COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Lemons and Frank 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

MALCOLM LARICE WILLIAMS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1928-98-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK 

 FEBRUARY 29, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 

 Andrew G. Wiggin (Edward W. Webb, Assistant 

Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. 

 Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Malcolm Larice Williams (appellant) appeals his conviction of 

unlawful wounding. On appeal, he contends that the trial court: 

1) abused its discretion in refusing to admit opinion testimony 

from an expert witness for the defense, 2) erred in refusing to 

allow cross-examination of a witness for the Commonwealth 

regarding an incident that occurred after the offense, and 3) 

erred in refusing to allow testimony from a witness for the 

defense regarding the incident that occurred after the offense. 

We disagree and affirm the conviction. 
I. BACKGROUND 

 Appellant and Canute Brown (victim) fought at a party on the 

evening of August 17, 1997. The fight, which occurred outside, 

was broken up and the two men separated. Appellant went into a 

house while the victim prepared to leave the party. Then, 

appellant came out of the house carrying a knife. He approached 

the victim and the two men fought again. Before the fight was 

broken up, appellant cut the victim on the shoulder with the 

knife. The victim got into his car to leave, and appellant 

shattered the driver's side window of the vehicle. Particles of 

glass fell onto the victim. 

 Before the police arrived, appellant fled the scene. Officer 

Hendricks of the Virginia Beach Police Department testified that 

when he arrived at the party the victim had a laceration on his 

left shoulder that was five or six inches in length. The 

paramedics arrived shortly after the police. Jasen White, a 

volunteer with the Virginia Beach Rescue Squad, treated the victim 

at the scene. He testified that the victim did not answer when 

asked if he had been stabbed. He reported the victim's injury as 

an abrasion that was six to eight inches in length with minor 

bleeding. The trial court permitted White to testify as to his 

concept of an abrasion. White described an abrasion as similar to 

the wound a person receives when he or she falls and scrapes his 

or her knee. 

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 On September 30, 1997, Officer Monteiro of the Virginia Beach 

Police Department questioned appellant about the incident at the 

party. Officer Monteiro read appellant his Miranda rights, and 

appellant agreed to talk with the officer. Initially, appellant 

only admitted to fighting with the victim and shattering the car 

window. He denied having a knife and cutting the victim. After 

further questioning, appellant admitted to getting a knife but 

denied using it. 

 A second incident between appellant and the victim occurred a 

few days after the party. At trial, counsel for appellant 

attempted to cross-examine a witness for the Commonwealth about 

the second incident. The Commonwealth objected on the ground of 

relevance. Counsel for appellant argued that the witness' 

testimony would go to state of mind and motive to fabricate. The 

trial judge sustained the objection. Counsel for appellant did 

not make a proffer of the witness' testimony. Later, counsel for 

appellant attempted to recall a defense witness to testify about 

the second incident. The Commonwealth objected. Counsel for 

appellant proffered the witness' testimony, but the trial judge 

sustained the objection on the basis that the testimony would be 

prejudicial to the Commonwealth because the Commonwealth's 

witnesses had been released and there was no opportunity for 

rebuttal. 

 The jury convicted appellant of unlawful wounding, and he was 

sentenced to serve five years in the state penitentiary. 

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II. ANALYSIS 

 Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court: 1) abused 

its discretion in refusing to admit opinion testimony from an 

expert witness for the defense, 2) erred in refusing to permit 

cross-examination of a witness for the Commonwealth regarding an 

incident that occurred after the offense, and 3) erred in refusing 

to permit testimony from a witness for the defense regarding the 

incident that occurred after the offense. We disagree and affirm 

the conviction. 

 "The admissibility of evidence lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. A trial court's evidentiary 

rulings will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of 

discretion is shown." Mack v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 5, 7, 454 

S.E.2d 750, 751 (1986) (citing Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 

88, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986)). 

The admission of expert testimony is 

committed to the sound discretion of the 

trial judge, and we will reverse a trial 

court's decision only where that court has 

abused its discretion. Nonetheless, expert 

testimony is inadmissible on any subject on 

which the ordinary lay person of average 

intelligence is equally capable of reaching 

his or her own conclusion. 

Brown v. Corbin, 244 Va. 528, 531, 423 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1992) 

(citation omitted). 

 Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that Jasen White, the 

volunteer for the Virginia Beach Rescue Squad, could not testify 

as an expert witness that the victim's wound was inconsistent with 

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a knife wound because he was not qualified to give opinion 

testimony. The trial judge, however, permitted White to describe 

the wound as an abrasion. 

 We hold that the trial court did not err in excluding White's 

opinion testimony. We find, based on the detailed description of 

the wound, that expert testimony was unnecessary in this case. 

"[T]he ordinary lay person of average intelligence," id., based on 

the description of the wound, could have determined whether the 

injury was inflicted by a knife. Therefore, such determination 

was within the province of the jury. 

 Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to 

permit him to cross-examine one of the Commonwealth's witnesses 

regarding an incident that occurred several days after the party. 

At trial, however, appellant did not proffer the witness' 

testimony when the trial court sustained the objection. 

 "When an objection is sustained and evidence is rejected, 

it is incumbent upon the proponent of the evidence to make a 

proffer of the expected answer; otherwise, the appellate court 

has no means of determining if the evidence is material or 

otherwise admissible." Speller v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 437, 

440, 345 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1986) (citing Blue Cross v. 

Commonwealth, 221 Va. 349, 357, 269 S.E.2d 827, 832 (1980)). 

 We find that appellant's appeal of this issue is 

procedurally barred because he did not proffer the testimony of 

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the witness at the time the trial court sustained the objection 

to the evidence. 

 Appellant challenges the trial court's refusal to permit 

him to recall a defense witness to testify about the incident 

that occurred several days after the victim was injured at the 

party. 

 "A trial court exercises discretion in deciding whether to 

permit the recall of witnesses for further examination." Avocet 

Development Corp. v. McLean, 234 Va. 658, 669, 364 S.E.2d 757, 

764 (1988) (citation omitted). 

 The trial court refused to permit appellant to recall the 

witness because the Commonwealth had released its witnesses for 

rebuttal based on an earlier ruling by the trial court. The 

trial court ruled that permitting recall of the witness would be 

prejudicial to the Commonwealth. 

 The Commonwealth released its witnesses before the defense 

rested and did so at its own peril. However, appellant had the 

opportunity to question the witness about the incident during 

direct examination. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion 

by the trial court. 

 For these reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction. 

Affirmed.

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