Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Audit of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s New Jersey Regional 

Computer Forensic Laboratory 

Hamilton, New Jersey 

Audit Division 16-11 March 2016 
 

 

 

                                                            

AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S 

NEW JERSEY REGIONAL COMPUTER FORENSIC LABORATORY
 

HAMILTON, NEW JERSEY 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Regional Computer Forensic 

Laboratory (RCFL) Program is a partnership between the FBI and other federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies operating within a geographic area. In 

2001, Congress directed the Attorney General to establish new RCFLs, and provide 

support for existing RCFLs, to ensure that they have the capability to perform 

forensic examinations of computer evidence related to criminal activity and 

cyberterrorism, as well as to train and educate federal, state, and local law 

enforcement personnel and prosecutors about computer crime. The USA Patriot Act 

of 2001 authorized $50 million in annual appropriations to develop this capacity.1 

In 2002, the FBI established the RCFL National Program Office (NPO) to oversee the 

establishment and operations of the RCFLs. 

This audit report focuses on the operations of the New Jersey RCFL (NJRCFL), 

located in Hamilton, New Jersey. The objectives of the audit were to assess the: 

(1) efficiency and effectiveness of the NJRCFL’s performance, (2) effectiveness of 

the NJRCFL’s outreach and partnership with the law enforcement community, and 

(3) NJRCFL’s case management system and its efforts to address any service 

request backlog. To accomplish these objectives, we interviewed officials from the 

NJRCFL and reviewed documents related to the NJRCFL’s structure, its 

accomplishments, and operational standards. We also interviewed the eight 

agencies that participate with the NJRCFL. 

We found that the NJRCFL experienced mixed results in achieving its various 

performance goals in fiscal years 2011 through 2014. We found that although the 

FBI revised the definition of a backlog case, that reduced the number of backlog 

cases at the NJRCFL, a material backlog still existed as of June 2015. We found the 

backlog was attributable to a number of factors, but chief among them was the 

need for both more examiners and additional advanced training for those already 

conducting exams. However, we also found that participating agencies were 

generally satisfied with the work performed by the NJRCFL. 

In addition, similar to what we found in a previous audit at the Philadelphia 

RCFL, we identified material weaknesses in Cell Phone Investigative Kiosk (Kiosk) 

usage that, if not addressed, could leave the Kiosk vulnerable to abuse.2 A Kiosk 

allows users to quickly and easily view data stored on a cell phone, extract the data 

to use as evidence, put the data into a report, and copy the report to an electronic 

1

 Pub. L. No 107-56 (2001). 

2

 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Philadelphia Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory Radnor, Pennsylvania, Audit 

Report 15-14 (April 2015), 2-9. 

i 
 

 

 

storage device. Although FBI policy requires Kiosk users to confirm they possess 

the proper legal authority for the search of data on cell phones or loose media, we 

found that the Technical Assistance Form used by the NJRCFL did not require users 

to confirm the legal authority for the search conducted using the Kiosk. However, 

after our audit fieldwork was complete, the RCFL National Program Office 

introduced a mandatory electronic form to be used on Kiosks. Law Enforcement 

Officers logging onto a Kiosk are required to complete the mandatory electronic 

form and indicate the type of legal authority and the number of devices processed. 

The NJRCFL has implemented the new mandatory form, which mitigates the Kiosk 

weaknesses we previously identified. We also found that 26 percent of Kiosk users 

that examined a cell phone did not certify that they had completed self-paced or 

hands-on training as required by FBI policy. 

We also found that the current process used to capture data for the number 

of law enforcement personnel that the NJRCFL trained, did not include adequate 

supporting documentation. For example, training participants registered for 

courses online using a system managed by the RCFL National Program Office. The 

NJRCFL used that registration information to identify the number of individuals that 

participated in training; however, we found that not everyone who registered for a 

class actually attended the class, and that the registration data was never updated 

to reflect actual attendance information. As a result, the FBI was unable to 

accurately determine the degree to which the RCFL program accomplished one of 

its core missions. 

Our report contains three recommendations to help minimize potential abuse 

or mishandling of the Kiosk program, maintain adequate supporting documentation 

to support training, and manage the current backlog. 

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AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S 

NEW JERSEY REGIONAL COMPUTER FORENSIC LABORATORY
 

HAMILTON, NEW JERSEY 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1 

FBI Regional Computer Forensics Laboratories ................................ 1 

New Jersey Regional Forensic Laboratory ....................................... 2 

Office of the Inspector General Audit Approach ............................... 3 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................... 4 

Performance .............................................................................. 4 

Cell Phone Kiosk Program ............................................................ 5 

Training .................................................................................... 8 

Law Enforcement Agency Participation ........................................... 9 

 Case Backlog ........................................................................... 10 

Conclusion............................................................................... 14 

Recommendations .................................................................... 14 

STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS.................................................. 16 

STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS ................ 17 

APPENDIX 1: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY ........................ 18 

APPENDIX 2: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE 

 TO THE DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ........................................................ 20 

APPENDIX 3: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND
 

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT ............... 22 
 

 

                                                            

AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S 

NEW JERSEY REGIONAL COMPUTER FORENSIC LABORATORY
 

HAMILTON, NEW JERSEY 

INTRODUCTION
 

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Regional 

Computer Forensic Laboratory (RCFL) Program was created in response to law 

enforcement’s urgent demand for expert digital forensics services and training. It 

is a partnership between the FBI and other federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies operating within a geographic area. In 1999, the FBI piloted 

the first RCFL in San Diego, California, as a full service forensics laboratory and 

training center devoted to examining digital evidence in support of criminal 

investigations and the detection and prevention of terrorist acts. 

In 2001, Congress directed the Attorney General to establish more RCFLs 

and provide support for existing RCFLs to ensure that each had the capability to: 

(1) perform forensic examinations of intercepted computer evidence related to 

criminal activity and cyberterrorism; (2) train and educate federal, state, and local 

law enforcement personnel, and prosecutors in computer crime; (3) assist federal, 

state, and local law enforcement in enforcing federal, state, and local laws related 

to computer-related crime; (4) facilitate and promote the sharing of federal law 

enforcement expertise and information about the investigation, analysis, and 

prosecution of computer-related crime, including the use of multijurisdictional task 

forces; and (5) to carry out such other activities as the Attorney General considers 

appropriate. The USA Patriot Act of 2001 authorized $50 million in annual 

appropriations to develop these capabilities.3

 In 2002, the FBI established the RCFL 

National Program Office (NPO) to oversee the establishment and operations of the 

RCFLs. In June 2015, the FBI’s RCFL Program consisted of 16 RCFLs. 

FBI Regional Computer Forensics Laboratories 

RCFLs were established to strengthen law enforcement computer forensic 

capabilities throughout the United States and have provided forensic expertise and 

training to thousands of law enforcement personnel. The primary forensic 

responsibilities of an RCFL are to: 

1. Conduct a comprehensive examination of digital evidence; 

2. Provide a complete and timely report to the contributor; 

3. Provide testimony as needed; and 

3

 The USA Patriot Act is an antiterrorism law enacted by Congress in October 2011 in 

response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Title VIII of the USA Patriot Act directs the 

Attorney General to create RCFLs to strengthen the fight against terrorism. 

1 
 

 

 

 

                                                            

 

 

4. Act as a regional focal point for digital evidence issues. 

According to the FBI, the key goals of the RCFL Program are to: 

1. Provide timely, professional, and technically advanced digital forensic 

services to law enforcement agencies in an RCFL’s service area;
 

2. Fully utilize applied science and engineering capabilities to support digital 

forensic examinations; 

3. Increase the confidence of investigators, prosecutors, and judges in the 

digital forensics examination discipline through standardized training and 

forensic protocols; 

4. Provide responsive and flexible services in support of diverse investigative 

programs; and 

5. Meet legal and administrative requirements of diverse judicial systems. 

General information on the governance of RCFLs, RCFL personnel and 

Program Membership, RCFL accreditation, and a summary of backlog service 

requests at RCFLs for fiscal years (FY) 2011 through 2013 can be found in our 

previous audit report on the Philadelphia RCFL.4 

New Jersey Regional Forensic Laboratory 

The New Jersey Regional Forensic Laboratory (NJRCFL), located in Hamilton, 

New Jersey, was established in 2004 and obtained its American Society of Crime 

Laboratory Directors (ASCLD)/ Laboratory Accreditation Board (LAB) Legacy 

Accreditation in 2006, and its ASCLD/LAB International Accreditation in 2012.5 

From FYs 2011 through 2014, the NJRCFL had a combined budget of $452,470 that 

was used for rent, equipment, supplies, administrative services, and other items 

such as travel and training.6 

The NJRCFL’s mission is to provide its customers with high quality digital 

forensics services and training. In FY 2014, the NJRCFL had 29 staff members from 

4

 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Philadelphia Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory Radnor, Pennsylvania, Audit 

Report 15-14 (April 2015), 13-15. 

5

 The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD) is a nonprofit professional 

society of crime laboratory directors and forensic science managers dedicated to providing excellence 

in forensic science. The ASCLD/LAB Accreditation Program, currently known as the ASCLD Legacy 

Accreditation Program, was the first accreditation program in the world for crime laboratories. The 

Legacy Accreditation Program has been replaced by the International Accreditation. 

6

 The NJRCFL is located within a New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety (NJ L&PS) 

facility. There is a current Memorandum of Agreement in place which states, “FBI will not reimburse 

L&PS for... apportionment for space rent, building utilities, building security, custodial services....” 

2 
 

                                                            

8 participating agencies, including: 8 FBI Special Agents, 6 FBI support staff, 10 

sworn task force officers and 4 non-sworn task force officers, and 1 FBI contractor 

(a system administrator).7

 The NJRCFL provides law enforcement agencies in New 

Jersey with pre-seizure consultation, on-site seizure and collection, duplication and 

storage of electronic equipment and other digital evidence, examination of digitally 

stored media, and courtroom testimony. Organizationally, the NJRCFL is a 

laboratory facility operated out of the FBI’s Operational Technology Division (OTD) 

under the RCFL NPO and the third largest RCFL by staff size. Within the NJRCFL, 

the Lab Director position is funded by the OTD as a temporary position and not a 

permanent position within the Newark Field Office. All other FBI positions assigned 

to the NJRCFL report to the Newark Field Office. 

Office of the Inspector General Audit Approach 

The objectives of our audit were to assess the: (1) efficiency and 

effectiveness of the NJRCFL’s performance, (2) effectiveness of the NJRCFL’s 

outreach and partnership with the law enforcement community, and (3) NJRCFL’s 

case management system and its efforts to address any service request backlog. 

To accomplish these objectives, we interviewed officials from the NJRCFL and 

reviewed documents related to the NJRCFL’s organizational structure, 

accomplishments, and operational standards. We also interviewed representatives 

from the 8 NJRCFL participating agencies and 1 non-participating agency to obtain 

their opinions on the effectiveness of the NJRCFL operations. To assess the 

NJRCFL’s efforts to address its service request backlog, we examined the FBI’s 

Computer Analysis Response Team’s (CART) database information to determine if a 

backlog existed. After determining that the NJRCFL had a backlog, we reviewed the 

NJRCFL requests for examination for unassigned cases and aging reports for open 

cases to determine the cause of the backlog. 

The results of our review are detailed in the Findings and Recommendations 

section of this report. 

7

 The eight participating agencies at the NJRCFL are the New Jersey State Police, the Essex 

County Prosecutor’s Office, the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office, the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s 

Office, the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office, the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, the FBI 

Newark Field Office, and the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office. The Somerset County Prosecutor’s 

Office was a participating agency through FY 2013; however, in FY 2014 it was no longer able to 

participate because its lone assignee became a part-time employee and the NJRCFL rules require 

participating agencies to provide at least one full-time employee. 

3 
 

 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

NEW JERSEY RCFL PERFORMANCE, PARTNERSHIPS, 

AND CASE BACKLOG 

RCFLs are responsible for providing timely and high quality 

digital forensics services and training to the FBI and their RCFL 

partners. The NJRCFL had mixed success in meeting its various 

performance goals in FYs 2011 through 2014. We identified 

weaknesses in the Cell Phone Investigative Kiosk (Kiosk) 

program that, if not addressed, could increase the risk of abuse 

and mishandling in the NJRCFL’s Kiosk. Further, we also 

identified weaknesses in the training program that could result 

in the misreporting of the number of personnel trained, one of 

the key goals of the RCFL program. Finally, we found that 

NJRCFL had a backlog as of June 2015. Despite the backlog, 

participating agencies were still satisfied with the work 

completed at the NJRCFL. 

Performance 

Performance for RCFLs is measured across a wide range of services – 

including laboratory performance, partnerships, and casework. We focused our 

audit testing on the capabilities that the USA Patriot Act of 2001 cited as the basis 

for the creation of the RCFLs. 

Forensic Examinations, Assisting Law Enforcement, Sharing Expertise 

The FBI’s Operational Technology Division maintains the CART Database, 

which tracks forensic examination work from inception to completion. In our audit 

of the Philadelphia RCFL, we assessed the reliability of the information in the CART 

Database and found it to be reliable for the purpose of evaluating performance 

achievements during the period covered by our audit. Additionally, the OTD 

recently identified the need for a more robust digital evidence tracking system. 

OTD has engineered and is in the process of fielding its new Digital Evidence 

Management System (DEMS) to better capture digital forensic matrices and replace 

the CART Database. The NJRCFL is in the process of transitioning from the CART 

Database to DEMS. 

The NJRCFL is the third largest RCFL by staff size and number of cases. The 

performance of an RCFL can be measured by different sets of data, including the 

number of service requests received, examinations completed, and terabytes of 

data processed. Table 1 provides a summary of these metrics included in our 

period of review for this audit. 

4 
 

 

 

                                                            

 

 

Table 1 

CART Database Performance Data 

For the NJRCFL in FYs 2011 through 2014
 

Performance Area FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 Average 

Service Requests Received 535 494 422 470 480 

Exams Completed 476 423 352 423 419 

Terabytes Processed 302 346 458 227 333

 Source: OIG Analysis of CART Database Data 

Cell Phone Kiosk Program 

The Cell Phone Investigative Kiosk (Kiosk) allows users to quickly and easily 

view data stored on a cell phone, extract the data to use as evidence, put the data 

into a report, and copy the report to an electronic storage device such as a compact 

disk.8

 In addition to the Kiosk, there is also a Loose Media Kiosk, which processes 

digital evidence stored on loose media, such as a DVD or memory card. Kiosks may 

be located at an FBI field office, FBI resident agency, or at an RCFL.9

 The NJRCFL 

Kiosk, which was first available for use in December 2008, is located in the 

reception area of the NJRCFL, which is outside of the FBI laboratory. To use the 

Kiosk, law enforcement personnel are required to schedule an appointment. 

However, the NJRCFL does not require Kiosk users to sign its Visitors Log since 

users do not go beyond the reception area or enter the NJRCFL’s laboratory space. 

While the Kiosk is housed in the reception area, the cables necessary to connect the 

Kiosk to a cell phone are not stored with the Kiosk. Instead, the NJRCFL examiner 

responsible for supervising the Kiosk provides the cables to a visiting user. Without 

the cables, cell phones cannot be connected to the Kiosk, ensuring that the 

examiner on duty would have to know that a person was attempting to use the 

Kiosk because the examiner would have to supply the appropriate cable. This 

procedure provides the appropriate level of assurance that a person cannot use the 

Kiosk without the knowledge of the examiner on duty. 

To make an appointment to use the Kiosk, generally, users email the NJRCFL 

Management and Program Analyst or the Operational Support Specialist to schedule 

their visit. According to the Director, sometimes one investigator will schedule a 

Kiosk appointment and another investigator will show up in his or her place, or 

8

 Unlike a full exam by a Certified Forensic Examiner, the report generated by a law 

enforcement officer using the Kiosk might not be acceptable as evidence at trial. However, its value in 

providing police and agents with quick access to the information on a cell phone without having to 

wait for a full exam to be conducted, which could be delayed for weeks or months, is often critical in 

helping law enforcement obtain investigative leads, gather evidence for additional arrest or search 

warrants or to convince a defendant who doesn’t contest the charges to plead guilty. 

9

 According to the FBI, non-FBI law enforcement personnel are allowed to use the Kiosks 

located in FBI field offices and resident agencies, but FBI personnel must escort them at all times. 

5 
 

 

 

 

more than one investigator may accompany the scheduled investigator to use the 

Kiosk. According to the Director, NJRCFL personnel assume that all of the 

personnel who arrive for a scheduled appointment are part of the same case. 

However, he said that the NJRCFL does not verify that everyone arriving for a 

scheduled appointment is working on the same investigative matter. 

As a result of the procedures and practices described above, we found that 

the NJRCFL did not have adequate controls over the access to and use of its Kiosk. 

FBI policy requires Kiosk users to confirm they possess the proper legal authority 

for the search of data on cell phones or loose media. During our fieldwork, neither 

the FBI nor the NJRCFL provided any confirmation to show that NJRCFL Kiosk users 

possessed the proper legal authority to search for evidence on the devices 

examined. In addition, the FBI did not provide us with any information regarding 

controls in place at the NJRCFL to ensure that users do not use the Kiosk for nonlaw enforcement matters, an inherent risk of Kiosks without adequate controls. 

We reviewed two versions of NJRCFL’s Technical Assistance Form, which 

Kiosk users are required to complete and return to the NJRCFL for their records. 

The first version of the form, used from January to June 2011, included the user’s 

name, agency, type of case, case number, and the type of technical assistance 

requested and/or provided. It also included a signature line. In June 2011, the 

form was revised to add the following four statements and corresponding signature 

lines: 

	 I certify that the legal authority indicated above is valid and authorizes a 

preview/examination of the items described above and this 

preview/examination does not exceed the scope of such authorization. 

	 I certify that I have taken the Kiosk training (when applicable). 

	 I understand that I must conduct all processing with the Kiosk and am 

responsible for testifying to any results generated. I also understand that 

laboratory personnel will not conduct any processing, prepare reports as to 

processing, or testify regarding results. 

	 I certify that I have AUSA [Assistant United States Attorney] concurrence to 

conduct this preview (FBI/LMK only). 

While the first of the four statements asks each user to certify that he or she 

has valid legal authority to examine the device in question, the form does not 

request that the person completing the form list the specific legal authority for the 

examination, nor does it even offer a list of possible legal authorities for conducting 

such a search. When we brought this concern to the attention of the NJRCFL 

Director, he said he was not aware of this omission. Because the Technical 

Assistance Form used by the NJRCFL did not require users to cite the legal authority 

for their search each time they used the Kiosk, we were unable to determine if the 

Kiosk users had the appropriate legal authority to use the Kiosk. 

6 
 

 

                                                            

As discussed in our previous report on the Philadelphia RCFL, we believe that 

although the Kiosk is an efficient tool for Law Enforcement Officers to use to 

examine digital evidence that may not require the extensive examination of a 

Certified Forensic Examiner, they are potentially vulnerable to serious abuse.10 In 

its July 2015 response to our audit, the FBI stated that the RCFL NPO introduced a 

mandatory electronic form on the front end of all Kiosks requiring that any Law 

Enforcement Officer logging on to the Kiosk provide the type of legal authority and 

the number of devices processed. This new mandatory electronic form was not 

being used at the NJRCFL Kiosk at the time of our initial visit. 

We reviewed all 330 Technical Assistance Forms that were made available to 

us during our fieldwork to verify that each form had the required content and 

signatures. We found that more than a quarter of the forms did not have a 

signature attesting that the user had completed the required Kiosk training. 

According to the FBI’s Digital Evidence Corporate Policy Directive and Policy 

Implementation Guide (Implementation Guide), prior to Kiosk use, self-paced or 

hands on training is required.11 Training is required to familiarize the user with the 

Kiosk equipment to prevent improper usage. In addition, as shown in Table 2, we 

also found that five percent of the forms were missing a signature for the statement 

concerning the user’s responsibility for testifying about the results generated by the 

Kiosk and two percent were missing all of the signatures. 

Table 2 

OIG Review of NJRCFL Technical Assistance Forms 

Frequency Total 

Universe Percent 

Missing All Signatures 2% 

Missing Kiosk Training Signature 26% 

Missing “Testifying to any Results” 

Signature 

5% 

5 330 

77 301
 

18 330 

Source: OIG Analysis of NJRCFL Technical Assistance Forms 

We believe that without completing the required training, Kiosk users could 

mishandle or improperly use the Kiosk or the results generated by it. However, 

after our audit fieldwork was complete, the NJRCFL implemented the new 

mandatory electronic form requiring Law Enforcement Officers to cite the legal 

authority allowing the officer to search the device and the number of devices 

processed. 

10 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Philadelphia Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory Radnor, Pennsylvania, Audit 

Report 15-14 (April 15), 13-15. 

11 FBI Operational Technology Division, Digital Evidence Corporate Policy Directive and Policy 

Implementation Guide, January 03, 2014. 

7 
 

 

 

 

Training 

The RCFL program’s mission includes training law enforcement personnel 

around the nation on topics related to seizing and handling digital evidence, using 

FBI-developed preview tools, and understanding digital forensic examination 

results. The NJRCFL included expanding the number of tools on which laboratory 

examiners are trained as one of its annual goals for FYs 2013 and 2014. 

Additionally, during that period, the NJRCFL offered training to law enforcement 

personnel that included the proper techniques for seizing, handling, and examining 

digital evidence. 

According to information provided by the FBI, the NJRCFL trained 422 

personnel in FY 2011, 493 in FY 2012, 303 in FY 2013, and 301 in FY2014. 

However, as described below, we were unable to verify the accuracy of these 

reported accomplishments because the NJRCFL did not maintain adequate 

documentation for training. As shown in Table 3, the FBI accomplishment data did 

not match the training records made available to us by the NJRCFL. 

Table 3 

NJRCFL Number of Persons Trained
 

Fiscal Year FBI Accomplishment 

Data 

Training 

Records 

Percent 

Difference 

2011 7% 

2012 21% 

2013 -2% 

2014 8% 

422 394 

493 388 

303 309 

301 277 

Source: OIG Analysis of NJRCFL Training Records and FBI Data 

As a result of not having adequate documentation, the accomplishment data 

reported by the FBI on the number of personnel trained was not reliable. Until 

spring 2014, personnel attending training offered by the NJRCFL registered using 

the RCFL NPO’s Training Registration System (TRS). All training data, including the 

attendance roster, was maintained on the registration website. However, according 

to a NJRCFL staff member, the instructors at the NJRCFL never retrieved an 

updated attendance sheet from TRS and therefore could not remove those 

registered participants who did not actually attend. 

According to the FBI, in spring 2014, the TRS was compromised after an 

intruder gained unauthorized access, and it was taken out of service until a more 

secure website could be deployed. During our audit, we compared the number of 

participants listed on the NJRCFL’s training records to the information reported in 

the accomplishment data the FBI provided to the Office of the Inspector General 

(OIG). As the comparison in the Table 3 above shows, the training records did not 

support the information reported to the OIG. The percent difference between the 

FBI accomplishment data and the NJRCFL training records ranged from 2 to 

21 percent. According to a NJRCFL staff member, since TRS was taken offline, the 

8 
 

 

 

 

 

 

NJRCFL has been responsible for printing the class roster, creating and maintaining 

a sign-in sheet, and subsequently reporting training data to the RCFL NPO. 

In addition to the training conducted at the NJRCFL, staff also conduct 

seminars and speak outside of the NJRCFL. For this outside training, NJRCFL 

personnel did not require participants to sign-in. Instead, attendance at these 

events was estimated. These estimates were reported to the RCFL NPO and 

included in the Annual Report. Because no supporting documentation was available 

for training conducted outside the NJRCFL, we could not reconcile the numbers 

provided by the FBI or those subsequently included in the Annual Reports. 

Because the RCFL NPO maintains the TRS, the challenges encountered by the 

NJRCFL are not unique to the NJRCFL. In our previous report on the Philadelphia 

RCFL, we recommended that the FBI create a secure automated system to register 

users for training held at local RCFLs, record user attendance at RCFL training, and 

report training data to the NPO. Following this audit, the FBI stated that while the 

RCFL NPO had sought to develop a technical solution to track all training, the cost 

and current budget do not permit such a training registration system at this time. 

Despite this, we recommend that the FBI develop interim procedures to accurately 

capture all training registrations and attendance for training conducted at the 

NJRCFL and at off-site locations. 

Law Enforcement Agency Participation 

According to the FBI, partnering is a central part of the RCFL Program and 

the key to its success. As of May 2015, there were 8 participating agencies at the 

NJRCFL. To become a participating agency, a law enforcement agency must sign a 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and detail personnel certified as forensic 

examiners to the local RCFL. According to officials from participating agencies, 

performance reviews of law enforcement personnel assigned to the NJRCFL are 

performed by their parent agency. Therefore, each agency is responsible for the 

conduct of its own NJRCFL assignee. 

Since partnering with other agencies is critical to the RCFL Program’s 

success, through 2014, the NJRCFL has made it a goal to expand the number of 

participating agencies. However, NJRCFL did not successfully meet this goal in 

2011 and 2012, but had success in adding three new agencies in 2013 and 2014. 

According to the NJRCFL Director, efforts to recruit additional agencies have not 

always been successful because: (1) travel time to the NJRCFL has been 

problematic for some agencies, and (2) at least one agency utilized the same 

forensic services that are available at the NJRCFL from another source at no cost 

and without a commitment for personnel to be detailed to the agency. 

We interviewed all eight participating agencies and one non-participating 

agency to obtain their opinions on the effectiveness of the NJRCFL operations. 

Overall, the participating agencies were satisfied with the services provided by the 

NJRCFL. However, when it came to the timeliness of examinations, the 

9 
 

 

                                                            

participating agencies agreed that the timeliness of examinations was an issue, but 

it did not present a problem for their daily operations. 

Case Backlog 

Beginning in January 2014, the FBI defined a ‘backlog’ request as a service 

request that had not been assigned to an examiner within 30 days of the request. 

Prior to January 2014, a ‘backlog’ request was any request not closed within 60 

days of receipt from the requesting agency. According to the FBI, the change was 

necessary because the original definition did not take into account the complexity of 

each case. According to the January 2014 Implementation Guide, to ensure an 

effective and efficient workflow, supervisors should assign service requests as 

examiners become available. At no time should a service request be assigned to 

avoid being identified as a backlog. 

According to the FBI, the goal of the new definition is to more accurately 

track any backlog by identifying requests that an RCFL does not have the resources 

to address. To help keep an accurate accounting of backlogged requests, FBI policy 

now limits service requests to no more than 10 unique items.12 The case agent or 

requesting agency should list the items in the service request and rank them in 

order of priority to the investigation. 

Using these criteria, we reviewed the case backlog and aging reports from 

the CART Database and interviewed the NJRCFL Director. Based on our review, the 

NJRCFL carries a backlog of requests, both assigned and unassigned. As shown in 

the figure below, using the new backlog definition, the NJRCFL carried 15 backlog 

service requests at the time of our review. However, when using the previous 

backlog definition, the NJRCFL had 194 service requests that were not closed within 

60 days, including 39 that were more than a year old. 

12 A unique item is considered a laptop, cell phone, desktop, tablet, etc. An exception is 

made for numerous items of the same type of disposable media (e.g., CDs, DVDs, flash drives and SD 

cards less than 1 GB), which can be counted as one item in a service request. 

10
 
 

 

                                                            

Table 4 

Backlog Service Requests by Days Open 

13

26

78

47

30

0

0

0

2

13

0 20 40 60 80 100 

2+ years 

1 year -2 years 

6 months - 1 year 

91 - 180 days 

31 to 90 days 

Amount 

Days Open

Unassigned Within 30 Days 

Not Closed Within 60 Days 

Source: OIG Analysis of FBI Data 

The NJRCFL Director requires that each examiner close at least 2 cases each 

month. However, according to NJRCFL’s Director, Deputy Director, and the Chief 

Forensic Examiner, this goal has become increasingly difficult to achieve as the 

storage capacity of the items to be reviewed has dramatically increased over the 

past three years. 

In December 2014, all RCFLs were informed by FBI’s Operational Technology 

Division that service requests that remain open for more than a year are seen as a 

high risk and could potentially impact the FBI’s operational cycle and ability to 

conduct effective and timely investigations. Therefore, a new measurement for 

CART service requests open for 1 year or more has been added to the Director’s 

Scorecard.13 The FY 2015 target is to have less than 20 percent of total service 

requests open for longer than 1 year. According to the FBI, less than 20 percent is 

a target that all CART programs are requested to work towards; it is not a 

mandate. As shown in the table below, even when using a different definition of 

what constitutes a backlog, the NJRCFL is still trying to reduce its backlog. 

13 The Director receives a Scorecard monthly that provides the same information as the 

service request but at the program level and encompasses the entire CART/RCFL Programs. 

11
 
 

                                                            

 

Table 5 

Status of Open Service Requests 

Month 

(2015) 

Percentage of Total Service 

Requests Open for a Year or More 

January 

February 

March 

April 

May 

June 

17% 

17% 

17% 

19% 

21% 

22% 

Source: FBI Data 

Efforts to Address Service Request Backlog 

Based on our interviews, the NJRCFL has made several efforts to manage 

their case backlog, including bringing on more examiners, implementing policies 

specific to reducing the backlog that have been approved by the NJRCFL Local 

Executive Board (LEB), streamlining the examination process, and providing 

additional advanced training to staff.14 However, these efforts have not effectively 

reduced the case backlog. 

According to the Director, the clearest solution to the backlog is bringing on 

additional examiners. However, the NJRCFL wants to balance the need for more 

examiners that come with more participating agencies against the need to complete 

the additional examination work. The Director estimated that it takes 

approximately 14-24 months to get a new RCFL employee through the training 

program to become a Certified Forensic Examiner. According to the 

Implementation Guide, Forensic Examiners in Training (FET) are only authorized to 

perform forensic tasks under the supervision of a Certified Forensic Examiner, 

which therefore limits the amount of exams they can complete. Accordingly, the 

NJRCFL Director cited their high percentage of FETs as a cause for the backlog. 

Table 6 

NJRCFL Certified Forensic Examiner and Forensic Examiners in Training 

Staffing Levels by Fiscal Year 

Fiscal Year Forensic Examiner Forensic Examiner 

in Training TOTAL 

2011 20 

2012 17 

2013 17 

2014 20 

16 4 

12 5 

13 4 

13 7 

Source: FBI Data 

14 The Local Executive Board (LEB) sets policies for the NJRCFL. The LEB is comprised of the 

head of each of the participating agencies, or a chosen representative. 

12 
 

 

 

NJRCFL’s LEB implemented new policies to help manage the case backlog. In 

FY 2011, the LEB adopted a policy to only process non-participating cases that 

involved crimes that were at least 2nd degree offenses, except for crimes against 

children. In FY 2012, the LEB established that all case-related cellular devices must 

be processed on the Kiosk prior to laboratory submission. This policy was finetuned in FY 2013 requiring all agencies to provide a “Page 2” in conjunction with 

any cellular device or loose media service request. Page 2 is the supplemental form 

for cellular phones that accompanies all service requests that include a cellular 

telephone as a submission. As mentioned earlier, all cellular devices must be 

analyzed utilizing the Kiosk before being submitted for a forensic examination. If 

the Kiosk is unable to recover the necessary information, the cellular telephone will 

be assigned to a forensic examiner for further analysis. No cellular telephone will 

be accepted for examination without this supplemental form. 

The NJRCFL sought to streamline the examination process through the Digital 

Crime Analysis Position (DCAP), the Virtual Machine Forensics Platform, and 

Centralized Imaging. DCAP was designed to enable state and local cases to have 

their review process performed remotely by the persons most familiar with the 

case, the investigator. DCAP is similar to FBI’s Case Agent Investigative Review in 

that it helps to free up the specialized examiner time for case processing and not 

image and review analysis. At the time of our audit, there were six stations with 

DCAP access available for state and local use at the NJRCFL. Additionally, three 

participating agencies obtained DCAP access outside of the NJRCFL; however, none 

of the three agencies were able to establish the remote connection at the time of 

our audit – which may be a result of certain firewall issues. 

According to the NJRCFL Director, participating agencies have been 

encouraged to use DCAP; however, he acknowledged that while this was supposed 

to alleviate some of the backlog issues, it may have actually caused some 

additional delays. He said that while it is a great idea to have the investigator most 

closely related to a particular case reviewing the data; it may take additional time 

because of the investigator’s competing priorities, which may result in un-reviewed 

data on the network. Additionally, many of the participating agencies we 

interviewed stated that DCAP is cumbersome to navigate and too time consuming 

to use. 

The Virtual Machine Forensics Platform enables NJRCFL examiners to work 

numerous cases on a single workstation. Additionally, Centralized Imaging is a tool 

that can image numerous computers in a large case simultaneously, reducing the 

wait time for pending cases to begin examination. According to the NJRCFL 

Director, Centralized Imaging has worked for the NJRCFL, especially with exigent, 

large cases; however, it also has not helped reduce the backlog as much as he 

thought it would. According to the NJRCFL Director, RCFL examiners have found 

that the Virtual Machine Forensic Platform was more troublesome than helpful in 

streamlining the examination process. 

According to the NJRCFL Director, in recent years, there had been very few 

advanced examiner training classes offered by the FBI and none were offered 

during sequestration. According to the FBI, the training budget has been 

13
 
 

 

 

 

significantly reduced every year for the past 5 years. The Digital Forensic Analysis 

Section, Digital Sciences Development and Staffing Unit has encouraged examiners 

to find local sources of training and has made funds available to allow examiners to 

attend advanced training. When a class was advertised, before an examiner could 

sign up for it, it would be either cancelled or quickly filled by other RCFL examiners. 

The more advanced training an examiner receives, the greater the examiner’s skill 

sets. A well-rounded examiner with multiple skill sets can complete most, if not all, 

of the different service requests received (e.g., Linux, Mac, cell phone, etc.). 

However, examiners cannot examine particular evidence if they have not received 

certification in that specific area. For example, if an iPhone arrives at the NJRCFL, 

the examiner must be cell phone certified as well as Mac certified. The Director 

explained that at least part of the backlog could be attributed to the lack of 

advanced training. Some of his examiners are unable to get certification in 

specialized areas because the training is unavailable. Therefore, NJRCFL has 

examiners that cannot complete certain exam requests and must wait until the 

certified examiners are available to complete the task. 

One of the primary responsibilities of an RCFL is to provide a complete and 

timely report to the requestor. Because the NJRCFL maintains a backlog, the 

timeliness with which the requestor receives the report can be problematic and may 

hinder an investigation where digital evidence plays a significant role. As a result, 

we recommend that the FBI ensure that the NJRCFL continue to examine its 

backlog to determine the causes and to develop and implement new measures to 

address the causes. In its July 2015 response to our Philadelphia RCFL report, the 

FBI stated that the Forensic Operations Unit has been in contact with the RCFLs 

experiencing a backlog to determine the reason for the backlogs and to assist with 

addressing them on a weekly basis. Furthermore, the FBI stated that the RCFL 

NPO will temporarily transfer personnel to RCFLs that are unable to address the 

backlog on their own, or identify other RCFLs, Field Divisions, or Headquarters’ 

laboratories that are able to accept additional workload to help reduce the backlog. 

Conclusion 

In FYs 2011 through 2014, the NJRCFL experienced mixed results in 

achieving its various performance goals. We found that while a material backlog 

existed at the NJRCFL, participating agencies were still satisfied with the work 

performed there. We also found that the current process for training law 

enforcement personnel was inadequate. As a result, the FBI was unable to 

accurately determine the degree to which the RCFL program is accomplishing one 

of its core missions. Therefore, we make the following recommendations. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the FBI: 

1. Ensure compliance with the FBI’s Implementation Guide policy that requires 

Kiosk users to have taken proper training prior to Kiosk usage. 

14
 
 

 

2. Continue to examine NJRCFL’s backlog to determine the causes and to 

develop and implement new measures to address them. 

3. Develop interim procedures to accurately capture all training registrations 

and attendance for training conducted at the NJRCFL and at off-site locations. 

15
 
 

 

STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS 

As required by the Government Auditing Standards, we tested, as 

appropriate, internal controls significant within the context of our audit objectives. 

A deficiency in an internal control exists when the design or operation of a control 

does not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their 

assigned functions, to timely prevent or detect: (1) impairments to the 

effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) misstatements in performance 

information, or (3) violations of laws and regulations. Our evaluation of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s internal controls was not made for the purpose of 

providing assurance on its internal control structure as a whole. FBI management 

is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of internal controls. 

Through our audit testing, we did not identify any deficiencies in the FBI’s 

internal controls that are significant within the context of the audit objectives and 

based upon the audit work performed that we believe would affect the FBI’s ability 

to effectively and efficiently operate, to correctly state performance information, 

and to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. 

Because we are not expressing an opinion on the FBI’s internal control 

structure as a whole, this statement is intended solely for the information and use 

of the FBI. This restriction is not intended to limit the distribution of this report, 

which is a matter of public record. 

16
 
 

STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE 

WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS 

As required by the Government Auditing Standards we tested, as appropriate 

given our audit scope and objectives, selected transactions, records, procedures, 

and practices, to obtain reasonable assurance that FBI management complied with 

federal laws and regulations, for which noncompliance, in our judgment, could have 

a material effect on the results of our audit. FBI’s management is responsible for 

ensuring compliance with applicable federal laws and regulations. In planning our 

audit, we identified the following law that concerned the operations of the auditee 

and that was significant within the context of the audit objectives: 

 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act of 

2001). 

Our audit included examining, on a test basis, the FBI’s compliance with the 

aforementioned law that could have a material effect on the FBI’s operations, 

through interviewing FBI personnel, surveying NJRCFL participants, and reviewing 

program performance documentation. Nothing came to our attention that caused 

us to believe that the FBI was not in compliance with the aforementioned law. 

17
 
 

 

APPENDIX 1 

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Objectives 

The objectives were to review performance in the following areas: 

(1) assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the NJRCFL’s laboratory performance; 

(2) assess the effectiveness of the NJRCFL’s outreach and partnership with the law 

enforcement community; and (3) assess the NJRCFL’s case management system 

and its efforts to address its service request backlog. 

Scope and Methodology 

We conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We conducted work at the NJRCFL 

in Hamilton, New Jersey. 

In conducting our audit, we interviewed officials from the NJRCFL and from 

the eight participating agencies. We also reviewed documents related to the 

NJRCFL organizational structure, RCFL accomplishments, and operational standards. 

To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the NJRCFL’s laboratory 

performance, we examined the NJRCFL’s progress towards achieving its annual 

goals. We reviewed and compared the annual goals to the statistics maintained in 

the CART Database. We compared the number of participants listed on the training 

roster to the information reported in the accomplishment data the FBI provided to 

the OIG. In addition, we compared the number of law enforcement and non-law 

enforcement persons trained at the NJRCFL. 

To assess the effectiveness of the NJRCFL’s outreach and partnership with 

the law enforcement community, we interviewed representatives from NJRCFL 

participating agencies to determine the effectiveness of the work conducted at the 

NJRCFL. In addition, we assessed the practices regarding the NJRCFL Kiosk usage 

and training. 

To assess the controls surrounding the NJRCFL Kiosk usage, we reviewed the 

NJRCFL Technical Assistance Form for required items, selected a judgmental sample 

of NJRCFL Technical Assistance Forms and compared the names on the forms to 

those for whom an appointment was made. In addition we reviewed the forms to 

determine whether they contained the required signatures. 

To assess NJRCFL training practices, we compared the number that attended 

NJRCFL training as reported by the FBI in its Accomplishment Data to the number 

of sign-ins for those training classes. Additionally, we tabulated the number of Law 

Enforcement Officers and non-law enforcement persons trained. 

18
 
To assess the NJRCFL’s efforts to address its service request backlog, we 

examined CART Database information to determine if a backlog existed. Based on 

the information obtained, the NJRCFL had a backlog. We also reviewed the NJRCFL 

requests for examination for unassigned cases and aging reports for open cases. 

19
 
APPENDIX 2 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE

 TO THE DRAFT AUDIT REPORT 

20
 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Federal Bureau of I_nvestigation 

Washington, D. C. 20535-0001 

March 14, 2016 

The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz 

Inspector General 

Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20530 

Dear Mr. Horowitz: 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and 

respond to your office's report entitled, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 's New 

Jersey Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory Hamilton, New Jersey. 

We are pleased that you found, " ... the participating agencies were satisfied with the 

services provided by the NJRCFL." 

We agree that it is important to minimize potential abuse of the Kiosk program, maintain 

adequate supporting documentation to support training,. and manage backlogs appropriately. In 

that regard, we concur with your three recommendations for the FBI. 

Should you have any questions, feel free to contact me. We greatly appreciate the 

professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter. 

Acting Section Chief 

External Audit and Compliance Section 

Inspection Division 

Enclosure 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Response to the 

Office of the Inspector General's Audit of the FBI's New Jersey Regional 

Computer Forensics Laboratory, Hamilton, New Jersey 

Recommendation #1: Ensure compliance with the FBI's Implementation Guide policy that 

requires Kiosk users to have taken proper training prior to Kiosk usage. 

FBI Response to Recommendation #1: Concur. The Digital Forensics and Analysis Section 

(DFAS) will issue a new version of the Cell Phone Investigative Kiosk (CPIK) statistic report 

program which will require the Kiosk user to indicate, via a checkbox prompt at sign on, whether 

or not they have received the self paced training associated with the Kiosk. If user indicates they 

have not yet received training, a training document will open allowing the user to take a self 

paced course with step by step instructions on how operate the Kiosk. Once the user passes the 

course, they will be able to access the functionality of the Kiosk. DFAS will implement this 

update for all Regional Computer Forensic Laboratories (RCFLs) by the end of June 2016. 

Recommendation #2: Continue to examine NJRCFL's backlog to determine the causes and to 

develop and implement new measures to address them. 

FBI Response to Recommendation #2: Concur. Digital Evidence Field Operations (DEFO) 

personnel will continue to contact the RCFLs to assess the material backlog. Thus far, the 

material backlog is trending down for all RCFLs. Prior to the OIG Audit, the Field Operations 

Unit was contacting the RCFLs experiencing a backlog to determine reasons for the backlogs 

and to assist with addressing the backlog. Currently, DEFO personnel are contacting the RCFLs 

quarterly to assess the material backlog. DEFO will canvas and provide travel for Temporary 

Duty (TDY) assignments to RCFLs that are unable to address the backlog on their own. 

NJRCFL currently has no backlog. 

Recommendation #3: Develop interim procedures to accurately capture all training 

registrations and attendance for training conducted at the NJRCFL and at off-site locations. 

FBI Response to Recommendation #3: Concur. DEFO is currently working with the 

developers of RCFL.GOV to include a link on the web page allowing for the recording of 

trainees registered for training held at RCFLs and their personnel attendance, which will be 

reported back to the DEFO Unit. In discussions with the web developers, it was determined that 

security restrictions will not allow the RCFL.GOV website to function as a training portal at this 

time. Training is currently tracked manually and reported to the RCFL National Program Office 

by each RCFL. DEFO Unit continues to work to get this functionality added to the RCFL.GOV 

website or find another viable method of tracking. 

21
 
APPENDIX 3 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
 

ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS 

NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT
 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this audit report 

to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI’s response is incorporated in 

Appendix 2 of this final report. The following provides the OIG analysis of the 

response and summary of actions necessary to close the report. 

Recommendation: 

1.	 Ensure compliance with the FBI’s Implementation Guide policy that 

requires Kiosk users to have taken proper training prior to Kiosk 

usage. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the 

FBI stated that its Digital Forensics and Analysis Section will issue a new 

version of the Kiosk statistic report program which will require the Kiosk 

users to indicate, via a checkbox prompt at sign on, whether or not they 

have received the self-paced training associated with the Kiosk. If users 

indicate they have not yet received training, a training document will open 

allowing the user to take a self-paced course with step by step instructions 

on how to operate the Kiosk. Once the user passes the course, he or she will 

be able to access the functionality of the Kiosk. The FBI stated that it will 

implement this update for all Regional Computer Forensics Laboratories 

(RCFL) by the end of June 2016. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

Digital Forensics and Analysis Section has implemented a new version of the 

Kiosk statistic report program for all RCFLs that requires Kiosk users to 

indicate that they have taken the proper training or prompts the user to take 

the proper training prior to using the Kiosk. 

2. Continue to examine New Jersey RCFL’s (NJRCFL) backlog to 

determine the causes and to develop and implement new measures 

to address them. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the 

FBI stated that Digital Evidence Field Operations (DEFO) personnel will 

continue to contact the RCFLs to assess the material backlog. Further, the 

FBI stated that DEFO personnel are currently contacting the RCFLs quarterly 

to assess the material backlog. DEFO will canvas and provide travel for 

Temporary Duty assignments to RCFLs that are unable to address the 

backlog on their own. The FBI’s response also stated that the NJRCFL 

22
 
 

 

currently has no backlog, however, no documentation demonstrating that the 

backlog no longer exists was provided. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that DEFO 

personnel have assessed the RCFLs material backlog, the underlying causes 

and measures to address them and, when necessary, have provided 

additional resources to RCFLs unable to address their backlog on their own. 

We also ask that the FBI provide evidence to demonstrate that the NJRCL 

has no backlog currently, or as of the response to our audit report. 

3. Develop interim procedures to accurately capture all training 

registrations and attendance for training conducted at the NJRCFL 

and at off-site locations. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the 

FBI stated DEFO is currently working with the developers of RCFL.GOV to 

include a link on the web page allowing for the recording of trainees 

registered for training held at RCFLs and their personnel attendance, which 

will be reported back to the DEFO. In discussions with the web developers, it 

was determined that security restrictions will not allow the RCFL.GOV website 

to function as a training portal at this time. The FBI further stated that 

training is currently tracked manually and reported to the RCFL National 

Program Office by each RCFL. In addition, the DEFO continues to work to get 

this functionality added to the RCFL.GOV website or find another viable 

method of tracking. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the FBI 

has developed a viable method of tracking who registered for and attended 

training held at the RCFLs and off-site locations. 

23
 
 

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General 

(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity 

whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, 

abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and 

to promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s 

operations. Information may be reported to the DOJ 

OIG’s hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or 

(800) 869-4499. 

Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

www.justice.gov/oig