Filed 6/13/24 P. v. Lewis CA2/5

Reposting correct version

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TEDDY LEWIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B335016

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. SA030632)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, William L. Sadler, Judge. Affirmed.

Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________
2

Defendant Teddy Lewis appeals from the trial court’s order 

denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 

1172.6 (former section 1170.95).1 Defendant’s appointed counsel 

found no arguable issues and filed a brief under People v. 

Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and defendant filed 

a supplemental brief. Finding no merit to defendant’s argument, 

we affirm.

In 1997, defendant was convicted of one count of attempted 

murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) following a no contest plea. He 

was sentenced to life imprisonment, with an additional three 

years for a firearm enhancement.2(§ 12022.5.) 

Twenty-five years later, defendant filed his petition for 

resentencing in pro. per. The trial court appointed counsel. The 

prosecution conceded defendant had established a prima facie 

case for resentencing under section 1172.6, and the matter 

proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. 

At the hearing, the prosecution relied on the transcript 

from defendant’s 2003 initial parole hearing. Over defendant’s 

objection, the trial court found the transcript admissible, under 

People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575. At the parole 

hearing, defendant was sworn. The Presiding Commissioner set 

forth the facts of the crime, and asked defendant if he had 

committed the crime; defendant agreed. The facts were as 

follows: Defendant and a co-defendant robbed a business at 

1

All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.

2 Our record of the proceedings in 1997 is minimal. It 

appears, however, that the life term was imposed because 

defendant’s victim was a law enforcement officer. (§ 664, subd. 

(e).) 
3

gunpoint. They fled from the scene in a Chevy van; defendant 

was driving. A CHP officer gave chase, with the lights and siren 

on his motorcycle activated. Eventually, defendant stopped the 

van. His co-defendant exited the van and ran away. Defendant 

put the van in reverse and backed up, at a high rate of speed, into 

the officer’s motorcycle, while the officer was still on it, pushing 

the motorcycle backward. The officer drew his gun and fired 

several times at defendant, striking him. Defendant exited the 

vehicle and ran; the officer followed on foot. Defendant raised his 

arm and fired four rounds at the officer, but did not hit him. 

Defendant tried to hide, but eventually surrendered.

At his parole hearing, defendant was further questioned as 

to the facts of his offense. When asked if there was a reason he 

had tried to run the officer down, he responded, “Well, I don’t 

really make excuses. There’s no excuse. I was in a desperate 

situation and I just had a desperate action that followed.” The 

Presiding Commissioner responded, “You ran away and shot at 

him.” Defendant said, “Just trying to get away.” He added, “I 

wasn’t really comprehending what was going on.” 

Defendant chose to testify at the section 1172.6 

resentencing hearing. He testified that the officer had shot him, 

and continued to shoot at him while he was running. When 

specifically asked if he shot back, he said, “Yes.” Defendant 

denied having any intent to kill the officer; he was simply scared, 

trying to get away, and shot “impulsive[ly].” In crossexamination, defendant began to minimize his culpability, 

denying facts he had admitted in his parole hearing. He denied 

knowing the officer was behind the van when he backed it up; he 

claimed he had driven into a dead end and had thought he lost 

the officer. He only realized the motorcycle was still behind him 
4

when he felt the impact. In redirect, defendant confirmed that, 

while he denied any intent to kill, he was not denying that he 

fired at the officer. Moments later, in recross, defendant modified 

his testimony further; he had not, in fact, tried to shoot at the 

officer. Instead, he shot, over his shoulder “in the direction of the 

officer.” He knew the officer was behind a building, and did not 

look or aim when he shot. He was simply shooting to scare the 

officer.

The court concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

defendant was guilty of attempted murder. He was the actual 

shooter and acted with intent to kill, which the court inferred 

from the shooting itself, as well as the earlier attempt to run over 

the officer. The court expressly found that defendant’s testimony 

lacked credibility. 

Given this conclusion, the resentencing petition was 

denied. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to 

Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231-232, raising no issues, 

but suggesting we consider independently reviewing the record. 

Defendant filed a supplemental brief.3

3 Defendant’s supplemental brief took the form of a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged both the denial of 

resentencing and defendant’s initial 1997 conviction. By order of 

May 13, 2024, defendant’s writ petition was considered a 

supplemental brief in the current case, and the writ matter was 

deemed non-operative. We address defendant’s argument 

directed toward the denial of his resentencing petition below. As 

to his arguments directed toward his initial conviction, he is 

procedurally defaulted from raising these issues, due to his 

inadequately explained delay in seeking relief. (In re Clark

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 783.)
5

We decline to conduct an independent review of the record 

as counsel requested, and limit ourselves to consideration of the 

issue defendant raises in his supplemental brief. Defendant 

argues there was insufficient evidence he possessed the intent to 

kill. 

At the outset, defendant’s admission that he was the 

shooter (and the driver) is sufficient to establish that he is not 

eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6, and his conviction 

is valid under current law. (See People v. Fisher (2023) 95 

Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029 [defendant’s admission at the plea 

colloquy that he was the actual shooter justifies denying the 

1172.6 motion at the prima facie stage].)

Nonetheless, we address defendant’s argument that there 

was insufficient evidence of his intent to kill. While the trial 

court must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, our 

standard of review is sufficiency of the evidence. (People v. 

Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.) We view the facts in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in favor 

of the judgment the existence of every fact that can reasonably be 

deduced from the evidence. (Ibid.)

Here, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding of 

intent to kill. Defendant, having been chased and ultimately 

cornered by the CHP officer, first tried to run him over with the 

van. Thereafter, while trying to flee, he shot at the officer 

repeatedly. Defendant’s actions demonstrate his intent to kill the 

officer. The court’s rejection of defendant’s testimony to the 

contrary is well-supported, especially since defendant 

contradicted his prior admissions at his parole hearing and at the 
6

resentencing hearing itself. The resentencing petition was 

properly denied.

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s resentencing petition is 

affirmed.

LEE, J.

WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting P. J. MOOR, J.

 Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.