DNN Sentinel

in this issue:

Vol. II , No. 1

 defense by other means

u.s. department of energy (doe)

national nuclear security administration (nnsa)

defense nuclear nonproliferation (dnn) National Nuclear Security Administration 

3 DNN Plays Central Role 

in Implementing Nuclear 

Security Summits

4 Workshop Furthers Goals 

of Maritime Security Gift 

Basket 

5 Uzbekistan Becomes 

28th HEU-free Country 

Under DNN Partnership

6 Innovation: X-Rays that 

Measure Plutonium 

Content

7 Grant to Texas A&M 

Builds Human Capital

8 Thor and FACT: Two 

Efforts Enhancing 

Monitoring and 

Verification

10 CTBTO Head Visits 

Sites Significant to U.S. 

Nonproliferation

11 Cesium Irradiator 

Replacement Promotes 

Radiological Security

12 Expert Profile: The JCPOA 

Technical Support Team

14 An Alternate Path to 

Relationship Building

15 Country Profile: India

16 FAQs: Nuclear Security 

Summits

ENERGY

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

New 

Delhi

MYANMAR

INDIA

Bay 

of 

Bengal

BANGLADESH

CHINA

BHUTAN

NEPAL

PAKISTAN

SRI LANKA

From the Deputy 

Administrator

At DNN, we recognize the value of thinking creatively 

about how to accomplish our mission. From working 

with our lab partners to develop and leverage new technical approaches 

to holding workshops and dialogues at varied venues, sometimes getting 

people out of their comfort zone can bring new thinking to the fore and 

reinforce lessons learned. Most recently, the Department of Energy and 

The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-hosted Apex Gold, a 

scenario-based policy discussion on nuclear security at the Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory in California. Ministerial-level participants 

and other senior representatives from 37 countries and four international 

organizations—the United Nations, INTERPOL, the European Union, 

and the International Atomic Energy Agency—were presented with a 

hypothetical scenario on the loss of civilian highly enriched uranium from 

regulatory control and worked together to determine how each of their 

nations might respond at each step as the scenario was rolled out. An 

important element of Apex Gold was the half day of tours at Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory. The tours helped participants to better understand some of the technical tools available for detecting and analyzing 

nuclear material, and informing decisions in the event of a terrorist event 

involving nuclear material, and also allowed them to get to know each 

other better prior to the scenario-based discussion. (http://nnsa.energy.

gov/blog/apex-gold-discussion-fosters-international-cooperation-run2016-nuclear-security-summit) 

The exercise, led by DNN in partnership with the team at NNSA’s Office 

of Nuclear Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation, laid important 

ground work for the forthcoming, and final, Nuclear Security Summit, 

which President Obama will host on March 31–April 1 in Washington. 

At the Summit, global leaders will discuss the threat of nuclear terrorism 

and identify steps to minimize the use of civil highly enriched uranium; 

secure nuclear materials; counter nuclear smuggling; and deter, detect, 
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

DNN SENTINEL: 

DEFENSE BY OTHER MEANS

VOL. II, NO. 1

http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/

ourprograms/nonproliferation-0

Editor-in-Chief

Anne Harrington

Editorial Board

Sid Bartlett

Andrew Brown

Jaci Dickerson

Thomas Gray

Erika Hunsicker

Michelle Livingston

Sarah Norris

John Wengle

Meghan Wool

Editorial Advisors

Corey Hinderstein

Andrew Hood

Editor

Elaine Specht

Graphics 

Mike Crew

Sarah Kaukeinen

Visit us!

Email us at DNNOutreach@nnsa.doe.gov 

to request to be added to the mailing list.

  DNN QUICK LINKS 

Follow the links below to learn more about recent NNSA and DNN activities.

Press Releases

Consortium Led by University of California, Berkeley Awarded $25M 

NNSA Grant for Nuclear Science and Security Research

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/

consortium-led-university-california-berkeley-awarded-25m-nnsa-grant-nuclear

NNSA Labs host U.S. and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) NonNuclear Weapon State Representatives

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/

nnsa-labs-host-u.s.-and-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-npt-non-nuclear

Blogs

NNSA Administrator Klotz Tours Argonne National Laboratory in 

Demonstration of Lab’s Critical Scientific Work Supporting Nuclear 

Threat Minimization

http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa-administrator-klotz-tours-argonne-nationallaboratory-demonstration-lab%E2%80%99s-critical-0

Working With PNNL Mentorees, Engineering Students Deliver Prototype 

Safeguards Fixtures

http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/working-pnnl-mentorees-engineering-studentsdeliver-prototype-safeguards-fixtures 

NNSA reorganizes Office of Emergency Operations (NA-40), Office of 

Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (NA-80)

http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa-reorganizes-office-emergency-operations-na40-office-counterterrorism-and

 National Nuclear Security Administration 

and disrupt attempts at nuclear terrorism. Leaders will also discuss how the vital work 

catalyzed by the Nuclear Security Summit process can be sustained once the formal 

summit process concludes. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/10/

statement-press-secretary-2016-nuclear-security-summit)

Many of the articles in this issue highlight the important work DNN undertakes in 

support of the goals President Obama outlined in Prague seven years ago. American 

leadership and technical expertise, found within the Department of Energy’s national 

laboratories, will continue to be essential to meeting and responding to global proliferation challenges and respond to new threats that will emerge in the future. 

Anne Harrington

Deputy Administrator

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Letter from the Deputy Administrator – Continued

2

Join Our 

Mailing List!
3

DNN Plays Central Role Before, During, 

and After Nuclear Security Summits

By Corey Hinderstein

More than 50 world leaders will gather 

in Washington, DC, on March 

31–April 1, 2016, for the fourth 

Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) to strengthen 

the global nuclear security architecture. DOE/

NNSA has played a central role in developing 

and implementing the commitments of the 

previous Summits and in planning the 2016 

NSS. Secretary of Energy Dr. Ernest Moniz will 

again join the President for what is expected to 

be the final Summit under the current format.

The Summit process was launched in 

President Obama’s Prague speech in April 

2009, in which he identified the risk of 

nuclear terrorism as the most immediate 

and extreme threat to global security. The 

President then laid out a four-pronged nuclear 

policy agenda, describing U.S. policies and 

initiatives towards nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, 

security, and energy. The President’s call to action on global 

nuclear security in Prague reinvigorated existing bilateral and 

multilateral efforts and challenged nations to re-examine their 

own commitments. 

Since the first Summit in April 2010 in Washington, DC, 

President Obama and his counterparts have built an 

impressive track record of meaningful progress towards 

nuclear security. These actions have included removing and 

eliminating highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, 

converting reactors using HEU to use low-enriched uranium, 

strengthening national regulations, creating nuclear security 

“Centers of Excellence,” upgrading security at facilities 

using nuclear and radiological material, and preventing illicit 

trafficking in these materials. These are all concrete threat 

reduction steps. DNN’s offices of Material Management and 

Minimization, Global Material Security, and Nonproliferation 

and Arms Control have played central roles in the success of 

NSS efforts. 

The 2014 Summit in The Hague, Netherlands, included a 

first of its kind “Scenario-Based Policy Discussion” (SBPD) in 

which leaders interacted with a fictional emergency event. 

This exercise illustrated the kind of decisions that leaders 

would face in such a circumstance and prompted a 

constructive discussion of steps countries could take 

before such an event arises. Secretary Moniz participated 

in that SBPD, and it served as the motivation for him to 

host Apex Gold, a ministerial-level exercise that took place 

in late-January 2016 at Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory. Apex Gold, co-hosted with the Netherlands’ 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, brought together 37 countries and 

4 international organizations to explore a fictional scenario of 

HEU out of regulatory control and was part of the run-up to 

the 2016 Summit at which leaders will again participate in an 

SBPD. 

The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit will focus on catalyzing 

new national commitments and strengthening institutions 

and initiatives that facilitate nuclear security. These elements 

of the global architecture will be part of the enduring legacy 

of the NSS process and form the foundation for countries’ 

commitments to nuclear security in the future.

See the related blog at http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/apex-golddiscussion-fosters-international-cooperation-run-2016-nuclearsecurity-summit 

Corey Hinderstein is DNN’s Senior Coordinator for the Nuclear 

Security Summit and Nonproliferation Policy Affairs.

In preparation for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, 37 countries and 

4 international organizations participated in Apex Gold, a ministerial-level, 

Scenario-Based Policy Discussion.
4

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Workshop Furthers Goals of 

Maritime Security Gift Basket 

By Kaitlin Oujo

DNN’s Office of Global Material Security (GMS) 

and the UK Department of Energy and Climate 

Change (DECC) concluded a three-day workshop 

in November 2015 on the security of the global maritime 

supply chain at the Wilton Park Conference Centre in the 

United Kingdom. Fifty participants from 15 countries and 

9 international organizations developed recommendations 

and shared best practices for effectively deterring, detecting, 

and responding to trafficking of nuclear and radiological 

materials out of regulatory control (MORC). The participants 

represented a broad range of stakeholders, including policy 

organizations, detection operations agencies, regulatory 

authorities, regional and international organizations, and 

major terminal operators.

At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, 13 countries signed a 

joint statement recognizing the importance of a national-level 

approach to combat the illicit transfer of MORC using the 

global maritime shipping system. In addition to pledging a 

deeper commitment to detection and removal of MORC, the 

signatories of the joint statement committed to participate 

in November’s workshop, which sought to identify best 

practices and actionable recommendations for permanently 

removing MORC from the maritime supply chain. The 

outcomes of the workshop were captured in a follow-on joint 

statement (co-drafted by GMS and DECC) to be presented 

at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC. 

DNN and DECC are also preparing a best practices guide 

that will be shared with the workshop participants and will 

be made publicly available. The joint statement and the 

best practices guide will provide a framework for follow-on 

actions aimed at addressing this issue. 

The interactive workshop consisted of panelists, speakers, 

and exercise breakout group sessions, which allowed 

participants to develop key findings, best practices, and 

recommendations. The workshop participants reconfirmed 

that detection systems are one important tool in a nation’s 

approach to combatting nuclear and radiological smuggling. 

Participants further agreed to the importance of both longterm planning to sustain detection systems and a comprehensive “end-to-end” regulatory framework for all those 

involved in detecting and responding to MORC. Participants 

discussed best practices, including regular training and 

routine exercises of systems to verify that relevant 

stakeholders understand 

their roles and responsibilities and maintain a state of 

readiness. Additionally, 

the workshop yielded 

recommendations for the 

international community to 

seek opportunities to 

further share information 

and develop better technical 

and operational solutions 

to reduce the high rate of 

innocent, naturally occurring radioactive material 

(“NORM”) alarms. These 

alarms have a negative 

impact on commerce and 

detract resources from 

detecting materials of 

concern. 

The U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, represented by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), made significant 

contributions to the workshop. DNDO provided subject 

matter expertise in exercise design and development, and 

the Director of DNDO, Dr. Huban Gowadia, participated in a 

panel discussion on the benefits and challenges to radiation 

detection programs. CBP also provided subject matter 

expertise to the workshop content, shared the agency’s lessons learned and best practices for operating and sustaining 

their detection program, and presented case studies of 

different types of detections.

Best practices and recommendations from the workshop will 

serve to further enhance collaboration in the area of global 

maritime supply chain area security and will be formally 

presented at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.

Kaitlin Oujo is an NNSA Graduate Fellow in the GMS Office of 

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence. She recently 

completed a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University.

See the related press release at http://nnsa.energy.gov/

mediaroom/pressreleases/nnsa-co-hosts-nuclear-security-summitworkshop-maritime-security-uk.

Elly Melamed, Associate 

Assistant Deputy Administrator 

for GMS, gave opening remarks 

at the workshop.

Panel discussions with 

international leaders held 

during the workshop offered 

multiple perspectives.
5

Uzbekistan Becomes 28th HEU-free Country 

Under DNN Partnership

On September 24, 2015, a partnership with DNN’s Office of Material Management and Minimization, the International 

Atomic Energy Agency, and the Russian Federation successfully returned to Russia the final 5 kg of highly enriched 

uranium (HEU) spent fuel from the IIN-3M “Foton” research reactor in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. This is the eighth 

shipment of HEU from Uzbekistan since 2004 and marks the removal of all HEU from that country. This HEU removal 

was notable in that it was the first transport of liquid HEU spent fuel by air. Uzbekistan is the 28th country, plus Taiwan, to 

become free of all HEU. 

Learn more and see additional pictures at http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/

nnsa-partnership-successfully-removes-all-remaining-heu-uzbekistan. 

An ISO transport container carrying the SKODA VPVR/M spent fuel 

shipment cask travels from the Foton reactor facility to Tashkent 

International Airport under police escort.

The SKODA VPVR/M spent fuel shipment cask is enclosed in a 

TUK-145/C over-package, which is licensed for air transport and 

protects its contents from extreme shocks.

The SKODA spent fuel shipment cask is prepared for 

transfer to its TUK-145/C over-package at Tashkent 

International Airport.

The over-package is loaded onto a cargo plane headed 

for the Mayak Reprocessing Facility in Russia for final 

disposition.
6

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

By Rollin Lakis 

DNN’s Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control 

(NPAC) is working in collaboration with Los Alamos 

National Laboratory (LANL) and Pennsylvania State 

University to build and test an advanced concept Cauchois 

X-ray spectrometer for nuclear fuel cycle safeguards 

applications. The unique performance attributes of the 

instrument may offer new possibilities for verifying plutonium 

in highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel 

reprocessing solutions.

The majority of plutonium in the world is produced in nuclear 

reactors and is contained in spent nuclear fuel stored around 

the globe. The amount of plutonium in a spent nuclear fuel 

assembly primarily is determined by operator declarations 

and through computer simulations using a “burnup code.” 

However, the Cauchois spectrometer, which can collect high 

resolution X-ray and gamma ray spectroscopy data in very 

high radiation environments, is enabling a new methodology, 

called self-interrogation X-ray fluorescence (SIXRF), to measure the plutonium content of the fuel directly. The Cauchois 

spectrometer method takes advantage of the fact that the 

high intensity scattered radiation from spent fuel interacts 

directly with uranium and plutonium atoms to create X-rays 

that can be used to measure the amount of special nuclear 

material in the fuel. This technique is important for the 

international safeguards community because it can detect 

the diversion of nuclear material, in this case plutonium in 

spent fuel.

The new Los Alamos spectrometer was built in partnership 

with Artep Inc., a small innovative technology company. 

The first experiments using irradiated nuclear fuel are being 

performed at the Radiation Science and Engineering Center 

(RSEC) at the Pennsylvania State University Breazeale 

Research Reactor. The University-National Laboratory 

collaboration has created an environment where irradiated 

nuclear fuel, including fuel removed directly from the 

university’s TRIGA (pool-type) reactor, is available for testing 

potential safeguards instruments. LANL and Penn State 

have performed initial measurements on the deck of the 

pool-type reactor with the intensely radioactive fuel shielded 

by a lead cask. 

The strong collaboration with Penn State University reactor 

operators, flexibility in the Breazeale reactor configuration, 

opportunity to perform development work in an irradiator 

pool where underwater measurement techniques can be 

performed separate from the main reactor pool, and diverse 

inventory of irradiated nuclear fuel, combine to create a 

unique environment at Penn State for nuclear safeguards 

instrument testing. The academic environment also encourages student participation. This experiment was supported 

by Ph.D. student Katrina Koehler (Western Michigan 

University) and post-doctoral researcher Nicola Winch. This 

work enables increased engagement between Los Alamos 

scientists and Penn State faculty and students in the areas 

of spent nuclear fuel characterization, radiation detector 

development, and international nuclear safeguards. Penn 

State students also participate in Los Alamos and other 

laboratory internships and nonproliferation summer schools.

Rollin Lakis is a research scientist in the Safeguards Technology 

Development Group at LANL. While working in the weapons 

program, Rollin developed considerable experience in plutonium 

metallurgy and in leading complex nuclear science experiments 

before focusing on international nuclear safeguards. He presently 

works to provide advanced technology solutions to support the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, U.S. international bilateral 

agreements, and other domestic sponsors.

Having made final adjustments to the quartz single crystal at the 

front of the Cauchois spectrometer, LANL post-doctoral researcher 

Nicola Winch (left) and Penn State research scientist Amanda 

Johnsen (right) prepare to install calibration filters and bolt on the 

spectrometer cover. The spent fuel cask (empty) is in front of the 

spectrometer, and the entire experiment is positioned along the 

reactor pool wall with the reactor bridge visible beneath the flag. 

innovation: X-Rays that Measure Plutonium Content

The Cauchois X-ray spectrometer is named for 

French physicist Yvette Cauchois, who made significant 

contributions to X-ray spectroscopy and X-ray optics.
7

Grant to Texas A&M Builds Human Capital 

By Melissa Einwechter

F

rom September 14–18, 2015, under a grant provided 

by NNSA’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative 

(NGSI), the Nuclear Security Science and Policy 

Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University coordinated the 

second Nuclear Facilities Experience (NFE). The first NFE 

was held in 2013 in Japan; the 2015 iteration was held in 

the United Kingdom. The NFE provides young professionals 

within the DOE National Laboratory enterprise and U.S. 

graduate-level technical university students the chance to 

visit advanced operating nuclear fuel cycle facilities and 

discuss topics such as facility operations, responsible 

nuclear materials management, and the application of 

international safeguards. Since the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) does not currently conduct routine 

inspections at any commercial nuclear facilities in the United 

States, the NFE provides a unique opportunity for American 

students and young professionals to visit commercial 

enrichment and reprocessing plants that are under 

international inspections.

The participants in the NFE in the UK included students 

from five U.S. colleges, scientists and engineers from 

three National Laboratories, and faculty members from the 

University of Utah and Texas A&M University. The group 

spent time at the URENCO uranium enrichment facility in 

Capenhurst; the Heysham nuclear power station, one of only 

seven Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors left operating in the 

world; and the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing site, including 

the now-decommissioned Calder Hall graphite-moderated 

Magnox reactor and the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing 

Plant. The final day of the NFE was spent in an educational 

exchange with students and faculty from King’s College in 

London.

Participants expressed high praise for this unique learning 

opportunity. In particular, they indicated that the ability to 

interact with facility operators to understand how they apply 

international safeguards was invaluable, and that the trip 

expanded their understanding of the complete nuclear fuel 

cycle, particularly in the workings of commercial facilities. 

Early career Laboratory staff indicated that what they learned 

at the NFE would directly benefit their ability to propose, 

develop, and support the most relevant technologies for 

safeguards applications. 

The next NFE will be held in Japan, May 15–20, 2016. 

Confirmed facilities include the MONJU Fast Breeder 

Reactor R&D Center, the FUGEN Decommissioning Center, 

the Tokai Reprocessing Technology Development Center, 

and the Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Cycle Plant (consisting 

of the reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities). 

Participants will also tour Hiroshima and meet with a local 

atomic blast survivor.

Melissa Einwechter is a Foreign Affairs Specialist in DNN’s 

Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, where she 

serves as Federal Program Manager for NGSI Human 

Capital Development, NGSI Concepts and Approaches, and 

Additional Protocol implementation in the United States.

NNSA Supports Human Capital Development

Since 2008, NNSA’s Human Capital Development 

(HCD) subprogram within NNSA has been building 

and supporting a sustainable pipeline of international 

safeguards expertise in the United States and for the 

IAEA. HCD activities help recruit, educate, train, and 

retain a new generation of international safeguards 

specialists in the United States. 

In addition to the multi-year grant to support 

the NFE opportunity, other HCD efforts include 

university curriculum development, internships and 

post-doctoral positions at National Laboratories, short 

courses about nuclear safeguards, and professional 

development and outreach to young and mid-career 

professionals. 

2015 NFE groups 

at Heysham nuclear 

power plant (above) 

and at Sellafield 

nuclear reprocessing 

site (right).
8

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

T

he Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Office of 

Research and Development (DNN R&D) supports 

U.S. national security goals by advancing technical 

capabilities to detect foreign nuclear weapons-related 

activities, illicit diversion of special nuclear materials and 

nuclear detonations globally. DNN R&D research efforts in 

nuclear detonation detection include advanced methods in 

detecting and processing seismic and infrasound signals. 

From a multilateral perspective, advancements in these 

areas of research are relevant to the Comprehensive-TestBan Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which manages the 

International Monitoring System (IMS) and the International 

Data Centre (IDC). The IMS uses several different methods 

for detecting possible treaty violations, including seismic 

and infrasound signals, and the IDC provides the analysis 

of these data. Two such DNN R&D research projects are 

described below.

Thor Wields a Seismic HammerTM

From 1951–1992, the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) 

hosted hundreds of nuclear tests. Many of these tests 

were of high enough yield to be sensed globally. Today, 

NNSS is available to support national security in many other 

ways, including as a laboratory of complex geologies for 

understanding the signatures and signals from underground 

explosions. Under the Source Physics Experiments (SPE) 

at NNSS, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia 

National Laboratories, along with the University of NevadaReno, are working with the NNSS managing contractor, 

NSTec, to conduct chemical explosion experiments to 

increase our confidence in detecting low-yield nuclear events 

by better understanding how explosions generate shear 

waves. This is important because the ratio of shear waves to 

compressive waves is one key discriminant between natural 

(e.g., earthquakes) and man-made (e.g., mining explosions) 

seismic signature sources. With each new explosion in 

the SPE series, researchers get terabytes of new seismic, 

infrasound, electromagnetic, and other signal data for 

developing an advanced and predictive modeling capability. 

However, even the best physics codes cannot faithfully 

reproduce experimental data without some knowledge of 

the geology in which the waves propagate. This is where the 

Seismic HammerTM comes in.

Thor and FACT: Two Efforts Enhancing Monitoring 

and Verification Capabilities

By Meghan Wool

About the CTBT, CTBTO, and IMS

When the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 

(CTBT) enters into force, it will ban all nuclear explosive testing by its member states. The Preparatory 

Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 

Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was founded in 1996 

to promote the Treaty and build-up of the monitoring 

and verification regime so the regime is operational 

when the Treaty enters into force. The monitoring and 

verification regime consists of three pillars to detect 

violations: An International Monitoring System (IMS) 

with 337 facilities worldwide to monitor for signs of 

nuclear explosions; an International Data Centre that 

processes data from the IMS; and On-Site Inspection 

of a location where a nuclear explosion is suspected 

to have taken place. DNN provides support to the 

CTBTO to strengthen all three areas of the monitoring 

and verification regime.

DNN’s support of the IMS primarily focuses on building 

capacity in the areas of seismological and infrasound 

technologies. There currently are 282 certified IMS stations in place with an additional 19 installed, 18 under 

construction, and 18 planned. The IMS relies on four 

complementary monitoring methods: Seismological to 

measure shock waves in the earth; hydroacoustic that 

listens for sound waves traveling through the oceans; 

infrasound to detect ultra-low frequency sound waves 

caused by an explosion; and radionuclide to detect 

radioactive debris and radioactive noble gases. Data 

from the IMS stations also can provide information 

on natural phenomena, such as earthquakes and 

tsunamis, or accidental releases of radionuclides.

Learn more about: 

CTBT—http://www.state.gov/t/avc/c42328.htm 

CBTBO and IMS—https://www.ctbto.org/
9

The Seismic 

HammerTM is a 

“weight-drop” 

seismic source, 

designed and 

operated by HK 

Seismic under 

subcontract 

to Sandia. In 

concept, it is 

as simple as it 

sounds; a weight 

is picked up 

and dropped, 

radiating seismic 

energy. What 

sets the Seismic 

HammerTM 

apart from 

its brethren is its scale. The dropped mass in question is 

13,000 kg in weight (approximately equal to the curb weight 

of 10 mid-sized cars). When this mass is lifted 1.5 meters 

and then dropped, over 191,000 Joules of potential energy 

is released. “Because the seismic efficiency of a weightdrop is so much higher than it is for explosives, the peak 

ground motion output by the Seismic HammerTM is roughly 

equivalent to 20 kg of explosives,” says Robert Abbott, 

Principal Investigator of the project at Sandia. Furthermore, 

unlike explosives, a weight-drop can be deployed in the 

same exact location over and over, allowing the data to 

be stacked, improving its signal-to-noise ratio with each 

successive hit.

Preliminary results from the recent DNN R&D-sponsored 

experiments (dubbed, “Thor”) are excellent. In total, over 

4,500 Hammer “hits” were recorded on approximately 360 

geophones along two long intersecting Seismic HammerTM 

tracks totaling over 36 km in length. (The next phase of SPE 

will be conducted where these two lines intersect.) Initial 

analysis of the data by Sandia validates the use of this tool 

by showing that the variation of compression-wave velocity 

with depth faithfully matches the geologic reconstructions 

inferred from borehole logs as compiled by geologists at 

NNSS. This newly validated, high-resolution, compressionwave velocity profile will enable researchers to remove 

uncertain propagation effects from the future explosion 

dataset, and thereby focus on the physics of the explosion 

source itself.

Sensing Seismic and Infrasound Phenomenon 

at FACT Site

Researchers at the 

Sandia National 

Laboratories Facility for 

Acceptance, Calibration, 

and Testing (FACT) Site 

in Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, evaluate and 

characterize seismic 

and infrasound sensor 

systems used for nuclear 

explosive test monitoring. 

These sensors enable 

detection of underground 

or near-surface nuclear 

explosions because 

signals from these large 

events can travel thousands of miles through the earth or 

atmosphere until a monitoring station detects them. Existing 

sensors have provided scientists with valuable data about 

large bolide explosions, such as the one caused by the 

Chelyabinsk meteor in 2012. 

Looking forward, the U.S. 

Department of State has 

provided Sandia with funding for 

upgrades to the FACT Site and 

for evaluation of components 

to improve the capability of 

the IMS. DOE/NNSA recently 

received approval from the U.S. 

Air Force to extend Sandia’s 

monitoring footprint from the 

initial 45 acres to additional sites 

within a 516-acre boundary. 

The additional space allows 

the team to set up and test 

larger sensor arrays with greater 

station spacing, which allows 

for performance evaluation 

of entire systems used for 

monitoring. The expanded 

FACT Site provides a unique 

testing capability to both the 

United States and international 

community.

Meghan Wool is a Leidos contractor supporting DNN’s 

Office of Research & Development.

When completed, the 

infrasound wind-filter 

testbed at the FACT Site will 

facilitate side-by-side testing 

of existing and potential 

new sensors for detecting 

nuclear explosions.

Under Secretary of State Rose 

Gottemoeller visited the FACT Site 

in September 2014.

The thousands of Seismic HammerTM “hits” 

made during the “Thor” experiments provide 

valuable data to better understand the 

potential behavior of seismic waves after a 

nuclear explosion.
10

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

CTBTO Head Visits Sites Significant to U.S. 

Nonproliferation

By Cornelia Brim and Maren Disney

Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 

Organization (CTBTO), visited three NNSA sites in November 2015—Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), 

the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)—to discuss NNSA’s support for 

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty-related efforts.

Learn more about Dr. Zerbo’s visit at:

http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/head-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-organization-ctbto-preparatory

http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/nnsa-sites-host-head-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-organization-ctbto

CTBTO Executive Secretary Dr. Lassina Zerbo (right) during his visit 

to the National Ignition Facility at LLNL.

CTBTO Executive Secretary Dr. Lassina Zerbo (center) during his 

visit to NNSS.

CTBTO Executive Secretary Dr. Lassina Zerbo (center) was joined 

by DNN Deputy Administrator Anne Harrington (third from right) 

and Defense Programs Acting Deputy Administrator Gen. S.L. Davis 

(second from right) during his visit to NNSS. 

Nancy Jo Nicholas, LANL’s Associate Laboratory Director for Threat 

Identification and Response, joined CTBTO Executive Secretary 

Dr. Lassina Zerbo during his visit to New Mexico. 
11

Through CIRP, NNSA provides a financial incentive toward 

the purchase of an X-ray irradiator, contingent on the disposition of the cesium-137 irradiator at the site. Disposition is 

facilitated through NNSA’s Offsite Source Recovery Program. 

During the pilot phase in FY 2015, NNSA partnered with 

one of the country’s premier blood facilities, OneBlood, 

Inc., to install one X-ray irradiator at a new facility in Florida. 

OneBlood is a not-for-profit 501(c)(3) community asset 

responsible for providing safe, available, and affordable 

blood to more than 200 hospital partners and their patients 

throughout most of Florida, parts of Georgia, Alabama, and 

South Carolina, distributing nearly one million blood products 

annually. “By implementing the X-ray irradiator, OneBlood 

has further enhanced the safety of the blood supply and 

increased the security of our facilities. At the same time, 

the X-ray irradiator has enabled us to increase our blood 

irradiation throughput and has exceeded our expectations 

for performance and reliability. OneBlood remains supportive 

of using non-isotopic alternatives and remains vigilant in 

seeking alternatives to cesium-137 irradiators as we go 

forward,” said Alicia Bellido Prichard, OneBlood Senior Vice 

President of Biologics.

NNSA plans to engage with additional sites in FY 2016 to 

expand the CIRP program and continue supporting the 

mission of permanent risk reduction.

Malika Taalbi is a former NNSA Graduate Fellowship 

Program participant and current contractor in ORS. 

She holds her B.A. from Marquette University in Political 

Science and her Master of International Public Affairs from 

the La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of 

Wisconsin-Madison.

Cesium Irradiator 

Replacement 

Preserves Health 

Benefits, Promotes 

Radiological Safety

By Malika Taalbi

Radioactive materials play a critical role in medical, 

industrial, and commercial applications. Technology 

advances, such as in the case of blood irradiation, 

have led to the increased availability of non-isotopic 

alternatives. As part of its mission to protect, reduce, and 

eliminate radioactive materials, DNN’s Office of Radiological 

Security (ORS) within the Office of Global Material Security 

leads efforts to reduce the need for high-activity sources 

by supporting viable non-isotopic alternative technologies 

to replace the most common devices that use high-activity 

sources. The result is permanent threat reduction through 

the elimination of risk-significant radioactive materials. 

A common application of high-activity radioactive material is 

the irradiation of blood components to prevent transfusionassociated graft vs. host disease (TA-GvHD), an extremely 

rare, yet nearly always fatal, disease in which white blood 

cells from a donor’s blood attack host tissues in a recipient 

patient. The potentially harmful cells can be inactivated 

through the application of ionizing radiation. Approximately 

20% of blood products in the United States are irradiated 

for use in patients at greatest risk, such as those who are 

immunocompromised, or patients with similar genetic 

components to the blood product donor.

Historically, the most common method of preventing this 

disease is through the application of gamma radiation by 

self-shielded irradiators containing cesium-137. However, 

non-isotopic technologies, such as X-ray irradiators or 

ultraviolet pathogen reduction, have become increasingly 

available in the U.S. commercial market. 

Under NNSA’s voluntary Cesium Irradiator Replacement 

Program (CIRP), ORS partners with commercial licensees 

to replace their cesium-137 irradiators with X-ray irradiators. 

ORS is helping medical facilities switch to X-ray irradiators for 

preventing TA-GvHD, a serious disease that can result from 

blood transfusions, instead of irradiators that use the highactivity radioactive material cesium-137.
12

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

Expert Profile: The JCPOA Technical Support Team

Focusing on Arak Modernization

T

he P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, 

United States, and Germany), the European Union, 

and Iran reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

(JCPOA) last summer to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program 

will be exclusively peaceful. The JCPOA prevents Iran from 

getting the capability to build a nuclear weapon and includes 

strong measures to detect violations. On January 16, 2016, 

the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that Iran 

had completed all the necessary nuclear steps required to 

reach “Implementation Day” under the JCPOA.

In a number of speeches and while testifying before 

Congress, Secretary Moniz made clear that the JCPOA is 

based on hard science. Nuclear experts from DOE/NNSA 

and DOE’s National Laboratories were essential to evaluating 

and developing technical proposals in support of the U.S. 

delegation. The list of labs and sites that provided support 

included Argonne National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Savannah River 

National Laboratory, the Y-12 National Security Complex, and 

the National Security Campus near Kansas City, Mo. 

Throughout the negotiations, Kevin Veal of DNN’s Office of 

Nonproliferation and Arms Control served as the primary 

technical advisor. When JCPOA negotiations encountered 

some challenges, for example those related to the potential 

for plutonium production at the Arak Heavy Water Research 

Reactor in Iran, the negotiators reached back to additional 

experts at DNN and the National Laboratories. 

The individuals featured here formed the core team addressing technical issues surrounding modernization of 

the Arak Reactor, a process that will eliminate a potential 

source of weapons-grade nuclear material. The redesign 

specified in the JCPOA will allow effective peaceful uses of 

the reactor and minimize accumulation of plutonium suitable 

for weapons. With their substantial technical expertise and 

experience with reactor conversion, these DNN and National 

Laboratory staff provided their support at critical points in the 

JCPOA negotiations and will be joined by additional experts 

to provide ongoing implementation support. 

Learn more about the JCPOA at http://energy.gov/search/site/jcpoa.

Meet the Technical Team

CHRISTOPHER LANDERS

Organization

DNN’s Office of Material 

Management and Minimization, 

Director of Reactor Conversions

Background in Brief

• Currently serving as one of the initial cohorts for the 

White House Leadership Development Fellowship 

(https://www.whitehouse.gov/participate/whldp) 

while continuing to support JCPOA implementation.

• Initially joined NNSA through the NNSA Graduate 

Fellowship Program supporting what was then the 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).

Role on JCPOA Technical Team

U.S. Primary Representative for the Arak Modernization 

Project

In His Own Words

“Having us be able to take the pressure off the political 

aspects for a moment by focusing on the technical 

components of the reactor seemed to help improve the 

negotiating environment. We were not only able to discuss the technical topics in the larger experts meeting, 

but we were also able to have a handful of break-out 

side meetings where the tension really seemed to lift and 

progress was achieved on getting to the agreement for 

the conceptual design parameters of the Arak redesign 

that would meet 

the performance 

needs of Iran, 

and of course the 

nonproliferation 

needs of the U.S. 

and others.”

“What would typically take a week 

or more, we were able to get 

turned around in a day or two. 

Big thank you to Argonne and 

Savannah River National Labs for 

their support.”

Christopher Landers

DNN’s Office of Material Management 

and Minimization
JOHN STEVENS, Ph.D. 

Organization

Argonne National 

Laboratory, Manager of 

the Research and Test 

Reactor Department in 

the Nuclear Engineering 

Division 

Background in Brief

• Joined Argonnne in 

March 2005. 

• Previously worked on 

light water reactor reload optimization for 14 years at 

Studsvik Scandpower, Inc., in Idaho Falls, ID.

Role on JCPOA Technical Team

Technical Lead for the Arak Modernization Project, coordinating the design and analysis work of the Argonne team 

and participating as reactor conversion subject matter 

expert for the interagency team.

In His Own Words

“In addition to 

working at a much 

quicker pace than is 

typical for engineering 

design, our team had 

to consider evolving 

goals and constraints. 

... Fortunately, 

our reactor conversion tool sets (in terms of methods, 

software, and expertise) have been developed and refined 

for a significant variety of applications, since each of the 

67 reactor conversions led by Argonne to date has been 

unique. We were able to wrap tools in a rapid-prototyping 

framework to deal with the different goals and constraints 

for experimental performance.”

ROGER BLOMQUIST, Ph.D.

Organization

Argonne National Laboratory, Nuclear Engineering Division 

Background in Brief

• A former U.S. Navy nuclear submariner who has been 

at Argonne for 36 years. 

Role on JCPOA Technical Team

Performed reactor physics calculations during negotiations that assessed the isotope production potential of 

the converted reactor compared to the original, nearly 

completed unit. 

In His Own Words

“It was very rewarding to be involved in a process that 

was so critical to the interests of the United States and the 

world. We strived to provide our negotiators and national 

security professionals 

with the most accurate, 

complete information 

possible to foster a 

successful negotiation and 

an effective, enforceable 

agreement.”

NATRAJ IYER, Ph.D.

Organization

Savannah River National Laboratory, 

Associate Laboratory Director, 

Nuclear Materials Management 

Programs 

Background in Brief

• Has been at Savannah River National Laboratory 

for 24 years.

• Previously worked with the Westinghouse Research 

and Development Center in Pittsburgh, PA.

Role on JCPOA Technical Team

Senior Technical Advisor to the Arak Modernization Project 

In His Own Words

“We are very fortunate to be 

working with some of the 

brightest people in DOE and 

across the interagency. I 

was able to see firsthand the 

depth of competency on the 

U.S team whose expertise 

and efforts were the key to 

successful negotiation.”

Clockwise around table: John 

Stevens at the keyboard and 

Roger Blomquist, joined by 

several members of Argonne’s 

Arak analysis team: Rich Lell, 

Arne Olson, and Mohammad 

Kalimullah.

“... the sun never set on our work 

for weeks at a time. That is an 

exciting way to work toward a big 

impact in the pursuit of peace 

and science.”

John Stevens, Ph.D. 

Argonne National Laboratory

“This was a true team effort, 

and all the team members 

contributed hugely to the 

success of the negotiations.”

Roger Blomquist, Ph.D. 

Argonne National Laboratory

“The most memorable 

and satisfying moment 

was to see the 

gradual conversion of 

naysayers to buy into 

the modernization 

concept proposed by 

the U.S. team.”

Natraj Iyer, Ph.D. 

Savannah River National 

Laboratory

13
14

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN)

An Alternate Path to Relationship Building

T

ypically countries interact by following formal 

government channels. These “Track I” interactions 

take place between lawfully elected or appointed 

officials authorized to represent their countries. But 

sometimes, international relationships can be enhanced 

through “Track II diplomacy,” informal and unofficial 

interactions that take place between private citizens 

who are not employed by a government. An example 

of a Track II exchange might include retired officials and 

non-governmental organizational representatives meeting 

to share specific technical expertise and gain common 

understandings. The 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords 

are widely considered the biggest success ever begun 

through Track II engagement. Interactions that involve both 

official and non-official actors are sometimes called “Track 

1.5” engagements. 

In the area of nuclear nonproliferation, DNN supports 

both Track II and Track 1.5 activities to address emerging 

challenges and opportunities in nonproliferation and arms 

control, and foster cooperation in areas where more formal 

government-to-government interactions are inappropriate or 

do not take place. 

India-Pakistan Relations

DNN’s Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) 

supports Track 1.5 and Track II events in South Asia with 

the ultimate goal of lessening the danger of nuclear conflict 

and seeking nuclear stability in the region. A large part of 

these efforts includes online initiatives and other social media 

activities intended to encourage dialogue among young 

South Asian strategic analysts and aspiring policy practitioners who will be the “heirs” to India and Pakistan’s nuclear 

weapons and challenges. 

Recognizing the need for a virtual space for young Indian 

and Pakistani strategic analysts to interact, NPAC, in 

partnership with the Stimson Center, launched the South 

Asian Voices website initiative to allow greater visibility and 

means of expression to a rising generation of strategic 

analysts in Pakistan and India. Since its inception, South 

Asian Voices has gained 

significant attention, with over 

70 thousand unique visits, 

nearly all of them by readers 

from India and Pakistan. South 

Asian Voices complements 

NPAC’s support for the 

Colombo Confidence Building Process, a social media and 

video project focusing on confidence building measures in 

South Asia that is managed by Sandia National Laboratories 

and has hosted 2.3 million unique viewers. NPAC also is 

working in partnership with the Stimson Center in organizing 

a Massive Open Online Course on South Asian Nuclear 

Deterrence Stability, and in partnership with the Middlebury 

Institute of International Studies, conducts workshops for 

Urdu language Pakistani journalists on the fundamentals of 

nuclear technology and policy to enable technically sound 

coverage of nuclear issues by vernacular media in Pakistan. 

Jason Portner contributed to this article. He is a Nonproliferation 

Graduate Fellow supporting NPAC’s Regional Analysis & 

Engagement Track 1.5 and Track II diplomatic efforts. A proficient 

Mandarin speaker, Jason holds a Master of Arts in International 

Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies.

Learn more 

about DNN’s 

work with India. 

The South Asian Voices website is at southasianvoices.org.
country profile: india

Atomic Energy Act 

passed, leading to the 

establishment of the 

Indian Atomic Energy 

Commission (IAEC)

Department of Atomic 

Energy established

Apsara research 

reactor became the 

first operating reactor 

in Asia

Broke ground on 

the Global Center 

for Nuclear Energy 

Partnership (GCNEP)

Initial classroom 

training facilities at 

GCNEP expected to 

be completed

1948

1954

1957

2014

2016

India’s 

Nuclear 

History 

in Brief

New 

Delhi

MYANMAR

INDIA

Bay 

of 

Bengal

BANGLADESH

CHINA

BHUTAN

NEPAL

PAKISTAN

SRI LANKA

First nuclear test

1974

1998 Multiple nuclear tests

123 Agreement between 

United States and India 

2008 brought into force

Full implementation 

of U.S.-India 123 

Agreement

2015

Country Profile: India, Page 16 15

President Obama has called India one of the defining partnerships of the 

21st century, one which will be vital to strategic interests in Asia-Pacific and 

across the globe. The United States supports India’s critical role as a leader 

in maintaining regional stability, and our security ties are reflected in growing 

bilateral defense and counterterrorism cooperation.

India and the United States share membership in a variety of international 

organizations, including the United Nations, International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), G-20, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) Regional Forum. In February 2016, India ratified the Convention 

on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), a multilateral 

treaty relating to liability and compensation for damage caused by a nuclear 

incident. Over the past year, the CSC has entered into force in the United 

States and several other countries.

India is rapidly increasing the capacity of its 

civilian nuclear power industry, which is growing 

to meet the electricity demand. The Government 

of India has plans to expand nuclear generation 

to 25% of the energy mix by 2050 through a 

combination of Russian-supplied light water 

reactors, French pressurized water reactors, U.S. 

advanced boiling water reactors, and indigenous 

designs. Of note, construction of Kudankulam 

Unit 2 is nearing completion and is expected to 

begin operation by March 2016.

Several important developments between 2005 and 2008 advanced India’s 

ability to pursue nuclear power. In 2005–2006, India committed to pursue civil 

nuclear cooperation with the United States and announced plans to separate 

its civil and military nuclear programs by placing the civil program under IAEA 

safeguards. The IAEA then approved a safeguards agreement with India, 

enabling the IAEA to verify the peaceful nature of India’s civil program. Soon 

after, the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided to allow transfers of civilian nuclear 

technology and fuel to India.

In addition to DNN’s cooperative engagement on nuclear security issues, 

DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy actively cooperates with India on civil nuclear 

energy topics, and several new areas of collaboration have been identified for 

further discussion. Some highlights of DNNs recent work with India follow.

123 Agreement

In 2008, the Department of State, with technical assistance from DOE/NNSA, 

concluded a Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (123 Agreement) with 

India. Since then, India has signed agreements with several other countries 

A Critical Player in Regional Stability 

India’s Nuclear Profile

21 Nuclear power plants 

in operation

6 Nuclear power plants 

under construction

35 Planned new nuclear 

power plants

4 Research reactors in 

operation

Announced separation 

of civil and military 

nuclear programs 2005– 

2006
16

FAQs: Nuclear Security Summits

President Obama, in his 

2009 Prague speech, 

announced that the 

United States would 

host a “Global Summit 

on Nuclear Security.” 

That summit has since 

evolved into a series of 

biennial Nuclear Security 

Summits. 

Who hosted the first three Summits?

The United States hosted the first Summit in Washington, 

DC, in 2010; South Korea hosted the 2012 Summit in Seoul; 

and the Netherlands hosted the Summit in 2014 at The 

Hague. 

What is the focus of the Summits?

The Summits bring attention at the highest level to the global 

threat of nuclear terrorism. They bring world leaders together 

to publically commit to principles of nuclear security paired 

with specific actions.

What is meant by “gift baskets”?

Some countries participating in the Nuclear Security 

Summits have taken the initiative to join together in smaller 

groups to make collective commitments on specific issues. 

These joint initiatives are known as “gift baskets.” For example, there have been gift baskets on enhancing radiological security, strengthening nuclear security implementation, 

supporting Centers of Excellence, and developing high 

density low-enriched uranium fuels.

How does DNN support the Nuclear Security Summits?

DNN’s core activities are central to implementing U.S. 

commitments made at the Nuclear Security Summits. DNN 

program offices have led the development and implementation of some of the most visible Summit deliverables, both 

nationally and in cooperation with international partners. 

In addition, DNN supports the extensive international 

consultations of the U.S. “Sherpa” team that is responsible 

for preparing the substantive elements of the NSS. DNN 

provides expertise before, during, and between the Summits 

so that U.S. commitments are technically sound and kept on 

track.

Will the 2016 Summit be the last?

2016 is expected to be the final Summit under the current 

format. It is possible that a future leader sees the value 

in reconvening the NSS process to address the evolving 

nuclear security environment.

To learn more about the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit that begins 

at the end of March, including the pre-Summit ministerial-level 

exercise, see the article on page 3.

President Obama at the first 

Nuclear Security Summit in 2010.

that allow for transfers of nuclear material, equipment, or 

components for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In FY 2015, 

DOE/NNSA concluded negotiations on the Administrative 

Arrangement to the 123 Agreement to outline the agreed 

procedures for tracking and accounting of material, paving 

the way for full implementation of the agreement. 

Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership

DNN representatives attended annual meetings of the Joint 

Working Group (JWG) in support of India’s Global Centre for 

Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) in Mumbai in August 

2015. Once construction is complete, the GCNEP will be 

India’s world-class national nuclear training center and a 

hub for training and collaboration with international partners. 

DOE/NNSA works with India’s Department of Atomic 

Energy in support of GCNEP development under a 2010 

Memorandum of Understanding. 

NNSA officials were impressed in August to learn the 

breadth of GCNEP development to date, including 

2016 construction milestones and training already being 

conducted for domestic and international audiences. JWG 

participants discussed previous and planned bilateral 

technical exchanges in support of curriculum and training 

facility planning. Future activities may include technical 

exchanges related to a number of topics, including 

development of an in-device delay for radiological sources; 

mobile source tracking and security technologies; and 

consideration of alternative, non-isotopic technologies for 

industrial and medical applications that currently require 

radiological sources. DNN viewed these discussions as a 

positive step in bilateral relations, as well as a step toward 

strengthening nuclear security around the world. 

See the related blog at http://nnsa.energy.gov/blog/doennsa-visitsmumbai-support-india%E2%80%99s-global-center-nuclear-energypartnership.

Country Profile: India – Continued