2021 IL App (2d) 190893-U 

No. 2-19-0893 

Order filed November 8, 2021

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 18-CF-3073 

) 

CHARLES EDWARD ROACH JR., ) Honorable 

) Debra D. Schafer, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Jorgensen and Brennan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for residential burglary was reversed for insufficient 

evidence. First, though defendant was spotted driving the victim’s car stolen from 

the street near the home, he was not found to possess the car keys taken from inside 

the home, and he could have come to possess the car other by stealing the keys.

Second, though defendant’s DNA was found on gloves recovered from the car, and 

entry was made through a window from which no fingerprints were recovered, there 

were at least three other contributors to the DNA found on the glove, and the 

detective who processed the crime scene testified that the intruder’s use of gloves 

was only one possible reason why no fingerprints were found.

¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Charles Edward Roach Jr., was found guilty of residential 

burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2018)) and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. He 
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appeals, contending that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered the 

victims’ residence. We agree and reverse.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The indictment alleged that defendant committed residential burglary in that, without 

authority, he knowingly entered the dwelling of Douglas Hicks with the intent to commit therein 

a theft or felony.

¶ 5 At trial, Hicks testified that he owned a home on Camp Avenue in Rockford. He kept a 

Buick Encore parked on the street. Because the house was not air-conditioned, the family kept the 

north and south side windows open and covered by screens in the summer. 

¶ 6 On August 7, 2017, Hicks went to bed around 9 p.m. The windows were open, and the 

screens were in place—“[e]verything was good with the world.” He and his wife left two sets of 

Encore keys on the dining room table.

¶ 7 When Hicks awoke at about 5 a.m. to get ready for work, his wife reminded him to remove 

his toolboxes from the Encore. He looked outside and said, “What car?” The Encore was missing.

He realized then that he had been “robbed.” He and his wife discovered other items missing from 

the house, including her purse, their car and work keys, their phones, and his grandson’s tablets. 

In addition, Hicks noticed that one window screen was partially open, although it had been closed 

the night before.

¶ 8 Hicks called the police. He also called OnStar to report the stolen Encore. Later that 

morning, he was notified that the Encore was in a Walmart parking lot. He went there and 

identified the Encore. 

¶ 9 Eric Lapier testified that he was a security guard at a Walmart store at Central Avenue and 

Riverside Boulevard on August 8, 2017. Around 7 a.m., a man he later identified as defendant 
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entered the store’s foyer and sat on a motorized cart for 30 to 60 minutes. Defendant appeared tired 

and was wearing a White Sox hat. Lapier approached defendant and asked him to remove his feet 

from the top of the cart. As he did so, he noticed a black tablet in the basket of the cart. When 

police arrived, he showed them defendant’s picture taken from a security camera. Lapier testified 

that defendant exited a blue SUV before entering the building.

¶ 10 Rockford police detective Nicholas Weber, a member of the crime scene unit, was 

dispatched to the Hicks residence on August 8, 2017. He found no fingerprints on the open 

window. He testified that there are many reasons for the lack of fingerprints, including that the 

person was wearing gloves. Weber did not process the window for DNA or process the house’s 

interior for fingerprints or DNA.

¶ 11 While at the house, Weber learned from other officers that “whoever broke into the house, 

they took keys and stole a vehicle,” which police found at a “nearby business.” Weber then went 

to the Walmart to process the Encore. He (1) collected from inside the Encore a pair of gloves, a 

White Sox shirt, and three cigarette butts; (2) collected a DNA sample from the interior of the 

gloves; (3) took DNA samples from the steering wheel and shift lever of the Encore; and 

(4) checked the interior of the Encore for fingerprints—there were none. 

¶ 12 Forensic scientist Laurie Lee testified that she found DNA from at least four individuals 

on the gloves recovered from the Encore. Defendant was the most significant contributor. Lee 

could not say when any of the DNA was deposited on the gloves. In addition, she found female 

DNA on one of three recovered cigarette butts. Lee received no samples from the White Sox shirt 

or the Encore. 

¶ 13 The jury found defendant guilty of residential burglary. On the date initially set for 

sentencing, defendant presented a pro se posttrial motion alleging that defense counsel was 
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ineffective. The court conducted an inquiry under People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and 

defendant presented his allegations. One of his claims was that counsel failed to call Latia Jones, 

who would have testified that she saw defendant being picked up in the stolen car. There were two 

others in the car when defendant got in. When they left, defendant was not driving. The court 

inquired of defense counsel, and he explained that an investigator from his office contacted Jones, 

but she was unable to provide defendant “an alibi defense for the date in question.” Neither Jones 

nor anyone else had mentioned the presence of other people in the car. The court found that counsel 

was not ineffective and postponed the sentencing hearing.

¶ 14 Defendant, by counsel, filed a posttrial motion. The court denied the motion and sentenced 

defendant to seven years’ imprisonment. Defendant timely appeals.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 The State charged defendant with residential burglary, which required the State to prove 

that he (1) knowingly and without authority entered a dwelling and (2) did so with the intent to 

commit a theft or felony therein. People v. Acklin, 2020 IL App (4th) 180588, ¶ 17. Defendant 

contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered the victim’s home. 

He points out that no one saw him inside or near the house, no physical evidence linked him to the 

house’s interior, and the only property seen in his possession was the victim’s car, which had been 

parked on the street outside the victim’s home. 

¶ 17 When a defendant challenges on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

criminal conviction, we ask only “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 

(2004) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
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¶ 18 We agree with defendant that the State presented no evidence that he entered Hicks’ house.

No one saw him inside or near the house. Weber did not find any fingerprints on the open window 

or test it for DNA. He did not test the inside of the house for DNA or fingerprints. Moreover, the 

State presented no evidence that defendant possessed any of the property taken from inside the 

house. Surveillance video showed him arriving at Walmart in Hicks’ car, but the car had been 

parked outside Hicks’ home. The tablet Lapier saw on the scooter in Walmart was black, while 

Hicks described the devices taken from his house as green.

¶ 19 The State argues that the following circumstantial evidence proves that defendant entered 

the house: (1) defendant possessed Hicks’ stolen car; (2) the car keys were missing from Hicks’ 

dining room table; (3) a pair of gloves bearing defendant’s DNA was found in the car; and (4) 

Weber testified that one possible reason no fingerprints were found on the window was that the 

intruder wore gloves. The State asks us to infer that defendant, while wearing the gloves, broke 

into the house, took the car keys and the other property reported missing, and used the keys to 

drive the car to Walmart.

¶ 20 Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts from which the trier of fact may infer other 

connected facts that usually and reasonably follow from human experience. In re Gregory G., 396 

Ill. App. 3d 923, 929 (2009). The only limitation on the use of circumstantial evidence is that the 

inferences drawn from it must be reasonable. Id. The State need not prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt each link in the chain of circumstances. Id. It is enough if all the circumstantial evidence

taken together satisfies the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Id.

¶ 21 The State’s circumstantial evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 

entered Hicks’ house. Weber testified that an intruder using gloves was only one possible reason 

for not finding fingerprints on the window. Further, no evidence linked the gloves in the car to the 
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crime scene. Lee, the forensic examiner, testified that she found DNA on the gloves from at least 

three individuals in addition to defendant. She was unable to say when any of the DNA was 

deposited. A cigarette butt found in the car contained female DNA, suggesting that someone else 

was recently inside the car.

¶ 22 Moreover, although the car keys were missing from inside the house, there was no evidence 

that they were recovered from the car or defendant’s person or that defendant ever had the keys.

Defendant was seen in Hicks’ car more than two hours after Hicks discovered the car missing and 

nearly three miles from Hicks’ home. Many explanations could account for defendant having the 

car at Walmart other than his entering the victim’s house and taking the keys. See People v. Caban, 

251 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1033 (1993). Caban noted that when a defendant has unexplained 

possession of proceeds from a recent burglary, this can infer that the defendant participated in the 

burglary or received the property later. Id. While both inferences are plausible, the likelihood of 

the former increases with the burglary’s proximity in time and place to the defendant’s being 

discovered with the stolen items. Id.

¶ 23 Both parties discuss the application here of People v. Housby, 84 Ill. 2d 415 (1981). Housby

addressed jury instructions permitting the fact finder to draw inferences in certain situations. The 

court concluded that a permissive inference in a jury instruction, where the fact finder has the 

option of ignoring or relying upon the inference, requires “as a minimum that there be a ‘rational 

connection’ between the facts proved and the facts presumed.” Id. at 420 (quoting Tot v. United 

States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943)). Housby went on to overrule previous Illinois decisions holding 

“that exclusive and unexplained possession of recently stolen property is sufficient, standing alone 

and without corroborating evidence of guilt, for conviction of burglary.” Id. at 423. It held that 

such an inference, even where permissive, violates the due process rights of defendants. Id.
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However, the inference from “exclusive and unexplained possession of recently stolen property” 

may be drawn “in conjunction with other circumstantial evidence of guilt provided it is a 

permissive presumption which leaves the fact finder free *** to accept or reject the inference.” Id.

at 424. Thus, a defendant’s due process rights will not be infringed by the factfinder’s reliance on 

the inference if:

“(i) there was a rational connection between his recent possession of property stolen in the 

burglary and his participation in the burglary; (ii) his guilt of burglary is more likely than 

not to flow from his recent, unexplained and exclusive possession of the burglary proceeds; 

and (iii) there was evidence corroborating [the defendant’s] guilt.” Id. at 424.

¶ 24 Courts have applied the Housby test in deciding whether the evidence was sufficient to 

sustain a residential burglary conviction. In People v. Natal, 368 Ill. App. 3d 262 (2006), a witness 

testified that he came home to find that his home had been burglarized. He went outside and saw 

the defendant standing on the sidewalk outside of his property about 20 feet away from the 

building. The defendant was holding and looking into two pillowcases that had been removed from 

the witnesses’ bed. Id. at 264. The pillowcases contained some additional property taken from the 

victim’s home. Id. Evidence showed that fingerprints lifted from the victim’s home did not belong 

to the defendant. The defendant, for his part, testified that he was walking nearby and found the 

items. The court reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding that his possession of recently stolen 

items, standing alone, was not enough to prove him guilty of residential burglary. Id. at 271. 

¶ 25 In People v. Rankin, 2015 IL App (1st) 133409, a witness testified that he was a passenger 

in a friend’s car when the car passed the building in which he lived. The witness saw the defendant, 

whom he knew, on the side of the building carrying clothes. Id. ¶ 4. When the witness later returned 

home, he found that someone had forcibly opened his apartment door. He entered the apartment 
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to find that all of his clothes were missing, the kitchen had been “ ‘torn up,’ ” and pipes were 

missing from the ceiling. Id. ¶ 5. The court reversed the defendant’s residential burglary 

conviction, finding it “mere speculation” that the clothes in question were the victim’s or that the 

defendant had entered his apartment and stolen the clothes. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. 

¶ 26 In Natal and Rankin, the defendants were seen right outside the burglarized premises with 

property known or suspected to have been taken in the burglaries, yet the evidence was held 

insufficient to prove that they had entered the premises and stolen the property. The evidence here

is even weaker, as defendant was seen nearly three miles from the Hicks home—and more than 

two hours after the burglary—driving a car that, in any event, was never inside the home.

¶ 27 The State argues that this case is more akin to People v. Gonzalez, 292 Ill. App. 3d 280 

(1997), Caban, People v. Span, 156 Ill. App. 3d 1046 (1987), and People v. Mallette, 131 Ill. App. 

3d 67 (1985), but those cases are distinguishable.

¶ 28 In Gonzalez, a witness saw the defendant and another man walk out through a gate on the 

victim’s property while carrying items. The witness followed the two for several blocks until they 

entered an apartment. The victim returned home and alerted the police, who entered the apartment 

and discovered items taken from the victim’s house. Gonzalez, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 282-83. Here, 

no eyewitness saw the defendant near the victims’ house, nor was he found in possession of 

anything from the house.

¶ 29 In Caban, the defendant was coincidentally stopped while a passenger in a car containing 

the stolen items. The car was about four miles from the crime scene, and the burglary had not been

reported yet. The defendant gave false accounts of his possession of the property. Caban, 251 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1031. This court found the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant’s residential

burglary conviction, noting that the defendant was stopped by the police while riding in a car 
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containing the stolen property and that the defendant’s possession of the property was proximate 

in both time and location to the site of the burglary. Id. at 1033-34. Thus, it was not unreasonable 

for the trial court to have inferred that the defendant and his companion committed the burglary 

and were leaving the scene when the police serendipitously stopped them. Id.

¶ 30 In Span, the victim testified that she was awakened either by the sound of car doors 

slamming or the sound of her Cadillac diesel automobile starting up. She went to the front porch 

in time to see her car backing out of the driveway, and she noticed that there was someone in the 

passenger’s seat. After calling the police, she noticed that her purse, which contained six $20 bills, 

credit cards, and her car keys was missing. She also noticed that someone had cut the screen and 

opened her kitchen window. Span, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 1048-49. About 40 minutes after the victim 

called the police an Illinois state trooper spotted the stolen Cadillac, and, after a high-speed chase 

and a foot chase, the driver and the passenger were arrested. The driver possessed property taken 

in the burglary. Although the passenger—the defendant—had no stolen property on his person, he 

had a sharp object capable of cutting the screen. The next day, the victim’s purse was found outside 

her neighbor’s house. Id. We affirmed the defendant’s residential burglary conviction. We noted 

that, shortly after the burglary, the defendant was found in joint possession of the Cadillac and 

property taken from the victim’s purse. We determined that the defendant’s possession of a sharp 

object capable of cutting the window screen provided sufficient corroboration to support the 

conviction. Id. at 1051-52. 

¶ 31 Finally, in Mallette, the police received at 3 a.m. a burglar alarm at an office complex in 

Bannockburn. Forty minutes later, Chicago police stopped a car in which the defendant was a 

passenger. The car contained typewriters, computer equipment, and a photocopy machine. While 

the police spoke with the driver, the defendant slid into the driver’s seat and drove away. After he 
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was apprehended, police discovered that the serial numbers of the equipment found in the car 

matched those stolen in the Bannockburn burglary. Mallette, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 68-69. We 

affirmed the defendant’s residential burglary conviction, noting that he was found 40 minutes later 

in a car containing proceeds of the burglaries. Although he was a passenger in the car, he was 

considered to be in joint possession of the property. Finally, there was corroborating evidence in 

that his flight showed consciousness of guilt. Id. at 72.

¶ 32 In each case the State cites, the defendant possessed property taken from inside the 

burglarized premises. Here, defendant acknowledges possessing Hicks’ car, but Hicks testified 

that his car was parked outside. This distinction from the State’s cases is not insignificant. Housby

requires, at a minimum, that the defendant possess property taken from the interior of the premises; 

however, such possession cannot stand alone to support a rational inference that a defendant 

entered the premises and stole property. See Housby, 84 Ill. 2d at 423. Here, no one saw defendant 

with any of the items taken from inside the home, and there was no evidence that any such items 

were found in the car after defendant abandoned it.

¶ 33 Moreover, in each case cited by the State, there was significant corroborating evidence. In 

Gonzalez, an eyewitness saw defendant leaving the victim’s property and followed him. In Span, 

the victim saw her car leaving the driveway and noticed someone in the passenger’s seat, in which 

place the defendant was found just a short time later. The defendant also possessed a cutting tool.

In Caban and Mallette, the defendants demonstrated their consciousness of guilt. Here, the only 

arguably corroborating evidence to which the State can point is defendant’s possession of gloves, 

but any inference drawn is tenuous at best. Weber only speculated that the person who broke out 

the screen might have worn gloves. The gloves contained the DNA of at least three other people 

and no evidence connected the gloves to the burglary scene.
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¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 35 The State presented insufficient evidence to prove, even circumstantially, that defendant 

entered the Hicks house. He was found not to possess any property taken from inside the house, 

including the car keys. Any number of explanations could account for his possession of the car at 

Walmart. Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s conviction of residential burglary.

¶ 36 Reversed.