J-A14024-14

* Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

JUAN MIGUEL SERRANO-TORRES, 

 Appellant No. 1586 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of August 7, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002943-2012 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 30, 2014 

Appellant, Juan Miguel Serrano-Torres, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on August 7, 2013. We affirm. 

The factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. On April 

12, 2012, Appellant and Josue Figueroa (“Figueroa”) were loitering in a 

courtyard. A vehicle occupied by the victim and another individual soon 

pulled up near the courtyard. The victim and Figueroa then engaged in a 

drug transaction. While the victim was walking away, Appellant shot him in 

the back. Figueroa then searched the victim’s pockets and removed items 

therefrom. 

Eventually, Figueroa was arrested for suspicion of committing the 

above described crime. During questioning by police, Figueroa implicated 

several individuals who turned out to not be involved. Eventually, Figueroa 
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implicated Appellant as the triggerman. Appellant was arrested on April 19, 

2012 at approximately 7:15 a.m. Appellant initially invoked his right to 

counsel and officers ceased their interviews; however, at approximately 6:45 

p.m. that same day, he waived his right to counsel. Police then played 

Figueroa’s recorded statement to Appellant. After hearing a portion of 

Figueroa’s statement, Appellant confessed to killing the victim. 

On July 31, 2012, Appellant was charged via criminal information with 

criminal homicide,1

 robbery,2 criminal conspiracy,3 and carrying a firearm 

without a license.4

 On July 23, 2013, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial 

motion which included a motion to suppress the statement he gave to police. 

On August 5, 2013, a suppression hearing was held at the conclusion of 

which the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. On August 7, 

2013, a jury found Appellant guilty of second-degree murder,5

 robbery, 

criminal conspiracy, and carrying a firearm without a license. The trial court 

 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501. 

2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701. 

3

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903. 

4

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106. 

5

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b). 
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sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole. This timely appeal followed.6

 

 Appellant raises two issues for our review: 

1. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s pre[-] 

trial motion to suppress his statements? 

2. Whether the evidence presented was insufficient as a matter 

of law to enable t[he] jury to convict Appellant of the charges 

in the above captioned case? 

Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

 In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress his statement given to police. He argues 

that “the duration and circumstances of Appellant’s detention prior to his 

confession rendered his subsequent waiver of Miranda rights invalid and his 

confession involuntary.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. 

“In addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression 

motion, we are limited to determining whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 89 A.3d 679, 683 

 

6

 On September 5, 2013, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On September 10, 2013, Appellant filed his concise 

statement. On November 4, 2013, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion. Both issues raised on appeal were included in Appellant’s concise 

statement. 
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(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).7 “[O]ur scope of review is limited to 

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the [trial] court.” In re L.J., 79 

A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “We may consider only the 

Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole.” 

Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 106 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 

Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a suspect has a 

right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. Prior to any 

custodial interrogation, the police must inform a suspect of his rights under 

Miranda, including the right to have an attorney present. “[O]nce a suspect 

asserts his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, not only must the current 

interrogation cease, but he may not be approached for further interrogation 

until counsel has been made available to him, unless he himself initiates 

further conversation with police.” Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 

1050, 1067 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). 

 

7

 We remind the trial court of the mandatory nature of Pennsylvania Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 581(I), which provides that: 

At the conclusion of the [suppression] hearing, the judge shall 

enter on the record a statement of findings of fact and 

conclusions of law as to whether the evidence was obtained in 

violation of the defendant’s rights, or in violation of these rules 

or any statute, and shall make an order granting or denying the 

relief sought. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I). A simple statement that the motion to suppress is 

denied is not sufficient to satisfy the Rule 581(I) requirement. 
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If a suspect re-initiates a conversation with police and subsequently 

waives his right to counsel, we then examine whether that waiver was 

knowing and voluntary. As we have explained: 

In determining whether a defendant’s waiver of his Miranda

rights is valid, a trial court must consider: (1) whether the 

waiver was voluntary, in the sense that the waiver was not the 

result of governmental pressure; and (2) whether the waiver 

was knowing and intelligent, in the sense that it was made with 

full comprehension of both the nature of the right being 

abandoned and the consequence of that choice. The 

Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a 

defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 76 (Pa. 2014) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Our Supreme Court 

has set forth the following numerous factors that should be 

considered under a totality of the circumstances test to 

determine whether a statement was freely and voluntarily made: 

the duration and means of interrogation, including whether 

questioning was repeated, prolonged, or accompanied by

physical abuse or threats thereof; the length of the accused’s

detention prior to the confession; whether the accused was 

advised of his or her constitutional rights; the attitude exhibited 

by the police during the interrogation; the accused’s physical and 

psychological state, including whether he or she was injured, ill, 

drugged, or intoxicated; the conditions attendant to the 

detention, including whether the accused was deprived of food, 

drink, sleep, or medical attention; the age, education, and 

intelligence of the accused; the experience of the accused with 

law enforcement and the criminal justice system; and any other 

factors which might serve to drain one’s powers of resistance to 

suggestion and coercion. 

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 67 A.3d 716, 724 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). 
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 Appellant does not argue that police re-initiated the conversation with 

him. Instead, he argues that the time that elapsed between his arrest and 

his confession was unreasonably long. Appellant contends that he should 

have been brought before a judicial officer for arraignment in a more 

expedient manner. He implicitly contends that if he were arraigned promptly 

he would not have confessed to the murder. Appellant also alleges that he 

was ingesting illegal narcotics while in custody and that he had not slept the 

night before. Thus, he argues that the totality of the circumstances show he 

did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. 

We will evaluate the Bryant factors seriatim. As to the duration and 

means of interrogation, the total duration of the interrogation prior to 

Appellant waiving his Miranda rights was only a few minutes. See N.T. 

8/5/13, at 68, 97. The interrogation occurred in a large room. See id. at 

26. There is no evidence that there was physical violence, or threats 

thereof. There was also no evidence of other improper interrogation 

techniques. Thus, the first Bryant factor weighs in favor of a finding of 

voluntariness. 

As to the length of Appellant’s detention, Appellant was in custody 

approximately 11.5 hours prior to his confession. Between 1977 and 2004, 

our Supreme Court adhered to a brightline six-hour rule. See

Commonwealth v. Davenport, 370 A.2d 301, 306 (Pa. 1977), overruled 

Commonwealth v. Perez, 845 A.2d 779, 787 (Pa. 2004). Under that rule, 
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any statement given to police more than six hours after arrest, and before 

arraignment, was per se inadmissible. Davenport, 370 A.2d at 306. 

However, in Perez our Supreme Court determined that the per se rule was 

not appropriate and reverted to a totality of the circumstances test, which 

we apply in this case. Perez, 845 A.3d at 787. 

 Nonetheless, the six-hour rule still provides a good baseline from 

which to evaluate the length of a defendant’s custody. In this case, the time 

between Appellant’s arrest and his waiver and subsequent confession was 

almost twice that length – 11.5 hours. Thus, it is obvious that this factor 

weighs against a finding that Appellant’s waiver was voluntary. However, 

the weight of this factor is not as significant as it may appear. 

During the course of Appellant’s detention, and prior to his 

arraignment, the police took steps to corroborate Figueroa’s statement that 

Appellant was the triggerman in the murder. These steps were necessary 

because Figueroa had implicated several other individuals in the murder 

prior to implicating Appellant. After brief periods of investigation, police 

were able to ascertain that those individuals were not involved in the 

murder. Thus, police had reason to believe that Figueroa was falsely 

implicating Appellant. 

In Commonwealth v. Perez, 760 A.2d 873 (Pa. Super. 2000), 

affirmed, 845 A.2d 779 (Pa. 2004), this Court recognized that a police 

investigation which may exonerate a defendant may cause him to be 
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detained for longer than six hours without being arraigned. Specifically, we 

stated that “[n]ecessary delay [between arrest and preliminary arraignment] 

can reasonably relate to . . . limited preliminary investigation into [a 

defendant’s] connection with the crime for which he was arrested, especially 

when it is directed to possible exculpation of the one arrested.” Id. at 875, 

quoting Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1968) 

(Burger, J. concurring). 

The facts in the case sub judice are similar to those in 

Commonwealth v. Seilhamer, 862 A.2d 1263 (Pa. Super. 2004). In 

Seilhamer, approximately seven hours elapsed between the initial contact 

between the police and the defendant and the defendant’s waiver of her 

Miranda rights. The police had sufficient probable cause to arraign the 

defendant two hours after the initial contact; however, they delayed 

arraignment because they were seeking other witnesses and evidence. Id.

at 1269-1270. Under the totality of the circumstances, including three 

readings of defendant’s Miranda rights and a delay attributed to further 

police investigation, we concluded her waiver was voluntary. Id. at 1270. 

Although the time between Appellant’s arrest and his waiver was somewhat 

longer, the rationale employed in Seilhamer and Perez offers persuasive 

force. Thus, although we conclude that the second Bryant factor weighs 

against a finding of voluntariness, the weight afforded to that factor is 

somewhat diminished because of the reason for the delay. 
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As to whether Appellant was advised of his constitutional rights, the 

record reflects that Appellant was advised of his Miranda rights on several 

occasions. Immediately prior to his confession, he was read his rights orally 

and signed a form, which outlined his rights in Spanish. N.T., 8/5/13, at 92, 

97. Thus, the third Bryant factor weighs in favor of a finding of 

voluntariness. 

As to Appellant’s physical and psychological state, the trial court found 

that Appellant was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 11/4/13, at 20. This finding of fact is supported by the 

record. The police officer that was interrogating Appellant testified that 

Appellant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. N.T., 

8/5/13, at 132. Although Appellant testified that he was under the influence 

of drugs and alcohol, the trial court made a credibility determination. See

Trial Court Opinion, 11/4/13, at 20. We may not overturn this credibility 

determination with the record before us. Furthermore, there was no 

evidence that Appellant was injured or ill. Thus, the fourth Bryant factor 

weighs in favor of a finding of voluntariness. 

As to the conditions attendant to the detention, Appellant admitted 

that the police offered him food and coffee during the course of his 

detention. See N.T., 8/5/13, at 172. There is no evidence that the police 

ever denied Appellant a request for food, drink, medical care, or use of the 

restroom. Although he may not have slept the night before, Appellant was 
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given a chance to sleep while in detention. Trial Court Opinion, 11/4/13, at 

21. Thus, the fifth Bryant factor weighs in favor of a finding of 

voluntariness. 

As to Appellant’s age, education, and intelligence, the detective that 

questioned Appellant testified that he did not have any educational problems 

or low level of intelligence. N.T., 8/5/13, at 148. Appellant was 33 years 

old at the time of his waiver. Thus, the sixth Bryant factor weighs in favor 

of a finding of voluntariness. 

There was no evidence presented with respect to Appellant’s familiarity 

with the criminal justice system. As such, the seventh Bryant factor is 

neutral. The parties do not contend, nor do we find evidence in the record, 

that there were non-enumerated factors that the trial court should have 

considered in determining whether Appellant’s waiver was voluntary.

Although one of the seven Bryant factors weighs against a finding 

that Appellant’s waiver was voluntary, five factors weigh in favor of a finding 

that his waiver was voluntary. There is little doubt that the one factor that 

weighs in favor of Appellant is significant. However, for the reasons set 

forth above, the time Appellant was in custody is mitigated because the 

actions taken by the police had the possibility of exonerating Appellant. 

Furthermore, one of the factors that weighs in favor of the Commonwealth, 

i.e., how often and by what means Appellant was given his constitutional 

rights, weighs heavily in favor of a finding that Appellant’s waiver was 
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voluntary. When combined with the other four factors that weigh in favor of 

the Commonwealth, we conclude that those factors outweigh the length of 

Appellant’s custody prior to his waiver. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress his confession. 

In his second issue, Appellant contends that the evidence was 

insufficient to convict him of second-degree murder, robbery, and 

conspiracy. “Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a 

question of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary.” Patterson, 91 A.3d at 66 (citation omitted). In 

reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine “whether 

viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the 

[Commonwealth], there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to 

find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 64 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). “Additionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence . . . . [T]he fact-finder is free to believe all, part[,] or 

none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 90 A.3d 721, 728 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). 

“A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it 

is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in 

the perpetration of a felony.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b). In this case, the 

underlying felony was the robbery. “A person is guilty of robbery if, in the 
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course of committing a theft, he[ ] inflicts serious bodily injury upon 

another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i). “A person is guilty of conspiracy 

with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of 

promoting or facilitating its commission he[ ] agrees with such other person 

or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which 

constitutes such crime[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1). 

 Appellant argues that the Commonwealth did not prove “Appellant 

intended to steal or knew Figueroa intended to steal the drugs from the 

victim during the transaction.” Appellant’s Brief at 25. However, the 

evidence was overwhelming that Appellant and Figueroa planned the robbery 

well in advance. Veronica Ortiz testified that, on the day of the murder, she 

heard Appellant and Figueroa “saying they were go[ing to] rob somebody. 

They needed some money.” N.T., 8/6/13, at 83. After the murder, 

Appellant admitted to several individuals that he had robbed the victim. See 

id. at 103 (statement to Wanda Baez-Lugo); id. at 136 (statement to 

Jacqueline Arroyo); id. at 149 (statement to Elizabeth Lopez). If the jury

believed this evidence, it could reasonably find that Appellant possessed the 

requisite intent for robbery, and thus also second-degree murder and 

conspiracy. Accordingly, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/30/2014