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Research Note 85-70

Soldier Performance

in Continuous Operations:

Administrative Manual for a Briefing and

Seminar for Platoon and Squad Personnel

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Felix Kopstein and Arthur Siegel

Applied Psychological Services, Inc.

Joseph Conn, James Caviness, and Willam Slifer

Soldier Support Center

Halim Ozkaptan and Fred Dyer

Army Research Institute

Submitted by

ARI Field Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia

Seward Smith, Chief

Training Research Laboratory

Harold F. O'Neil, Jr., Director

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DTIC

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CT 1 6 1985

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

July 1985

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THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST 

QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY 

FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED 

A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF 

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REPRODUCE LEGIBLY, 
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

EDGAR M. JOHNSON

Technical Director

L. NEALE COSBY

Colonel. IN

Commander

Research accomplished under contract

for the Department of the Army

Applied Psychological Services, Inc.

Accession For

NT1S GRA&T

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Unatmoun i

Justification.

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(DTIC) to comply with regulatory requirement!. It hat been given no primary distribution other than to DTIC

and will be available only through DTIC or other reference tarvicat euch as the National Technical Information

Service (NTISI. The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report arc those of the author(s) and

should not be construeJ as an official Cepattmeni of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated

by other official documentation.

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UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Wh»n Dmlm F.nfred)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONS

BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1 REPORT NUMBER

ARI Research Note 85-70

2. OOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CAT ALOO NUMBER

VtD-mo.iZL

4. TITLE fand Sub(lrU)

SOLDIER PERFORMANCE IN CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS:

ADMINISTRATIVE MANUAL FOR A BRIEFING AND

SEMINAR FOR PLATOON AND SQUAD PERSONNEL

S TYPE OF REPORT a PERIOD COVFRFD

Final Report

May 1981-March 1983

8 PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR^ p. Kopstein & A. Siegel (Applied Psychological Services, Inc.); J. Conn, J. Caviness, &

W. Slifer (Soldier Support Center); & H. Ozkaptan

s F. Dyer (ARI)

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf«)

MDA 903-81-C-0286

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

Applied Psychological Services, Inc.

Science Center

Wayne, PA 19087

10 PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT. TASK

AREA a WORK UNIT NUMBERS

2Q163743A774

II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

U.S. Army Research Institute, Fort Henning Field

Unit, P.O. Box 2086

Fort Banning, GA 31905-0686

12 REPORT DATE

July 1985

13 NUMBER OF PAGES

201

14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME ft AODRESSflf dlHetotM from Controtfln« Office)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue

Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

15. SECURITY CLASS, fof fhf« taport

Unclassified

15a. OECLASSIFI CATION/DOWNGRADING

SCHEDULE

1«. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT fof Ml Roporf)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT fof th« abafract mnftmd In Block 30, If dfffaronf from Roport)

IB. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS rConllnua on rovorc« «Ida If nacataary and Idanflfy by block nufflbar)

Stress Performance degradation

Continuous operations Unit effectiveness

Training Performance maintenance

Organizational development Work/rest planning

Human factors Stress control

Stress management

Human resources

Endurance

20. ABSTRACT CCaoMnua an rorvr» >idk If n«e««aafy and Idanflfy by block numbar!

If any Army unit is to meet the demands of continuous operations, a systematic human resources conservation program must be planned and implemented.

The details of such a program are described. Without such a program, intolerable levels of performance degradation are projected during continuous

operations.

Strategies for countering the anticipated degradation during continuous

operations include: leadership training, confidence building, (Continued)

DO FORM

t JAN 73 1473 EDmON OF » MOV 65 IS OBSOLETE UNCLASSIFIED

1 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (-»han Dafa Enlarad;
UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEf"7l»n O.I« Km.r.dJ

ARI Research Note 85-70

20, (Continued)

organizing for full communications, behavioral modeling, overtraining and

crosstraining, developing physical fitness, and development of performance

supports.

Tactics for countering performance degradation during continuous operations include task rotation, task sharing, use of performance supports,

proper management of stress, and appropriate work/rest cycles.

The program for integrating these concepts into a unit developmental

program includes systematic steps along a time frame. The strategies are

set in place during the preparatory stage, and these provide the foundation

for implementing the tactics during continuous operations.

UNCLASSIFIED

^SECURITY CU ASSIFICATION OF THIS P»GECI»Ti»n Dmlm F.nlmfd)
\.t

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The preparation of this Planual benefitted greatly from contributions

by a number of people. Drs. F. Dyer and H. Ozkaptan aided in many of

the finer points of technical presentation and orientation. Majors J. Giffin

and J. Plumley helped to specify objectives and organization, and

contributed specific suggestions on many aspects of the information

presentation. LTC L. Ritcey and SGM E. DeLong reviewed the discussion

cases for technical accuracy and relevance, and their many suggestions

helped to bring the issues into clearer focus. All of these contributions

are gratefully acknowledged.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.

UNIT I

UNIT II

Audio-Visual Presentation 3

Classroom Lecture 9

UNIT III Classroom Lecture 37

UNIT IV Classroom Lecture 55

UNIT V Case Discussions 77

Section 1 --General 79

Section 2--Discussions Leader's Information 80

The Cases 81

Organization Of Cases 82

Introduction to Cases 83

Hints for Productive Case Discussions 84

Training (Behavioral) Objectives Platoon and

Squad (P&S) 85

Table 1 Training Objectives Met by Each Case 86

CASES

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

Case 4

Case 5

Case 6

Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectives

Goofing-Off During FTXs

Individual Stress Control Training • • •

87

89

101

113

Airlift to Combat Zone 125

Rest Vs. Defensive Preparation 137

Unit Reconstitution 149

APPENDIX A Platoon and Squad Tasks Supported by Orientation/

Workshop 161

APPENDIX B Adjunct Reading Material (Handouts) 165

iv
INTRODUCTION

This manual contains directions for presenting instruction about

soldier performance in continuous operations. The manual provides a

self-contained package for:

1. acquainting platoon and squad leadership with methods

for maintaining effective performance during continuous

operations.

i

2. explaining the techniques for sustaining effectiveness

during continuous operations.

!

1 3. orienting this leadership to issues in developing a

continuous operations capability.

The materials consist of five units:

Unit I — a 35mm slide presentation. Staying Effective in Continuous Operations, accompanied by a recorded narration.

• The purpose is to introduce participants to

the problem of soldier performance degradation in

I continuous operations, to present some techniques

for dealing with it, and to suggest effective

procedures for achieving a continuous operations

capability.

Unit II — an oral (classroom) presentation/discussion supported

by flipcharts and hand-outs. The purpose is to elaborate

on practical implementation of four types of counter

degradation measure (CDM):

j 1. leadership

1

2. commitment

3. physical conditioning

4. stress management

Unit III ~ an oral (classroom) presentation/discussion supported

by flipcharts and hand-outs. The purpose is to elaborate

on practical implementation of three types of CDM:

1. identifying and selecting talent

2. task restructuring and rotation

3. system modifications and performance supports

Unit IV — an oral (classroom) presentation/discussion supported

by flipcharts and hand-outs. The purpose is to

elaborate on practical implementation of three types of CDM;
1. training

2. work/rest sleep discipline

3. resource management

Unit V — six discussion cases dealing with various issues from

the start of unit/training to application of CDMs in

continuous combat. They furnish a basis for a problem

solving workshop designed to provide practice with

specific issues in developing and maintaining a continuous operations capability.

Directions as well as supporting guidance for the administration of each of

these five units are provided successively. The appendix lists the specific

platoon and squad level tasks which the five units, taken as a whole, are

designed to support.

Whenever feasible, all five units should be scheduled. Units II, III,

and IV rest on the foundation of Unit I, and Unit V rests on the

foundation provided by all prior units. If sufficient time is not available

for administering all units, the case discussions can be curtailed or

omitted.

References

Discussion leaders should become familiar with, at least, the below

listed references which will help the leader to provide authoritative

answers to questions, and to inject relevant background information into

the discussions.

1. Human performance in continuous operations;

II. Management guide (Research Product 80-4b)

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333

2. FM26-2, Management of Stress in Army Operations

3. FM26-XX, Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations

Items 2 and 3 of these references as well as the present materials were

developed under supervision of the Soldier Developments Directorate, Fort

Benjamin Harrison, the TRADOC element with proponency for soldier

performance. Users are encouraged to comment on them, or on any issue

of soldier performance to the Soldier Developments Directorate.

HANDOUTS

Some items of adjunct material appear in Appendix B to this manual.

Sufficient copies of these handouts should be reproduced in advance and

distributed to prospective participants. Thev should be asked to review

them before arriving for training. If materials cannot be distributed in

advance, they should he placed on a table in the meeting room and

attention called to their availabilitv.
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UNIT I

Audio-Visual Presentation
UNIT I

(Approximate Duration; 30 Minutes)

General

Unit I, a slide/audio tape presentation, reviews expected conditions in

potential future warfare and shows how these conditions inevitably degrade

the performance of every soldier from commander to footsoldier. The

presentation considers the techniques that can be used for retarding the

pace of degradation and presents considerations for preparing a continuous

operations capability. The purpose is to orient participants about problems

and some means for dealing with them.

While this Unit is intended to be used in combination with succeeding

Units, it can be used independently to brief a group of any size. When

scheduled for use in combination with the othur Units, it is recommended

that the group be limited to no more than 18 participants.

The slide/audio tape presentation (35mm slides and audio, single track

tape cassette) is available from:

U.S. Army Soldier Support Center

ATTN: ATZI-NCR-SP

Ft. Benjamin Harrison, IND 46216

Materials

35mm slide projector

slide tray of sufficient capacity

83 slides (35mn) "Staying Effective in Continuous

Operations" (plus focusing slides A and B)

projection sereen

tape cassette player

tape cassette: "Staying Effective in Continuous

Operations"

Preparation

1. If not already loaded, load the slides into

a slide tray in numerical sequence.

a. assure correct slide orientation:

(1) relate slide tray's geometry to projector's

(2) in the projector, slide image must be "upside

down" and matte (emulsion) side toward screen

2. Project loaded slides to assure that all are corroctlv oriented;

after corrections, set tray back to first slide (focus sharply).

3. Insert tape cassette into cassette player

4. Preview the Unit in its entirety before presenting the Unit

for the first time.

PREVIOUS PAGE

IS BLANK
Presentation Procedure

Welcome audience to the briefing (and subsequent

seminar) on soldier performance in continuous

operations.

SAMPLE

My name is

I am

(State affiliation and role in oarent organization)

Welcome to this orientation and workship on staying effective in continuous operations. This training was prepared by

the Soldier Support Center in order to present the basic facts

and issues in regard to sustaining soldier combat performance

effectiveness during continuous operations.

The material you are about to see reviews the condition

expected in future massive ground warfare and shows how

these conditions inevitably degrade the performance of every

soldier from commander to foot soldier. It presents techniques

for retarding the pace of degradation. Later we will explain

their implementation in training and continuous combat. As the

result of this orientation, you will see the dimensions of the

problem and some means for coping with it.
.- _•

2. Turn off lights.

3. Start cassette player; turn on projector

4. When click is heard on tape, advance to

next slide

5. At end, turn off cassette player and projector; turn on lights.

6. Announce:

I (we) have no doubt that there are now a

number of questions. I (we) will try to deal

with any points on which you may want some

elaboration.

Discussion Guidance

1. Respond to specific questions factually,

(e.g., are there any FMs on continuous operations?—Ans. FM26-XX, Soldier Performance

in Continuous Operations.

2. Elaborate on general points as requested.

3. Continue this discussion until most, if not

all, questions are answered. Some questions

may be answered by a statement such as "That

is covered in the Unit(s) which are scheduled

to follow."

4. Propose a brief break period before continuing.

5. Introduce the break with a statement such as:

"Lets take a brief break. After that, we will

begin to explain the Counter Degradation Measures

or CDMs and how to train your men in these techniques."
UNIT II

Classroom Lecture

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9

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UNIT II

I General

Unit II is intended to follow immediately after the audio-visual

presentation and discussion which constitute Unit I. Along with Units III

and IV, it provides an in-depth explanation of measures for countering

and retarding performance degradation in continuous combat operations.

Unit II tells how these CDMs ought to be introduced into the training to

develop a capability for continuous operations.

Presentation Procedure

A lesson plan, followed by a suggested script for Unit II, is

presented below. Unit II is a lecture presentation. The instructor may

read this script, or he may deliver his own version by relying on the

topical cues that accompany each paragraph (left column).

PREVIOUS PAGE

IS BLANK

11
UNIT II

LESSON PLAN

TITLE: Counter Degradation Measures 1: Leadership,

Commitment, Physical Conditioning, and Stress

Management

TRAINING OBJECTIVE; Action: (1) The student will be able to implement

four CDMs at the Platoon/Squad level. (2) The

student will be able to devise new CDMs. (3) The

student will be able to evaluate proposed and/or

implemented CDMs. (4) The student will be able

to instruct others in the use of CDMs.

Conditions: Following authorization from the appropriate commands.

Standards: The student will accurately and successfully participate in a set of case discussions

which involve CDM implementation.

MEDIA AND EQUIPMENT: Flipcharts (prepared). Handouts

METHOD OF INSTRUCTION: Lecture

TIME: 50 minutes minimum (if possible, 2h)

13

PREVIOUS PAGE

IS BLANK
Importance of Counter

Degradation Measures

(COM)

UNIT ll~TEXT

You have completed the first Unit of your continuous

operations training, that is, the audio-visual orientation. That presentation gave you an overview of expected future warfare conditions, some adverse factors

resulting from these conditions, and how these factors

will progressively degrade soldiers' fighting effectiveness. A number of Counter Degradation Measures

(CDMs) have been worked out. These CDMs will enable

prepared troops to keep up an acceptable level of performance effectiveness even in the face of the adverse

conditions of continuous operations. They were briefly

explained in the orientation. Now we will look at each

of the CDMs in detail. We will explain the implementation and evaluation of each of these CDMs.

Four of them will be explained in this Unit.

Refer to chart They are shown on this chart. The remaining CDMs

will be covered later.

COUNTER DEGRADATION MEASURES

(CDMs)

1. Leadership

2. Commitment

3. Physical conditioning

4. Stress management

CDMs—are techniques

—must be practiced

Here are some important things to remember about all

of the CDMs. They are the best available combination

of techniques for resisting all of the factors that degrade performance. The CDMs do not make soldiers immune to performance degradation as a tetanus shot

makes you immune to tetanus. The CDMs are techniques for delaying serious performance degradation,

and for coping with or compensating for that degradation. They will keep you and your soldiers going

for a longer time and at a higher level of combat Performance. However, the CDMs must be worked out in

advance, and they must be practiced until they have

become second nature.

14
CDMs are a total package

not a menu

You cannot pick and chose just those CDMs that look

good to you. Research and experience tell us that

CDPIs work reliably only when they are used in

combination. Notice, for instance, that some of the

CDMs are dependent on some others. In other cases, a

combination of two or three of them act together to

resist fatigue and the other factors that pull the level

of performance down. Remember, we are discussing

each CDM separately here, but they are all part of the

program of preparation to maintain performance

effectiveness in continuous combat operations.

Refer to chart

A. Leadership and Commitment

We'll get started with two CDMs, leadership and

commitment. The particular points that we will cover in

this connection are shown on this chart (POINT TO

CHART).

A. LEADERSHIP AND COMMITMENT

1. How to satisfy leadership needs

2. How and when to shift leadership style

3. Building morale/motivation/confidence

4. Building cohesion/esprit/commitment

5. Passing on information

6. Keeping in touch in combat

Leadership and commitment

are foundations

Be a 1st class model

We begin with leadership and commitment

arc really the foundation on which

development of a continuous operations

built. If these foundations are not solid,

of preparation will be shaky, and when

comes—in continuous combat—the CDMs

very effective.

because they

the entire

capability is

the program

the real test

will not be

The men you lead will look to you as a model of how to

behave. In the extreme conditions of continuous

operations, a strong model helps when determination

begins to sag. Even in training for continuous

operations, each soldier's determination may be put to

15

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Leaders must demonstrate

commitment

the test. At the very becfinninpf, every soldier must

appreciate the absolute necessity for this training and

the value that the CDPIs will have for him in combat.

Even for effective training, soldiers must become

personallv committed to the objectives of tbat training.

The first and foremost requirements are for soldiers to

understand the importance of what is being asked of

them and for leaders to demonstrate their own total

commitment to the training.

You know how to be

leaders

How to Satisfy Leadership Needs

The fact that you are here means that the Army

regards you as leaders and has assigned you to

leadership positions. Our purpose at this moment is

not to tell you how to be leaders. You already know

that, and we are not about to repeat the information

contained in such publications as FM22-100 or

FM22-600-20. What we are trying to explain here is

how to apply leadership with respect to some special

requirements of continuous operations and of the

training for it.

Leaders must discipline

themselves

The very first of these requirements is self-discipline.

This does not mean waiting to eat or for comforts until

your men are looked after. It means that you must

discipline yourself to follow all of the rules for slowing

down your own performance degradation.

Know strengths and

weaknesses and be open

about them

Continuous operations, even more so than any combat,

will not let you or anyone get away with faking

anything. Either you "can do," or you "can't do."

To get the peak fighting effectiveness from your team

or unit at all times—and you will need the peak

effectiveness—you have to know the strengths and

weaknesses of everyone, including yourself. Just as a

particular type of ammunition is effective against some

types of targets, but not against other types, some

soldiers are better at doing some things than others.

As a leader you must know about every soldier under

you—what he does well and what he does poorly. Also,

it's no good pretending, for instance, at night in

unfamiliar terrain that you know your way around,

when, in fact, you arc the type of person with a poor

sense of direction. Be open about such things. Rely

on somebody with a good sense of direction to help

you out. In this sense, too, be a model to your men.

16

^ ' • • -• .• -* -» " "--
Admrt mistakes and learn

from them

Being open about shortcomings is a very important

leadership trait: nobody is perfect. In training,

mistakes are bound to be made. Some of these mistakes

will likely be your own. In training, at least, a

mistake is serious only if it gets covered up and

nothing is learned from it. After all, training is a

process of eliminating mistakes. Show by example that

you learn from your own mistakes, and that this is the

spirit in which you look at mistakes made by others.

The objective in training is to achieve nearly perfect

readiness for actual combat. It is not the objective

simply to pass the next ARTEP evaluation with zero

deficiencies.

Assess and record status

to track

There is another leadership requirement closely connected with learning from mistakes. As a leader, you

must make it a point to know what your team or unit

actually can do—at all times. Don't guess and don't

assume. Go only by what you observe objectively—by

the performance that is actually demonstrated. Don't

trust your general impressions or your memory. Keep

records that let you see whether any improvement is

taking place, how much improvement, and whether it is

at a good enough rate. Unless every soldier in the

unit and the unit as a whole steadily keep on improving their performance, there is a problem that

needs to be diagnosed and solved.

Recognize achievement

and effort

Further achievement feeds on earlier achievement.

Hand out recognition for genuine accomplishment.

Telling a soldier, unit, or team what they did right

will work better in the long run than chewing them out

for what they did wrong. That does not mean that you

should not point out what was done wrong. You must

also explain how to do it better the next time. Give

the praise to the soldier, but criticize only the task

performance and not the person. Also, recognize the

soldier who is genuinely trying to do his best even

when his best is not good enough by objective

standards. Reassure him that you believe he will meet

the standards, if he keeps on trying. Don't underestimate the importance of this requirement. Soldiers need

recognition from their superiors, and they need it most

of all when they are being asked to make a tough effort.

Establish leadership

authority

Establish your personal authority. To establish the

kind of personal authority that will hold your team or

unit together in continuous operations and keep them

going, you will have to demonstrate two things. First,

17
Show you know what

must be done

Strictly enforce your

decisions

show your men that you know what to do at all times,

that is, that your decisions are the best ones under

all circumstances. Second, show them that you will use

the power you have to enforce your decisions. Think

carefully—possibly even asking for advice—before you

make a decision. However, once the decision is made,

everyone must have no doubts that you mean it. In

continuous operations, your men will need to have absolute faith in you.

Dedication to winning We've saved the most important leadership requirement

as the last one so that you will remember it, if you

remember nothing else. To stay effective in continuous

operations, there has to be a total dedication to winning. That total dedication has to begin with you. You

need to make clear to your men that you are totally

dedicated to winning and that you expect them to be

totally dedicated to winning. You have to demonstrate

this spirit without exception, and you have to establish it so thoroughly that anything else becomes

unthinkable. There has to be an absolute belief that,

if continuous combat ever becomes actual, the team or

the unit can and will win. Remember that the ability of

battalions, brigades, divisions, and even armies to win

in battle depends on the performance and spirit of all

of the small units that make them up.

How and When to Shift Leadership Styte

No one is immune to

performance degradation

Decision making and

thinking degrade first

and most

The conditions of continuous combat operations will

place the greatest imaginable demands on your resources as a leader. No one is immune to the performance degradation resulting from sleep loss, fatigue, stress, limited visibility, pnd the uncertainty of

battle. In fact, scientific projections and experience

shov that the performance of those with decision making responsibility—like tank commanders or platoon

lesixers—will degrade more rapidly than the perfoi fiance of soldiers with less decision making responsibility—like tank loader or artillery battery crew

member. Therefore, you need techniques to: (1) cope

with your own performance degradation, and (2) lead

others who are in a degraded condition. We will deal

with the first point when we get to stress management

techniques. Here we will discuss the second point.

Adverse conditions of

continuous operations

Imagine the conditions of solcUors during continuous

combat. Some of you may have already experienced

combat conditions. But Army studies tell us that future combat operations will be unlike anything that has

ever existed in the history of warfare. The key

18
element fron a human performance point of view is that

future combat will be intense and it will be non-stop,

day and night. What is that going to to do to you and

your soldiers?

"Mental" tasks—first to

suffer

"Physical" tasks—more

resistant to degradation

When we talk about the effects of continuous combat

operations, we can make a distinction between physical

activities and mental activities. The mental activities

will be most severely affected by continuous

operations. This means anything you do that requires

alertness, thinking, memory, calculation, or even

recognizing—for instance, recognizing friendly tanks

or aircraft. Physical performance will also become

degraded, but not very badly. This means that

habitual tasks like firing your rifle or fuzing a shell

will still be done reasonably well even when soldiers

are half asleep on their feet.

Adjusting leadership

j style

The implications of all of this for leadership are that

soldiers will have difficulty understanding, remembering, and following orders. Therefore, you will

need to adjust your leadership style to maintain effectiveness with troops who are in a degraded condition. This will add to the strain on you, but it is a

necessary part of your role as a leader.

Be understanding You must understand soldiers in this degraded

condition. Take their reduced mental abilities into

account when giving orders. Do not become angry with

soldiers who cannot seem to make sense out of what

you are saying.

Some steps to remember

for continuous missions

Keep your orders simple

Repeat orders

Soldiers repeat orders

back to you

Write it down

Here are some of the steps you should take when

dealing with soldiers of reduced capacity. First, keep

your orders short and simple. Get only one thought

straight in your own head, and then state it as clearly

and as simple as possible. Tell the men what to do and

to do it. Repeat your orders. To ensure that the men

understand what you are telling them, have them

repeat the order back to you. Don't simply ask "Got

it,?" and don't be satisfied with a "Yes sir" answer.

One final suggestion, depending on the situation—have

your men write down the order. In that way their

unreliable memory for recent information gets a

back-up capability.

Summary In summary, the key shifts in leadership style that are

necessary when troops are extremely fatigued are of

two kinds. First, anything you toll a soldier—an

19

<--. <-_«-. ..'
order, directions, or any information—must be simple,

brief, and stated very, very clearly. At this stage,

they can't interpret what you mean; you have to tell

them. Second, because the men will be lethargic, that

is, unable to get themselves going, you will have to be

patient but firm. In a sense, you have to point them

in the right direction and then give them a shove to

get them going. These are the key shifts that will be

necessary. Do any of you have other suggestions or

ideas?

(TRAINEES OFFER SUGGESTIONS)

Performance = ability x

motivation

Building Morale/Motivation/Confidence

Most theories of human behavior distinguish between

the potential for performance and actual performance.

Actual performance depends on both the existing

capability (through learning, training, practice) and

the existing level of motivation. Obtained performance,

that is, what people actually do, is the product of

motivation and acquired (learned) capability. No matter

how high the level of either factor, if the other is

zero (or effectively zero) no adequate level of

performance will be obtained. Individuals or teams

perform best when motivation and morale are high.

Morale Morale and motivation are not entirely synonymous.

Morale is the condition in a group in which personal

needs, desires, and objectives are either aligned with

those of the group, or are willingly subordinated.

High morale arises, for example, out of well

established leadership authority which formulates group

objectives. These objectives are accepted and adopted

by each group member, because the leadership

authority has become unquestioned and the leadership

is trusted.

Using reward When mornle in a group is high, the achievement of

the group's goals provides the incentives.

Reinforcement, the essential ingredient for achieving a

high performance capability, derives from indications

that the goals are being approached—that there is

progress toward these goals. A reward (which is

another term for reinforcement) is the information that

the individual has contributed to the achievement of

the common goal.

20
Exploit positive, success

experiences

This experience of setting and achieving goals is also

important for motivation, the "drive" behind behavior.

Soldiers must have positive experiences to develop a

"can do/will do" attitude. These experiences should

come from training, exercises, and everyday interactions with superiors. Motivation can be infectious.

So, when you are motivated and let that motivation

show, your men will be motivated. This motivation is

essential to withstanding the conditions of continuous

operations.

Buidling confidence

Refer to chart

Confidence is an important factor which contributes to

individual motivation. A soldier must have confidence

in himself, his abilities, his equipment, his unit, and

his leaders. Confidence cannot be ordered. It is

developed through experience, and leadership must

arrange the proper experiences. This chart gives some

of the guidelines for developing confidence.

(SHOW CHART)

(CHART)

0

Set realistic goals

0

Test for achievement

0

Praise improvement

0 Recognize individuals

0

Support the soldier

0 Be honest and realistic

0 Consider enemy conditions

Key points We see that the important points are:

1. Set realistic goals for progressive development of

individual, team, and unit competence

2. Systematically test the achievement of these goals

3. Praise improvement and coach units toward

achieving higher competence

4. Single out individuals and teams for recognition of

competence, or even for genuine effort

21
5. Support each soldier's confidence at every

opportunity

6. Present realistic and detailed expectations

about future combat conditions in continuous

operations

7. Point out that the enemy faces the sane adverse conditions

Importance of these

factors

Building Unit Cohesion/Esprit/Commitment

There is a great deal of evidence which points to the

importance of factors such as unit cohesion, esprit,

and individual commitment to sc Idier performance in

combat. For example, in WW II, elite units with strong

group cohesiveness, such as Airborne Divisions,

suffered fewer neuropsychiatric, that is, stress

casualties than other units. Also, the 442nd Regimental

Combat Team, made up of Japanese-Americans, and the

most decorated unit in the U.S. Army, had almost no

psychiatric or stress casualties throughout the Italian

campaign. We see that these factors can be extremely

important.

Group identification:

1. group membership

2. group prowess

3. group uniqueness

Morale, as mentioned earlier, amounts to alignment with

or willing subordination of personal goals to group

goals. A precondition is identification with the group.

The greater the feeling of belonging to the group, the

stronger will be the operation of the factors outlined

here. Therefore, anything that contributes to the

cohesiveness of the group and to identification with it

should be encouraged. The possibilities are too

numerous and diverse for discussion here. A few can

be suggested: (1) emphasize membership in the group,

for example, "you're one of us, and we take care of

our own," (2) emphasize group prowess, such as,

"we're one helluva bunch, and we can do anything,"

and (3) emphasize uniqueness and superiority of the

group, captured in such slogans as, "when things

really get tough, they call for us, cause nobody else

can..." Other themes of this type can be imagined. In

any case, fixed slogans and cut-and-dried examples

cannot substitute for continuing, sensitive appraisal of

the extent to which group identification exists in the

organization and for constant efforts to strengthen it.

Competition Competition is another technique for enhancing group

identification. Rivalry between comparable organizations

at comparable levels of competence automatically

22
establishes performance standards. Soldiers will ^et

caught up in the cornpetition and will feel, "We must

be good enough to beat the competition." Because the

competition will act similarly, the standards need to be

constantly raised, if one is to be successful or to

remain successful.

Competition inherently emphasizes group membership

("our team") and, because the success experience from

successful competition depends on group identification,

competition strengthens group identification.

Peer pressure Additional benefits result from competition and the

development of esprit. One benefit is the peer

pressure that one feels as a member of a group or

team. This peer pressure serves to keep performance

standards high because the soldier feels, "they won't

let me down, because they expect me not to let them

down."

Self esteem and commitment Motivation and morale were discussed earlier from the

external point of view. That is, the sources of control

and manipulation for motivation/morale which were

considered are external to the individual. The

strongest, most stable, and durable motivation,

however, arises internally and is based on the

individual's own self esteem and commitment to the

goals of the unit. No external source of control comes

close in effectiveness to the control a person exercises

over himself. The ultimate object in leadership and

group identification development is to have the

individual soldier adopt the common goals as his very

own. Once the source of moiivation has been

transferred from external (leadership) control to

internal control, self-esteem and commitment

begin to motivate independently and continuously.

They become, in the ideal case, an integral part of the

individual's personality.

High standards of

performance:

1. Leadership

2. Peer pressure

3. Commitment

In summary, wc now have three coordinated forces

working together. They are: (1) responding to the

authority of leadership, (2) the peer pressure inherent

in the demand to live up to the performance level of

others in the group, and (3) meeting self-imposed

standards of performance based on self-esteem and

commitment.

23
Communication

Passing On Information

Good leadership is the glue that holds a unit together.

In the same vein, we can view communication as the

lubrication for the working parts of the unit. Good

communication in a unit means that information flows

freely and accurately through both formal and informal

channels. The responsibility for achieving good

communication clearly falls on established leaders.

Before we can even talk about communication we have

to mention the background for it. That background is

important for meaningful communication as well as

providing a basis for independent judgment, when the

soldier has to exercise it. At all times, make sure that

every soldier understands the objectives of the unit's

mission, the plan of operations, and what he and his

team are expected to accomplish. This will help him

and you when things no longer go according to plans.

Practice good

communication

Most of your communications are not orders. During

training exercises, for example, you answer questions,

give instructions, give guidance, and evaluate

performance. During all of these interactions,

communication pattern are established. Good leadership

will ensure that the patterns that are established lead

to full and free exchange of information. For example,

when soldiers' comments and questions are met with a

"none of your business" attitude or sarcasm, those

soldiers will be less likely to pass on the important

information (like status of equipment or morale) that

you need to lead your unit effectively. Therefore, in

all communications be respectful and professional.

Feedback Feedback is another important aspect of communication.

As a soldier is learning any new task, you must guide

his actions and provide feedback about the effectiveness of these actions. This feedback must be

clear and direct. As a leader, you need feedback from

your soldiers about the effectiveness of your actions.

For example, when you set up task rotation schedules,

you need feedback from the soldiers concerned so that

you can devi« the best possible schedule. Remember-:

your soldiers need feedback from you, and you need

feedback fron your soldiers.

24
Encourage free and full

information exchange

Maximize information

sources

I have stressed that the exchange of information

should be free and full. This goal is not automatic or

easy to achieve; you must work at it. One problem for

you to recognize is how easily information can be

distorted. You all know how easily and quickly rumors

spread. A small, accurate item of information can get

distorted wildly because the soldiers involved don't

have enough accurate information to counteract the

rumor. Also, sometimes information is distorted because

of the needs, motivations, and desires of the

communicator and/or receiver of the information. A

commanding officer may fail to "see" some problem—like

poor morale—that might be obvious to someone who

doesn't have as much to lose by acknowledging the

problem. This type of distortion is known as

"filtering." It can be reduced by increasing the

number of channels of information—for example, using

both formal and informal channels and also relying on

direct observation in addition to verbal reports.

Avoid rumors At times the question is raised, "How much should I

tell the soldier?" The answer, in most cases, is, "as

much as possible.'' Recall that I mentioned earlier that

rumors breed in situations where there is a shortage

of information. Rumors are generally detrimental to

morale. Therefore, you should curb their development

whenever and wherever possible. The most effective

method is to provide accurate information and as much

information as possible without compromising security.

This is especially true during combat operations.

Practice good

communication

Keeping in Touch in Combat

V/e just mentioned that all security-free aspects of

information should be passed on as often as possible.

Information of this type is a vitally important part of

building and maintaining confidence. But this

procedure, as all techniques for building better

communications, must be practiced to be maximally

effective durino- both training and actual combat

conditions.

Communication during

combat

One final aspect of communication has to do with keeping in touch during combat. During the adverse conditions of continuous operations, soldiers must be assured that they are not alone. You must devise and

practice methods for contact to be made among soldiers—by each other, by squad leaders, and by platoon leaders. This is very important in sustaining soldier performance during continuous operations because

the conditions will be extremely stressful. For a soldier to know that he is in the same situation with others will help him to "tough it out." So remember,

25

. * - *- _ rf-
keep in touch. If, during actual combat, you cannot

maintain frequent direct contact with your men, then

use any other channels available to you—radio, hand

signals, or whatever—to let them know you are there.

Refer to chart

B. Physical Conditioning

Physical fi4ness is extremely important for all members

of the Army. In fact, a number of field manuals, such

as FM2i-20, Physical readiness training, and

regulations, like AR 600-9, Army physical fitness and

weight coiltrol program, have been published on this

subject. Today we will deal only with the role physical

conditioning plays in continuous operations preparedness. A high degree of fitness will help soldiers

withstand the adverse conditions of continuous operations. This chart shows the topics we will deal with.

(SHOW CHART)

(CHART)

B. Physical Conditioning

1. Bounce-back

2. Stamina

3. Strength

4. Pacing energy expenditure

5. Pushing the physical limits

6. Reaping the benefits of a

physical conditioning program

Physical conditioning

applies to everyone

Physical conditioning is a CDM which applies to

everyone in the unit. The benefits of physical

conditioning will greatly repay the time investment.

This CDM is different fron some of the others in that

soldiers do not learn a new set of skills. We should

not underestimate physical conditioning. As a result of

a fitness program, soldiers will be better able to resist

fatigue; all tasks will be perfovr.od longer and at a

higher level of effectiveness.

26
Recovery from fatigue

Bounce-Back

One benefit of physical fitness is known as

bounce-back. Physical fitness is the ability of the

body to stand up under prolonged, extraordinary

demands without harm. The fit soldier can call on his

mind and body to perform strenuous activity for

extended periods and bouncebask to normal

effectiveness after a relatively short interval of rest.

Whether moving heavy weapons, packing bulky loads,

or digging in, the fit soldier can draw on his reserves

of strength or wind to bounceback with only the

briefest of rest. These reserves are maintained on a

daily and weekly basis through physical training and

being in shape.

Stamina or endurance

Stamina

Stamina is equivalent to endurance. Fitness should be

developed in all soldiers to increase their work

capacity and ability to withstand the stresses of

continuous operations. The best way to produce

stamina is through aerobic fitness.

Aerobic fitness—oxygen

to the muscles

Aerobic fitness refers primarily to a well-developed

oxygen delivery system—strong heart and lungs that

efficiently deliver oxygen to the working muscles. Aerobic fitness refers to the efficient conversion of food

into muscle-energy by using this oxygen. The connection between aerobic fitness and fighting ability is

a direct one. The soldier requires energy to fight—

energy created by burning fats and carbohydrates.

This process takes oxygen. The tougher the action,

the more energy—and oxygen—are needed.

Aerobic activities Perhaps the best, although certainly not the only,

method of producing aerobic fitness and the accompanying stamina is running. Running (as v;ell as

swimming and bicycling) calls for a sustai- d expenditure of energy rather than bursts of energy. It

is this type of activity which builds up ener^ry reserves. Running a hfilf an hour three times a week is

sufficient to produce physiological benefits. Encourage

activity of this type.

27

•.-.v.v.V ". .- .« V\
Mental benefits There are also mental benefits to be gained from aerobic fitness. Feelings of depression, moodiness, and

lethargy (not wanting to move) usually accompany extreme tiredness. These will affect the aerobically fit

soldier far less than the unfit one. Both body and

mind will stay sharp during the stress of continuous

operations.

Muscular strength

Strength

Physical activity which requires bursts of energy,

such as weight lifting, while not developing aerobic

fitness, develops strength. Activities, such as pushups and chin-ups, that develop strength, should be

encouraged to enable the soldier to perform heavy

work.

Situations requiring

strength

Although today's Army is a highly mechanized and

technologically sophisticated organization, the importance of physical strength should not be overlooked. As combat operations continue and adverse

circumstances combine to present unusual situations,

there will be some situations which require brute

strength. For example, disabled vehicles may have to

be off-loaded, or pulled out of mud or water. Efforts

of this type require upper body strength in addition

to aerobic fitness. While jogging, for instance,

develops aerobic fitness, it does not build strong arm

muscles. Soldiers must develop upper body strength in

addition to aerobic fitness.

Tailoring physical fitness

programs

How to do it and how much is enough? These are important questions but no hard-and-fast rules exist.

Physical fitness programs must be tailored to the needs

of your individual units. Some of the fitness training

will take place during required activities and calisthenics. However, individual fitness programs including sports, running, and weight training should

be pursued.

Recovery from exhaustion

Pacing Energy Expenditure

It is widely recognized that recovery following exertion

will be more rapid and more complete, if a rest period

is begun prior to total exhaustion. Whenever possible,

soldiers should recognize their own resources and pace

28

j- .
themselves so as not to totally deplete these resources

before attempting recovery. During combat, a pace will

be forced on the soldier and he may not have the

option of resting when his reserves are low. However,

during training, pacing can be adjusted end soldiers

should develop a knack for self-pacing.

Internal signals of enery

expenditure

Proper pacing means learning to respond to signals

from the body so that a sustained rate of energy expenditure is maintained. These signals (which include

feelings of exhaustion and pain) tell the soldier whether or not he can keep going at the same rate. The

soldier must become sensitive to these signals by practicing continued physical activity. When he can recognize them and use them to monitor his energy expenditure, he can avoid complete exhaustion.

Increasing physical

limits

Pushing the Physical Limits

There are other benefits to self monitoring. By knowing the limits of his physical endurance, the soldier

can set goals that are just slightly beyond these limits. As he reaches this new limit, he sets a new goal

just slightly beyond the old one. In this way, he inches

forward to greater strength and endurance.

Physical and mental

benefits

There are really two types of benefits that follow from

"pushing the limits." One is physical, as I just pointed

out. The other is mental. Continuing to work at one's

upper limit over extended periods of time requires

considerable mental determination. In a sense, the mind

can be trained to continue to direct the body although

it is fatigued. The soldier will also learn that both Ms

body and his mind are capable of effort that he previously thought would be impossible.

Reaping the Benefits of a Physical Conditioning Program

The demands of a

physical fitness program

YOU may be thinking, "that sounds great in theory,

but it's impossible in practice." Not so. Following

these guidelines is difficult and challenging, but not

impossible. To implement properly a complete physical

fitness program will demand leadership and commitment. Lead your soldiers and convince them that

physical fitness programs are necessary and important.

You must also get them to make their commitment to

the program. Rut although physical fitness programs

29
Increased cohesion and

esprit

can be demanding, they can also provide returns in

areas other than increased physical and mental

stamina. Specifically, a physical conditioning program

can be very useful in developing group cohesion and

esprit. Whenever a group of soldiers goes through an

experience together, especially a difficult experience,

the members of the group are brought together more

tightly. Common experiences enhance closeness.

Continuous combat

produces much stress

Refer to chart

C. Stress Management

The conditions of continuous combat are probably the

most severe a soldier could possibly be subjected to.

Without doubt, the response of each individual soldier

will be a high level of stress—physical and mental. A

small amount of stress is sometimes good for a soldier;

it motivates him. But, the conditions of continuous

combat may lead to higher levels of stress. Everyone

must learn to recognize the symptoms of stress and to

use techniques for stress management. Of course, to

be maximally effective, you and your soldiers, need

experience with these techniques. The specific

concepts for consideration are on this chart. (SHOW

CHART)

(CHART)

C. Stress Management

1. The meaning of stress

2. The consequences of stress

3. The symptoms of stress

4. Controlling stress

5. Techniques for controlling stress

6. Programs of preparation

Stress is the soldier's

response to a Stressor

The Meaning of Stress

Stress is an adaptive process by which body and mind

are trying to adjust to stressful conditions. Plost people seem to think that stress means the conditions or

the situation that affect them. Actvally, stress is a

complex response of the mind and ihe body, which

allows the soldier to cope with extreme demands

30
(adverse conditions). The demands may be physical

(e.g., cold, injury, disease) or mental (e.g., fear,

conflict, pressure). The demand starts within the

soldier, as he interprets some external event or

personal need. That event or need is sometimes called

a source of stress or a Stressor. For example, the

appearance of an aircraft is not stressful. Stress

begins when shape, direction of travel, characteristic

noise, attitude, and silhouette provide the tipoff about

the intent of the approaching aircraft. Another

example is that of continuous noise, which in itself if

not very stressful. But, when noise is loud or

irregular, it becomes a real source of stress.

Three stages of stress:

1. alarm reaction

2. resistance

3. exhaustion

The Consequences of Stress

Regardless of the source of stress, the overall

response con be described by a set of stages. During

the first stage, called the Alarm Reaction, the normal

level of resistance to sources of stress actually drops

slightly. The body is "getting ready to get ready."

This stage is relatively brief. It is followed by a

second stage, called the Stage of Resistance, during

which resources are successfully mobilized. As a

result, the level of resistance to sources of stress is

greatly increased. When stress is very high and

continues for a long time, the resources for resistance

are expended faster than the body can create them.

Eventually, the Stage of Exhaustion is reached. This

means that the available bodily resources have been

exhausted. Obviously, extreme stress can't be allowed

to go on for too long.

The Symptoms of Stress

Signs of stress are

warning signals

Stress due to combat—

1. duration

2. Intensity

Before we go on to talk about stress control and the

techniques for it, let's look at the signs of stress

building up, or if you like, the warning signals. In

the special context of continuous operations, as

distinguished from any intense combat, we need to look

at the signs of stress from two perspectives. First,

there are the signs of exhaustion and the performance

degradation due to sleep loss and operating at a

furious pace for too long. Second, there are the signs

of stress—mainly emotional stress—due to the intensity

and pace of combat itself.

31

.w JV.-. V
Refer to chart The signs of the first type, that is, those due to

continuous activity without sleep, are mainly indicators

of soldiers' likely performance capability, or how

degraded performance is likely to be. These signs are

summarized on the chart (POINT TO CHART), and you

also have a handout which is a copy of the chart.

(CHART)

Some Physical Signs

0 Vacant stare—eyes seem to be fixed and

unfocused

0

Skin pallor—skin is pale, because blood vessels are constricted

0

Postural instability—sways while standing up

Some Behavioral Signs

0

Slowness of response—slow to respond to signals, directions, events

0

Lapses in attention—for moments the soldier

is "not there" or seems asleep

0

Inability to grasp directions—has difficulty

in comprehending orders, may have to repeat

them to himself several times

0 Difficulty with numbers—cannot keep numerical groups straight, cannot do simple arithmetic

0 Difficulties in expression—has difficulty formulating verbal statements and messages

0 Unclear speech—speech may be slurred

0 Decision problems—has difficulty in reaching

even the simplest kinds of decisions

0 Message garbling—incoherently relays messages, relay contains gaps and may be partly

repetitive

32

- * i>i>.% .-• .•
The ch&H or your handout contains the essential

information. Are there any questions? (WAIT FOR

QUESTIONS) The more of these sipns a soldier

shows, and the more strongly he shows them, the more

exhausted he is and the more his performance

capability will be down.

Refer to chart This will also be true for this second set of symptoms

which are those due mainlv to the intensity and

lethality of the combat (POINT TO CHART) What

these signs mean, or what they look like, is explained

in your handout. We're not going to repeat the

information in the handout. Take a quick look through

it.

(CHART)

THE SIGNS OF STRESS

In Yourself In Others

Aggression Loneliness Alcohol

Anxiety Low self- Denial

Apathy esteem Drugs

Depression Moodiness Emotional

Diarrhea Nausea outbursts

Dry mouth Nervousness Excitability

Fatigue

Forgetfulness

Nightmares

Numbness/

tingling

Impulsive behavior

Inadequate eating

"Freezing" Pounding or drinking

Frustration heart One track

Guilt Sweating thinking

Hot and cold Tension Restlessness

spells Urination Risk taking

Inability to Smoking

concentrate Speech disorder

Irritability Trembling

33
(WAIT) Are there any questions? (WAIT FOR

QUESTIONS) Do get familiar with these various

symptoms of stress and exhaustion so that you'll

recognize them when you see them.

CAUTION! Before we go on, let me caution you that other causes

can produce the same or similar symptoms. For

instance, radiation, chemical or biological agents,

certain diseases, heat or cold exhaustion, concussions,

and the like may produce similar symptoms.

Controlling Stress

How to control stress It ought to be obvious from everything we've told you,

that keeping stress under control and down to a

moderate level will be vitally important in continuous

operations. At the same time you'll wonder how that's

to be done, because, if there were a way, people

would surely be using it. Well, there are ways, they

are being used by some people, but they take

preparation and practice.

Stress control can

be learned

The first thing to remember is that stress control can

be learned, but it can't be taught by the numbers.

Learning to gain control over the stress in your own

body and mind is different from learning to field strip

a rifle or learning standard hand signals.

All the same, stress control can be mastered and it

does work. It works so well that the degree of control

that has been attained can be startling. In a medical

laboratory you can hook up people to instruments that

measure their blood pressure, heart rate, and a lot of

other indicators of the bodily response to stress.

People who have learned to control stress can bring

down their blood pressure, heart rate, and so forth at

will. All of the instruments show this. They can do it

in less than a minute. This is pretty convincing proof

that stress control does work.

...but, it requires

conscientious, dedicated

practice

Stress control must be

taken seriously

However, stress control can't be mastered overnight.

It requires conscientious and dedicated practice. Every

soldier—and that includes all of you—must take stress

control seriously, because, even more than top

physical conditioning, it will keep you going and may

save your life. Just as you don't get into top physical

condition overnight, stress control takes work.

34
You must choose among

available techniques

Techniques for Controlling Stress

Four kinds of techniques for controlling and reducing

stress are explained in the handout. We will not

recommend any of these techniques over the others.

You have to make that choice based on what you think

will work in your unit and its particular situation. In

fact, there are additional techniques that have not

been mentioned, because they require special equipment or specially trained personnel. For example, the

bio-feedback technique requires apparatus by which

you can see when you are successful in lowering your

pulse rate, your blood pressure, and so forth.

If you feel out of your depth, remember that

professional help is available to you. Contact your

Division Mental Health personnel for help. They are a

resource you can draw on in developing and

implementing the stress control training program.

The procedures for

gaining control over

stress are simple

The procedures for each of the four techniques that

are practical in military settings are described in the

handout. Notice that they are quite straightforward.

Take a minute or two to look through the handout. If

you see anything that raises a question, please ask

and I'll trv to answer it. (PAUSE AND WAIT FOR

QUESTIONS)

Stress reduction capability

develops slowly

As you see, the techniques really are so

straightforward that anyone can follow them. Stress

control capability develops gradually, but surely. Stick

to the training, take it seriously, and it will get you

there. We hope you never have to use this ability in

actual combat, but it will help you even in everyday

life.

Stress control is

individual training

How do you get an effective stress control preparation

program going in your unit? The first thing to

remember is that you can't approach it like

calisthenics. You can't just have everybody fall out for

stress control training. Stress control is an individual,

a personal, and—yes—a private skill. The procedures

for any of the techniques described in your handout

have to be followed by each soldier individually and at

his own pace. Let me repeat that point: at his own

pace. He is learning to get control over some things

that go on in his own body and mind. How that

learning progresses and it's timing can't be determined

by any other person than that individual. Stress

control training is individual training.

35
Explain to get willing

cooperation

V/e are talking about an effective stress control

program, not one that looks good. An effective

program of individual training in a completely

individual skill must first get the willing, dedicated

cooperation of the individual involved. Every soldier

has to understand very clearly what this training

accomplishes and what it will do for him. Explain to

the troops the combat conditions they will face in

continuous operations, what they will do to the ability

to keep going, and how stress control will keep the

soldier from becoming a stress casualty.

Demonstrate leadership

dedication

Create the right kind of a climate. The first thing to

do is to let everyone know that you are implementing

your own stress control training.

Allow flexibility to your

men

Allow flexibility to your men, but assure that they

practice stress control. Stress control practice should

be part of normal, everyday duty.

D. Review and Questions

Review This unit described three CDMs: (1) leadership and

commitment, (2) physical conditioning, and (3) stress

management.

Countering performance

degradation

These CDMs are a part of a total package that the

best information available tells us is necessary to

counter the performance degradation that will occur for

every soldier, regardless of rank, during continuous

combat operations. We must deal with this performance

degradation in a systematic manner. We can minimize

it, retard it, and compensate for it. The CDMs are

tools to help us accomplish this.

Questions There is time for a few questions or suggestions

before we move on to complete our discussion of CDMs.

36
UNIT III

Classroom Lecture

37
UNIT III

Clone ral

l

T

nit III is intended to follow immediately after the lecture and

discussion which constitute Unit II. Alon^ with Units II and IV, it

provides an in-depth explanation of measures for countering and retarding

performance degradation in continuous combat operations. It suggests how

CDT.ls may be introduced into the training to develop a capability for

continuous operations.

Presentation Procedure

A lesson plan, followed by a suggested script for Unit III, is

presented below. Unit III is a lecture presentation. The instructor may

read this script, or he may deliver his own version by relying on the

topical cues that accompany each paragraph (left column).

39
UNIT III

LESSON PLAN

TITLE: Counter Degr dation Pleasures 2: Special Talent,

Task Allocation, System Modifications and Performance Supports

TRAINING OBJECTIVE: Action: (1) The student will be able to implement

three CDMs at the Platoon/Squad level. (?.) The

student will be able to devise new CDMs. (3) The

student will be able to evaluate proposed and/or

implemented CDHs. (4) The student will be able

to instruct others in the use of CDMs.

Conditions: Following authorization from the

appropriate commands.

Standards: The student will accurately and

successfully participate in a stt of case discussions which involve CDM implementation.

MEDIA AND EQUIPMENT: Fli. charts (prepared)

METHOD OF INSTRUCTION: lecture

TIME: 50 minutes minimum (if possible, 2h)

"PREVIOUS PAGE

IS BUANK

41
UNIT III—TEXT

Three CDMs:

1. Identifying and

selecting talent

2. Task restructuring

and rotation

3. System modifications

and performance

supports

In this lesson, we will consider three Counter Degradation Pleasures (CDPIs). (1) identifying and selecting talent, (2) task restructuring and rotation, and

(3) system nodiffcations and performance supports. I

will explain the reasons for the implementation and the

evaluation of each CDP1. There will also be an opportunity to ask questions at the conclusion.

A. Identifying and Selecting Talent

Identifying and selecting

talent

Refer to chart

First, consider the talent identification and selection.

There are three main issues related to identifying and

selecting talent. First, you must understand the

concept of special talent. Second, you must be able to

find this talent in your troops. And third, you must

know how to use this talent. These issues are shown

on this chart. (SHOW CHART)

(CHART)

A. Identifying and Selecting Talent

1. Special talent and abilities

2. Hov to uncover special talent

3. How to use special talent

Talents and abilities—

examples: Targets Detection, sure orientation

Abilities especially useful in combat

Special Talent and Abilities

We all recognize that soldiers vary widely in their talents and abilities. Some commonly recognized special

abilities are mechanical ability or athletic ability. Sometimes soldiers possess abilities that are uniquelv suited

to some of the special demands of combat. Some examples are quick target detection, sure orientation,

accuracy with numbers, and physical agility. The main

concern here is to spot any special abilities that the

men in your unit may have. The men with special talents should be identified so that their abilities can be

used to the unit's advantage.

42

' m

m

\ V* '
Additional useful abilities What special abilities or talents are possible? Some

have already been mentioned: mechanical ability,

orientation ability, and so on. Other talents that might

be considered are physical strength, the ability to

speak a foreign language, such as Russian,

Ukranian,or Polish, range estimation, and stress

tolerance. What are some of the other relevant abilities

that are specific for your units?

(STUDENTS SUPPLY SUGGESTIONS)

How to Identify Special Talent

Identification of talent:

1. ASVAB

The Army makes an effort to identify and use some

abilities. Evidence of this is the use of the

ASVAB—the ability tests given in recruiting centers—

and the efforts to place personnel in duty positions

that most effectively use their skills. Much of this

information, like scores and foreign language ability,

are available to you in personnel files. You should use

these as a first step in identifying some of the special

talent in your unit.

2. Interviews Additional measures will be necessary to uncover

completely and "tap" the special talent in your unit.

Two possibilities are very informal interviews and

"tests" set up during field exercises. Talk to your

men individually and ask about each individual's

orientation ability, or ability to speak a foreign

language. A word of caution is in order, about ability

information received, from interviews. Soldiers may

overrate their ability out of modesty, or for other

reasons. Rather than letting a soldier get by with a

statement such as: "Yes, I'm very good at orienting in

the field" ask for specific examples (what specific

example(s) does he have? when? at night? unfamiliar

terrain?) and weigh the evidence using your own

judgment. Obviously, they may also overrate their

ability.

3. Excercises One good method of uncovering special talent is to

observe performance in the field. During training and

tactical exercises, plan to search for talent. For

example, through coordination with OPFORCE elements,

repeated infiltration attempts can be scheduled.

Soldiers who are consistently among the first to spot

these attempts are thereby identified as those with the

"sharpest eyes ann ears." You can identify soldiers

with talent for ovu-ntation during night exercises.

Another example is identifying those who are especially

accurate at estimating range.

43

^\
Use of talent

Examples:

Languages

Range estimation

Security

How to Use Special Talent

The uses of many talents are self-evident. For

example, soldiers who speak a foreign language can be

used as interpreters in interrogating POV/s. Soldiers

who accurately estimate range can be relied on when a

quick response must be made to suddenly appearing

targets. Soldiers with keen sight and hearing can be

used for perimeter security, especially at night. Can

anyone think of other examples like these?

(STUDENTS SUPPLY SUGGESTIONS)

Know your men and use

them wisely

The main point of this section on special talent is:

"Know your men and use then wisely." Each target

calls lor its own type of ammunition. Likewise, certain

tasks call for special talents. If any of the men in

your unit have a required special talent, learn of it

and use it.

Don't overload One final note is: "Use them wisely." "Wisely" does not

mean "exclusively" or "all the time." These men have

special talents, but they are not supermen. They, too,

will degrade during continuous combat operations.

Their talents can be used for the benefit of the entire

unit. But, remember to rotate the load; don't overload

any individual.

Task restructuring and

rotation

Refer to chart

B. Task Restructuring and Rotation

Now we will go on to topics related to structuring and

restructuring task performance. The following topics

are included: (SHOW CHART)

(CHART)

B. Task Restructuring and Rotation

1. Flexibilities and task/role

allocations

2. Contingencies and task/role

reallocations

44

•-Sä'. ..••• k." •-•
3. Rotation and work schedules

4. Parallel task performance

5. Shared task performance

Flexibilities and Task/Role Allocation

Example of "sharing

the load"

Imagine a four legged table. It's stable and solid. The

weight of the table is equally distributed over the four

legs. What happens if you cut off one leg? Weil, the

table may not fall over, but you may be sure the table

won't be as stable as before. Any weight placed on the

table may cause it to fall over. Now, within limits, an

Army unit is like that table. The weight of mission

success is distributed over every member of that unit.

The point here is not to place too much "weight" on

any one soldier or team and to consider the

consequences of losing people—just as we imagined

losing a leg of the imaginary table. The task and/or

role allocation topic deals with the issue of distributing

the "weight" of mission success.

Flexibilities for task

allocation

To a certain extent, task allocation is already

accomplished by MOS structures, policies with respect

to line of command, and traditional views on

assignment of responsibilities. But, you must look for

flexibilities within these guidelines. CDMs call for

special planning.

Allocate duties equitably The key to task allocation is to assign duties

equitably. Don't "load up" your best man. Sure, he

gets the job done initially, but with all those

responsibilities, he'll be the fastest to degrade. Spread

the responsibilities out. Train in such a way that

during operations, you will be able to assign tasks to

the least degraded soldiers.

Examples:

Obstacles

Range cards

Combat vehicle

Some examples of flexible task allocation at the squad

level are:

0

having a number of men responsible for

placing obstacles and mines

0

sharing the responsibility for preparing

range cards

0

having a number of men capable of performing

specific tasks such as combat vehicle driving.

45
Share the load Remenber that tasks differ in a great many ways. For

example, they differ in their relative importance or

criticality to mission success. Mission success will be

endangered if all critical tasks are concentrated in one

duty position and the person involved is killed.

Success will also be endangered if that person's

performance capabilities deteriorate—for any reason—to

low levels. A low level of effectiveness, it will be

recalled, equates with a low reliability of performance

or a snail likelihood that each critical task will be

carried out adequately. Therefore, it is vitally

important to distribute the critical tasks.

Contingencies and Task/Role Reallocation

Changing task allocations A major benefit resulting from flexibility in task/role

wüh changing circumstances allocations during training is the flexibility you will

have during operations. You and your troops will be

better able to manage and cope with the stresses of

continuous operations. It's a simple matter of not

putting all your eggs in one basket. You must

anticipate losses in personnel capability, and not just

in the number lost for whatever reason (KIA, WIA,

MIA). Keep in mind that the troops you do keep will

be getting less and less effective. This performance

degradation will show itself in increased errors and

slowed performance. These concerns force you to be

flexible in your assignments. You will need to allocate

and reallocate tasks in such a way that mission success

will be accomplished even in the face of the adverse

conditions of continuous operations.

Rotation and W-rk Schedules

Flexibility in task/role Maintaining flexibility in task/role allocation will permit

rotation you, during combat operations, to order frequent task

rotation among all soldiers and teams competent to

perform a given task.

Performance declines In manv tasks, performance declines v/ith prolonged

with time on task execution of the task. This decline is additional to the

degradation from fatigue and other adverse factors.

Tracking enemy targets with a MG or an optical sight

are examples of such tasks. Both tine off-target and

number of times off-target increase the longer these

tasks arc performed. Frequent rotation provides relief

and, at the same time, maintains more effective

Performance.

46

-, ^ - ! - • -
Adjusting work/rest

schedules

Task rotation allows work and rest schedules to be

adjusted so that, with proper time management, fatigue

can be held in check as long as possible. This point

will again be raised later.

Parallel task performance

Parallel Task Performance

Parallel task performance means deliberate duplication

or redundant performance. Redundancy is perhaps the

most widely used technique for assuring adequate performance in adverse circumstances. It is, for example,

the standard engineering technique for guaranteeing

the performance of complex hardware systems. Simply

put, in a vehicle with both hydraulic and mechanical

brake linkage, one or the other can fail and yet brakes

will be available. So, redundancy serves to assure

performance reliability and that means mission success.

Examples of parallel task

performance:

Calculations

Map reading

Redundancy, as applied to human performance, means

that two or more persons perform the same task to

assure that it is performed correctly. For example, 1'

two persons perform a calculation independently and

arrive at the same result, some confidence can be

given to that result. Similarly, if these people

independently determine their location on a map and

agree, it is more likely that the result will be the

correct, actual location than the determination of a

single person.

Training required for

parallel task performance

Task sharing

Parallel task performance is a very simple yet effective

CDM. The only requirement is that more than one man

is trained on the particular task. The steps for you to

take are to identify especially critical tasks and to

make sure that a number of men are trained on them.

Then, you will be able to use thSM men when they are

needed.

Shared Task Performance

One final benefit of maintaining flexibility in task

assignments is that task sharing can be used. Sharing

does not mean reorganizing the lines of responsibility,

as specified by the TOE. Rather, sharing means a

rearrangement, either partial or full, of certain task

responsibilities. For some tasks, prior training may be

necessary before personnel can share the task, and

this should certainly be considered in training. But,

for many tasks, the necessary skills are already present or incorporated into standard training and, therefore, the only required action is to "do it."

47

J- .•-• r* t. fitrj v-
Benefits of task sharing Task sharing can lead to major performance inprovements under stressful conditions. Not only will

task sharing improve performance on particular tasks

but it will also help to slow the build-up of fatigue

and the resulting performance degradation.

Examples:

Physical tasks

Let's begin with a simple example of task sharing.

When the task at hand consists of lifting some object

which exceeds the strength of all but the very strongest, load sharing is clear and obvious. That task

becomes easy and its performance reliable when two or

more people share the exertion. Even when the load to

be lifted is such that it presents no serious problem to

the fresh, rested person, it may be impossible for the

extremely fatigued person.

Complex tasks The principle of task load sharing can be extended to

situations in which the load is not literally a physical

weight. In a clerical task, for instance, it is often

possible to share the component activities of the task

between two people and to gain efficiency as well as

longer endurance. In a calculation, especially of a

repetitive type, it is often possible to split the

activities in an analogous way. In perceptual or

sensory tasks (looking, listening), such divisions of

task responsibility are often possible.

Sharing with devices Also, as discussed before, the sharing need not be

between two persons. It can be a sharing with devices

(in the broadest sense of that term). A rope and

pulley arrangement shares the load of lifting weights.

A hand held calculator shares the load of calculations,

and so forth.

When to task share The issue is not whether task load sharing should be

done, but when it should be considered. Progressive

deterioration of performance capabilities needs to be

foreseen. Tasks that are critical in some sense (mainly

to mission accomplishment) should be examined in detail, and provisions for sharing the task load with

other persons or with devices preplanned. Remember

that the person who can easily complete a task in normal situations may find that the task overloads him

under the impact of continuous operations.

48
C. System Modifications and Performance Supports

Refer to chart This is a list of the topics we will cover under this

topic. (SHOW CHART)

(CHART)

C. System Modifications and Performance

Supports

1. Explanation of system modifications

2. Explanation of performance supports

3. Examples of types and applications

4. Inventing the ''better way"

5. Encouraging invention

6. Evaluating system modifications

and performance supports

7. Adopting and implementing system

modifications and performance supports

General information "System modification" and "performance supports" are

terms used to describe a variety of tools and procedures for improving or at least sustaining soldier

performance during the stressful conditions of continuous combat. Th( y can all be classified as changes,

aids, and improvements ("crutches," if you will) that

result in improved soldier performance. There is no

limit to the number or type of system modifications

and/or performance supports. We can suggest a few

today and give you some examples and ideas, but don't

get the idea that we've exhausted all the possibilities.

This is an area that is wide open for creative ideas.

Use your imagination to find better ways of doing things.

49
Determining where to

apply the system

modification

Explanation of System Modifications

The steps involved in developing system modifications

and performance supports are to first examine the process in question. Analyze it in detail so as to make

every step explicit together with the factors on which

success depends. Then, review for possible simplification, streamlining, or even just making one or

more steps easier to accomplish.

Before we go on let me caution you. Of course, what I

am telling you here does not apply to any sort of

prescribed operating procedures; you always do them

by the book. We are here talking about procedures in

which you have some latitude. Also, do not make a

change without testing to make sure it is really an

improvement. It just might prove to have been a poor

idea.

Types of system

modification

System redesign or modification possibilities fall into

three categories:

0

physical

0

informational

0

procedural

Examples:

Storing ammunition

Working with information

An example of physical system modification is the

pattern of storing various types of ammunition at a

gun position. Even minor adjustments in location,

stacking, type of separation, and so on, can decrease

the demand on the soldier resources for fuzing and

loading designated rounds. An informational modification might be an increase/decrease, or a rearrangement of information arrayed in a single display

(chart, CRT, status board). Such changes reduce the

mental demands when someone using the display looks

for and thinks about relevant information. A procedural modification may involve moving some step (or

sequence of steps) upstream or downstream. Select

tasks which must be performed when the stress in

high and, if possible, schedule them so that they are

carried out when the stress is low.

Performance supportsaids to performance

Explanation of Performance Supports

Performance supports is an area that is wide open for

development. The returns resulting from thoir use can

50
be substantial. A performance support helps the

soldier accomplish his task. A tired soldier nay need a

lever to shift heavy equipment. The lever is a

performance support.

Examples:

Binoculars

NVDs

Computers

Many kinds of performance support already exist and

are in common use. Binoculars support distance vision.

Telephones or radiotelephones support distance communication. Many types of night vision devices (NVDs)

and laser target designators (LTDs) and rangefinders

support soldiers' judgments in accurate range estimation. Computers, or merely hand held calculators,

support numerical operations and thinking. And remember, thinking is especially vulnerable to degradation during continuous operations.

Use simple performance

aids, too

High technology is not necessarily required for a performance support. Many types of performance supports

are of a rudimentary nature: note pads, charts, plexiglass overlays, and grease pencils. Other types of

support require only a moderate level of technology

such as cassette recorders or optical filters for enhancing contrast or shifting colors.

Emphasize the use and development of such supports

for performance so as to enable each soldier to accomplish tasks successfully when his initial performance capability is degraded.

Who can think of an example of other possible

performance supports?

(STUDENTS SUPPLY SUGGESTIONS)

Examples of Types and Applications

Further examples Once you understand the basic concept you can recognize examples all around you. Performance supports

can be as simple as a sling to help carry a rifle or the

hole in a dog tag which a tank commander might use to

estimate distance to a target.

51

v v •.- - • ^
Finding better ways of

accomplishing tasks

Inventing the "Better Way"

One major similarity amonf* all system modifications and

performance supports is that they reduce task performance difficulty. Performance of some tasks is impossible without aids (such as long distance communication and night vision devices) v/hile performance

of other tasks would be possible without aids. System

modifications and performance supports function to

conserve soldiers' energy and delay performance degradation in continuous operations. For these reasons,

it is very important to develop the "better way" getting tasks accomplished.

Encouraging Invention

Enlisting the support

of all members of the

unit.

Don't be complacent about your own performance level

or the performance level of your unit. Even if you

have achieved high proficiency levels, don't "rest on

your laurels." Look for better, easier, efficient ways

of achieving the same level of performance. Finding

better, easier, efficient ways of getting the job done

will pay off when troops are degraded by continuous

operations.

Encourage suggestions It is everyone's job to think about system modifications

and performance supports. Enlist the aid of every member of your unit and follow up on the hints provided.

Those who actively perform various types of activities

are in the best position to recognize ways of aiding

performance and supporting the abilities involved. Encourage, recognize, reward, and disseminate suggestions on how to facilitate performance, and especially, performance while the soldier is in a degraded condition.

Examples:

Charts

Identifying threat

equipment

Better, easier, efficient ways to accomplish important

tasks in continuous operations are a leadership problem, but it is everyone's job to find them. For instance, numbers and their mental manipulation become

more and more difficult with cumulative sleep loss. For

many purposes, tables can be prccalculatcd, or curves

drawn, or nomographs developed to aid the soldier.

52
Searching for solutions

Evaluating System Modifications and Performance Supports

All of you have probably anticipated what you are going to hear next. Not all suggestions for improvement

will be valid, worthwhile suggestions. Sometimes, it

seems like it's basic human nature to complain about

conditions—"the equipment doesn't work," "the manuals

are unclear," or "it's toe heavy to carry around." But

what you must do is turn those complaints around. If

there really is a problfcti what can be done in terms of

system modifications and/or performance supports to

remedy that problem?

Evaluating suggestions

Weighing benefits

against costs

Once system modifications and performance supports

have been suggested it is up to you and your commanding officer to evaluate the suggestions for feasibility and likelihood of success. There are no hard

and fast rules about what will work and what won't.

However, there are general guidelines you should consider. These guidelines apply to both system modifications and performance supports. First, ask whether the proposed change is realistic and would actually

serve to help the soldier rather than just be an added

burden, either in terms of physical burden or of additional training requirements. For example, a wheeled

cart for the Cal. 50 MG may sound like a good idea,

but it would probably have problems with rough terrain or wooded areas and would bo more of a nuisance

than an aid. A better solution, if the machinegun must

be carried, is to trade off the responsibility of carrying it so that one soldier doesn't get too fatigued.

In summary, you will have to weigh proposed benefits

against possible problems. But don't shortchange an

idea. Suggestions deserve a thorough analysis. Procedures and equipment are constantly changing in the

Army. The suggestions you evaluate will change things

for the better.

Take a broad perspective A second consideration in evaluating suggested system

modifications and performance supports is to consider

the change from a broad perspective. The perspective

could be a team, squad, platoon, or entire division

and all the equipment and the procedures. The question you consider is, "Mow will this change impact on

the functioning of the total system?" The elements of

any system arc interdependent—a change in one can

have an influence on some or all of the other elements.

53
Consider the possibility of these changes and ensure

that the new modification or performance support will

have a beneficial effect on the total system.

Adopting and Implementing System

Modifications and Performance Supports

Incorporating aids into

training

After a system modification or performance support has

been evaluated, found to be worth implementation, and

authorized by the appropriate chain of command, it

must be incorporated into the troops' preparation for

combat. No change will have maximum usefulness unless it has been thoroughly practiced. Soldiers must be

comfortable with the change whether it is a procedure

or a physical object. For these reasons, incorporate

the modifications or performance supports into training

long before the acute need arises.

D. Review and Questions

Review This unit described three CDPls: (1) using special

talent, (2) task restructuring and rotation, and (3)

system modifications and performance supports.

Countering performance

degradation

Let me remind you, again that these CDPls are part of

a total package. The best information available tells us

that it is necessary to counter the performance degradation that will occur to every soldier, regardless of

rank, during continuous combat operations. We must

deal with this performance degradation in a systematic

manner. We can minimize it, retard it, and compensate

for it. The CDP.Is are tools to help us accomplish this.

Questions

Questions There is time for a few questions or suggestions

before we move on to complete our discussion of CDMs.

54

' - > _•
UNIT IV

Classroom Lecture

55

* L • . ^•.
UNIT IV

General

Unit IV is intended to follow immediately after the lecture and

discussion which constitute Unit III. Along with Units II and III, it

provides an in-depth explanation of three additional measures for

countering and retarding performance degradation in continuous combat

operations. It details these three CDMs (training, work/rest/sleep

discipline, resource management), and relates these to preparing for

continuous operations.

Presentation Procedure

A lesson plan, followed by a suggested script for Unit IV, is

presented below. Unit IV is a lecture presentation. The instructor

may read the script, or he may deliver his own version of it by relying on

the topical cues that accompany each paragraph (left column).

57
TITLE

UNIT IV

LESSON PLAN

Counter Degradation Pleasures 3: Traininsf, Sleep Discipline, and Resource Management

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: Action; (1) The student will be able to implement three

CDMs at the Platoon/Squad level. (2) The student will

be able to devise new CDMs. (3) The student will be

able to evaluate proposed and/or implemented CDMs.

(4) The student will be able to instruct others in the

use of CDMs.

Conditions: Following authorization from the appropriate commands.

Standards: The student will accurately and successfully participate in a set of case discussions which

involve CDP' implementation

MEDIA AND EQUIPMENT; Flipcharts (prepared)

METHOD OF INSTRUCTION: lecture

jll^g. 50 minutes minimum (if possible, 2h)

59
Refer to chart

UNIT IV~TEXT

This unit covers the last three, but possibly the most

important, Clounter Degradation Measures (CDMs): (1)

training for continuous operations, (2) work/rest/sleep

discipline, and (3) resource manapenent.

(CHART)

COUNTER DEGRADATION MEASURES

(CDMs)

1. Training

2. Work/rest/sleep discipline

3. Resource management

Training features to be

emphasized

A. Training for Continuous Operations

Training for continuous operations means learning to

maintain combat effectiveness under extremely adverse

conditions. The training objectives, for the most part,

do not relate to new technical or tactical skills. Rather

the training aims at maintaining effectiveness of acquired skills in new and particularly adverse circumstances.

(CHART)

A. Training for Continuous Operations

1. Overtraining

2. Training under realistic conditions

3. Patterns of practice

4. Coaching of performance

5. Diagnosing deficiencies and feedback

6. Crosstraining

7. Training efficiency: plans and administration

60
Refer to chart Each of these points (POINT TO ITEMS ON CHART

SUCCE5SIVELY) is a feature of major importance in

training to acquire continuous operations capability.

This capability is synonymous with the capability for

performing mission related combat tasks even under

the worst imaginable conditions.

1. Overtraining

Overtraining means

training over and

beyond basic mastery

Overtraining means training over and beyond showing

just once—maybe in an ARTEP evaluation—that you

can do some task. It means that you keep on

practicing, practicing, practicing until doing that

task, in the truest sense, becomes second nature.

The benefits are:

0

reliable

0

automatic

0

rapid

performance

All kinds of research studies and common sense

experience tell you that the more you practice the

better you get. Getting better means that the task

performance is more reliable, more automatic, and more

rapid. It means the task is performed correctly every

time; it means that you do it so automatically you don't

have to think about "how to"; it means you'll start

doing the task when the performance is called for.

Reliable, automatic, and

rapid performance is

resistant to degradation

The real pay-off from all this training comes in actual

combat. If you've achieved reliable, automatic, and

rapid performance in training, that performance will

stay effective in continuous combat. More than any

oth( .' technique, overtraining will keep you doing the

important combat tasks and doing them effectively.

There is really no substitute for practicing over and

over again.

Practice does not always

make perfect

2. Training Under Realistic Conditions

Practice does not always make perfect. How does this

square with practicing over and over again. Both are

true. Suppose that you are learning to field strip or

to clear a jam in your weapon. Inside a warm

classroom, it doesn't take all that long until you can

do it blindfolded. Now, suppose you are called on to

perform this task in a howling blizzard with

temperatures down to minus 20oF. If you touch a metal

part with your bare fingers, they'll freeze on to that

part instantly. You must keep gloves or nittens on

your hands. How well do you think you'll be able to

perform under these circumstances?

61
Practice conditions must

match expected conditions

of performance

Maybe I should ask you this question after you've

dropped the first small part into the snow. What you

do to clear the jam hasn't changed, but how you go

about it has. For instance, your finger, hand, wrist

and arm motions will have to change when you have to

work without any "feel," and you'll have to make some

provision to catch the falling parts before you lose

them. In short, while practice makes perfect, practice

must take place under the same conditions under which

you expect to have to perform the task.

Progress from practice

in easy to practice in

tough conditions

Is 0400, after three days without sleep a good time to

teach somebody for the first time how to do mental

arithmetic? By the same token, would you take a new

recruit and teach him how to clear a jam in his weapon

in a blizzard at minus 20F? Well, the answers are quite

obviously "no." First, you teach your trainee the basic

"how to" of some task. Then, you let him practice it

until he can do it properly. Only then do you ask him

to perform it under less than favorable circumstances.

Gradually and progressively, you make the conditions

of practice more severe—always guided by whether or

not your trainee has learned to cope with a given level

of difficulty and difficult circumstances. The guiding

principles is: train as you expect to fight. But, build

up gradually to fighting capability under the most

adverse conditions.

3. Patterns of Practice

Practice tasks in context

and in combination

You can train for performance of a task all by itself.

But, that's not how things really happen. There is

hardly any task that isn't preceded by a different

task—maybe a task someone else performs—and usually

some other activity follows when a task is finished. In

short, most tasks require a coordinated performance,

because they are part of an overall context. Often,

you have to shift back and forth, because you have to

do two or more things at the same time. Effective practice has to take account of the context and the combinations.

the FDC example In an artillery Fire Direction Center (FDC), a team

consisting of a Horizontal Control Operation and a Vertical Control Operator develop the firing data from

information fed by a Forward Observer. At least, they

do this when the computer is down. Many of the separate tasks depend on some item of information beinp

developed elsewhere. The filing can't be completed

until the necessary information is furnished. Time is

very tight, and tasks have to be synchronized.

62

- •• F
Sometines more than one mission is being fired; some

missions are interrupted or cancelled; some missions

are picked up again, and so forth. Perhaps, you can

now see what I mean by context and combination. Knowing how to determine, for example, range or deflection

is not enough. You have to practice it in coordination

with other tasks and in coordination with other team

members. This is one example. Can any of you give me

some others? (DRAW OUT APPROPRIATE EXAMPLES

FROM STUDENTS)

Continuous combat is

a championship contest

H. Coaching Performance

Comparing continuous combat to sports, especially team

sports, may sound far-fetched. However, some points

of similarity can be noted. In each case one side or

team tries to get the better of the other; each side

follows some strategy; and various tactics are used to

gain the advantage.

Achieving champion

level performance

requires coaching

The making of champions depends on the team, but a

lot of it depends on the coach. A good coach makes

the most of each of the team players and the team as a

whole. Getting your team or unit ready for continuous

operations is a lot like getting a championship team

ready. You have to realize that a major part of your

responsibility is to coach the team.

Coaching:

0

how to

0 winning attitude

Coaching your team or unit means showing it how to

improve performance, and how to achieve the required

capability. It means showing the fine points of combat

skills and not just under favorable conditions. Show

your men how to keep their performance up—especially, when you start to practice in really tough

conditions.

Improving performance:

1. Diagnosing deficiencies

5. Diagnosing Deficiencies and Feedback Guidance

Sometines, real improvement nay be forthcoming even

though the winning spirit is there. The reason is that

the team doesn't know what is going wrong. It's the

coach's job to analyze just what keeps any individual,

team, or unit from doing better. You have to pinpoint

the deficiencies, and then you have to figure out the

reasons for them.

63

« li.' . ._• . • k." ..-
Improving performance:

2. How to eliminate

deficiencies

If you're the only one who knows what's wrong and

why, nothing is going to change. Feed the information

back to the soldiers you're training. Hold up a mirror

for them so that they can see themselves as you see

them. Point out the deficiency that is keeping them

from getting better, and explain or demonstrate exactly how to overcome that deficiency. Show the reasons for the deficiency that is holding them back.

Improving performance:

3. Do's and don't of

guidance

There are some principles of effective coaching.

(POINT TO CHART)

(CHART)

Do's and Don't's of Good Coaching

Do

Point out differences

in., (e.g., weapon

signature) to be observed

Don't

Tell soldier(s) to look

harder, or to take a

better look

Demonstrate to soldier(s) the best position for operating the

weapon

Tell soldier(s) he

(they) used the wrong

position

Explain exact details

of a report to be provided

Ask for a better report,

or for more information

Specify clearly the

way(s) in which the

team is to act together

Tell the team to "get

your act together"

Refer to chart Explain clearly what is wrong and how to do it better.

As the chart shows, be specific about what you want

your trainees to do. Don't be satisfied with telling

them to try again or to try harder. That doesn't tell

them what vou want them to do; it only tells them

what you don't want. Notice that the chart follows its

own advice: it is specific about how to provide good

coaching guidance.

64

."- wN .•- jv .siv.v
6. Crosstraining

Crosstraining = insurance Let's talk about crosstraining. Of course, crosstraining

is routine, and our pvrpose is not to tell you how to

do it generally. We want to talk about some aspects of

crosstraining that are are particularly important for a

continuous operations capability. Crosstraining represents insurance. As more soldiers are crosstrained,

the more likely it is that somebody will be available to

carry out some important task. Crosstraining provides

the insurance that somebody "can do and will do."

Insure:

1. Most valuable assets

When you insure, you mainly insure your most valuable

assets. You crosstrain first those tasks that are most

important when your team or unit must carry out its

typical combat missions. You never have enough time

and other resources to crosstrain every one of your

soldiers with every other one. Therefore, set your

priorities by asking yourself what would happen to

your mission capability, if no one were available to

perform certain tasks. For example, what if only the

gunner knows how to correct a CAL 50 MC malfunction, and you lose him. Maybe, you haven't lost

him, but he is too fatigued—his performance is too

degraded—to handle that task. That's the new consideration with respect to continuous operations.

Insure:

2. Assets most likely

to be lost

You have to insure, also, those assets that are most

likely to evaporate in continuous operations. For example, in one continuous operations exercise—with

very little sleep—an infantry platoon was able to maintain its speed of march across ccuntry, but the platoon leader was unable to read or interpret his map.

In continuous operations, the performance of tasks

that require you to think, plan, calculate, determine,

make decisions, or even to recognize (for example,

enemy vehicles) becomes degraded soonest and to the

greatest extent. Leadership tasks are mostly of this

type. But whoever normally performs them, give

crosstraining priority to those tasks that are most vulnerable to performance degradation. Make sure there is

somebody else to help or take over.

65 u
Difficult conditions are

difficult to creat

7. Training Efficiency; Plans and Administration

Continuous operations training presents some special

problems. You ought to understand these special problems so as to support training intelligently. The point

is simple: the difficult conditions of continuous

operations are hard to come by in training. For

example, to simulate really tough condixicns you need

to run continuous FTXs that are three to five days

long. You'll appreciate that it's difficult to get training

facilities for three to five days. In any case, you can't

run a continuous FTX every other week.

Opportunities for genuine

continuous operations

training are scarce; make

the most of them

The message is really quite clear. The genuine training opportunities—training under wcll-sinulated continuous combat conditions—are relatively few and far

between. When you get the chance, make the most of

the opportunity. Practice as much as possible your

most important tasks. Practice them again and again,

and have your men practice theirs. Especially practice

the combat tasks that require judgment, calculation, or

in any way using the brain. If you ever have to fight

in continuous combat, the payoff will be tremendous.

Sleep discipline is vital

in continuous operations

B. Work/Rest/Sleep Discipline

Sleep discipline is another CDM.

(CHART)

B. Work/Rest/Sleep Discipline

1. Counteracting sleep-loss effects

2. Setting priorities for sleep and

rest

3. Developing unit work/rcst/sleep

schedules

4. Enforcing the discipline

66
: .

Refer to chart (POINT TO CHART) Even though you may not have to

develop your unit's sleep discipline, you may have to

adjust it for your particular team or unit. You need to

understand the background and the reasons for it to

make sleep discipline effective.

1. Counteracting Sleep-Loss Effects

No one can do without

sleep indefinetely

No one, regardless of rank, age, or determination to

resist, can go without sleep indefinitely. The only real

cure for loss of sleep is sleep itself. Sleep has to be

managed, and everyone has to get a fair share.

Sleep loss affects "brain

activity"

Sleep loss hits hardest the activities which require

that you use your head or your brain. You use your

brnin not only for thinking or decision making, but

also for other things that you don't think about normally. For example, staying alert so as to spot enemy

infiltration attempts, or noticing changes on some instrument read-out or on a radar screen are also dependent on an alert brain. By the same token, noticing the differences between—say—friendly and enemy tanks also requires an alert brain. While the only

real cure for loss of sleep, as we mentioned, is sleep

itself, there are a few techniques to help you stay

alert.

Refer to chart (POINT TO CHART) What you see here fits some situations some of the time. For instance, "mild physical

exercise" makes no sense while you're moving over

rough terrain and you're trying to stay alert for possible mines or booby traps. It does make sense for a

GSR operation or someone manning a sentry post.

Again, we can't foresee every kind of situation that

you'll encounter, but adjust the system—for example,

simplify procedures—to compensate. You will have to

do a little thinking about how the items in the chart

fit with your situation.

67
(CHART)

SOME TECHNIQUES FOR

COUNTERACTIMC SLEEP-LOSS EFFECTS

0

Periodic breaks in task and mild physical exercise or recreation

0

Task rotation among crosstrained crew

on relatively routine jobs

0

Task rotation among crew on complex

tasks only when members are highly

trained to shift functions

0

System desk a to compensate for types

of errors mo-st likely to occur

0

Plan for and provide naps where possible

0

Provide hot food or hot beverages

Are there any questions about anything on this chart?

(WAIT FOR QUESTIONS, IF ANY)

Effective sleep discipline

is highly specific

2. Setting Priorities for Sleep and Rest

The chart says to plan for and provide naps where

possible. You may have very little control there, because the enemy may not let you nap. Also, the general policy for sleep allocation and management will be

laid down for you by your battalion headquarters.

However, really effective sleep discipline has to be

extremely specific. You will have to fine tune the sleep

discipline for your team or unit.

Fair allotment must be

adjusted for need

lioss of sleep most directly affects decision making,

planning, evaluating, and so forth. For the most part,

these are leadership activities. Plakinpr decisions and

directing any team or unit is the main leadership responsibility. Leadership tasks must be protected as

much as possible. Fair allotments of slcen have to be

allowed to meet this need.

68
Refer to chart Keeping this in mind, we can understand the general

scheme of priorities for sleep and rest that you pee on

the chart (POINT TO CHART). Notice that the chart

doesn't refer to soldiers, but to their activities or

duty responsibilities. The responsibilities determine the

priority. The first priority, for reasons already given,

is assigned to those who have leadership responsibilities. The next priority is assigned to soldiers

whose responsibilities require them to perform important calculations, make judgments, or evaluate information. The third order priority is assigned to soldiers who must stay vigilant or alert such as sentries

and radar operators. Everyone else will have to try

and make do with an even share of what is possible.

Obviously, you have to determine for your specific

unit how this scheme applies. To be effective, it has

to be specific down to the smallest team, and sleep

discipline has to be practiced extensively.

(CHART)

GENERAL PRIORITIES FOR SLEEP/REST

PRIORITY TYPE OF ACTIVITY/RESPONSIBILITY

Leadership

Evaluations, judgments, and calculations

3

4

Vigilance tasks

Other activities

There may be some control

before, during, and after

combat

3. Developing Unit Work/Rest/Sleep Schedules

Unit work/rest/sleep schedules are an "iffy" thing. If

there is enemy initiated action, you obviously have no

control over who sleeps and when. Sometimes, even in

the middle of a continuous combat operation, there may

be a break for some teams or units. Before actual

combat—during the preparation period—a fair decree

of control will exist. After a unit is withdrawn from

combat, there will be some control over sleep

schedules, but we'll consider this later. In any case,

there will be times when it is possible to follow some

kind of a work/rest/sloop schedule. Here are some

items to remember on those occasions.

69
Preadapt to combat zone

local time and schedule

Just about everybody knows what "jet-lap" means, and

nost of us know what it feels like. Traveling across

meridians upsets your biological rhythms that are associated with your wake/sleep cycles. Staying awake

around the clock also does that. The upset wake/sleep

cycles degrade performance effectiveness considerably

for at least a week, but can be felt up to three or

four weeks. One very good way to deal with this problem is to adopt the new schedule as soon as you know

where you're going. Start getting up in the morning

and going to sleep at night according to the clock of

your destination. At first this will be hard to do, but

you'll be preadapted when you get there. The time

change won't bother you as much, and it won't bother

you as long. When you arrive at your destination, put

in at least part of a work day so that you'll be tired

and able to sleep. Do not go to sleep immediately on

arrival.

Refer to chart Here, we're only going to tell you about fairly shortterm and very demanding schedules. (POINT TO

CHART)

(CHART)

RECOMMEND

WORK/REST/SLEEP SCHEDULES

0

For up to five days almost any work/rest

schedule (e.g., 2 on - 2 off, 4 on - 4 off,

8 on - 8 off) will sustain performance equally

well

0

For up to 30 days follow a 4 on - 4 off, or a

16 on - 8 off schedule

0 Avoid a 4 on - 2 off schedule, if possible

For up to five days, any of these suggested schedules

will work about equally well. Rcyond that, use the 4

on - 4 off or the IG on - 8 off schedule. Avoid the 4

on - 2 off schedule, because it has adverse effects.

Those roconmonded schedules will keep your men in

the best possible condition.

70
Develop and enforce the

unit-specific discipline

in training

4. Enforcing the Discipline

After you have developed a specifically tailored discipline, enforce it strictly in training. For example,

during continuous FTXs, see to it that your men go to

sleep immediately when their turn comes. Don't permit

any fooling around. Soldiers have to practice falling

asleep immediately—as strange as that may sound—and

they have to learn how to wake up alert. V/aking up

and being alert are not always easy for everyone.

Practice and enforce sleep discipline just as you

enforce, for example, water discipline.

Enforce sleep discipline

in combat

If you have done a good job in developing and enforcing the sleep discipline in training, it should be

easy to implement in actual continuous combat. In an

early period—maybe the first day or two—there might

be some resistance to strict sleep discipline. Enforce it

strictly so that some performance effectiveness remains

for days three and four and beyond. Remember, also,

that in actual continuous combat circumstances will

change; adjustments in the sleep discipline will become

necessary.

Soldiers' performance

is a resource

C. Resource Management

Soldiers' performance and its effectiveness is one of

the resources needed to accomplish your mission. Other resources are weapons, equipment, food, fuel, and

so on. In continuous operations, soldiers' performance

effectiveness is likely to become the scarce resource.

That's why it must be managed, and managed carefully.

(CHART)

C. Resource Management

1. Implementing a counter-degradation

program

2. Rest vs. effort toward mission

achievement

3. Maximizing recovery opportunities

71
Refer to chart (POINT TO CHART) Management of battle resources is

mainly a problem for higher command levels. Your specific concerns are shown here on the chart.

Make the program work

1. Implementing a Counter-Degradation Program

When your battalion implements its counter-degradation

program, your main responsibilities is to make the program work. Give it your full, intelligent support. The

program and the training schedule can't foresee every

detail nnd every contingency. You will have to fill in

constructively so as to support the intention M well s

the letter of the program. Inform yourself, for example, by referring to FM 26-XX, Soldier Perforirance

in Continuous Operations. Understanding why you are

asked to perform a detail will help you to do a better

job.

Make your men understand See to it that your men understand the overall continuous operations policy, the necessity for it, and its

aims. Show them that the training and preparation

program is very much for their own benefit. Attend to

your leadership responsibilities as they were discussed

earlier. Especially at the beginning, be flexible as well

as firm. Continuous operations training is very demanding, and, at the beginning, all of your soldiers

will not be equally in shape for it. Give them time to

get in shape and to get in step, but be firm about

clear progress in that direction.

Maintain communication We've talked about the importance of open communication channels before. Continuous operations training is relatively new, and there hasn't been a great

deal of experience accumulated. Observe what is and

what isn't working well in the program. Feed this information back to your superior. Honest and constructive suggestions will be very important.

2. Rest vs. Effort Toward Mission Achievement

Rest vs. effort, a complex

problem

Another soldier resource management problem you may

have to face is the decision whether or not to let your

men rest and sleep versus work such as hardening a

battle position. Unfortunately, this is a very complex

problem for which there are no cut and dried answers.

Each situation will be different in ways that can't be

foreseen.

72
Strong performance or

strong position

You have to balance, in each case, the acconplishnent

against the condition of your men. For example, in the

case of sleep versus preparing stronger defensive

positions, the question is whether the position or the

ability of the men to fight effectively will contribute

most toward mission accomplishment. Even a strong

position may be worthless when manned by soldiers

who can't handle the important fighting tasks. In the

light of what we've told you here, you should

appreciate the importance of sleep in deciding this

issue. It will always be a difficult decision.

Refer to chart We can point out some of the major factors to weigh.

(POINT TO CHART)

(CHART)

SLEEP/REST VS. EFFORT:

SOME FACTORS TO CONSIDER

0 How vital is task accomplishment?

0

Estimated available time?

0 How many soldiers available?

0

Time since soldiers last slept?

0 Ability to rotate or work shifts?

0 Kinds of expected fighting tasks?

First, what will the task accomplishment buy you in

terms of supporting your mission? How much time have

you to get it done, and does it allow for both work

and sleep? Are there enough soldiers available so that

some can sleep while others work? How long has it

been since these men slept and for how long? Can you

rotate the work with sleep, or can you work shifts?

Also, consider the kinds of fighting tasks that will

have to be performed. Soldiers can fire weapons and

perform similar highly practiced, physical tasks even

after much sleep loss. But, they can't stay alert for

enemy infiltrations or react to a sudden shift in

enemy tactics. Obviously, other considerations may

enter. You'll have to decide each situation on the basis

of its characteristics.

73

P k'* »"•_ *
3. Maximizing Recovery Opportunities

Practice sleep discipline Your management responsibility is to enforce strict

at all times practice of sleep discipline at all tines—in training and

in continuous combat. Soldiers must realize that they

have to conserve their own performance effectiveness

as much as possible.

Refer to chart Of course, continuous FTXs, and even combat missions

come to an end, though others may follow. (POINT TO

CHART) This chart tells most of that story.

(CHART)

TIME REQUIRED FOR COMPLETE RECOVERY

FROM EXTENDED LOSS OF SLEEP

0 As much as 120 hours following 96 or more

hours of complete sleep loss

0

12 hours sleep/rest after 36-48 hours of complete sleep loss with light to moderate workload (subjective fatigue may linger for three

days)

0

24 hours sleep/rest after 36-48 hours sleep

loss with high workload (12-16 hours per

day)

0

Two to three days time off after 72 hours or

more acute sleep loss

0

Three to five days to initiate biological

adaptation and return to normal day/night cycle

from night shift work

0

Three to four weeks for full adaptation or biological rhythms to atypical work/rest schedules

(as in night shift work)

74
What we do not know is how much real physical

* conditioning and frequent experience with extended

sleep loss modifies the information in the chart. Until

» you have compiled a lot of experience, keep it in

mind, especially after continuous FTXs or similar

exercices. You are in the most direct contact with

your men and have the first line of management

| responsibility.

D. Review and Questions

Review We covered three major counter degradation measures

(CDMs): (1) training, (2) work/rest/sleep discipline,

and (3) resource management.

Questions Some questions you may have wanted to ask earlier

may have been answered by some of the later

I information. I'm sure there are some that haven't been

' answered. Now we have time to answer them.

I

i

I

75
r

UNIT V

Case Discussions

PREVIOUS PAGE

IS BLANK

77
UNIT V

Section 1. General

Unit V is composed of a set of cases which are designed to suoport a

case method of instruction about issues involved in developing and

implementing orograms aimed at assuring sustained soldier performance in

continuous operations. This Unit should be introduced only after

participants have been exposed to the preceding Units.

I

The case discussions which constitute Unit V provide a simulated

platoon leadership environment for exploring issues associated with the

development of a continuous operations capability. The objective is to

provide practice with the complex of factors that must be considered in

establishing and, ultimately, exploiting a continuous operations capability.

The cases introduce situations representative of various stages within a

time frame extending from peacetime through a transition period into actual

continuous combat; in this way they also demonstrate the dependence of a

genuine capability in combat on the prior, conscientious implementation of a

well designed program of preparation. The issues associated with each case

are not only specific to various points in the time frame, but also carry

implications across that time frame.

Organization of Subsequent Text

I Section 2 presents the information needed for implementing the case

method. Hints which will assist the case discussion leader (instructor) in

the conduct of the case discussions are also included.

Section 3 contains the actual case materials together with guidance for

the case discussion leader.

79
Section 2. Discussion Leader's Information

Unit V is composed of six cases which provide practice in solving

some of the problems in implementing a program to achieve a continuous

operations capability. The Unit is based on the case method of instruction. Completion of this Unit will provide a fuller ability to meet

many issues that may be encountered in the course of implementing a

training program and later in actual operations. The discussion will provide an opportunity to exchange views about common problems and approaches to dealing with them.

The Case Method

The case method of instruction is widely used in the advanced study

of medicine, business, public administration, international relations, and,

of course, military science. Often, formal instruction seeks to present

specific facts and/or procedures for achieving clearly specifiable objectives. For some purposes, however, specific facts and procedures

cannot be delineated; even the objectives to be attained are highly complex, abstract, and dependent on circumstances. Their unambiguous

formulation may not be possible. For this type of problem solving, also,

a "standard" solution cannot be defined. For example, in a military context, the "optimal" solution will depend on the specific, local conditions

(e.g., type of organization, nature, quantity, and availability of resources) and on trade-offs that cannot be precisely quantified. Solutions

to such problems cannot be taught. But, concepts and considerations

important to the analysis of such problems and to the synthesis of

solutions can be taught. The case method is an ideal way to achieve this

goal.

The case method makes it possible to deal with problems which involve complex information embedded in a realistic context. It permits the

consideration not only of facts in isolation, but in relation to each other

and to a host of surrounding conditions. In assessing each case, analysts are forced to deal with these relationships, to judge their relative

importance, and to weigh the multiple consequences of any potential solution. This constitutes practice in dealing effectively with an entire class

of problems of the given type.

In addition, during the discussion of a case by a group, the discussants stimulate each other to achieve new insights. They prompt each

other, by their comments, to perceive salient problem features through

each others' eyes. Often, this serves to restructure, or to reorganize

each discussant's own perceptions, and, ultimately, to stabilize a definition of the best or optimal way to deal with the issues.

By nature of its goals, case discussions are informal. However,

they are more than casual speculations. For the present materials, there

are a number of specific points that should emerge during the discussion

and each case is rooted to specific training objectives. The training objectives for each case are included with each case. Moreover, the "lend

questions" which are provided serve to focus the discussion on the goals.

80
The Cases

There are six cases in the Unit. All pertfdn to prepariner

soldiers for continuous combat and maintaining their effective

performance in continuous operations. The cases are ordered in a

sequence that progresses from initial implementation of a training

program to problems after extended, continuous combat. V/hile each

case can be considered quite independently of all others, a curtailed

administration should include, at least, one case from the beginning,

middle and end of the sequence (e.g., 1-3-5, 2-4-6).

An abstract of each case appears below:

0 Case 1: Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectives

Content: Bravo Company is implementing the Battalion's

continuous operations training program. There are complaints about the rigors of the training, and there are

attempts to avoid the training.

0 Case 2: Goofing-Off during FTXs

Content: During continuous FTXs certain personnel in

various platoons experience communication "failure"

and give various excuses.

0 Case 3: Individual Stress Control Training

Content: There is resistance and skepticism as stress

control training is launched. Thereafter, there are

problems in monitoring progress and justifying further

training.

0 Case 4: Airlift to Combat Zone

Content: Hostilities break out in Europe, and Alpha

Company is airlifted with little notice. Problems

of time zone dislocation for an advance party and

the main body are interwoven with those presented

by the arrival of last minute replacements.

0 Case 5. Rest Vs. Defensive Preparation

Content: The dilemma of assigning priority to work

or to rest/sleep is explored in the light of uncertainties about the amount of time that will be available before a throat attack begins.

0 Case 6. Unit Rcconstitution

Content: A unit is reconstituted out of elements from

two diTFcront units shattered in continuous combat.

Issues of stress tolerance and unit cohesion are examined

with respect to mission capabilities.

81
Organization of Cases

The organization of cases follows a consistent pattern. Each case is

divided into three parts. Each part represents a self-contained, progressive stage of problem devclopnent. Following each of these parts,

two (sometimes overlapping) sets of issues are sketched. The total group

will be divided into halves and each half, in a "huddle session," will

develop responses to one of the sets of issues. These issues called "discussion," are followed by statements about the purpose of the discussion

and "key points." These purposes and key points are not to be distributed to the discussion groups but are included to assist the instructor during steps 6 and 7 below. During steps 6 and 7, each group

will report its consensus back to the total group which will then critically discuss the solution(s).

"Lead questions" are provided that are relevant for the discussion

of either or both steps 6 and 7. These questions represent salient points

which have implications for the problem hand and may be introjected into

the discussion by the leader to: (1) keep the discussion on track and

continually progressing toward the objectives, and (2) stimulate discussion if the discussion is lagging. The lead questions need not be used

verbatim. They may be paraphrased. Many of the points included in the

lead questions will emerge spontaneously during the discussion. In this

case, the corresponding lead question(s) should be ignored. Possible

responses to the lead questions are also included for the instructor's

convenience.

Required Materials and Facilities

All the materials necessary for presenting the cases are included

within the cases themselves. However, the scenario (i.e., description of

conditions) for each part of each case will need to be reproduced in as

many copies as there are participants in a session. Similarly, each member of each group (A and B) will need a copy of the issues which his

group is to discuss during their "huddle session."

The meeting room will need two conference tables around which the

two huddle groups can meet, as well as facilities for the group to meet

as a whole. Availability of a chalk board will also be helpful.

Size

The total group size should not be greater than 18 persons. This

will allow nine persons per "huddle group."

Recommended Procedure

Plan well in advance which cases are to be presented and discussed. The sequence of procedures for presenting the case materials is:

1. When the group first meets, state the content of the

Unit, its purposes, how the sessions will be run, and

the organization of the cases. Emphasize the informal

nature of the session(s). Ask the attendees to introduce themselves and to say something about their current duty assignments.

82
2. Introduce the first case,

paraphrase.

Use either the text below or

Introduction to Cases

Earlier, information was presented about continuous operations and

soldiers' perfornance degradation. Now, let's get down to cases. (Distribute Part 1 of your first case.) Part 1 of this first problem solving

case is given in this handout. Read Part 1 and trv to fix the key points

clearly in your mind.

Next, we are going to divide the group into a right and a left half.

If you are in the group to the right, you will be considering the'^uddle

questions" for Group A; those on the left will work with the question(s)

for Group B. (Divide the group.) Each group is to review the issues as

in a staff meeting. The objective at this point is to formulate views and

positions for later discussion. Someone in each group should be appointed as group leader to record the group's consensus on the various

points and to report these to the total assembly.

Before you actually start, let me point out that this is a problem

solving seminar. The problem area is sustaining soldier's fighting effectiveness in continuous operations and the training to achieve such a

capability. We know that certain factors must be considered in deciding

what needs to be done. The earlier parts of your training discussed

these factors. During your deliberations, be sure to consider them and

how they apply to the specific case under discussion. The object here is

to introduce you to the broad spectrum of issues pertaining to soldier

performance in continuous operations, and to exchange views on what

you will have to do about then.

3. Distribute, to the members of each group, the appropriate huddle questions.

4. If there are no questions, let each group designate a

leader and proceed to confer for about 15 minutes.

5. Call the two groups together and write each group's

question(s) on the chalk board.

6. Ask the leader of Group A to present the views develloped in its huddle. Then, the entire group critically

evaluates the views that have been presented. Use the

lead questions, as appropriate, as topics for consideration. Next, apply a parallel procedure for Group B.

7. Encourage continuing discussion. If prompts are needed,

pose one of the lead questions for each case and part

of it. Do not inhibit discussion that is in full swing

and proceeding naturally Occasionally suggest factors

that have not been consiflored (e.g., use further lead

questions). Terminate the discussion of tho current

Case or Part when appropriate. Summarize what has

taken place and the principle views that have emerged.

8. Introduce the next Car.e or Part.

83
Hints for Productive Case Discussion

Your role as the case leader is to assure productive discussions

which form the basis for achieving the objectives of the Unit. The following hints may be useful for assuring the quality of the discussion:

1. If the group seems reluctant to sustain discussion,

rephrase some key point that has been introduced

(e.g., in Group A's or B's report), and ask for

elaboration relative to some key issue or training

objective. The "key points" included with each part

of each case will also be helpful for assuring full

consideration. Alternatively, ask one of the lead

questions. Address one or two specific participants

directly.

2. Emphasize the problem solving nature of session. Stress

that, at this time, no one has "the answers." Rather,

the search is for constructive approaches to coping

with the continuous operations issues, the factors

to be considered in that context, and their application.

The Army needs to develop and evaluate many different

views.

3. No matter how absurd or irrelevant it may be, never

reject an openly stated view. Especially, if that

view has been stated v/ith some vehemence, avoid the

use of the negative. Instead, use the phrase "yes,

but...," and bring out the objection in this way.

4. If any participant seeks to monopolize the discussion,

praise his contributions, and suggest that "we want to

hear what (designate a person or persons) thinks."

5. Draw out the reluctant participant by addressing some

questions (perhaps a lead question) specifically to

him.

6. Bring back a discussion that has drifted off by injecting a lead question, or by asking how "all this"

helps to develop a continuous operations capability.

7. If you do not know the facts pertaining to a question,

admit that you do not know. Never bluff. Where approppriate, you might ask why the question is essential to

the point under consideration.

8. At all times, by your tone and bearing, show your own

interest in th6 topic and your enthusiasm for exploring

the best ways of developing a continuous operations capability.

84
Training (Rehavioral) Objectives

Platoon and Squad (P&S)

Specific Objectives

The case discussions are intended to contribute to the attainment of the

following learning objectives:

1. Recall adverse conditions of continuous conbat operations

and their effect on performance effectiveness.

2. Recognize signs of stress in self and others.

3. Relate the appropriate counter degradation technique(s)

to specific signs of stress.

4. Specify the integration of counter degradation measures

into current training program.

5. Implement a program incorporating the techniques for

achieving continuous operations capability within

current unit-specific training programs.

6. Evaluate progress toward the achievement of a continuous

operations capability.

7. Apply diagnostic procedures and leadership techniques

for the purpose of achieving and maintaining effective

performance under continuous combat operations conditions.

Table 1 indexes each case by the platoon and squad training objectives it

is designed to meet.

85
Table 1

Training Objectives Met By Each Case

Case Training Objective

12 3 4 5 6 7

1 X X X

2

3

4

5

6

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X X X

R6
CASES

87
(Objectives: 2, 4, 5)

Case No. 1. Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectives

PART 1

Bravo Company of the 314th Armor Battalion was recently provided

the Battalion's continuous operations training plan and ordered to begin

implementing it. The plan has a fairly tight schedule and little flexibility.

Its earliest segments contain a heavy schedule of physical conditioning with

demanding running and weight-lifting standards for everyone to meet.

Twice now, after a full and exhausting day of training, there have been

night FTXs so that Bravo Company had to operate around the clock. More

exercises of this type are scheduled with increasing frequency, and they

are of increasing length.

The implementation of tho continuous operations training plan has

been something of a shock to the men of Bravo Company. There is

grumbling from a substantial proportion of the enlisted men. The basic

complaint seems to be that the continuous operations training program is so

demanding that it absorbs all of soldiers' available time and energy. It

leaves them virtually no free time, and it leaves no energy for their

private lives or families. These complaints were expressed quite forcefully

to LT Parker of the 2nd Platoon during a gripe session. LT Parker is not

quite sure how to deal with the situation.

"AU*"

89 r
Case 1. Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectives

PART 1

Group A Discussion

Is this LT Parker's Problem? Should he adopt a "do as you're told"

attitude, or sympathize with the men? Consider how LT Parker should

treat the information about his men's attitudes.

Purpose;

To learn the necessity for laying the groundwork prior to initiating

continuous operations training.

Key Points:

1. Continuous operations training, as well as continuous combat

operations, places special demands on leadership.

2. All members of a unit must be made to understand the

necessity for the training and what it will accomplish.

3. Proper preliminary orientation is a prerequisite for

realistic continuous operations training.

Lead Questions:

What might be wrong with Bravo Company's implementation

of the training plan?

* Advance orientation lacking

* Immediate, inflexible implementation

What can LT Parker do to rectify or compensate for these

deficiencies?

* Orient and explain

* Exorcise leadership; display commitment

* Objectively report problems through channels

90
Case 1. Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectives

PART 1

Group B Discussion

In what way can LT Parker's response support continuous operations

policy and the Battalion's progran? Is this kind of problem unexpected,

or can it be anticipated? Why? Consider the constructive possibilities.

Purpose:

To learn the nature and extend of demands made on all personnel by

CDP1 training, and to anticipate the likely resulting problems.

Kev Points:

1. Soldiers must know what to expect.

2. Soldiers must understand the necessity for continuous

operations training and what it will accomplish.

3. Leaders must demonstrate their commitment to the goals

of this training.

4. Problems can be anticipated and solutions planned for.

Lead Questions:

Regarding this situation, is it advisable for LT

Parker not to "make waves", and to keep the problem

within the Platoon?

* To perfect its programs. Battalion must

become aware of omissions, shortcomings,

etc.

Should the problem have been allowed to develop, and

when should it have been anticipated?

* Personnel needs and problems must be

recognized in program planning

* Orientation and indoctrination are essential

prerequisite to continuous operations training

91
Case 1. Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectives

PART 2

As a result of extensive indoctrination and explanation efforts by LT

Parker, attitudes about the continuous operations training seem to have

improved. As implementation of the Battalion's program is proceeding on

schedule, the frequency and duration of continuous FTXs is increasing. In

LT Parker's judgment, norale in his platoon is fairly good. Now, however,

PSG Black comes to him with the story about two men who have

approached him for help in taking care of some personal problems.

It seems PFC White, who is trying to support a wife on his Army

pay, has been working as a bartender at the Officers' Club in the evening

hours to earn some supplementary pay. Up to now, White has been able to

trade scheduled working hours at the Club with others, but now the

training schedule leaves no more flexibility. PFC White wonders whether he

could be excused from some of the training, or whether anyone can help

him in some other way.

SSG Blue has a wife and two young children. The wife works nights

in a bakery to supplement the family income. Now, with SSG Blue gono on

so many extended FTXs, the Blues cannot find enough babysitters to stay

in the house while both parents are gone. SSG Blue says he doesn't know

what to do.

93
Case 1. Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectives

PART 2

Group A Discussion

Put yourself in PSG P.lack's shoes. What reoonnendations should he

make to LT Parker regarding PFC White's problem? Is this purely a platoon

level problem? How so?

Purpose:

To provide practice in considering the relative priorities of personal

problems in relationship to established objectives of a unit.

Key Points:

1. Unit objectives dominate, except in true emergencies,

2. Developing a continuous operations readiness requires

commitment to goals and determination to achieve them.

3. Professionalism, esprit, morale, and unit eohesiveness

all result from soldiers' making common sacrifices.

Lead Questions:

What channels and agencies exist to help the Platoon

alleviate these problems?

* Higher Hq staff (Gl, G5)

* Army social service support agencies

What criteria should be used to justify exceptions to the

established program?

* Emergency of an urgent nature

* No delay or other solution is possible

94

V.V-.
Case 1. Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectives

PART 2

Group B Discussion

Put yourself in PSG Black's shoes. What reconnendations should he

nake to LT Parker reprarding SSG Blue's problems? Is this purely a

platoon level problem? How so?

Purpose:

To gain an appreciation of the relative priorities of personnel needs

and problems in relationship to the established objectives and needs of a

unit.

Key Points:

1. Unit objectives dominate, except in emergencies.

2. Developing a continuous operations readiness requires

commitment to goals and determination to achieve them.

3. Leaders must be firm, but not insensitive to their soldiers'

problems.

Lead Questions;

Can a "that's your tough luck" disposition be justified?

* Display sensitivity: "No, but let me see what

can be done..."

* Explain, emphasize responsibility to other unit

members

* Point out that the training is in the soldiers'

own personal self-interest

What policies or procedures could be implemented for the

early recognition and resolution of such conflicts?

* Alert personnel to schedules well in advance

* Secure higher Hq recognition/support for problems

* Refer personnel to Army social service support

95

i-• ^ »

.•• -V -••i.^.-- -"-'. » .»-. • ^
I

i

Case 1. Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectives

PART 3

Through Company and Battalion channels, the Army's social service

support has been secured and most personal problems are being resolved.

i The training program is on schedule and exercises are simulating

continuous operations more and more faithfully.

Now a five-day, full scale continuous FTX is scheduled for next

week. A number of key enlisted men ask to be excused and request leave.

At least some of the requests seem to have reasonable validity. For

example, SSG Green, a tank commander, has a wife who is due to give

birth during the next week. SSG Green wants to be near his wife. A

number of similar problems exist.

97
Case 1. Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectives

PART 3

Group A Discussion

Consider whether a really tough policy of no excuses for anyone is

justified in this situation or not. What are some of the personal

needs/factors that must be weighed against the unit's training schedule

and objectives? By what criteria must personnel needs be judged?

Puypose:

To provide an understanding of the relative priorities of personal

problems and established objectives of a unit.

Key Points:

1. Firmness with flexibility is needed rather than unyielding

rigidity.

2. Flexibility does not necessarily disrupt the training program.

3. Sensitivity to soldiers' problems is an essential leadership

requirement.

4. Genuine emergencies can be accommodated even within a

tightly scheduled program.

Lead Questions:

Are there instances when legitimate personal needs override unit objectives?

* Unnecessary risks to soldier's health and safety

* Legitimate family or personal emergencies which the

soldier cannot otherwise control

Other things equal, would the skipping by some men of one

major training exercise create a training deficiency for them

or for the Platoon?

* In combat, too, some soldiers will not be available

* Crosstraining may be enhanced

* Program effectiveness does not depend on a single

exercise

98
Case 1. Personnel Needs Vs. Unit Objectivos

PART 3

Group B Discussions

What are the negative and the positive effects of excusing some

soldiers' from a continuous operations FTX. Consider both the effect on

the platoon's normal mission resources and the missed training issue. What

opportunities does the situation offer?

Purpose;

To gain experience in considering the potential costs and benefits

resulting from flexibility in continuous operations training.

Key Points;

1. Realistic continuous operations FTXs are expensive to

establish and the Army wants as many persons as possible

to benefit from the training.

2. Each soldier has responsibilities to his unit as well as

to his personal goals.

3. Combat requires units to fight with available resources.

4. Units must learn to cope with personnel shortages.

5. Effective training does not depend on any one exercise.

6. Crosstraining and task rotation must be practiced in real

contexts during FTXs.

Lead Questions;

What does "normal mission resources" really mean,

especially with respect to soldiers in continuous

operations?

* Continuing full personnel strength cannot

be realistically expected

* Performance effectiveness will degrade progressively and severely

Might the nonavailability of some key men enhance the

realism of training?

* Test crossLraining and implement task rotation

* Test the unit's ability to cope with reduced

resources

* Enhance the unit's self-confidence that it

can cope

99

.- -./.->
(Objectives 1, 4, 5, 6)

Case 2. Goofing-Off During FTXs

PART 1

Alpha Company of the 27th Infantry Battalion (Plech) recently started

to implement its Battalion's continuous operations training program. Implementation was preceded by a two hour indoctrination and explanation

session for all men. Reaction to the indoctrination includes considerable

skepticism; the men believe there is a great deal of exageration regarding the effects of continuous operation on their performance. They

think the training is a lot of unnecessary fuss about nothing. Also, they

can see no real reason to implement the program now, v/hen a clash with

Warsaw Pact forces does not seem very likely, they feel that "life's tough

enough, why make it tougher." For these reasons, enthusiasm for the

continuous operations training is not very high at the beginning of its

implementation.

In keeping with the Battalion's program/schedule, prior to a just

completed two-day continuous operations FTX, everyone was kept awake

for 24 hours; also, the exercise itself was continuous with no sleep/rest

scheduled. During the second night of the FTX, LT Jones (Platoon Leader of the 3rd Platoon) could not locate A-Squad, which was operating

dismounted from IFV, for nearly two hours. SGT Brillig, the Squad Leader, claims a communications failure. LT Jones suspects that the Squad

was holed up and sleeping somewhere. A post-exercise check of communications gear revealed no malfunctions in the equipment. Nevertheless, SGT Brillig sticks by his story. He suggests that the antenna

may have shorted out, perhaps against an overhead wire that he didn't

spot in the dark.

101
Case 2. Goofiner-Off During FTXs

PART 1

Group A Discussion

Consider all the available facts, and other relevant information you

have. Suggest how the initial resistance ought to be handled. What

squad deficiencies are indicated?

Purpose:

To provide a knowledge about potential problems in the initial

implementation of CDM training and methods for resolving resultant

issues.

Key Points:

1. Indoctrination into the need for CDPls and the necessity

for this training must be well planned and complete.

2. Leadership, at all levels, must be aware of its special

responsibilities in developing a continuous operations

capability.

3. Leadership must consider what has not yet been learned

as well as what has been learned.

Lead Questions:

What would you suspect about the quality and effectiveness of the continuous operations indoctrination?

* Content of indoctrination possibly not well

planned

* Value of CDP1 training not convincingly explained

Would you regard the lack of experience with continuous

operations and the effects they produce an extenuating

circumstance?

* Ability to cope (e.g., with sleep loss) does

not yet exist

Does the initial resistance tell us something about the

esprit of Alpha Company.

*

*

Units with high esprit are more apt to regard

difficult tasks as a challenge

The negativism may bo symptomatic of a deeper

problem not related to the continuous operations

problem

102
Case 2. Goofing-Off During FIXs

PART 1

Group B Discussion

As&uming that A-Squad may have been nappinff, how ought this

situation be handled? Consider this prevailing attitudes and the stage of

continuous operations training. Is the problem best handled within the

Platoon?

Purpose:

To learn how to manage issues which might arise during the initial

implementation of CDP1 training.

Key Points:

1. This is Alpha Company's very first experience with

continuous operations training, probably best handled

within the squad the first time.

2. The experience can demonstrate the value of CDM training

to all personnel.

3. Commitment to unit objectives cannot be compelled, but

must be patiently encouraged within every squad.

4. Leaders must appreciate the difficulties of CDM training

and demonstrate patience in early stages.

Lead Questions:

Is a "learn from your mistake, but don't let it

happen again" policy advisable in this case?

* There may be an underlying motivational

problem

* Circumstances frequently will require flexible leadership

How could this incident be made an object lesson for

all and, at the same time, serve as a kind of disciplinary action against A-Squad?

* Let the platoon know what happened and

the potential consequences of such actions

during combat

* In actual combat, A-Squad would have endangered

the survival of the platoon

103
Case 2. Goofinp:-Off During FTXs

PART 2

The 3rd Platoon is not the only one in which problems cropped up

during the two-day continuous FTX. During the second night, also, an

IFV from LT Carver's 1st Plntoon overheated. The breakdown was

reported immediately, but was followed by a great deal of misinformation as

to how quickly the IFV could be counted on to resume its mission. Its

crew spent an inordinate amount of time tracing the trouble which was

simply a lose V-belt on the fan drive and coolant pump. Once identified,

the problem was fixed in a few minutes. However, the delay and some

uncautious communication about it allowed P.F.D force elements to overwhelm

the 1st Platoon. A new communication security procedure had been given

to the 1st Platoon only four hours before the violation.

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IS BLANK

105
Case 2. Goofing^Off 'luring FTXs

PART 2

Group A Discussion

How is the perfornnnco degradation in the 1st and 3rd Platoons

different? Consider all relevant information. Outline an after-action critique

for both Platoons.

Purpose:

To provide the understandingthat problen solving skills deteriorate

o a greater extent than more basic skills.

Kev Points;

1. Thinking and problem solving abilities deteriorate

soonest and to the greatest degree.

2. Marginal basic problem solving competence "falls

apart" under the impact of sleep loss and other

adverse factors.

Lead Questions:

Is there a suggestion that the crew was experiencing

some performance degradation?

* Degradation affects various tasks at

different rates

* Thinking/problem solving tasks are the

first to show degradation

Was there possibly some deficiency, also, in the

platoon leadership?

* No one is immune to performance degradation

* Procedures for "back up", and contingency

plans must be in place

* Clear, firm, effective directions were

apparently not given by leadership

106
Case 2. Goofinrr-Off During FTXs

PART 2

Group H Discussion

Compare and contrast the type of perfornance decrement experienced

by the 1st and 3rd Platoons. Considering, also, that communications

discipline appears to have been violated, is discinlinary action for the

responsible 1FV crew called for?

Purpose:

To contrast deficient competence with degraded performance, and

willing with unwilling cooperation.

Key Point:

1. Soldiers were evidently making a valiant, but ineffective

effort quite unlike those in 3rd Platoon.

2. Platoon leadership was partly responsible for violation

of communications discipline.

3. Leadership and troops still lacking experience with

effects of performance degradation.

4. The incident should be an object lesson rathe: than being

treated as a disciplinary problem; the problem solving

skills of the 1st Platoon probably degraded along with their

memorv for recent events.

Lead Questions:

V/hat CD?1 tactics might have improved the situation?

* Shift in leadership style: simple, clear

directions

* Possibly, performance supports for troubleshooting

* Written rather than oral orders

How might some sort of performance support have been

helpful?

* Performance supports help to maintain performance effectiveness under degraded

conditions

* Trouble shooting guide could reduce thinking/problem solving requirements

107
Cnsc 2. Goofiner-Off During FTXs

PART 3

Tho 27th Inf. Bn. (Mcch) is now just into the fourth month of its

continuous operations training pi'ogram. r.'uch progress has been made in

developing and implementing strategies for countering performance

degradation and practicing the techniques in training. Last week was

devoted to a 5-day continuous FTX. On the third night of the FTX, the

following incident took place.

IT Jones of the 3rd Platoon assigned SGT Brillig's A-Squad to a

perimeter defense south of the DP occupied by the 3rd Platoon. The RED

attack was expected to come from that direction. A-Squad's orders were to

fire on infiltrators as they were initially detected, and then to withdraw

speedily into the BP itself. Absolute communication silence was to be

maintained until contact with RED force was made.

In keeping with a policy of frequent personal contacts, LT -Tones

made a quick check on A-Squad. As he approached their perimeter line

from the BP he found SGT Brillicc alone, propped up against a tree, and

fast asleep. hT Jones roused SGT RrilUg who insisted that he was merely

practicing the Platoon's sleep discipline. All other Squad personnel

appeared to be awake, though only moderately alert judfnnpr by their

slowness in detecting LT Jones' approach.

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100 ,s BLANK
Case 2. Goofing-Off During FTXs

PART 3

Group A Discussion

What CDIM training factors nake this incident different from the

initial incident involving SGT Brillig. If Brillig's explanation is "true," what

does this tell us about the sleep discipline policy of the unit? What

disposition would you make in this case?

Purpose:

To demonstrate issues and applicable standards at different stages of

continuous operations readiness preparations.

Key Points:

1. CD!\1 training is now well advanced.

2. How well is sleep discipline policy understood and

Implemented by other squnris?

3. Who supervised A-Squad while SGT Brillig slept?

Lead Question:

Could it be that there is some ambiguity in the

established sleep discipline?

* How carefully was it formulated?

* Has practice of sleep discipline been checked

and given after action review?

* Either the sleep discipline or SGT Brillig

is at fault

110
Case 2. Goofinfc-Off During FTXs

PART 3

Group P Discussion

What deficiencies may be indicated by this incident? What constructive

changes would you make as a result of this incident?

Purpose:

To show how mistakes can be turned into profit and how mistakes can

be used beneficiallv.

Kev Points:

1. Some four months of CDM training have taken place between

the first and second incident.

2. Sleep discipline has been either inadequately developed,

or inadequately explained and practiced.

3. Sleep discipline as well as discipline need to be

strengthened.

Lead Questions:

Does SGT Brillig's previous suspected infraction

necessarily have a bearing on the present issue?

* Previously unprepared to cope

* This cannot be claimed now

Should all other squad members have been awake?

* Not if sleep discipline is well designed

* No sign of task rotation or paralleling of

personnel

111
(Objectives: 4, 5, 6)

Case No. 3 Individual Stress Control TrainingPART 1

The 819th FA Battalion is a component of the 54th Infantry Division

(T.ioch). In response to divisional policy, the 819th is progressively

implomonting a program of preparation and training to develop a capability

for extended operations with sustained effectiveness. Individual stress

control training is an early and prominent feature of the program's

schedule. CPT Kricczek has appointed LT Valdez as the "big guru"

responsible for guiding and monitoring the individual stress control

training in A-Battery, or "this contemplating your bellybutton stuff as

CPT Krieczek refers to it privately. He chose LT Valdez for this role,

because his college major was in "head shrinking" (psychology),

LT Valdez finds he has received a "challenging" assignment. It will

demand from him considerable tact and inventiveness. In A-Battery the

initial reactions to the program and to his assignment are mixed. Some of

the other officers seem to share CPT Krieczek's attitude as do several of

the senior NCOs. Some soldiers do accept the program as constructive and

potentially useful to them, but quite a few resist the monitorship. Some do

not want to be bothered at all; some do not believe that the program has

any value for them, and some want to handle stress and relaxation in their

own way.

113
Case 3. Individual Stress Control Training

PART 1

Group A Discussion

Suggest what LT Valdez might do to improve the attitudes toward the

program. Would it be advisable to invoke the authority of the divisional

policy and the battalion's program? What might be an alternative approach?

Purpose:

To learn how willing individual cooperation can be obtained for a

stress control program.

Key Points:

1. Stress control training is individual, with individual

practice, and dependent for success on individual

cooperation.

2. Objectives, techniques to achieve them, the reasons for

them, and the benefits must be clearly understood for

cooperation to be given.

3. Soldiers look to their leaders as models in forming

attitudes and in guiding their own behavior; leaders

must provide positive models.

Lead Questions:

What is the true key to a successful program?

* Clear, full understanding of it

* Voluntary commitment to its goals

What or what actually determines whether training

will be effective?

* Each individual soldier's belief and commitment

Would it make sense to specify some proficiency

level that must be attained?

* Attainment could not be measured

(determined) in anv practical way

* The true tost situation is the combat

situation

114
Case 3. Individual Stress Control Training

PART 1

Group B Discussion

Is LT Valdez professionally equipped, has he sufficient technical

knowledge to execute his assignment effectively? How/where night he find

technical guidance and support? Suggest steps for LT Valdez in planning

the substance of an effective program.

Purpose:

To establish the depth of professional expertise required for the ideal

CD!M training program, and to consider potential compromises for practical

feasibility.

Kev Points:

1. A full professional background is desirable, but not

essential for guiding a CDI\1 training program.

2. Technical advice and guidance can be obtained from

technical book and nearby Army professionals.

3. Laying the proper groundwork is the key to an effective program; the rest is conscientious practice.

Lead Questions:

Might a library be of use to LT Valdez?

* Pertinent books and pamphlets are available

* His background should enable him to understand such material

What sort of professional assistance might LT Valdez

try to secure?

Psychiatrists

Psychologists

* Psychiatinc Social Workers

* "Graduates" of relaxation training

115
Cnse 3. Individual Stress Control Training

PART 2

In consequence of LT Valdez' quiet, but determined stress control

indoctrination efforts, attitudes of officers and EM in A-Batterv have

become more favorable. A significant shift toward willingness to try stress

control techniques came after LT Valdez arranged for an explanation by

MAJ (PIC) Roper, a psychiatrist at the Base Hospital. Her explanations and

the details of a substantive program seemed to remove much of the

mysterious or mystical aspect, and to replace it with sound reasons for the

relaxation procedures. Thus an "OK, let's try it" attitude began to

prevail.

LT Valdez' training plan calls for every officer and soldier to devote

about 20 minutes daily to the practice of relaxation procedures. Exactly

when this practice takes place is left to each individual, and it can be

accomplished at any convenient time of the day. The problem for LT

Valdez is to monitor the program. He cannot observe/check directly

whether practice is regular and daily. Thei'efore, he depends on

everyone's verbal assurances that they do practice regularly. He is

beginning to hear doubts that all this practice is doing anything. Both,

soldiers and officers, are unable to tell whether, in fact, they are learning

to relax, and whether they have gotten better at it than they were at the

beginning. Even LT Valdez, himself, cannot feel sure that his own efforts

are producing any effect.

15 B>-AN^_

117
Case 3. Individual Stress Control Training

PART 2

Group A Discussion

How can LT Valdez meet his monitoring responsibilities? Should he be

concerned with monitoring adherence to the practice schedule? Consider

how you might advise him to act.

Purpose;

To show the alternatives available for the implementation and

monitoring of a stress control training program.

Key Points:

1. A high degree of flexibility is required.

2. A strong commitment and genuine belief in its value are

more important for the success of a program of this

type than monitorship by superior authority.

3. The relaxation training must be incorporated into

each soldier's dailv routine.

Lead Questions:

Realistically, can a daily practice schedule be

enforced?

* Some sort of daily practice is required

* Encouragement is more beneficial than

strict monitorship

Could maintenance of a cooperative attitude (willingness to try and continue trying) be monitored? How?

* Establish an atmosphere of "look, how good

I'm getting"

* Casually report anecdotes about successes

* Ask: "anv luck in lowering your pulse rate

yet?"

118
Case 3. Individual Stress Control Traininer

PART 2

Group B Discussion

Is there a reason to worry about trainee's inability to notice any

progress? How could progress be demonstrated? Consider how you might

advise LT Valdez in this matter.

Purpose:

To learn about the elusive nature of the success criterion for stress

control training and the degree of success to be expected at intermediate

stages of his type of training.

Key Points:

1. Overt indications of training success are subtle

and difficult to objectify.

1. Especially, during early stages of training, progress is a matter of faith rather than demonstration.

3. Maintenance of belief in the program, and commitment to it are indications of progress.

Lead Questions;

Would any significant, noticeable results be expected

during early stages of training?

* Effects are subtle, not easily noticed

* It takes a while before any effects appear

How could a beginning achievement of some stress

control capability be established?

* Very difficult to establish

* Ability to slow pulse rate even very slightly

119
Case 3. Individual Stress Control Training

PART 3

LT Valdez succeeds in reassuring himself and other members of

A-Battery that the stress control training practice is meeting with some

success. He raised the question of uncertainty about progress in a phone

call to MA.T (PIC) Roper. At her invitation, LT Valdez comes to a

laboratory at the Base Hospital where it is established, by means of some

laboratory apparatus, that he has acquired a slight capability for reducing

bloodpressurc and pulse rate at will. LT Valdez loses no time in spreading

the word about his accomplishment throughout A-Battery. Soldiers begin to

check their own pulse rates before and after relaxation exercises.

Now several months have passed. LTC Conn, commander of the 819th,

requests an accounting of progress in stress control capabilities from each

of the Batteries. He believes that enough time has been spent on this

training, and that no more time should be expended on it. He wants proof

that all this time has produced tangible benefits. CPT Krieczek turns to

LT Valdez for recommendations on how to respond to LTC Conn's inquiry.

121
Case 3. Individual Stress Control Training

PART 3

Group A Discussion

Consider what LT Valdoz should roconnond. How should he advise

CPT Kricczek? Be specific.

Purpose:

To learn methods for demonstrating the effects of stress control

training.

Kev Points:

1. Stress control techniques allow one to cope with

one's own stress; this is not easily observable for

someone else.

2. Some aspects of physical conditioning 'e.g., resiliency,

endurance) mipht be enhanced by stress control training.

3. Except in a biomedical laboratory, effects are difficult

to demonstrate; if there are some benefits, soldiers will

be aware of them and will so testify.

4. Individuals will vary greatly in the effects they obtain

as a result of training, and even more than they do for

physical training or marksmanship.

5. Continued practice is essential and requires no significant time and effort.

Lead Questions:

What sort of evidence might LTC Conn accept as proof?

* Subjective evidence (soldier's reports) may

have to be accepted

Can a conclusive test be made in a lenghty continuous FTX simulating intense and adverse combat conditions?

* Not a conclusive answer, but an indication;

the dangers and stresses of real combat

cannot be simulated in FTXs.

* In real continuous combat, the pay-off is

groat (on a very modest investment)

* Some indications (e.g., pulse, breathing

rate, stamina) mav be obtainable

122
Case 3. Individual Stress Control Training

PART 3

Group B Discussion

Can an unanbiguous and convincing "proof" be provided? Consider

that the 819th is not in actual combat oDerations, but does occasionally

participate in simulated continuous FTXs.

Purpose:

To demonstrate methods of evaluating the effectiveness of stress

control training.

Kev Points:

1. FIcxihility must be maintained for, both, implementation

and evaluation.

2. Continuous FTXs come closest to producing the same types

of stresses as actual combat, but the dangers of combat

cannot be simulated.

3. A variety of methods should be used to assess the variety

of effects that stress control training produces, including

soldiers' reports.

Lead Ouostions:

How significant is the amount of time being spent

on stress control training?

* Practice should be daily

* Required time is no greater than for coffee

break

Might there be benefits from constant and never-ending

practice?

* Maintains ability at a high level

* Extends or deepens degree of control

123
(Objectives: 1, 2, 3, 7)

Case 4. Airlift to Combat Zone

PART 1

The 54th Infantry Division (Mech) is stationed at Ft. X-ray, Texas.

There, it is perfecting its combat capabilities. The 54th is at about 70% of

authorized personnel strength and, with very little variation, this holds

for its component units. In response to a divisional policy, these

components implemented a continuous operations training program v/hich

has been under way for about three months. This is the situation when

hostilities errupt in central Europe,

Alpha Company is one of the components of the 54th. Today, its

commanding officer is informed that in six days a sizable advance party

will be deployed to Europe. The advance party will consist of several

officers, mostly senior NCOs, and some lower grade EMs. Their task is to

prepare facilities and make arrangements for those to follow. Heavy

equipment is to be left behind and replaced from European POMCUS

stocks. Since other components of the 54th and many other units are

similarly being airlifted, the situation at the destination promises to be one

of confusion and intense, activity.

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125
Case 4. Airlift to Combat Zone

PART 1

Group A Discussion

What performance decrement factor could affect the performance of the

advance party? Suggest measures designed to keep them performing

effectively in the near as well as the distant future. (Consider logistics

only incidentally!)

Purpose:

To learn how to meet the problems of performance decrements which

arise during the early phases of translocation.

Kev Points:

1. After arrival in Europe the advance party will have

continuous demands made on them

2. The destination work/rest/sleep time frame must be

adopted immediately.

3. A rotating work/rest/rleep schedule that assures

adequate sleep for everyone, but especially senior

leaders must be designed immediately.

4. Responsibilities must be delegated on a rotating

basis.

Lead Questions:

What provisions are likely to minimize "jet-lag"

effects?

* Immediately adopt destination time zone schedule

* Sleep/rest during flight

* Work immediately after arrival

In the advance party, how can delegation of responsibilities be integrated with an effective work/rest

schedule?

* Rotate responsibilities and tasks

126
Case 4. Airlift to Combat Zone

PART 1

Group B Discussion

Consider the problems and prospects of the main body of Alpha

Company. Suggest measures designed to keep them performing effectively

in the near as well as the distant future.

Purpose:

To learn the likely course of events preceding actual departure to the

combat zone and the initial steps to be taken to ensure continuing

performance effectiveness on and after arrival.

Kev Points:

The destination work/rest/sleep time frame must be

adopted immediatolv.

Applicable aspects of the unit's sleep discipline must

be implemented immediately.

Responsibilities must be delegated on a rotating basis

within an efficient work/rest/sleep schedule.

Begin strict soldier resource management.

Lead Question:

Will there be opportunity for rest/sleep during

the flight to Europe?

* Yes, and this opportunity must be

exploited to the ma::imum

127
Case 4. Airlift to Conbat Zone

PART 2

Alpha Company at Ft. X-ray immediately resets its clock to central

European time. While this created some conflicts with other Ft. X-ray

organizations and some housekeeping issues in clearing this home base,

they arc minor and are resolved.

Beginning some 70 hours before scheduled departure, a variety of

new personnel begin to arrive. This new personnel will bring the Company

up to about OO*. of its authorized strength. Soldiers arrive singly and in

small groups at all hours. While they appear to be qualified combat

infantrymen, none seems to have been exposed to continuous operations

training. A few of these men were already stationed at Ft. X-ray, but

many have travelled from various distant locations.

120
Case 4. Airlift to Combat Zone

PART 2

Group A Discussion

Under the circumstances, what assignments and CDPT preparation

would you suggest for the arriving personnel in the various platoons?

Consider, also, their eventual activity after arrival in Europe.

Purpose:

To establish some issues in integrating new personnel into CDM

trained unit during a brief predeparture period.

Kev Points:

1. New personnel must be integrated into established units.

2. Immediately orient new men to their unit CDM policies

and procedures, and to CDMs.

3. Rely as much as possibly on soldicr-to-soldier indoctrination.

Lead Questions:

Can new personnel be indoctrinated into sleep

discipline practices to, at least, some good

effect?

* Some comprehension better than none

* Practice until combat starts accumulates

some benefits

How might soklicr-to-soldier instruction be integrated into a duty rotation schedule?

* Pair old and new personnel with parallel

MOS

Implement overlapping duty/sleep cycles

130
Case 4. Airlift to Combat Zone

PART 2

Group B Discussion

In view of the necessity for receiving' and integrating arriving

personnel, how can Alpha Company continue with its CDM training and

preparation while simultaneously bringing the new personnel to the desired

level of CDM proficiency. Consider all relevant factors.

Purpose:

To illustrate realistic challenges to a smooth implementation of

predcparture work/sleep/rest schedules.

Key Points:

1. Reception and integration of new personnel must

be handled by each unit's leadership on a rotating

basis.

2. Hours since arriving personnel last slept must be

considered in integrating them into work/rest/sleep

schedules.

3. New personnel are untrained in sleep discipline, but

must be adapted immediately to the destination time

frame.

4. New personnel must be made aware of all CDM practices

including task sharing, task rotation, job rids, stress

control, cross training.

Lead Ouestions:

Mow can leade/&Hp actions integrate new personnel,

and does this necessarily conflict with an effective

work/rest schedule?

* Rotate those responsibilities

* Also, delegate some responsibility for

integration

When will the priority for sleep bo highest?

* In-flight, during airlift

131
Case 4. Airlift to Combat Zone

PART 3

Alpha Company is now emplaninpf to be airlifted to Europe. They will

arrive in Germany in about eight hours. There, additional personnel will

join Alpha Company so as to bring it to 100% of authorized strength.

Nothing is known about the backgrounds of the new personnel.

The advance party advises that heavy equipment to be received will

require considerable check-out and preventive maintenance before it can be

counted on to perform reliably in combat. Facilities for this purpose and

for quartering and feeding personnel are at a premium. Because of the

sudden developments, and the massive airlifts from CONUS there is much

competition for all available resources, attendant unpredictable delays, and

inescapable confusion. The massive thrust of the threat attack has

heightened the urgency for all arriving units to complete their provisioning

and to move into assigned combat areas.

133

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Case 4. Airlift to Combat Zone

PART 3

Group A Discussion

In view of the prospective confusion and unpredictability, how can

Alpha Company personnel maintain its CDM Program while accomplisning its

get-ready tasks as quickly as possible? Suggest the possible problems and

their solution in relation to the work/rest/sleep program, rotation,

paralleling, job aids, and stress control.

Purpose:

To appreciate advance measures for maintaining CDM effectiveness in

a unit along with obstacles and ways to overcome them.

Key Points:

1. On a rotating basis, delegate responsibilities to

the maximum extent feasible after providing clear,

precise guidelines.

2. Consider the pros and cons of throe overlapping 16

hour duty shifts (8 hours sleep) per 24 hour day.

3. Have CDM contingency plans in place for new personnel

4. Allocate some specific time for indoctrinating new

personnel in CDMs.

5. Learn skills of new personnel and parallel them with

old personnel.

6. Allow for as much rotation and cross training as

possible in time available, even at the expense of

other tasks.

Lead Question:

How can advance contingency planning and delegation

of responsibilities for executing the broad plan(s)

help to maintain a reasonable work/rest/sleep

schedule?

* Such plans, in general form, are part

of unit readiness

* Refine plans as specific information

becomes available

* Unit readiness includes ability to handle

such situations

134
Case 4. Airlift to Combat Zone

PART 3

Group B Discussion

How might the advance party and the new Europe-based personnel be

best integrated into Alpha Company's work/rest/sleep schedule? Suggest an

overall solution that would allow Alpha Company to enter combat in a

rested condition.

Purpose:

To consider differences in personnel time frames (wake/sleep cycles),

and how they can be integrated with schedules.

Kev Points:

1. Europe-based personnel are adapted, and advance party

are partly adapted to local time zone.

2. Differences in soldiers' wake/sleep cycles (high and

low periods) can be exploited in synchronizing them

with work/rest/sleep schedules.

3. Earlier, US-based, replacements are least able to cope

with displacement and sleep loss.

Lead Question:

After arrival in Europe, should US-based/replacements be given more opportunity for sleep/rest

than others?

* Wake/sleep cycles may have been most

disrupted

* Personnel untrained in CDMs

135
(Objectives 1, 2, 3, 7)

Case 5. Rest Vs. Defensive Preparation

PART 1

You are the Platoon Leader (PL) of a mechanized infantry platoon

which is part of TF-4-78. This TF, has been in near continuous combat

for the past 40 hours. Except for very brief, occasional cat naps no one

in your platoon has had any sleep during this time. About two-thirds of

your platoon have undergone CDM training. The remainder are newlv

assigned replacements without CDM training. The TF is righting in the

vicinity of Coburg along the Itz river in terrain characterized by rolling

forested hills with steep slopes in some areas. The weather has been

rainy, overcast, and temperatures have ranged between 25° F and 45°

F. In the fighting your platoon sustained some personnel losses

(including the PSG), but 10 fresh rested replacements, who just

arrived, brought you back up to 100% of personnel strength.

Now elements of the TF are ordered to occupy and strengthen a

battle position (BP) on the slopes above the Fullbach creek against a

threat forces attack that is expected to come in about 12 to 18 hours.

Your platoon is ordered to occupy and hold a BP on the northeast third

of BP 41. You decide to place the support element in reverse slope

hiding position and the maneuver element in the woods oriented to the

southeastern infantry approach through the woods.

On arrival you recon the area and discover the BP is covered by

dense woods. It will require extensive preparation to yield acceptable

fields of fire. Just then you receive the news that no engineer

assistance will be available to prepare the BP. The terrain is very rocky

and difficult to dig by hand. Defensive positions will require overhead

protection from artillery and tree splintering effects.

137
Case 5. Rest Vs. Defensive Preparation

PART 1

Group A Discussion

Consider the basic issue of work versus rest/sleep under the

circumstances. Suggest relative priorities for the beginning, middle, and

end of the period from now till the expected start of the threat attack.

Purpose:

To provide practice in analyzing allocations of time to work and to

rest.

Kev Points:

1. A strong BP will be easier to hold against attacks.

2. Sleep deprived, extremely fatigued soldiers will fight

ineffectively

3. Ideally, soldiers should come awake as the attack begins.

Lead Questions*;

What average degree of performance degradation

do you expect after 40 hours, and for what

sort(s) of activities?

* Beginning of slight to moderate degradation

* In mental tasks, but none in physical tasks

Is rest/sleep more essential for fighting or for

the BP strengthening tasks?

* BP strengthening tasks are essentially physical

* Combat requires constant, serious decisions

* Leaders make most and the most important decisions.

*A11 lead questions in all Parts are pertinent to all other Parts of this

Case.

138
Case 5. Rest Vs. Defensive Preparation

PART 1

Group B Discussion

Security must be maintained at all times along with defensive

preparations. Consider security vs. defensive preparations vs. rest/sleep,

and in relation to assignment of old (continuous operations trained) and

new (replacement) personnel.

Purpose:

To provide the ability to meet issues and apply techniques for

allocating burdens so as to sustain prolonged unit effectiveness.

Key Points:

1. Paired posting of personnel/(old/new, old/old) can

serve security and rest objectives.

2. Immediate rest requirements for most recent replacements are minimal, but they may not be trained to

cope with sleep loss in combat.

3. Available time seems to offer opportunity for a

balanced, effective work/rest/sleep schedule.

Lead Questions*

Which tasks require maximal alertness, and who

is likely to be maximally alert?

* Security duties require vigilance (alertness)

* New arrivals more rested, but their reliability

is unknown — they are "strangers"

What use can be made of the task sharing principle

at this time?

* Task sharing will decrease fatigue level;

assign two soldiers to heavy jobs.

*A11 lead questions in all Parts are pertinent to all other Parts of this

Case.

139
Case 5. Rest Vs. Defensive Preparation

PART 2

You have barely bepun to lay your plans when S2 confirms previous

estimates. It is exceedingly unlikely that the threat attack will come in

less than 12 hours, but it is also virtually certain that it will come no

later than 18 hours from now.

141
Case 5. Rest Vs. Defensive Preparation

PART 2

Group A Discussion

Delineate a work/rest schedule for the platoon and its members that is

most appropriate for these circumstances.

Purpose:

To consider some specific factors in developing an optimal work/rest

schedule.

Kev Points:

1. Work 6 hours; then sleep for as many as possible.

2. Rest is desirable for "old" personnel early in the

projected period, especially those not trained to

cope.

3. Sleep is imperative for all personnel late in the

projected period.

Lead Questions*

When should everyone in the platoon be most rested

and alert?

* Just prior to start of attack

* But, attack may come earlier than expected

All lead questions in all Parts arc pertinent to all other Parts of this

Case.

142
Caso 5. Rest Vs. Defensive Preparation

PART 2

Group R Discussion

How should defensive preparations and security duties be rotated

arnonfr squads or squad members9Consider this in relation to CDM trained

and new personnel.

Purpose:

To provide practice in considering1 pertinent and interrelated factors

in making duty and rest assignments.

Key Points:

1. CDM trained personnel are just beginning to tire, but

can cope.

2. The replacements are not trained to cope; rest them first,

3. The most recent arrivals are rested, but their reliability is unknown and they are not yet integrated into

their squads.

4. Squad leaders "wear out" fast in combat and should bo

alloted extra sleep.

5. Security duties demand vigilance; this ability is

highly subject to degradation.

Lead Questions*

Can rest and security duties be integrated? How?

* Sentry duty is not physicallv demanding

* Paired sentries permit one soldier to

rest, while other stays alert; then they

rotate

'All lead questions in all Parts arc pertinent to all other Parts of this

Case.

143
Case 5. Rest Vs. Defensive Preparation

PART 3

About six hours have elapsed. Work, so far, has produced a number

of bunkers, a substantial number of fox holes, a few connecting trenches,

and has cleared some fields of fire, but not much progress has been made

with overhead protection. Now S2 provides a revised estimate which

shortens the time remaining of the expected attack to three (from six)

hours.

To meet the situation, leadership decides to man all positions

redundantly (in parellel). They believe this to be sound CDM practice.

145
Case 5. Rest Vs. nofonsive Preparation

PART 3

Group A niscussion

Reconsider the work vs. rest issue in the light of the new

circumstances.

Purpose:

To provide additional practice in considering physical vs. human

resources trade-offs.

Key Points:

1. Sleep must have top priority for the remaining time.

2. Complete only the most essential work.

3. Consider makeshift preparations and trade-offs.

Lead Question*

When might the platoon next have an opportunity for

rest/sleep, and how does that weigh in the scale

against incomplete preparations?

* Any further opportunity is highly uncertain

* Prolonged unit effectiveness may be more

important than any one BP

'AH lead questions in all Parts arc pertinent to all other Parts of this

Case.

146
Case 5. Rest Vs. Defensive Preparation

PART 3

Group P Discussion

Comment on the decision to man positions redundantly. Was this the

time to institute this procedure. What, if any, other CDFIs should be

considered at this tine? How so?

Purpose:

To review the CDMs and their applicability to the immediate

precombat situation.

Kev Points:

1. Sleep and security must now assume top priority.

2. Trade-offs for sleep against other resources are

possible and can be considered but no other CDMs

seem appropriate at this time.

3. Rest, especially, leaders and personnel without

CDIM training.

head Question*:

Need the newest arrivals be rested at all?

* Probably untrained to cope with sleep loss

* How long now since they last slept?

* How long till next opportunity for sleep?

Could other resources (e.g., immunition, equipment)

bo traded for effort and time in accomplishing the

preparation and to secure sleep; would it be justified?

* Is effectiveness or ammunition more important?

* Use ammunition to blast out protection?

* Sacrifice equipment for personnel or fighting

effectiveness?

*All lead questions in all Parts are pertinent to all other Ports of this

Case.

147
(Objectives 1, 2, 3, 7)

Case 6. Unit Rcconstitution

PART 1

You are the platoon leader of a mechanized infantry platoon that is

part of TF 4-78. You and your platoon have been in continuous combat for

the past 68 hours. Fighting is in the general area of Coburg along the Itz

river in terrain characterized by rolling, forested hills with steep slopes in

some areas. The weather is rainy, overcast, and temperatures have ranged

between 25° F and 45° F. There is some morning fog and haziness.

While the core of your platoon is continuous operations trained, it was

brought up to strength by replacements who are not so trained. Most

recently heavy losses in personnel and equipment have been sustained.

The 3rd Squad was lost in its entirety; though its IFV and driver

survived, the 1st Squad lost its IFV along with its driver and the

Gunner/Carrier Team Leader. Another IFV was hit. Its driver was injured,

but he is able to keep the moderately damaged vehicle going.

Now elements of the TF including your platoon, are strengthening BP

45, as best possible, against an imminent threat attack. Most of your men

have been able to snatch about 20 minutes of sleep. You, yourself, are

awakened when nine replacements arrive. They are personnel from the 16th

Armored Division which was shattered entirely in previously fighting. All

are armor specialists with no infantry experience. For example, four of the

men were tank loaders, and it is not clear what else they know how to do.

Two tank commanders, one tank gunner, and one tank driver in the group

had two tanks shot out from under thorn (generally the stress limit anyone

can endure).

149
Case 6. Unit Reconstitution

PART 1

Group A Discussion

Propose a scheme that the best integrates the replacements into your

own considerably attrited platoon. Consider all relevant factors, and the

pros and cons in suggesting their respective assignments and

responsibilities.

Purpose:

To learn some of the important issues for reconstituting an effective

unit in combat.

Key Points:

1. Replacements should be integrated individually

2. Even though all replacements may have come from the

same platoon, their leadership is not intact.

3. Some armor and mechanized infantry equipments are similar;

tank drivers can probably drive an IFV, gunners

probably make good riflemen, etc.

4. Roughly half of the armor replacements are now at or

near their (mental) stress limits; use them redundantly; provide aids.

5. Unit integration needs to be complete and rapid

Lead Questions:

Apart from issues of combat skills and competence,

how far can you trust the new men, especially those

with two prior traumatic experiences?

* Soldiers are at or near their (mental)

stress limits

* Reliance on their continuing performance

is inadvisable

* Consider employing these men in noncombat

roles.

How will your old platoon members respond to the

assignments of the new soldiers?

* Low trust in non-integrated "strangers"

150
Case 6. Unit Reconstitution

PART 1

Group B Discussion

What leadership actions are especially important under the

circumstances? Consider, both, your platoon's and the replacements'

recent history. Suggest what and how it should be done?

Purpose:

To review leadership considerations and actions that are of

special importance for reconstituting units in combat.

Key Points:

1. Armor replacements have recently experienced extreme

stress.

2. A strong leadership style must be exhibited.

3. Leadership action aimed at integrating old and new

personnel into a cohesive unit is extremely important.

4. Spell out orders clearly and directly for stressed

personnel.

5. Plan for as much redundancy and task sharing as

possible.

6. Provide performance supports

Lead Questions;

Is it likely that cohesiveness in your platoon increased

sharply in consequence of recent experiences?

* Tough combat especially welds unit cohesiveness

* Concern of unit members for each other, but not

for "outsiders," becomes very high

* Specifically acquaint old/new personnel with each

other

Arc the new men likely to be regarded as outsiders by the

old men of your platoon, and vice versa?

* Yes, but...

* ... they have undergone similar experiences

* Explain respective experiences to old/new personnel

151
Case 6. Unit Reconstitution

PART 2

Three hour pass. It is 0500, and BP 45 is under attack bv a

combined arns force estimated to be at least two regiments. The TF

elements successfully repel and initial tank and infantry attacks launched

against the BP from different directions. This action buys enoucrh time

for another team to occupy a blocking position to the rear of RP45. Now

the Task Force Commander orders you to disengage and withdraw to

another BP before becoming overrun. The withdrawal requires crossing

the Itz river, which is fordable with difficulty.

In your platoon, there are no recent serious/casualties, but the

previously injured IFV driver has lost consciousness. Also, one of the

former tank loaders has been shot in the arm. It is a flesh wound, but

the outward appearance is that of an injury far more serious than the

true extent suggested by careful examination. You replace the

unconscious IFV driver with the former tank driver. Also, you assign

one of the former tank commanders as Gunner/Carrier Team Leader for

the IFV that used to carry 3rd Squad. The Commander designated your

platoon to overwatch the withdrawal of other elements, and to keep

dismounted threat infantry from damaging IFVs as they ford the Itz.

153
Case 6. Unit Reconstitution

PART 2

Group A Discussion

Assume that MEDEVAC is not available and that chances of getting

effective medical help for the wounded IFV driver and the former tank

loader are quite slim. Their presence (one is seriously and one is

grotesquely wounded) might substantially heighten the mental stress of your

platoon members, and that stress is already very high; abandoning them

may shatter unit cohesiveness and morale. Consider the advisability of

carrying the wounded on the IFV in the light of all relevant factors.

Suggest a disposition and justify it.

Purpose:

To demonstrate how a difficult situation can be turned to long run

advantage in stress relief.

Key Points:

1. Wounded must be carried with unit even though the

presence of wounded soldiers may add to already

extremely high (mental) stress level.

2. Abandoning wounded will weaken the trust and bonds

that hold the unit together. Such bonds sustain

endurance.

Lead Questions;

Could abandoning one or both wounded to be picked

up by threat attackers be justified?

* No

What is the likely effect of the wounded men on the

highly stressed squad that has to carry them?

* Increase in stress level possible if situation

not managed correctly

* Not a conscious reaction, but more of an unconscious, emotional response

* Increase in unit cohesion

154
Case 6. Unit Reconstitution

PART 2

Group B Discussion

Formulate a CDM plan for the platoon to overwatch other TF elements,

and for overwatching during its own fording of the Itz. Remember that

certain IFV crew members are probably near their stress endurance limits

and that their reliability is questionable. Consider all relevant factors.

Purpose:

To provide practice in considering the uncertainties associated with

reconstituting units in association with the uncertainties contributed by

very high stress levels.

Key Points;

1. Consider all possible CDMs.

2. Consider likely stages of performance degradation.

3. Consider coping capabilities of CDM trained and unj trained personnel.

4. Consider stress levels and performance reliability of

extremely stressed armor personnel.

Lead Ouestions:

How degraded are performance capabilities likely to

be at this stpge?

* Stage of progressive performance degradation:

moderate to serious

* Intense combat suggests high stress and accelerated

performance degradation

* Early morning suggests low point in wake/sleep

cycles

How are issues of performance degradation confounded with

those of basic competence (in infantry skills) in the case

of the armor replacements?

* Replacements hfive come through very intense combat

* Coping skills, if any, adapted to armor operations

How far will 2nd Squad likely trust the 3rd Squad IFV to

overwatch its river fording operation? How effectively can

they collaborate?

* Doubts, mistrust likely to be high

* Experience of working together is lacking

* All soldiers' performance now seriously degraded

155
Case 6. Unit Reconstitution

PART 3

The TFV led by the former tnnk commander is hit a<5 it prepared to

cross the Itz. There is no significant damage to the IFV and its

occupants. However, the effect on the team leader (former tank

commander) is drastic. He has "gone over the line", and stands "frozen"

in the hatch with eyes tightly closed. He does not respond to commands

and resists attempts to dislodge him.

157
Case 6. Unit Reconstitution

PART 3

Group A Discussion

What leadership action is indicated. How will the stress tolerance of

other crew members be affected by the presence of the stress casualty?

Suggest the best, justifiable disposition under the circumstances. Consider

all factors.

Purpose:

To consider further the antagonistic objectives of stress relief and of

unit cohesion and morale.

Key Points;

1. Stress casualties present the same issues as physical

casualties (VVIAs), but in even more intense form.

2. Stress casualities are entitled to the same consideration

as any wounded, disabled soldier.

3. Keep with unit but reassign.

4. Leadership authority must be firm and orders must be

short and direct.

5. Mild sedation for stress casualty

6. Reinforce confidence of group.

7. Fully structure each persons role

8. Don't strike stress casualty, douse with water, etc.

9. Try kindly firmness with stress casualty

Lead Questions;

What is the likely effect on others in the 1FV of the

the team leader's behavior?

* Intensifies stress levels at a critical moment

Is the stress casualty likely to interfere with the river

fording operation?

* Not if managed correctly

What long/range effect is the stress casualty's presence

likely to have on this squad?

* If managed correctly can lead to an

increase in cohesion and expectation of "on for

all and all for one"

158
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Case 6. Unit Reconstitution

PART 3

Group R Discussion

Suggest what leadership should do and how it should act. Consider all

relevant factors, especially the effect on crew/squad members of the stress

casualty.

Purpose:

To provide practice in considering stress management under "high

stress" conditions.

Key Points:

1. Direct contact with all individuals reduces stress.

2. Specify ihe threat directly and how it is to be dealt

with.

3. Try to identify any highly stressed soldiers and

pair them with less stressed persons.

4. Provide reassurance.

5. Don't argue with subordinates, don't call attention to

stress casualty.

6. Communicate as much status information as possible.

7. Support operations by providing highly specific directions on what to do, who should do it, and how to go about

it.

V Lead Questions:

What long range effect night a decision to abandon

him have on the stress casualty's fellow replacements and former buddies?

* Loss of trust, hope, am" endurance

* Antagonism to your leadership

Should rank or anothei factor decide who will get

the IFV and its soldiers across the river?

* Thi deciding factor is who is in the "best shape"

and "can do"

159
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APPENDIX A

Platoon and Squad Tasks Supported by

Orientation/Workshop

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PLATOON AND SQUAD LEADERS' TRAIMIMC.

A. Pooall the potential conditions of future continuous combat operations

and the impact of these conditions of soldiers' fighting pcrfornance.

|

1. Enumerate the adverse conditions associated with continuous

combat operations.

j

2. Describe how these adverse factors progressively degrade

the effectiveness of soldieis' performance.

3. Recognize the signs of stress in self and others.

I B. Consider the available techniques for counteracting performance

degradation.

1. Recall the major categories of counter degradation measures.

2. Relate the various counter degradation techniques or

measures to unit training programs and schedules.

3. Specify interrelationships of counter degradation measures

in achieving sustained effective performance.

C. Apply the methods and techniques for efficient development of a

continuous operations capability within unit training/preparation

programs.

1. Implement an orderly approach to developing the CDFI

capability.

2. Implement effective procedures for achieving training objectives.

3. Assess programs toward the CDFl capability

within the unit.

4. Apply diagnostic procedures and consequent corrective

actions to maintain an adequate rate of CDMs capability

acquisition.

5. Effectively guide unit to the timely achievement of a

reliable continuous operations capability.

D. Implenent features and techniques for prolonging performance in

continuous combat operations.

1. Base planning of unit's tactical maneuvers, in part, on

true retained performance capability.

2. Implement procedures and techniques for sustaining and prolonging effectivo performance.

3. Practice shifts in leadership style appropriate to the stress

endurance stage reached by unit personnel.

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-••-- - - • - - - - - i .. i._ v .. . . . , . , , . , , rAPPENDIX B

Adjunct Reading Material (Handouts)

1. Reprints of Articles:

a. Continuous Operations

b. A Debt That Must Be paid: Sleep TiOss

c. Who Melts, When, and Why?

d. The Hunan Dimension

2. Effects of Continuous Operations on Soldiers' Performance

3. Flow of Counter Degradation Pleasures Preparation

4. Sleep/rest priorities

5. P.ules for Sleep Managonent

6. Advisable Work-Rost Schedules Under Stressful Battlefield

Conditions

7. Stress Reactions and Helpful Measures

8. Techniques for Coping with Stress in Self

165
1 www' www > . w—m—w-m •- »> • •—< " "—- '- - -—r

Continuous Operations

By Captain George R. Frank

"Afy men had been moving andfighting for 39 hours since

leaving Ein-Hotsev. Before we could enter the perimeter, the

dropped battalion had to lift mines and roadblocks. These

jokers had posted a sign over the entrance: "International

Boundary, Show Your Passports." I noticed that no one with

me laughed and I took it as a sign that we were wearing fine.

Some ofmy officers had gone 3 nights without sleep—/ hadn V

closed my eyes in 70 hours.

"At 2300 hours, after getting afull report on the local situation, I called all commanders together to issue orders for the

organization of the expanded camp and for completing the

capture of Mitla Pass. I stillfeltfairly good—maybe that was

because I had ridden near the front of the column where the

dust, and consequently, the fatique had been less. What I

planned to do was tell them that we would again carry on at

about 0400. That would get us to the Pass by first light, and I

figured that 5 hours sleep would be enough.

"But I didn't get the words out. As I started speaking, I

looked at the menfacing me. Every man was sleeping. At that,

my words blurred and I toppled over. Nature simply look

over. I slept for 4 hours and 15 minutes. I could have used

more, but an air drop came in and one 600-pound bundle

landed 3feetfrom my head. That wakened me and reconvened

the conference."

Decision in Sinai, by Lieutenant Colonel Moshe Rose as told

to Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall.

While advanced technology has developed weapons systems

that are ible to operate with little "down time," man, on the

other hand, remains the same fragile organism he has been

since the beginning of time. Man then is the "weak

link,"—the most vulnerable, but also the most vital component of any of our weapons systems.

When discussing the factors that degrade crew performance

it is desirable, for the sake of simplicity, to categorize these

factors into two broad areas; physiological and psychological.

Physiological Performance Degraders

Fatigue is probably the foremost degrader of performance.

It can be easily understood that in a modern battlefield environment, with the capabilities of advanced weapons systems,

man will be »He only part of the system unable to sustain long

periods of operation. Very little research has been done in this

area and nearly all the studies that have been done are based

primarily on noncombat situations, usually involving aircraft

or naval crews performing technical tasks. There are however,

several recent studies on which the recommendations of this

article are based.

A recent experiment in England (Exercise Early Call) tested

the effects of fatigue due to sleep-loss.1In this study, three platoons of infantrymen were tested. One platoon was given 3

hours sleep per night. A second platoon was given 1 Vi hours of

sleep each night, and the last platoon was deprived of all

sleep.' Over a period of 9 days the platoons were required to

develop and improve several battle positions, go on ambush

and reconnaissance patrols, and defend their battle positions.

The platoon that received 3 hours of sleep each night remained

an effective combat force throughout the entire 9-day exercise

with only unrelated medical problems causing the loss of personnel.'

The platoon that had received only 1 'A hours of sleep each

night progressively lost energy, personal initiative, group

coherance, and organization, until after 4 days they were able

to rally only to immediate challenges. On the fifth day, they

lost 50 percent of their personnel due to extreme fatigue and

exposure.

No one from the third platoon, which was deprived of all

sleep, completed the test. From the end of the fourth day until

the middle of the fifth (after a period of 90 to 104 hours of

continuous wakefulness) the entire platoon was gradually

withdrawn from the test because of extreme fatigue and the inability to stay awake. Even after three days, or 72 straight

hours of wakefulness, most of the platoon had ceased to be an

effective combat force.4

Another significant result of the test showed that about 9

percent of the "sleep-deprived" and "I'A hour-sleep" groups

reported unusual visual experiences or hallucinations after 3

days, they were unable to communicate verbally, their sight

was restricted, and their auditory senses virtually

unstimulated.

Studies indicate that performance and efficiency begin to

deteriorate after 14 to 18 hours of continuous work and reach

a low point after 22 to 24 hours. Performance improves

somewhat during the next 8 to 10 hours but begins to decrease

again thereafter.' After 24 hours of continuous duty at a new

or a monotonous task, degradation of performance becomes

evident. Most tasks involving cognitive or perceptual skills,

such as planning or interpreting complex data, begin to show a

performance degradation after 36 to 48 hours of continuous

wakefulness. Seventy-two hours of wakefulness is about the

limit of endurance, after which personnel cease to be effective.

Schedules of sleep/work are also important factors in determining the amount of sleep loss that will impair performance.

Twenty-four hours of wakefulness will impair performance

if it is imposed on a crew that has completed a week on a

167

ARMOR march-april 1982 19
". '• . -.—^— ^-" T— ' -, " ' ' " ^-

1

•.-•- - - '-

4-hour work—2-hour rest schedule.* The same 24-hour period

of wakefulness will cause impairment to performance of crew

on a 4-hour work—4 hour rest schedule, after 2 weeks on the

schedule.' This indicates that crews on a "4-off-4-on"

schedule are less affected by sleep loss than those on a

4-on—2-off schedule.

The jobs that sleep loss affects most seem to be jobs that require monotonous tasks, jobs requiring continuous attention,

tasks performed on a time-shared basis with other tasks that

are relatively unlearned.'

In order to minimize the effects of sleep loss, the commander must be able to recognize the signs ofsleep loss on performance. These effects are noticeable as: slower reaction

time; increased time to perform a known task; short-term

memory decrement; impairment in learning speed, reasoning,

and complex decision chain; errors of omission; lapses of attention; irritability; depression, and erratic performance.*

It has been demonstrated that the diurnal cycle (day/night

cycle) has a significant effect on performance.1* When personnel become used to a set pattern of work/rest periods, where

rest periods occur at the same time each day. they become

adapted to this schedule. Any deviation to this schedule that

changes the rest period will result in performance decrements.

Biological adaptation to work/rest schedules may take from 20

to 30 days."

To employ a work/rest schedule during the heat of battle is

out of the question; however, a strictly-enforced sleep plan is

vital when possible, for example when occupying and preparing a battle position before enemy contact or during

assembly area operations. A work/rest schedule of 4 hours

work and 2 hours rest will not degrade performance over a

period of a few days but will be less effective than a 4-hour

work and 4-hour rest schedule in the long run."

A recommended sleep plan would furnish each soldier with

a minimum of 4 hours rest each 24 hour period. This would

not, in all probability, be as effective over long periods of time

as a sleep plan where personnel would receive 6 or more hours.

Four hours rest for each 24-hour period would probably sustain personnel for several weeks if they did not have jobs .that

require complex decision making, but they would probably

begin to show signs of exhaustion after 2 weeks. For periods of

1 to 2 weeks, a unit could possibly maintain combat effectiveness on 3 hours of sleep per 24-hours. This appears to be

about the limit, however.

For personnel in highly-technical jobs that require constant

monitoring or vigilance, a rest plan of 4 hours on and 4 hours

off would be best. Anything less than 4 hours would result in a

decrease in vigilance and perceptive abilities.

Another aspect of sleep loss that must be considered is the

time required for recovery from the effects of sleep loss. If a

commander knows his unit will be undertaking a long period

of combat or prolonged work, it is recommended he give his

personnel 12 hours of sleep or rest before the operation and

awaken them no more than 2 hours before the operation

begins.

After an operation of 36 to 48 hours of continuous

wakefulness, 12 hours of sleep or rest is required to return personnel to normal functioning: however, subjective fatigue may

linger for 3 days." If a high level of activity, such as combat, is

undertaken during this period, personnel miy need two

12-hour rest periods to attain complete recover." After 72 ir

more hours of continuou wakefulness, personnel may need as

much as 2 or 3 days of rest for recovery of normal performance.

To minimize the effects of sleep loss, the commander has

several options. Possibly the best solution for staff personnel is

periodic breaks and mild exercise. Some of the exercises

recommended are "Range of Motion" and "Strength and

Stamina" exercises involving stretching and tensing muscles

without requiring a lot of space." Examples of these can be

found in, Biotonics, Stamina Through Six-Secoud Exercises

That Really Work. Among combat crews, the commander

may rotate tasks if the crews are cross-trained. It must be

noted, however, that varying tasks through job rotation works

only if the jobs include tasks with different human requirements, (gunner to lo: der or driver)." Job rotation also

requires a highly-trained crew ifthe jobs are complex. Prior to

combat, effective training and experience will reduce the effects of fatigue.1

*

The two categories of personnel who can be expected to

show signs of fatigue first are: the young immature soldier who

is unsure of himself and the seasoned old soldier upon whom

others have relied and who has sustained them at the cost of

his own fatigue." Commanders (leaders) often regard

themselves as being the least vulnerable to fatigue, but in fact,

tasks requiring the quick reaction, complex reasoning, and detailed planning, that they perform, make leaders the most

vulnerable to sleep deprivation/* "The display of sleep selfdenial as an example of self-control by leaden is extremely

counterproductive."''

Once the battle has started and there is contact with the

enemy, sleep plans, job rotation, and rest periods may become

impossible. However, under the "Division '86" concept with

four maneuver companies in each battalion, the commander

may be able to rotate companies out of contact, enabling them

to get at least a temporary break in which rest will be equally as

important as maintenance and resupply. Currently, this could

possibly be done at brigade level, pulling battalions out of contact for rest, rearming, and reconstitution. Care needs to be

taken not to rely exclusively on the performance of certain individuals, teams, or units so that each are rested in turn.

Medicines provide another means for increasing performance during periods of fatigue, but the use of medicines to improve performance has largely been condemned in our society.

It also must be realized, that no performance improving drug

is without side effects and that frequent repetition can lead to

20 ARMOR march-april 1982 i6R
serious consequences.

• Caffeine from coffee, theophylline from tea, and theobromine from cocoa are purine derivatives. These substances,

especially caffeine, excite the central nervous system. "Consciousness is brightened, thought association takes place faster

and clearer, reaction time is shortened, motor actions are increased and feelings of tiredness and sleepiness disappear.""

Muscular performance capability is increased most by caffeine

and least by thcobromine. "In cases where requirements exist

for intensified performance capability for short-term operations several large mocca cups of coffee, direct caffeine, caffeine drinks, or cola preparations can achieve the desired goal

although not without limitation. In cases where longer endurance periods are required, they show no improved

results.""

Temperature is another performance degrader that has a

profound physiological effect and a somewhat lesser

psychological effect on soldiers during continuous operations.

Even though the human body is less adaptable to cold than

to heat, cold has less of an impact when considering an armored vehicle crew's performance. Exposed infantrymen are

more susceptable to cold Injuries than tank crews because

body heat and equipment-generated heat within the vehicle

raise the ambient temperatures. Exposure to cold for 2 to 3

hours reduces hand strength 20 to 30 percent. If gloves are

worn, manual dexterity is diminished, and the combat effectiveness of the armored vehicle is reduced. For leaders, continuous operations in cold weather require extensive logistical

planning. Soldiers will need to be resupplied with additional

clothing, fuel, and food, and. in extreme cold, they may require special equipment such as arctic parkas and mittens. For

well-protected, well-fed soldiers, cold is probably more of a

psychological Stressor than a physiological hazard."

Heat, however, is of much more concern than cold, and personnel in tanks or other armored vehicles suffer most from intense heat. As a general rule, any temperature above 90° F will

degrade crew performance, and a wet-bulb-globe temperature

(WBGT) of 85* is the maximum for effective crew performance. A WBGT of 81.3° is considered ideal, 85° is the maximum acceptable temperature for working conditions, and 90°

to 93" will cause casualties.

Surface temperatures of areas with which the crew may

come in contact can cause extreme discomfort or even blister

the skin. For instance, during tests in the Yuma desert, surface

temperatures reached as high as 155°, while WBGT measured

106°."

When anticipating operations in hot climates, commanders

and staff should plan for a 3- to 12-day period for troops to

become acclimated." Acclimation is faster if soldiers perform

work or mild exercise rather than rest during the acclimation

period. Physically fit troops acclimatize at a dramatically

quicker rate than the unfit.

When a unit must operate "buttoned up" in missionoriented, protective posture (MOPP) the problems of heat

casualties are multiplied. Infantrymen are able to operate efficiently for only about 20 minutes in temperatures of 75° to

90"F where high energy expenditure levels are required." This

creates an even greater problem for armor crewmen, operating

in an environment where engine, radios, and weapons are producing heat.

During a test of the M-l at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona

in September 1980, crewmen were exposed to an inside WBGT

of 890F and an outside (dry-bulb) temperature of 102T."

They were clothed in full MOPP IV ensemble (protective mask

with hood, chemical protective overgarments, gloves and

boots) and conducted crew duties with blowers off and hatches

closed. The crew simulated Tiring the main gun by loading and

unloading a "dummy" round and traversing and elevating the

turret. After I hour the crew lost effectiveness, and 20 minutes

later the test was terminated for safety considerations. The test

demonstrated that a tank crew. Fighting "buttoned up" in a

full MOPP ensemble, on a 100CF day will begin to show heat

stress in less than 1 hour and experience heat casualties in less

than 2 hours."

To lessen the effects of heat stress, leaders should closely

monitor NBC hazards and impose high MOPP levels only

when necessary. In some situations it might be appropriate to

wear NBC protective clothing over underwear, remove hoods,

open hatches and turn on blower motors.

Dehydration creates the most ugrent problem in operating in

a hot climate. At daily mean temperatures of 90°F, soldiers

resting in the shade need 6 quarts of water per day." Moderate

work at this temperature raises the requirement to 8 quarts per

day, while soldiers doing heavy work for 8 hours at this

temperature need 12 quarts of water per day. At a daily mean

temperature of 120oF, personnel resting in the shade need 17

quarts of water per day, while personnel working moderately

hard will need 20 quarts, and soldiers working hard in the sun

will need at least 25 quarts of water per day.'4

The Israeli system of overdrinking is successful incombating

dehydration. Each leader constantly insures that his personnel

drink water. Water is consumed once an hour for temperatures

below 100oF and twice an hour for temperatures above

100SF." To insure proper water consumption a urine color

check is made. Dark urine color indicates a water deficiency."

Soldiers should not be allowed to consume cold beverages that

could reduce sweating and cause overheating. Alcohol consumption should be strictly forbidden as it requires extra water

for the body to process." Water loss can be reduced by the

conserving sweat. This is done by wearing the complete

uniform with the sleeves rolled down and the head covered.

Clothing helps ration sweat by absorbing it and through

v. ......^^ifeJ^

169 ARMOR marchapril 1982 21
• "t- ■■'"-

evaporation cools the body. Salt is also lost in sweat, but silt

should be given only when recommended by medical personnel.

When operating in hot climates, soldiers require a minimum

of 6 hours rest per day and IS to 20 minutes of rest per hour

when performing hard work." It may be necessary to schedule

periods of heavy physical activities during the night or early

morning hours when temperatures are lowest.

Other factors that physically degrade crew performance during continuous operations are noise and overpressure. These

factors are significant degraders of performance. There is little

that commanders can do to lessen the effects of either of these

factors, however it is important to know the causes and effects

of each. . -

Noise is an occupational hazard that especially affects armor

crewmen. Not only is noise an annoyance but it interferes with

communication, and if the noise is experienced for long

periods it may cause temporary hearing loss." Therefore,

commanders should enforce the wearing of protective devices

even though these devices restrict and inhibit communication.

Overpressure caused by large explosions nearby is similar to

noise and results from the pressure waves in the atmosphere.

Overpressure may cau«e lung hemorrhage, eardrum rupture,

and air bubbles in the blood stream." Personnel in armored

vehicles are somewhat protected. In foxholes personnel may

receive greater overpressure than in the open due to the reduction in square area at the bottom as compared with the

opening, creating a funnel effect. Nuclear bursts will likely

cause large numbers of casualties by overpressure. Conventional munitions create mainly an annoyance but may burst

eardrums.

Psychological Performance Degraders

Psychological Stress is an important area of discussion when

considering factors which degrade performance. What causes

stress? Simply put, stress is caused by a situation in which adjustment is difficult or impossible to overcome but the motivation to overcome the situation is strong." '

The primary stress of the battlefield is the fear of disfigurement, mutilation, intense pain, death, or even fear of loosing

face within a peer group. Fear is universal in combat and it is

accepted that everyone will experience fear. It becomes a problem, however, when it seriously degrades performance or leads

to bizarre behavior.

In the next war commanders must be prepared to deal with

large numbers of psychological casualties within the first few

hours, due to the vast destructive potential of modem weapons

systems and the extreme violence and speed ofthe modem battlefield.

There seems to be a close association between neuropsychiatric casualties and "wounding rates." Studies have also indicated that the intensity of the conflict as well as the time

spent in combat are big factors. Lastly, the relative activity or

inactivity of the soldier is closely related to neuropsychiatric

casualty rates.4' Stalemate, inability to retaliate, and idleness

cause a marked increase in the number of neuropsychiatric

cases.

A. J. Class has stated that fear and exhaustion during intense combat will surface eventually and almost everyone has a

breaking point.*' A breakdown of pyschological defenses

against fear is evident in over 30 percent of nonbattle

casualties. He divides these casualties into five groups.

In Group I individuals report to the aid station with minor

organic disease or injury that would result in little if any incapacitation. Their medical condition thinly disguises a

pyschological breakdown."

In Group It individuals have subjective complaints but

negative findings—backache, headache, diarrhea, or

weakness. Such symptoms represent an unconscious attempt

to withdraw from an intolerable situation.4'

In Group III individuals appear with self-inflicted wounds

or other nonbattle injuries that could have been avoided, indicating either a conscious or unconscious attempt to flee the

battlefield.4*

Group IV contains the soldiers who have lost or broken

eyeglasses or dentures, which will keep the men out of combat

only temporarily.4'

Group V soldiers are those suffering complete psychiatric

breakdowns, who have lost their ability to cope with the situation of combat.4

* This group of casualties is completely ineffective.

Israeli experiences during the 1973 war have shown that elite

units have fewer neuropsychiatric casualties.4* This would

seem to indicate the importance of unit cohesiveness, interpersonal relationships and esprit-de-corps.

There are many ways in which positive leadership may also

play an important part in reducing the number of neuropsychiatric casualties. The spirit of the offense is a practical

technique to reduce the impact of fatigue and fear. Purposeful, aggressive action brings relief from combat tension."

Furthermore, a soldier's attitude and performance in training is related to his performance in combat. Realism in training

improves a soldier's ability to withstand combat stress. Training should emphasize the sights and sounds of the battlefield.

It should produce fear provoking situations that develop the

soldier's knowledge of himself, his enemy, and his weapons.

Confinement is a potential Stressor that may affect the

behavior of the crew members when "buttoned up" for long

periods of time.

Confinement may cause "status leveling." Because of the

lack of privacy and the inability to maintain social distance between superiors and subordinates, authority may be undermined." Anger, scorn, and ridicule may be directed at

superiors. "Status leveling" reduces authority and the leader

becomes only another member of the crew. Confinement may

22 ARMOR marchapril 1982 170
•-; •-. w- w-r—^"V »".•»

. also foster territorial behavior, with possessive feelings toward

certain locations or items within the vehicle." The tank commander should allocate space with very explicit rules and use

of resources.

Confinement in a "buttoned up" tank also causes problems

of crew performance due not only to psychological stress but

also to the physical limitations imposed on vision. Crowding

causes stress through a disruption of individual "personal

space."" In a hostile or stressful environment such as combat,

the need for interpersonal distance between individuals increases. During daylight, target detection is degraded from 8

to 25 percent during closed hatch operation." Navigation is

degraded 8 to 26 percent and takes 11 to 40 percent more

time," while obstacle neogtiation takes from 21 to 99 percent

more time."

At night target detection is degraded 8 to 46 percent."

Navigation is degraded 14 to 39 percent and takes 19 to 54 percent more time."

MOPP also increases the effects of confinement. A

"buttoned-up" M-6 H / allows only two crew members to don

protective clothing at a time, one at the commanders station,

one at the loaders station, and it requires 16 minutes even with

practice." The M-l Abrams has a smaller crew compartment.

and thus, will require even more time, suggesting that crew

members should wear protective clothing if there is a possibility of chemical warfare.

Infantrymen are also affected by long confinement in armored personnel carriers and fighting vehicles by

temperatures, vibration, blast effects, acceleration and

deceleration, high noise level, air pollution, sleep deprivation,

and body restriction." The effects of body restriction impairs

movement for only short intervals after dismounting.

It is essential that we begin training to combat physiological

and psychological Stressors by realistic, stressful training.

Leaders at every level of command must realize that a viable

work/rest plan that includes commanders and staff must be

implemented. Additionally, simulated neuropyschiatric battle

casualties should be incorporated into every Held training exercise and ARTEP to adequately train our personnel for continuous operations.

Whenever planning is being done by commanders and staff,

emphasis must be placed on the human factor of every

weapons system. Although training, proper planning, and

other techniques may extend the amount of time a crew may

remain combat effective, the human being is still the most

vulnerable and valuable asset in the Army inventory.

Foolnoles

MAJ Gregory Lucas Bclenky, "Unusual Visual Experiences Reported by Subjects in the British Army Study of Sustained Operations, Early Call", (US Army

Medical Research and Development Command, Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD

October 1979) p. 69S.

'Ibid.

Ibid.

'Ibid.

'Albert L. Kubala and William L. Warnick, "A Review of Selected Literatureon

Stresses Alfcctin« Soldiers in Combat" (Human Resources Research Organization. Alexandria. VA, May 1979), p. }-l}.

"'Human Ptrforir.ance and Military Capability in Continuous Operations."

(The Technical Cooperation Program, Washington, DC, December 1974) p.

B-2.

"Ibid. . *

•Kubala and Warnick. p. 3-14.

"'Human Performance and Military Capability in Continuous Operations", p.

B-2.

"Donald F. Haggard, "Human RRO Studies in Continuous Operations"

(Human Resources Research Organization, Alexandria, VA, March 1970), p. 3.

"Kubala and Warnick, p. 3-15.

"Ibid.

""Human Performance and Military Capability in Continuous Operations", p.

B-3.

"Ibid.

"Ibid.

"Rex E. Wiederanders, M.D. »ith Edmond C. Addeo, Biolonics. Slamina

Throufh Six-Stcond Exercises Thai Really Work, (Warner Books, Inc., 75

Rockfeller Plaza, New York, NY. 1977), pp. 119-187.

"Haggard, p. 3.

'•"Human Performance and Military Capability in Continuous Operations", p.

B-3.

"LTC Peter B. Peterson, "Fatigue in Sustained Tactical Operations". (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 29 Jun 1972), p. 70.

"Felix F. Kopstein et al. "Human Performance in Continuous Operations:

Volume II. Management Guide" (Applied Psychological Services Inc.. Wayne

PA Science Center. December 1979), p. xii.

"LTC Wolfgang Wolf, "Possibilities of Using Medicines lo Improve Performance During Military Operations," (Translation of Truppendiensl No. 6 by US

Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency, Washington, DC, 1970) p.

"Ibid.

"Ibid. p. 6.

"Kubala and Warnick, p. 3-3.

"Ibid, p. 3-1.

'"Ivan A. Suarez, "Armored Fighting Vehicle Compartment Temperatures-MW

Tank", (U.S. Army Proving Grounds, Yuma, AZ, November 1974), p. 12.

"Ibid, p. 10.

"Kubala and Warnick, p. 3-6.

""Road Battalion Operations in a Toxic Environment Volume I of III. Operational Capability Experiment", (CDCED. 6)-4, HQ DA Combat Development

Command Expenmentailun Center, Ft. Ord, CA, December 1963), p. 10.

•MAJ Kelly, DCSCD/NUC Directorate, "Memorandum for CG, SUBJECT:

XMI Testing in a Chemical Environment", (U.S. Army Proving Grounds,

Yuma, AZ, September IVH0(. p. I.

Ib.d.

""Dewrt Operations Handbook"

Division, Ft. Bragg, NCI, p. 1-2-1

"Ibid.

"Ibid, p. 1-2.

"Ibid.

ibid. p. 1-3.

(G-2, SERE Training Office. 82d Airborne

"Ibid, p. I-S.

"Kubala and Wamick, p. 3-g.

"Ibid.

"Kubala and Warnick, p. 2-4.

"Ibid, pp. 2-10-2-12.

"A. J. Class, "The Problem of Stress in • Combat Zone". (Symposium on

Stress. Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington. DC, March 19)3).

"Ibid.

"Ibid.

"Ibid.

"Ibid.

"Ibid.

"MAJ Larry H. Ingram and MAI Frederick J. Manning, "Psychiatric Battle

Casualties: The Missing Column in a War Without Replacements", Military

Review, Ft Leavenwonh, KS, US Army Command and General Staff College.

Vol LX, Aug 1980, No. I), p. 27.

"Kubala and Warnick, p. 2-12.

"Kubala and Warnick, p. 3-18.

"Ibid.

"Kubala and Wamick, p. 3-20.

"MAJ R. C. Barron et a]., "Degradation of Tank Effectiveness", (HQ,

TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity, Fort Hood, TX, September 1976), p.

1-3.

"Ibid. p. 1-4.

"Ibid.

"Ibid.

"Ibid.

"Kubala and Warnick. p. 3-23.

"Samuel A. Hicks, "The Effects of Confinement on the Performance of Combat Relevant Skills: Summary Report", (US Army Human Engineering

Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, Dec 1964), p. I.

CAPTAIN GEORGE R.

FRANK enlisted In the Army

in 1971, and served as an

NCO in the 7th Special

Forces Group. He later

received a bachelor degree

in business administration

from Campbell College. He

was commissioned in Infantry through CCS in 1976

Captain Frank has served as

platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and executive

officer In the 62d Airborne

Division. He Is a graduate ol

the Armor Officers' Advanced Course and is attending the Supply Management Officers" Course. Fort

Lee, VA enroute to Panama.

tflsSBiiaMMa

171 ARMOR march-april 1982 23
*:-*_.-•y*'. » ,

A Debt That Must Be Paid

SLEEP L OSS

: ?-.

-.j

•• V b

by Captain Richard P. Geler

It is 0230 hours, the team is deployed in a night

defensive position on the third night of a joint training excercise. The team commander is in his tank slumped

over the M-36 sight box. The radios are turned up. A

report from the scout platoon blasts over the radio. A

company-sized force is moving toward the team's position. The commander attempts to alert his platoon

leaders. One answers immediately, but the others do not

respond. Frantically, the commander sends his loader to

alert the platoons while he curses himself for dozing, the

company CP for not keeping the platoons on the net, and

the platoon leaders for not monitoring the radio. Fortunately, the team commander is able to awaken his unit,

maneuver, and destroy the enemy force. After the exercise is terminated, the commander wonders what happened to the sleep discipline that had been stressed during

the previous month's training and ARTKP. Because of

safety constraints, night operations were limited to static

defense. The company's SOP called for 50 percent alert

during a night defense, which would require two people

asleep in each tank at all times. So why were the troops so

exhausted? What condition would the unit be in after 4

days and 3 nights conducting an active defense against

the Threat in Kurope? Could sleep loss lose the first battle

of the next war?

Few studies are available on the effects of continuous

"perations on soldiers. Research conducted by the Navy

reveals that sleep loss is the most detrimental factor to extended operations. The emphasis of their research is on

the effects of sleep loss on sailor's work efficiency. The

results indicate the following:

• The mean duration of sleep under normal conditions is

7.5-8 hours.

• Younger individuals (20-39/ require an average of 1

hour more sleep than the older group (40-59).

• The human body is not equipped to anticipate shortened sleep cycles and to adapt accordingly.

• Failure to receive the required sleep results in a

backlog or sleep debt. The only way to eliminate this debt

is to allow an individual I hour of sleep in rddilion to his

normal required amount.

• Performance degradation as pertains to vigilance does

not disappear with less than 3 hours of sleep.

• A minimum of 5 hours of sleep is required to enable an

individual to maintain an acceptable level of consistent

and reliable performance.

• The physical and psychological recovery from the effects of sleep loss is accomplished by the acquisition of

the normal, uninterrupted sleep period.

• High stimulus or motivation will readily override the

detrimental effects of sleep loss on performance for a

short period of time.

Many studies on continuous work have been done by

civilian universities under Armv contract. These studies

172 ARMOR january-february 1979 37
were conducted in a laboratory using college students as

test personnel and because of this the results are not totally valid for Army use. However, some data can be of use

to the Army in predicting effectiveness and perhaps

lessening the effects of sleep loss. These effects are:

• The first work performance decrements occurred after

approximately 18 hours of work. During the early morning hours of the first night, average performance decreased to approximately 82 percent of the baseline performance. During the first half of the second day. performance improved to about 90 percent of baseline, but

decreased again during the second night to approximately

67 percent of baseline. Recovery of performance baseline

was complete after a 24-hour period of rest and recovery.

• Following 36 hours of continuous work. 2. 3. and 4

hours of sleep yielded an immediate recovery in performance of about 76 percent. 56 percent, and 75 percent,

respectively, whereas 4 hours of .sleep following 44 hours

of continuous work produced only a 39-percent recovery.

"Commanders must cope with the effects of

sleep loss on their own performance as well as

their troops. They must train and trust subordinates to command their unit while they

sleep."

• A temporary improvement in job performance,

speed.and accuracy after sleep loss is common. However,

this improvement requires nearly three times the expenditure of energy and over a period of time, work output

drops alarmingly.

• Physical strength remains unimpaired until extreme

levels of sleep starvation are realized.

• Moderate exercise, especially of the large muscles of

the body, tends to increase alertness and helps sustain

good performance.

• The most difficult jobs for the sleep-deprived individual are ones which require sustained attention to

brief, intermediate signals and those that require complex, swift decisions or planning.

• Sleep loss typically causes errors of omission, not commission.

• Continuous operations can increase an individual's

caloric needs to as much as 10,000 calories a day. There is

some data to suggest that sleep loss leads to iron deficiency, vitamin B deficiency, dehydration, and an impaired

capability to fully utilize glucose as an energy source.

• Prolonged thermal exposure, confinement, noise and

vibration stress (all present in armored vehicles) degrade

performance and ability to cope with sleep loss.

• The degree of job training may affect continuous work

performance. Studies indicate that highly-trained individuals can be expected to work continuously at 50 percent of theirmaximum for a period of 8 hours, whereas untrained individuals cannot be expected to work at much

more than 25 percent of their maximum over the same

period.

To minimize the effects of sleep loss, commanders

should consider the following action:

• insure that troops are motivated, trained, and properly led.

• Provide increased rations, water, vitamin B, and iron

supplements to sustain troop effectiveness under the

stress of sleep loss.

• Increase supervision during the hours of 0100 to

daybreak to offset the reduced vigilance during these

hours.

• Insure that troops receive some sort of exercise. If

possible get them away from confinement, noise, vibration, and excessive heat or cold stress for a period of time.

Even stopping the tank, and walking around it to check

the track and suspension may help.

• In a lull in the battle, give half of the unit 7 to 8 hours

of uninterrupted sleep rather than split the watch and

give each half 4 hours.

• Realize that the younger the soldier, the more sleep he

requires.

• Accept as a natural law that the human body cannot

anticipate shortened sleep cycles or sleep loss. Neither

through practice nor any other means can soldiers perform effectively with a sleep debt for an extended period

of time.

Most importantly, commanders must cope with the effects of sleep loss on their own performance as well as

their troops. They must train and trust their immediate

subordinate to command their unit while they sleep. Command decisions in future battles cannot be degraded by

sleep loss. We can no longer afford to let our executive officers dedicate themselves to maintenance problems and

run themselves into exhaustion doing a motor sergeant's

job. They must be aware of the tactical situation, receive

adequate rest, and be trained and capable of conducting

tactical operations while the commander sleeps.

These "tips" may help reduce the effects of sleep loss

for 48 hours or less, but what can be done if troops are required to function for over 48 continuous hours? Drugs to

prevent sleep are not the answer, since harmful side effects and individual variation of dose rates seem to be an

Insurmountable problem. Drugs or devices to induce sleep

and give an individual an equivalent 8 hours of sleep in 1

hour or less do not appear to be available in the near

future because of harmful side effects.

Will units conducting the active defense against the

Threat in Europe have lulls in the battle that will allow

sleep recovery? It is not likely. Since 1954 the Threat has

made continuous combat operations the main principle of

their combat doctrine. Their doctrine states, "the offensive...will be conducted night and day...without letup until the enemy is defeated."

Four days after the battle begins the Threat will have

rotated units into the battle. Will we be able to defeat

these units or will the Threat forces find American

soldiers asleep in tanks, trucks, and foxholes?

Unless our need for sleep is overcome or our force structure is redesigned to rotate units in and out of the battle,

sleep loss could lose the first battle of the next war.

•-•i.

CPT RICHARD P. GEIER

was commissioned In Infantry from Pittsburg State

University. Pittsburg. Kan.

He served as platoon leader,

company XO, BMO, S-4 and

S-3 air in the 1-37 Armor.

Katterbach. Germany. He

was a platoon leador and

company XO in the 1-39 Inf.;

CSC commander, 2-1 Inf.;

and company commander.

2-77 Armor. A recent AOAC

graduate, he Is assigned to

the Battlefield Automation

Management Directorate,

CACOA, Ft. Leavcnworth.

Kan.

38 ARMOIt january-february 1979 173
by Doctors Frederick J. Manning and Larry H. Ingraham

In late 1977, the authors of

this article arrived in Heidelberg,

West Germany, to set up what

was indeed to be a Special

Foreign Activity of the Walter

Reed Army Institute of Research.

Hardly had the lettering on our

office door dried when a distressed looking major wearing crossed

cannons brought us a field artilleryman's version of that old

tongue twister, "How much wood

could a woodchuck chuck if a

woodchuck could chuck wood?"

He wanted to know, "How much

ammo can an ammo bumper

hump if an ammo bumper hadda

hump ammo?" That is to say, he

explained that the corps headquarters where he worked had

recently begun a major evaluation of what would be required of

whom should their present war

plans have to be executed.

His field artillery section was

naturally concerned with the

enormous number of rounds likely to be required of the corps artillery. They had a good idea,

from maintenance data and test

firings, of how many hours the

self-propelled howitzers could

propel themselves before a

serious deficiency showed up and

of how many rounds could be

fired at varying rates of fire. He

had come to us, he explained, to

find out how long they could expect to operate on a round-theclock basis before the men

"melted." As guidance, he went

on, we would probably be most interested in one member of the gun

crews in particular: the soldier

charged with wrestling the

200-pound projectiles from their

storage place in the ammunition

vehicle to the howitzer's

hydraulic loader and lifting it into

place. The major calculated that

this individual would be lifting on

the order of 16 tons a day if the

Warsaw Pact behaved as they

were supposed lo. The major

stated that, if we could simply tell

him how many days an individual

could continue this, the study

could move on to other areas.

It was not easy to tell a man

who had figured vehicle and barrel lives out to two decimal places

that wo thought continuous

operations were viable from a

human standpoint for approximately 36 hours, plus or minus

26 hours. It was even more difficult to tell him that the

laboratory studies of sleep

deprivation (on which we based

this estimate), though totally

unrelated to field artillery operations, also led us to believe it was

the leaders, not the ammo

humpers, who were most likely to

be the weak link in the conduct of

continuous high intensity combat

operations as described in the

Army's new now-to-fight. manual,

FM 100-5. However, we did voice

our opinion, and, as a result, the

May-June 1981

174

13
^^ t I" . *. ^ ". "

,.,,.,.,.£•(., I

1

, i

1

.^. I" W'W ' 1 > 1 » J , • 1 . . I

The quality of work performed by mental laborers Is affected by sleep deprivation.

authors and three enlisted

members of our unit spent the

next six months watching the

day-to-day operations and training of a field artillery battalion in

Europe. Here it was clearly not

within our resources to stage a

30-day, round-the-clock field exercise. Instead, we observed the applicability of well-controlled

laboratory findings to this

specific real-world situation to

discover possible "fault lines"

along which such a unit might

crack under the stress of continuous operations.

Direct observation and informal interviews of soldiers and

their families, in garrison and during field training, both during and

after duty hours, were the

primary means of data collection.

As such, 1,000 pages of field

notes were gathered. Additional

sources of data were formal interviews, questionnaires, personnel

and medical record screens, and

third party evaluations such as

the Annual General Inspection

(ACiI) and the unit Nuclear Surety Kvalution. In this article, we

shall emphasize some of the more

general issues of leadership and

performance. Additionally, now

being blessed with the gift of

hindsight, we shall confine

14 Field Artillery Journal

i a
ourselves to observations whose

generality we have subsequently

noted as we visited other units on

other projects.

Our original focus was on sleep

deprivation, and it quickly

became apparent that, in the field

as in the laboratory, it was

psychological rather than

physiological exhaustion that is

the critical problem with sleep

deprivation. In a sentence, it is

not a question of muscle, but of

judgment and will. Further,

though the fit is not perfect, we

found it useful to think about the

effects of sleep deprivation on

judgment when considering

leadership in continuous operations, as well as the will to continue when we turn to the junior

enlisted.

Leaders and judgment

There have been a number of

well-conducted experiments in

the Held, as well as in the lab,

which indicated that cognitive

tasks such as map reading, encoding and decoding, logical

reasoning, and short-term

memory are affected much sooner

and more severely by sleep loss

and other Stressors than purely

physical tasks such as marching

or even marksmanship. Perhaps

even more disturbing from the

viewpoint of unit survival (unlike

physical laborers whose work

quantity is decreased by fatigue),

decision makers and other mental

laborers have the quality of their

work reduced. The latter, particularly when unrecognized or

unacknowledged, is clearly the

greater of two evils. That it is

unrecognized and unacknowledged, at least by its primary victims, became obvious to us on our

first trip to the live-fire training

area with the battalion This

three-week event, which takes

place twice a year, features a

May-June 1981

36-hour continuous operations

scenario for each of the batteries

and constitutues a kind of final

exam. Although we, as observers,

personally found the pace of

events p linfully slow (in large

measure because of elaborate

safety measures imposed by

range officials), we were immediately struck by the reluctance (nay, refusal) of the officers

and senior NCOs to get any sleep.

Tasks were delegated to junior officers and NCOs, but then senior

officers and NCOs would remain

awake, often with little actual

work to do, until all delegated

tasks were completed. Staying

awake was more than a point of

pride for these men who appeared

to subscribe fully tc the view that

sleep is only for the weak, for they

expended a fair amount of energy

on anyone in the unit whom they

chanced upon napping between

moving and shooting. This was

nowhere more firmly entrenched

than among the men for whom

sleep was most important, commanders themselves, who acted

as if they were the least

vulnerable, if not completely immune. Confronted with the

disparity between their behavior

and their previous enthusiastic

agreement about the necessity for

sleep, some appeared mildly

disturbed, but only one would admit, after 30 hours, that he

"wasn't worth a damn," but felt

he simply couldn't go to sleep

while his men were still up.

In practice, this means that the

performance of decision makers,

such as commanders and battery

executive officers, and those

whose jobs involve primarily

cognitive skills, such as battalion

staff, FDC (fire direction center)

members, survey sections, chiefs

of firing battery, and communications equipment operators, will

very likely be more susceptible to

the stress of continuous high intensity combat than those with

more labor-intensive jobs. Further, these same battery

"exams," enhanced by a twoweek stint with the battalion in

REFORGEIt 73. gave us some

idea of the kinds of problems likely to beset us if the Soviets ever

carry out their published strategy

of constant attack. 24 hours a

day. Exactly as we saw in the

steiile conditions of a US lab, a

striking division of effort

developed as time wore on.

Forced-paced activities, e.g. requests for fire f jm forward

observers and higher headquarters, continued to produce

well-trained, timely responses;

howevor, it soon became apparent

that the "cost" of this performance was "increasing neglect"

of self-paced activities such as updating meteorological corrections, plotting potential targets,

preplanned fire and no-fire zones,

setting up camouflage nets, running telephone wire to perimeter

guards, etc. Though none of us

knew enough about field artillery

to document it. it seems unlikely

that battalion and brigade headquarters were unaffected, since

good planning ought to be selfpaced rather than mere reaction

to outside forces.

Junior enlisted and will

Now, let us turn to the other

half of the answer to the question

of who melts and why: the

followers and the will to continue.

We focus on will rather than ability here because it became obvious

very quickly during field exercises that the majority of the

troops in our artillery battalion

could and did manage short

periods of sleep in spite of the

noisy and uncomfortable conditions. Though the addition of incoming artillery round? may

change our views, at present we

15

176
think it safe to assume that most

of the junior enlisted ranks will

snatch the three hours of sleep

necessary to support the largely

physical and forced-paced wnrk

demanded of them. The "wili >nd

drive to continue," however, may

be worth some consideration. We

don't mean for a moment to conjure up images of cowardice,

desertion, mutiny, or giving up

without a fight by this phrase

"will to continue." More experienced and perceptive

observers than we have asked

this question of why men fight;

however, the answer seems to be

at least in this half of the world in

this century, best described by

the words of S.L.A. Marshall:

"The same things that induce him

to face life bravely—friendship,

loyalty to responsibility, and

knowledge that he is a repository

of the faith and confidence of

others." Certainly we in the Army Medical Department have

come to regard what has been

variously called bonding,

cohesiveness, or esprit-de-corps

as the most important variables

in the prevention and recovery of

neuropsychiatric casualties in

combat. Talks with Israeli

medical authorities and others

have led us to conclude that such

casualties will be generated far

more quickly and in even larger

quantities in any future conventional war than in World War II.

As a result, we were more than a

little dismayed at how easy it was

for a stranger to the unit, a major

at that, to elicit disparaging

remarks about the unit and its

members from the very people

whose lives depended on it.

The reason for this may be

partly due to the high turnover

rate (one-third of the battalion in

the six months we studied it),

which made shared experiences

and lasting friendships difficult.

Another factor was surely the

very pronounced vertical segregation we were in good position to

observe, since our team included

officers, a senior NCO, and two

junior enlisted soldiers. The division of junior enlisted, NCOs,

and officers was absolute and allencompassing, characterized at

each level by lack of respect for,

and confidence in, members of the

other two levels. Laziness or ignorance, or both, were the

characteristics offered most in

describing the other two groups.

Though some might argue that

this was an inevitable result of

grafting a Prussian military

system to a society which has as

>s founding principle, "All men

l a created equal," we feel the

results of our most recent

research give cause for hope.

For the past year, the VII

Corps Inspector General and his

team have included a standardized series of interviews as they

conducted week-long unannounced inspections of corps combat

battalions. Designed by us in an

attempt to assess cohesiveness

and esprit in these units, results

have shown considerable variation among units, and these variations in turn are closely correlated

with differences among these

units on traditional measures of

battalion functioning. More important to the present discussion

are the five questions which most

reliably differentiate the highesprit, high-preformance units

from the low-esprit, lowperformance units:

•How often, aside from

meetings, does your platoon

leader talk to you personally?

•How often, aside from

meetings, does your CO talk to

you personally?

•Is your squad (section) leader

ever included in after-duty activities?

•Who would you go to first if

you had a personal problem?

•If we went to war tomorrow,

would you feel confident about

going away with this unit, or

would you rather go with

another?

These questions were directed

toward the junior enlisted personnel, and four of the five questions

dealt directly with the frequency

of non-duty interaction with

leadership. Today's troops, it

seems, want to know their leaders

and, in turn, be known by them as

individuals rather than mere cogs

in the "green machine" and .ire

willing to pay for that interaction

with better performance, even in

garrison. One might even

speculate that just the sort of interaction these troops seem to

crave would go a long way toward

releasing their leaders from the

apparent dilemma described

above, wherein the leader knows

that fatigue and stress will soon

degrade his judgment but

believes that a good leader should

never sleep while his men are asked to work. As long as leaders and

followers alike are only allowed to

role-play, troops will seldom have

the courage (or desire) to tell the

old man to "Get some sleep, sir!

You need it more than we do, and

we can handle this by ourselves."

Nor will the "old man" have the

knowledge of and confidence in

the troops to do it on his own.E3

Frederick J. Manning Ph.D.. and Larry H. Ingraham, Ph.D., arc

assigned to the United States Army Medical Research

Unit-Europe, which is a special foreign activity of the Waler

Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, DC.

16 177 Field Artillery Journal
.. ^

EZ

ßy Lieutenant Colonel Wm. Edivard Slifer

Ten years ago the United States anticipated

that in the 1980s it would have force readiness

equal to, or superior to, that of the Soviet

Union. National policies, resource constraints,

shifting priorities and Soviet technological

improvements appear to have created a negative

gap between our respective force readiness

capabilities. As a result, the Army has initiated a

large scale modernization program to close the gap

and bring the Army to its maximum effectiveness

In order to assure victory on the battlefield.

Many factors determine the outcome of battle;

one of the major factors is the human

dimension. The modernization program is giving

increased emphasis on the need to maximize the

human capability of our soldiers (i.e., the human

dimension). In line with this need, for over a year,

the Human Dimension Division, Doctrine and

Combat Developments Directorate, Soldier

Support Center, has been engaged in developing

comprehensive "people" doctrine. The Human

Dimension Division is studying some of the more

important variables which affect human capability

-- unit cohesion, combat stress, and human

performance in continuous operations. Test

doctrinal literature is being developed in each area.

Unit cohesion is a critical clement of readiness,

because it acts as a positive motivator in peacetime

and as a force multiplier in combat. Data from

previous wars validate that cohesive units perform

38

178

Soldi«' Support Journal
' ,• • BaBoa«B*B»a*H«>D«HAR*U*R*E«BeHeä«««e«C*E«CI*H«U«i:*Bt>K*H*R«B«n*nait«B«B*DCi:«H«B»t:oR

I

I

I

I L

L

better than units with less cohesion. For example,

battle casualty data from World War II shows that

combat stress (neuropsychiatric) casualties in units

which were not very cohesive had a devastating

effect on the ability of the units to sustain

themselves in combat. In 44 days of heavy fighting

on the Gothic line, the newly committed 88th and

91st Divisions received approximately 3,600 and

2,700 wounded in action respectively. In addition,

they lost 817 and 919, respectively, as a result of

combat stress. The percentages of combat stressto

wounded in action casualties were 22.7 percent and

34 percent respectively.

The above figures can be compared with even

heavier fighting encountered by two very cohesive

units. In 38 days of combat at Normandy, the 82d

Airborne Division lost 4,197 wounded in action and

238 (only 5.7 percent) as a result of combat

stress. The 101st Airborne Division at the Battle of

the Bulge, in 43 days, lost 4,992 wounded in action

and 102 (only 2.0 percent) to combat stress. These

historical examples show that cohesive units

withstand the stress of combat much better than

units which are not as cohesive.

The Human Dimension Division has a twopronged effort underway in the area of

cohesion. One is to produce a Department of Army

Pamphlet, "Leadership Guide to Assessing and

Managing Unit Cohesion." The other is to produce

a follow-on comprehensive doctrinal test field

manual on unit cohesion.

The leadership guide is geared to help leaders at

company level and below to make their units more

cohesive. It is also intended to be of assistance to all

leaders. Throughout the guide, the relevance of

leadership to the entire processofbuildingcohesion

is emphasized.

Contents of the guide include: (a) a general

introduction to group characteristics with

emphasis on the need for cohesion; (b) differences

between formed and interest groups and their

implications for influencing individual behavior;

(c) stages of unit development and general

leadership roles for each stage; (d) knowing

personnel, not only as individuals, but also as

members of a group (i.e., the unit); (e)

understanding the unit socialization process and

the significance of values and standards; (0

implications of divergent unit and individual

objectives and the necessity for congruence; and (g)

the importance of identifying with one's unit and

the need to know the positive aspects of the unit's

history.

A unique feature of the leadership guide is a

summary of questions for leaders to ask which will

assist them in assessing unit cohesion. The

following is a sample of the questions:

-vs.*

r,' •

LTC Win. F.dtmrd SUfvr has bim dcrclniiiinj compreheii.iice

"licoplc" tloctrine nt the Suldier Siijiiioit Center. mUtot^MM^yC

Stniizwiml

* Does the unit provideforsatisfaction ofmember

needs?

* Do unit members know who cares about them?

* Do unit members have yardsticks to measure

their performance?

* Are unit members confident?

* Does each sub-imit have sufficient members and

other resources to ac^omplish its mission?

* Is unit cominunication effective?

* Do unit 7nembers belong to prominent interest

sub-groups which support or detract from unit

cohesion?

* Is each soldier's family made to feel a part of

unit life?

In March, 1980, a Human Dimension Working

Group Conference was sponsored by the Soldier

Support Center and was attended by sixteen

military and civilian behavioral science

experts. The conference participants decided that

sufficient information and research was available

to produce a field manual on unit

cohesion. Production of a test field manual is now

underway as a joint undertaking by the Walter

Reed Army Institute of Research, the Army

M*,/June 1981 179

3]
———-—-»»» w»w»»w<»»i»»ir»»i»»Mw»»a»u»a»B»B»a»a»B»»i»M»a»i

Research Institute, ODCSPER and the Soldier

Support Center's.

The field manual is being developed from a total

systems perspective. It will demonstrate why

cohesion is important, what happens if you don't

have cohesion, actions that can be taken to get

cohesion, and why certain actions work to obtain

cohesion. The manual will include a chapter on

diagnosis and assessment as well as a list of markers

(e.g., sick call rates, Article 15's/courts-martial) to

use in order to identify whether a unit is cohesiveor

in trouble. The manual will also contain a list of

cohesion builders for the battalion commander

down to the squad leader. Each leadership level is

discussed in terms of the types of behavior that will

enhance cohesion or operate against it. Emphasis is

placed on the idea that cohesion stems from

meaningful mission oriented experiences within

the- t where the quality of unit performance is fed

bac > the group, is meaningful to the group, and is

a p: lary means to instill cohesion.

The two most important ingredients of combat

stress are physical fatigue and mental

stress. Combat stress is a result of prolonged

exposure to battle conditions, just as injury and

physical disease are results of battle

conditions. Both intensity and duration determine

how much stress builds up in the soldier. Stress

casualties increase when combat intensity

increases. Stress casualties also increase the longer

troops stay in active combat. The greatest stress

results from very intense combat that continues for

an extended period.

a

'Sl

•J.

U

H

CÜ.MHAT INTENSITY/DURATION ,

Combat intensity, duration, and stress

casualties.

Experience from W\V II arid Korea

demonstrated a clear and reliable relationship

between battle intensity and stress

casualtifs. When battle intensity is expressed in

terms of thf number of persona Wounded In Action

(WIA), the relationship may be graphically

illustrated as follows;

10.000

1,000

100

MAR

1944

86th INFANTRY DIVISION DEC

1944

Combat stress casualties constitutca substantial

part of the medical workload. In past wars, it was

revealed that there was one combat stress casualty

for every four wojnded in action -- one for every

three wounded during lengthy periods of intense

combat. In a war characterized by continuous

operations on a high-intensity, integrated

battlefield, the relationship of stress casualties to

wounded in action is expected to be at least one to

three and conceivably even greater. Combat stress

is not solely a medical problem. It is also a

command problem -- both in terms of numbers lost

from duty and reduced performance of duty. It is a

command responsibility to take actions to increase

the individual soldier's resistance to combat stress

and to manage stress in units.

Test Field Manual

The Army Research Institute (ARI). is

producing a test field manual. "Maiutynncut of

Stnsa in Army Opcnitions," '\n a joint ARI-HÜD

cooperative venture. In the past. leaders have not

paid sufficient attention to mental stress. The field

manual informs leaders that appropriate methods

of coping with and managing stress will reap

dividends d ii ringoom bat. Areas of emphasis are on

what the individual soldier can do, what the

"buddy" can do. and what the leader can do in order

40 180 Soldier Support Journal
»Ken

ÄfSK»^1 ^l-^^^s^^

People doetrine emphasizes what the individual soldier can do and what the "buddy"van do to rrfOffiiKf,

prevent and cope with combat streM. iiimh, I„J HmM M. Kyrfrr)

to recognize, prevent, and cope with combat stress.

Victory on the battlefield is the ultimate goal of

the Army. To achieve victory with the lowest cost of

health and lives, soldiers must be well trained for

battle. A significant part ofsuch training must be

learning to cope with stress. It cannot be

overemphasized that leaders, too, must learn to

cope with stress and additionally to manage stress

in their units. Utilization of stress coping and

managing techniques in combat will help to

conserve the fighting strength.

Human Performance in Continuous

Operations

The prospects of continuous combat operations

in future, intensive warfare, introduce significant

changes in Army operations. Unless carefully

managed, performance on successive days of

continuous operations will be degraded. The

degradation becomes more severe as more and

more sleep is lost. For any mission involving

extended operations without sleep, leaders must

know the performance level which can be

realistically expected, what aspects of performance

are most vulnerable to degradation, and how to

manage and control performance degradation.

The March, 1980 Human Dimension Working

Group Conference determined that a three-volume

research study entitled, "Human Performance in

Continuous Operations," was capable of being

translated into a test field manual. The Army

Research Institute and the Human Dimension

Division are engaged in a first-try attempt to

translate the research study directly into test

doctrine.

The test field manual will serve several

needs. Factors governing rates and degrees of

progressive performance degradation are

explained. Differences in expected effectiveness

for various types of combat activity over 120

continuous mission hours are illustrated.

Principles for countering and slowing the erosion of

human resources are outlined. Suggestions are

given for programsto condition units for continuous

operations, and for preserving their fighting

capabilities during continuous combat. Such

information will profit those possessing lead« .-ship

responsibilities for the planning and manaj / wit

of human performance in combat missions.

The Soldier Support Center efforts represent a

modern day approach to modern warfare. The

modern Army must integrate technological

knowledge ofsoldier capability and potential. The

human dimension force multiplier is to enable the

soldier to deal successfully with the Stressors ofthe

NBC battlefield and fight effectively.

4k

Lieutenant Colonel Win. Kdnard Sli/er is a Social Work

Research Stuff Officer uilh the Doctrine and Combat

Developments Directorate, Human Dimension Diiiition, Saldier

Support Center nt Fort Penjamin Harrison. Indiana.

He holds a BatMmr Deijree in Philosophy. a Master Dnjnc in

Public Administration, and Master and Doctoral deyrees in

Social Work: He is a dislinijiiished yradiinte of the U.S.A.

Command and General Stuff Collnje.

LTC Slifer was commissioned in I'JdS and has served in n

succession of Division. Mental Hyyiene Consultation, Research

a nd Staff Assiyn ments.

May/Jun« 1981 181 41
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184
Rules For Sleep Management

• Begin the work phase immediately after eastbound flights to assure that

the soldier will be sufficiently tired to sleep during off-duty phase.

i

• Before starting continuous operations, allow 12 hours for rest and

sleep.

• Provide 12 hours of sleep after 36 to 48 hours of continuous operations,

if a normal or light work load of eight or less hours per day preceded

the period of continuous operations.

• Allow soldiers at least 15 minutes after being awakened before involving

them in assignments.

• When extended sleep is not possible, "cat naps" will be beneficial.

Advisable Work-Rest Schedule Under

Stressful Battlefield Conditions

Hours On Hours Off

8

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16

4

8

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Up to 5 days continuous

Operation

Up to 30 days continuous

operation

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-J
TECHNIQUES FOR COPING WITH STRESS IN SELF

Relaxation The relaxation technqiue should be practiced every day

for about 20 minutes until it is learned. After it is

learned, relaxation can be brought about very quickly.

At first, practice in a quiet place where you will not be

interrupted. As you master the technique, you will no

longer need a quiet place. You will be able to make the

technique work in noisy, crowded environments, arid

even in combat.

Do not expect success right away. The first time you

tried pitching, shooting baskets, typing, firing a weapon,

or close order drill you did not do well either. As you

know, with conscientious practice you improved. It is

important to remember the sequence in the exercise. At

the beginning, team up with another soldier. Let him/

her coach you through the exercise. Very soon, you will

remember each step of the exercise so that you will be

able to do the exercise by yourself. Don't get too concerned about doing the exercise perfectly. The idea is

to relax.

Breathing Exercise

When you are under stress, your body needs a lot of oxygen. Breathing brings air, and the oxygen in it, to your

body. Oxygen helps the brain and the rest of the cells in

your heart, muscles, and body organs. When you are under stress your breathing is rapid and shallow, but when

you are relaxed your breathing is slow and deep. Rapid

and shallow breathing does not take in a lot of air. The

purpose of the breathing exercise is to change the breathing when you are under stress from rapid and shallow to

slow and deep. The breathing exercise, described below,

can be done alone, at any time.

1. Sit comfortably.

2. Close your eyes and think about your

breathing. After initial practice, perform the exercise with your eyes open.

3. Think only about your breath flowing in

and out. Use only your nose to breathe.

188
4. Think these words to yourself several

times while you are breathing: "I am

relaxing,I am breathing smoothly and

evenly. Fresh air is flowing in and out

of my lungs.1 feel calm and refreshed."

5. Keep thinking of your breath as it

flows in and out; think only of breathing evenly.

6. After5 minutes stand up slowly, stretch,

and resume what you were doing.

Relaxation Exercise IL

1, Get intoa comfortable position, which

you will maintain throughout the exercise.

Sit ina chair with your head

and body slumped forward and

arms on your thighs.

or

Lie on your back with legs and

arms slightly apart from your

2.

3.

4.

body.

or

Sit on the floor with your legs

crossed under you and your

arms on your thighs.

Stretch your body all over.

Close your eyes (aftera while try it

with your eyes open) and think about

your favorite, most quiet place. Perhaps you like the beach, or a lake, or

the woods. Hear the waves on the

beach. Feel the warm sand and the

sun. Smell the breeze. Listen to the

birds. Be there!

Feel the peace all around you, and

notice how calm and relaxed you are.

189
5. If your mind wanders, say to yourself: "I am calm. I am safe. I am

relaxed. " Or, concentrate on your

breathing and repeat the word "one"

after each exhalation.

6. Breathe slowly and deeply through

your nose. Let out each breath as

slowly as you can through your nose.

7. Relax all tense muscles from head to

toes. Start with the toes.

Toes. Curl your toes toward the soles

of your feet and tense them for about

five seconds. Take a deep breath, then

let it out slowly and let up on your toes.

Then say "relax" to yourself three times.

Calves. Point your toes up toward your

face and tighten your calves. Hold it for

about five seconds. Take a deep breath,

then let it out slowly, and let the tension

go at the same time. Again, say "relax"

to your^lf three times.

Thighs. With your legs out straight,

point your toes up toward your face and

tense up your thighs. Hold it for about

five seconds. As before, take a deep

breath, release it, and let up on the

tension, and say "relax" to yourself

three times.

Buttocks. Tense your buttocks by pushing them down. Hold for about five seconds, and say "relax" to yourself three

times.

Stomach. Tense it as you would for a

punch. Hold for about five seconds, and

say "relax" to yourself three times.

Chest. Press the palm of one hand

against the other. This will tighten your

chest. Hold for about five seconds, and

say "relax" to yourself three times.

190
shrugging them and bringing your head

down as far as it will go. Hold for

about five seconds, and say "relax" to

yourself three times.

Arms. With your arms out in front

of you. tighten your fists, forearms,

and upper arms. Hold for about five

seconds, and say "relax" to yourself

three times.

Throat. Tense your throat by pressing your chin down against your chest.

Hold for about five seconds, and say

"relax" to yourself three times.

Neck and Head. Press your head back

and down against your shoulders. Hold

for about five seconds, and say "relax"

to yourself three times.

Face. This includes your forehead,

eyes, nose, cheeks, mouth, and chin.

Make a "funny face" by wrinkling your

forehead, closing your eyes tightly, and

gritting your teeth, all at the same time.

Hold for about five seconds, and say

"relax" to yourself three times. Next,

stretch your face: pull eyebrows up,

chin down, ears back. Hold for about

five seconds and say "relax" to yourself

three times.

8. Stay in your relaxed position for a few more

minutes. Feel the relaxation in your body.

Your- body will feel heavier, and you may

feel a tingling all throughout.

9. Stretch, and go on to the next exercise.

Body Parts Exercise

1. Stay in the same position. You will go back

over each body part, but instead of tensing

and relaxing it, you will just relax it. As

you think about each body part, you will say

"relax" three times.

IL'l
2. Relax all muscles from head to toes. Start

with your toes.

Toes. Wiggle your toes and ankles. Let

go of all tension in your feet. Let them

hang limp and heavy. Think about your

feet and say to yourself "relax, relax,

relax. "

Calves. Imagine your calves to be heavy

and limp. Think about your calves and

say to yourself "relax, relax, relax."

Thighs Imagine your thighs to be so

heavy they are sinking into the floor.

Think about your thighs and tell them

to "relax, relax, relax. "

Buttocks. Think about letting all the

tension out of your buttocks. Tell

them to "relax, relax, relax. "

Stomach. Breathe slowly and evenly

while you think about your stomach.

Tell it to "relax, relax, relax. "

Chest. Think about your chest. Breathe

deeply. Tell it to "relax, relax, relax."

Shoulders. Wriggle your shoulders

while you think about them. Tell them

to "relax, relax, relax, "

Arms. Wriggle your fingers and move

your v/rists. Think about the tension

going out of your arms. Tell them to

"relax, relax, relax. "

Throat. Think about your throat feeling "elaxed. Tell it to "relax, relax,

relax."

Neck and Head. As you think about

your neck and head, slowly move your

head from side to side. Tell them to

'relax, relax, relax. "

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Face. Think about your forehead, eyes,

nose, cheeks, mouth, and chin. Let

your lower jaw drop. Tell them to "relax, relax, relax."

3. Is there any tension anywhere in your body?

Think about the tense part of your body and

make it relax. Think about your entire body

and tell it to "relax, relax, relax. "

4. Stay relaxed for five minutes. Either think

of pleasant things (your favorite place), or

let your mind go blank.

5. After the five minutes, say to yourself:

"l am deeply relaxed. I am ready to wake

up refreshed and relaxed, "

6. Arouse yourself slowly! Wiggle the toes,

flex the ankles, wrists, and fingers. Bend

the right arm, then the left; bend the right

knee, then the left.

7. Stretch your arms over your head. Slowly

sit up, stand, and stretch again.

Self-Suggestion The self-suggestion technique combines self-suggestion an<

exercise to reach deep mental and physical relaxation. For

self-suggestion to work, you have to:

apply the procedure as presented

stay in position for some time

keep distractions out

concentrate on bodily processes

The exercises produce feelings of heaviness and warmth, i

slow and regular heart beat, and slow and regular breathin

Each complete set of exercises takes about 10 minutes.

Trking more time will be helpful. Two separate, daily sej

sions, at any time of the day, are recommended until results begin to show. Results cannot be forced; they will

come gradually. After the technique begins to work, a

single daily session should be enough. As one sign that the

technique Is beginning to work, you will notice that your

hands warm up; also, you will feel tensions going clown.

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For each session, find a quiet place where you will not

be disturbed. Either lie or sit comfortably. The exact

words are not important. It is most important to concentrate on the meaning of the words and feeling what is

said. The phrases must be spoken very slowly. Speak

each phrase three times, and allow three seconds between phrases.

1. Relaxation Phrases (3 minutes). Try to see and fc»!

the relaxation in each part of your body as you say me

phrase. Say them slowly to yourself, and repeat each

one three times.

"I feel quiet. "

"l am beginning to feel relaxed. "

"My feet feel heavy and relaxed. "

"My ankles and my knees feel heavy and relaxed."

"My hips feel heavy and relaxed. "

"My stomach and my chest feel heavy and relaxed. '

"My hands and arms feel heavy and relaxed. "

"My shoulders feel heavy and relaxed. "

"My neck, jaw, and forehead feel heavy and relaxed. "

"Everything feels comfortable and smooth. "

"My whole body feels quiet, heavy, relaxed, and

comfortable. "

2. Warmth Phrases (2 minutes). Stay in the same position. Again, concentrate on v/hat you are saying, and

try to feel it. Repeat each phrase three times.

T "l am quiet and relaxed."

T "My feet and legs are heavy and warm. "

T "My arms and hands are heavy and warm. "

T "I feel quite quiet and relaxed. "

T "My whole body is relaxed and warm. "

"My hands are relaxed and warm. "

Warmth is flowing into my hands; they are

warm, warm, warm..."

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3. Imagery Phrases (3 minutes). Stay in the same position. Keep the eyes closed, concentrate, and feel

each phrase as you say it. Repeat each phrase three

times.

v

"My whole body feels quiet, comfortable,

and at ease."

"My mind is quiet. "

"My thoughts are quiet and I am at ease."

"l am shutting out the world, and I am

at ease."

"Deep in my mind I feel myself quiet and

at ease. "

"l am alert, but in an easy, quiet, inward

way. "

"My mind is calm and quiet. "

"l feel all quiet inside. "

4. Activation Phrases (2 minutes). After practice, try

to attain the same effect with your eyes open. End

the session with a stretch. Take three deep breaths.

Repeat each phrase three times.

"l feel life and energy flowing through

my feet and legs. "

"l feel life and energy flowing through

ray hips, stomach, and chest. "

"l feel life and energy flowing through

my hands and arms. "

"l feel life and energy flowing through

ray shoulders, neck, head, and face. "

"The life and energy makes me feel light

and alive. "

Meditation Meditation must be practiced, at least, once daily, at any

time of the day for about 20 minutes. To practice meditation you must:

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take a very comfortable position

stay passive (do not try, but let it

happen)

shut out all distracting thoughts and

cares

shift your attention inward and keep

your mind from wandering outward

(it helps to keep saying "Ommm... "

to yourself, and/or to stare at something fixed)

At first, find a quiet place without distractions. Later

this will not matter. Recommended positions are sitting

cross-legged, kneeling, or lying down.

1. Stay in the comfortable position.

2. Close your eyes, if necessary to avoid

distractions.

3. Deeply relax all your muscles. Begin

at your feet and go up to your face.

Stay relaxed.

4. Breathe through your nose. Breathe

easily and notice your breathing, concentrate on your breathing. Keep taking deep breaths. Keep your thoughts

turned inward.

5. After about 20 minutes, end the mediation. Stay in your position for another.

minute or two. Very slowly arouse

yourself. After awhile, begin to stand

up slowly.

Inoculation There are two phases in the inoculation technique.

Phase 1. Education. This phase is meant to

provide you with a better understanding of

your stress reactions. Recall stressful events

or situations. Then try to remember your exact reactions to them. For example, recall a

time when you felt great fear. Most likely,

your reactions included sweaty palms, dry

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dry mouth, fast heartbeat, fast breathing,

"butterflies" in the stomach, or tense

muscles.

Phase 2. Rehearsal. Work out positive,

self coping methods. Tailor the methods

when you face stress. For example, if

you have poor night vision and have a fear

of not being able to find your way in the

dark, you would mentally rehearse ways

in which you would go about finding your

way in the dark. These might include

memorizing various paths iq daylight, or

noticing familiar objects that you could

feel in the dark and which would serve as

cues in determining a particular path.

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