U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

Review of the Department’s 

Preparation to Respond to 

a WMD Incident 

May 2010 

I-2010-004
 
 

 

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EXECUTIVE DIGEST 

The use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), whether by a hostile 

nation, a terrorist group, or an individual, poses a potentially serious threat 

to the United States. One of the greatest concerns is that a WMD may fall 

into the hands of terrorists or that terrorists will develop their own WMD. 

WMDs include any device that is intended to cause death or serious bodily 

injury to a significant number of people through the release of toxic 

chemicals, disease organisms, or radioactive material.1 

The federal government has taken various steps to prepare to meet 

that threat. Among those steps has been the issuance of national policies, 

such as the National Response Framework, issued in January 2008 by the 

Department of Homeland Security and approved by the President. The 

National Response Framework established a comprehensive approach for a 

unified national response to natural and man-made disasters, including 

WMD incidents. The National Response Framework directs the Attorney 

General to appoint a Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official to coordinate 

and direct federal law enforcement support activities related to a critical 

incident. Further, the National Response Framework includes annexes 

called Emergency Support Functions (ESF) that assign specific 

responsibilities to federal agencies in the event of a disaster. Under the 

National Response Framework, the Department of Justice (Department or 

DOJ) is assigned by ESF-13 the responsibility for coordinating federal law 

enforcement activities in response to a critical incident, such as a WMD 

attack, and for ensuring public safety and security in the event an incident 

overwhelms state and local law enforcement. 

This review evaluated the readiness of the Department and its 

components to respond to a potential WMD incident. In addition, we 

examined the readiness of Department components’ field offices in the 

National Capital Region (NCR) to respond in a coordinated way to a WMD 

2 incident. 

1 Annex 5 to National Security Presidential Directive-17/Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive-4, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, February 26, 2008. 

2 The National Capital Region is composed of the District of Columbia and nearby 

jurisdictions in Virginia and Maryland. 
 

 

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RESULTS IN BRIEF 

Our review found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has 

taken appropriate steps to prepare to respond to a potential WMD attack. 

The FBI has implemented a headquarters-led program that has established 

WMD response plans, provides WMD training to its staff and regularly 

conducts and participates in WMD exercises. 

However, we concluded that the Department of Justice as a whole and 

components within the Department have not implemented adequate WMD 

response plans. As a result, the Department is not fully prepared to provide 

a coordinated response to a WMD incident. For example, the Department 

does not assign one entity or individual with the responsibility for the 

central oversight or management of WMD incident response. The 

Department has not updated its policies to reflect recent national policies, 

and the Department’s operational response policies and plans have not been 

fully implemented. Moreover, no components other than the FBI have 

specific WMD operational response plans or provide training on responding 

to a WMD incident. 

We also determined that the Department is not prepared to fulfill its 

role, assigned to it under the National Response Framework’s ESF-13, to 

ensure public safety and security in the event a WMD incident overwhelms 

state and local law enforcement. The Department designated the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) as the lead agency to 

implement this requirement, but we found that the Department and ATF 

have not fulfilled the Department’s role for coordinating the federal law 

enforcement response activities to an ESF-13 activation.3 For example, the 

Department and ATF have not made personnel assignments to manage 

these activities, and ATF has not developed a catalog of law enforcement 

resources – people and equipment – available to be deployed in the event of 

a WMD incident. 

In the National Capital Region (NCR), we found that law enforcement 

agencies coordinate regularly because of the preparations and cooperation 

required for the frequent special events held there. However, improvements 

3 ESF-13 activities include: (1) providing basic law enforcement assistance such as 

conducting routine patrols and making arrests; (2) issuing identification badges to 

emergency responders and other personnel needing access to a controlled area and 

verifying emergency responder credentials; (3) providing security forces to control access to 

the incident site and critical facilities; (4) providing officers for traffic and crowd control; 

and (5) providing for protection of emergency responders and other workers operating in a 

high threat environment. 
 

 

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are needed to ensure Department components’ field offices are prepared to 

quickly and safely respond to a WMD incident. For example, the FBI’s 

Washington Field Office is the only Department component field office in the 

NCR with a written plan and checklist to respond specifically to a WMD 

incident in the NCR. Moreover, most component field offices in the NCR 

have conducted little or no planning specifically for responding to a WMD 

incident and have no defined role in the FBI’s WMD response plans. We 

also determined that some component officials in the NCR field offices are 

not aware of ESF-13 or that the Department designated ATF as the lead 

agency in carrying out the Department’s responsibility to ensure public 

safety and security if ESF-13 is activated in the aftermath of a WMD 

incident. 

In the sections below, we discuss in more detail the status of the 

Department’s and its components’ preparations for responding to a WMD 

incident, as well as the preparations of Department component field offices 

in the NCR. 

The FBI has taken appropriate steps to prepare to respond to a WMD 

incident. 

We concluded that the FBI has taken appropriate steps to prepare to 

respond to a WMD attack. Part of the FBI’s primary mission is to prevent 

WMD incidents and investigate WMD threats. The FBI also has a WMD 

response program managed by the FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Directorate (WMD Directorate). The WMD Directorate’s mission includes 

managing WMD investigations, assessing and responding to incidents 

involving the use or threatened use of WMD, and conducting exercises to 

test the FBI’s ability to respond to a WMD incident. 

The FBI has developed various plans, handbooks, and other resources 

to guide its staff in responding to a WMD incident. Further, the FBI 

regularly provides its staff with training specific to WMD incidents. The FBI 

provides WMD training for all new Special Agents during their initial FBI 

Academy training, and FBI WMD Coordinators and Intelligence Analysts are 

trained in specific WMD areas of emphasis. The FBI also provides training 

to a designated cadre of its Special Agents in Charge to serve as Senior 

Federal Law Enforcement Officials.4 

4 The National Response Framework authorizes the Attorney General to appoint a 

Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official, in appropriate circumstances such as a WMD 

incident, to provide operational coordination and direct the federal law enforcement support 

operations related to the incident. 
 

 

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The FBI also regularly conducts and participates in WMD response 

exercises. The FBI’s data showed that from fiscal year (FY) 2005 to 

FY 2009, its field offices participated in at least 936 WMD exercises.5 

However, we found that the preparation of after action reports to document 

deficiencies identified during WMD response exercises is inconsistent, which 

hinders the FBI’s ability to identify and address those deficiencies. 

The Department is not fully prepared to provide a coordinated 

response to a WMD incident. 

In contrast to the FBI, we found that the Department as a whole does 

not have policies or plans for responding to a WMD incident. Further, other 

than the FBI, Department components’ preparations for responding to a 

WMD incident were not well coordinated. Department personnel (other than 

FBI staff) receive little training in the unique requirements associated with 

responding to a WMD incident. We also found that the Department does 

not have central oversight or management of WMD incident response policy 

development and planning for responding to a WMD incident. The 

management of the Department’s response program is uncoordinated and 

fragmented, with some response functions being handled by a Special 

Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General and others by senior staff at the 

National Security Division (NSD), the Executive Office for United States 

Attorneys (EOUSA), and the FBI. 

The Department has previously identified the need for coordinated 

emergency management at the Department level. In January 2006, the 

Assistant Attorney General for Administration circulated a proposed DOJ 

Order that assigns responsibilities for emergency response to a Crisis 

Management Committee. However, the proposed Order has not been made 

6 final. 

During our review, the Department began to take additional action in 

this area. In August 2009, the Deputy Attorney General directed the NSD, 

Office of Legal Policy, EOUSA, and the Justice Management Division to each 

designate a senior-level position to coordinate interagency response and 

emergency management activities. However, we believe this latest approach 

risks perpetuating a fragmented program because these individuals report 

to their component senior management. We believe the Department needs 

5 The data provided by the FBI included 45 of its 56 field offices. 

6 As of May 2010, the Department components had commented on the proposed 

Order and the Order was awaiting review by the Justice Management Division’s Office of 

General Counsel. 
 

 

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to assign a senior official to be responsible for coordinating across all 

Department components the preparations and training to respond to a 

WMD incident. 

We also found that the existing Department-level response policies 

and plans are not in compliance with national policy and are outdated. The 

Department’s policies and plans do not incorporate principles and 

requirements of the National Response Framework or the National Incident 

Management System, which establishes a standardized approach for 

planning for and responding to all domestic incidents, including WMD 

incidents. The Department’s Critical Incident Response Plan, which has not 

been updated since it was approved by the Attorney General in May 1996, 

does not address WMD incidents. 

Additionally, the Department’s policies and plans have not been fully 

implemented. For example, while current Department policies establish a 

Crisis Management Committee to determine the Department’s on-scene 

response to an incident and an Attorney Critical Incident Response Group 

to coordinate legal support during an incident, neither of these entities 

exists. 

Finally, we found that no Department law enforcement component, 

other than the FBI, has specific WMD operational response plans. ATF, the 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the United States Marshals 

Service (USMS) each have groups that manage all-hazards responses, but 

these groups do not include specific preparations for WMD incidents. 

Further, although senior officials from all components told us they would 

support an FBI response, ATF, the DEA, and the USMS do not maintain 

operational response plans to respond to WMD incidents.7 Also, except for 

the FBI, the components have provided little to no training for responding to 

a WMD incident and have rarely participated in WMD exercises. The other 

components do not regularly participate in National Level Exercises 

involving a WMD incident response or in WMD exercises at the regional, 

state, and local levels. 

The Department is not prepared to fulfill its role, assigned to it under 

the National Response Framework’s ESF-13, to ensure public safety 

and security in the event of a WMD incident. 

The National Response Framework established the Department as the 

lead agency under ESF-13 to coordinate the use of federal law enforcement 

7 EOUSA (and the United States Attorneys’ Offices) and the NSD have developed 

plans or guides for a legal response to a WMD incident. 
 

 

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resources to maintain public safety and security if local and state resources 

are overwhelmed during an incident. However, our review indicates that in 

the event of a WMD incident, the Department is not prepared to coordinate 

federal law enforcement activities to ensure public safety and security in 

accordance with ESF-13.8 

In January 2008, the Department’s lead component for ESF-13, ATF, 

proposed a Concept of Operations Plan to provide a structure for the 

Department to implement its ESF-13 responsibilities. As of March 2010, 

that Concept of Operations Plan was still in draft, and several actions 

essential to the Department’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities for 

coordinating the federal law enforcement activities in an ESF-13 activation 

remained incomplete. The incomplete elements include staffing national 

and regional coordinator positions; training staff in ESF-13 operations; 

cataloging law enforcement resources available in the event of an ESF-13 

activation; participating in National Level Exercises to test preparedness; 

and deputation of law enforcement personnel. 

We found the Department and ATF have not made all the necessary 

personnel assignments to manage ESF-13 activities. At ATF headquarters, 

the ESF-13 National Coordinator has been assigned, but a Deputy National 

ESF-13 Coordinator has not been designated, and as of April 2010, ATF has 

not filled 6 of the 13 other positions it has dedicated to ESF-13. 

In addition, ATF has provided minimal training in implementation of 

ESF-13 responsibilities to ATF field office personnel, support agency 

personnel, and state and local emergency operations officials. According to 

ESF-13 staff, ATF has trained only its personnel in field offices that are in 

states prone to hurricane activity for an ESF-13 activation resulting from a 

hurricane. 

ATF has also not developed a catalog of law enforcement resources 

available to be deployed from all ESF-13 agencies or Department 

components in an ESF-13 activation because other agencies have not 

responded fully to ATF’s requests for information. Further, ATF has not 

tested its preparedness to carry out its ESF-13 responsibilities in National 

Level Exercises or any other functional exercise involving a WMD incident. 

Finally, ATF is still in the process of determining how ESF-13 law 

enforcement personnel will be deputized as Deputy U.S. Marshals if ESF-13 

is activated. 

8 The National Response Framework outlines 10 specific responsibilities for the 

Department to coordinate. See Appendix III for the Department’s ESF-13 responsibilities. 
 

 

In the National Capital Region, with the exception of preparing for 

special events, WMD incident response planning depends primarily on 

FBI resources and capabilities. 

In the NCR, Department components regularly work with each other, 

with other federal agencies, and with state and local law enforcement to 

prepare to respond to critical incidents that may occur during the frequent 

special events that occur in the NCR, such as presidential inaugurations 

and visits by heads of state. As a result of the frequent cooperation and 

coordination for special events, NCR field office staff told us they are aware 

of other agencies’ roles and the resources that are available from them if a 

WMD incident should occur during a special event. 

However, outside of special events, among Department components in 

the NCR only the FBI has conducted WMD-specific planning or training. 

The FBI’s Washington Field Office is the only Department component in the 

NCR with plans specifically for responding to a WMD incident, and it is the 

only NCR field office that provides WMD training to its response personnel 

and regularly participates in WMD exercises. The FBI’s plan identifies how 

the FBI will work with federal agencies outside the Department, state and 

local law enforcement, and emergency response agencies, but it does not 

include any stated role for the NCR field offices of the Department’s other 

components. 

When we asked if they were familiar with the FBI’s WMD response 

plan, officials from ATF, the DEA, and the USMS said they were not familiar 

with the plan and had not asked to see it. Additionally, FBI exercise data, 

from FY 2005 through FY 2009, shows that the FBI Washington Field Office 

participated in 29 WMD exercises with state and local law enforcement, as 

well as other federal agencies. However, the other Department of Justice 

components did not participate in these or other WMD response exercises. 

We also found that some component officials in NCR field offices were 

not aware of ESF-13 or ATF’s role as the Department’s lead coordinator if 

ESF-13 is activated. We asked 12 NCR field office managers about ESF-13 

requirements and assignments, but only 6 knew about ESF-13 and only 3 

were aware of ATF’s designation as the Department’s lead coordinator. This 

lack of familiarity could delay a coordinated federal law enforcement 

response in the event a WMD incident or other disaster results in the 

activation of ESF-13. 

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Conclusion 

Our review concluded that only the FBI has taken adequate steps to 

prepare to respond to a potential WMD attack. The FBI has headquarters 

and field office operations plans, handbooks, and other resources for 

responding to WMD incidents. The FBI regularly provides WMD-specific 

training to its personnel who are likely to respond to a WMD incident. The 

FBI regularly conducts or participates in WMD response exercises, having 

taken part in over 900 exercises from FY 2005 through FY 2009. The FBI 

field offices track their participation in exercises, although after action 

reports based on the exercises are not consistently prepared. 

However, neither the Department nor the components within the 

Department have implemented adequate WMD response plans. The 

Department has not designated an entity or individual to provide central 

oversight of WMD-related activities, and responsibility for management of 

the Department’s response program is uncoordinated and fragmented. The 

Department has not updated its policies to reflect recent national policies, 

existing policies have not been fully implemented, and we found no 

Department policies or plans for responding to a WMD incident. 

Aside from the FBI, the Department’s other law enforcement 

components’ preparations for responding to a WMD incident are also 

lacking. Officials in ATF, the DEA, and the USMS indicated that they would 

support the FBI’s response to a WMD incident. However, none of these 

components has specific WMD operational response plans, provides training 

for responding to a WMD incident, or regularly participates in WMD 

response exercises. 

In addition, the Department has not adequately prepared to 

coordinate federal law enforcement activities if it is called upon to ensure 

public safety and security in accordance with ESF-13 in the event of a WMD 

incident. ATF has not assigned adequate staff to ensure all ESF-13 

planning and coordination activities required by the National Response 

Framework are carried out. ATF has not provided adequate training in ESF13 responsibilities to its own staff or personnel from other ESF-13 agencies. 

Additionally, ATF lacks comprehensive information on law enforcement 

resources that could be deployed during a WMD incident. 

In the National Capital Region, coordination is aided by regular 

preparations and cooperation required for frequent special events in the 

region. However, other than the FBI, component field offices in the NCR 

have no WMD-specific response plans or training and have not participated 

in WMD-specific exercises. Moreover, we found a lack of awareness 
 

 

regarding the Department’s ESF-13 responsibilities and ATF’s authority to 

serve as the lead coordinator for those activities, which could delay 

coordinating federal law enforcement support to state and local law 

enforcement in the event of a WMD incident in the NCR. 

In this report, we make five recommendations to help the Department 

better prepare to respond to a WMD incident and to fulfill its responsibilities 

under ESF-13. We recommend that the Department: 

1. Designate a person or office at the Department level with the 

authority to manage the Department’s WMD operational response 

program. 

2. Update the Department’s response policies and plan to conform 

them to the National Response Framework and the National 

Incident Management System. 

3. Require Department components to update their own policies and 

plans to reflect the updated Department guidance, and to reflect 

the need for adequate coordination among Department 

components in responding to WMD incident. 

4. Establish effective oversight to ensure that components maintain 

WMD response plans, participate in training and exercises, and 

implement a corrective action program in response to such 

exercises. 

5. Ensure that the Department is prepared to fulfill its emergency 

support function responsibilities under the National Response 

Framework, including reviewing the designation of ATF as the 

Department’s lead agency to coordinate public safety and security 

activities, approving a Concept of Operations Plan, and staffing 

national and regional coordinator positions. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1
 

BACKGROUND ................................................................................ 4
 

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW ... 14
 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW ............................................................ 16
 

The FBI has taken appropriate steps to prepare to respond to 

a WMD incident ........................................................................ 16
 

The Department is not fully prepared to provide a coordinated 

response to a WMD incident ...................................................... 23
 

The Department is not prepared to fulfill its role, assigned to it 

under the National Response Framework’s ESF-13, to ensure 

public safety and security in the event of a WMD incident ......... 31
 

In the National Capital Region, with the exception for preparing 

for special events, WMD incident response planning depends 

primarily on FBI resources and capabilities ............................... 36
 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................... 41
 

APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW .................. 43
 

APPENDIX II: EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND ESF 

COORDINATORS .................................................... 47
 

APPENDIX III: DEPARTMENT’S ESF-13 RESPONSIBILITIES .......... 50
 

APPENDIX IV: THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY 

GENERAL RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT ............. 51
 

APPENDIX V: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY 

APPENDIX VI: THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 

APPENDIX VII: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
 

ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONSE .......................... 53
 

RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT ............................. 58
 

ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE ................................ 60
 

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INTRODUCTION 

In December 2008, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism issued a report 

on the United States’ ability to protect 

itself from a WMD attack. The 

Commission concluded that, without 

concerted action to prevent it, a WMD 

attack is likely to occur somewhere in the 

world by 2013.9 

The general definition of a WMD is 

“any weapon or device that is intended or 

has the capability to cause death or 

serious bodily injury to a significant 

number of people through the release, 

dissemination, or impact of toxic or 

poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a 

disease organism; or radiation or 

radioactivity.”10 Chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear materials can be 

used to produce thousands of casualties in 

a single attack. In addition to mass 

casualties, a WMD could also disrupt vital 

infrastructure and disable 

communications, financial, and 

transportation systems. The text boxes to 

the right and on the next page present 

hypothetical examples of biological, 

chemical, radiological, and nuclear WMD 

incidents. 

Planning for a response to a WMD 

incident is important because the actions 

taken to ensure public safety and security 

in response to a WMD incident differ from 

Biological Attack Scenario 

Two individuals release 100 liters 

of aerosolized anthrax into the air 

of a major metropolitan city. More 

than 330,000 people are exposed 

to the anthrax spores. Casualties 

and injuries resulting from the 

inhaled anthrax and subsequent 

infection reach upwards of 13,000 

people. The economic costs 

associated with the closure and 

decontamination of affected areas 

may run in the billions of dollars, 

and the city will likely face a 

recovery effort that will take 

months. 

Chemical Attack Scenario 

Members of a terrorist organization 

acquire the nerve agent sarin and 

release it into the ventilation 

system of a large office building in 

a metropolitan area. The agent 

quickly kills 95 percent of the 

building’s 6,000 occupants. Even 

more injuries and deaths occur as 

first responders arrive on the scene 

unaware of the current conditions. 

As the nerve agent escapes the 

building, almost 50,000 people 

located in adjacent buildings are 

forced to shelter in place. Recovery 

time will likely be 3 to 4 months, 

with the economic impact reaching 

upwards of $300 million. 

Source: DHS’s Progress in Federal 

Incident Management Planning, 

DHS OIG-10-58, February 2010. 

9 Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, World at 

Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 

Terrorism, December 2, 2008. 

10 Annex 5 to National Security Presidential Directive-17/Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive-4, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, February 26, 2008. 
 

 

 

responding to an incident involving only conventional explosives. When 

conventional explosives are involved, injuries and damage are caused by 

physical force, either from the force of the blast itself or by shrapnel. 

Immediately after the explosion, the 

response is focused on, for example, 

caring for the injured, stabilizing 

damaged buildings, cleaning up debris, 

and conducting an investigation to 

identify the perpetrator. 

In contrast to conventional 

explosives, WMD incidents involve agents 

that are more persistent. For example, a 

so-called “dirty bomb” can release 

radioactive material that contaminates 

the immediate area of the blast and can 

taint a larger region over time. Moreover, 

the radiological material is invisible and 

remains in the ground unless it is 

removed, presenting a danger to 

individuals entering the area for many 

years. Toxic chemicals such as nerve 

agents not only contaminate the area 

where they are released, but may float 

downwind to settle and cause casualties 

elsewhere. Biological agents may remain 

a viable threat for long periods of time, 

and biological WMD incidents may not 

even be recognized until victims’ 

symptoms appear and mass casualties 

are evident. 

When a WMD incident occurs, first 

responders must follow local protocols for 

notifying emergency services and 

emergency support personnel. Only personnel trained in responding to a 

WMD incident should be deployed to a potentially contaminated area. 

Responders must initiate a risk assessment and recognize the 

characteristics of chemical and biological agents, radiological materials, 

and dissemination devices. In addition, first responders use specialized 

detection devices and equipment, such as kits for detecting chemical 

agents and meters to measure radiation. 

Radiological Attack Scenario 

Members of a terrorist organization 

have manufactured and detonated a 

radiological dispersal device or a “dirty 

bomb” in three regionally close, 

moderate to large cities. Each 

explosion causes significant damage to 

many of the buildings and structures 

in the immediate area of the blast. At 

each site, there are approximately 180 

deaths and upwards of 20,000 

detectable contaminations. Recovery 

efforts could take several months to 

years. Total economic loss could be in 

the billions of dollars. 

Nuclear Attack Scenario 

Members of a terrorist organization 

have detonated a 10-kiloton 

improvised nuclear device in a heavily 

populated metropolitan area. The 

initial detonation causes total 

infrastructure damage in a 3-mile 

radius and various levels of radiation 

spanning out 3,000 square miles. As 

casualties climb in excess of several 

hundred thousand, hundreds of 

thousands of survivors either shelter in 

place or are forced onto the city’s 

transportation system to seek shelter 

in safe areas or evacuate the city. The 

city is now facing hundreds of billions 

of dollars in damage and a recovery 

effort that will take years. 

Adapted from: DHS’s Progress in 

Federal Incident Management Planning, 

DHS OIG-10-58, February 2010. 

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In a WMD incident, protection of the lives of the victims as well as 

the responders is a primary concern. Response teams must have the 

appropriate equipment to allow them to safely enter a WMD site and 

avoid the hazard of the WMD agents. For unknown or highly toxic areas, 

responders must use a fully encapsulated, vapor protection suit that 

provides the greatest level of skin and respiratory protection available. 

As the hazard is remediated less protective measures may be allowed. 

In addition, according to the Target Capabilities List in the National 

Response Framework, first responders should isolate the hazards by 

establishing control zones.11 There are three types of control zones: 

• Hot Zone– The area immediately surrounding a hazardous 

materials incident, which extends far enough to prevent the 

hazardous materials released from causing harm to personnel 

outside the zone. This zone is also referred to as the exclusion 

or restricted zone. Personnel entering this area must wear the 

highest level of protective equipment based on the substance 

involved. 

• Warm Zone– The area where personnel, equipment 

decontamination, and hot zone support takes place. It is 

referred to as the decontamination, contamination reduction, or 

limited access corridor. It includes control points for access to 

the corridor, which assists in reducing the spread of 

contamination. Personnel working in this area must also wear 

appropriate protective gear, as they will be dealing with 

contaminated people and equipment. 

• Cold Zone – Contains the command post and other support 

functions deemed necessary to control the incident. Personnel 

working in this area do not have to wear protective gear, but 

should have it available if needed. 

According to the Target Capabilities List, after these areas are 

established, responders must continue to assess the ongoing threat for 

WMD and begin rescue operations. Responders must develop a 

decontamination plan for people, pets, and livestock, as well as the area 

itself. Decontamination procedures vary depending on the specific hazard 

because one procedure or method will not work for all hazards. The 

contaminated area must remain secure until decontamination is complete. 

11 The Target Capabilities List defines 37 specific capabilities that all levels of 

government should possess in order to respond effectively to disasters, including a 

WMD incident. 
 

 

BACKGROUND 

The federal government has taken various steps to prepare to meet 

the threat of weapons of mass destruction. One of those steps was the 

completion of the National Response Framework, which establishes a 

comprehensive approach for a unified national response to natural and 

man-made disasters, including WMD incidents. National policies and 

presidential directives are intended to promote an organized and 

coordinated response to a WMD attack. 

In this section, we discuss the Department of Justice’s 

(Department or DOJ) policies, guidance, and plans relating to emergency 

or critical incident response that pertain to all such incidents. As 

discussed below, the Department does not currently have any policies, 

guidance, or plans that are specific to the WMD threat. 

We also describe the presidential directives and national policies 

that control emergency response planning, including requirements for 

coordination among federal departments. 

Department Policy and Guidance Governing Emergency Response 

Planning 

The Department’s policies and assignment of responsibilities for 

responding to critical incidents are primarily contained in one 

Department order, four memoranda from the Attorney General or Deputy 

Attorney General, and a memorandum of understanding between the 

Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) and the National 

Security Division (NSD). The following provides a brief description of 

these materials. The duties these documents assign to each component 

are described in the next section. 

DOJ Order 1900.6A, Department of Justice Crisis Management 

Plan, December 13, 1988. This Order contained Department policy for 

crisis management, including terrorist incidents, and assigns 

responsibilities for a Crisis Management Plan’s management and 

implementation. It created a Crisis Management Committee to guide the 

Department’s readiness planning and to determine the operational 

responsibility for the on-scene federal or Department response to a 

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critical incident.12 It also directed the Justice Management Division’s 

(JMD) Security and Emergency Planning Staff (SEPS), under the 

direction of the Crisis Management Committee, to “conduct periodic 

exercises of emergency operating plans to ensure that the DOJ maintains 

a high level of readiness.” 

Memorandum from the Attorney General, Attorney Critical Incident 

Response Group, January 11, 1996. This memorandum established an 

Attorney Critical Incident Response Group to improve the Department’s 

legal response to critical incidents and established requirements for 

Department attorneys and U.S. Attorney staff in headquarters and 

districts in responding to a critical incident. 

Memorandum from the Attorney General, Critical Incident 

Response Plan, May 23, 1996. This memorandum provided that the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Strategic Information Operations 

Center, the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group, and Department 

headquarters may become involved in critical incident responses, 

depending on the magnitude of the event and the response required.13 

In addition, the memorandum clarified that the prosecutorial and legal 

response to a critical incident would be handled by the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office (USAO) in the district where an incident occurred and that the 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the U.S. Marshals Service 

(USMS) would consult and coordinate with the FBI during a crisis. 

Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, Emergency 

Support Function-13 (ESF-13), Public Safety and Security, October 16, 

2008. In this memorandum, the Deputy Attorney General stated that in 

line with a recommendation by the Homeland Security Council following 

Hurricane Katrina, the Department was assigned the lead role in 

coordinating federal law enforcement support to state and local and 

federal government agencies during critical incidents. This 

responsibility, designated as Emergency Support Function-13 (ESF-13) 

in the National Response Framework, requires the Department to ensure 

public safety and security in the event of a natural or man-made 

12 At a minimum, the Crisis Management Committee includes the Attorney 

General or his or her designee; the Deputy Attorney General; the Associate Attorney 

General; the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel; the Director, Office of 

Public Affairs; and the Director of the FBI. 

13 The Strategic Information Operations Center is the FBI’s national command 

center and operates on a 24-hour basis. The Critical Incident Response Group 

facilitates the FBI’s rapid response to critical incidents. 
 

 

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disaster.14 (The requirements of ESF-13 are described below in the 

section on national policy.) The Attorney General accepted the 

assignment for the Department in 2006 and assigned the lead role to the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). The 2008 

memorandum formalized ATF’s assignment as the Department’s 

coordinator for ESF-13 activities to “coordinate the Federal law 

enforcement response to assist other Federal, State, local, tribal, and 

territorial law enforcement department and agencies that have been 

overwhelmed or incapacitated by an act of terrorism or natural or manmade disaster.” 

Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, Interagency 

Coordination Positions for Response and Emergency Management, 

August 31, 2009. In this memorandum, the Deputy Attorney General 

directed EOUSA, JMD, NSD, and the Office of Legal Policy each to 

identify a senior-level individual to assume responsibilities for 

coordinating the component’s participation in interagency policy 

development and planning for man-made and natural disasters, as well 

as for national and regional exercises. According to a senior Department 

official from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, four individuals in 

these components had assumed these responsibilities as of January 12, 

2010. 

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Executive Office for 

United States Attorneys and National Security Division, April 16, 2008. 

This memorandum of understanding transferred the overall 

administrative, logistical, and program management functions of the 

Crisis Management Coordinator program from the NSD to EOUSA and 

further delineated the respective duties and responsibilities of EOUSA 

and the NSD in crisis responses.15 The NSD retained responsibility for 

anti-terrorism responses, including providing guidance and training to 

the USAOs on legal issues that are likely to arise in a terrorist incident, 

participating in interagency meetings with the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and other agencies to plan the Department’s role in 

14 “Public safety and security” is defined as the ability to protect critical 

infrastructure, control access to and from an incident site, manage traffic and crowd 

control, and provide general law enforcement support during an incident. 

15 The Crisis Management Coordinator program was designed to improve the 

planning and preparation of the USAOs to respond quickly to critical incidents. Each 

Crisis Management Coordinator is responsible for ensuring the USAOs’ coordination 

with law enforcement and emergency response agencies, ensuring the identification and 

organization of resources for providing legal advice during a critical incident, and 

improving the USAOs’ anticipation of crisis situations.
 

 

response to a terrorist event, and participating in exercises that involve 

responding to an act of terrorism. EOUSA assumed oversight 

responsibility for the administrative, logistical, and program management 

aspects of the Crisis Management Coordinator program, including 

preparation, planning, and response coordination for natural disasters 

and other non-terrorism crisis events. 

Department Components Involved in Emergency Response 

Various Department components and offices have emergency 

response roles under the DOJ Orders and Attorney General memoranda 

described above. Table 1 lists these offices and components, the main 

responsibilities they have been assigned, and the order or memorandum 

in which the responsibility was assigned. 

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Table 1: Assigned Responsibilities in 

an Emergency Situation 

Office Responsibilities 

Department Offices 

ODAG Member of the Attorney General’s Crisis Management Committee. DOJ 

Order 1900.6A. 

JMD Under the direction of the Crisis Management Committee, SEPS is to 

conduct periodic exercises of emergency operating plans to ensure the 

Department maintains a high level of readiness. DOJ Order 1900.6A. 

JMD’s Justice Command Center, in coordination with Department 

components, maintains crisis management plans. DOJ Order 1900.6A. 

Maintains a coordinator for component participation in interagency 

policy development for man-made and natural disasters, and national 

and regional exercises. August 2009 Deputy Attorney General 

Memorandum. 

EOUSA Maintains a coordinator for component participation in interagency 

policy development for man-made and natural disasters, and national 

and regional exercises. August 2009 Deputy Attorney General 

Memorandum. 

NSD Provides guidance and training to the USAOs on legal issues that likely 

to arise in a terrorist event. Provides legal advice on criminal matters 

during an emergency. April 2008 Memorandum of Understanding 

between EOUSA and the NSD. 

Participates in interagency meetings with the DHS and other agencies to 

plan the Department’s role in response to a terrorist event and 

participates in exercises that involve responding to an act of terrorism. 

April 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between EOUSA and the 

NSD. 

Maintains a coordinator for component participation in interagency 

policy development for man-made and natural disasters, and national 

and regional exercises. August 2009 Deputy Attorney General 

Memorandum. 

Office of 

Legal 

Counsel 

Member of the Attorney General’s Crisis Management Committee. DOJ 

Order 1900.6A. 

Office of 

Legal Policy 

Maintains a coordinator for component participation in interagency 

policy development for man-made and natural disasters, and national 

and regional exercises. August 2009 Deputy Attorney General 

Memorandum. 

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Components 

ATF Coordinates ESF-13 activities if ESF-13 is activated during a WMD 

incident. October 2008 Deputy Attorney General Memorandum. 

DEA Consults and coordinates with the FBI during a crisis. May 1996 

Attorney General Memorandum. 

FBI The FBI field office where the incident occurs responds to domestic 

security and terrorism threats and notifies FBI headquarters and the 

NSD when a crisis begins.* The FBI Director notifies the Deputy 

Attorney General or the Attorney General. If the response requires more 

resources than a field office can provide, FBI headquarters will activate a 

regional response or greater. May 1996 Attorney General Memorandum. 

Member of the Attorney General’s Crisis Management Committee. DOJ 

Order 1900.6A. 

USAOs Provides legal guidance and oversight in all situations involving a federal 

law enforcement response. May 1996 Attorney General Memorandum. 

USMS Consults and coordinates with the FBI during a crisis. May 1996 

Attorney General Memorandum. 

* The Criminal Division’s Counterterrorism Section (CTS) had an emergency response role prior 

to September 2006. However, on September 28, 2006, the Department announced that CTS 

would become part of the NSD established under the USA Patriot Improvement and 

Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-177 (2006)). 

National Policies Related to Emergency Response Planning 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of 

Domestic Incidents, February 2003. Issued by the President, Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 provides that the DHS has the 

lead role in managing the response to incidents in the United States, 

including terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The 

Directive specifies, however, that the Attorney General, in coordination 

with the DHS and working through the FBI, will coordinate law 

enforcement’s activities for preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks. 

The Directive required that, by the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 2005, 

federal departments and agencies formally implement a standardized 

methodology for responding to all domestic incidents, from natural 

disasters to acts of terrorism.16 It also mandates that federal agencies 

revise their emergency operations plans to adhere to a national policy for 

emergency response and preparedness. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, National Preparedness, 

December 2003. HSPD-8 requires all federal agencies, under the 

leadership of the DHS, to support in the preparation for and response to 

16 This methodology was formally included in the National Incident 

Management System, discussed below. 
 

 

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a domestic emergency. The Directive also requires a national-level 

exercise program to annually test federal agencies’ emergency response 

preparedness. The exercises include critical incident scenarios, such as 

responding to natural disasters and preventing and responding to WMD 

and terrorist incidents. 

In December 2007, the President approved Annex 1 to Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-8, which formally established a standard 

comprehensive approach to national planning for critical incident 

response. The annex requires agencies to develop all-hazards plans, as 

well as plans to respond to eight scenarios representing the gravest 

dangers faced by the United States (described in the National Response 

Framework below), and to participate in interagency planning and 

coordination for domestic incidents. 

Executive Order 13527, Establishing Federal Capability for the 

Timely Provision of Medical Countermeasures Following a Biological 

Attack, December 30, 2009. To further address the biological scenario in 

Annex 1 to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, the President 

approved this Order requiring that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, 

Health and Human Services, and Defense, and the Attorney General, in 

coordination with the U.S. Postal Service, within 180 days of the date of 

the Order, to develop a plan for supplementing local law enforcement 

personnel, as necessary, with federal law enforcement to provide security 

for assisting postal workers delivering medical countermeasures in the 

event of a biological attack, with anthrax as the primary consideration.17 

National Incident Management System, March 2004 . The National 

Incident Management System is a standardized methodology for 

responding to critical incidents, including a WMD incident, which is 

designed to be used at all levels of government. The President directed 

the DHS, in HSPD-5, to issue a document establishing the methodology 

and directed all level of government to adopt it. The National Incident 

Management System methodology includes: (1) command and 

management, including templates for the standard incident command 

structures; (2) preparedness, including templates for planning, training, 

and exercises; (3) resource management; and (4) communications and 

17 The Office of the Deputy Attorney General, ATF, EOUSA, and the NSD are 

participating in the development of a federal law enforcement plan for assisting the 

U.S. Postal Service in providing security for the distribution of medical 

countermeasures in the event of a biological attack. 
 

 

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information management.18 Agencies are required to train their 

operational response personnel on the National Incident Management 

System methodology. 

National Response Framework, January 2008. Issued by the DHS 

and approved by the President, the National Response Framework 

implements the requirements in HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 for a consistent 

approach to emergency response and preparedness for domestic 

incidents.19 It describes how communities, tribes, states, the federal 

government, the private sector, and nongovernmental partners should 

work together to respond to incidents; describes specific authorities and 

best practices for managing incidents; and reinforces a consistent 

methodology for managing incidents. It also states that agencies are to 

conduct exercises and evaluate their performance to identify and correct 

weaknesses. 

The National Response Framework directs federal agencies to 

develop all-hazards response plans and plans to respond to eight 

scenarios. Of the eight scenarios, four are WMD-specific and include 

attacks with nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons.20 

In addition, the National Response Framework contains annexes that 

address specific hazardous incidents. The Department is identified as a 

cooperating agency in the following annexes: nuclear and radiological, 

biological, and catastrophic incidents.21 The Department, through the 

FBI, is identified as the lead coordinator for the Terrorism Incident Law 

Enforcement and Investigation Annex, which assigns the Department the 

responsibility for investigating all threats or acts of terrorism. 

18 www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/IncidentCommandSystem.shtm, accessed 

May 12, 2010. 

19 This policy was originally approved by the President and issued in December 

2004 as the National Response Plan. The policy was revised in January 2008 and 

renamed the National Response Framework. 

20 The other four scenarios are explosives attack, natural disaster, cyber attack, 

and pandemic influenza. 

21 The lead coordinating agencies for the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex 

are the Department of Defense; Department of Energy; DHS; Environmental Protection 

Agency; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. The lead coordinating agency for the Biological Incident Annex is the 

Department of Health and Human Services. The lead coordinating agency for the 

Catastrophic Incident Annex is the DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
 

 

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The National Response Framework also authorizes the Attorney 

General to appoint a Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official, in 

appropriate circumstances such as a WMD incident, to provide 

operational coordination and direct the federal law enforcement support 

operations related to the incident. According to the National Response 

Framework, this official does not have to come from the Department, but 

will usually be an FBI Special Agent in Charge if the incident is an act of 

terrorism. 

The National Response Framework also establishes 15 Emergency 

Support Functions that are common to all incidents and designates 

9 federal departments to be the lead coordinators of various functions.22 

The Department is the lead coordinator for ESF-13, which involves the 

use of federal law enforcement resources to maintain public safety and 

security if local and state resources are overwhelmed during an act of 

terrorism or natural or man-made disaster.23 ESF-13 can be activated 

by a presidential declaration of an emergency or disaster, or by the 

Attorney General at the request of a state governor.24 

The National Response Framework assigns the Department 

10 specific responsibilities related to ESF-13. The 10 responsibilities 

include staffing management positions at headquarters and in field 

offices to manage ESF-13 activities: cataloging federal resources, 

training staff, planning and participating in National Level Exercises, and 

22 A summary of the 15 Emergency Support Functions is presented in 

Appendix II. 

23 ESF-13 activities are not the same as the activities described in the National 

Response Framework’s Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex or 

other criminal investigative law enforcement activities. During terrorist incidents, 

including a WMD incident, ESF-13 coordinates and contributes support to the FBI’s 

operational response, if requested. 

24 The Justice Assistance Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 10501 (2006), et seq., and the 

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288, as 

amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206, and implementing regulations in 44 C.F.R. 

§§ 206.31-206.48. Under Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance provisions in 

the Justice Assistance Act, the Attorney General may provide law enforcement 

assistance in response to a governor’s written request when assistance is necessary to 

provide an adequate response to a law enforcement emergency. The Stafford Act 

provides the statutory framework for a presidential declaration of an emergency or a 

declaration of a major disaster. Such declarations allow a wide range of federal 

resources to be made available to assist in dealing with the emergency or major 

disaster. Federal resources under this Act supplement state and local resources for 

disaster relief and recovery. 
 

 

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providing coordination among the Department’s law enforcement 

partners in the field (see Appendix III for the Department’s ESF-13 

responsibilities). On October 16, 2008, an Office of the Deputy Attorney 

General memorandum formally designated ATF as the Department’s lead 

for planning and coordinating the federal law enforcement response if 

ESF-13 is activated. While ATF coordinates all ESF-13 activities, 

personnel to perform ESF-13 activities may be provided by any of 

13 federal agencies.25 

25 There are 13 agencies involved in ESF-13 activities. The Department of 

Justice is lead coordinator, and the other 12 agencies are the Department of 

Agriculture; Department of Commerce; Department of Defense; Department of Energy; 

Department of Homeland Security; Department of the Interior; Department of the 

Treasury; Department of Veterans Affairs; Environmental Protection Agency; National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration; Social Security Administration; and U.S. Postal 

Service. We refer to these 12 support agencies in the text as the ESF-13 agencies. 
 

 

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PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW
 

Purpose 

Our review examined the Department’s and its components’ 

preparedness for responding to a WMD incident. Specifically, we 

examined whether: 

•	 the Department and components have adequate policies and 

operational plans for their WMD preparedness activities; 

•	 the Department and components have a person or office to manage 

WMD operations, activities, or responsibilities; 

•	 the Department and its components are training their personnel to 

respond to a WMD incident; 

•	 the Department and its components are conducting WMD response 

exercises; and 

•	 corrective actions are being taken to resolve deficiencies identified 

during WMD response exercises. 

In addition, we examined the preparations of components’ field 

offices in the National Capital Region for responding to a WMD 

incident.26 

Scope and Methodology 

We examined the preparedness of the Department and its 

components to respond to a WMD incident. Emergency preparedness 

functions are generally considered to have two main elements: 

operational response and continuity planning. Operational response 

consists of an on-scene response to the incident and investigation of the 

incident. Continuity planning includes continuity of operations planning 

(COOP) and continuity of government (COG) planning.27 

This report examines the preparations of the Department to carry 

out an operational response but does not examine preparedness to 

prevent a WMD incident, conduct a criminal or other investigation of a 

26 The National Capital Region is composed of the District of Columbia and 

nearby jurisdictions in Virginia and Maryland. 

27 COOP details how an agency will continue to perform its essential functions 

during circumstances that disrupt normal operations and COG refers to the continued 

functioning of constitutional government under all circumstances. 
 

 

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WMD incident, or COOP and COG planning. Also, we did not review 

ESF-13 support for responding to natural disasters, such as hurricanes 

and earthquakes. 

In conducting this review, we examined the roles of the Office of 

the Deputy Attorney General, JMD, ATF, the Criminal Division, DEA, 

EOUSA, FBI, NSD, Office of Legal Counsel, Office of Legal Policy, USAOs 

in the National Capital Region, and the USMS.28 

Our fieldwork, which was conducted from July 2009 through 

December 2009, included interviews, data collection and analyses, and 

document reviews. The review covered activities from FY 2005 through 

FY 2009. A detailed description of the methodology of our review is in 

Appendix I. 

28 Although we reviewed the Federal Bureau of Prisons because of its law 

enforcement capabilities, we determined during the review that the Department has not 

designated a role for the Federal Bureau of Prisons in providing an operational response 

to a critical incident and so did not include it in this report. 
 

 

 

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RESULTS OF THE REVIEW
 

Our review found that the FBI has taken appropriate 

steps to prepare to respond to a WMD incident because it 

has implemented a headquarters-led program that 

established WMD response plans, provided WMD training 

to its response staff, and performed WMD exercises. 

However, the Department and its other components have 

not implemented adequate WMD response plans. The 

Department’s emergency response program is 

fragmented, and the components’ WMD incident 

response planning is inconsistent and not well 

coordinated. There is no Department plan that 

specifically addresses response to a WMD incident as 

opposed to other crises or critical incidents. Further, 

the FBI has not formally identified roles and 

responsibilities for the other Department components in 

its plans. Moreover, the Department is not prepared to 

carry out its responsibilities under ESF-13 for 

coordinating the law enforcement activities of federal 

departments to ensure public safety and security if state 

and local law enforcement is overwhelmed by a WMD 

incident. In the National Capital Region, planning for 

incidents that may occur during special events is 

coordinated, but planning for incidents at other times 

needs improvement. 

The FBI has taken appropriate steps to prepare to respond to a WMD 

incident. 

As described in the following sections, we found that the FBI has 

implemented an appropriate WMD response program, including 

designating a group within the FBI to manage WMD operations activities 

and responsibilities, establishing operations plans for responding to a 

WMD incident, providing appropriate FBI staff with training to prepare 

for a WMD incident, participating in WMD response exercises, and 

considering corrective actions taken based on exercises. 

The FBI WMD Directorate manages the FBI’s WMD response efforts . 

Management of FBI resources, and the FBI’s actual operational 

response activities, at the scene of a WMD incident are coordinated 
 

 

 

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through the FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMD 

Directorate). The WMD Directorate’s mission includes managing WMD 

investigations, preventing the use of WMDs, assessing and responding to 

incidents involving the use or threatened use of WMDs, and staging 

various exercises to test the FBI’s ability to respond to a WMD incident. 

The WMD Directorate includes the WMD Operations Unit, which provides 

strategic management and oversight of the FBI WMD program. The 

WMD Directorate is supported by the following additional FBI units: 

•	 The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) integrates tactical 

and investigative resources to provide rapid support to a field 

office response to a critical incident and to facilitate 

management of the incident. 

o	 CIRG’s Strategic Information and Operations Center serves 

as the FBI’s 24-hour clearinghouse for information and the 

center for crisis management, including the collection and 

dissemination of information to support responding to a 

critical incident. 

o	 CIRG’s Operations Support Branch prepares for, responds 

to, and assists in the resolution of critical incidents. 

•	 The Laboratory Division provides, among other things: (1) WMD 

operational and technical-level training to FBI field personnel; 

(2) research and development in WMD detection, identification, 

and response; (3) forensic, scientific, and technical response to 

WMD incidents; and (4) WMD technical information and advice 

to the FBI and other federal, state, and local agencies. 

In addition, at the field office level the FBI primarily relies on a 

designated Special Agent in each field office, referred to as a WMD 

Coordinator, to implement the FBI’s WMD-related activities, including 

responding to a WMD incident. The responsibilities of WMD 

Coordinators are to identify WMD threats and vulnerabilities, provide 

WMD subject matter expertise to field offices, and coordinate with 

headquarters during the FBI’s response to a WMD incident.29 

29 The OIG recently conducted an audit of the FBI’s WMD Coordinator Program. 

The audit report found many WMD Coordinators could not identify the top, specific 

WMD threats and vulnerabilities that faced their particular field division. See 

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator Program, Audit Report 09-36 

(September 2009). 
 

 

 

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The FBI maintains operational plans, handbooks, and other resources to 

direct and assist FBI personnel in responding to WMD incidents. 

The FBI maintains a variety of operational plans to respond to a 

WMD incident at the headquarters, regional, and local levels. For 

example, the FBI has a Terrorism Incident Response Protocol that 

establishes step-by-step procedures for headquarters units that assess 

and respond to acts of terrorism, including WMD incidents. The FBI also 

has Crisis Response Plans that provide detailed, tactical, and 

administrative assignments for the FBI’s response to critical incidents at 

the local and regional level.30 In addition, the FBI has Incident 

Contingency Plans that are further detailed, based on a standard 

template, and that can be modified to address potential WMD threats in 

each field office. 

The FBI also maintains handbooks and other resources to aid FBI 

Special Agents in responding to various types of WMD incidents. For 

example, the Radiological/Nuclear Law Enforcement and Public Health 

Investigative Handbook provides responders with indicators to determine 

if radiological or nuclear materials are present. The FBI also has created 

a Critical Incident Handbook, which is designed to assist FBI Special 

Agents in Charge in quickly organizing and executing an effective 

response to a critical incident, including a WMD incident. The handbook 

contains information to guide Special Agents in Charge through all 

phases of a critical incident and provides a checklist for responders to 

follow. Other FBI resources provided to FBI response personnel include 

pocket guides, flipbooks, and cards. These resources present chemical, 

biological, and radiological indicators, WMD response procedures, WMD 

statutes, and guidelines to respond to WMD threats and incidents. 

The FBI regularly provides training specifically on responding to a WMD 

incident to its response staff. 

The FBI provides a variety of regular training specific to WMD 

incidents, including: 

•	 All new Special Agents receive basic WMD training during their 

initial FBI Academy training; 

30 FBI officials said every FBI field office should have a Crisis Response Plan, 

which is supposed to include a WMD annex describing the FBI’s operational response to 

a WMD incident. 
 

 

 

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•	 WMD Coordinators and Intelligence Analysts receive training in 

specific WMD areas of emphasis, including: (1) biological, 

(2) chemical, including chemical explosives, (3) radiological, 

(4) nuclear, (5) agroterrorism, (6) explosives, and (7) hazardous 

materials; and 

•	 FBI personnel, as well as local, state, and federal first 

responders participate in the Comprehensive Integrated 

Training and Exercise course, which is designed to enhance 

first response capability to a WMD incident. The objective of 

the course is to strengthen the ability of the FBI and its partner 

agencies to detect and prevent WMD threats and respond to 

WMD incidents. The course concludes with a WMD scenario 

tabletop exercise. 

In addition, various divisions within the FBI that could have a role in 

responding to a WMD incident are trained within their areas of expertise. 

For example: 

•	 A WMD Master’s Degree and Certificate Program, which is 

offered to Special Agents and Intelligence Analysts but is mainly 

directed at WMD Coordinators, includes courses with a specific 

emphasis on the material most relevant to the FBI’s role in 

WMD incidents, and 

•	 A program for Special Agents to develop as WMD career 

professionals with expertise in a specific type of WMD that 

offers WMD training through partner agencies and the National 

Laboratories. 

Further, a Supervisory Special Agent with the FBI’s Operational 

Technology Division told us that the Division trains staff all over the 

country to operate specialized equipment to ensure communications 

within the FBI during any critical incident.31 Also, the Laboratory 

Division’s Assistant Director said the Laboratory Division trains evidence 

response personnel located in each FBI field office, as well as specialized 

response teams that would be involved in responding to a WMD incident, 

to safely enter an incident area to collect evidence and support a 

31 Although not part of the WMD Directorate, the FBI’s Operational Technology 

Division supports the FBI’s investigative and intelligence-gathering efforts with a wide 

range of technological equipment and communications tools, such as mobile command 

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response.32 In addition, the Laboratory Division provides hazardous 

materials operations, incident command and WMD crime scene 

operations training to FBI Special Agents in Charge or other FBI 

personnel who may lead an incident command. 

The FBI also trains a designated cadre of FBI Special Agents in 

Charge to serve as Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officials who provide 

operational coordination and direct the federal law enforcement support 

operations related to an incident. All FBI personnel identified as 

potential Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officials are also trained on 

the National Response Framework, National Incident Management 

System, and Incident Command System through resources provided by 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Emergency Management 

Institute.33 He said this training is provided so everyone “is on the same 

page and using the same language.” 

The FBI regularly conducts and participates in WMD response exercises . 

Since 2005, there have been two National Level Exercises involving 

a WMD incident response, one in 2005 and another in 2007. The FBI 

participated in both.34 In addition, the FBI both sponsors WMD incident 

exercises and participates extensively in WMD incident exercises 

sponsored by other federal agencies and state or local law enforcement. 

FBI exercise data showed that from FY 2005 to FY 2009, FBI field 

offices regularly participated in WMD-related exercises. Each year, the 

FBI participated in 168 to 215 WMD exercises, for a total of at least 

32 An example of a Laboratory Division specialized team is the Hazardous 

Evidence Analysis Team, which responds to contaminated areas to conduct traditional 

forensics, such as looking for fingerprints and hair samples. 

33 The Incident Command System is used to facilitate a common response 

structure for activities in command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and 

administration. 

34 TOPOFF 3 and TOPOFF 4, now known as a National Level Exercises, were 

congressionally mandated counterterrorism exercises for senior law enforcement and 

first responder officials. TOPOFF 3 took place from April 4-8, 2005, and simulated 

incidents of biological and chemical agent attacks. TOPOFF 4 took place from 

October 15-20, 2007, and was designed to prevent or respond to a simulated terrorist 

attack using WMDs. A National Level Exercise in 2009 focused on prevention of a WMD 

attack, but not on responding in the event the attack was carried out. 

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936 WMD exercises (Table 2).35 These exercises provided training to test 

responses to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear device, as 

well as the use of improvised explosive devices. Of the 936 exercises, 

496 (53 percent) were field training exercises and the remaining 440 

(47 percent) were tabletop or command post exercises.36 

Table 2: FBI Field Offices’ Participation in Exercises 

Year Number of Exercises 

2005 186 

2006 188 

2007 179 

2008 168 

2009 215 

Total 936 

Source: FBI WMD exercise data. 

The FBI sponsored or co-sponsored some of the exercises, although 

most were sponsored by state and local law enforcement agencies. 

Table 3 shows the entities that sponsored the exercises in which the FBI 

participated. 

Table 3: Sponsoring Agencies and Number of WMD Exercises 

Conducted 

Sponsoring Entity Exercises 

Amtrak 1 

Coast Guard 28 

Customs and Border Protection 2 

Department of Agriculture 6 

Department of Defense 61 

Department of Energy 16 

DHS 5 

Environmental Protection Agency 10 

FBI 46 

Continued on next page 

35 The documentation provided by the FBI regarding its field offices’ 

participation in WMD response exercises included 45 of the 56 field offices. 

36 A tabletop exercise is an analysis of an emergency situation in an informal 

environment designed to elicit discussion as participants examine and resolve problems 

based on existing plans and identify where those plans need to be improved. A 

command post exercise simulates a response to an incident where the on-scene 

coordinator, responders, and technical representatives make response decisions, deploy 

manpower and equipment, maintain liaison with headquarters, and handle 

communications. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sponsoring Entity Exercises 

FBI and Department of Energy 1 

Federal (not specified) 26 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 4 

Food and Drug Administration 1 

International law enforcement agency 8 

Local law enforcement agency 653 

Multi-agency (not specified) 5 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 13 

Postal Service 50 

Total 936 

Source: FBI WMD exercise data. 

Although the FBI was able to provide data regarding 45 of its 56 

field offices, the information reported was not standardized. As reflected 

in the chart above, some field offices named the sponsoring entity, and 

others categorized the entity broadly (for example, “federal”). In addition, 

while most data described the type of WMD incident being tested, 50 of 

the 936 exercises did not. Thus, while the FBI is tracking its 

components’ participation in exercises, this information could be more 

complete to better capture who is sponsoring the exercises, the entities 

participating, and the type of WMD response tested. The FBI also does 

not have one place where all the WMD exercise participation of its many 

separate units is documented. Nonetheless, we believe the available data 

clearly shows the FBI is conducting and participating in many exercises 

to prepare to respond to a WMD or other critical incident. 

After action reports are not consistently prepared. 

We found that the preparation of after action reports to document 

deficiencies identified during WMD response exercises is inconsistent. 

Conducting exercises is only the first step in ensuring an effective 

response capability – deficiencies revealed during exercises must be 

identified and addressed. The National Response Framework states that 

agencies must establish a corrective action program to improve their 

emergency operations and that, upon concluding an exercise, 

performance should be evaluated, weaknesses identified, and corrective 

action plans instituted. 

The OIG requested FBI after action reports for any WMD exercise 

in which the FBI had participated. In response, the FBI provided after 

action reports for 25 exercises that took place between FY 2005 and 

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FY 2009.37 Thirteen were written by the FBI, and 12 were written by 

other agencies. According to FBI data, however, of the 936 exercises in 

which the FBI participated, 473 had written after action reports and 335 

exercises did not have written after action reports. The FBI’s data did 

not show whether after action reports were written for the remaining 128 

exercises.38 

FBI officials gave conflicting responses regarding the requirement 

to write after action reports. Of the nine FBI officials we interviewed, four 

stated that written after action reports were required, and five officials 

said written after action reports were not required. Those officials who 

said written after actions reports were not required also said that after 

action reports were usually written by the federal, state, or local agency 

that hosted the exercise. 

The Department is not fully prepared to provide a coordinated 

response to a WMD incident. 

Although the FBI appears prepared to provide the initial response 

to a WMD incident, the Department as a whole is not fully prepared to 

provide a coordinated response. We found that no entity or individual 

has been assigned responsibility for central oversight of WMD response 

activities throughout the Department. In addition, the existing 

Department-level response policies and plans are not in compliance with 

national policy and are outdated. Further, the components’ preparations 

for responding to a WMD incident, other than the FBI’s, are inconsistent 

and not well coordinated. Moreover, appropriate component staff does 

not appear well trained in the unique requirements associated with 

responding to a WMD incident. The following sections provide greater 

detail on these deficiencies. 

No entity provides central oversight of the Department’s WMD-related 

activities. 

We found that the Department has not assigned one entity or 

individual with the responsibility for the central oversight or 

management of WMD incident response policy development, planning 

37 Not all FBI field offices provided after action data. The FBI does not maintain 

its exercise data in a central location. Rather, exercise and after action data from the 

FBI was provided by field offices or various entities within FBI headquarters. 

38 The Operational Technology Division provided data for 22 exercises in which 

it participated and provided after action reports for 6 of the 22 exercises. 
 

 

 

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and training for responding to a WMD incident, or conducting WMD 

incident response exercises. The JMD Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General for Policy Management and Planning stated that “it is not clear” 

who has responsibility for managing WMD response activities in the 

Department. He noted that the uncertainty could create a 

“disaggregated” response to a WMD incident. Through our interviews of 

36 senior officials involved in emergency response planning in the 

Department and the components’ headquarters, it was clear that no 

person or entity is managing the overall Department’s response 

activities.39 

The management of the Department’s response program is uncoordinated 

and fragmented. 

Although no one entity handles management of the Department’s 

operational response program, including a response to a WMD incident, 

some response functions are being handled by a Special Assistant to the 

Deputy Attorney General as well as senior staff at the NSD, EOUSA, and 

the FBI. These individuals also represent the Department in interagency 

policy and planning meetings for scenarios and exercises. The Special 

Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General stated that his principal role is 

to attend interagency meetings to ensure the Department is appropriately 

represented and responds to interagency requests. NSD and EOUSA 

officials stated they were primarily concerned with addressing legal 

questions and authorities that arise during a response. FBI officials said 

they were primarily concerned with ensuring that the FBI could meet its 

responsibilities at headquarters and at the site of an incident. 

An EOUSA Attorney Advisor who was detailed to the Office of the 

Deputy Attorney General from 2002 to 2006 stated that he had been the 

central coordinator of the Department’s response planning. He originally 

worked on national security policy, but after the terrorist attacks on 

September 11, 2001, was assigned to coordinate Department notices, 

meetings, and after action reports for response preparedness. He said he 

had been the “Senior Counsel for National Security Affairs” and the “de 

facto executive secretary” for correspondence about national security 

matters, including response preparedness. He said he had coordinated 

with the components and had met regularly with the Deputy Attorney 

General to provide updates on emergency preparedness. After the end of 

his detail, however, the position of Senior Counsel for National Security 

39 JMD’s Security and Emergency Planning Staff is responsible for managing 

the Department’s activities for continuity of operations planning, but not for managing 

the Department’s incident response planning program. 
 

 

 

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Affairs was discontinued, and the responsibilities for emergency 

management activities were assigned to various personnel in the Office of 

the Deputy Attorney General and NSD. 

Similarly, the NSD’s National Crisis Management Coordinator told 

us he was detailed to the NSD to get the USAOs “back on track” after the 

first OIG review of USAO Critical Incident Response Plans (CIRP) in 2003, 

but he said he spent a considerable amount of time on other duties, 

including a criminal investigation.40 As of December 2009, the NSD 

hired a Director of Preparedness and Response to work full time on 

emergency management for the NSD. 

These individuals also told us that they believed the Department’s 

operational response program lacks leadership and oversight. The 

EOUSA Attorney Advisor said the Department’s current state of response 

preparedness had no overarching structure to make it work. Similarly, 

the NSD National Crisis Management Coordinator stated that the 

Department’s response program lacked general leadership, 

centralization, and coordination. He added that nobody is looking at all 

of the components regarding response operations, particularly for 

responding to a WMD incident. He said that the Department “needs to 

get a better handle on this,” but “if you’re not at the Deputy [Attorney 

General] level no one is going to listen to you. You need clout.” EOUSA’s 

Counsel for Emergency Management and Crisis Response agreed, saying 

these issues need to be addressed at a Department level and the Office of 

the Deputy Attorney General or an Associate Deputy Attorney General 

needs to have the emergency planning portfolio. 

In fact, the need for coordinated emergency management at the 

Department level has been previously identified by the Department. In 

January 2006, the Assistant Attorney General for Administration 

proposed an updated DOJ Order to address the need for better 

coordinated emergency response management at the Department level 

through a new Crisis Management Plan. The proposed Order assigned 

responsibilities for emergency response to a Crisis Management 

Committee that would have coordinated with the components to conduct 

40 The OIG conducted two reviews of USAO plans to respond to critical 

incidents. The first report, issued in 2003, was entitled Review of the Critical Incident 

Response Plans of the United States Attorneys’ Offices, Evaluations and Inspections 

Report I-2004-001 (December 2003). A follow-up report was issued in 2007, entitled 

Review of the Critical Incident Response Plans of the United States Attorneys’ Offices, 

Evaluations and Inspections Report I-2007-001 (January 2007). 
 

 

 

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periodic exercises of emergency operating plans to ensure that the 

Department maintains a high level of readiness. 

A February 23, 2006, memorandum from staff of the 

Counterterrorism Section of the Criminal Division critiqued the proposed 

Crisis Management Plan. The memorandum suggested adding senior 

representatives from the Criminal Division, the NSD (when it was 

established), and EOUSA to the Crisis Management Committee. The 

memorandum concluded that the preparedness elements discussed in 

the proposed Order should not be addressed piecemeal with separate 

components. The memorandum stated that the 

Department is long overdue to design and implement an internal 

mechanism or structure to comprehensively and effectively address 

preparedness issues . . . . These issues demand a more organized, 

deliberate, and thoughtful approach, with more coordination both within 

the Department and with other agencies. 

However, the proposed Order has not been made final.41 

During our review, the Department began to take action in this 

area. A Deputy Attorney General memorandum dated August 31, 2009, 

directed the NSD, Office of Legal Policy, EOUSA, and JMD to each 

designate a senior-level position to coordinate interagency response and 

emergency management activities associated with interagency policy 

development and planning for man-made and natural disasters, national 

and regional exercises, and COOP or COG matters.42 However, we 

believe that the designation of these individuals does not meet the need 

for a Department-level manager with the authority to direct emergency 

response efforts. Similar to the shortcomings the Criminal Division 

noted in the February 2006 memorandum described above, this latest 

approach risks perpetuating a fragmented program because these 

individuals report to their offices’ senior management and will not be 

directing or managing the overall Department’s preparation to respond to 

a WMD incident. 

41 As of May 2010, the Department components had commented on the 

proposed Order, and the Order was awaiting review by the JMD Office of General 

Counsel. 

42 These representatives have formed the Crisis Response Working Group, 

which, in addition to the components identified in the memorandum, includes 

representatives from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 

and Criminal Division.
 

 

 

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The Department has not updated its policies to reflect recent national 

policies. 

The existing Department-level response policies and plans are 

outdated and not in compliance with national policy. Since 1996, the 

federal government has taken various steps in response to the WMD 

threat, including issuing new national policies such as Homeland 

Security Presidential Directives-5 and 8. The National Response 

Framework and the National Incident Management System were 

established to attempt to promote an organized, coordinated response to 

critical incidents, including a WMD incident. In addition, the DHS was 

created in 2003, and the FBI was given new counterterrorism 

responsibilities. 

However, the Department’s polices and 1996 Critical Incident 

Response Plan have not been revised to reflect these changes. For 

example, they do not incorporate the principles and requirements of the 

National Response Framework or the National Incident Management 

System.43 Also, the Department’s Critical Incident Response Plan, which 

has not been updated since first approved by the Attorney General in 

May 1996, does not address the National Planning Scenarios.44 To 

ensure the Department is prepared to respond to a WMD incident, we 

recommend that the Department’s Critical Incident Response Plan be 

updated to include WMD scenarios. 

Department operational response policies and plans have not been fully 

implemented. 

DOJ Order 1900.6A, issued in December 1988, established a 

Crisis Management Committee to determine the Department’s 

responsibility for the on-scene federal or Department response. However, 

we found that this committee does not exist. 

43 Homeland Security Presidential Directives-5 and 8 require federal agencies to 

adopt the National Response Framework. Officials in the Office of the Deputy Attorney 

General and the Office of Legal Counsel confirmed that the National Response 

Framework is considered binding on the Department and its requirements should be 

the basis for the Department’s policy. 

44 There are eight National Planning Scenarios. Four are WMD-specific and 

include attacks with nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. The other 

four scenarios are explosives attack, natural disaster, cyber attack, and pandemic 

influenza. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Further, the May 1996 Critical Incident Response Plan advised the 

members of the Attorney Critical Incident Response Group to participate 

in law enforcement crisis scenario training that occurs throughout 

Department components, such as ATF, the DEA, and the USMS. 

However, we found that the Attorney Critical Incident Response Group 

also does not exist and that the expected coordination does not occur 

among the components. 

Overall, we found no Department-sponsored training or 

coordination of exercises to test preparedness for responding to a WMD 

or other incident. 

No law enforcement components other than the FBI have specific WMD 

operational response plans, although EOUSA and NSD have developed 

plans or guides for a legal response to a WMD incident. 

We found ATF, the DEA, and the USMS each have groups or 

individuals to manage all-hazards responses, but no Department 

component, other than the FBI, assigns an entity specifically to prepare 

for WMD incidents.45 Further, none of the components maintains plans, 

handbooks, and other resources specifically for responding to WMD 

incidents. 

ATF’s Chief of the Office of Field Operations said that ATF’s plan in 

the event of a WMD incident is to not respond, but rather to provide 

support to the FBI. DEA and USMS officials stated that in the event of a 

WMD incident they would develop plans to support an FBI response if 

the FBI asked for support, after the components’ headquarters approved 

the use of resources. 

We found that EOUSA, the USAOs, and the NSD have developed 

plans or guides for a legal response to a WMD incident. The USAOs’ role 

during a WMD incident is to provide legal guidance and oversight to the 

on-scene law enforcement response. To accomplish this, USAOs would 

rely on guidance from EOUSA and the NSD. EOUSA developed a 

template for all USAOs to use in creating their district-specific Critical 

Incident Response Plans, which describe the USAOs’ role in the 

45 According to the USMS, it created a Hazardous Response Unit after the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to handle WMD incidents and training, but the 

unit was disbanded prior to 2006. 

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immediate aftermath of a WMD incident.46 In addition, the NSD 

maintains operational guides to respond to a WMD incident. For 

example, the NSD maintains a guide for a legal response to an anthrax 

attack at a special event and for responding to an improvised nuclear 

device. 

However, we found no efforts among the components to coordinate 

responding to a WMD incident. The FBI is the only component with 

plans, handbooks, and other resources for responding to a WMD 

incident, but officials from the other components said they have not seen 

the FBI’s response materials. The Assistant Directors of the FBI’s WMD 

Directorate and Critical Incident Response Group said the FBI would not 

object to letting other Department components review the plans, but 

none of the components have asked to do so. 

No components other than the FBI provide training on responding to a 

WMD incident. 

We found that Department components provide general training on 

responding to critical incidents, including training on the general 

principles of the National Response Framework, National Incident 

Management System, and the Incident Command System. However, 

except for the FBI, the components provide little or no training 

specifically on how to respond to a WMD incident. 

The training programs at ATF, the DEA, EOUSA (and the USAOs), 

and the USMS are designed for critical incidents resulting from all 

hazards. We found that only two of the components’ training programs 

included instruction, albeit minimal, on WMD response. The USMS 

requires all newly hired Deputy U.S. Marshals to complete a chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear awareness course that instructs 

them on how to identify a hazardous agent release, activate emergency 

response operations, perform basic decontamination procedures, and use 

proper personal protective equipment in accordance with regulations. 

46 USAO Critical Incident Response Plans are designed to be all-hazards 

response plans. EOUSA’s original template for responding to critical incidents was 

revised, in part, to ensure the USAOs’ plans comply with the National Response 

Framework and National Incident Management System. In addition, EOUSA maintains 

an online reference, USABook, that provides guidance regarding statutes that could 

apply to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. Also, in 2009, 

EOUSA’s Office of Legal Education published Crisis Response and Related Litigation, 

which describes the USAOs’ role in emergency management and crisis response, 

including USAOs’ response to acts of terrorism. 
 

 

 

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This training is given once to new Deputy U.S. Marshals, and no 

subsequent training in WMD response is provided. 

EOUSA hosted a Regional Security Specialist and Crisis 

Management Coordinator Conference in November 2009. In attendance 

at the conference were USAO Crisis Management Coordinators.47 At the 

conference, which we also attended, the coordinators received an 

overview of the National Response Framework. In addition, coordinators 

divided into working groups to discuss how they would respond to 

specific critical incidents, including an unexpected crisis, which may 

include a WMD incident. Officials from the following groups gave 

presentations on their components’ roles and resources for responding to 

a critical incident: 

• the Department,48 

• state and local law enforcement agencies, 

• ATF in ESF-13, 

• the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group, 

• the FBI’s WMD Directorate, and 

• the NSD’s Counterterrorism Section. 

We found that, except for these presentations to attendees of this 

particular conference (who were all USAO staff), the components did not 

coordinate with each other on the training they provide to their 

personnel. Each component provides training only on its own roles and 

responsibilities, and does not include in the training any information on 

the roles and responsibilities of other components that may be 

responding to the same incident. 

The need for coordination was raised during the EOUSA Crisis 

Management Coordinator training described above. At the conference, a 

Special Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General said there needed to be 

more discussion and coordination about how the Department would 

47 Each USAO is required to designate a Crisis Management Coordinator. The 

Crisis Management Coordinator is to be a senior Assistant U.S. Attorney and is 

responsible for ensuring the USAO’s coordination with law enforcement and emergency 

response agencies, ensuring the identification and organization of resources for 

providing legal advice during a critical incident, and improving the USAO’s anticipation 

of crisis situations. 

48 The Department portion of the training focused on the role of the Department 

in helping create the national policy included in the National Response Framework. 

There was no discussion of Department planning or identifying Department or 

component roles and responsibilities. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

respond to WMD incidents, and he encouraged USAO Crisis Management 

Coordinators to “get to know your Department personnel” because “the 

last thing you want is to have an incident and meet the responders for 

the first time.” In addition, EOUSA’s Counsel for Emergency 

Management and Crisis Response, a principal coordinator of the 

conference, noted that other Department components that would have a 

role in responding to an incident were not present at the training. He 

encouraged all USAO Crisis Management Coordinators to bring 

Department response personnel “to the table” to coordinate in their 

respective districts. 

No component other than the FBI regularly conducts or participates in 

WMD response exercises. 

As described previously, there have been two National Level 

Exercises involving a WMD incident response, one in 2005 and another 

in 2007. The FBI and ATF participated in both exercises, the USMS 

participated in the 2005 exercise, and two USAOs participated in the 

2007 exercise. The DEA was not involved in either exercise. 

At the regional, state, and local levels, officials in ATF and the 

USMS told us their personnel rarely participate in WMD exercises. FBI 

data confirmed that ATF, the USMS, and the USAOs, participated in only 

22 of the 936 exercises.49 DEA officials stated they have not been 

involved in any WMD exercises. 

The Department is not prepared to fulfill its role, assigned to it 

under the National Response Framework’s ESF-13, to ensure public 

safety and security in the event of a WMD incident.

As discussed above, the National Response Framework established 

the Department as the lead agency for ESF-13 with the responsibility to 

coordinate the use of federal law enforcement resources to maintain 

public safety and security if local and state resources are overwhelmed 

49 The number of Department components who participated in the WMD 

exercises is likely understated because 11 FBI field offices did not respond to our 

request for information on exercises. Some other field offices omitted information such 

as the participation of other Department components in exercise. In addition, FBI data 

for the 46 reporting field offices noted that no Department components participated in 

591 of the 936 exercises, and it was unknown whether any component other than the 

FBI participated in 323 of the exercises. 

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during an incident.50 The Department delegated the responsibility for 

implementing its ESF-13 activities to ATF. 

However, we found that the Department is not prepared to 

coordinate federal law enforcement response activities if it is called upon 

to ensure public safety and security in accordance with ESF-13 in the 

event of a WMD incident.51 ESF-13 staff said that, in the event of a 

WMD incident “we are totally unprepared.” They added that, “right now, 

being totally effective would never happen. Everybody would be winging 

it.” 

In January 2008, ATF proposed a Concept of Operations Plan to 

provide a structure for the Department to implement its ESF-13 

responsibilities. Yet, as of March 2010, that Concept of Operations Plan 

was still in draft and had not been approved by the Department.52 In 

addition, several elements within the draft Concept of Operations Plan 

that are essential to the Department’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities 

for coordinating the federal law enforcement activities in an ESF-13 

activation remained incomplete. As discussed below, the incomplete 

elements include staffing national and regional coordinator positions; 

training staff in ESF-13 operations; cataloging law enforcement resources 

available in the event of an ESF-13 activation; participating in National 

Level Exercises to test preparedness; and deputizing ESF-13 law 

enforcement personnel. 

Staffing national and regional coordinator positions. The 

Department and ATF have not made all the necessary personnel 

assignments to manage ESF-13 activities. The draft Concept of 

50 The National Response Framework outlines 10 specific responsibilities for the 

Department to coordinate. See Appendix III for the Department’s ESF-13 

responsibilities. 

51 These ESF-13 activities, include: (1) providing basic law enforcement 

assistance such as conducting routine patrols and making arrests; (2) issuing 

identification badges to emergency responders and other personnel needing access to a 

controlled area and verifying emergency responder credentials; (3) providing security 

forces to control access to the incident site and critical facilities; (4) providing officers 

for traffic and crowd control; and (5) providing for protection of emergency responders 

and other workers operating in a high threat environment. 

52 Although the Concept of Operations Plan has not been approved by the 

Department, according to ATF it has been vetted and approved through the 13 agencies 

involved in ESF-13 activities on multiple occasions. ATF stated that future iterations of 

the Concept of Operations Plan would not contain the term “draft.” 
 

 

 

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Operations Plan proposed a national-level management structure, 

housed at ATF headquarters, consisting of an ESF-13 National 

Coordinator, who has been assigned, and a Deputy National Coordinator, 

who has not been assigned, selected by ATF and approved by the 

Department. The ESF-13 National Coordinator is to manage all routine 

ESF-13 planning activities. 

Until April 2010, ATF had only four administrative staff working on 

ESF-13 activities as a collateral duty. As of April 2010, ATF increased its 

authorized ESF-13 staffing to 13 headquarters positions, although the 

positions remained largely unstaffed, with only 7 of the 13 positions 

filled. ATF currently has two Special Agents, four professional support 

personnel, and one contractor dedicated to ESF-13. 

According to the Concept of Operations Plan, the National 

Coordinator and Deputy National Coordinator are to be supported by an 

interagency contingent of five Sector Coordinators, each responsible for 

representing ESF-13 matters in coordination with Federal Emergency 

Management Agency regional offices.53 ATF initially planned to provide 

some of the Sector Coordinators and requested that the remaining 

coordinators be provided by other ESF-13 agencies. However, only one 

agency, the DHS’s Customs and Border Protection, responded to ATF’s 

request. As of March 18, 2010, ATF had decided not to staff the Sector 

Coordinator position from interagency personnel but rather to staff the 

position with contractors to coordinate with Federal Emergency 

Management Agency regional offices. Until the contractors are hired, 

ATF has temporarily assigned ATF liaisons in each of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency regions. 

Additionally, while the Department designated a Department 

ESF-13 Coordinator in early 2009, as called for in the draft Concept of 

Operations Plan, the individual selected currently performs this function 

as a collateral duty. The Department ESF-13 Coordinator works with the 

ATF ESF-13 National Coordinator, Deputy National Coordinator, and 

other ESF-13 management personnel, but is not involved in routine 

planning. The Department Coordinator is supposed to administer all 

aspects of the support in the event of an ESF-13 activation, including 

coordination between ATF’s ESF-13 staff and other federal officials. The 

current Department ESF-13 Coordinator divides his time between ESF13 responsibilities and his work for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the 

53 Each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions has a 

Regional Interagency Steering Committee that coordinates interagency and 

intergovernmental issues related to disaster planning and operations. 
 

 

 

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Eastern District of Louisiana. As of May 2010, a replacement ESF-13 

Coordinator had been selected, but had not entered the position. 

Training. ATF has provided minimal training on implementing 

ESF-13 responsibilities for ATF field office personnel, support agency 

personnel, and state and local emergency operations officials. ESF-13 

staff said that ATF field staff have not been trained to respond to a WMD 

incident. The draft Concept of Operations Plan requires “training for all 

levels of personnel involved in the program.” The training is intended to 

enable ATF field office personnel to provide initial situation assessments 

from an affected area to aid in the determination of the appropriate 

response to requests for assistance. Training is also required to prepare 

staff to resolve conflicting demands for public safety and security 

resources; coordinate backup support from other geographical regions to 

an affected area; and ensure that responding agencies are provided with 

information on known hazards, mission requirements, appropriate 

vaccinations, credentials, and personal protective equipment. 

ATF’s ESF-13 staff said training for ATF field office personnel, 

support agency personnel, and state and local emergency operations 

officials has not been fully implemented. According to ESF-13 staff, ATF 

has trained only ATF personnel in Florida, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, 

and Alabama field offices for an ESF-13 activation resulting from a 

hurricane. ATF has provided field office ESF-13 Coordinators with an 

ESF-13 briefing paper and slide show, and the draft Concept of 

Operations Plan as guidance for how to respond in an ESF-13 activation. 

ATF is in the process of training ATF Assistant Special Agents in Charge 

(ASAC) in the requirements of being an ESF-13 Coordinator. The 

training curriculum familiarizes these ASACs with ESF-13’s role in the 

National Response Framework, the ESF-13 Concept of Operations Plan, 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency mission assignment 

process, and ESF-13’s interagency relationships. ATF has completed two 

of these training sessions during FY 2009 and one during FY 2010. Two 

additional training sessions are scheduled for May and June 2010.54 

Also, ATF provided similar ESF-13 training to approximately 20 of its 

supervisors other than ASACs in FY 2009. 

54 During February 2010, ATF conducted ESF-13 training for approximately 

45 members of its ESF-13 Assessment Teams. The Assessment Teams consists of ATF 

ASACs, ATF Group Supervisors, ATF Crisis Management Coordinators, and personnel 

from the USMS and DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Assessment 

Teams coordinate the needs for support with state emergency managers and ESF-13 

Coordinators through embedded ESF-13 liaisons in the state emergency operations 

centers. 
 

 

 

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Cataloging Resources. ATF has not developed a catalog of law 

enforcement resources – people and equipment – available to be deployed 

in an ESF-13 activation. The draft Concept of Operations Plan requires 

ATF to screen and match approved ESF-13 mission assignments with 

available Department and other federal law enforcement resources. 

However, ATF does not have information on the resources available from 

all ESF-13 agencies and does not have specific resource information for 

Department components, particularly at the local level. 

Resource information is critical for ATF to identify the need for 

ESF-13 support and analyze potential factors (for example, mapping, 

modeling, and forecasting for crowd size, impact of weather, and other 

conditions) that may affect resource allocations and requisite actions 

affecting public safety and security in the event of a WMD incident. ATF 

lacks information on ESF-13 agency resources because the other ESF-13 

agencies have not responded fully to ATF’s requests for information. 

Further, because of the lack of staffing, ATF has not designated anyone 

to follow up on the requests and could not conduct the logistical resource 

planning if the data were made available. 

Participation in National Level Exercises. ATF has not tested its 

preparedness to carry out its ESF-13 responsibilities in any National 

Level Exercises. The draft Concept of Operations Plan states that “ATF 

will ensure ESF-13 participation is included in National Level Exercises 

when appropriate to support the exercise scenarios.”55 ESF-13 staff 

explained that although they participated in the TOPOFF 4 National 

Level Exercise, they did not exercise ESF-13 functions. Instead, ATF’s 

exercise role was to provide support to the FBI.56 The ESF-13 Program 

Manager said ATF has not had the opportunity to evaluate ESF-13 

operational readiness because ESF-13 has not been included in National 

Level Exercises and ATF has not conducted any other operational 

exercise. Participating in National Level Exercises will enable ATF to 

fulfill the Department’s responsibility for conducting an evaluation of 

operational readiness. 

55 The exercise scenarios are designed to test a response to a specific man-made 

critical incident or natural disaster, such as an improvised nuclear device or an 

earthquake. 

56 The TOPOFF 4 National Level Exercise was a congressionally mandated 

terrorism preparedness exercise involving top officials at every level of government. 

TOPOFF 4 was sponsored by the DHS and involved a 2-year cycle of seminars, planning 

events, and exercises that culminated in a full-scale assessment of the nation’s capacity 

to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks involving WMDs.
 

 

 

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Deputation. The Concept of Operations Plan states that ESF-13 

federal law enforcement officers “should not be deployed without being 

deputized as a Deputy U.S. Marshal.” ESF-13 staff explained that ATF is 

still in the process of determining how deputation will be implemented 

during an ESF-13 activation. The ESF-13 Program Manager said ATF 

has requested a written legal opinion from the Department that explains 

the authority of federal law enforcement officers under ESF-13 so that 

those law enforcement officers who are deputized know the extent of 

their authorities. The NSD’s Director of Preparedness and Response said 

that this lack of clarity regarding deputation could “paralyze an agent in 

the field who doesn’t know if his actions are covered.” 

When we asked why ATF had been unable to implement the 

ESF-13 Concept of Operations Plan, ATF officials stated that ATF lacked 

the funds to fulfill the Department’s ESF-13 responsibilities. We 

reviewed ATF budget documents and found the Department’s budget 

request for FY 2011 was the first time that funding designated 

specifically for ESF-13 activities was included in the Department’s 

budget request to the President.57 The requested funding would provide 

for one ESF-13 National Coordinator, two program managers, two 

intelligence analysts, one management analyst, and one program 

analyst. ATF also requested $34,000 to fund two nationwide training 

sessions per year to provide ESF-13 representatives with the necessary 

skills and knowledge to successfully develop and maintain relationships 

with ESF-13 state and local law enforcement partners. 

In the National Capital Region, with the exception of preparing for 

special events, WMD incident response planning depends primarily 

on FBI resources and capabilities. 

The National Capital Region (NCR) is a potential target for 

terrorists who may attempt to use WMD in an attack. In this review, we 

examined the preparations of Department component field offices in the 

NCR to respond to a WMD attack. 

As described in the sections above, the FBI has created plans and 

assigned other resources for responding to a WMD incident and 

participates in exercises that specifically include WMD scenarios in the 

NCR. Further, we found that components regularly work with each 

other, with other federal agencies, and with state and local law 

57 In 2006, as a part of the budget formulation for FY 2008, ATF requested 

funding to support ESF-13 activities, but this request was not included in the 

Department’s budget request for FY 2008. 
 

 

 

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enforcement agencies to prepare to respond to critical incidents that may 

occur during the frequent special events in the NCR. This regular 

coordination for special events builds knowledge and relationships that 

help prepare components for responding to incidents in the NCR. 

Nonetheless, as previously noted in the report, WMD incident response 

planning in the NCR depends primarily on FBI resources and 

capabilities, and other components have conducted minimal WMDspecific planning or training. In addition, some components’ personnel 

in the NCR were not familiar with the responsibilities assigned to the 

Department in the event ESF-13 is activated and did not know that ATF 

is the Department’s designated lead coordinator of ESF-13. 

The FBI has a WMD-specific plan and guides, and conducts exercises on 

responding to a WMD incident in the NCR. 

The FBI’s Washington Field Office is the only component field office 

in the NCR with a written plan and checklist to respond specifically to a 

WMD incident in the NCR. The FBI’s plan identifies how the FBI will 

work with other non-Department agencies and state and local law 

enforcement and emergency response agencies. However, the FBI plan 

does not include any stated role for the Department’s other law 

enforcement components in the NCR. FBI NCR officials said if the FBI 

needed support for its response to a WMD incident from the other 

components’ NCR field offices, they would contact those field offices 

through their representatives on the Joint Terrorism Task Force to 

coordinate the support.58 

Additionally, the FBI’s Washington Field Office conducts exercises 

on responding to WMD incidents in the NCR. According to FBI exercise 

data, from FY 2005 through FY 2009 the FBI Washington Field Office led 

or participated in 29 field training or tabletop WMD exercises. These 

exercises included state and local law enforcement, as well as other 

federal agencies, including the DHS and the Departments of Defense and 

Energy. However, other DOJ component field offices did not participate 

in the 29 FBI exercises and, other than scheduled special events, did not 

participate in any other WMD response activities with the FBI. Our 

interviews with other components’ NCR field office managers confirmed 

that they do not participate in WMD exercises or any other WMD 

response activities with the FBI except for special events. 

58 Joint Terrorism Task Forces operate in 100 cities nationwide. They are based 

out of the 56 FBI field offices and 10 smaller offices around the country and include 

representatives from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. 
 

 

 

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NCR field offices regularly coordinate with each other to prepare to 

respond to critical incidents that may occur during special events. 

We found that NCR field offices regularly coordinate with each 

other to prepare to respond to critical incidents, including WMD 

incidents, which may happen during the special events that frequently 

occur in the NCR. Many of these events are unique to the NCR, such as 

presidential inaugurations, State of the Union Addresses, visits by heads 

of state, and mass political demonstrations. Planning for these events is 

led by non-Department agencies within the NCR, and Department NCR 

field offices participate and coordinate through the FBI’s local Joint 

Terrorism Task Force. 

The field offices also meet regularly with the local police 

departments, as well as other federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies to discuss threats and prepare for these special events. In 

addition, ATF, DEA, and FBI officials told us they meet with the 

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments to discuss incident 

response in the NCR.59 USMS officials said they do not participate in 

such meetings. As a result of the frequent coordination for special 

events, NCR field office staff told us they are aware of other agencies’ 

roles and the resources that are available from them if a WMD incident 

should occur during a special event. However, we believe that WMD 

planning for special events does not adequately prepare NCR components 

for a WMD incident that occurs outside of a special event. For example, 

during special events roles and responsibilities are pre-determined and 

resources are on standby, which would not be the case for incidents that 

occur at other times. 

Most NCR component field offices have conducted little or no planning 

specifically for responding to a WMD incident and have no defined role in 

the FBI’s WMD response plans. 

Although the NCR field offices’ preparations for special events 

include planning for WMD incidents, we found that preparations for a 

WMD incident that might occur at times other than during a special 

event were lacking. 

59 The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments is a regional 

organization of 21 Washington-area local governments that develops regional responses 

to such issues as public safety, the environment, affordable housing, economic 

development, health and family concerns, human services, population growth, and 

transportation.
 

 

 

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The ATF, DEA, and USMS field offices had no plans that 

specifically addressed responding to a WMD incident. Although NCR 

USAOs maintained all-hazard Critical Incident Response Plans, we found 

no specific WMD-related response guidance as contained in EOUSA’s 

Critical Incident Response Plan template.60 When we asked field office 

officials from other components why they did not have WMD-specific 

plans, they stated that they believed the FBI would be the Department’s 

lead responder in the event of a WMD incident in the NCR and that their 

roles would be limited to supporting the FBI’s response. Both ATF’s 

Acting Special Agent in Charge and the DEA’s Special Agent in Charge of 

their Washington field offices said that they believed the FBI is aware of 

their agencies’ capabilities and resources and would request them as 

needed. When asked if they were familiar with the FBI’s WMD response 

plans, only the USAO officials said that they were aware of the plans. 

ATF, DEA, and USMS field office officials were not familiar with the 

plans. Further, the ATF, DEA, and USMS field office officials stated that 

they had not asked to see the FBI’s plans to determine whether they 

would be included in the FBI’s response. 

The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office 

Counterterrorism Division confirmed that no other component had asked 

to review the WMD response plan, but said he “did not see why it would 

be a problem” for other Department components to review it. 

Some component officials in NCR field offices are not aware of ESF-13 or 

ATF’s role as the Department’s lead coordinator if ESF-13 is activated 

during a WMD incident. 

To determine if the Department components’ field offices are 

prepared to carry out the Department’s responsibilities for ensuring 

public safety and security if ESF-13 was activated in the NCR during a 

WMD incident, we asked 12 NCR field office managers about ESF-13 

requirements and assignments. Only three officials (one each from ATF, 

the FBI, and the USAO) knew of the Department’s responsibilities under 

ESF-13 and that ATF is designated as the Department’s lead coordinator 

if ESF-13 is activated. Another three officials (one from the FBI field 

office and two USAO staff) knew about the Department’s ESF-13 

responsibilities, but not that ATF is the Department’s lead coordinator. 

Six officials (one each from the FBI and the DEA, and four USMS 

60 We reviewed the Critical Incident Response Plans for the District of Columbia 

and the Eastern District of Virginia. 
 

 

 

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officials) were not familiar with either ESF-13 or ATF’s designated role for 

the Department. 

This lack of awareness on the part of field office managers 

regarding ATF and ESF-13 is problematic. Field office managers should 

be familiar with how their components would participate in a coordinated 

national response to a WMD incident. Although requests for support 

would most likely come from headquarters to the field offices, effective 

coordination of the federal, state, and local response would be critical 

during an ESF-13 activation. The lack of familiarity regarding national 

plans, such as ESF-13, could inhibit a coordinated response and 

valuable time could be wasted in providing needed resources, as was 

seen during the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2006.61 

In sum, although law enforcement agencies in the NCR coordinate 

regularly because of the preparations and cooperation required for 

frequent special events, we believe improvements are needed to ensure 

NCR field offices are prepared to quickly and safely respond to a WMD 

incident. In a WMD incident, agencies’ roles are not specified and 

resources are not pre-positioned as during a special event. Moreover, the 

hazard presented by a WMD – as opposed to conventional or improvised 

explosives or natural disasters – is unique. Without WMD-specific 

training and response plans, responders may be at greater risk of 

becoming casualties. Because the component field offices in the NCR 

other than the FBI have no WMD-specific response plans or training, and 

have not participated in WMD-specific exercises, it is uncertain that they 

are fully prepared to safely and effectively contribute to the Department’s 

overall response in the event of a WMD incident. Moreover, the lack of 

awareness regarding the Department’s ESF-13 responsibilities, and 

ATF’s authority to serve as the lead coordinator for those activities, could 

delay a coordinated federal law enforcement response to a WMD incident 

that requires activation of ESF-13 in the NCR. 

61 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina (February 

2006), p. 53. 
 

 

 

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Our review concluded that only the FBI has taken adequate steps 

to prepare to respond to a potential WMD attack. The FBI’s WMD 

Directorate manages its WMD operational response activities and 

establishes the responsibilities for its units that will respond. The FBI 

has headquarters and field office operations plans, handbooks, and other 

resources for responding to WMD incidents. The FBI regularly provides 

WMD-specific training to its personnel who are likely to respond to a 

WMD incident. The FBI regularly conducts or participates in WMD 

response exercises, having taken part in over 900 exercises from FY 2005 

through FY 2009. FBI field offices track their participation in exercises, 

although after action reports based on the exercises are not consistently 

prepared. 

However, neither the Department nor the components within the 

Department have implemented adequate WMD response plans. 

The Department has not designated an entity or individual to provide 

central oversight of WMD-related activities, and responsibility for 

management of the Department’s response program is uncoordinated. 

The Department has not updated its policies to reflect recent national 

policies, existing policies have not been fully implemented, and we found 

no Department policies or plans for responding to a WMD incident. 

Aside from the FBI, the Department’s other law enforcement 

components’ preparations for responding to a WMD incident are also 

lacking. Officials of ATF, the DEA, and the USMS all indicated that they 

would support the FBI’s response to a WMD incident. However, none of 

these components has specific WMD operational response plans, 

provides training for responding to a WMD incident, or regularly 

participates in WMD response exercises. We found the response 

planning among all the components, including the FBI, to be 

inconsistent and not well coordinated. 

In addition, the Department has not adequately prepared to 

coordinate federal law enforcement activities if it is called upon to ensure 

public safety and security in accordance with ESF-13 in the event of a 

WMD incident. A Concept of Operations Plan proposed in January 2008 

to guide the Department in implementing its ESF-13 responsibilities was 

still in draft as of March 2010. ATF has not assigned adequate staff to 

ensure all ESF-13 planning and coordination activities required by the 

National Response Framework are carried out. ATF has not provided 

adequate training in ESF-13 responsibilities to its own staff or personnel 
 

 

 

from other ESF-13 agencies. ATF also lacks comprehensive information 

on law enforcement resources that could be deployed during an incident. 

In the National Capital Region, coordination is aided by the regular 

preparations and cooperation required for the frequent special events in 

the region. However, other than the FBI, Department field offices in the 

NCR have no WMD-specific response plans or training and have not 

participated in WMD-specific exercises. Moreover, we found a lack of 

awareness regarding the Department’s ESF-13 responsibilities and ATF’s 

authority to serve as the lead coordinator for those activities, which could 

delay the execution of a coordinated federal law enforcement response in 

the event of a WMD incident in the NCR. 

In this report, we make five recommendations to help the 

Department better prepare to respond to a WMD incident and to fulfill its 

responsibilities under ESF-13. We recommend that the Department: 

1. Designate a person or office at the Department level with the 

authority to manage the Department’s WMD operational 

response program. 

2. Update its response policies and plan to conform them to the 

National Response Framework and the National Incident 

Management System. 

3. Require Department components to update their own policies 

and plans to reflect the updated Department guidance, and to 

reflect the need for adequate coordination among Department 

components in responding to WMD incident. 

4. Establish effective oversight to ensure that components 

maintain WMD response plans, participate in training and 

exercises, and implement a corrective action program in 

response to such exercises. 

5. Ensure that the Department is prepared to fulfill its emergency 

support function responsibilities under the National Response 

Framework, including reviewing the designation of ATF as the 

Department’s lead agency to coordinate public safety and 

security activities, approving a Concept of Operations Plan, and 

staffing national and regional coordinator positions. 

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APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW
 

The methodology used in this review consisted of interviews with 

officials from the Department and its components, document review, 

data analysis, and observation of component training. In addition, site 

visits were conducted at the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group and 

facilities in Quantico, Virginia, and at the FBI and ATF field offices in the 

National Capital Region. 

Interviews 

To obtain an overview of the Department and its components’ 

activities concerning operational response, we conducted 79 in-person 

and telephone interviews with personnel from the Department, the 

components included in the review, and other federal agencies. Table 4 

lists the individuals interviewed. 

Table 4: Officials Interviewed During the Review 

Organization Position 

Office of the 

Deputy Attorney 

General 

Special Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General 

Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General 

Justice 

Management 

Division 

Director, SEPS 

Associate Director, SEPS 

Attorney Advisor, SEPS 

Emergency Management Specialist, SEPS 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Policy, Management, and 

Planning 

National Security 

Division 

Assistant Attorney General 

Counsel 

National Crisis Management Coordinator, Counter Terrorism 

Section 

National Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Coordinator, Counter 

Terrorism Section 

Chief of Staff 

Criminal Division Director, Security and Operations Support 

Physical Security Specialist 

Emergency Management Specialist 

ATF Acting Assistant Director of Field Operations 

Special Agent in Charge and National ESF-13 Coordinator, Special 

Events Branch 

Deputy Chief, ATF Arson and Explosives Program Division 

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Organization Position 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Division 

ATF Counsel, Washington Field Division 

Program Manager, ATF Critical Incident Response Program 

Contractor, ATF Critical Incident Response Program 

Chief, ATF Office of Field Operations, Special Operations Division 

BOP Chief, Emergency Preparedness 

Emergency Management Specialist 

DEA Section Chief, Office of Emergency Management, Command 

Center and Emergency Preparedness Section 

Deputy Chief, Command Center and Crisis Preparedness Section 

Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Office 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Office 

EOUSA Attorney Advisor, Office of the Director 

Counsel, Emergency Management and Crisis Response, Office of 

the Director 

National Emergency Management Coordinator 

FBI Assistant Director, Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate 

Assistant Director, Critical Incident Response Group 

Section Chief, Critical Incident Response Group 

Supervisory Special Agent/Unit Chief, Crisis Management Unit 

Critical Incident Response Group 

Supervisory Special Agent, Crisis Management Unit Critical 

Incident Response Group 

Chief, Operations Support Branch, Crisis Management Unit 

Critical Incident Response Group 

Special Agent/Unit Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Directorate 

Unit Chief, Executive Strategy Unit, Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Directorate 

Unit Chief, WMD Operations Unit 1, Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Directorate 

Countermeasures and Preparedness Section Chief, Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Directorate 

Unit Chief, WMD Countermeasures Unit, Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Directorate 

Supervisory Special Agent, WMD Countermeasures Unit, Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Directorate 

Special Agent, FBI Liaison to DHS 

Assistant Director, FBI Laboratory Division, Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Directorate 

Chief, Operational Response Section, FBI Laboratory Division, 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate 

Unit Chief, National Preparedness Unit, Weapons of Mass 

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Organization Position 

Destruction Directorate 

Supervisory Special Agency, National Preparedness Unit, Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Directorate 

Unit Chief, Strategic Information Operations Center 

Unit Chief, Crisis Coordination Administration Unit, Strategic 

Information Operations Center 

Assistant Director, Operational Technology Division 

Supervisory Special Agent/Assistant Section Chief, Technical 

Programs Section, Operational Technology Division 

Unit Chief, Technical Programs Section, Operational Technology 

Division 

Supervisory Special Agent, National Capital Response Squad, 

Washington Field Office 

Special Agent in Charge, Counterterrorism Division, Washington 

Field Office 

Special Agent, National Capital Response Squad, Washington 

Field Office 

Office of Legal 

Counsel 

Special Counsel 

Office of Legal 

Policy 

Chief of Staff and Senior Counsel 

Management and Program Analyst 

USAO District of Washington, D.C., Assistant U.S. Attorney 

District of Maryland, Assistant U.S. Attorney 

Eastern District of Virginia, Assistant U.S. Attorney 

USMS Chief Inspector, Office of Emergency Management 

Inspector, Office of Emergency Management 

Deputy Assistant Director of Judicial Operations, Judicial 

Security Division 

Deputy Assistant Director of Judicial Services, Judicial Security 

Division 

Chief, Office of Security Systems, Judicial Security Division 

Assistant Chief Deputy for the District of Maryland 

Supervisory Deputy, United States Marshal, Washington, D.C., 

Superior Court 

Judicial Security Inspector, Deputy U.S. Marshal, District of 

Washington, D.C. 

Judicial Security Inspector, Eastern District of Virginia 

Department of 

Homeland Security 

Assistant Deputy Administrator, National Preparedness 

Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Associate Director, Office of National Capital Region Coordination, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Branch Chief, Operations Planning Branch, Disaster Operations 

Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

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Organization Position 

Director, 

General 

Preparedness and Mitigation, Office of the Inspector 

Inspector, Office of the Inspector General 

Assistant Administrator, 

Emergency Management 

National 

Agency 

Integration Center, Federal 

Director, Preparedness Policy, Planning, 

Emergency Management Agency 

and Analysis, Federal 

Document Reviews and Data Analyses 

We reviewed Homeland Security Presidential Directives, national 

policies, Department orders, and component policies pertaining to 

operational response. We also reviewed component training data to 

determine whether the Department or its components were providing the 

required training. 

We performed a quantitative analysis of the relevant interviewees’ 

responses to determine the extent to which the Department and its 

components have prepared to respond to a WMD incident. We also 

reviewed exercise data from the FBI in the review concerning WMD 

incidents to determine the frequency of participation in WMD-related 

exercises. We specifically requested that the FBI provide data regarding 

the exercises it had conducted that involved responding to a WMD 

incident. 

Site Visits 

We visited ATF and FBI field offices in the National Capital Region. 

The National Capital Region is composed of the District of Columbia and 

nearby jurisdictions in Virginia and Maryland. We also contacted by 

telephone the DEA and USMS field offices in the District of Columbia and 

Virginia, as well as the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in the District of Columbia, 

the Eastern District of Virginia, and Maryland. Because the FBI has a 

significant role in operational response, we also visited the FBI’s Critical 

Incident Response Group and the Operational Technology Division in 

Quantico, Virginia, to learn more about the FBI’s capabilities. In 

addition, we attended EOUSA’s Regional Security Specialist and Crisis 

Management Coordinator conference in Columbia, South Carolina. 

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APPENDIX II: EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND ESF 

COORDINATORS 

ESF-1 – Transportation 

ESF Coordinator: Department of Transportation 

•	 Aviation/airspace management and control 

•	 Transportation safety 

•	 Restoration and recovery of transportation infrastructure 

•	 Movement restrictions 

•	 Damage and impact assessment 

ESF-2 – Communications 

ESF Coordinator: DHS (National Communications System) 

•	 Coordination with telecommunications and information 

technology industries 

•	 Restoration and repair of telecommunications infrastructure 

•	 Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber and 

information technology resources 

•	 Oversight of communications within the federal incident 

management and response structures 

ESF-3 – Public Works and Engineering 

ESF Coordinator: Department of Defense (U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers) 

•	 Infrastructure protection and emergency repair 

•	 Infrastructure restoration 

•	 Engineering services and construction management 

•	 Emergency contracting support for life-saving and lifesustaining services 

ESF-4 – Firefighting 

ESF Coordinator: Department of Agriculture (U.S. Forest Service) 

•	 Coordination of federal firefighting activities 

•	 Support to wildland, rural, and urban firefighting operations 

ESF-5 – Emergency Management 

ESF Coordinator: DHS (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 

•	 Coordination of incident management and response efforts 

•	 Issuance of mission assignments 

•	 Resource and human capital 

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•	 Incident action planning 

•	 Financial management 

ESF-6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human 

Services 

ESF Coordinator: DHS (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 

•	 Mass care 

•	 Emergency assistance 

•	 Disaster housing 

•	 Human services 

ESF-7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support 

ESF Coordinator: General Services Administration and DHS (Federal 

Emergency Management Agency) 

•	 Comprehensive, national incident logistics planning, 

management, and sustainment capability 

•	 Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies, 

contracting services, etc.) 

ESF-8 – Public Health and Medical Services 

ESF Coordinator: Department of Health and Human Services 

•	 Public health 

•	 Medical 

•	 Mental health services 

•	 Mass fatality management 

ESF-9 – Search and Rescue 

ESF Coordinator: DHS (Federal Emergency Management Agency)
 

•	 Life-saving assistance 

•	 Search and rescue operations 

ESF-10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response 

ESF Coordinator: Environmental Protection Agency 

•	 Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological, 

etc.) response 

•	 Environmental short- and long-term cleanup 

ESF-11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources 

ESF Coordinator: Department of Agriculture 

•	 Nutrition assistance 

•	 Animal and plant disease and pest response 

•	 Food safety and security 

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•	 Natural and cultural resources and historic properties 

protection 

•	 Safety and well-being of household pets 

ESF-12 – Energy 

ESF Coordinator: Department of Energy 

•	 Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration 

•	 Energy industry utilities coordination 

•	 Energy forecast 

ESF-13 – Public Safety and Security 

ESF Coordinator: Department of Justice 

•	 Facility and resource security 

•	 Security planning and technical resource assistance 

•	 Public safety and security support 

•	 Support to access, traffic, and crowd control 

ESF-14 – Long-Term Community Recovery 

ESF Coordinator: DHS (Federal Emergency Management Agency)
 

•	 Social and economic community impact assessment 

•	 Long-term community recovery assistance to states, tribes, local 

governments, and the private sector 

•	 Analysis and review of mitigation program implementation 

ESF-15 – External Affairs 

ESF Coordinator: DHS 

•	 Emergency public information and protective action guidance 

•	 Media and community relations 

•	 Congressional and international affairs 

•	 Tribal and insular affairs 

Source: National Response Framework. 

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APPENDIX III: DEPARTMENT’S ESF-13 RESPONSIBILITIES 

Responsibility Department ESF-13 Responsibilities 

1 • Serves as the headquarters and regional-level ESF-13 coordinator 

and primary agency. 

• Represents the ESF-13 agencies on the ESF Leaders Group and the 

Regional Interagency Steering Committee. 

• Coordinates preparedness activities with ESF-13 supporting 

agencies. 

2 • Provides expertise on public safety and security issues to the 

Domestic Readiness Group, when requested. 

3 • Manages ESF-13 preparedness activities and conducts evaluation of 

operational readiness, including a roster and description of public 

safety and security activities. 

4 • Maintains close coordination during operations between the affected 

regional office(s), the National Response Coordination Center, other 

ESFs, local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and the National Joint 

Terrorism Task Force, as required. 

5 • Ensures that all activities performed under the purview of ESF-13 

are related to the mission of ESF-13. If any potential for conflict 

exists, it is the Department’s responsibility to resolve these issues 

prior to accepting the mission assignment. 

6 • Facilitates resolution of any conflicting demands for public safety 

and security resources, expertise, and other assistance. 

• Coordinates backup support from other geographical regions to the 

affected area. 

7 • Processes mission assignments, tracks resource allocation and use, 

and facilitates reimbursement to assisting departments and 

agencies via emergency management funding mechanisms and 

authorities, if appropriate. 

8 • Obtains initial situation assessment from field units and determines 

appropriate management response to anticipated or current 

requests for assistance. 

9 • Obtains and distributes incident contact information to supporting 

agency coordinators for emergency responders. 

10 • Assesses requests before committing resources, and ensures 

responding agencies are provided with information on known 

hazards, mission requirements, appropriate vaccinations, 

credentials, and personal protective equipment to operate in the 

environment to which they are assigned. 

Source: National Response Framework, Annex 13. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

50 
 

 

 

APPENDIX IV: THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 

RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

51 

u.s. J)cllartment or J ustice 

Office of the Deputy Allomey Gcncral 

1I.o\a) 25.2010 

The Honorable Glenn A. Fine 

JnSpl"ctor General 

U.S. Department of 1 ustiee 

950 Pennsylvania A venue, N. W. 

Washington. D.C. 20530 

Il l': Office or the JII J)(' or Gelll'r:IJ's RqJOrl O il the Ilqmrtmenl's J' rC[JllrHl iun 10 

R('spu ud 10 a Wea pons or Mass l)eslrUCliOIi (Wi\'1 D) J llcidl'nt 

Dear Mr. Fine: 

I am writing to provide the Dep:mlllcnl of Justiee's formal response to the abovereferenccd rcport. 

We appreciate the work of the Ollice of the Inspector General (DIG) in reviewing the 

way in which Department components havc prcpared to respond \0 a Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) incidclll. Prcventing terrorist attacks. including WMD attacks. is the 

Department's highcst priority. Thc Departmcnt has tasked the Fcdcnlll3ureau of Investigation 

(1'131) with lend responsibility for prcvcming WMD attacks in the United States and for 

responding to such attacks should they occur. FDI brings specialized investigatory. crl1ergenc~ 

response. and forensic capabilities to that endeavor. We agree with the O[G that the FBI has 

taken appropriate steps 10 preparc to respond to It potential WMD ,1!\ack and thm Ihe FD['s 

substantial training regime 10 investiglltc :l1ld pre\'cnt WMD threats is a benefit to the countr} . 

We also agree that the FOI is notlhe only Department entity responsible lor :lddrcssing WMD 

allae , and thllllhe entire Dcpanment must be prepared to respond cfTeet ivcly to a WM]) attack 

(or any other emergency event) should one occur. 

The Dcpanmelll believes Ihat the l'undamcnt:11 conclusion of lhe report is sound: Ihe 

Depllrtmenl of Justice should do more in order to lormall) and ccnlrally coordinate cmergeney 

response activities of all appropri:lle Dcpanment components. The o\'eroll reeommendlltions of 

the rcport strike uS os helpful and inlonnativc. WI.' CllllClir ill 111/ /i1'C r eCOlIIlIIl!lItillfilJlu. 111111 ... iff 

illlplc lII/.'1I1 111/ oj 'hI.' rl.'cmllllll.'lII/lIfiollS i ll 'he IIIl11l11er (k~cribell be/ow. 

We also nOle. howe\·er. the subslantial improvemenlS made during the paSI year in the 

capacity of the Department and its law cnforcernellt componenls to implemcnt Emcrgency 

Support Function il l) of the Nationlll Response Fmrnework. Progress in this regard has becn 

measurable lind wi!! continue as the Depanment's ESF-l) dUlies receive incrc;lsed funding in the 

future. Additionally. as Ihe report nOles.the ESF-13 limetion is designed to work relative to all 
 

 

 

Ilazards (i t'" natural disasters or terrorist cvents). Tile Burenu of f\lcohol. Toba~~o, I' i~arms 

and Explosives has tested its ESF- I 3 protocols on three occasions since 2006, and each occasion 

W:IS successful. 

The Departmem will respond quickly to the OIG·s n::eommend3tions wilh 3 series of 

aetiolls thnt will create a clearer and more fOrm31 system to ensure that all Justice Departmellt 

emergency response functions. continuity of operations progroms, alld cOlltilluity of go\"cnll1li:m 

programs arc up to dme. aligllcd with llatiOllal policies. and well-coordinated within the 

Dep.1rtmcnt. Spt:cilic3l1y, the Dep.1rtmenl intends to accomplish the 1"0110\\ ing tnsks in the 

coming weeks: 

I, T~ Acting Deputy Anomc), Geneml will issue a melllonlIldlllll to all compollellls 

idemifying nil individual in the Office o(the DepUt)' Anomer General (ODAG) 

responsible for ovcrseeing cllll"fgem:y rcsponse 3(;li"ities of Ihe Department. This 

individual \\ill serve as a single poim of comact wilhin the leadership officl.'s of the 

Departmcnt for nil emergency response ac tivities, will ensure that the Department's 

emergency response program is up to date, and will ensure tha! Departmenttrainillg 

acth'itics relative to emergency response functions are thorough and widely availablc 

to relevant Department components. 

2. The Department will create a new commillee of relevant Department componentS that 

will ensure that the Department's leadel'Jihip offices rceeivt' timely and thorough 

ad\'iee and r<:'eommrndations (Ibom emcrgeney response preparedness issues. 

J. The commillee noted nbove will be tasked to fCview Department policies and 

directives related to emergency response' functions. continuity of opt:rations and 

continuity o( government progrJffiS to ensure that the)' arc effective and up to date. 

This review will stretch beyond \\1M]) mailers (since the Dcpartment must be 

prepared to address a wide variety of potential emergencies) but \\IMD issues will be 

accounted for in the review. ODAG will ensure that the ])ep:'lrtlllenl'S W~ID 

emergency fCsponse eap(lbilities (Ire consistent with the Department'S other 

emergency response capabilities. 

We beliel'e that these actions wil! result in a stronger and durable system of cOccti\'e 

man(lgclntnt and ol'el'liight conlrols for emergency responsc (lcti\'ities. 

ames A. Baker 

Associate Deputy Allomey Gello:'ral 

, 

. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

52 
 

 

 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

53 

 

APPENDIX V: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY 

ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONSE 

The Office of the Inspector General provided a draft of this report to 

the Office of the Deputy Attorney General for its comment. The ODAG’s 

response is included in Appendix IV to this report. The OIG’s analysis of 

the ODAG’s response and the actions necessary to close the 

recommendations are discussed below. 

General Comment 

Summary of ODAG Comment. The ODAG response stated that 

there have been substantial improvements made during the past year in 

the capacity of the Department and its law enforcement components to 

implement Emergency Support Function-13 (ESF-13) of the National 

Response Framework. According to the ODAG, progress in this regard 

has been measurable and will continue as the Department’s ESF-13 

duties receive increased funding in the future. The ODAG also stated 

that the ESF-13 function is designed to work relative to all hazards (that 

is, natural disasters or terrorist events). Further, the ODAG response 

stated that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has 

tested its ESF-13 protocols on three occasions since 2006, and each 

occasion was successful. 

OIG Analysis. Our report describes many of the actions taken by 

the Department and ATF related to ESF-13. However, while we 

acknowledge these activities, it is important to note that none specifically 

involved a WMD incident. For example, according to ATF, since 2006 it 

has participated in at least 10 incidents where ESF-13 played a crucial 

role in coordinating a federal law enforcement response when state and 

local law enforcement agencies were overwhelmed. However, these 

incidents included six hurricanes, one tropical storm, one wildfire, and 

two floods. None involved responding to a WMD incident. 

Recommendation 1. Designate a person or office at the Department 

level with the authority to manage the Department’s WMD 

operational response program. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the ODAG Response. The ODAG concurred with 

this recommendation and stated that the Acting Deputy Attorney General 

will issue a memorandum to all components identifying an individual in 
 

 

 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

54 

 

the ODAG responsible for overseeing the emergency response activities of 

the Department. This individual will serve as a single point of contact 

within the leadership offices of the Department for all emergency 

response activities, will ensure that the Department’s emergency 

response program is up to date, and will ensure that Department 

training activities related to emergency response functions are thorough 

and widely available to relevant Department components. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ODAG are responsive to 

our recommendation. Please provide the OIG with a copy of the 

memorandum identifying the individual in the ODAG responsible for 

overseeing the emergency response activities of the Department. 

Recommendation 2. Update the Department’s response policies and 

plan to conform them to the National Response Framework and the 

National Incident Management System. 

Status. Resolved – open. 

Summary of the ODAG Response. The ODAG concurred with 

this recommendation and stated that the Department will respond 

quickly to the OIG’s recommendations with a series of actions that will 

create a clearer and more formal system to ensure that all Department 

emergency response functions, continuity of operations programs, and 

continuity of government programs are up to date, aligned with national 

policies, and well coordinated within the Department. 

Further, the Department will create a new committee of relevant 

Department components that will ensure that the Department’s 

leadership offices receive timely and thorough advice and 

recommendations about emergency response preparedness issues. The 

committee will be tasked to review Department policies and directives 

related to emergency response functions, continuity of operations and 

continuity of government programs to ensure that they are effective and 

up to date. The ODAG stated further that this review will stretch beyond 

WMD matters (since the Department must be prepared to address a wide 

variety of potential emergencies), but WMD issues will be accounted for 

in the review. The ODAG will ensure that the Department’s WMD 

emergency response capabilities are consistent with the Department’s 

other emergency response capabilities. 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ODAG are responsive to 

our recommendation. Please provide the OIG a copy of the Department’s 

new policies, directives, and a WMD plan that are in conformance with 
 

 

 

national policies and a list of the members of the committee of relevant 

Department components who will be responsible for emergency response 

preparedness issues. 

Recommendation 3. Require Department components to update 

their own policies and plans to reflect the updated Department 

guidance, and to reflect the need for adequate coordination among 

Department components in responding to WMD incident. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of the ODAG Response. The ODAG concurred with 

this recommendation. The ODAG stated in its response that the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation is not the only Department entity responsible for 

addressing WMD attacks and that the entire Department must be 

prepared to respond effectively to a WMD attack (or any other emergency 

event) should one occur. 

OIG Analysis. The ODAG’s response is partially responsive to our 

recommendation. The ODAG did not state that it will require 

Department components to update their own policies and plans to reflect 

the updated Department guidance, or to reflect the need for adequate 

coordination among Department components in responding to a WMD 

incident. Please provide the OIG a description of the actions Department 

components will take to revise their policies and plans to reflect the 

updated Department guidance and to reflect the need for adequate 

coordination among the components in responding to a WMD incident. 

Recommendation 4. Establish effective oversight to ensure that 

components maintain WMD response plans, participate in training 

and exercises, and implement a corrective action program in 

response to such exercises. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of the ODAG Response. The ODAG concurred with 

this recommendation and stated in its response that the Department 

should do more to formally and centrally coordinate emergency response 

activities of all appropriate Department components. The ODAG stated 

that the individual assigned responsibility for overseeing emergency 

response activities will ensure that Department training activities related 

to emergency response functions are thorough and widely available to 

relevant Department components. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

55 
 

 

 

 

 

OIG Analysis. The actions planned by the ODAG are partially 

responsive to our recommendation. The response does not address the 

maintenance of WMD response plans, participation in exercises, or the 

implementation of a corrective action program in response to such 

exercises. Please provide the OIG with the actions planned to ensure 

that the components maintain WMD response plans, participate in 

training and exercises, and implement a corrective action program in 

response to such exercises. 

Recommendation 5. Ensure that the Department is prepared to 

fulfill its emergency support function responsibilities under the 

National Response Framework, including reviewing the designation 

of ATF as the Department’s lead agency to coordinate public safety 

and security activities, approving a Concept of Operations Plan, and 

staffing national and regional coordinator positions. 

Status. Unresolved – open. 

Summary of the ODAG Response. The ODAG concurred with 

this recommendation and noted in its response that there have been 

substantial improvements made during the past year in the capacity of 

the Department and its law enforcement components to implement 

Emergency Support Function 13 of the National Response Framework. 

The ODAG stated that progress in this regard has been measurable and 

will continue as the Department’s ESF-13 duties receive increased 

funding in the future. The ODAG stated that the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has tested its ESF-13 protocols on 

three occasions since 2006 and each occasion was successful. 

OIG Analysis. The ODAG’s response is partially responsive to our 

recommendation. While the ODAG in its response stated that ATF has 

tested its ESF-13 protocols on three occasions since 2006, and each 

occasion was successful, none of these tests involved a response to a 

WMD incident. The response also did not specifically indicate how the 

Department will ensure that it is prepared to fulfill its emergency support 

function responsibilities under the National Response Framework. 

Further, the response did not address whether the Department plans to: 

•	 review the designation of ATF as the Department’s lead agency to 

coordinate public safety and security activities, 

•	 approve a Concept of Operations Plan, or 

•	 staff the national and regional coordinator positions. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

56 
 

 

 

Please provide the OIG with information on how the Department 

plans to ensure that it is prepared to fulfill its emergency support 

function responsibilities under the National Response Framework, 

including whether it plans to review ATF’s designation as the 

Department’s lead agency for ESF-13 matters, its plans for finalizing and 

approving a Concept of Operations Plan, and its plans for staffing all the 

national and regional coordinator positions. 

Please provide the OIG with the information described above in 

each recommendation, or the status of the planned actions, by July 30, 

2010. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

57 
 

 

 

APPENDIX VI: THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 

RESPONSE TO DRAFT REPORT 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

58 

U. . S. S, Ofp Otpaartmtt nl oof r JuJ ustioe stice 

Drua OnIa Eafoo:em~nt Earon:em~nI AdmininralioD Admininr. ,i"D 

....... dro.go.' w .... ..... ngron. D,C D.C. . 205)1 lOB1 

MA~Y Y 1 9 1010. , 

ME ME,\M1ORMpVM ORANWIM 

Mu:!. .. 1 D. GwJedSC 

........... """, lnspcI:lor 

for I ... Gmcnl ion orod lnJpe<1ions Divi ...... 

Office of!he I .. pee .... GcnmoI 

Fl\O FROM, M: " ... ,nM. foley . l--" 

Aobn, O<-pu.~ Chio~ Offi<-<, of InspcI:lKNu 

SUIlJECT ECT, , DEA', 11. R"""""", ... """'" 10 the !he OIG 0113 "'.If Oraft Dfaft 

v..,,,,,,,-

lI.epor\ R"""n: R ... e>~ it-w ""M of'~ Dtpa_'s Dtpan-.u ~ """"",Ii"" I'"""",ti"" 

'" RRupooNi up"nd", '" " ~ W_ wMpIM "'Man On".",,,;,,,, I«ilkn' Inrl<k~' 

",. The DruJ Dtus Enforutn<ft' Enfo<=n«ll J\<lmmiotnolion i\dminI"",1ion (DEAl "-c.. """"'ed "' ...... '0<1 "'" the O<puun<l11 ~ of lllSlio.o J",,;« (ool) (DO/) Offioc: 

ofllx oflho Impo<lOr WpI'<IOl' 11'",_ 0rn<RI", GrnmI'1 (0113) (OIG) Draft DrIft 1\(pOII R(pOrl u~«I. uaod. It R ... , i ... , ""M "'1M Dtpllfl1llrnl"s DtpllfImrnl:' i'r<pIlI"tl/Wfr Pr<ptUGIWtr 10 kI 

R<>pOIId Rupc-w/ .. '" a ~ wMpIM of.lf .lfan an Dts,_~ Du"'"m'"" "" 1",,1,"",. I",U ... ,. ,j.]i){)9..(}i)6 A·~ . Allbouill!he: AllIIougll the ~ons ~""" in 

llu. W' r<pJ<1 '"""" arc ate d,rected d"'«1ed '" '<> DOl. DOl, DE.>. DEA 1'" provi&:> .. ;00 Ih< the follo";nl f<>llo";n." I"onn.ol fi:onn,ol .... response ponoe 1O..w,..,... '0 o.ddr<so. portion po<tion of 

!he the rcpon ..... that DEA DE.>. """"iden """,idt-n 1""""",,,,<. inocanl<. 

s" s~ "'p",,,n, .-pmr.~' ",b" MA" tht~aI at IAtb~ ~ f'BI Bf "IuI8'/)' ,uf~'lf "",4",,. ClMdu<" '" panldpa parrldpat6/tt ln I~ "'" ".'IDID ...",.... _ .. a _~ ... :ba, 

".,.;1. pap JI. 

DtA RR.,poa n poo .. : , DE.>. D~ putici.,.,cd putici .... cd in >c>enl ~ ~.uo.w ~.uc-t Le<."d te--.I WMD ... uaci-. ad_ 0., On)""" June 22 and ond 

lJ. 2J, lOOl. 2OOl. DEA DE.>. n'lPP rn~ and ond dtployod dq>loycd 69 69 pmonnd penonnel in N.,ionai Notional w 'oI EAad"" E.. .... i .. "P""""Ic" "PiMo<:!e" 

(Oo!bteal: (~of of A Avian ..... Inn lnn ....... ond orod 1m"On" terron" thnoaIs _ .. of. of. WWMD MD .'lACk olllcl:). , In """jUDe",," _i_lion wi with th Ih< the 

.. ... era era>< .. oa:nario. ocerwio, the DEI. DEA Dopul)' DepuIy Admini_ Admini.....,.. """ "",".mod .. nod with DE!. DEA ladtnhip lta6tnhip lind onoI """"""led oonducIo<I 

brier...,. brier."" "'=, .. ",pnI;n8 ~ptd'n8 an oaen<Ytmttll¢l>tY ~~ ....,.,.,.., response 10 the f.Obl...", ubI ...... .. 

•• aci ad ... ... ............ p","""" , 10 !he: .... 

"' .... , .. S<en&rio. soc:nario, OEA DE!. lead"""'p, l.e>d<nlup, 10 "",I..o.1h< i"do.de the Deputy Dqouty Admini.In"", Adm"u.tn"'" and ond Ih< the AdmonillnlOr. AdmuuJ<ntor. 

rl<ployod deployod 10 cmcrsmcy <n"I<rs<Roy .ll":m' &ll<mlIl< ''' 1..,.,iorIs """''" .... 10 ,., funher funh,:,. "'II&" tr\lII&< In in Ihe the .... ""ad aci .. 1OUI.lIio. scenario. 

On J June .... 21. 2006, 2006. DEA DEI. m,..., ... gap ond orod depk»'od d<pk»td 6<1 penonn<l penonnel in in N.IionaI, .tiOIIIl Le\Id .. >'d Eutcl Eurci .. 

"f""''lJd -r ..... "Onl 

= 

Challrn ClIolI""ge·· ..... PEA DE.>. I..oodenhip. Load<niup. 10 include i""I..o. the tho Dq>uIy Dqouty Admini ......... participated part,,;patcd in 

Ihi Qu.... . e>aci ... ... 
 

 

 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

59 
 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX VII: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
 

ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE
 

The Office of the Inspector General provided a copy of this draft 

report to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General for comment. A copy 

of the report was also provided to the Drug Enforcement Administration. 

The DEA provided general comments on one area of the report. The DEA 

did not respond to the recommendations because they were directed to 

the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. The DEA’s response is 

included in Appendix VI of this report. The OIG’s analyses of the DEA’s 

general comments are discussed below. 

Summary of the DEA Response. In response to the OIG’s 

conclusion that no Department component other than the FBI regularly 

conducts or participates in WMD response exercises, the DEA stated that 

it participated in several National Level Exercises to respond to a WMD 

incident. Specifically, DEA stated that on June 22 and 23, 2005, it 

engaged in the National Level Exercise “Pinnacle,” which was an exercise 

to respond to an outbreak of avian influenza and terrorist threats of a 

WMD attack. During the exercise, DEA leadership conducted briefings 

regarding an agency emergency response to the exercise and deployed to 

emergency alternate locations to further engage in the exercise scenario. 

In addition, on June 21, 2006, DEA leaders participated in the National 

Level Exercise “Forward Challenge that involved a WMD scenario.” Also, 

the DEA deployed personnel to emergency relocation sites as part of 

National Level Exercises in 2007 and 2008 that dealt with WMD 

scenarios. The DEA stated that it had provided this information to the 

OIG to update the draft report, but the information was not included. 

OIG Analysis. The OIG did not include this information in the 

report because the DEA’s participation in these National Level Exercises 

was limited to exercising elements of its Continuity of Operations Plan 

(COOP). In fact, National Level Exercises “Pinnacle” and “Forward 

Challenge” were designed by the Department of Homeland Security 

specifically to test COOP preparedness, not the operational response to a 

WMD incident, which was the subject covered by our report. Similarly, 

the DEA’s deployment of personnel to relocation sites as part of National 

Level Exercises in 2007 and 2008 was related to testing its COOP 

preparedness. As we informed the DEA, and made clear in our report, 

COOP preparedness, including the participation in COOP-related 

exercises, is not the subject of this report. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

60 
 

 

 

 

In addition, we note that during our interviews with DEA 

emergency management officials, they had stated that the DEA did not 

participate in the emergency response operations portion of the National 

Level Exercises and that the DEA had not participated in any exercise 

that included an on-site simulation of a WMD incident. Furthermore, 

the DEA was not listed as a participant in the National Level Exercises of 

2005 (TOPOFF 3) or of 2007 (TOPOFF 4), which were the National Level 

Exercises that involved responding to a WMD incident. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Evaluation and Inspections Division 

61