alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 44.53 Amended modification. ( a ) The Administrator may propose to revise the terms and conditions of a granted modification by issuing an amended proposed decision and order, along with a statement of reasons for the amended proposed decision and order, when one or both of the following occurs: ( 1 ) A change in circumstances which originally supported the terms and conditions of the modification.
( 2 ) The Administrator determines that findings which originally supported the terms and conditions of the modification are no longer valid.
( b ) The Administrator's amended proposed decision and order shall be served upon all parties to the proceeding and shall become final upon the 30th day after service thereof, unless a request for hearing on the proposed amendments is filed under § 44.14. If a request for hearing is filed, the amended proposed decision and order shall be subject to all procedures of subparts C through E of this part as if it were a proposed decision and order of the Administrator issued in accordance with § 44.13. The original modification shall remain in effect until superseded by a final amended modification.
( c ) In cases where the original decision and order was based upon an alternative method of achieving the result of the standard, the amended decision and order shall at all times provide to miners at the mine at least the same measure of protection afforded to the miners at the mine by such standard. In cases where the original decision and order was based upon a diminution of safety to the miners resulting from application of the standard at such time, the amended decision and order shall not reduce the protection afforded miners by the original decision and order.
[55 FR 53443, Dec. 28, 1990]
#### § 550.1402 Definitions.

Terms used in this subpart have the following meaning:

*Case file* means a BOEM document file containing information and the record of evidence related to the alleged violation.

*Civil penalty* means a fine. It is a BOEM regulatory enforcement tool used in addition to Notices of Incidents of Noncompliance and directed suspensions of production or other operations.

*Reviewing Officer* means a BOEM employee assigned to review case files and assess civil penalties.

*Violation* means failure to comply with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) or any other applicable laws, with any regulations issued under the OCSLA, or with the terms or provisions of leases, licenses, permits, rights-of-way, or other approvals issued under the OCSLA.

*Violator* means a person responsible for a violation.
###### Editorial Note on Part 250

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 250 appear at 77 FR 50891, Aug. 22, 2012.

#### §§ 250.877-250.879 [Reserved]
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16
- 6306

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. LAVONTE LAMONT HALLMAN , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina , at Charlotte

. Max O. Cogburn, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:12

- cr
- 00097

- MOC

- DCK

- 1; 3:15

- cv
00468

- MOC )

Submitted : July 27 , 2017 Decided: July 31, 2017

Before AGEE and FLOYD , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Lavonte Lamont Hallman, Appellant Pro Se. John George Guise, COPELAND RICHARDS, Davidson, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Lavonte Lamont Hallman appeal s the district court’s order denying relief on his 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion

. Hallman challenges his career offender designation based

on Johnson v. United States ,
__ U.S.

__ , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which declar ed the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act unconstitutionally vague. * Hallman’s argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’ s recent decision that the Sentencing Guidelines, including the career offender residual clause, “are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause.” Beckles v. United States,

__ U.S.

__ , 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

* Before this court, Hallman clarifies that he believes he is entitled to relief under our decisions in United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793 (4th Cir. 2016), and United States v. Billups, 652 F. App’x 157 (4th Cir. 2016). These cases do not apply to Hallm an as they address armed career criminal designations under the Armed Career Criminal Act, not career offender designations.
<PAGE>



Exhibit 99.1        Officer's Certificate regarding Annual Statement of
                    Compliance of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.

                   WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP.
                              OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE

The undersigned officer of Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp., a
Delaware corporation (the "Company") hereby certifies on behalf of the Company
and on his own behalf for purposes of the WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2004-AR9, as follows:

1. I am a duly appointed and qualified First Vice President of the Company.

2. Capitalized terms used and not defined herein shall have the meanings
ascribed to such terms in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement related to the
above-referenced series of Certificates.

3. I am duly authorized to execute and deliver this Officer's Certificate on
behalf of the Company.

4. A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the preceding
calendar year and performance under this Agreement has been made under my
supervision.

5. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has
fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement throughout such year.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed my name as of March 29, 2005.





                   WASHINGTON MUTUAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP.


                     By: /s/ Thomas G. Lehmann
                         -------------------------------------
                         Thomas G. Lehmann
                         First Vice President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         575,704
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     40,575
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               776,479
<PP&E>                                      13,464,583
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,386,220
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              14,209,526
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,286,039
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        60,678
<OTHER-SE>                                      92,918
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                14,209,526
<SALES>                                        682,325
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               682,325
<CGS>                                          850,029
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,153,503
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             333,126
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (804,304)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (804,304)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (804,304)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.15)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.15)


</TABLE>
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, United States Senior C ircuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 5 2001 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT ROGER L. (BUCKY) MOORE, and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 00-3219

v. District of Kansas BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Defendants - Appellees. (D.C. No. 99-CV-1214-JTM)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, REAVLEY ** , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges. Plaintiff-appellant Roger Moore appeals from summary judgment against his claims that his collective bargaining represent ative (Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers) and his employer (Union Pacif ic Railroad) colluded to violate his rights to fair representation and his r ights under the union constitution.1 See New York Dock Ry. v. United States , 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979).
2 See 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (i). -2- The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdi ction for several reasons and that Moore’s fair-representation claim is barred by the union membership’s ratification of the implementing agreement between Brotherhood a nd Union Pacific. The court also stated that the defendants would be enti tled to summary judgment. We affirm for the following reason. Moore has presented no evidence beyond the union ag reement itself in support of his fair-representation claim or his cla im to seniority rights. Likewise, he has offered no evidence that Union Pacific acted inappropriately. Therefore, his fair-representation claim fails. For the same reason, no violation of the union constitution is presented. However, our holding does not preclude a claim that the collective bargaining agreements were unfair to Moore or sugge st any decision as to whether that claim could be arbitrable under the New York Dock conditions, 1 or before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. 2 AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT Thomas M. Reavley Senior Circuit Judge
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12

- 41430 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
PHILLIP EDWARD BAKER , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 3:11

- CR

- 8

- 1

Before WIENER, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Phillip Edward Baker was convicted following a bench trial of receipt of child pornography, access with intent to view child pornography, and possession of child pornography and sentenced to a 135

- month term of imprisonment and a life

- term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 252A(a)(2)(B), (a)(5)(B), (b)(2)

. Baker challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence and challenges the

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED February 13, 2014 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 12-41430 Document: 00512531958 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/13/2014No. 12

- 41430
district court’s admission of exhibits consisting of utility bills and bank
statements found at the residence

. The district court did not err in determining that the information set forth in the affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant was not stale. See United States v. Allen , 625 F.3d 830, 842

- 43 (5th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Craig , 861 F.2d 818, 822

- 23 (5th Cir. 1988)

. Baker has not demonstrated plain error with respect to his argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that an attachment describing the items to be searched for and seized was not attached to the search wa rrant, rendering the warrant constitutionally deficient. See United States v. Scroggins , 599 F.3d 433, 448 (5th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Rodriguez , 602 F.3d 346, 361 (5th Cir. 2010)

. Finally, the d istrict court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Baker’s objection to the admission of the exhibits. See United States v. Garcia, 530 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Arrington , 618 F.2d 1119, 1126 (5th Cir. 1980)

. AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 12-41430 Document: 00512531958 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/13/2014
§ 28.1 Purpose. This part: ( a ) Establishes administrative procedures for imposing civil penalties and assessments against persons who make, submit, or present, or cause to be made, submitted, or presented, false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims or written statements to Federal authorities or to their agents; and
( b ) Specifies the hearing and appeal rights of persons subject to allegations of liability for such penalties and assessments. Hearings under this part shall be conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act pursuant to part 26, subpart B, of this chapter.
[61 FR 50213, Sept. 24, 1996, as amended at 73 FR 76831, Dec. 17, 2008]
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 6089** 

CLYDE OWEN DAY, JR. , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from th e United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk
. Rebecca Beach Smith , Chief District Judge. ( 2:11

- cv - 00079

- RBS

- DEM )

Submitted : February 23, 2012 Decided: February 28, 2012

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and DIAZ , Circuit Judge s.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Clyde Owen Day, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Kathleen Beatty Martin, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PE R CURIAM: Clyde Owen Day, Jr., seeks to appeal the district
court ’ s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the district court ’ s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (A) (2006) ; Reid v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004).
A certificate of appealability will not iss ue absent “ a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. ” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisone r must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Da y has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss3 the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argume nt would not aid the decisional
process.

DISMISSED
#### § 56.7055 Intersecting holes.

Holes shall not be drilled where there is a danger of intersecting a misfired hole or a hole containing explosives blasting agents, or detonators.

[56 FR 46508, Sept. 12, 1991]
### §41724. Musical instruments

(a) In General.—

(1) Small instruments as carry-on baggage.—An air carrier providing air transportation shall permit a passenger to carry a violin, guitar, or other musical instrument in the aircraft cabin, without charging the passenger a fee in addition to any standard fee that carrier may require for comparable carry-on baggage, if—

(A) the instrument can be stowed safely in a suitable baggage compartment in the aircraft cabin or under a passenger seat, in accordance with the requirements for carriage of carry-on baggage or cargo established by the Administrator; and

(B) there is space for such stowage at the time the passenger boards the aircraft.

(2) Larger instruments as carry-on baggage.—An air carrier providing air transportation shall permit a passenger to carry a musical instrument that is too large to meet the requirements of paragraph (1) in the aircraft cabin, without charging the passenger a fee in addition to the cost of the additional ticket described in subparagraph (E), if—

(A) the instrument is contained in a case or covered so as to avoid injury to other passengers;

(B) the weight of the instrument, including the case or covering, does not exceed 165 pounds or the applicable weight restrictions for the aircraft;

(C) the instrument can be stowed in accordance with the requirements for carriage of carry-on baggage or cargo established by the Administrator;

(D) neither the instrument nor the case contains any object not otherwise permitted to be carried in an aircraft cabin because of a law or regulation of the United States; and

(E) the passenger wishing to carry the instrument in the aircraft cabin has purchased an additional seat to accommodate the instrument.

(3) Large instruments as checked baggage.—An air carrier shall transport as baggage a musical instrument that is the property of a passenger traveling in air transportation that may not be carried in the aircraft cabin if—

(A) the sum of the length, width, and height measured in inches of the outside linear dimensions of the instrument (including the case) does not exceed 150 inches or the applicable size restrictions for the aircraft;

(B) the weight of the instrument does not exceed 165 pounds or the applicable weight restrictions for the aircraft; and

(C) the instrument can be stowed in accordance with the requirements for carriage of carry-on baggage or cargo established by the Administrator.

(b) Regulations.—Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall issue final regulations to carry out subsection (a).

(c) Effective Date.—The requirements of this section shall become effective on the date of issuance of the final regulations under subsection (b).

(Added Pub. L. 112–95, title IV, §403(a), Feb. 14, 2012, 126 Stat. 84.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The date of enactment of this section, referred to in subsec. (b), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 112–95, which was approved Feb. 14, 2012.

Final regulations, referred to in subsecs. (b) and (c), were issued Dec. 29, 2014, effective Mar. 6, 2015. See 80 F.R. 161.
### [§5330. Repealed. Pub. L. 112–141, div. B, §20030(e), July 6, 2012, 126 Stat. 731]

Section, Pub. L. 103–272, §1(d), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 831; Pub. L. 109–59, title III, §§3002(b)(4), 3029(a), Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1545, 1625, related to State safety oversight of certain rail fixed guideway public transportation systems.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Pub. L. 112–141, div. B, §20030(e), July 6, 2012, 126 Stat. 731, provided that the repeal of this section is effective 3 years after the effective date of the final rules issued by the Secretary of Transportation under section 5329(e) of this title. Such effective date is Apr. 15, 2016, see 81 F.R. 14230.
### §13708. Billing and collecting practices

(a) Disclosure.—A motor carrier subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I of chapter 135 shall disclose, when a document is presented or electronically transmitted for payment to the person responsible directly to the motor carrier for payment or agent of such responsible person, the actual rates, charges, or allowances for any transportation service and shall also disclose, at such time, whether and to whom any allowance or reduction in charges is made.

(b) False or Misleading Information.—No person may cause a motor carrier to present false or misleading information on a document about the actual rate, charge, or allowance to any party to the transaction.

(c) Allowances for Services.—When the actual rate, charge, or allowance is dependent upon the performance of a service by a party to the transportation arrangement, such as tendering a volume of freight over a stated period of time, the motor carrier shall indicate in any document presented for payment to the person responsible directly to the motor carrier that a reduction, allowance, or other adjustment may apply.

(Added Pub. L. 104–88, title I, §103, Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 873.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 10767 of this title prior to the general amendment of this subtitle by Pub. L. 104–88, §102(a).

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Jan. 1, 1996, except as otherwise provided in Pub. L. 104–88, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as a note under section 1301 of this title.