTC staff 

members indicated satisfaction with MCT services and reported having no problems accessing 

services for their clients. When probed about the lack of consensus, proponents of this model 

indicated that it was rarely, if ever, used outside of RAP court and that the MCT model had 

recently been significantly modified. Lastly, they suggested that some people may not have a 

clear understanding of the program. This confusion was further exacerbated because MCT was 

adapted from an existing, better-known therapeutic intervention called Multi-Systemic Therapy 

(MST). In fact, the local providers’ attempts to modify this program may have driven the limited 

extent to which MCT was understood and used by DYS staff. These findings suggest that MCT 

was not implemented as intended regarding content or in the appropriate approach or delivery 

mode which requires intensive and frequent contact with a behavioral specialist. 

2.3.5 Sanctions, Incentives, and Rewards. 

The use of sanctions, incentives, and rewards (SIRs) is based on a theory of behavior 

modification designed to support and encourage positive behavior and compliance. DYS’ 

application of SIRs was incorporated into the JBTC strategy in an effort to provide swift and 

appropriate responses to the behaviors of JBTC youth, which reflected either positive progress 

(which was rewarded) or non-compliance (which was sanctioned). Through the JBTC planning 

process, standardized policies were established to ensure consistency in the administration of 

SIRs. 

Sanctions were defined as punishment for violating conditions of probation and judicial 

oversight and included detention, reduced privileges, home arrest, or curfews. They were 

administered in response to non-compliant behaviors, such as a positive UA or a missed curfew. 

Incentives were defined as attempts to motivate appropriate behavior, for example, an increase in 

privileges. Rewards were defined as positive reinforcement for appropriate prosocial behavior, 

for example, a food or clothing voucher. This system of sanctions, incentives, and rewards was 

utilized by various staff participating in JBTC (e.g., the RAP Court judge, service coordinators), 

and probation counselors. 

36 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
When presented with the definitions of SIRs, staff members indicated a clear 

understanding of the terms; however; they also indicated overlap at times between the incentives 

and rewards. When asked to elaborate on the differences between incentives and rewards, 

participants offered the following: 

• Incentives are planned, smaller, and given between phases. 

• Rewards are spontaneous (unanticipated by client), bigger, and more special than 

incentives. 

According to the JBTC staff, rewards were easier than incentives to administer because 

rewards are more clearly defined. Incentives, on the other hand, are more individualized and 

were used to motivate a youth to engage in better or more appropriate behavior. Thus, incentives 

were not always given based on positive behavior, but instead to encourage positive behavior 

making the provision of them more subjective than rewards which were based on positive 

behavior. JBTC staff members indicate the SIRs approach made tangible incentives and 

rewards available to youth and this availability allowed for immediate response, which is often 

important when trying to modify, extinguish, or maintain select behaviors. Both service 

coordinators and probation counselors utilized this approach and believe it was an effective asset 

that increased their work productivity. 

Although the SIRs approach was well-received and highly utilized, the JBTC staff 

identified the following challenges to using this approach: 

• Probation counselors had limited flexibility in terms of the sanctions they could employ 

• Program participants requested items just because they knew the items were available 

• Program participants perceived the administration of the SIRs as unfair 

• Parents in some cases viewed the rewards and incentives as promoting criminal behavior 

An overall assessment of the sanctions, incentives, and rewards (SIRs) system indicated 

that involved staff found it to be effective. Specifically, SIR availability allowed for immediate 

response, which staff thought important when trying to modify, extinguish, or maintain select 

behaviors. Both service coordinators and probation counselors utilized this approach and 

regarded it as a valuable tool to improve their ability to improve youth behavior and maintain 

desired outcome. However, challenges were identified that, once addressed, could further 

improve the efficacy of this approach. Specific examples included parental perceptions that some

sanctions were too lenient. Such challenges were often exacerbated because parents of different 

youth compared SIRs and stated disapproval if they perceived disparities or inequities in their 

37 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
distribution. The presence of non-adjudicated siblings in a household with JBTC youth 

presented another challenge. Some parents/guardians felt that JBTC youth were rewarded (or 

given incentives) for undesirable or inappropriate behaviors, which sent contradictory messages

to siblings about the consequences of delinquent behavior. Such challenges were more 

prominent among families with limited resources, likely because such families were not 

financially able to provide comparable incentives and rewards to non-delinquent siblings. 

The parameters outlining the administration of SIRs were not well-defined to make an 

overarching assessment of the level of fidelity to the intend provision. However, findings do 

suggest JBTC staff administered SIRs in the intended spirit and purpose of the approach. JBTC 

demonstrated an understanding of purpose of SIRs and a willingness to use SIRs to improve 

youth behavior. 

2.3.6 Judicial Oversight and Juvenile Supervision 

In an effort to closely monitor youth in the JBTC program, the Lane County Juvenile Court 

system established a separate docket to review the progress of JBTC youth via “progress 

hearings.” Initially, each JBTC youth had a court review hearing every 30 days. This time frame 

could be altered (increased or decreased) based on progress made or problems encountered by 

the youth. In addition to these routine hearings that were provided to all JBTC participants, a 

comprehensive and integrated system of supervision for monitoring JBTC youth was established 

that includes service coordination, probation, and judicial oversight. The RAP Court, which is 

the JBTC drug court, was provided to only a small proportion of the JBTC participants. 

Within the Service Coordination component of juvenile supervision, each JBTC youth is 

assigned a service coordinator, who administers assessment protocols and identifies and secures 

the service and/or treatment needed by JBTC youth. These services may include AOD treatment, 

MH treatment, and school-related services. It is the responsibility of the service coordinator to 

coordinate the services needed by JBTC youth and monitor their progress. The role of the 

service coordinator provides structure to the linkage between the juvenile justice and treatment 

arenas. Based on their assessments, service coordinators make recommendations to the 

probation counselors who supervise JBTC youth. JBTC youth meet with their assigned service 

coordinators prior to meeting their probation counselors, which often results in the early 

identification of the youth’s treatment/service needs and options. 

38 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The progress hearing component of juvenile supervision is referred to as judicial oversight. 

The court mandates intervention plans, including drug testing, AOD treatment, and mental health 

services. The consistent application of SIRs is also an important characteristic of judicial 

oversight, which is provided by the judge, probation counselors, and the service coordinators. 

Communication among these representatives of the court regarding the status and progress of 

JBTC youth is enhanced by their access to the MIS. 

Overall, JBTC staff members stated that the roles of service coordinators and probation 

counselors, in concert, provided for intensive supervision, which benefited the JBTC youth. 

Staff perceptions of juvenile supervision were favorable and supportive. For example, probation 

counselors expressed great appreciation for service coordinators, with whom prior to JBTC, they 

had a “strained” relationship. In turn, service coordinators were viewed as having “lightened the 

load for the probation counselor,” who otherwise would have assumed the responsibility of 

coordinating services. Services, however, were not deemed to be adequate for dually-diagnosed 

youth. 

In terms of fidelity, Case Management, which includes service coordination and 

supervision (i.e., probation), was well-integrated and effective at achieving its intended goals. 

Through open dialogue and discussion, probation counselors and service coordinators were able 

to develop an efficient system of managing JBTC youth. Findings also suggest that DYS was 

able to secure the necessary level of care and services from AOD treatment agencies for JBTC 

youth despite the limited availability of inpatient treatment slots/beds. 

Drug (RAP) Court. The drug court component of Lane County JBTC was the RAP 

Court. This court, under the jurisdiction of one juvenile court judge, had a capacity of 25 youth 

and, thus, was not able to oversee the entire JBTC population. A subset of JBTC participants 

was assigned to the RAP Court; most were randomly assigned but some were placed into the 

court through actions by the RAP Court judge or DYS staff. Eligibility for this drug court 

component was based on the following conditions: 

• Youth is eligible for JBTC services (high-risk youth with AOD issues) 

• A petition is filed for the youth’s case 

• Youth is assessed at intake by the Drug Court service coordinator 

Youth assigned to RAP court had frequent contact with the RAP Court judge and other 

JBTC staff. The distinctive features of this drug court included frequent contact with the judge, 

39 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
frequent use of SIRs, regular UA testing, and more family involvement in the court proceedings 

and the supervision of the youth. 

DYS staff perceived RAP Court as one of the most effective system enhancements. 

Respondents described the goals of RAP Court as follows: to eliminate AOD use, prevent 

recidivism, and reunite families or at least improve family functioning. Respondents indicated 

that RAP Court was the only program component exclusively available to JBTC youth. The 

interest in RAP Court is very high, and is perceived by some as a “separate” program from JBTC 

because of the significant resources needed for its operation. 

Respondents viewed RAP Court as a holistic, comprehensive approach to working with 

drug-involved juvenile offenders. The RAP Court: 

• allows for weekly monitoring of youth through staffing and case reviews, 

• requires regular court appearances, 

• provides ongoing supervision, and 

• provides a mechanism by which youth are held accountable for their behaviors. 

Respondents believe the phases and the SIRs used to hold youth accountable is a major 

contributor to the success of the RAP court and the youth it serves. Staff also believe the RAP 

Court model allows for weekly contact between RAP Court staff members and treatment 

providers, thus promoting a high level of communication. This process was described as 

extremely collaborative. Finally, the RAP Court judge was cited by many as a critical factor and 

seen a major contributor to the success of this program component. He is perceived as being 

aware of treatment services available to youth and their families, and staff commented on how 

well he gets to know the participating youth. 

The RAP Court component of JBTC is potentially a dynamic component of any 

intervention designed to impact drug offending youth because of its intense and frequent contact 

with the court. However, our evaluation of this component clearly suggests that how and who 

administers this component may also play a significant role in its success. The RAP Court judge 

was charismatic but firm and able to quickly get the attention of the participating youth to 

understand the conditions of their involvement in the RAP Court component of JBTC. While 

these observations are not conclusive or suggestive of a positive impact of the RAP Court 

component, they do suggest that the fidelity of this component has to consider the “who” as 

much as the “how”. Based on this approach, we can conclude that the RAP Court content for 

properly implemented and the RAP Court process was influenced by the RAP Court judge. In 

40 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
other words, this component was implemented properly, but it is not certain whether the current 

judge’s style and approach was effective. 

2.4 Barriers to Collaboration and Program Implementation 

JBTC included a range of stakeholders internal and external to the Department of Youth 

Services who collaborated to implement the JBTC program. To assess the collaborative process, 

a Barriers to Collaboration & Implementation Survey was administered in fall 2001 to members 

of the JBTC Policy Board (N=33) to assess the pre-JBTC environment and the current JBTC 

environment after JBTC reached full implementation stage. Members of various community 

sectors, including law enforcement, non-profit organizations, schools, state and local 

government, social/human services, substance abuse and mental health treatment, and juvenile 

corrections comprised the JBTC Policy Board. Each was asked to identify and examine any 

potential barriers to the development and implementation of JBTC. 

Three major issues related to either collaboration or implementation were identified by the 

Policy Board respondents. 

• Collaboration: Almost all (85.7%) of the respondents indicated that collaboration, 

initially, was not viewed as an effective means toward achieving the substance abuse 

treatment goals identified by Lane County. However, fewer respondents (42.9%) 

indicated this issue as a current major barrier; suggesting that over time, respondents 

began to view collaboration more favorably with respect to implementing multi-agency 

projects. 

• Resources: Almost half (42.9%) of the respondents initially identified insufficient 

resources for staffing and/or programming as a major barrier to collaboration and 

implementation at some point during the process. The same percentage of respondents 

identified this issue as a current barrier to collaboration and implementation. Therefore, 

insufficient resources continue to be a barrier in the view of some Policy Board members. 

• Community Awareness: Almost a quarter (23.8%) of the respondents believed 

inadequate community awareness and understanding of the seriousness of drug use 

among youth was a major barrier to collaboration and implementation. However, fewer 

respondents (14.3%) identified this issue as a current barrier, suggesting that community 

awareness of this issue may have increased over time. 

Respondents were also asked to indicate the aspects of the program’s development and 

implementation that they would change or enhance, given their current knowledge. The most 

common responses were related to funding, the referral process, and specific aspects of

programming, including the need for the development and provision of services in rural 

communities. Feedback regarding funding focused on the need to obtain funding beyond that 

41 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
currently being provided by the Federal government. The process of referring youth to service 

providers was also discussed by respondents. Specifically, they indicated that the referral 

process was not balanced across the agencies and that JBTC staff seemed to have their favorite 

programs to which they referred the majority of clients. Respondents identified the need for a 

“fair,” “objective,” and more “balanced” process by which referrals are made. 

Respondents also identified specific aspects of programming that they would change. 

They expressed ideas about channeling more money into female-specific programs from the 

onset. Another programmatic aspect identified was the desire for better assessment strategies 

and criteria for identifying at-risk youth. Finally, respondents identified a mismatch of services 

between the rural and urban communities. Specifically, they said the services in the rural 

communities were inadequate, or, in many instances, non-existent. Respondents said they would 

have allocated funds for the development and delivery of services in rural areas. 

2.5 Summary

The process evaluation reveals that Lane County was successful in implementing many of 

the key components of the JBTC program. DYS staff members and representatives of the 

services community indicated that JBTC had improved communication and coordination 

between agencies working with high risk youth. JBTC was also viewed as having increased the 

availability of appropriate services—particularly AOD treatment—to which youth could be 

referred and to have resulted in better services for girls. Staff felt that improvements were still 

needed in the types of family and mental health services to which youth could be referred and 

that more services were needed for the rural areas of the county. 

The increased use of urinalysis to detect illicit drugs and to hold youth accountable for 

their substance use was also viewed as a significant benefit of the JBTC program. Adjustments 

were made to the administration of testing during JBTC implementation to improve its 

usefulness. These adjustments included changing the administration of the testing so that it was 

random rather than scheduled and incorporating temperature strips to prevent tampering with 

provided urine samples. 

The RAP Court program, which operated as a juvenile drug court in concert with the JBTC 

program, was also seen as highly effective in managing the behavior of high risk youth. A 

deficiency of the RAP Court program is capacity, in that the court can serve only 25 youth. 

42 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
There is also a need to carefully select the judicial administrator(s) of such a component to 

ensure their judicial demeanor is appropriate for this type of program. 

43 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
3 JBTC Outcome Evaluation 

The JBTC program was designed and delivered to produce certain outcomes in 

participating youth. The primary outcomes sought by JBTC are reduced delinquency and 

substance use. Secondary outcomes include increased access to substance abuse treatment and 

mental health services, and improved school performance and family functioning. To evaluate 

the JBTC program along these dimensions, we collected data on youth who were referred to and 

received risk assessments at the Lane County DYS during the baseline recruitment period, which 

ran from April 15, 2000 to November15, 2001. 

We conducted three waves of interviews with and collected administrative data on a 

baseline sample of 306 youth. The first interview occurred within approximately one month of 

the youth being risk assessed at DYS. The second interview was conducted approximately six 

months after the baseline interview, and the third interview was conducted approximately six 

months after the 6-month follow-up interview, or 12 months after the baseline interview. We

conducted 306 baseline interviews, 208 6-month follow-up interviews, and 183 12-month 

follow-up interviews. As discussed in Section 1.3.2.2, the only significant difference between 

youth who were retained in the study over time and those who dropped out of the study was that 

those who were retained were more likely to be female than those youth who were not retained. 

In the following section, we describe those recruited into the evaluation, comparing the 

JBTC participants with the youth who were not enrolled in JBTC. In Section 3.2, we present the 

results of the multivariate outcome models. 

3.1 JBTC Program Evaluation Participants 

This section of the report describes the youth who were recruited into the JBTC program 

evaluation. The sample descriptive statistics are presented below in Exhibit 3-1. The statistics 

are from baseline data and describe the sample either at the time of the baseline interview or over 

the six-month period before the baseline interview. Statistics for the entire sample and the JBTC 

and non-JBTC participants are shown. The p-values for tests of equivalence of the JBTC and 

non-JBTC groups are also included; the p-values are for chi-square statistics for nominal/ordinal 

measures and for t-tests for continuous measures. Overall, the results in Exhibit 3-1 suggest that 

where statistically significant differences exist, the JBTC group had values that implied higher 

44 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
risk in the sense of theoretical or empirical linkages to delinquency and other anti-social 

behaviors when compared with the non-JBTC group. 

Exhibit 3-1. Descriptive Data on the JBTC Evaluation Sample 

 

Variable 

Whole Sample

(N = 306) 

JBTC Sample 

(N=149) 

Non-JBTC 

Sample 

(N=157) p-value*

n % n % n %

Gender 

Male 214 69.9% 104 69.8% 108 68.8% 0.52X

Female 92 30.1% 45 30.2% 49 31.2%

Age (at baseline)

Mean 15.25 15.48 15.02 0.0001t

Range 9 - 18 10 - 18 9 - 18 

Race 

White 236 77.1% 107 71.8% 125 79.6% 0.068 X

Non-white 70 22.9% 39 26.2% 29 18.5%

Risk Scores 

Mean school risk score (range) 2.15 (0-5) 2.6 (0-5) 1.68 (0-4) 0.0001t

Mean Family risk score (range) 2.73 (0-7) 3.44 (0-7) 1.99 (0-6) 0.0001t

Mean crime risk score (range)) 2.41 (0-7) 2.92 (1-7) 1.89 (0-6) 0.0001t

Mean drug risk score (range) 1.4 (0-4) 2.3 (0-4) 0.49 (0-3) 0.0001t

Mean total risk score (range) 8.9 (0-20) 11.48 (3-20) 6.25 (0-17) 0.0001t

Housing (at baseline) 

Living in house, apartment, etc. 264 86.3% 121 81.2% 143 91.1% 0.013X

Living on the street 9 2.9% 5 3.4% 4 2.5% 0.75X

Living in a shelter or facility 32 10.5% 22 14.8% 10 6.4% 0.024X

School 

Enrolled (at baseline) 237 77.5% 101 67.8% 136 86.6% 0.0001X

Been Suspended (ever) 258 84.3% 132 88.6% 126 80.3% 0.025 X

Family 

Caregiver income from job (at baseline) 239 78.1% 109 73.2% 130 82.8% 0.081X

Family member with severe AOD problem (ever) 203 66.3% 110 73.8% 93 59.2% 0.005 X

Family member with a criminal history (ever) 210 68.6% 116 77.9% 94 59.9% 0.002 X

Self-Reported Violence (ever) 

Victim 207 67.6% 110 73.8% 97 61.8% 0.019 X

Perpetrator 172 56.2% 93 62.4% 79 50.3% 0.037 X

Delinquency (prior 6 months) 

Arrested 90 29.4% 58 38.9% 32 20.4% 0.0001X

Mean number of arrests (range) 1.42 (1-6) 1.63 (1-6) 1.22 (1-3) 0.0001 t

Mean number of arrests for those arrested (range) 2.43 (2-6) 2.62 (2-6) 2.09 (2-3) 0.006 t

Mean severity score (range) 2.21 (0-16) 2.89 (0-16) 1.57 (0-16) 0.003 t

Mean severity score for those arrested (range) 7.53 (4-16) 7.43 (4-16) 7.71 (4-16) 0.987 t

Maximum severity score (range) 16 (0-16) 16 (0-16) 16 (0-16) 0.0001 t

Substance Use (prior 6 months) 

Tobacco 204 66.7% 129 86.6% 75 47.8% 0.0001X

Alcohol 206 67.3% 121 81.2% 85 54.1% 0.0001X

45 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 

Variable 

Whole Sample

(N = 306) 

JBTC Sample 

(N=149) 

Non-JBTC 

Sample 

(N=157) p-value*

n % n % n %

Marijuana 200 65.4% 131 87.9% 69 43.9% 0.0001X

Illicit Drugs other than Marijuana 98 32.0% 67 45.0% 31 19.7% 0.0001X

Crack Cocaine 7 2.3% 6 4.0% 1 0.6% 0.061X

Powder Cocaine 24 7.8% 21 14.1% 3 1.9% 0.0001X 

Amphetamine 48 15.7% 35 23.5% 13 8.3% 0.0001X

Inhalants 12 3.9% 8 5.4% 4 2.5% 0.25X

Hallucinogens 60 19.6% 39 26.2% 21 13.4% 0.006 X

Heroin 6 2.0% 6 4.0% 0 0.0% 0.013 X

Barbiturates 16 5.2% 12 8.1% 3 1.9% 0.016 X

Designer Drugs 29 9.5% 20 13.4% 9 5.7% 0.03X

Substance Abuse Treatment (prior 6 months) 

Received Treatment 22 7.2% 12 8.1% 10 6.9% 0.66X

Used illicit drugs and received treatment 18 9.0% 11 8.3% 7 10.1% 0.33X

Mental Health Diagnoses (prior 6 months) 

Depression 47 15.4% 30 20.1% 17 10.8% 0.026X

ADD/ADHD 16 5.2% 8 5.4% 8 5.1% 1X

Bi-polar disorder 8 2.6% 5 3.4% 3 1.9% 0.489 X

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 8 2.6% 6 4.0% 2 1.3% 0.163 X

Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 10 3.3% 8 5.4% 2 1.3% 0.054 X

*p-value for test statistics comparing JBTC and non-JBTC values; ‘X’ indicates a chi-square test 

and ‘t’ indicates a t-test.

 

Demographic Measures. The JBTC and non-JBTC youth were demographically similar at 

baseline. The majority (70%) of those recruited into the evaluation study are male, a proportion 

that was also true of the JBTC (70%) and non-JBTC (69%) participants. Participants in the 

study ranged in age from 9 to 18. The overall mean age of 15.25 years at baseline was similar for 

JBTC youth (15.48) and non-JBTC youth (15.02), although this difference of about half a year 

was statistically significant. Approximately 77% of the evaluation participants, or 236 youth, 

identified themselves as white.7

 Approximately 72% of the JBTC youth and about 80% of the 

non-JBTC youth participating in the evaluation identified themselves as white.8

 

Risk Scores. Youth are administered a risk assessment that evaluates them on four 

dimensions—school, family, crime and drugs. The scores for each of these dimensions are 

summed to produce a total risk score. Higher risk scores indicate the youth is at greater risk. 

 

7

 Of the 70 youth (23%) who identified themselves as non-white, 6 are black, 18 are Hispanic, and 46 are of another 

race, which includes Asians, Native Americans, and those who are multi-racial. 8

 Of the 39 JBTC youth (26%) who identified themselves as non-white, 5 are black, 9 are Hispanic, and 25 are of 

another race. Of the 29 non-JBTC youth (19%) who identified themselves as non-white, 2 are black, 8 are Hispanic, 

and 19 are of another race. Race/ethnicity data were not reported by three JBTC and three non-JBTC youth. 

46 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The mean risk scores for youth participating in the JBTC evaluation were 2.15 for school, 2.73 

for family, 2.41 for crime, 1.4 for drugs, and 8.9 for total risk. The mean risk scores for JBTC 

participants were significantly higher than those of the non-JBTC participants. JBTC 

participants had mean risk scores of 2.6 for school, 3.44 for family, 2.92 for crime, 2.3 for drugs, 

and 11.48 for total risk. Mean scores for non-JBTC youth participating in the evaluation were 

1.68 for school, 1.99 for family, 1.89 for crime, 0.49 for drugs, and 6.25 for total risk. 

Youth were typically considered to be high risk, and, therefore, likely to be considered for 

JBTC, if their total risk scores were above 10. However, in some cases intake staff would 

“override” a risk score below 10 and classify a youth as high risk. This override was often done 

in an effort to make sure a youth would receive treatment when the youth had a high score on the 

drug component but scored relatively low on the other components. 

Housing. Most of the youth participating in the JBTC evaluation study (264, 86.3%) 

reported living in a house or apartment at baseline, whereas 9 (2.9%) reported living on the street 

or in a shelter and 32 (10.5%) reported living in a treatment or detention facility. Most of the 

JBTC participants (121, 81.2%) reported living in a house or apartment at baseline, whereas 5 

(3.4%) reported living on the street or in a shelter and 22 (14.8%) reported living in a treatment 

or detention facility. Most of the non-JBTC youth participating in the evaluation (143, 91.1%) 

reported living in a house or apartment at baseline, whereas 4 (2.5%) reported living on the street 

or in a shelter and 10 (6.4%) reported living in a treatment or detention facility. Overall, JBTC 

youth were less likely to be living in a house or apartment and more likely to be living in a 

residential treatment or detention facility at baseline than were non-JBTC youth. 

School. Of those participating in the evaluation, 237 (78%) reported having completed or 

being enrolled in school, whereas 68 (22%) reported no longer attending school. When asked 

about whether they had ever been suspended from school, 258 (85%) answered affirmatively, 

whereas 46 (15%) reported that they had never been suspended from school. JBTC participants 

were less likely than non-JBTC participants to report having completed or being enrolled in 

school (67.8% versus 86.6%, respectively). JBTC participants were more likely than non-JBTC 

participants to report having been suspended from school (132 or 88.6% vs. 126 or 80.3%, 

respectively). 

Family Characteristics. Most evaluation study participants (239, 80%) reported that their 

primary caregiver received most of their income from salary or wages, but 58 (20%) reported 

47 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
that their primary caregiver received most of their income from social services or illegal activity. 

The majority of JBTC participants (109 or 73.2%), and 130 (82.8%) of the non-JBTC 

participants, reported having a primary caregiver who received most of their income from salary 

or wages. 

Two-thirds of study participants (203, 67%) reported having a family member with a 

severe problem with alcohol or drugs. Significantly more of the JBTC participants (110 or 

73.8%) than the non-JBTC participants (93 or 59.2%) reported having a family member with a 

severe problem with alcohol or drugs. 

Most of study participants (210 or 73%) also reported having a family member with a 

criminal history. JBTC participants were more likely than non-JBTC participants to report 

having a family member with a criminal history (116 or 77.9% and 94 or 59.9% of the JBTC and 

non-JBTC participants, respectively). 

Self-Reported Violence. The majority of study participants reported being a victim of 

violence: 207 youth (68%) reported having been a victim of a physical attack at some time in 

their life in which the perpetrator was trying to cause serious harm. JBTC participants (110 or 

73.8%) were more likely than non-JBTC participants (97 or 61.8%) to have reported being a 

victim of a physical attack. 

The majority of study participants also reported being a perpetrator of violence: 172 youth 

(57%) reported having attacked someone at some time in their life with the idea of seriously 

hurting them. JBTC participants were more likely than non-JBTC participants to report being a 

perpetrator of a physical attack (62.4% versus 50.3%, respectively). 

Delinquency. Data from the Oregon Juvenile Justice Information System (JJIS) were used 

to determine the extent to which youth participating in the study were involved with the juvenile 

justice system. All measures of delinquency reported here exclude the instant offense, which is 

the arrest that led to the youth being eligible for the study. 

During the six months before the baseline interview, 90 of the JBTC evaluation study 

youth (29%) had been arrested at least once in addition to the instant offense. The proportion of 

JBTC participants with at least one additional arrest was 38.9% (n=58)—almost double the 

20.4% (n=32) of non-JBTC youth who were arrested during this time. 

JBTC youth were not only more likely to have experienced an arrest, but had experienced 

more arrests during the six months prior to the baseline interview. The mean number of arrests 

48 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
experienced by youth participating in the evaluation was 1.42. For JBTC and non-JBTC youth, 

the means were 1.63 and 1.22, respectively. Conditional on having an (additional) arrest, the 

sample was arrested an average of 2.43 times in the 6 months before baseline. The JBTC and 

non-JBTC youth who had been arrested were arrested at least once, on average, were arrested 

2.62 and 2.09 times, respectively, during this period. 

Each arrest recorded in JJIS is given a severity score that indicates the seriousness of each 

charge for which the youth was arrested. Severity scores range from 1 to 19, with 19 being the 

most serious (murder). Scores of 1 and 2 indicate status offenses and supervision violations, 

respectively. For analysis purposes, we adjusted the severity scores by reducing scores of 1 and 

2 to 0, since these scores reflect arrests or contacts for non-criminal charges. As these are ‘noncriminal’ charges, we omitted these charges when we analyzed arrest severity. Scores of 3-6 

reflect arrests for misdemeanor property or other offenses. Scores of 7-10 reflect arrests for 

misdemeanor person or violent offenses. Scores of 11-14 reflect arrests for felony property or 

other offenses. Scores of 15-19 reflect arrests for felony person or violent offenses. The highest 

severity score associated with JBTC and non-JBTC youth in the study in the six months before 

baseline was 16. The lowest score for JBTC and non-JBTC youth was 4. 

For the total sample of 306 youth, the mean severity score for arrests in the six months 

prior to risk assessment was 2.21. These figures do not include the instant offense. The mean 

scores for JBTC and non-JBTC youth were 2.89 and 1.57, respectively. These figures may 

appear to be rather low, but the means include zero values for any youth who was not arrested or 

who had severity scores in the 1 to 2 range for an arrest. If the sample is restricted to the 90 

youth who were arrested for a criminal charge in the six months prior to risk assessment in 

addition to their instant offense, the mean severity score was 7.5 (sd = 3.46). There was no 

significant difference in the mean severity scores for JBTC and non-JBTC youth. For JBTC 

youth, the mean score was 7.43 (sd = 3.40) and for non-JBTC youth, the mean score was 7.71 

(sd = 3.61). 

Substance Use. During the baseline interview, youth were asked whether they had used 

various substances. Those youth who responded affirmatively were then asked more detailed 

questions about the age of first use, recency of use, frequency of use, etc. for that substance. Selfreported data were collected for lifetime, six months prior to baseline, and thirty days prior to 

baseline for alcohol, tobacco, and ten illicit drugs (or drug categories). 

49 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Exhibit 3-2 shows self-reported lifetime use of tobacco products, alcohol, marijuana, and 

other illicit drugs excluding marijuana. As can be seen, most of the 306 youth participating in 

the JBTC evaluation reported using tobacco products (245, 80.1%), alcohol (259, 84.6%), and 

marijuana (253, 82.7%) at some time in their life. About half of the youth (150, 49.0%) reported 

using an illicit drug other than marijuana at least once in their lifetime. For specific illicit 

substances, 119 youth (38.9%) reported using hallucinogens, 67 (21.9%) reported using 

amphetamine or methamphetamine, 49 (16.0%) reported using “designer drugs” such as ecstasy, 

48 (15.7%) reported using inhalants, 42 (13.7%) reported using powder cocaine, 34 (11.1%) 

reported using barbiturates or tranquilizers, 14 (4.6%) reported using crack cocaine, and 14 

(4.6%) reported using heroin at least once in their lifetime. 

142

103

144

115

147

106 97

53

54 42 51 52

104

7 5 2

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Tobacco (JBTC)

Tobacco (non-JBTC)

Alcohol (JBTC)

Alcohol (non-JBTC)

Marijuana (JBTC)

Marijuana (non-JBTC)

Other drugs (JBTC)

Other drugs (non-JBTC)

Use No Use

Exhibit 3-2. Self-Reported Lifetime Substance Use 

(The numbers of JBTC and non-JBTC youth reporting use are indicated on the columns.) 

Nearly all of the 149 JBTC youth reported using tobacco products (142 or 95.3%), alcohol 

(144 or 96.6%), and marijuana (147 or 98.7%) at some time in their life. Nearly two-thirds of 

the JBTC youth (97 or 65.1%) reported using an illicit drug other than marijuana at least once in 

50 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
their lifetime. For specific illicit substances, 82 youth (55.0%) reported using hallucinogens, 50 

(33.6%) reported using amphetamine or methamphetamine, 33 (22.1%) reported using “designer 

drugs” such as ecstasy, 32 (21.5%) reported using inhalants, 31 (20.8%) reported using powder 

cocaine, 24 (16.1%) reported using barbiturates or tranquilizers, 10 (6.7%) reported using crack 

cocaine, and 11 (7.4%) reported using heroin at least once in their lifetime. 

A majority of the 157 non-JBTC youth reported using tobacco products (103 or 65.6%), 

alcohol (115 or 73.2%), and marijuana (106 or 67.5%) at some time in their life. About a third 

of the non-JBTC youth (53 or 34%) reported using an illicit drug other than marijuana at least 

once in their lifetime. For specific illicit substances, 37 youth (23.6%) reported using 

hallucinogens, 17 (10.8%) reported using amphetamine or methamphetamine, 16 (10.2%) 

reported using “designer drugs” such as ecstasy, 16 (10.2%) reported using inhalants, 11 (7.0%) 

reported using powder cocaine, 10 (6.4%) reported using barbiturates or tranquilizers, 4 (2.5%) 

reported using crack cocaine, and 3 (1.9%) reported using heroin at least once in their lifetime. 

As AOD use was a criterion for JBTC participation, the high rates of self-reported use by 

JBTC participants is not surprising. The high rates of self-reported use by the non-JBTC youth 

are perhaps more surprising. These lifetime figures, of course, include experimentation (e.g., 

one time use) and experimentation that may have occurred sometime earlier. The self-reported 

use in the past 6 months informs this issue. 

Exhibit 3-3 shows the numbers of JBTC and non-JBTC youth who reported tobacco, 

alcohol, marijuana, and other drug use during the six months prior to the baseline interview. As 

can be seen, most of the 306 youth participating in the JBTC evaluation reported using tobacco 

products (204, 66.7%), alcohol (206, 67.3%), and marijuana (200, 65.4%) in the six months prior 

to the baseline interview. About a third of the youth (98, 32.0%) reported using an illicit drug 

other than marijuana in the six months prior to the baseline interview. With regard to specific 

illicit substances, 60 youth (19.6%) reported using hallucinogens, 48 (15.7%) reported using 

amphetamine or methamphetamine, 29 (9.5%) reported using “designer drugs” such as ecstasy, 

24 (7.8%) reported using powder cocaine, 16 (5.2%) reported using barbiturates or tranquilizers, 

12 (3.9%) reported using inhalants, 7 (2.3%) reported using crack cocaine, and 6 (2.0%) reported 

using heroin in the six months prior to the baseline interview.

51 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
129

75

121 131

69 67

31

20

82

28

72

18

88 82

126

85

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Tobacco (JBTC)

Tobacco (non-JBTC)

Alcohol (JBTC)

Alcohol (non-JBTC)

Marijuana (JBTC)

Marijuana ( non-JBTC)

Other drugs (JBTC)

Other drugs (non-JBTC)

Use No Use

Exhibit 3-3. Previous Six-Month, Self-reported Substance Use. 

(The numbers of JBTC and non-JBTC youth reporting use are indicated on the columns.) 

 

 

Most of the 149 JBTC youth reported using tobacco products (129, 86.6%), alcohol (121, 

81.2%), and marijuana (131, 87.9%) in the six months prior to the baseline interview, while 

about half of the JBTC youth (67, 45.0%) reported using an illicit drug other than marijuana in 

the six months prior to the baseline interview. With regard to specific illicit substances, 39 

(26.2%) reported using hallucinogens, 35 (23.5%) reported using amphetamine or 

methamphetamine, 20 (13.4%) reported using “designer drugs” such as ecstasy, 21 (14.1%) 

reported using powder cocaine, 12 (8.1%) reported using barbiturates or tranquilizers, 8 (5.4%) 

reported using inhalants, 6 (4.0%) reported using crack cocaine, and 6 (4.0%) reported using 

heroin in the six months prior to the baseline interview. 

About half of the 157 non-JBTC youth reported using tobacco products (75, 47.8%), 

alcohol (85, 54.1%), and marijuana (69, 43.9%) in the six months prior to the baseline interview. 

52 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
About a fifth of the non-JBTC youth (31, 19.7%) reported using an illicit drug other than 

marijuana in the six months prior to the baseline interview. With regard to specific illicit 

substance use, 21 (13.4%) reported using hallucinogens, 13 (8.3%) reported using amphetamine 

or methamphetamine, 9 (5.7%) reported using “designer drugs” such as ecstasy, 3 (1.9%) 

reported using powder cocaine, 3 (1.9%) reported using barbiturates or tranquilizers, 4 (2.5%) 

reported using inhalants, 1 (0.6%) reported using crack cocaine, and 0 (0%) reported using 

heroin in the 6 months prior to the baseline interview. 

The final time period in which youth were asked to self-report substance use was the thirty 

days prior to the baseline interview. It should be noted that for many of these youth, this period 

occurred entirely or mostly following the arrest that lead to their inclusion in the study. Exhibit 

3-4 shows the numbers of members of both groups self-reporting substance use in the previous 

thirty days. 

112

59

83

43

67

42 32

6

37

98

66

114

82

115 117

151

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Tobacco (JBTC)

Tobacco (non-JBTC)

Alcohol (JBTC)

Alcohol (non-JBTC)

Marijuana (JBTC)

Marijuana (non-JBTC)

Other drugs (JBTC)

Other drugs (non-JBTC)

Use No Use

Exhibit 3-4. Previous 30 Days, Self-Reported Substance Use. 

(The numbers of JBTC and non-JBTC youth reporting use are indicated on the columns.) 

53 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Over half (171, 55.9%) of the 306 youth participating in the JBTC evaluation reported 

having used tobacco products, 126 (41.2%) reported using marijuana, and 110 (36.0%) reported 

using alcohol in the 30 days prior to the baseline interview. As for illicit drugs other than 

marijuana, 38 youth (12.4%) reported use in the 30 days prior to the baseline interview.9

 

A majority of the 149 JBTC youth (112, 75.2%) reported using tobacco products, 83 

(55.7%) reported using marijuana and 67 (45.3%) reported using alcohol in the 30 days prior to 

the baseline interview. As for illicit drugs other than marijuana, 32 youth (21.5%) reported use 

in the 30 days prior to the baseline interview.10 The non-JBTC participants were less likely to 

report substance use during the 30 days prior to the baseline interview. About a third of the 157 

non-JBTC youth (59, 37.6%) reported using tobacco products, 43 (27.4%) reported using 

marijuana and 42 (26.8%) reported using alcohol in the 30 days prior to the baseline interview. 

As for illicit drugs other than marijuana, only 6 youth (3.8%) reported use in the 30 days prior to 

the baseline interview.11 

Youth who participated in the JBTC evaluation were also asked how old they were when 

they first used a substance. For the 306 evaluation study participants, the mean ages of onset for 

the most commonly reported substances are 11.1 years for tobacco, 12.2 years for alcohol, 12.1 

years for marijuana; 13.9 for hallucinogens; and 14.3 years for amphetamine/methamphetamine. 

JBTC participants reported slightly younger ages of onset than non-JBTC participants for most 

substances—10.7 versus 11.6 years for tobacco, 12.1 versus 12.2 years for alcohol, 11.6 versus 

12.9 years for marijuana, 13.7 versus 14.4 years for hallucinogens, and 14.2 versus 14.4 years for 

amphetamine/methamphetamine, respectively. 

 

9 With regard to specific illicit substance use, 23 youth (7.5%) reported using hallucinogens, 21 (6.9%) reported

using amphetamine or methamphetamine, 12 (3.3%) reported using “designer drugs” such as ecstasy, 8 (2.6%)

reported using barbiturates or tranquilizers, 7 (2.3%) reported using powder cocaine, 3 (1.0%) reported using

inhalants, 3 (1.0%) reported using crack cocaine, and 2 (0.6%) reported using heroin at least once in the 30 days 

prior to the baseline interview. 10 With regard to specific illicit substance use, 17 youth (11.6%) reported using hallucinogens, 18 (12.1%) reported

using amphetamine or methamphetamine, 8 (5.4%) reported using “designer drugs” such as ecstasy, 6 (4.0%)

reported using barbiturates or tranquilizers, 5 (3.4%) reported using powder cocaine, 2 (1.2%) reported using

inhalants, 6 (4.1%) reported using crack cocaine, and 2 (1.4%) reported using heroin at least once in the 30 days 

prior to the baseline interview. 11 With regard to specific illicit substance use, 2 youth (1.2%) reported using hallucinogens, 3 (1.8%) reported using

amphetamine or methamphetamine, 2 (1.2%) reported using “designer drugs” such as ecstasy, 2 (1.2%) reported

using barbiturates or tranquilizers, 2 (1.2%) reported using powder cocaine, 1 (0.6%) reported using inhalants, 1 

(0.6%) reported using crack cocaine, and 0 (0.0%) reported using heroin at least once in the 30 days prior to the 

baseline interview. 

54 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
AOD Treatment. Data from the Client Process Monitoring System (CPMS) were used to 

determine which youth participating in the JBTC evaluation study received substance abuse 

treatment. The CPMS is Oregon's system for maintaining data on services rendered by publicly 

funded behavioral health programs. All state-licensed providers of substance abuse treatment are 

required to submit client-level data on the treatment they have administered.12 These data 

exclude any treatment that was paid for with private funds (e.g., health insurance) and, therefore, 

may undercount treatment provided. There is no reason to assume, however, that this 

undercount would differ for our two study groups. 

According to the CPMS data, only 22 (7%) of the 306 youth participating in the JBTC 

evaluation study received AOD treatment services in the six months prior to participating in the 

risk assessment that indicated their eligibility for the study. Of the 149 JBTC youth, only 12 

(8.1%) received substance abuse treatment in the six months prior to risk assessment. Of the 157 

non-JBTC youth, only 10 (6.4%) received AOD treatment in the six months prior to risk 

assessment. 

Mental Health Diagnoses and Treatment. Youth were asked whether they had been 

diagnosed by a professional as having depression, Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD)/Attention 

Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), bi-polar disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 

(PTSD), or Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) in the six months prior to the baseline 

interview. Of the 306 youth participating in the JBTC evaluation, 47 (15.7%) reported having 

been diagnosed with depression, 16 (5.3%) reported having been diagnosed with ADD/ADHD, 

10 (3.3%) reported having been diagnosed with OCD, 8 (2.7%) reported having been diagnosed 

with PTSD, and 8 (2.7%) reported having been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder. 

JBTC youth were more likely than non-JBTC youth to report having been diagnosed with 

depression (20.7% versus 11%, respectively). A slightly larger, but not significant, percentage of 

JBTC youth were more likely to report have been diagnosed with OCD (5.5% versus 1.3%, 

respectively). There were no differences between the two groups between those reporting having 

been diagnosed with ADD/ADHD (5.5% versus 5.2%, respectively, for JBTC and non-JBTC 

 

12 Youth were also asked whether they had received substance abuse treatment and the nature of the treatment they 

received. However, we have doubts about the validity and reliability of these reports because of inconsistencies in 

the responses to certain questions. Additionally, de-briefing conversations with interviewers indicated that youth 

had trouble understanding the treatment items or deciding whether they had received treatment services. We

therefore relied on the CPMS data to indicate whether a youth received substance abuse treatment. 

55 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth), with PTSD (4.1% versus 1.31%, respectively), and with bi-polar disorder (3.4% versus 

1.95, respectively). 

Of the 306 youth, 123 (40.3%) reported receiving some sort of mental health counseling or 

treatment in the six months prior to the baseline interview. JBTC and non-JBTC youth were 

about equally likely to have reported receiving treatment (38.3% versus 42.3%, respectively). 

We believe, however, that these self-reported MH treatment data may not be reliable. The field 

interviewers suggested that many of the subjects had a difficult time understanding what 

constitutes mental health treatment. Further, we examination of the CPMS administrative data 

revealed only a few subjects who had received mental health counseling that was covered by 

Oregon’s health care system. The impact for the evaluation is not being able to assess the extent 

to which subjects received mental health services, one goal of JBTC. 

Summary. The JBTC participants differed from the non-JBTC participants on many of 

the measures that historically have been associated with higher rates of recidivism and substance 

abuse. The JBTC subjects were assessed as higher risk than the non-JBTC participants and had 

more extensive and more serious criminal histories. JBTC participants were more likely to 

report AOD use and to have begun use at a younger age. These subjects were also more likely to 

have been in treatment or a shelter prior to assessment and to have family members with criminal 

records and serious alcohol or drug problems. Finally, the JBTC youth were more likely to report 

being diagnosed with a mental health problem. 

These findings are not surprising and suggest that DYS implemented JBTC as planned. In 

particular, the differences between the JBTC participants and those who were not included in 

JBTC are consistent with DYS’s plan to target the program to those youth deemed highest risk. 

As we noted in the Introduction, we selected an approach for the outcome evaluation that 

controlled for this selection bias, as well as the maturation bias seen so often in studies of 

negative behaviors. We turn to these analyses now. 

3.2 Multivariate Analyses 

The substantial differences between the youth participating in JBTC and youth not 

participating in JBTC are a reflection of the non-experimental design of the study. High-risk 

youth—those who scored above a certain value (i.e., 10 on a 0-20 scale) on the risk assessment 

or those who were deemed by DYS intake staff to be high-risk regardless of their risk assessment 

score—were deemed eligible for participation in JBTC. Eligible youth then had to agree to 

56 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
participate in JBTC. Such non-experimental conditions can lead to selection bias that should be 

controlled, to the extent possible, using appropriate analytic techniques. Selection bias is most 

problematic when groups differ on characteristics that are correlated with expected differences in 

the outcomes of interest—the circumstance of this evaluation. 

Another potential source of bias is known as maturation. Maturation bias occurs when the 

outcome naturally evolves or changes over time irrespective of the presence of an independent 

variable of interest such as a program. Arrests often occur at a peak of criminal activity since 

engaging in many delinquent acts increases the likelihood of an arrest. The arrest may in turn 

serve as a catalyst for change or the offender may return to more conventional or normal 

behavior that would have occurred even without the intervening arrest or any subsequent 

intervention. Either will lead to observed lower rates of arrest following the instant arrest. 

Testing the impact of an intervention without accounting for the potential effect of maturation 

bias can confound the intervention effect with the impact of maturation. 

Our statistical approach to analyzing the data from this non-experimental study controls for 

much of the potential selection and maturation bias. These models follow methodology similar 

to that used in Heckman (1978) and Murray (1998), among others. The models rely on the 

availability of multiple or repeated measures for each subject—in a sense allowing a subject to 

serve as his or her own comparison. 

We demonstrate the form of our outcome models using the example of marijuana use in 

the past thirty days (MJ). Specifically, we estimated the following logit model for youth i in time 

period t: 

MJit = β0 + β1JBTCi + β2Time1it + β3Time2it + β4Intervention1it + β5Intervention2it + γ* Zit + eit

MJit equals 1 if youth i reported using marijuana during time t and equals 0 otherwise. 

JBTC equals 1 if the youth is in JBTC, and equals 0 if the youth is not in JBTC. The JBTC

variable is included in the equation to control for selection bias due to unobserved variables. If 

people were randomly assigned into groups, then the coefficient estimate for JBTC, β1, would be 

0. The variable Time1 equals 1 if the observation is at the six-month follow-up interview, and 0 

otherwise, and Time2 is similarly constructed for the twelve-month follow-up interview. The 

follow-up variables are included in the models to control for maturation bias. For example, if 

57 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth were not, on average, reducing their marijuana use between baseline and the six-month 

follow-up interview, regardless of the intervention, then the estimate for β2 would equal 0. 

The most important variables in the above equation are the interactions between the 

follow-up variables (Time1 and Time2) and group (JBTC), denoted Intervention1 and

Intervention2. These interaction terms capture the effect of the JBTC program (Murray, 1998). 

Intervention1 equals 1 only if the observation is for a person who is in JBTC and for an interview 

conducted 6 months after baseline; otherwise, Intervention1 equals 0. The corresponding 

coefficient, β4, measures the degree to which JBTC is associated with marijuana use in the 

previous six months. Similar reasoning applies to Intervention2 and its associated coefficient, 

β5. If the JBTC program is effective at reducing marijuana use, we would expect the two 

coefficients, β4 and β5, to be negative and statistically significant. 

Z represents covariates that are included to control for selection bias due to observed 

variables. Included in Z are age, gender, race/ethnicity, time at risk, and participation in the 

juvenile drug (RAP) court program. These variables are a parsimonious set of all available 

covariates, which were selected for the final specification based on significance tests using the 

full set of covariates in previous specifications. 

The choice of outcome models was guided by the logic model for JBTC (Exhibits 1-1 and 

1-3). In particular, JBTC was expected to increase access to treatment, reduce substance use, 

and reduce criminal behavior. Our dependent variables are derived from both administrative data 

and self-report data from subject interviews. Our independent variables include the constructed 

variables JBTC, TIME1, TIME2, Interventioin1, and Intervention2, as well as variables

constructed from the baseline interview (age, gender, race/ethnicity) and administrative sources 

(time at risk and RAP court participation). For models in which the dependent variable was 

derived from administrative data, we estimated the models for the full sample (i.e., for the 306 

study participants). For self-reported dependent variables, we were constrained to include only 

observations for subjects for time periods in which we had interview data. 

Sections 3.2.1 through 3.2.3 present the results of analyses examining the effect of JBTC 

participation on AOD treatment, AOD use and recidivism (arrest). Other individual outcomes of 

interest included improvements in positive indicators including education success and family 

relations. Items relevant to these questions were not included in the baseline interview, so we 

were not able to use the modeling approach described above to investigate these outcomes. We 

58 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
were able to develop some descriptive measures that allowed us to study these potentially 

positive effects of JBTC. The results of these analyses are presented in Section 3.2.4. 

3.2.1 AOD Treatment

We used the Oregon State Client Process Monitoring System (CPMS) to determine which 

youth received substance abuse treatment. We identified subjects who received AOD treatment 

during the following three periods: six months before baseline, six months between baseline and 

the six-month follow-up interview, and the six months between the six- and 12-month 

interviews. The percentage of each group for whom treatment was identified for each period is 

shown in Exhibit 3-5. As can be seen, JBTC resulted in a dramatic increase in participation in 

AOD treatment during the six months following baseline. Specifically, 58% of JBTC 

participants received AOD treatment between the baseline and 6-month interviews. These 

increases did not persist, however, and only 15% of JBTC participants received AOD treatment 

between the 6- and 12-month interviews. There was little change in the percentage of non-JBTC 

youth who received treatment over the 18 month period. Although JBTC was supposed to serve 

those at highest risk, many of those in the non-JBTC group also had reported AOD use. 

58%

15%

3%

8% 7%

0% 6%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

baseline 6 month 12 month

JBTC non-JBTC

59 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Exhibit 3-5. Administrative Reports of AOD Treatment Received in the Previous Six 

Months. 

The logistic regression model results for receiving substance abuse treatment are presented 

in Exhibit 3-6. As the odds ratios indicate, participation in JBTC is significantly associated 

with receiving substance abuse treatment in both the first and second six-month periods of JBTC. 

Participation in JBTC in the first six months after baseline increased the odds of a youth 

receiving substance abuse treatment by 13.95 times. Similarly, participation in JBTC in the 

second six months after baseline increased the odds of a youth receiving substance abuse 

treatment by 3.78 times. 

Exhibit 3-6. Logistic Regression Model of Receiving Substance Abuse Treatment 

Odds Ratio Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 

Male 0.635 0.15 0.40 1.01

Age 1.072 0.06 0.96 1.20

Nonwhite 0.881 0.23 0.53 1.46

Time at risk 0.994 0.00 0.99 1.00

RAP court 1.158 0.31 0.68 1.97

Intervention1 13.950*** 8.28 4.36 44.65

Intervention2 3.782* 2.45 1.06 13.45

Time1 1.067 0.50 0.42 2.69

Time2 0.466 0.24 0.17 1.29

JBTC 1.250 0.57 0.51 3.05

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.01 level; *** 

statistically significant at the 0.001 level 

3.2.2 AOD Use 

The multivariate results of the logit models on self-reported substance use are presented in 

this section. We modeled use of alcohol, marijuana, and illicit drugs other than marijuana during 

the previous six months. 

Alcohol Use. The percentages of subjects in our two study groups who reported alcohol 

use in the previous six months are shown in Exhibit 3-7. The baseline data points are the values 

that were reported in the earlier discussion of baseline characteristics. As can be seen, 81% of 

60 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
JBTC participants compared with 54% of non-JBTC youth reported having used alcohol in the 

six months prior to the baseline interview. At the six-month interview, the percentage of JBTC 

participants reporting alcohol use dropped to 65%, a much more substantial decrease than that 

observed for the non-JBTC subjects. At the 12-month interview, however, the percentage of 

each group reporting alcohol use had returned to percentages essentially equivalent to those 

observed at baseline—79% of JBTC and 54% of non-JBTC participants. 

81% 79%

54%

65%

49%

54%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

baseline 6 month 12 month

JBTC non-JBTC

Exhibit 3-7. Self-Reported Alcohol Use In The Previous Six Months. 

Results for the logit model of alcohol use are presented in Exhibit 3-8. Participation in 

JBTC had no significant affect on whether a youth reported using alcohol in the first six months 

of JBTC (Intervention 1) or in the second six months of JBTC (Intervention 2). The significance 

of the JBTC measure in the models confirms that at baseline the JBTC and non-JBTC groups 

were different in terms of the outcome of interest. The only other variable significantly 

associated with alcohol use is age. As youth get older, the odds that they will use alcohol 

increases. For every year increase in age, the odds that a youth will use alcohol increase by 1.37 

times. 

61 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Exhibit 3-8. Logistic Regression Model of Alcohol Use 

Odds Ratio Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 

Male 0.966 0.24 0.59 1.58

Age 1.369*** 0.08 1.22 1.54

Nonwhite 1.154 0.32 0.67 1.99

Time at risk 0.998 0.01 0.99 1.01

RAP court 1.183 0.57 0.46 3.04

Intervention1 0.542 0.19 0.27 1.09

Intervention2 1.046 0.45 0.45 2.44

Time1 0.808 0.17 0.54 1.21

Time2 0.995 0.24 0.62 1.60

JBTC 3.104*** 0.88 1.78 5.41

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.01 level; *** 

statistically significant at the 0.001 level 

Marijuana Use. Self-reported marijuana use during the three six-month periods is shown 

in Exhibit 3-9. As reported earlier, JBTC participants were more than twice as likely as nonJBTC youth (89% versus 44%, respectively) to report having used marijuana in the previous six 

months. Self-reported marijuana use declined dramatically for the JBTC participants over the 

three interviews, although 50% and 57% of these subjects reported using marijuana at the 6-

month and 12-month interviews, respectively. There was relatively little difference in selfreported marijuana use from period to period by the non-JBTC group--similar to the relatively 

constant reports of alcohol use by the non-JBTC youth. The results for marijuana differed from

those for alcohol in that the 12-month reports remained substantially lower for JBTC participants 

than those observed at baseline. 

62 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
57%

36%

58%

89%

41%

44%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

baseline 6 month 12 month

JBTC non-JBTC

Exhibit 3-9. Self-Reported Marijuana Use in the Previous Six Months

The results of the estimation of the logit model for marijuana use are presented in Exhibit 

3-10. Participation in JBTC is significantly associated with a reduction in marijuana use in both 

the first and second six-month periods of JBTC. Participation in JBTC in the first six months 

after baseline (Intervention1) reduced the odds of a youth using marijuana by 6.85 times 

(1/0.146). Similarly, participation in JBTC in the second six-month period after baseline 

(Intervention2) reduced the odds of a youth using marijuana by 6.52 times (1/0.181). As was the 

case with alcohol, as youth get older, the odds that they will use marijuana increase. For every 

year increase in age, the odds that a youth will use marijuana increase by 1.2 times. 

Exhibit 3-10. Logistic Regression Model of Marijuana Use 

Odds Ratio Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 

Male 0.945 0.22 0.60 1.48

Age 1.197** 0.07 1.07 1.34

Nonwhite 1.074 0.26 0.67 1.73

Time at risk 0.990 0.01 0.98 1.00

RAP court 0.799 0.31 0.37 1.72

Intervention1 0.146*** 0.06 0.06 0.33

Intervention2 0.181*** 0.08 0.08 0.44

63 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Odds Ratio Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 

Time1 0.859 0.19 0.56 1.32

Time2 0.701 0.17 0.43 1.14

JBTC 10.882*** 3.64 5.65 20.98

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.01 level; *** 

statistically significant at the 0.001 level 

Use of Illicit Drugs Other than Marijuana. Self-reported use of illicit drugs other than 

marijuana is shown in Exhibit 3-11. JBTC youth were much more likely at all interviews to 

report having used an illicit drug than were non-JBTC youth. Although there were small 

declines for both groups from the baseline reports to the 6-month interview reports, reports 

increased slightly at 12 months. Overall, there was little change for either group over the 18 

months included in the three interviews. 

41%

16%

37% 45%

15%

20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

baseline 6 month 12 month

JBTC non-JBTC

Exhibit 3-11. Self-Reported Use of Illicit Drugs Other Than Marijuana in the Previous Six 

Months. 

The logistic regression model results for use of illicit drugs other than marijuana are 

presented in Exhibit 3-12. Participation in JBTC had no significant effect on whether a youth 

used illicit drugs other than marijuana in the first (Intervention1) or second (Intervention 2) six64 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
month period of JBTC. The only variables significantly associated with use of illicit drugs other 

than marijuana are age and gender. As youth get older, the odds that they will use illicit drugs 

other than marijuana increase. For every year increase in age, the odds that a youth will use 

illicit drugs other than marijuana increase by 1.17 times. Interestingly, females are significantly 

more likely than males to use illicit drugs other than marijuana. The odds of a female using an 

illicit drug other than marijuana are 1.65 times higher than they are for males. 

Exhibit 3-12. Logistic Regression Model of Use of Illicit Drugs Other Than Marijuana 

Odds Ratio Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 

Male 0.607* 0.14 0.39 0.95

Age 1.172** 0.07 1.04 1.32

Nonwhite 0.894 0.22 0.55 1.46

Time at risk 0.991 0.00 0.98 1.00

RAP court 0.884 0.32 0.43 1.81

Intervention1 0.867 0.34 0.40 1.87

Intervention2 0.962 0.43 0.40 2.32

Time1 0.692 0.21 0.39 1.24

Time2 0.731 0.24 0.38 1.41

JBTC 3.359*** 0.89 2.00 5.65

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.01 level; *** 

statistically significant at the 0.001 level 

3.2.3 Recidivism 

We used the Oregon State Juvenile Justice Information System (JJIS) to determine if a 

youth recidivated (i.e., was re-arrested) once they were enrolled in the JBTC evaluation study. 

Recidivism was modeled in the same manner as the substance use measures presented above. 

Since we are using administrative rather than self-reported interview data as the outcome, all 306 

who were initially recruited into the JBTC evaluation study are retained in the recidivism

models. We examined both any new arrest and the number of arrests. The baseline measures for 

both variables exclude the arrest that was associated with inclusion in the study. 

Any Arrest. The percentages of each group who had one or more arrests during each of 

the three six-month periods are shown in Exhibit 3-13. At baseline, the JBTC youth were 

almost twice as likely as the non-JBTC youth to have been arrested at least one additional time

beyond the arrest leading to their inclusion in the study. Specifically, 39% of JBTC youth 

compared with 20% of non-JBTC youth had one or more (additional) arrests during the 6 months 

65 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
preceding the baseline interview. The results for the second 6-month period (i.e., 6 months post 

baseline or, for the JBTC youth, the first 6 months of program participation) are similar to those 

observed prior to risk assessment—a greater percentage of JBTC youth was arrested than nonJBTC youth (43% versus 18%, respectively). Notably, by the 12-month interview, the 

percentage of JBTC youth with one or more arrests was 22%, nearly equivalent to the 18% arrest 

rate for the non-JBTC group. The decline in the rate of recidivism was greater, therefore, for the 

JBTC youth than for their non-JBTC counterparts. Specifically, although the JBTC youth were 

deemed to be at much higher risk at baseline than the non-JBTC youth, by 12 months postbaseline, they were equally likely to have been arrested during the previous 6 months. 

A number of variables are significantly associated with recidivism, measured as any arrest 

during the 6-month period. As can be seen in Exhibit 3-14, participation in JBTC during the 

second six-month period (Intervention2) is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of arrest. 

If a youth participated in JBTC, the odds that they were re-arrested during the second six-month 

period decreased by 2.36 times, a statistically significant effect at the 0.05 level. 

22%

43% 39%

18% 18%

20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

baseline 6 month 12 month

JBTC non-JBTC

 

Exhibit 3-13. Percentage Arrested One or More Times in the Previous Six Months. (The 

baseline measure excludes the arrest associated with inclusion in the study.) 

66 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Other things equal, nonwhite youth had greater odds of re-arrest (odds ratio of 1.63), as did 

males (odds ratio of 2.10), while older youth had lower odds (odds ratio of 0.91). RAP court 

participants also had lower odds of re-arrest--participating in RAP court reduces the odds of a 

youth being re-arrested by 2.11 times (other things equal). Finally, additional time at risk (i.e., 

the time a youth is not in a residential or detention facility) is associated with a decrease in the 

odds that a youth will be re-arrested. Although the direction of this relationship seems 

counterintuitive, it likely reflects the fact that those who get arrested are being detained and thus 

are at risk for shorter time periods. 

Exhibit 3-14. Logistic Regression Model of Likelihood of Re-arrest 

Odds Ratio Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 

Male 2.103*** 0.39 1.46 3.02

Age 0.909* 0.04 0.84 0.99

Nonwhite 1.626** 0.29 1.15 2.31

Time at risk 0.988*** 0.00 0.98 0.99

RAP court 0.474** 0.12 0.29 0.77

Intervention1 1.351 0.50 0.66 2.77

Intervention2 0.424* 0.17 0.19 0.94

Time1 0.744 0.20 0.43 1.28

Time2 0.793 0.25 0.43 1.46

JBTC 2.72*** 0.76 1.57 4.70

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.01 level; *** 

statistically significant at the 0.001 level 

Number of Arrests. In addition to modeling if a youth was re-arrested, we modeled the 

number of times a youth was re-arrested. Exhibit 3-15 shows the mean numbers of arrests in 

each 6-month period for the JBTC and non-JBTC groups. For JBTC and non-JBTC youth, the 

mean numbers of arrests for this period were 0.63 (sd = 1.02) and 0.22 (sd = 0.46), respectively. 

Across all subjects, the mean number of arrests in the 6 months before participating in the 

evaluation (excluding instant offense) was 0.42 (sd = 0.81). 

67 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
0.66

0.30

0.63

0.23

0.29 0.22

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

baseline 6 month 12 month

JBTC non-JBTC

Exhibit 3-15. Average Number of Arrests in the Previous Six Months. (The baseline 

measure excludes the arrest associated with inclusion in the study.) 

During the 6-month period between baseline and initial follow-up interview, the average 

numbers of arrests for the two groups were similar to the pre-baseline period (the baseline 

measure excludes the instant arrest)— of 0.47 arrests (sd = 0.891) overall; 0.66 (sd = 0.927) and 

0.29 (sd = 0.819) arrests for the JBTC and non-JBTC youth, respectively. The average number 

of arrests for the JBTC participants was nearly equivalent to that of the non-JBTC group during 

the 6-to-12-month period—JBTC and non-JBTC youth had an average of 0.30 (sd = 0.610) and 

0.23 (sd = 0.565) arrests, respectively. Overall, between the 6- and 12-month interviews, study 

participants experienced 0.26 (sd = 0.527) arrests. 

We estimated negative binomial models of number of arrests during each six-month 

period. The results of this estimation are shown in Exhibit 3-16. As can be seen, a number of 

variables are significantly associated with the number of times a youth is re-arrested. In 

particular, participation in JBTC during the second six-month period (Intervention2) is 

associated with a decrease in the number of re-arrests. Being nonwhite and being male are 

68 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
associated with an increase in the number of times a youth is re-arrested. Aging, however, is 

associated with a decrease in the number of times a youth is re-arrested. Participating in RAP 

court is also associated with a decrease in the number of times a youth is re-arrested and 

additional time at risk (i.e., the time a youth is not in a residential or detention facility) is 

associated with a decrease in the number of times a youth is re-arrested. Again, this relationship 

is due to the fact that those who get arrested, and especially those who are arrested multiple 

times, are being detained thus reducing their time at risk. 

Exhibit 3-16. Negative Binomial Model of Number of Re-arrests 

Incidence Rate

Ratio 

Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 

Male 1.785*** 0.30 1.29 2.47

Age 0.874*** 0.03 0.82 0.94

Nonwhite 0.394* 0.18 1.08 1.81

Time at risk 0.992*** 0.002 0.99 1.00

RAP court 0.522*** 0.09 0.37 0.74

Intervention1 0.745 0.21 0.43 1.30

Intervention2 0.385** 0.12 0.21 0.72

Time1 1.163 0.26 0.75 1.81

Time2 0.947 0.23 0.58 1.53

JBTC 3.133*** 0.66 20.7 4.75

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; ** statistically significant at the 0.01 level; *** 

statistically significant at the 0.001 level 

3.2.4 Educational Performance and Family Relationships 

Evaluations of interventions often focus on negative outcomes (e.g., re-arrest) in an 

attempt to determine if the intervention under study was effective at preventing or reducing the 

prevalence of negative outcomes. Interventions, however, can also produce positive outcomes in 

addition to preventing negative outcomes. Youth were asked a number of questions about 

various aspects of their lives, some of which enabled us to determine how aspects of their lives 

changed over time. A number of education, family functioning, and employment measures were 

created and tested. Two measures on which the JBTC and non-JBTC participants differed 

significantly were educational performance and family relations. Questions that feed these 

measures were not asked at baseline because the Lane County DYS stipulated that the baseline 

interview be very brief. Youth were, however, asked about their educational performance and 

family relations during the 6- and 12-month follow-up interviews. The questions were phrased 

69 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
so that youth were asked to indicate how a given situation has changed since six months ago. At 

the six-month interview, for example, youth were asked, “How is your educational performance 

now compared to 6 months ago?” The 6- and 12-month questions therefore reflect how the 

situation has changed since the baseline and 6-month interviews, respectively. Youth were then 

able to respond using the following responses: it’s better, it’s about the same, and it’s worse. 

We combined the responses to these items from the 6- and 12-month interviews to identify 

the apparent trend over the 12-month period following baseline. In particular, we classified each 

trend as better, the same, or worse. The possible responses at each of the follow-up interviews 

and the overall trend are shown in Exhibit 3-17. 

Exhibit 3-17 Response Combinations and Overall Trend for Positive Outcomes 

Response 

Combination 

6-month Interview

Response 

12-month Interview

Response 

Overall Trend 

1 Better Better Better

2 Better Same Better

3 Better Worse Worse

4 Same Better Better

5 Same Same Same

6 Same Worse Worse

7 Worse Better Better

8 Worse Same Worse

9 Worse Worse Worse

Exhibit 3-18 displays the overall-response trends for the educational performance 

measure. A significantly larger proportion of the JBTC participants reported an improving trend 

in terms of education performance compared with youth who were not participating in JBTC 

(91% vs. 69%; p<0.01). A larger proportion of the non-JBTC youth reported that their 

educational performance essentially remained the same over the 12-month period (0% vs. 21%; 

p<0.01), while roughly equal proportions said their performance worsened. 

 

70 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
91%

0%

9% 10%

21%

69%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Better** Same** Worse

JBTC non-JBTC

* statistically significant at the 0.05 level 

** statistically significant at the 0.01 level 

Exhibit 3-18. The Proportion of JBTC and Non-JBTC Youth Who Reported Doing Better, 

The Same, and Worse in Terms of Educational Performance 

Exhibit 3-19 shows the overall-response trends for the family relations measure. Youth 

were asked, “How are you getting along with your family now compared to six months ago?” 

Again, youth were able to respond: better, about the same, and worse. A significantly larger 

proportion of the JBTC participants reported an improving trend in terms of family relations 

compared with youth who were not participating in JBTC (84% vs. 69%; p<0.01). However, a 

larger proportion of JBTC youth also reported doing worse in terms of family relations (14% vs. 

4%; p<0.01). A larger proportion of the non-JBTC youth reported that their family relations 

essentially remained the same over the 12-month post-baseline period (2% vs. 27%; p<0.01). 

71 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
84%

2%

14%

4%

27%

69%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Better** Same** Worse

JBTC non-JBTC * statistically significant at the 0.05 level 

** statistically significant at the 0.01 level 

Exhibit 3-19. The Proportion of JBTC and Non-JBTC Youth Who Reported Doing Better, 

The Same, and Worse in Terms of Family Relations 

3.3 Summary

Results from our analyses suggest that outcomes of the JBTC evaluation are largely 

positive. JBTC participation was associated with the following outcomes: 

• Increased access to AOD treatment 

• Reduced use of marijuana (but not alcohol, or illicit drugs other than marijuana) 

• Reduced recidivism as measured by re-arrest 

 Additionally, descriptive data from the 6- and 12-month follow-up interviews suggest that 

JBTC may have improved school outcomes and family relationships for participants. 

72 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
4 JBTC Cost-Effectiveness Evaluation Results 

In this section, we build on the positive evaluation findings reported in the previous section 

and estimate the cost effectiveness of the JBTC program. We first provide details on the 

approach to the analysis and then present our findings. 

4.1 Perspective and Method 

When undertaking any cost-effectiveness analysis, one must first decide on the appropriate 

analytic perspective. The chosen perspective is important in determining the relevant cost 

domains and how they should be measured (Gold et al., 1996; Hargreaves et al., 1998). To 

estimate costs, we took the taxpayers’ perspective, which includes the relevant costs incurred by 

all publicly funded agencies and organizations directly involved with JBTC. We did not include 

costs directly incurred by youth in JBTC nor did we include any costs incurred by the youth’s 

families. 

Cost-effectiveness analysis involves collecting and analyzing cost data, collecting and 

analyzing effectiveness data, and then combining the results from the cost and effectiveness 

analyses. The chosen perspective of the analysis determined which agencies’ and organizations’ 

cost data we collected and analyzed. We categorized these organizations into the following 

domains: police; assessment; detention; treatment; case management; supervision; and 

incentives and rewards. We collected data on each study participant’s use of resources. 

Multiplying this measure of utilization by the cost per unit of resource used produced an estimate 

of the cost incurred for each youth. All cost data included employee benefits and administrative 

overhead. This overhead reflects support services, such as secretarial support, as well as 

maintenance and utility costs that would vary with the resources directly provided to youth 

participating in the program. 

The effectiveness analyses used the results for the outcome evaluation, described in 

Section 3. The cost and effectiveness results were then combined to estimate a costeffectiveness ratio for each statistically significant effectiveness outcome. The cost-effectiveness 

ratio expresses the cost of achieving a one unit change in the effectiveness measure. For 

example, consider the outcome of rearrest within one year. The cost-effectiveness ratio 

generates an estimate of the cost necessary to avert one youth from being arrested within one 

year. 

73 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
4.1.1 Cost Estimation 

We estimated costs over each of eight domains: initial screening and assessment, urine 

analyses, case management, detention, arrest, inpatient substance abuse and mental health 

treatment, outpatient substance abuse and mental health treatment, and incentives and rewards. 

For each domain, we collected utilization data on the number of times a study participant came

into contact with agencies in the domain, and the unit cost of each contact. Most of the unit costs 

were derived from personal interviews with staff at the Department of Youth Services (DYS). 

Utilization data were obtained from the JBTC Management Information System (MIS), Oregon 

Juvenile Justice Information System (JJIS), and the Oregon Health Plan Client Process 

Monitoring System (CPMS). 

For the court appearances and probation domains, we were able to estimate unit costs but 

were unable to obtain reliable utilization data, thus these domains were omitted from the 

analyses. This omission is likely to underestimate the costs associated with youth both in the 

JBTC program and those not in the program. Moreover, the JBTC program has a raised level of 

supervision and court involvement, thus, because youth in the JBTC program are likely to spend 

more time in court than non-JBTC youth, the additional cost of the JBTC program is likely 

underestimated. 

For the treatment cost domain, the utilization data only reliably yielded whether a youth 

attended treatment during a period of time, rather than the intensity of treatment received. 

However, we needed to account for the intensity of treatment, because treatment intensity – 

number of outpatient visits or number of inpatient nights – determines costs. To impute 

treatment intensity, we used the DYS management information system to estimate treatment 

costs for youth in JBTC. These estimates were then used to impute by demographic 

characteristics for all youth. Appendix 2 details the sources of utilization data and cost data and 

the unit costs. 

After estimating unit costs and gathering utilization data in each domain, our methodology 

for estimating the costs of JBTC is straightforward. For example, the cost of detention for a 

study participant is the days in detention during the study period multiplied by the cost of 

detention per day. These costs were then averaged across participants who were in JBTC and 

compared to the average for participants not in JBTC. 

74 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
4.1.2 Cost Results: Descriptive Statistics 

Exhibit 4-1 shows the descriptive comparison of costs for the six months before the 

baseline interview. These estimates help describe participants immediately before they were 

recruited into the study. Over all domains combined, costs on average for those participants who 

were inducted into JBTC were $501 and costs for those not inducted into JBTC were $388. This 

difference was not statistically significant (p=0.47). Of the component domains, two had 

differences between the JBTC and non-JBTC groups that were statistically significant, arrest and 

assessment. The mean arrest costs for the JBTC participants were $80, compared to the mean of 

arrest costs for non-JBTC participants of $28 (p<0.001). This difference in arrest costs likely 

reflects a higher rate of offending by JBTC youth in the six months prior to baseline. The 

difference in the mean of assessment costs ($6; p<0.001) was likely significant because 

assessment costs were more commonly borne by JBTC participants. 

Exhibit 4-1. Average Costs (and Standard Deviations) by Domain and JBTC Status: Six 

Months before Baseline 

Domain Cost JBTC (N = 149) non-JBTC (N=157) 

Assessment * $5.64 (22.30) $0 (0)

Treatment $128.82 (559.19) $143.44 (594.16)

Case management $6.89 (44.82) $3.19 (34.09) 

Detention $278.07 (1659.52) $210.53 (1500.66)

Urine analysis $2.10 (6.87) $2.99 (7.06) 

Arrest * $79.74 (128.39) $28.18 (58.3) 

Incentive $0.02 (.25) $0 (0)

Total Costs $501.28 (1730.69) $388.34 (1603.1)

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level 

Across both groups of participants, the most expensive domains were arrest, detention, and 

treatment. Detention costs on average were highest for both groups ($278 for JBTC; $211 for 

non-JBTC); treatment costs were the second most expensive domain ($129 for JBTC; $143 nonJBTC); and arrest costs were the third most expensive domain ($80 for JBTC; $28 for nonJBTC). These three cost domains account for approximately 97% of the total costs for both 

75 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
groups of participants. As demonstrated below, to a large extent changes in use of resources in 

these domains drive the cost analysis results. 

Exhibit 4-2 shows how average costs by domain vary by JBTC status for the period from

baseline to the six month follow-up. The average costs demonstrate that after the baseline 

interview JBTC participants used more treatment and more criminal justice resources. 

Moreover, JBTC participants incurred greater costs than non-JBTC participants in all domains 

and all these differences were statistically significant. The two domains with the most notable 

differences were detention and treatment. The mean detention cost for those in JBTC was 

$2554, which was significantly larger than the $795 for those not in JBTC. Similarly, the mean 

treatment costs of $1,104 for those in JBTC were significantly higher than the costs for those not 

in JBTC ($152). 

Exhibit 4-2. Average Costs (Standard Deviation) By Domain and JBTC Status: Baseline to 

Six-Month Follow-Up 

Domain Cost JBTC (N = 149) non-JBTC (N = 157) 

Assessment* $77.65 (34.98) $4.16 (19.32) 

Treatment* $1104.12 (1182.80) $151.95 (603.97) 

Case management* $171.74 (171.96) $7.17 (46.31) 

Detention* $2553.99 (3821.13) $795.06 (2880.32) 

Urine analysis* $51.83 (102.87) $12.33 (12.77) 

Arrest* $84 (117.19) $37.03 (103.46) 

Incentive* $5.50 (11.98) $0.03 (0.4) 

Total Costs* $4048.8 (3936.24) $1007.74 (3055.49) 

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level 

Case management costs also increased for both those in JBTC and those not in JBTC, with 

a particularly large increase for those in JBTC. The mean cost for those in JBTC during this 

baseline to six-month follow-up period was $172, compared to only $7 for those not in JBTC. 

Reflecting the trend across all domains, total costs were higher when compared to the prebaseline means previously presented and were much higher for those in JBTC than those not in 

JBTC. Mean costs across all domains for those in JBTC were $4,049, more than four times the 

mean of $1008 for those not in JBTC. 

76 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Exhibit 4-3 presents average costs by JBTC status for the final six-month period, that 

between the 6- and 12-month follow-up. These average costs make a useful comparison to those 

presented in Exhibits 4-1 and 4-2. 

Detention costs for both groups of youth fell slightly from the previous period. Detention 

costs for JBTC youth were, on average, $2,015 during this period, whereas the detention costs 

for non-JBTC youth were $498, on average, a difference that is statistically significant at the 

0.05 level. Although overall treatment costs fell from the preceding period (baseline to 6-month 

follow-up), treatment costs for both groups reflected the JBTC program’s emphasis on 

connecting youth to treatment. Average treatment costs were $341 for JBTC participants and 

$57 for non-JBTC participants; the difference in costs between those in JBTC and those not in 

JBTC was statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 

Arrest costs for JBTC and non-JBTC youth were lower than the previous period. In the 6- 

to 12-month follow-up period, the mean was $37 for JBTC youth and $29 for non-JBTC youth. 

Reflecting the design of the JBTC program, average case management costs continued to rise 

from baseline; case management costs were $207 for JBTC youth. For non-JBTC youth, case 

management costs continued to be low, with a mean of $5 in the 6- to 12-month follow-up 

period. The difference in case management costs between the two groups was statistically 

significant. Costs over all domains were driven largely by detention, treatment, and case 

management costs. The mean total cost over the 6- to 12-month follow-up for those in JBTC 

($2,628) was significantly higher than that for those not in JBTC ($592). 

Exhibit 4-3. Average Costs (Standard Deviation) By Domain and JBTC Status: Six-Month 

To Twelve-Month Follow-Up 

Domain Cost JBTC (N = 149) non-JBTC (N = 157) 

Assessment $3.13 (16.86) $0.59 (7.45)

Treatment* $340.98 (1124.52) $57.48 (366.97)

Case management * $207.42 (184.02) $4.99 (36.60)

Detention * $2014.67 (4088.63) $498.38 (2686.72)

Urine analysis * $11.15 (46.48) $1.00 (5.33)

Arrest $37.33 (77.06) $28.98 (71.37)

Incentive * $13.93 (25.75) $0.38 (4.79)

Total Costs* $2628.61 (4234.96) $591.81 (2744.60) 

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level 

77 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
4.1.3 Cost Results: Multivariate Analyses 

Although comparing averages is instructive, it fails to control for three types of factors that 

may be driving any apparent association between JBTC status and cost. These factors are the 

same as those controlled for in the outcome evaluation described above in Section 3. The first 

type is the influence of variables observed in the data, such as gender. The second type is the 

influence of factors not observed in the data, such as a youth’s motivation to engage in treatment. 

This consideration is potentially important, given that the simple averages presented in Exhibit 

4-1 suggest that JBTC youth are more involved in criminal activities at baseline, for example. 

The third type is the effect of maturation bias (sometimes called ‘regression to the mean’). 

Youth likely enter the study at a time of crisis in their lives, thus improvements in outcomes 

could be expected regardless of whether they participate in JBTC. As discussed in Section 3, the 

analytic approach used here controls for potential bias caused by these factors and allows us to 

accurately estimate the association between JBTC and costs. Results are expressed as the 

incremental cost per youth associated with JBTC. Exhibit 4-4 presents these results by domain 

as well as across all domains combined. 

The results unambiguously show that the incremental total costs associated with JBTC 

were positive, and thus JBTC youth were more expensive to supervise and treat. All else held 

equal, the average youth used $1535 (p=0.001) more resources under JBTC for the baseline to 

six-month follow-up period and $457 more resources for the 6- to 12-month follow-up period 

(p=0.04). In the baseline to 6-month period, the domains that most greatly contributed to the 

total increment were treatment (incremental cost = $958; p=0.001), detention (incremental cost = 

$317; p=0.09), and case management (incremental cost = $159; p<0.001). The fact that the 

detention cost estimate is not significant reflects the large standard error, which in turn reflects a 

large amount of overall variation in the length of detention periods experienced by youth. 

The remaining four domains – assessment, urine analysis, incentives and rewards, and 

arrest – all had typically lower incremental costs compared to detention, treatment, and case 

management. Reflecting the fact that assessments occurred early on in the study and were more 

common among JBTC youth, the increment associated with assessment costs was higher in the 

baseline and 6-month period (incremental cost = $66.94, p = 0.001) than the 6- to 12-month 

period (incremental cost = -$5; p = 0.08). Similar reasoning holds for urine analysis costs where 

78 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
incremental costs were higher in the baseline to 6-month period (incremental cost = $42; p < 

0.001) than the 6- to 12-month period (incremental cost = $11.9; p = 0.06). Incremental 

incentive and reward costs were small, positive and statistically significant in both follow-up 

periods, again reflecting the fact that JBTC youth were given incentives and rewards, whereas 

non-JBTC youth were not. 

Incremental arrest costs were negative for both periods, meaning that JBTC was associated 

with cost savings related to arrest in both periods. However, these savings were small. For the 

first follow-up period, a youth in JBTC cost $9 less than a non-JBTC youth (p=0.51), and for the 

second follow-up period, a youth in JBTC cost $50 less than a non-JBTC youth (p=0.001). 

Total incremental cost associated with JBTC fell from $1535 in the first follow-up period 

(baseline to 6-months) to $457 in the second follow-up period (6-months to 12-months). This 

decrease reflects the finding that, with the exception of case management and incentive/reward 

costs, incremental costs in most domains fell, with the largest reductions in the domains that 

contributed most to the overall costs. Between the two periods, incremental treatment costs fell 

from $958 to $284 and incremental detention costs fell from $317 to $6. 

Exhibit 4-4. Incremental Cost (Standard Deviation) of JBTC Program 

Domain Cost Baseline to 6 months 6 to 12 months 

Assessment $66.94 (2.90) * -$5.02 (2.90) 

Treatment $958.37 (118.11) * $284.53 (118.36)*

Case management $158.94 (13.15) * $201.27 (13.18) *

Detention $317.19 (183.98) $6.41 (184.45

Urine analysis $41.87 (6.23) * $11.90 (6.25) 

Arrest -$9.03 (13.72) -$49.51 (13.75)* 

Incentive $5.66 (1.57) * $14.15 (1.57) *

Total Costs $1534.59 (218.16) * $457.43 (218.69)* 

* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level 

4.1.4 Combining Cost and Effectiveness 

The most practical tool for assessing costs relative to effectiveness is the CostEffectiveness Ratio (CER). As described in the introductory section above, the costeffectiveness ratio expresses the additional cost necessary to achieve an incremental change in an 

outcome. For the sake of practicality, we computed the cost-effectiveness ratio using total costs, 

79 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
but did not compute the ratio for each of the domains that comprise total cost. Also, we limited 

the cost-effectiveness ratio analysis to the two outcomes with statistically significant 

effectiveness results—marijuana use and arrest. 

The cost-effectiveness ratio is defined as: 

CER = ∆cost / ∆effectiveness 

CER is the cost-effectiveness ratio, ∆cost is the difference between the average cost of 

those who participated in JBTC and the average cost of those who did not, and ∆effectiveness is 

the difference in average effectiveness for the two groups. For the effectiveness measure, we use 

the estimates from the outcome evaluation presented in Section 3. For the cost estimates, we 

used the incremental cost estimates previously presented. Because we independently evaluated 

the impact of JBTC for the 6-month and 12-month follow-up periods, we estimated separate 

cost-effectiveness ratios for the 6-month and 12-month follow-up periods. 

Recall that significant effectiveness results were found for the 12-month arrest outcome

and the 6- and 12-month marijuana outcomes. The results in Section 3 indicate that for the 

second follow-up (months 6 to 12), JBTC was associated with a reduction in the odds of a youth 

being arrested by 58%. With regard to any marijuana use, JBTC was associated with reductions

in the odds of a youth using marijuana by 85% for the first follow-up and by 82% for the second 

follow-up period. Exhibit 4-5 shows the cost-effectiveness ratio estimates that combine these 

effectiveness estimates with the cost estimates. The estimates show the additional average cost 

of using JBTC to either prevent one youth from being arrested or one youth from consuming 

marijuana. 

Exhibit 4-5. Cost-Effectiveness Ratio Estimates for JBTC Program 

Outcome Baseline to 6 months 6 to 12 months 

Marijuana use $4739 $1590 

Arrest effectiveness not significant $3751 

The estimates suggest that the cost of using JBTC to avert one youth from marijuana use 

was $4,739 for the first follow-up period (baseline to 6 months) and $1,590 for the second 

follow-up period (6 months to 12 months after baseline). The large reduction in the cost80 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
effectiveness ratio from the first to second follow-ups was driven by the reduction in the 

incremental cost between the two periods. The odds of marijuana use associated with JBTC 

remained similar across the two periods, but the incremental cost fell from $1535 to $457. The 

estimates also suggest that the cost of using JBTC to avert one youth from having at least one 

arrest was $3,751. 

The estimates of the cost-effectiveness ratio can be readily transformed into an 

approximate reinterpretation that may be useful for decision-makers. By taking the reciprocal of 

the estimates in Exhibit 4-5, the estimates can be re-stated to predict the reductions in marijuana 

use and the reductions in arrests associated with a $10,000 increase in spending on JBTC. 

Specifically, for each additional $10,000 spent on JBTC, we could expect to observe during the 

baseline-to-6 month period 2.11 fewer youth using marijuana. Following 6 months of services 

(i.e., during the 6-to-12-month post-baseline period), the $10,000 would be expected to result in 

about 6 fewer marijuana users and about 3 fewer arrests. 

Exhibit 4-6. Implied Reductions in the Number of Youth Who Avoid Arrest and 

Marijuana Use from Spending $10,000 on JBTC 

Outcome Baseline to 6 months 6 to 12 months 

Marijuana use 2.11 6.33 

Number of youth with at 

least one arrest 

effectiveness not significant 2.67 

4.1.5 Summary

In this study, we collected detailed cost information for a comprehensive array of cost 

domains. We then estimated the cost per youth from the tax-payer perspective, and calculated 

the incremental impact of JBTC on costs while controlling for a variety of factors. The results 

show that on average at the 6-month follow-up, a youth in JBTC consumed $1535 more taxpayer resources than a youth not in JBTC. At the 12-month follow-up, on average, a youth in 

JBTC incurred $457 higher costs than a youth not in JBTC. 

The greatest cost drivers were treatment and detention. As youth became connected with 

the treatment system, case management costs also increased. Over the two follow-up periods, 

the incremental cost associated with treatment and detention fell markedly, which in turn drove 

the fall in incremental total cost. 

By combining the incremental cost estimates with the results of particular effectiveness 

analyses, we estimated the additional cost necessary to avert youth from marijuana use and 

81 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
arrest. The cost-effectiveness ratio estimates indicated that at the 6-month follow-up the cost of 

diverting a youth from using marijuana was $4,739. Reflecting an overall fall in incremental 

costs from the first to the second follow-up, this cost at 12 months fell to $1,590. The cost at 12 

months of diverting a youth from being arrested was $3,751. 

82 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
5 Conclusions 

In 1998, the Lane County, Oregon Department of Youth Services (DYS) was awarded a 

cooperative agreement from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to implement a Juvenile 

Breaking the Cycle (JBTC) program. The JBTC Program is an ambitious effort to effect major 

changes in the lives of juvenile arrestees by enlisting a spectrum of county and state agencies to 

provide (1) immediate identification of substance abuse problems at the time of arrest (or 

apprehension), (2) assessment to establish the degree of the substance abuse problems and the 

presence of other psychological or criminogenic risk factors, (3) the integrated delivery of 

services, and (4) the systemic use of sanctions, incentives, and rewards to encourage compliance 

with treatment and desistance from criminal involvement. The program was designed to take 

advantage of what had been learned from research on the development and evaluation of 

multifaceted interventions to address the complex configuration of problems that many druginvolved juvenile offenders have. In particular, JBTC built upon what had been learned about the 

implementation and effects of programs that attempt to integrate substance abuse treatment with 

other programmatic interventions (mental health, family, etc.) and monitoring activities (urine 

analysis, court monitoring, etc.). This report provides the results of the JBTC evaluation, 

including those from the process, outcome, and cost-effectiveness evaluation components. 

The process evaluation reveals that Lane County was successful in implementing many of 

the key components of the JBTC program. DYS staff members and representatives of the 

services community indicated that JBTC improved communication, coordination, and 

collaboration between agencies working with high risk youth. It is this level of collaboration, 

both internal and external to an organization, that allows for the proper implementation and more 

importantly institutionalized and sustained implementation of projects and initiatives that are 

originally funded through federal grants or contracts. JBTC was also viewed as having increased 

the availability of appropriate services—particularly AOD treatment—to which youth could be 

referred and to have resulted in better services for girls. Staff felt that improvements were still 

needed in the types of family and mental health services to which youth could be referred and 

that more services were needed for the rural areas of the county. 

83 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The increased use of urinalysis to detect illicit drugs and to hold youth accountable for 

their substance use was also viewed as a significant benefit of the JBTC program. Adjustments 

were made to the administration of testing during JBTC implementation to improve its 

usefulness. These adjustments included changing the administration of the testing so that it was 

random rather than scheduled and incorporating temperature strips to prevent tampering with 

provided urine samples. 

The RAP Court program, which operated as a juvenile drug court in concert with the JBTC 

program, was also seen as highly effective in managing the behavior of high risk youth. A 

deficiency of the RAP Court program is capacity, in that the court can serve only 25 youth. 

There is also a need to carefully select the judicial administrator(s) of such a component to 

ensure their judicial demeanor is appropriate for this type of program. 

Our outcome analyses indicate that youth who participated in JBTC increased their access 

to AOD treatment, reduced their use of marijuana (but not alcohol, or illicit drugs other than 

marijuana), and reduced their recidivism as measured by re-arrest and number of re-arrests 

compared to youth who did not participate in JBTC. These positive outcome findings are 

especially impressive considering that JBTC were deemed to be at higher risk than their 

comparison counterparts. Additionally, descriptive data from the 6- and 12-month follow-up 

interviews suggest that JBTC may have improved school outcomes and family relationships for 

participants.

We combined incremental cost estimates with the outcome evaluation results to estimate 

the cost of achieving each statistically significant outcome (e.g., averting a youth from marijuana 

use or arrest). The cost-effectiveness ratio estimates indicated that at the 6-month follow-up, if 

the only impact of JBTC had been the reduced use of marijuana, the cost of diverting a youth 

from using marijuana was $4,739. Reflecting an overall fall in incremental costs from the first to 

the second follow-up, this cost at 12 months fell to $1,590. The cost at 12 months of diverting a 

youth from being arrested was $3,751, again under the assumption that only arrests were affected 

(and, e.g., not marijuana use). 

In conclusion, the Lane County implementation of the JBTC Program was successful on 

several fronts. The collaborators were successful in implementing many key components of the 

program and continue to operate the JBTC program. Key stakeholders are aware of and continue 

to try to address weaknesses in the program, including limitations in mental health services and 

84 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
development of appropriate and sufficient services for youth living in rural areas. Importantly, 

JBTC appears to have increased access to treatment during the first six months of program

participation, which coupled with UA testing, significantly reduced marijuana use. The decline 

in marijuana use persisted into months 6 through 12 following entry into JBTC. During this later 

6-month period, the arrest rate of JBTC participants dropped significantly and was nearly 

equivalent to the arrest rate of the comparison group. 

85 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
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86 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

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87 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix 1. Response Bias Analyses 

Youth were recruited to participate in the evaluation of the JBTC program between April 

15, 2000 and November 15, 2001. During this period, approximately 925 youth were 

administered risk assessments by DYS. Of these, we received contact information on 587 youth 

(62%) from DYS in a timely manner (i.e., immediately after risk assessment).13 Of the 587 

youth we actively recruited for the study, we were able to interview 306 or 52%. The inability to 

locate a parent in order to obtain parental consent and to find the youth were the primary reasons 

interviews were not conducted. We had relatively few outright refusals when we were able to 

locate the parent(s) and youth. However, for this response bias analysis, we are comparing those 

youth who were successfully recruited into the study to all other youth who were risk assessed 

during our recruitment period, regardless of whether DYS provided their information to us or 

whether they had an actual opportunity to participate in the evaluation study. 

Of the 925 youth, we interviewed 50% (146 of 290) of the youth who were in JBTC and 

25% (160 of 635) of those who were not. We obtained administrative data from DYS on the 925 

youth who had been administered a risk assessment a conducted a response-bias analysis in an 

effort to determine whether the youth who participated in the study are noticeably different from

youth who did not. Overall, those who were recruited into the study differed significantly from 

those who were not. In particular, study participants as a group had higher risk assessment 

scores than those who did not participate. Exhibit A1-1 summarizes the results of significance 

tests comparing study participants with those who did not participate in the study. 

Exhibit A1-1. Study Participants Compared with Non-Participants 

Variable Group Means (s.d.) 

In Study Not in Study 

Test statistic 

AGE 15.10 (1,88) 15.86 (1.6) -5.91643***

SUBRISK 1.37 (1.36) 1.15 (1.2) 2.339719*

SCHOOLRI 2.17(1.22) 1.60 (1.33) 6.368735***

FAMRISK 2.68 (1.72) 2.00 (1.78) 5.443017***

TOTRISK 8.77 (3.99) 6.55 (4.45) 7.575269***

 

13 The procedures established to obtain referrals and information on risk-assessed youth soon after intake and risk

assessment were inadequate, particularly during the early part of the evaluation. Multiple DYS staff members had to

provide the information and coordination between these staff and the field interview staff was difficult to establish in

a manner that assured that cases weren’t lost to the evaluation. These communication issues were resolved as the 

evaluation progressed. 

88 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Group Means (s.d.) 

GENDER (% Male) 69.8% 78.5% 8.172**

***Significant at p < .001 level; ** significant at p < .01; * significant at p <.05 

These differences were not unexpected. Specifically, the lowest risk youth have the least 

exposure to DYS and are more likely to have parents who view the DYS experience as an 

aberration and who prefer to remove the youth from any reminder of the event that led them to 

DYS, increasing their reluctance to allow the youth to participate in interviews. This finding is 

also not surprising because 48% of the youth in our sample were in JBTC, in other words they 

had been identified as high risk by DYS, whereas only 23% of the non-study sample was 

enrolled in JBTC. Also, those participating in the study were on average younger than those who 

did not (15.1 vs. 15.9 years), and study participants were more likely to be female (30% vs. 

22%). The gender differences are somewhat surprising—but less so given reports from

interviewers that girls were more compliant in terms of willingness to participate and showing up 

for interviews. 

Because we knew there were major differences between the JBTC and non-JBTC youth, 

we stratified the population by JBTC status to examine for differences between study 

participants and non-participants but within and outside of JBTC. The purpose of these analyses 

was to determine how typical the participating JBTC youth were compared with the nonparticipating JBTC youth, as well as how typical the participating non-JBTC youth were 

compared with the non-participating non-JBTC youth. The results of these analyses inform our 

ability to draw inferences from the outcome evaluation. Specifically, if we found few or no 

differences between participants and non-participants in each group, we could confidently 

conclude that observed differences in outcomes could be properly allocated to all JBTC 

participants when compared with all other DYS-assessed youth. 

These stratified analyses suggest that the participating JBTC subjects were not 

significantly different from the non-participating JBTC subjects in terms of age and risk 

assessment scores. Results are shown in Exhibit A1-2. The gender difference remained, 

however, with girls disproportionately represented in the study (32% vs. 15%). Again, this 

finding is not surprising because girls proved to be more reliable and responsive throughout the 

study. 

 

89 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Exhibit A1-2. Study Participants Compared with Non-Participants—JBTC Youth 

Variable Group Means (s.d.) 

In Study Not in Study 

Test statistic 

AGE 15.39 (1.56) 15.70 (1.45) -5.91643***

SUBRISK 2.26 (1.19) 2.28 (1.08) 2.339719*

SCHOOLRI 2.61 (1.04) 2.44 (1.25) 6.368735***

FAMRISK 3.40 (1.59) 3.34 (1.85) 5.443017***

TOTRISK 11.35 (2.71) 11.29 (3.72) 7.575269***

GENDER (% Male) 68.5% 85.1% 11.63***

***Significant at p < .001 level; ** significant at p < .01; * significant at p <.05 

As can be seen in Exhibit A1-3, for the non-JBTC youth, the analyses suggest that study 

participants were significantly younger (15.39 vs. 15.70 years) and had higher risk scores (except 

for the substance abuse subscale). There was no difference in the gender representation between 

participants and non-participants in this group. 

Exhibit A1-3. Study Participants Compared with Non-Participants—Non-JBTC Youth 

Variable Group Means (s.d.) 

In Study Not in Study 

Test statistic 

AGE 14.82 (2.1) 15.91 (1.64) -5.91643***

SUBRISK 0.53 (.89) 0.81 (1.01) 2.339719*

SCHOOLRI 1.74 (1.23) 1.35 (1.25) 6.368735***

FAMRISK 2.00 (1.55) 1.60 (1.54) 5.443017***

TOTRISK 6.32 (3.43) 5.11 (3.58) 7.575269***

GENDER (% Male) 71.1% 76.4% 1.832

***Significant at p < .001 level; ** significant at p < .01; * significant at p <.05 

Given that JBTC was targeting higher risk youth in Lane County, the fact that the study 

recruited the riskiest subjects among the non-JBTC youth suggests that the quasi-experimental 

comparison group may be more comparable to the JBTC group than it otherwise may have been. 

Nonetheless, the results of the recruitment process, reflected in our response-bias analyses, 

suggest that our comparisons using interview data should be interpreted as how well JBTC 

participants fared in comparison with the riskier DYS youth who did not participate in JBTC. 

90 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix 2. Cost Data and Utilization Sources 

Exhibit A2-1. Sources for JBTC Program Evaluation Cost and Utilization Data 

Unit Unit Costs Utilization

Initial screening and 

assessment 

Per 

assessment 

Department of Youth 

Services (DYS) staff 

JBTC Management 

Information System (MIS)

Court Per 

appearance 

Cowell et al., 2002; 

staff time estimates 

Not available 

UA Per UA DYS Staff Oregon Juvenile Justice 

Information System (JJIS) 

Case management Per day DYS Staff MIS, number of days 

Detention Per night DYS Staff JJIS 

Arrest Per arrest City of Eugene Police 

Department 

JJIS 

Probation Per day DYS Staff Not available 

Inpatient and 

residential drug 

abuse tx 

Per youth Oregon Office of 

Medical Assistance 

Health Plans (OMAP) 

fee schedule 

Oregon Health Plan Client 

Process Monitoring System

(CPMS) and MIS 

Outpatient drug 

abuse tx 

Per youth OMAP fee schedule CPMS and MIS 

Incentives and 

rewards 

Per incentive 

or reward 

Study records MIS and DYS staff 

Note: All acronyms in the table are spelled out in the first instance of use. 

91 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.