FEDERAL 

COURTHOUSES 

Actions Needed to 

Enhance Capital 

Security Program and 

Improve Collaboration

Report to Congressional Requesters

February 2017

GAO-17-215

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-215, a report to

congressional requesters.

February 2017

FEDERAL COURTHOUSES

Actions Needed to Enhance Capital Security 

Program and Improve Collaboration

What GAO Found

Three federal agencies—the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), 

the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), and the Federal Protective 

Service (FPS)—collect information about security concerns at federal 

courthouses related to the agencies’ respective missions. However, only AOUSC 

develops information that can be used to understand security concerns across 

the courthouse portfolio. In contrast, the Marshals Service and FPS collect

information on security concerns on a building-by-building basis in varied ways, 

but the manner in which the information is collected prevents it from being used 

to understand portfolio-wide security concerns. This is inconsistent with GAO’s 

risk management framework. Both agencies are taking steps to improve their 

information, but it is not clear whether these improvements will provide the 

portfolio-wide information stakeholders need to make risk-informed decisions.

The General Services Administration (GSA) has initiated 11 projects at 10

courthouse locations nationwide, as part of its Judiciary Capital Security Program 

(CSP); two projects have been completed. Local officials said that these projects

have already improved or will improve security at the selected courthouses once 

completed. CSP improvements have been aimed at separating the paths of 

judges, prisoners, and the public, so that trial participants only meet in the 

courtroom. Transparency and collaboration issues have emerged among federal 

stakeholders as the program has been implemented. For example, not all key 

stakeholders GAO spoke to were clear on the eligibility of specific locations for 

CSP projects and varied in their views about how collaborative the process to 

select CSP projects has been. Although stakeholders have taken some steps to 

improve CSP transparency and collaboration as the program has evolved, some 

issues remain. Taking additional steps to improve documentation of decisionmaking and sharing this document with stakeholders could further enhance 

transparency and collaboration and better assure that all of the agencies and 

policy makers have the same understanding of how the program is supposed to 

work, that it is addressing the most urgent courthouse security needs, and that 

the expertise of all stakeholders is being used to ensure program efficiency.

GAO found that agencies could take additional actions to enhance security at 

federal courthouses by addressing a related GAO open recommendation, and 

establishing a formal mechanism such as a working group or forum to enhance 

coordination and information sharing. Specifically, in 2011, GAO recommended 

that the agencies update a 1997 memorandum of agreement to clarify their roles 

and responsibilities. This action has not been done although FPS has taken 

some steps to start the process. In addition, GAO found that GSA, AOUSC, the 

Marshals Service, and FPS had not routinely met to address courthouse security 

issues at a national level where decision-making authority exists. This lack of a 

formal meeting mechanism inhibits their ability to communicate regularly about 

their roles and responsibilities and share information about security concerns. 

This is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive/limited official use report 

issued in October 2016. View GAO-17-215.For more information, 

contact Lori Rectanus at (202) 512-2834 or

rectanusl@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

The variety of civil and criminal cases 

tried in 400-plus federal courthouses

can pose security risks. The CSP was 

started in 2012 and was designed to 

be a less costly alternative to building 

new federal courthouses by adding key 

security features to existing 

courthouses. Congress has provided 

$20 million in obligational authority for 

the program in each of the fiscal years 

that it has been funded.

GAO was asked to review physical 

security at federal courthouses. This 

report discusses (1) the extent to which 

federal stakeholders have identified 

security concerns; (2) how the CSP 

addresses courthouse security 

concerns; and (3) what actions federal 

agencies could take, if any, to improve 

courthouse security. GAO reviewed 

agency documents, AOUSC security 

scores, and interviewed officials from 

the Marshals Service, FPS, GSA, and 

AOUSC. GAO also visited eight 

courthouses to include six locations 

selected for CSP projects, and two that 

were considered but not selected.

Although these site visits cannot be 

generalized to all CSP project locations 

or all federal courthouses, they provide 

insight into federal agencies’ practices 

to secure courthouses.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that (1) the 

Marshals Service and FPS improve the 

courthouse security information they 

collect; (2) GSA and AOUSC improve 

the CSP’s transparency and 

collaboration through better 

documentation; and (3) GSA establish

a working group or other forum to 

enhance coordination. The agencies

concurred with GAO’s

recommendations.
Page i GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Letter 1

Background 4

AOUSC Is Able to Identify Security Concerns across the 

Courthouse Portfolio, While the Marshals Service and FPS Are 

Able to Identify Concerns at the Individual Building Level 9

CSP Shows Potential for Enhancing Security at Federal 

Courthouses, but Greater Transparency and Collaboration 

Could Improve the Program 14

Agencies Can Take Additional Actions to Address Previous Issues 

and Improve Coordination and Information Sharing 23

Conclusions 28

Recommendations 29

Agency Comments 30

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 33

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 37

Appendix III Comments from the General Services Administration 39

Appendix IV Comments from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 40

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Table

Table 1: Funding and Security Information for Judiciary Capital 

Security Program (CSP) Projects, Fiscal Years 2012–

2016, as of March 2016 15

Figure

Figure 1: General Depiction of Federal Stakeholders’ Roles in 

Courthouse Security 5

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Abbreviations

AOUSC Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 

CSP Judiciary Capital Security Program 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOJ Department of Justice 

FPS Federal Protective Service 

GSA General Services Administration 

ISC Interagency Security Committee 

MOA memorandum of agreement 

OMB Office of Management and Budget

SEPS Security and Emergency Planning Staff 

U.S. Marshals Service Marshals Service

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Page 1 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

February 16, 2017

The Honorable Bill Shuster

Chairman

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio

Ranking Member

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The Honorable Lou Barletta

Chairman

The Honorable Hank Johnson

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Economic Development,

 Public Buildings, and Emergency Management

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The Honorable André Carson

House of Representatives

Federal courthouses are critical to the U.S. judicial process and to 

processing civil and criminal cases related to federal crimes such as 

domestic and international terrorism and organized crime, extremist 

groups, gangs, and drug trafficking. This environment can pose particular 

security risks to the 400-plus1 federal courthouses nationwide, making the 

physical security of courthouses essential. However, our prior work has 

found that various attributes influence courthouse security and that older 

or historic buildings may not be able to support, or may make it more 

 1

These courthouses include federal district, appellate, and bankruptcy courthouses, and 

there are 454, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) at the 

time of our review. The General Services Administration (GSA) reported to us that the 

agency counts 445 federal courthouses, at the time of our review. AOUSC and GSA count 

courthouses differently because of how each defines what constitutes a courthouse. For 

the purposes of its long-range facilities assessment, AOUSC defines a courthouse as a 

building that contains a courtroom. GSA counts a building as a courthouse if it has a real 

property designation as a courthouse or courthouse/office and/or has space identified as 

courtroom/judiciary by GSA’s National Building Space Assignment Policy standards.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

difficult to address security at those courthouses.2 The Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2012 created the Judiciary Capital Security Program 

(CSP) with $20 million in obligational authority.3 The program was 

designed to improve physical security in buildings occupied by the 

judiciary and the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service) in lieu of 

construction of new facilities.

The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), an agency within 

the judicial branch, implements the policies of the Judicial Conference of 

the United States,4 including its security policies, and provides a range of 

legislative, legal, financial, technology, management, administrative and 

program support services for federal courts. Except for law enforcement 

and related security functions the General Services Administration (GSA) 

manages federal facilities, including courthouses, and is responsible for 

operation, maintenance, and protection as outlined in the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002.5 The Marshals Service, a component of the 

Department of Justice (DOJ), protects federal judicial facilities and 

personnel. The Federal Protective Service (FPS), a subcomponent of the 

National Protection and Programs Directorate within the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), provides facility security assessments at 

federal courthouses owned or leased by GSA.6 We have previously found 

that these federal stakeholders have faced challenges in implementing 

assigned responsibilities when addressing the demands of the complex 

environment of courthouse security.7

 2

GAO, Federal Courthouses: Improved Collaboration Needed to Meet Demands of a 

Complex Security Environment, GAO-11-857 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2011).

3

Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 911 (2011). 

4

The Judicial Conference, chaired by the Chief Justice of the United States, is the 

principal policy-making body for the judicial branch and security issues involving the 

federal courts.

5

Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 422, 116 Stat. 2135, 2184 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 232).

6

Throughout this report, we refer to federal agencies and the judiciary, which have 

responsibilities related to courthouse security, as federal stakeholders. 

7

GAO-11-857. In this report we recommended that DHS and DOJ update a memorandum 

of agreement (MOA) to clarify stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities, among other things. 

DHS and DOJ concurred with this recommendation but it remains open.
Page 3 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

You asked us to review physical security concerns at federal courthouses 

and federal stakeholders’ efforts to address these concerns. This report 

addresses the following questions:

• To what extent have federal stakeholders identified security concerns 

across the portfolio of federal courthouses?

• How has the CSP addressed courthouse security concerns and how, 

if at all, can the program be improved?

• What actions, if any, could federal agencies take to improve 

courthouse security?

This report is a public version of a previously issued report identified by 

DHS and DOJ as containing information designated as law enforcement 

sensitive/limited official use, which must be protected from public 

disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information including 

specific security concerns, the results of AOUSC’s security scores, and 

the names and locations of courthouses we visited or whose information 

we analyzed. The information provided in this report is more limited in 

scope, as it excludes such sensitive information, but it addresses the 

same questions that the law enforcement sensitive/limited official use 

report does, and the overall methodology used for both reports is the 

same.

To address these objectives, we reviewed agency documents including 

capital-planning documents, security assessments, and other reports, and 

interviewed AOUSC, Marshals Service, and FPS officials to determine 

what information they collect, and to understand how they identify security 

concerns. We did not independently determine what constitutes a 

physical security concern; rather, we relied on these federal stakeholders 

to determine physical security concerns as defined by their own 

standards and guidance. As part of our review of these data, we 

assessed federal stakeholders’ documentation and written responses 

about data collection procedures and their views of the quality of the data. 

We determined that AOUSC’s data were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes, and we analyzed the results of AOUSC’s data in 2016. We also 

reviewed and analyzed federal stakeholders’ documentation on the CSP,

and interviewed relevant officials about methods used to select project 

locations and collaborate with other federal stakeholders. We visited 6 of 

the 10 federal courthouse facilities selected for a CSP project, which we 

selected to cover CSP projects at various stages of implementation 

(completed, under construction, and pre-construction), as well as two 

locations considered for the CSP but not selected. During the site visits, 
Page 4 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

we toured the courthouses to observe security concerns and the ways 

CSP projects have addressed or will address them. We interviewed local 

officials from the Marshals Service, FPS, GSA, and local court officials to 

obtain information about CSP implementation, as well as their views on 

courthouse security concerns in general. Although information obtained 

from these site visits cannot be generalized to all CSP project locations or 

all federal courthouses, the site visits provided us with insights into 

federal agencies’ practices to secure courthouses. We compared federal 

stakeholders’ efforts to select projects and collaborate to criteria in our 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government8 and the Office 

of Management and Budget’s (OMB) directive on open government.9

Further details on our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to February 2017, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Security at federal courthouses is complex and involves multiple federal 

stakeholders with different roles and responsibilities (see fig. 1).

 8

See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-

21.3.1 (Washington, D.C. November 1999). The Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act 

of 1982 (Pub. L. No. 97-255, 96 Stat. 814) requires GAO to issue standards for internal 

control in government. In 2014, we updated those standards see GAO, Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C. September 

2014). This document provides managers criteria for designing, implementing, and 

operating an effective internal control system.

9

OMB, Open Government Directive, OMB Memorandum M10-06 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 

8, 2009). The directive also recognizes that the presumption of openness does not 

preclude the need to protect confidential information. While OMB directives are not 

applicable to the judicial branch, funding for the CSP is provided through the Federal 

Buildings Fund administered by GSA—an executive agency that is subject to OMB 

directives.

Background
Page 5 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Figure 1: General Depiction of Federal Stakeholders’ Roles in Courthouse Security
Page 6 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

A 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA)10 between these entities 

defines the roles and responsibilities for each of these stakeholders in 

protecting federal courthouses and the federal framework for securing 

courthouses. The MOA recognized areas in which stakeholders are to 

coordinate their security efforts and established an informal collaboration 

and oversight mechanism at the regional level.

The following federal stakeholders receive funding for court security 

activities in different ways:

• FPS is funded by the security fees it collects from agencies that 

occupy GSA facilities for the security services FPS provides11 and 

does not receive a direct appropriation.12

• The judiciary receives a court security appropriation. The amount for 

fiscal year 2016 was approximately $538 million.13 AOUSC uses part 

of this appropriation to pay for FPS fees and transfers part to the 

Marshals Service for specific judiciary related costs or security 

equipment.

• In addition to the funds received from AOUSC, the Marshals Service 

receives direct appropriations for construction in space controlled, 

occupied, or used by the Marshals Service for prisoner holding and 

related support (for example, vehicle sally ports and prisoner 

elevators).14

 10This memorandum was reaffirmed in 2004 to acknowledge the transfer of FPS from 

GSA to DHS.

11FPS charges federal agencies that occupy GSA facilities three fees: (1) a basic security 

fee of $0.74 per square foot for fiscal year 2016, (2) a building-specific administrative fee, 

and (3) a security work authorization administrative fee. All customer agencies in GSAcontrolled properties pay the basic annual security fee. Customer agencies in facilities for 

which FPS recommends specific countermeasures to mitigate vulnerabilities pay the 

building-specific administrative fee, along with the cost of the countermeasures 

implemented. Customer agencies that request additional countermeasures pay the 

security work authorization administrative fee, along with the cost of the countermeasures.

12Rather than receiving a direct appropriation, FPS has statutory authority to obligate and 

spend its collected fees.

13Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2441 (2015).

14A vehicle sally port is a secure entryway for the loading and unloading of prisoners.
Page 7 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

• Instead of receiving direct appropriations, GSA administers the 

Federal Buildings Fund, which is the primary source of funds for 

operating federal space held under the custody and control of GSA 

and the capital costs associated with the space.15 The Federal 

Buildings Fund is funded primarily by income from rental charges 

assessed to tenant agencies occupying GSA-held and -leased space 

that approximate commercial rates for comparable space and 

services.16 Congress exercises control over the Federal Buildings 

Fund through the appropriations process that sets annual limits—

called obligational authority—on how much of the fund can be 

obligated for various activities. GSA, as an executive branch agency, 

requests obligational authority from Congress as part of the annual 

President’s Budget Request. GSA’s total obligational authority for 

fiscal year 2016 was approximately $10.2 billion.17

The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) addresses the quality and 

effectiveness of physical security for federal facilities, including 

courthouses.18 The ISC sets out the risk management process for federal 

facilities in the ISC’s risk management standard.19 Pursuant to this 

standard, FPS conducts facility security assessments, which consist of 

identifying and assessing threats to, and vulnerabilities of, a facility as 

well as identifying countermeasures (e.g., security equipment) best suited 

to mitigate vulnerabilities at the facility. These assessments generally 

focus on building systems and perimeter and entry issues.

The ISC risk management standard also lays out standards for 

establishing facility security committees, which consist of a representative 

from each of the tenant agencies in the facility, and which are responsible 

for addressing security issues identified in the facility security assessment 

 15GSA sometimes receives supplemental appropriations to meet repair or new 

construction needs.

16 For more on the Federal Buildings Fund, see GAO, Federal Buildings Fund: Improved 

Transparency and Long-term Plan Needed to Clarify Capital Funding Priorities, 

GAO-12-646 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012). 

17Pub. L. No. 114.113, 129 Stat. 2242, 2451 (2015).

18The ISC, chaired by DHS, consists of 53 federal departments and agencies, has as its 

mission the development of security standards and best practices for nonmilitary federal 

facilities in the United States.

19ISC, The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security 

Committee Standard, 1st edition (Washington, D.C.: August 2013).
Page 8 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

and approving the implementation of recommended security 

countermeasures. These standards include the following:

• facility security committees are established when two or more federal 

tenants with funding authority occupy a facility,

• findings from the FPS facility security assessments are to be 

presented at facility security committee meetings, and

• meeting minutes must document each vote to approve or disapprove 

a recommended countermeasure, and if agenda decisions are 

disapproved, the meeting minutes must document the chosen risk 

management strategy.

As new threats to federal facilities have emerged, the federal government 

has released additional directives related to the security of federal 

facilities, including courthouses. For example: 

• The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets. Following the attacks on 

September 11, 2001, the White House developed this National 

Strategy to ensure that initial efforts to protect key assets were 

sustained over the long term.20 Courthouse security falls under the 

National Strategy which outlines the guiding principles that 

underpin national efforts to secure infrastructure and assets vital 

to public health and safety, national security, governance, 

economy, and public confidence.

• The National Infrastructure Protection Plan. DHS developed this 

plan to guide the national effort to manage risks to critical 

infrastructure.21

 20The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, D.C. February 2003).

21DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure 

Security and Resilience (Washington, D.C.: December 2013).
Page 9 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Identifying security concerns at federal courthouses is critical to managing 

the risk to those courthouses. We previously compiled a risk management 

framework applicable to protecting federal facilities that defined risk 

management in general as managing across a portfolio.22 We have also 

issued other reports in recent years that discuss the importance of 

understanding risk comprehensively (rather than only on an individual 

building basis) in order to effectively protect federal facilities consistent 

with that definition.23 AOUSC collects security information in a way that 

provides a picture of portfolio-wide concerns and can be used to 

comprehensively understand security concerns across the portfolio of 

 22GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal Agencies’

Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices, GAO-05-49 (Washington: D.C.: 

Nov. 30, 2004). In this report, we identified key practices for facility protection through a 

comprehensive literature review of Inspector General reports and our previous reports. 

We also interviewed officials from major property-holding agencies, and validated our 

results using an expert symposium on facility protection.

23In GAO-11-857, we said that an advanced use of risk management involves the ability to 

gauge risk across a portfolio of facilities and that this was important because it could allow 

stakeholders to comprehensively identify and prioritize risks at a national level and direct 

resources toward alleviating them. In GAO, Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key 

Practices Would Improve the Federal Protective Service’s Approach to Facility Protection, 

GAO-10-142 (Washington, D.C. Oct. 23, 2009), we reported that a building-by-building 

approach to risk management rather than a comprehensive approach to assessing risk 

provides less assurance that the most critical risks at buildings across the country are 

being mitigated.

AOUSC Is Able to 

Identify Security 

Concerns across the 

Courthouse Portfolio, 

While the Marshals 

Service and FPS Are 

Able to Identify

Concerns at the 

Individual Building 

Level

AOUSC Develops 

Portfolio-Wide Information 

About Security Concerns 
Page 10 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

federal courthouses. AOUSC assesses and scores courthouses on the 

security features of court operations, in accordance with the U.S. Courts 

Design Guide24 as part of their long-range capital-planning process, 

according to AOUSC officials.25 Through this process, AOUSC develops 

security scores for courthouses that range from 0 to 100, with 100 being 

an ideal courthouse that meets all assessed security factors, as 

determined by the judiciary. These scores allow the judiciary to compare 

security needs across courthouses and understand the relative security 

deficiencies of one courthouse compared to others. AOUSC has three 

categories to describe these security scores: below 60 is poor, 60–79 is 

marginal to acceptable, and 80–100 is good.

AOUSC’s scores reflect different aspects of courthouse security, such as

whether the courthouse has separate pathways for judicial personnel,

prisoners, jury members, and the public; secured parking for judges; 

vehicle sally ports for prisoner transport; an adequate number of 

courtroom holding cells; and physical barriers to block unwarranted 

vehicular access. While AOUSC’s security scores consider some aspects 

of security on the perimeter and in space where prisoners are held, 

detailed assessments of these aspects of security are the responsibility of 

FPS and the Marshals Service, consistent with their missions.26

 24Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. Courts Design Guide, 2007 (Revised 

December 2015). The guide translates requirements of the federal judiciary into criteria for 

the design and construction of court facilities.

25The judiciary’s Asset Management Planning process involves assessing, identifying, and 

ranking its space needs, and this information is to be used to develop housing strategies 

for the judiciary. In this process, AOUSC assesses factors from several categories—

building condition, space functionality, security, and compliance with judiciary space 

standards—and develops scores to manage long-term planning.

26AOUSC assessments include certain perimeter security factors, but are not specifically 

measured against the ISC standard that FPS uses when conducting facility security 

assessments. Similarly, AOUSC assessments do not include all factors contained in the 

Marshals Service standard—U.S. Marshals Service, Publication 64, Volumes I and II:

Requirements and Specifications for Special Purpose and Support Space Manual (2014 

Edition) and Volume 3: Judicial Security Systems Requirements and Specifications

(2005). Publication 64 provides construction requirements, specifications, and security 

product information for Marshals Service space, as well as requirements for judiciary 

space protected by the Marshals Service, such as the lobby, public areas, and 

courtrooms.
Page 11 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

The Marshals Service and FPS also identify security concerns at 

individual courthouse facilities, focused on their respective missions, but 

unlike AOUSC, they do not currently collect this information in a way that 

it can be readily compared across the portfolio of courthouses to gauge 

the overall concerns with these buildings. As discussed below, the 

Marshals Service identifies security concerns through two kinds of project 

requests to address security concerns.

27 The Marshals Service is taking 

steps to improve the information it collects; however, these steps may not 

enable it to understand concerns portfolio-wide as defined by our risk 

management framework, because of the reasons discussed below.

• Marshals Service officials told us that previously, they had no means 

to prioritize among project requests to correct deficiencies in judicial 

space, such as those in courtrooms.

28 The Marshals Service is 

piloting an initiative to create a means of prioritizing these requests 

into three levels of priority. However, Marshals Service officials told us 

that they still will not be able to compare similar concerns from one 

courthouse to another once the improvements to the process are 

made, because similar concerns would fall into the same priority level, 

and the initiative does not have a method for prioritizing within the 

same priority level.

• For projects to correct deficiencies in Marshals Service space, such 

as the areas used to move prisoners throughout the courthouse, 

headquarters Marshals Service officials told us that they currently rely 

on institutional knowledge to evaluate requests.29 Marshals Service 

officials said that it can be difficult to determine which projects to fund 

and not all officials would arrive at the same decisions, as there is 

currently no standard process for reviewing project requests and 

making funding decisions. To improve this process, the Marshals 

 27The Marshals Service also collects certain data on threats to protected court personnel 

and incidents, but we found these data were not sufficiently reliable to manage risk across 

the portfolio of federal courthouses. In addition to Marshals Service data, the DOJ’s 

Security and Emergency Planning Staff (SEPS) conducts compliance reviews for 

individual buildings, including some courthouses. SEPS officials told us these reviews 

primarily originate with requests from the SEPS Compliance Review Team. However,

these reviews cannot be used to assess vulnerabilities across the portfolio of courthouses.

28These project requests are submitted by Judicial Security Inspectors.

29These project requests are submitted by headquarters Marshals Service project 

managers or district managers in the field.

Marshals Service and FPS 

Identify Building-Specific 

Security Concerns That 

Cannot Readily Be 

Tracked across the 

Portfolio of Courthouses
Page 12 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Service is developing a decision matrix to document how decisions 

are made, but officials said they were not sure if this process would 

result in a way to compare projects as part of the portfolio of 

courthouses, as they are still early in the process of developing the 

matrix.

FPS conducts facility security assessments of individual buildings, 

including courthouses. These assessments consist of identifying and 

assessing threats to and vulnerabilities of a facility, for example, whether 

security equipment is working properly.

30 FPS shares these assessments 

and recommendations for countermeasures with the building’s facility 

security committee as part of the security services it provides to its 

customer agencies, and the facility security committee votes on whether 

to approve or disapprove suggested countermeasures.31

Information on the status of FPS countermeasure recommendations—

whether facility security committees have accepted, rejected, or not made 

a decision—can provide insight into the level of risk tenant agencies 

accept at a particular facility and enables risk-informed decisions. FPS 

began tracking the facility security committee decisions at the individual 

facility level in fiscal year 2015. Our prior work has found that the tool 

FPS uses to conduct facility security assessments was not designed to 

compare risks across federal facilities.32 FPS officials recognize the value 

of being able to analyze countermeasures across courthouses and other 

federal buildings. They said that this information would provide a greater 

understanding of which countermeasures were consistently accepted or 

 30We previously found that FPS may not have a complete understanding of the risk at 

federal facilities because FPS does not assess the threat, consequences, or vulnerabilities 

to specific undesirable events as called for by the ISC standard. We recommended that 

the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the ISC to supplement its risk assessment 

guidance with information on how to incorporate threat, consequence, and vulnerability 

assessments into a risk assessment methodology and DHS concurred, but the 

recommendation remains open. See GAO, Federal Facility Security: Additional Actions 

Needed to Help Agencies Comply with Risk Assessment Methodology Standards,

GAO-14-86 (Washington, D.C. March 5, 2014).

31A vote to approve a countermeasure is a financial commitment by federal tenants, who 

are responsible for funding their prorated share of the cost.

32See GAO, Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Assess Risk and Better 

Manage Contract Guards at Federal Facilities, GAO-12-739 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 

2012). FPS has an interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified 

Infrastructure Survey Tool. We recommended that DHS address the tool’s limitations. 

DHS concurred with this recommendation and it remains open.
Page 13 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

rejected, which could help FPS make better recommendations for all 

federal buildings, not just courthouses, in its facility security assessments. 

For example, if FPS knew that a particular recommendation was 

frequently rejected because it is cost prohibitive, FPS might look for 

another less costly option to mitigate that deficiency, according to 

officials.

FPS is also pursuing the capability to track the status of countermeasures 

in an automated way as part of initial plans for a software upgrade for its 

vulnerability assessment tool that allows FPS inspectors to review 

recommended countermeasures, among other things. However, officials 

were not certain when, or if, this capability will be ultimately included in 

the upgrade. FPS officials said that absent the capability to track 

countermeasure status in an automated way, obtaining information on 

whether countermeasure recommendations are accepted or rejected 

across all courthouses (or analyzing it by other variables) would be a 

labor-intensive process because relevant data are not easy to retrieve 

and would have to be done so manually. FPS officials said that there 

might be other ways to obtain this capability, but so far, they have not 

developed them. Further, FPS officials said that facility security 

committees often do not report whether they are approving or 

disapproving a countermeasure, even though the ISC standard calls for 

approval or disapproval to be documented in the facility security 

assessment. Tracking information on countermeasure implementation 

across the portfolio could help hold facility security committees 

accountable for their responsibilities under the ISC standard.

The improvements that both agencies are making to their information on 

security concerns are promising but may not provide the portfolio-wide 

information that decision makers need to make risk-informed decisions. 

Portfolio-wide information could enhance the way that headquarters 

Marshals Service officials make decisions when selecting security 

projects, so that the selections address the most urgent needs and FPS 

could be in a better position to understand the degree to which facility 

security committees are accepting risk at federal facilities.
Page 14 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Congress provided $20 million in obligational authority for the CSP in the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 201233 and also provided obligational 

authority for the program for fiscal years 2013, 2015, and 2016, which 

GSA has designated for 11 projects in 10 locations.34 The program, which 

is funded from GSA’s Federal Buildings Fund, is intended to address 

security deficiencies in existing buildings where physical renovations 

(“brick and mortar solutions”) are viable, and to provide a vehicle for 

addressing security deficiencies in a timely and less costly manner than 

constructing a new courthouse. Program goals include: (a) utilizing 

existing building assets and government resources cost-effectively; (b) 

addressing security deficiencies which put the public and government 

staff at risk; and (c) providing a low-cost alternative to high-cost capital 

investments. Courts with adequate space to house judicial officers but 

with poor physical security are eligible to participate because such courts 

are unlikely to obtain a new courthouse in the foreseeable future. As of 

March 2016, two projects had been completed, two were in construction, 

four were in design, and three had not yet begun design, as shown in 

Table 1.

 33Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 911 (2011).

34The CSP was not funded in fiscal year 2014.

CSP Shows Potential 

for Enhancing 

Security at Federal 

Courthouses, but 

Greater Transparency 

and Collaboration 

Could Improve the 

Program

Officials at CSP Locations 

Cite Improvements in 

Security as a Result of the 

Program
Page 15 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Table 1: Funding and Security Information for Judiciary Capital Security Program (CSP) Projects, Fiscal Years 2012–2016, as 

of March 2016

Fiscal 

year Project

Project

amounta Security score as of March 2016b Project status

2012 4 locations $4.7 million

$3.1 million

$5.5 million

$6.7 million

80.2c

68.2d

41.1

37.2

Complete (January 2015)

Complete (July 2015)

In construction (estimated completion October

2016)

In construction (estimated completion December

2016)

2013 1 location $20 million 34.8 In design 

2015 3 locations $6.723 million 

$6.068 million

$7.209 million

14.3

26.5

4.1 and 16.6e

In design 

In design

In design

2016 3 locations $15.7 million

$1.93 million

$2.37 million

56.1

15.4

68.2

Expenditure plans submitted to Congress. Senate 

authorization, January 2016; House authorization, 

March 2016

Total $80 million

Source: GAO analysis of General Services Administration (GSA) and Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) information. | GAO-17-215

a

The project amount is the amount that GSA submitted to Congress in its expenditure plan for each 

fiscal year that the CSP was funded.

b

AOUSC assesses and scores security features, among other things, as part of a long-range capitalplanning process. These scores range from 0 to 100, with 100 representing a courthouse that fully 

meets all assessed factors. Scores in this table are rounded to the nearest one tenth. These numbers 

are based on 2016 data. These courthouses were chosen for a CSP project before the 2016 

assessments.

C

The location with the score of 80.2 is one of the completed CSP projects. Before the CSP project, 

that courthouse’s security score was 46.1 (as of July 2014 data).

d

Before the project this location’s security score was 58.9 (as of July 2014 data).

e

This location has two security scores—one for each part of the building.

CSP projects are designed to improve the separation of circulation in 

accordance with the U.S. Courts Design Guide, which states that an 

essential element of security design is the physical separation of the 

public, judges, and prisoners into three separate paths of circulation so 

that trial participants do not meet until they are in the courtroom during 

formal court proceedings. AOUSC officials told us that having three 

separate paths of circulation is important so that judges are protected 

from being influenced or threatened by parties to court proceedings, their 

families, or other members of the public when entering and circulating 

through a courthouse. They also told us that criminal defendants pose a 

security risk to co-defendants, witnesses, and the general public. Some of 
Page 16 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

the CSP improvements to address these separate paths of circulation 

include:

Adding or enlarging sally ports: Some federal courthouses have no 

vehicle sally port (or an inadequate one) for the Marshals Service to load 

and unload prisoners. 

Building secure parking for judges: Some federal courthouses do not 

have a secure place for judges to park and enter the building.

Adding elevators for prisoners and/or judges: In some of the older 

courthouses, the structure of the building and location of elevators may 

not permit three separate paths of circulation.

Reconfiguring space to provide secure patterns of circulation: Some 

federal courthouses cannot accommodate the three separate paths of 

circulation without space reconfiguration.

While CSP projects may not address every security deficiency in a 

building, officials at locations that have been selected for a CSP project 

told us that the projects will provide (or have provided) significant 

improvements to security at those locations. For example, a local GSA 

official said that the security changes as a result of a completed CSP 

project has created a “night and day” difference in the overall security of 

the building as the parking and circulation issues have been addressed. 

In addition, local Marshals Service officials said that when the CSP 

project at their location is completed, it will address their highest security 

priorities and improve security. AOUSC officials have re-evaluated their 

security scores for the two projects that have been completed, and the 

security scores have improved. At one location the security score 

increased from 46.1 (poor) to 80.2 (good), and at the other, the score 

increased from 58.9 (poor) to 68.2 (marginal to acceptable).35

 35GSA and AOUSC officials told us that the CSP project where the security score 

increased from 58.9 to 68.2 was very small and that this location is being considered for 

additional CSP projects to address remaining security concerns.
Page 17 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

The process used to select potential CSP project locations has continued 

to evolve since the program began in 2012, and as a result, transparency 

and collaboration related to potential CSP project location selections and 

program execution have improved. According to OMB’s directive on open 

government, transparency promotes accountability and collaboration

improves the effectiveness of government by encouraging partnerships 

and cooperation.36 Similarly, our prior work has recognized that leading 

practices for capital-planning include that an agency’s project prioritization 

process be transparent about how project rankings are determined, 

among other things.37 In addition, our prior work also recognized that 

collaboration is key to ensuring the efficient use of limited resources to 

address issues that cut across more than one agency, and that 

collaboration ensures that federal efforts draw on the expertise of the 

involved agencies.38

At the time of our review, two rounds of CSP project location selections 

had been finished, and a third round was underway. With each round, the 

transparency of selection evolved as more criteria were added for 

selection and more people were involved in the selection process. More 

specifically:

• During the first round of selections, for fiscal year 2012 only, 

according to AOUSC officials, AOUSC selected four project locations 

using professional judgment informed by the expertise of GSA and the 

Marshals Service to get them started quickly because a report and 

spending plan on program implementation had to be submitted within 

90 days of the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2012.39 For example, one location was chosen because it had an 

existing concept study that could be used as a basis for the project, 

 36OMB, Memorandum M10-06.

37GAO-12-646.

38GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

39Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 911 (2011). The reporting requirement was included 

in the House Report accompanying H.R. 2434, the Financial Services and General 

Government Appropriations Bill, 2012 (H. Rep. No. 112-136 at 48 (2011)); and in the 

Senate Report accompanying S. 1573, the Financial Services and General Government 

Appropriations Bill, 2012 (S. Rep. No. 112-79 at 83 (2011)).

Selection Process for CSP 

Projects Has Evolved 

since Inception, with Some 

Improvements to 

Transparency and 

Collaboration
Page 18 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

and another was prioritized, in part, because of a threat to a judge at 

that location, according to AOUSC officials.

• For the second round of project location selections, for projects 

funded in fiscal years 2013 through 2017, criteria were developed for 

selection following a two-step process. First, the judiciary developed a 

preliminary list of project location candidates following a set of “Go/No 

Go” factors. For example, only courthouse facilities that were federally 

owned and had resident judges were eligible for selection. Second, 

AOUSC conducted what it referred to as a “deep dive analysis” that 

involved a number of factors. While this allowed greater insight into 

how locations were selected, from our review of AOUSC documents, 

we noted that there was still a lack of clarity about how some of these 

factors would be measured. For example, one factor was “type of 

caseload and proceedings” meaning that a “significant” number of 

criminal proceedings are conducted in the facility, but it was not clear 

how locations were evaluated on these criteria. As a result, for the 

CSP projects selected in round two, we were unable to determine how 

the criteria were used to prioritize project locations amongst each 

other and why certain project locations were ultimately selected over 

others because the decisions (such as why some were selected and 

others were eliminated from contention) were not documented and it 

was not clear how all criteria were defined and applied.

• The process for the third round of potential CSP project location 

selections (for projects 2018 and beyond) contained additional 

improvements. AOUSC and federal stakeholders added refinements 

to the existing two-step process and some additional steps after the 

“Go/No Go” factors and “deep dive analysis” including: (a) a series of 

internal judiciary review meetings that further narrowed the list of 

candidates based on first-hand knowledge and observations; (b) 

meetings between AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and GSA in March 

2016 to narrow the remaining potential locations into three tiers based 

on security scores as well as other factors; (c) reviews of the 

feasibility of a project at the top eight locations, and (d) selecting four 

of those locations for consideration. From our review of AOUSC 

documents, we noted that this round of project location selections 

provided important transparency improvements. For example, during 

this round the CSP had a greater emphasis on buildings with poor 

security scores—quantitative information that can be objectively 

reviewed. In round three, only locations with poor security scores 

(below 60) were considered for the program, and the Judiciary’s 

Space and Facilities Committee approved four locations for a CSP 

study in June 2016 that have security scores less than 30 (only 4 of 
Page 19 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

the 10 previous locations chosen for CSP projects had security scores 

less than 30, see Table 1).

In addition to transparency improvements related to the selection 

process, federal stakeholders have enhanced their collaboration during 

CSP project execution. GSA officials said that they were not involved in 

developing the scopes of work for the original four projects in fiscal year 

2012 and the corresponding cost estimates for them. As a result, the 

project concept studies did not consider GSA’s mechanical, engineering,

and plumbing standards,40 which are considered for concepts in other 

capital projects.41 GSA officials said that this led to inaccurate estimates 

and delays in the execution of some 2012 projects. For example, GSA 

officials said that during one 2012 funded project, they were not consulted 

on the concept and estimate, and that the estimate was under by about 

30 percent, which they said is a significant deviation. After AOUSC 

conferred with stakeholders on needed improvements in the second 

round of CSP project selections (fiscal years 2013–2017), GSA officials 

said that they began reviewing the cost estimates and providing 

comments to AOUSC. Further, GSA officials said that AOUSC now seeks 

their expertise on assumptions developed in the concept studies before 

developing an estimate, which has minimized the amount of re-work 

required at design.

Although federal stakeholders have taken the aforementioned positive 

steps to improve CSP, not all of the issues with transparency and 

collaboration have been addressed, in particular:

• Key stakeholders were not clear on the eligibility of particular locations 

for a CSP project and how to suggest locations for consideration. 

Marshals Service headquarters officials told us that they have asked 

that certain court locations be considered for the CSP, but they have 

been denied. For example, headquarters Marshals Service officials 

told us that they requested that one particular federal courthouse be a 

part of the CSP, specifically to add certain features to improve 

 40GSA, PBS-P100 Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service (Washington, D.C.: 

March 2015).

41Prior to GSA’s design of each CSP project, AOUSC has hired a contractor to complete 

capital security concept studies which consisted of a review of the security issues specific 

to each courthouse location. The studies also identified space solutions to improve 

security and included three options to improve security with corresponding budget 

estimates.

Further Opportunities to 

Improve Transparency and 

Collaboration of the CSP
Page 20 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

circulation. This courthouse was not included as a potential CSP 

project location, and the Marshals Service moved forward with the 

design of the project. GSA officials told us that the judiciary developed 

a process for identifying CSP projects and subsequent studies 

resulted in a priority list of locations, and that this courthouse was not 

put forth by the judiciary to be studied. 

During the third round of project selections, that same courthouse was 

one of four locations removed by the judiciary during the internal 

judiciary meetings due to having Marshals Service-funded projects, or 

joint projects, but no Marshals Service officials participated in this 

discussion.42 Specifically, documentation from this internal meeting 

showed that this courthouse was removed due to a Marshals Service 

project that was already funded. However, local judicial, Marshals 

Service, and GSA officials told us when we visited that a circulation 

project was not planned for the location, and Marshals Service 

officials provided a document that showed that the project has not yet 

been funded, (project design has been funded). Although the judiciary 

removed this courthouse from consideration for a project, Marshals 

Service officials maintain that it could have been a CSP project.

• There continues to be a lack of clarity about how key deep-dive 

analysis factors were applied during the most recent round of project 

selection. For example, one of these factors (as conceptualized in 

round three) was the number of criminal defendants the courthouse 

processed. But there is no description of what number of defendants 

would be too low for a court to be considered further for a CSP 

project, and the reasons that some locations were removed for a low 

number of criminal defendants, while others with the same number 

were put forward, were not clearly documented. For example 

according to AOUSC documentation, a certain potential location was 

removed as a candidate during the latest round of CSP selections 

during internal judiciary meetings because it had zero criminal 

 42Marshals Service officials said that two of these four locations have not been discussed 

with them, but they confirmed that they have funded a security project in one of these four 

locations.
Page 21 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

defendants. However, other locations were put through to the next 

round that also had zero criminal defendants.43

• Marshals Service officials also expressed a transparency concern 

regarding CSP costs. Specifically, the additional costs they incur from 

CSP projects are not considered during project selection. According to 

Marshals Service officials, when the judiciary selects a CSP project, 

the Marshals Service must find funding for any Marshals Service 

security equipment needed to support the CSP projects. Marshals 

Service officials said that in the first year of project selections (2012), 

the corresponding Marshals Service costs were covered, but that 

since then, GSA has told them that they would need to provide the 

funding.

• Key stakeholders hold varying views about how collaborative the 

process to select CSP projects has been. AOUSC officials said they 

believe that CSP selection process has been collaborative and that no 

project was or is approved for CSP funding without the concurrence of 

the Marshals Service and GSA. However, Marshals Service officials 

said that they have not found the process of selecting projects to be 

collaborative, but rather, from their point of view, the CSP projects are 

selected by the judiciary based on its view of security concerns. GSA 

officials said that they were not involved in project selection during the 

first two rounds of CSP project selection, but that during the third 

round of project selections, the process was more collaborative. 

Similarly, FPS has generally not been included in the planning or 

execution of CSP projects. FPS was only included in CSP planning 

and implementation for one of six CSP project locations we visited, 

where the local Marshals Service sought FPS’s expertise in 

placement of security equipment. At these locations, CSP projects 

may alter the perimeter of the building and could affect FPS’s 

equipment. For example, local FPS officials in one location we visited 

said that they did not know about the impending CSP project until we 

notified them of our visit to tour the project site. They said they would 

 43While there may have been other reasons contributing to the fact that other locations 

were put through and this courthouse was not, they were not always clearly and 

consistently documented in the information that AOUSC provided to us. For example, 

another courthouse considered for the program also had zero criminal defendants, and 

documentation explained that the number of criminal defendants was reported as part of a 

different courthouse. However, in a separate case, the courthouse had zero criminal 

defendants, and did not have any serious security issues, but it was left on the list based 

on the perspective of judiciary officials, but no information was provided about that 

perspective.
Page 22 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

need new security equipment and that they could possibly add their 

expertise to other aspects of the project early in the process to avert 

unnecessary costs if they were consulted on this CSP project. 

AOUSC officials told us that moving forward, FPS will be included in 

the CSP.

As our prior work has shown, the interests of multiple—and often 

competing—stakeholders may not align with the most efficient use of 

government resources and can complicate decision making.44 Better 

transparency about how projects are selected, could help to ensure that 

the CSP is not subjected to competing stakeholder interests. 

Furthermore, as we have also reported, effective collaboration can help 

maximize performance and results, particularly for issues that cut across 

more than one agency, as is the case with courthouse security.45 CSP 

projects involve multiple stakeholders, and projects have multiple phases, 

so it can be difficult to ensure that all stakeholders fully understand all 

program procedures and are involved at the right time and to the right 

degree throughout the life of the project. An internal control for efficient 

and effective operations is to ensure that all transactions and other 

significant events are clearly documented in a manner that allows the 

documentation to be readily available for examination.46 With clearer 

documentation of the process shared with all stakeholders, transparency 

and collaboration could also be enhanced in the CSP. By developing 

approaches to provide stakeholders information that clearly describes 

how all selection criteria are to be applied, how to put forth a location for 

consideration, what specific costs are eligible for funding within a project, 

how collaboration is to occur during project selection and execution, and 

when and how to include all relevant agencies in each phase of the 

project, stakeholders could be better assured that they all have the same 

understanding of how the program is supposed to work, that the program 

is addressing the most urgent needs and that the expertise of all 

government stakeholders is being used to help ensure that the program is 

as efficient as possible.

 44See GAO, Federal Real Property: National Strategy and Better Data Needed to Improve 

Management of Excess and Underutilized Property, GAO-12-645 (Washington, D.C.: June 

20, 2012).

45GAO-06-15.

46GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
Page 23 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

We have previously reported on coordination issues facing the security of 

courthouses.47 More specifically, in September 2011, we found that 

federal stakeholders faced issues, among others, related to implementing 

their roles and responsibilities, gathering and sharing comprehensive 

security information, and participating in security committees. At that time, 

we recommended that FPS and the Marshals Service, in conjunction with 

the judiciary and GSA, jointly lead an effort to update a 1997 MOA that 

outlines stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities. Implementation of this 

recommendation was key to addressing the issues in our view. Since 

then, FPS officials said that they took the initiative on updating the MOA, 

working with each party individually and sharing iterative updates based 

on comments. FPS officials said that they took the lead in this effort 

because they wanted to address the recommendation and no other 

agency was moving forward with it. However, despite these efforts, nearly 

5 years after the recommendation, the updated MOA still has not been 

signed. FPS officials told us that the MOA had been set aside at different 

times since the recommendation was made, in part, due to staff turnover 

at each agency that in some instances resulted in major revisions to the 

draft that necessitated additional vetting. In addition, FPS officials said 

that lengthy reviews and issues coordinating schedules have also 

contributed to the delays.

During our visits to CSP project locations as a part of this review and 

during discussions with AOUSC and local court officials, and 

headquarters and local Marshals Service, GSA, and FPS officials, we 

found that the issues we identified in September 2011 persist. More 

specifically, these issues include those outlined below.

 47GAO-11-857.

Agencies Can Take 

Additional Actions to 

Address Previous 

Issues and Improve 

Coordination and 

Information Sharing

Previously Identified 

Issues Continue to Impair 

a Comprehensive 

Approach to Courthouse 

Security
Page 24 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

We found that the Marshals Service’s and FPS’s roles and responsibilities 

have at times been fragmented.48 Some local FPS officials said that it can 

be difficult to determine what entity has responsibility for security 

equipment. For example, a local FPS official told us about a situation in 

one courthouse, where some security equipment is monitored by FPS 

and some is monitored by the Marshals Service. We found the same type 

of situation in another location and officials were unsure how that 

arrangement came to be. In addition, headquarters Marshals Service 

officials told us that overall there is fragmentation between FPS and the 

Marshals Service in ensuring that security equipment is operational. In 

one location FPS local officials also said that duplicative security efforts—

such as when both the Marshals Service and have FPS have equipment 

in the same building or part of the building—can create confusion.

We found that the level of coordination can be site-specific and 

personality-driven which can make executing roles and responsibilities 

difficult. For example, one local FPS official told us that FPS has a very 

strong relationship with the local Marshals Service officials and judges 

and are always included in court security meetings. However, at another 

courthouse, an FPS inspector did not complete all sections in the 2014 

facility security assessment, noting that an individual with the Marshals 

Service would not answer all FPS questions during the interview and that 

FPS could not be sure that all security equipment was working because 

that individual would not permit the FPS inspector to conduct testing. FPS 

and the Marshals Service both have new staff in those roles and officials 

see the relationship improving; however, another facility security 

assessment will not be completed until 2017.

Some local Marshals Service officials said that in certain locations, it is 

difficult and time consuming for FPS to execute their role of repairing 

equipment. For example, local Marshals Service officials at one location 

we visited told us about a recent problem they encountered regarding 

malfunctioning equipment at another location they serve. Initially, the 

Marshals Service security contractor assessed that it needed a small, 

inexpensive part, but the contractor could not fix it because the equipment 

was owned by FPS. Marshals Service officials said that after 60 days and 

 48Fragmentation refers to those circumstances in which more than one federal agency (or 

more than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad area of 

national interest.

Effective Execution of Roles 

and Responsibilities
Page 25 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

reaching out through numerous calls and e-mails, FPS received the 

internal approvals to fix the equipment.

We found that there continue to be issues associated with stakeholders 

gathering comprehensive information on security concerns and sharing 

the information gathered. As discussed earlier, the Marshals Service and 

FPS have some information on security concerns for individual 

courthouses, but cannot readily track the information across the portfolio 

and address risks to courthouses associated with that analysis, based on 

the way information is currently gathered. Further, information that 

agencies already collect is not readily shared with the other agencies. For 

example, AOUSC officials said that they have had difficulty getting facility 

security assessments from FPS and have been told by some FPS 

inspectors that AOUSC officials are not entitled to receive a copy of the 

assessment, as they are not tenants in the building. Further, FPS officials 

said that if AOUSC and the Marshals Service shared the information they 

collect on security concerns with FPS, they could coordinate more with 

those agencies, but FPS does not routinely have access to information 

collected by these agencies.

Without sharing existing information on security concerns, federal 

stakeholders do not have complete information to help them look for 

strategic ways to achieve efficiencies and to address the risks to federal 

courthouses more comprehensively. Further, if the agencies worked 

together to gather and understand all of the available security information, 

they could better understand what information is not collected at a 

portfolio level, and work on a coordinated strategy to obtain needed 

information efficiently. GSA officials told us that if more comprehensive 

information was available and shared regarding deficiencies in 

courthouses, federal agencies could develop joint acquisition strategies to 

address widespread deficiencies more efficiently. For example, if FPS 

develops the capability to track the status of countermeasure 

recommendations across courthouses in an automated way, as 

discussed earlier, and the results show that a particular countermeasure 

is recommended often, but rarely accepted because is it cost-prohibitive, 

federal agencies could leverage the buying power of the federal 

government to drive down the cost of the countermeasure.

Of the eight locations we visited, three did not have an active facility 

security committee even though they have other federal tenants in the 

Comprehensive Gathering and 

Sharing of Information on 

Security Concerns

Accountability for Security at 

Individual Courthouses
Page 26 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

building. In such buildings, a facility security committee is called for by the 

ISC standard.49 Headquarters Marshals Service officials told us that in 

their experience, facility security committee meetings, in reality, often do 

not reflect the facility security committee provisions in the ISC standard 

and that although addressing security needs ultimately falls upon the lead 

tenant of each facility (the facility security committee chair), there are no 

accountability mechanisms for ensuring these needs are addressed. FPS 

officials also said that there is currently no compliance mechanism for the 

ISC standard. Without attending these meetings, stakeholders involved in 

courthouse security may be missing opportunities to share information 

and coordinate so that security risks are better understood and 

addressed. In 2013, we found that the ISC did not formally monitor

agencies’ compliance with ISC standards, but was planning an effort to 

do so.50

We found that GSA, AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and FPS did not 

routinely meet to address courthouse security problems at a national level 

where decision-making authority exists. For example, more than four and 

a half years passed before the four federal stakeholders met together in 

May 2016 to discuss the MOA updates at a national level, although FPS 

had been working on the update. A GSA official told us that when the four 

stakeholders did meet, the meeting was very productive. FPS officials 

said that though they considered assembling the larger group early on, 

they elected to elicit comments and revisions on a draft to galvanize the 

most substantive changes needed based on consultation with “key 

representatives.” AOUSC officials told us that they did not know why they 

had not met as a group prior to May 2016. In fact, Marshals Service and 

AOUSC officials said that there was no working group or forum where the 

four agencies could discuss issues relevant to courthouse security at the 

national level where decision-making authority exits. In our previous work, 

 49We have found that compliance with ISC standards also varies at other federal facilities. 

See GAO, Facility Security: Greater Outreach by DHS on Standards and Management 

Practices Could Benefit Federal Agencies, GAO-13-222 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 

2013). 

50We have found that compliance with ISC standards also varies at other federal facilities. 

See GAO-13-222 (Washington, D.C.: January 2013).

Federal Stakeholders Do 

Not Have an Effective 

Structure for Addressing 

Security Issues
Page 27 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

we identified interagency working groups as one of the collaboration 

mechanisms used by agencies to coordinate activities.51

National level coordination and cooperation in protecting critical 

infrastructure is a key policy emphasis of the federal government. The 

federal government has prioritized the protection of federal facilities 

through directives to address the changing nature of threats to federal 

facilities, including federal courthouses. Through these documents, the 

federal government has consistently presented a common vision for 

critical infrastructure protection: agencies involved in the security of 

federal facilities should work together cooperatively to provide security to 

our critical infrastructures in an efficient manner that maximizes the 

federal government’s limited resources, for example:

• The National Infrastructure Protection Plan notes the importance of 

obtaining a shared vision with stakeholders with similar missions, 

saying that “for the critical infrastructure community, leadership 

involvement, open communication, and trusted relationships are 

essential elements to partnership.”

• The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets states that protecting our critical 

infrastructures and key assets calls for a transition to a national 

cooperative approach across federal agencies.

However, the continuing issues related to cooperation that continue to 

hinder effective courthouse security—in the areas of executing roles and 

responsibilities, collecting and sharing information on security concerns, 

and accountability for participating in coordination mechanisms like 

security committee meetings—illustrate that more could be done to align 

with the priorities that the federal government has established in these 

documents. Also, the delays in updating the MOA further illustrate that the 

cooperative approach described in the National Strategy has not been 

fully developed. Without a more cooperative approach to securing 

courthouses, such as through a working group or similar forum, 

 51GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 

Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012). In this 

report, we identified mechanisms that the federal government uses to lead and implement 

interagency collaboration by conducting a literature review on interagency collaborative 

mechanisms and interviewing academic and practitioner experts. Other examples of 

identified interagency collaboration mechanism include national strategies and initiatives, 

and joint program efforts such as exercising and training.
Page 28 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

challenges across the portfolio of federal courthouses will likely persist. 

The physical security of government assets is one of the most challenging 

aspects of real property management. In fact, one of the reasons that 

managing federal property is an area that we have designated as high 

risk is due to the challenges involved with protecting federal facilities.52

Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, except for law enforcement 

and security related functions transferred to DHS, GSA has the 

responsibility to protect buildings it holds or leases.53 In its role as a 

steward of federal courthouses under its custody and control, and as part 

of its related protection responsibilities, GSA is well positioned to 

establish a working group or other forum of federal stakeholders to 

improve cooperative efforts.

Securing our nation’s federal courthouses is complex and challenging and 

four federal stakeholders have a significant role—the judiciary, through its 

administrative arm, AOUSC; GSA; the Marshals Service; and FPS. 

Addressing courthouse security concerns begins with good information 

regarding the risks to each courthouse, but the federal government does 

not have this comprehensive information. The only portfolio-wide 

information that the federal government has is collected by AOUSC; 

however, these scores are only part of the story because comprehensive 

information related to security concerns identified by the Marshals Service 

and FPS is not currently used portfolio-wide. While both agencies have 

plans to enhance their processes, it is unclear whether these 

improvements will lead to the ability to assess security concerns across 

the portfolio of courthouses. With better portfolio-wide information from 

the Marshals Service and FPS, decision makers can be better equipped 

to make risk-informed decisions.

Addressing courthouse security concerns can be a costly undertaking, 

especially in older courthouses that were not designed for modern day 

security threats, particularly with regard to meeting current standards that 

call for the separate circulation of judges, prisoners, and the public. The 

CSP was designed to be a less costly alternative to building new federal 

courthouses and provides a way to add key security features. Since 2012, 

the CSP has demonstrated the potential to address security problems for 

 52GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-15-290 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2015).

53Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 422, 116 Stat. 2135, 2184 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 232).

Conclusions
Page 29 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

less than the cost of a new courthouse. Transparency and collaboration 

have improved, showing that the CSP is generally moving in the right

direction, but some concerns remain. Stakeholders do not have the same 

understanding about how the CSP program works at key stages, 

including project selection, and on how collaboration will occur.

While the CSP has the potential to address security concerns at 

courthouses that are selected for the program, issues persist related to 

cooperation and information sharing that we have found in the past. 

Creating greater cooperation—as the National Strategy suggests—to 

address courthouse security concerns can help GSA, AOUSC, the 

Marshals Service, and FPS to systemically identify risks, the resources 

needed to address those risks, and investment priorities when managing 

security at these facilities. This effort would involve all relevant 

stakeholders working together, having quality information to work with, 

and using it to manage risk and find efficiencies in their efforts. Without a 

coordinating mechanism at the national level, however, the four agencies 

are limited in their effectiveness in developing comprehensive 

approaches for addressing challenges that affect courthouse security.

• We recommend that the Attorney General instruct the Director of the 

Marshals Service to ensure that the improvements being made to the 

Marshals Service’s information on the security concerns of individual 

buildings allow the Marshals Service to understand the concerns 

across the portfolio.

• We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security instruct the 

Director of FPS to ensure that the agency develops the capability to 

track the status of recommended countermeasures across the 

courthouse portfolio, either through FPS’s planned software 

enhancement or other method.

• We recommend that the Administrator of GSA and the Director of the 

AOUSC, on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, in 

conjunction with the Marshals Service and FPS, improve CSP 

documentation in order to improve transparency and collaboration in 

the CSP program.

• We recommend that the Administrator of GSA—in conjunction with 

AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and FPS—establish a national-level 

working group or similar forum, consisting of leadership designees 

with decision-making authority, to meet regularly to address 

courthouse security issues.

Recommendations
Page 30 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

We provided a draft of law enforcement sensitive/limited official use 

version of this report to the DOJ, DHS, GSA, and AOUSC for review and 

comment. In addition, DOJ and DHS conducted sensitivity reviews of the 

law enforcement sensitive/limited official use version of this report. As a 

result of these reviews, this public version of the report omits sensitive 

information including specific security concerns, the results of AOUSC’s 

security scores, and the names and locations of courthouses we visited or 

whose information we analyzed.

In response to our request for comments on the law enforcement 

sensitive/limited official use version of this report, we received an e-mail 

from DOJ’s Audit Liaison Specialist which stated that DOJ was not 

providing written comments, but that DOJ agreed with our 

recommendation to ensure that the improvements being made to the 

Marshals Service information on the security concerns of individual 

buildings allows the Marshals Service to understand the concerns across 

the portfolio. After the law enforcement sensitive/limited official use

version was issued, the Marshals Service provided additional information 

stating that it had several initiatives under way in response to this 

recommendation, including an approach to real property management 

that incorporates security, construction, and budget concerns across the 

portfolio. In addition, DOJ stated that the Marshals Service will work with 

AOUSC, FPS, and GSA to improve CSP documentation and will support 

and participate in a national-level working group regarding courthouse 

security issues. We have not yet evaluated this information to determine if 

it will address our concerns and recommendation.

We also received written comments from DHS, GSA, and AOUSC, which 

are reproduced in full in appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively. DHS 

agreed with our recommendation to ensure that FPS develops the 

capability to track the status of recommended countermeasures across 

the portfolio. DHS noted that it appreciates our acknowledgement that 

security at federal courthouses is complex and involves multiple federal 

stakeholders with different roles and responsibilities. After the law 

enforcement sensitive/limited official use version of this report was 

issued, DHS provided additional information stating that it has included 

cross-portfolio tracking of existing and recommended countermeasures 

as part of a mission needs statement, with an acquisition decision to be 

made in 2017. We have not yet evaluated this information to determine if 

it will address our concerns and recommendation.

GSA agreed with our recommendations to improve CSP documentation 

to improve transparency and collaboration and to establish a nationalAgency Comments
Page 31 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

level working group or similar forum to meet regularly to address 

courthouse security concerns. In the comments, GSA noted that it will 

develop a comprehensive plan to address the recommendations and is 

confident that this plan will satisfactorily remedy concerns this report 

raises. After the law enforcement sensitive/limited official use version of 

this report was issued, GSA provided additional information stating that it 

plans to assist the judiciary in developing a statement of work for a CSP 

handbook and subsequently work with the judiciary, USMS, and FPS to 

develop the handbook. GSA also provided information stating that it plans 

to finalize the Courts Security Memorandum of Agreement between 

AOUSC, the Marshals Service, FPS, and GSA; and that it plans to 

develop a courthouse security working group charter. We have not yet 

evaluated this information to determine if it will address our concerns and 

recommendations.

AOUSC agreed with our recommendation to improve CSP documentation 

in order to improve transparency and collaboration and discussed steps 

that AOUSC is already taking to address this recommendation. AOUSC 

stated that it has started to compile and document all relevant 

background, policy, and process information to provide a central resource 

for all stakeholders to use. Further, AOUSC stated that it plans to develop 

a handbook/guide for use by GSA, the Marshals Service, FPS, and other 

stakeholders detailing key aspects of the CSP selection process. AOUSC 

stated that this documentation will address our recommendation by 

making documentation readily available for examination by all 

stakeholders including descriptions of all selection criteria to be applied, 

how projects are identified, specific costs eligible for funding, and how 

collaboration will occur during project selection and execution. After the 

law enforcement sensitive/limited official use version of this report was 

issued, AOUSC provided additional information about actions it has taken 

in response to this recommendation, including implementing of a 

communications plan for all new CSP concept studies and ensuring that 

all stakeholders are included in CSP concept, design, and construction 

meetings. In addition, AOUSC stated that the judiciary is working with 

GSA to jointly develop a CSP handbook, which they plan to complete by 

the end of 2017. Further, AOUSC stated that all relevant stakeholders 

were invited to participate in a meeting GSA held to develop a courthouse 

security working group charter. We have not yet evaluated this 

information to determine if it will address our concerns and 

recommendation.

All four agencies provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.
Page 32 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

We are sending copies to appropriate congressional committees, the 

Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, Administrator of the 

General Services Administration, and Director of the Administrative Office 

of the U.S. Courts. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov. GAO staff who made major 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

Lori Rectanus

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Page 33 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

This report focuses on physical security concerns in federal courthouses. 

This report addresses the following questions:

• To what extent have federal stakeholders identified security concerns 

at federal courthouses?

• How has the Judiciary Capital Security Program (CSP) addressed 

courthouse security concerns and how, if at all, can the program be 

improved?

• What actions, if any, could federal agencies take to improve 

courthouse security?

This report is a public version of a previously issued report identified by 

the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice as 

containing information designated as law enforcement sensitive/limited 

official use, which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, 

this report omits sensitive information including specific security concerns, 

the results of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court’s (AOUSC)

security scores, and the names and locations of courthouses we visited or 

whose information we analyzed. The information provided in this report is 

more limited in scope, as it excludes such sensitive information, but it 

addresses the same questions that the law enforcement sensitive/limited 

official use report does, and the overall methodology used for both reports 

is the same.

To determine the physical security concerns identified by the AOUSC, the 

U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), and the Federal Protective 

Service (FPS), we reviewed and analyzed documents from these federal 

stakeholders, including capital-planning documents, security 

assessments, information on physical security concerns, and other 

reports, and interviewed AOUSC, Marshals Service, and FPS officials to 

understand how they each identify security concerns and what data they 

collect. We limited our scope to information collected by these federal 

stakeholders, and we did not independently determine what constitutes a 

physical security concern. Rather, we relied on these stakeholders to 

determine physical security concerns as defined in their own standards 

and guidance. As part of our review of these data, we assessed federal 

stakeholders’ documentation and written responses about data collection 

procedures and their views of the quality of the data. We analyzed 

AOUSC’s March 2016 security scores, but we did not analyze the scores 

of non-resident courthouses and bankruptcy-only courthouses due to 

differences in security requirements of the different court operations and 

facilities, differences that limit the comparability of security scores, leaving 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Page 34 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

267 courthouses for our analysis. We believe that AOUSC’s security 

scores, developed as part of the judiciary’s long-range capital-planning 

process, are sufficiently reliable for our purposes based on answers that 

AOUSC provided to our questions on data reliability. We also reviewed 

incident and threat data collected by the Marshals Service and FPS, but 

based on our assessment, we do not believe these data were sufficiently 

reliable for describing physical security concerns across courthouses. We 

based this conclusion primarily on interviews with the Marshals Service 

and FPS officials who both stated that there were significant limitations in 

these data. We reviewed the methods of collecting information by these 

federal stakeholders to determine whether it was used to understand 

security concerns portfolio-wide as defined in our risk management 

framework.1

To understand how the CSP has or will address physical security 

concerns, we visited eight courthouses, which we selected to cover six 

CSP projects at various stages of implementation (completed, under 

construction, and pre-construction) as well as two courthouses that were 

considered but not selected. For each of the six site visit locations that 

have had or will have a CSP project, we (1) toured the facility to observe 

security concerns and how these concerns were (or will be) addressed in 

a CSP project; (2) reviewed documentation including CSP concept plans, 

security assessments and scores, and other reports indicating security 

concerns; and (3) interviewed local officials from the General Services 

Administration (GSA), Marshals Service, and FPS as well as local 

judiciary officials, to obtain their views about physical security concerns 

prior to the projects and how these concerns have or will be addressed by 

the CSP, and about courthouse security concerns in general. We relied 

on officials to bring security issues to our attention at the individual 

courthouses we visited. While we visited six of the ten courthouses 

selected for a CSP project as of fiscal year 2016, the information we 

obtained from these site visits cannot be generalized across all CSP 

locations. However, this information does provide useful examples about 

a majority of CSP projects selected to date. We also selected two 

courthouses that were considered but not chosen for the CSP and 

appeared on AOUSC’s documentation of potential locations that was 

used to selected projects from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2016. We 

selected these particular locations because they could be combined with 

 1

GAO-05-49.
Page 35 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

our CSP site visits or were accessible to our field staff. As with the CSP 

site visits, we toured the facility, reviewed documentation on security 

concerns, and interviewed federal stakeholders, as discussed above.

To understand how federal stakeholders have selected CSP projects and 

collaborated in planning and implementation efforts, we reviewed and 

analyzed these stakeholders’ documentation on the CSP, including 

project concepts and drawings, as well as AOUSC’s summaries of 

selection criteria, summaries of an interagency summit to improve the 

CSP, an agenda for an interagency meeting, and spreadsheets used to 

select projects. We also interviewed relevant officials about methods used 

to select project locations and collaborate with other stakeholders. We 

incorporated written and testimonial information from all stakeholders, as 

was appropriate and was relevant to the issues raised in our report. We 

compared federal stakeholders’ efforts to select projects and collaborate 

to criteria in our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government2 and the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 

directive on open government.3

To assess other actions federal stakeholders could take to address 

courthouse security challenges, we examined relevant statutes, 

memorandums of agreement, and federal stakeholders’ policies and 

guidance pertaining to roles and responsibilities for physical security at 

federal courthouses, as well as our prior work regarding courthouse 

security, including GAO-11-857. Where they were available, we also 

reviewed the meeting agendas and minutes of the facility security 

committees for the courthouse locations we visited. We interviewed 

headquarters and local officials from the GSA, Marshals Service, and 

FPS and AOUSC officials and local judiciary officials to obtain their views 

about efforts to address courthouse security challenges. We compared 

federal stakeholders’ efforts to directives and authorities that have 

established the federal government’s vision for critical infrastructure 

protection, including the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of 

 2

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

3

OMB Memorandum M10-06.
Page 36 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,4 the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan.

5

We conducted this performance audit from June 2015 to February 2017, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 4

The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2003).

5

DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP 2013): Partnering for Critical 

Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Washington, D.C.: December 2013). 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 37 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 38 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security
Appendix III: Comments from the General Services 

Administration

Page 39 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Appendix III: Comments from the General 

Services Administration
Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

Page 40 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

Page 41 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security
Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

Page 42 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security
Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

Page 43 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 44 GAO-17-215 Federal Courthouse Security

Lori Rectanus, (202) 512-2834 or rectanusl@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, David Sausville (Assistant 

Director), Amy Higgins (Analyst in Charge), Geoffrey Hamilton, John 

Mingus, Kate Perl, Malika Rice, Amy Rosewarne, and Kelly Rubin made 

key contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(101200)
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