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99–627 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–96] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 24, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Haney, ADM Cecil D., USN, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command ................. 5 

McKeon, Hon. Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, Department of Defense ............................................................................ 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Haney, ADM Cecil D. ....................................................................................... 40 

McKeon, Hon. Brian P. .................................................................................... 25 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 23 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Chart: Nuclear vs Conventional MDAP Bow Wave ....................................... 71 

Letter from Secretary of the Air Force to Mr. Rogers ................................... 72 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bridenstine ................................................................................................. 75 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 75 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 84 

Dr. Fleming ....................................................................................................... 91 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 87 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 79 

Mr. Takai .......................................................................................................... 85 

(1) 

U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 24, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:33 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. I would like to call this hearing to order, this hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces. 

Today we are focused on the U.S. strategic forces posture, and 

we have again this year a tremendous pair of witnesses—no pressure, fellas—the Honorable Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, and Admiral Cecil Haney, Commander, STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command]. 

I want to, as always, thank you all for the time it takes to prepare for these. I know it is an inconvenience, it takes a lot of time 

and effort, but it is very helpful to us. So I do appreciate that. 

We also appreciate the seriousness with which you have prepared for this hearing, and I assure you, we approach our responsibility to provide oversight policy and funding authorization for the 

Nation’s nuclear deterrent, missile defense, and national security 

space systems and capabilities with the same seriousness. 

Your testimony will directly inform the policy and funding authorization decisions we make in the coming weeks as we prepare 

for the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. These three 

mission areas could not be more important, indeed existential, to 

the Nation’s security. 

Admiral Haney, I noted your recent appearance at the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies when you stated, quote: ‘‘We 

are out of time. Sustainment is a must. Recapitalization is a requirement . . . Our budget has a deterrent value of its own and reflects our Nation’s commitment to our deterrent strategy . . . Our 

adversaries pay close attention to whether we back up our words 

with resources . . . Our choice is not between keeping the current 

forces or replacing them. Rather, the choice is between replacing 

those forces or risk not having them at all.’’ Close quote. 

Admiral Haney, I hope you repeat this point as often as you can. 
2 

To many in the public policy and advocacy machine in this city, 

they either aren’t aware of this fact or they are willfully choosing 

to ignore it. We can’t help those who are willingly choosing ignorance, but we shouldn’t give up on those who just aren’t aware of 

the facts. 

Mr. McKeon, I know you spent a significant amount of time and 

energy in the Department’s Nuclear Enterprise Review of 2013. I 

am eager to hear how you are ensuring the momentum achieved 

during this review is maintained, especially as we see key recommendations, like the replacement of Vietnam-era missile field security helicopters, that are languishing in red tape in the Air Force 

and the Joint Staff. 

And I know I don’t have to tell you, but I feel it is essential that 

the American people are aware of the increasing threat we face in 

outer space. We are facing serious and growing foreign threats to 

our space systems. We need to work closely with STRATCOM and 

OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] to ensure that the warfighter has the capabilities and authorities to fight and win a war 

should it extend into space. 

With that, I recognize the gentleman, my friend from Tennessee, 

Mr. Cooper, for any opening statement he may want to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to add my voice in welcoming the witnesses, and 

also emphasize for this public portion of the hearing that there 

probably are no more important issues that our Nation or the 

world faces, because these are existential issues. We have got to 

get this right. And I appreciate the long professional involvement 

of both of our witnesses in making sure that we do get these vital 

existential issues correct. 

It is also important from a fiscal standpoint, because literally 

this is a trillion-dollar subject here, and we have got to get that 

right as well to make sure that we have a safe, secure, and reliable 

nuclear deterrent as efficiently as possible. And that costs real 

money, because we are also talking long-range bombers here, we 

are talking about new submarines, we are talking about keeping 

our ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] missile fields state of 

the art. 

So these are extremely important topics. Sadly, a lot of our duties have to be held in secret. But I welcome the witnesses and look 

forward both to the public and the private portions of this hearing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

And as always, your full opening statements will be accepted for 

the record, without objection. 

And now I recognize you, Mr. McKeon, for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statement. 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN P. McKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cooper, members 

of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify 

today on the fiscal year 2017 budget request for strategic forces. 

We are grateful in the Department for your continuing support of 

this critical mission of nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation. 

Earlier this month, Secretary Carter identified five evolving challenges that have driven the focus of the Defense Department’s 

planning and budgeting this year. The first and second challenges 

reflect a return to great power competition with Russia and China; 

third is North Korea; fourth, Iran; and fifth, our ongoing fight 

against terrorist organizations. 

Each has implications for our current or planned strategic capabilities and posture. Let me address each of these briefly in turn. 

First, China is introducing qualitative advances into its nuclear 

and conventional military capabilities as it continues to rise in the 

Asia-Pacific region. We will continue our rebalance to maintain the 

regional stability that we have underwritten for 70 years and that 

has allowed many nations to prosper. 

Second, Russia poses one of our most pressing and evolving strategic challenges, challenges felt across the strategic forces mission. 

Russia has undertaken aggressive actions in Crimea, and elsewhere in Ukraine, and has adapted a pattern of reckless nuclear 

posturing and coercive threats. Russia remains in violation of the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty, and Russia remains unreceptive to the President’s offer to negotiate further reductions following the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] 

Treaty. 

Third, North Korea’s evolving nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a continuing threat to the United States and our allies 

and partners. Last month, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test, and earlier this month conducted a ballistic missile 

launch that successfully placed a satellite into orbit. 

Fourth, as we work to counter Iran’s malign influence against 

our allies and partners in the Middle East, we will remain vigilant 

for any reversal of course by Iran on its commitments under the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Iran’s ballistic missile program is the largest in the region, and we must continue to enhance 

our ability to defend against this ballistic missile threat today and 

in the future. As Secretary Carter has underscored, the nuclear 

deal does not in any way constrain or inhibit the ability of the 

United States to defend itself or our allies and partners. 

Finally, denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction 

and weapons-usable materials is an absolute imperative in the ongoing fight to defeat terrorist organizations. 

Let me focus briefly on some key details in the fiscal year 2017 

budget. 

First, on nuclear deterrence, although the President’s ultimate 

goal is a world without nuclear weapons, he has been clear in his 

commitment to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for as long as nuclear weapons exist. 
4 

This is the highest priority of the Department of Defense. We 

work closely with the Department of Energy to maintain the safety 

and security of our nuclear forces at the lowest possible number of 

weapons consistent with retaining a full set of options to respond 

to and to address current and potential threats. 

Our budget request focuses on maintaining stable and robust deterrence in a time of geopolitical uncertainty while also managing 

the transition to a modernized nuclear force through life extension 

programs for warheads, replacement of aging delivery systems, and 

enhancements to sustainment and operations of the current force. 

It also includes funding necessary to continue addressing the findings of the nuclear enterprise reviews. 

Our plan is fully consistent with the administration policy of a 

reduced role for nuclear weapons in our defense strategy and retains only those capabilities we need to sustain stable and effective 

deterrence. 

The effort to modernize our delivery systems and extend the life 

of our warheads across the triad and our nonstrategic nuclear force 

will require significant resources over the next decade and beyond. 

This critical investment is affordable if prioritized appropriately by 

the Department, the Congress, and the Nation. 

On missile defense, our request funds the development and deployment of a robust ballistic missile defense capability to protect 

our homeland, deployed forces, and allies and partners. North Korea’s launch, which I recently mentioned, underscores the importance of BMD [ballistic missile defense] in protecting the homeland 

and the need to increase the number of our deployed Ground-based 

Interceptors to 44, develop a redesigned kill vehicle, and proceed 

with the development of Long-Range Discrimination Radar. Our 

budget funds all of these. 

As North Korea and potentially Iran make progress on ICBMclass missile technologies, we must be prepared to address new, 

more complex threats in the next decade. To that end, our budget 

requests funding for investments in new technologies, including directed energy and the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle. Progress on these 

technologies, as well as adapting current technologies to new purposes, will enable us to meet the advancing threat and lower the 

costs of intercepting ballistic missiles. 

Our budget also reflects the Department’s commitment to building regional missile defenses that are interoperable with systems 

deployed by international partners. We continue to implement the 

European Phased Adaptive Approach [EPAA] to missile defense, 

which is designed to protect our deployed forces and allies in Europe from attacks emanating from the Middle East. 

In December of last year, the Missile Defense Agency declared 

the Aegis Ashore defense system in Romania technically capable of 

defending against Iranian ballistic missiles. The request supports 

the implementation of phase three of EPAA, including the upcoming groundbreaking at the Aegis Ashore site in Poland, which will 

be completed in the 2018 timeframe. 

Mr. Chairman, let me briefly touch on space. In his Worldwide 

Threat Assessment testimony earlier this month, the Director of 

National Intelligence said that Russia and China understand how 
5 

our military fights and how heavily we rely on space, and they are 

each pursuing destructive and disruptive antisatellite systems. 

To address these concerns, the Department conducted a portfoliowide strategic review of our space systems, focusing on how we assure space capabilities in light of current and future threats. The 

results included significant new adjustments in the budget, starting with last year and continuing in this year. In addition, we are 

strengthening the governance of our space enterprise and providing 

an independent voice in providing assessments to the Secretary. 

At Air Force Space Command, we have established a Joint Interagency and Combined Space Operations Center that will allow us 

to experiment with new operational concepts across the national security space enterprise and develop new concepts and associated 

tactics for future operations. 

We appreciate your support and review of this budget, which is 

critical to our national defense. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Admiral Haney, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ADM CECIL D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

Admiral HANEY. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers and Ranking 

Member Cooper and members of this committee. I am honored to 

be with you today, and I am pleased to testify with Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Mr. Brian McKeon. 

I am also honored to be here to represent my sailors, soldiers, 

airmen, and marines and civilians, my team, who carry out the 

very missions assigned to U.S. Strategic Command. They are dedicated professionals who represent our most precious resource and 

deserve our unwavering support. 

As a result of their efforts, our Nation’s strategic nuclear deterrent force remains safe, secure, and effective and ready, and we are 

working hard to improve the resilience and flexibility in space and 

cyberspace. It is crucial that we modernize our strategic nuclear 

deterrence capabilities, which underpin our Nation’s security. 

As you know, the current global security environment is more 

complex, dynamic, and uncertain than possibly at any time in our 

history, and our adversaries and potential adversaries challenge 

our democratic values and our security in so many ways. They are 

modernizing and expanding their nuclear capabilities, developing 

and testing counterspace and cyberspace technologies, and are advancing conventional and asymmetric weapons. 

Future deterrence scenarios will likely include multiple adversaries operating across multiple domains using anti-access/area denial, asymmetric warfare, and escalate-to-deescalate tactics. These 

trends affect strategic stability. 

Given all of this, the missions of U.S. Strategic Command remain 

important to our joint military forces, our Nation, and our allies 

and our partners. 

My command priorities guide our efforts. Comprehensive strategic deterrence, assurance, and escalation control is far more than 

just nuclear weapons and platforms. It also includes a robust foun-
6 

dational intelligence apparatus, space, cyberspace, conventional 

and missile defense capabilities, and comprehensive plans that link 

organizations together in a coherent manner. 

Additionally, we engage daily in a broad range of activities across 

our other mission areas: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; countering weapons of mass destruction; joint electronic 

warfare; and analysis and targeting. 

Achieving comprehensive strategic deterrence, assurance, and escalation control requires a long-term approach to investing in capabilities and a multigenerational commitment to intellectual capital. 

The President’s budget for fiscal year 2017 strikes a responsible 

balance between national priorities, fiscal realities, and begins to 

reduce some of the risks we have accumulated because of deferred 

maintenance and sustainment. This budget supports my mission 

requirements, but there is no margin to absorb new risk. Any cuts 

to that budget will hamper our ability to sustain and modernize 

our military forces. 

I thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Haney can be found in the 

Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you both for those opening statements. Now 

we will start with questions. I will recognize myself first. 

For both of you, have both of you participated in a nuclear exercise to demonstrate how the people and systems would work if they 

are ever called upon? 

Start with you, Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, in my prior job in the White House, 

I took part in an exercise with the director of the White House 

Military Office. It was somewhere in 2013. I can’t remember the 

date. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Haney. 

Admiral HANEY. Chairman, I have participated in a number of 

exercises as part of my job, as a minimum once a quarter, but I 

can’t tell you how many I have had. 

Mr. ROGERS. On nuclear exercises, was it your experience that 

the people and systems performed as you expected in those exercises? 

Admiral HANEY. Yes, Chairman, they did. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Yes, they did. And part of the exercise that I was 

on was working on quality of the communications, and they actually performed better than we expected. 

Mr. ROGERS. Good. Mr. McKeon, to your knowledge, in your tenure at NSC [National Security Council] and DOD [Department of 

Defense], has President Obama actually participated in such an exercise? 

Mr. MCKEON. I don’t know the answer to that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Could you find out and let me know back at 

your convenience? 

Mr. MCKEON. We can check. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Haney, I call your attention to the charts 

on your TV screens to your left and right. These show the so-called 

acquisition bow wave in the Department of Defense. Is this a nu-
7 

clear bow wave or does the Department have an acquisition bow 

wave across the services in practically every capacity? The chart 

may not be that helpful to you. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 71.] 

Admiral HANEY. Chairman, I have seen a variety of charts relative to the need in our current plan in terms of needing resources 

in order to recapitalize and modernize our strategic forces. As you 

know, we have in many cases stretched out well beyond the life expectancy of many of our programs, and now we are at a point 

where we have to modernize various facets of our triad as well as 

our nuclear command and control capabilities. 

So that is what is creating this bow wave of sort that is discussed 

in various things, such as the Congressional Budget Office reports 

and what have you, that quantify it thereabouts 5 to 6 percent of 

our associated expected departmental budget over those years. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. McKeon, is the modernization of deterrent the 

highest priority of the Department of Defense? 

Mr. MCKEON. It is, yes. And the Secretary, I believe, has testified 

to that in the past. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. 

We hear—and this is also for you—we hear some people saying 

that the need to have a debate on modernization of the triad. What 

are your thoughts on this? Has the administration not debated 

these issues? Has the President not made his decisions in Congress 

as well? 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Chairman, I think I have seen some of the 

comments you may be referring to, and those are interesting comments, but they don’t reflect the policy of the President or the administration. 

We have clear policy guidance from the Nuclear Posture Review, 

from the review on employment that was conducted early in the 

second term, and from the last Quadrennial Defense Review, and 

that guidance says we shall have a triad. And that is what we need 

to sustain and that is what we need to modernize. We won’t be 

here for these investments—or at least I won’t—in the next administration, but we are laying the foundation for the way ahead. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. 

Admiral Haney, I noted your stated concerns about the idea of 

overflights of the U.S. by Russia with a new advanced electro-optical sensor. The treaty also allows the Russian Federation to overfly 

the United States with infrared and synthetic aperture radar sensors. If electro-optical capability is at risk, what of these even more 

advanced capabilities, are they a risk? 

Admiral HANEY. Chairman, regarding the Open Skies Treaty, as 

we look at how technology has developed, it is not surprising to me 

that there would be a desire to use more advanced capabilities in 

order to conduct that Open Skies Treaty. 

While I am concerned in terms of overflights of any ability of another nation to learn more about our overall critical infrastructure, 

I do have respect for said treaty in terms of the 32-some nations 

that are also part of that treaty, in which it allows for transparency 

and the ability of sharing immediately that information that that 

treaty is associated with. 
8 

So as we make these advances and as Russia is asked to apply 

additional capability, there is a process that is going through by 

which this is being assessed. And I feel that I have a voice in that 

process going forward here as we measure the pluses and minuses 

associated with that approach. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, you realize that Congress as policymakers are 

going to need to take those risks into consideration and we depend 

on you to give us a heads-up as to what you see is the most threatening of those risks. And that is why I asked the question. 

With that, I will turn to the ranking member for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me point out the obvious here, which is there is an astonishing national consensus in both parties, among most all people, 

that the triad is important; in fact, it is vital to our national security, and it is our duty to keep it safe, secure, and reliable. That 

includes all the life extension programs, upgrades, to keep that capability state of the art. 

We almost should be thankful that we face a few rivals and 

would-be rivals in the area, because think of how difficult it would 

be to fund all this if there were none. So now we have something 

to complain about and also build support behind. 

But it is our unquestioned superiority that is what we must 

maintain. And I am just thankful that there is such a bipartisan 

consensus on these issues and that the admiral can testify in favor 

of the President’s budget request wholeheartedly. 

I hope that this Congress will not only fund that amount, but actually find the real dollars to support it and not borrow that 

money, as we have for many other DOD expenditures. 

Mr. McKeon, on a much, much smaller issue, the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Program is an important program, and I understand that you would like to expound on some of the activities happening in North Africa regarding that program. 

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Cooper, thank you. 

As you and I discussed briefly this morning in the office call, we 

have recently begun work on a Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in North Africa. As you know, this program had its roots at 

the end of the Cold War in the former Soviet Union, but over time 

it has expanded and Congress has given us the authority to expand 

this to other regions. 

And its specific authority here is to address an emerging proliferation threat. And what we are embarking on is working with 

the Government of Tunisia to strengthen its border and security of 

its border with Libya, which is quite porous, a lot of people moving 

back and forth across it. You are probably aware of the strike we 

took in western Libya this weekend against several people in a 

camp, including a leader suspected of the Bardo Museum attack in 

Tunis last year. 

So we think this is an important and urgent project because of 

the threat to Tunisia of terrorists moving across that border, as 

well as from ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and from AQIM 

[Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], in its western mountains. We 

have seen ISIS using sulfur mustard in Iraq and Syria, so it is not 

a leap to suggest they might undertake similar attacks in Libya. 
9 

And so we are very focused on trying to help the Government of 

Tunisia, which started the Arab Spring and seeks to build on a 

new democracy, and it is under threat from a lot of places. 

Mr. COOPER. So this is an emerging threat on the Tunisian border to prevent Libyan WMD [weapons of mass destruction], not nuclear but chemical, from possibly crossing that border? 

Mr. MCKEON. That is correct. And I should say, Mr. Cooper, we 

have done similar projects strengthening border with an eye toward the WMD issue in Ukraine in the last couple of years and in 

Jordan as well. 

Mr. COOPER. Oh, I appreciate that clarification. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions at this time. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here and for the work that you each 

do for our country. 

Admiral Haney, it is always good to talk with you. Thank you 

for our earlier visit. And I would like to follow up on something we 

chatted about briefly earlier, and that is the JICSpOC [Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center]. And I am encouraged 

to see that you are using rapid acquisition authority for that and 

also to see that the GEON [GPS Enhanced Onboard Navigation] is 

in the budget request. When do you think the JICSpOC will be 

fully operational? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Lamborn, thank you for that 

question. The Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center, JICSpOC, very important to me and your Strategic Command 

and I think to our Nation, particularly as we work right now 

through our experimentation process, which goes through this summer, such that we can look at refining CONOPS, concept of operations, which will further help define what we need for the future. 

So we have completed a couple of those experiments, pretty 

elaborate, bring in professionals across our Department of Defense 

space as well as our Intelligence Community space, coming together, working in a synergetic way so that we can look at how do 

we have space indications and warnings, situational awareness, attribution capability, all the way to what to do about it if that occurs. 

As such, this will take some time. I don’t have a discrete timeline 

for you right now. We are working with the Office of Secretary of 

Defense, Joint Staff, and others in terms of providing those refined 

concepts of operation, which will further define that timeline. But 

I am encouraged that we have some capability just in where we 

have experimented if we needed to pull it together in a hurry to 

take matters at hand. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

And for anyone who is unaware of what is happening here, it is 

just a way of integrating the DOD and the Intelligence Community 

so that they can look at space assets and what they have to offer 

together. In other words, the integration part is so critical there. 

Do you see roadblocks going forward? And do you have all the 

authorities you need to make sure this capability gets fielded as 

rapidly as it needs to be? 
10 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, as part of this, we are working 

through to really understand those authorities either we may need 

in heightened tensions and what have you, in that regard, as we 

work through various scenarios associated with it. 

As of right this moment, I have the authorities I need in order 

to work through this concept. There may become a time in the future where additional authorities are required. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And do you see any roadblocks on the way going 

forward? 

Admiral HANEY. Right now, the biggest roadblock, I would say, 

is working to establish what frequently is called, like, a common 

operational picture, and how we can look at the dynamics, space 

situational awareness, in a more refined manner as we look at the 

threats that other nations are working in their counterspace programs. We are working on that, as you mentioned the GEON-type 

concept, as a team right now. But we have to get there, and we are 

working on helping to define that through this experimental phase 

of the JICSpOC. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you so much. 

And I am going to shift gears completely. And this is kind of 

technical, but it is an important question that I have worked with 

staff on. The Air Force is completing its analyses of alternatives for 

the OPIR [Overhead Persistent Infrared] and AEH[F] [Advanced 

Extremely High Frequency] systems. Can you assure us that the 

analysis of alternatives will fully take into account your requirements, that is the warfighter requirements? And can you send us, 

send the committee written details on the AOAs when the AOAs 

are completed? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, I would say yes to both questions. 

I work very closely with the Air Force and with the principal Department of Defense space adviser, Secretary James, as well as the 

Office of Secretary of Defense staff as we look at this going forward. But I am a teammate in terms of working the analysis of alternatives for those programs. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Ashford, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you. 

Admiral Haney, thanks again for keeping me abreast and our office abreast of the issues that you are raising here today and other 

issues as we have been proceeding along. And thank you for your 

work at Offutt and at STRATCOM in our area. It is exemplary 

work and admired by everyone. So thank you. 

I just want to, if I could, just reiterate what the chairman asked 

about the Open Skies issue. I did notice in our Omaha World-Herald today a discussion that you had had concerning that. And I 

would second the chairman’s comments about, as we move forward, 

to be clear as to what we should or shouldn’t do in regard to that. 

And also the fact that we do have missions from Offutt in the 55th 

that are part of that Open Sky, and so obviously have concerns 

about it in that regard. So anything you can do to keep us abreast 

would be great. 

I have a question though, totally unrelated, really, I think to 

probably the budget, and we have had this conversation before. 
11 

And one of the concerns, very briefly, and we can talk about it further later, but this whole idea of standardizing cyber education and 

cybersecurity issues so that as this becomes more advanced and as 

the need for workforce in this area increases. 

What are your thoughts generally about trying to come up with 

some kind of standardized way to train our cyber force, and as the 

threats are so dynamic, so frequently changing, that if we have 

some sort of standardized way to educate our people? Do you have 

any general thoughts on that? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Ashford, first and foremost, the 

Department is working—Joint Staff is working—on an approach to 

ensure all of our employees, all of our workforce, all of our sailors, 

soldiers, airmen, marines, do have a basic understanding of what 

we call cyber hygiene in terms of their role, one as a sensor and 

reporting and understanding what types of things they see on cyber 

and get those reported to the necessary team that works that. 

So you have standardization of the population as a whole and the 

workforce as a whole, then you have the standardization of the 

training associated with those that are at a higher level of working 

cyber defense and those types of operations for, for example, U.S. 

Cyber Command and the services and the work to ensure we have 

the necessary capability to protect the military systems and also to 

work to defend the Nation. 

Mr. ASHFORD. As we reach out to the private sector in obtaining 

expertise as we move forward, do you feel work needs to be done 

in how we train those individuals so that they better understand 

the standards that are applied in the military? Do you see that 

evolving? 

Admiral HANEY. I know a lot of the industry teams I talk to, et 

cetera, are very concerned about cyber as well. Across the country 

as a whole I think the knowledge of the threat is improving. I do 

believe we have a lot more work to go in that regard. And my commander for U.S. Cyber Command, Mike Rogers, has been involved 

in a variety of different areas in coupling together with other outside Department of Defense organizations in that regard. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McKeon, you mentioned the Joint Interagency and Combined 

Space Operations Center, or JICSpOC, in your written statement. 

Can you briefly discuss how this effort contributes to space mission 

assurance? 

Mr. MCKEON. Congressman Coffman, this is a little bit of an 

operational experiment, as Admiral Haney said. It is for focusing 

on space situational awareness and coordination between ourselves 

and the IC [Intelligence Community]. And what they have been 

working on is, I think, a series of vignettes to sort of understand 

the operating picture and how we are integrating with our IC colleagues and even the private sector and some allies at some future 

point. 

So it is still early days in it. The deputy secretary has focused 

a lot on this, and he has already gone out there to pay a visit to 
12 

it. I would defer to Admiral Haney to the other details he would 

have. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure. Admiral Haney. 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, we have been working a bit on 

space mission assurance even before we had the JICSpOC. What 

is nice about the JICSpOC concept is it is really honing in our efforts and working as a team, as was mentioned here. The business, 

first and foremost, very complicated environment by which we are 

working in, and the key of integrating all of our combined efforts. 

And that is why taking an interagency approach to this is very 

important in terms of being able to share, move information in a 

timely manner, and then have a more synergistic approach to the 

problem with both DOD and IC assets going forward, particularly 

as we look at what our adversaries—potential adversaries—are 

working toward, everything from jamming, lasing, terrestrial 

launch rockets into space, and on-orbit kind of capabilities. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure. Admiral Haney—and then I will go to Mr. 

McKeon—we have heard a lot about the threats from North Korea 

and Iran in terms of missile threats. Can you comment on our missile warning posture in relation to these emerging threats? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, with regard to missile warning 

posture, 24/7 I have service men and women that are manning stations, one, to very quickly report through our overall constellation 

of any launch that occurs anywhere on the planet. That information is moved quickly. It is backed up and verified by land-based 

radars in terms of things so that we can ascertain whether there 

is an attack against America or attack against an ally, or is it 

something we expect in a test, or what have you. And there is a 

process and a procedure that moves that information all the way 

through command centers, and what have you, in terms of things. 

So that piece, I think, works very well today. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Do you have anything to add, Mr. McKeon? 

Mr. MCKEON. I don’t have anything to add to that, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Washington State, 

Mr. Larsen, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McKeon, the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] has estimated that the cost of maintaining nuclear weapons and delivery 

vehicles to be approximately about $340 billion over 10 years. Is 

that an estimate that you agree with, the CBO estimate? 

Mr. MCKEON. Maintaining the current infrastructure now, including modernization, or just sustaining what we have? 

Mr. LARSEN. I think that is including modernization. 

Mr. MCKEON. It is probably in the ballpark, Congressman. I 

think our sense of the modernization in the years ahead is between 

$350 billion and $450 billion. 

Mr. LARSEN. Over the next 10 years? 

Mr. MCKEON. I think that is the number. 

Mr. LARSEN. And somewhere around—although 30 years is a 

long way from now, we will probably all be gone by then—there is 

a trillion-dollar estimate from a lot of outside groups for over 30 

years. Does that sound about right? 
13 

Mr. MCKEON. I would have to check on that. It may include a 

lot of ongoing sustainment and operation. It is not just the recapitalization. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. Okay. So the point I am getting at is the answer to your question earlier to Mr. Rogers about this being the 

highest priorities in the budget. If these are the highest priorities 

in the budget then, again, you mentioned you get to go—knocking 

on wood we get to stick around. What does that mean for the other 

priorities in the budget, without adding dollars or adding relatively 

more dollars, what does that mean longer term for budgets, defense 

budgets? 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, it is clear that the future Congresses and future administrations face a big challenge with this. I think we discussed it a little bit in the hearing that Chairman Thornberry had 

last summer with the deputy secretary and the vice chairman, 

where we start in 2021, it is in the current Future Years Defense 

Program with the Ohio Replacement Program. And right now for 

the nuclear enterprise in DOD it is about 3 percent of the budget. 

It will grow to 5 or 6 percent during this recapitalization period, 

so it is doubling, but still not a huge part of the Department budget. 

I think our leadership would say today, if we continue to see the 

fiscal constraints that are in place, Budget Control Act is still 

there, notwithstanding the 2-year relief from the balanced budget 

deal, we would probably need some top-line relief in the 2020s in 

order to accommodate this. But as Secretary Carter said, it is the 

top priority, so we need to figure out a way to pay for it. 

Mr. LARSEN. I would just note a doubling of billions of dollars, 

even though it might be 3 percent to 5 percent, is a lot of money. 

Mr. MCKEON. Indeed. 

Mr. LARSEN. Still a lot of money and still puts a lot of pressure 

on the rest of the budget. I just want to be sure we are clear about 

that. 

Can you talk a little bit about the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] missile defense batteries and the discussion 

going on with South Korea and what we can expect. Is South Korea 

ready to incorporate that into their defenses? And if an agreement 

was signed today, actually how long would it take until a THAAD 

system could be even operational in the ROK [Republic of Korea]? 

Mr. MCKEON. As you know, we recently announced with our Korean partners, consultations on deploying THAAD to the Republic 

of Korea. And I think there is a formal meeting next week General 

Scaparrotti mentioned in his testimony this morning. And I think 

probably the long pole in the tent is the site, the land for the battery. And I don’t know how long that would take to come to an 

agreement with the Koreans on the funding for that. 

I think once we had it in place, I don’t think it would take very 

long to deploy it. We have the battery available. So I think that 

would be the main issue in the near term. 

Mr. LARSEN. Admiral Haney, you spoke a little bit this morning, 

I just want to get your feedback again on a recent GAO [Government Accountability Office] report that found that overlapping testing and acquisition of additional interceptors for Alaska risk compromising the reliability of the system. And I want to know how 
14 

much you would agree with that analysis, if at all; and then related, are you concerned about the deterrent capability of that system as a result? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, I think it is very important relative to that report that we are able to populate our missile fields 

up to that 44 number by 2017, which is the plan. And as I look 

at the priorities for missile defense, it is also very important that 

we are able to conduct the necessary testing so that we can have 

a most reliable kill vehicle as well as discrimination. So getting to 

the long-range discriminating radar is important for a future, and 

in looking at the other alternatives so that we can work that cost 

curve associated with our approach per missile so that we can be 

even better as a deterrent. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. 

I think that is good for me for now. Thanks. Yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here and testifying before 

our committee. 

Admiral Haney, I wanted to talk to you for a second about the 

JSpOC [Joint Space Operations Center]. We have had opportunities to talk about it. We have heard testimony on this committee 

from General Raymond, when he was JFCC Space [Joint Functional Component Command for Space], that space is getting more 

contested, more congested. And one of the challenges they have at 

the JSpOC is doing all of the conjunction analysis and reporting 

not only for DOD purposes but also for all the commercial operators and foreign operators. 

And as this continues, the burden is getting bigger and bigger. 

And I would like to hear from your perspective, do you believe this 

burden is going to continue to grow with all the commercial activities and foreign activities in space? 

Admiral HANEY. I absolutely do think the activities in space will 

continue to grow, which ultimately means the activities that our 

Joint Space Operations Center there in Vandenberg, California, 

that works space situational awareness from that point, absolutely, 

will continue to grow. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. We have also heard testimony from General 

Hyten and General Raymond about not wanting the DOD to be the 

FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] for space. Is that a concern 

that you share as the commander of STRATCOM? 

Admiral HANEY. Well, I think when we say we don’t want to be 

the FAA for space, what does that mean? When I hear that, what 

is really being discussed is that is in the bin of what I call space 

traffic control, in terms of things. 

As the Department of Defense with critical capability in space, 

we don’t get a pass, we have to understand space situational 

awareness. And I would say as the years go on, giving where potential adversaries are investing in counterspace capability, we are 

going to have to have even better space situational awareness capability, data fusion capability, et cetera. And this is some of the 

work that is ongoing here as we experiment in the JICSpOC, the 

Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center. 
15 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Right. So the concern I have is that as we continue moving forward with all of the activities—we have heard, you 

know, OneWeb is launching a constellation of 800 satellites into 

low-Earth orbit [LEO], SpaceX is talking about a constellation of 

4,000 satellites into low-Earth orbit—it seems at some point, I 

think everybody agrees, we have got to make sure that the DOD 

is the number one entity in the world when it comes to space situational awareness, not only taking advantage of all of our sensors 

and our software, but also taking advantage of what commercial is 

doing in integrating commercial capabilities, and even what foreign 

countries are doing, that are our partners and allies integrating 

that as well. 

My concern is that we could lose focus by really taking up a lot 

of our manpower resources to do conjunction analysis when there 

are two, say, commercial communication satellites in LEO, which 

isn’t really the case these days but in the future will be, that conjunction analysis in mass volumes could really burden the JSpOC 

in the future. And I just want to make sure that that is something 

that you are thinking about as the commander of STRATCOM as 

we move forward. 

Admiral HANEY. Absolutely, Congressman. I would just say, as 

we look at this, and like you said, as Space Fence comes on board 

here, the amount of data will come up, et cetera, but there are certain attributes that have to be done even from a space traffic control as well as space situational awareness. And with it, we have 

to have information assurance. Data protection has to be part of 

that as we go forward. And with it we have to have automation 

and better fusion capability. 

So however we do it in the future, those are the attributes. We 

are clearly working and definitely thinking about that going forward. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I am running out of time here, but I just want 

to get this, maybe you can respond in writing at some point. When 

we go forward with the future communication architecture, one of 

the challenges we have on this committee is not getting an accurate assessment of SATCOM [satellite communications] utilization. 

What percentage of our SATCOM, how much gigabits per second 

or gigabits in general are flowing through commercial vice military, 

and which commercial satellites are carrying most of the capacity, 

and in what regions? And do we have any underutilized capacity? 

Are we purchasing capacity beyond what we need? Maybe there are 

areas where we don’t have enough capacity. 

So just getting an accurate assessment of SATCOM utilization 

would be very valuable for us. And I know that is one of the missions of STRATCOM and very much appreciate if we could get an 

update there. 

Admiral HANEY. Absolutely, Congressman Bridenstine. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 75.] 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Montana, Mr. 

Zinke, for 5 minutes. 
16 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be with your committee today. 

Admiral, my background is as Navy SEALs [Sea, Air, Land 

teams]. And I have spent a lot of time looking at security, and recently I went out to Malmstrom Air Force Base. And I am concerned about the UH, the helos, particularly the Vietnam-era 

Hueys. From talking to folks on the ground looking at it, and I concur, these are aging helicopters, as well as they don’t have the lift 

and capacity. And if they do get an alert situation, they just don’t 

have the hover time and the distances in Montana and I assume 

Minot. And I understand that you did go out to exercise Mighty 

Guardian recently. Do you share my same concerns about the 

Hueys? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, absolutely, in terms of thinking 

very crisply associated with what we need to do to improve security 

of our missile fields, and part of that effort has included looking at 

those UH–1s and working with the Air Force and Joint Staff in 

terms of our methodology going forward. 

So I know the Air Force has a plan now by which they plan to 

work to replace those helicopters, but the attributes you listed are 

the attributes that concern me in terms of the capability, not just 

now, but into the future. 

Mr. ZINKE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the 

record a response from the Secretary of the Air Force to Chairman 

Rogers. In it, reading through it, she notes until we replace the 

Hueys, it is not going to be possible to meet the alert requirement 

in that letter. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 72.] 

Mr. ZINKE. Are you familiar with the letter, Admiral? 

Admiral HANEY. I am not exactly sure which letter you are talking about. I am understanding of the requirements associated with 

what we need the security helicopters to do. 

Mr. ZINKE. You would concur, though, that it is a priority to 

make sure we have an alert requirement and that the teams that 

are operating have the right aircraft and the right capacity and 

lift? 

Admiral HANEY. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. MCKEON. Congressman, if I could interject, the deputy secretary is very focused on this, and we have had discussions about 

an interim solution until the Air Force procures the replacement. 

So we don’t have a solution yet, but it has gone up to the deputy 

and we will meet Admiral Haney’s requirement. 

Mr. ZINKE. I do sit on the seapower side of it, and I know that 

we looked at, as the Navy moves around their helicopters, their 

MH–60s, to see whether or not it would be possible to trans-deck 

some of those, and it doesn’t seem possible. So I think the solution 

is to look at maybe perhaps the Army contractor, find a vehicle 

where we can get you the right helicopter replacement. 

I came in the service in 1985. I remember the Hueys. But I 

haven’t flown on a Huey since the mid-1990s. I was surprised when 

I went out there and saw them. They are an aging aircraft, but 

they just don’t have the lift. Montana has got a lot of expanses, let 

alone the weather, and then just the lift capacity. If they do get in 
17 

trouble, they just don’t have the lift to get the right people out 

there and stay in station. 

Sir. 

Mr. MCKEON. I was just going to say, I have ridden the ones at 

F.E. Warren. They run very well. And the people who maintain 

them know how to maintain them, and they have a high operational readiness rate. But they are very old, as you say, and there 

is the weight issue. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you for your service, sir. 

I yield the remainder of my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. His letter will be taken into 

the record, without objection. 

Mr. ROGERS. And you know, I am glad to hear, Secretary 

McKeon, that you have said that you all have taken that up, because it is something that I have put a lot of attention on, as has 

the ranking member. We are very concerned about seeing those 

helicopters replaced, and I hope that you can help the Air Force 

stop being so worried about being sued and start making the right 

decisions and the other stuff will work itself out. 

I just wanted to go back before I close out, the topic that I was 

talking about with you, Admiral Haney, before I yielded to the 

ranking member for his questions, and that goes back to this Open 

Skies issue. Can you discuss with us in this open setting what exactly the Russians are overflying as far as infrastructure and what 

they are getting out of those flights? 

Admiral HANEY. Chairman Rogers, I think that might be better 

discussed in a closed hearing in terms of things. But they follow 

a flight plan and they fly over the United States. We know where 

they are going to go, that sort of thing, that covers a lot of areas. 

It is a transparency treaty, so likewise we work with those other 

30-some nations to also likewise fly over Russian areas. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I will ask you in the closed session then. 

What about this, can you talk about this in the open setting: Do 

you know how Open Skies fits into the Russian overall collection 

strategy? 

Admiral HANEY. Well, I don’t have the Russian intelligence 

guidebook available to me, but I will say that given the lack of 

overhead capability that the Russians have, Open Skies gives them 

a capability to be able to reconnoiter parts of our country and other 

nations as part of that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. That is all I have got. 

I yield to the ranking member for any additional questions he 

may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to wait till 

the classified session. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Then I will go to Mr. Larsen from Washington State. I understand he has another set of questions. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, just one question, and this is to give some 

context for tomorrow. We have the full committee as General 

Breedlove is coming to testify. So I wanted to hear from both of 

you, you can choose which one goes first, what would be your recommendations in response to Russia’s noncompliance with the INF 

Treaty, thinking specifically the INF Treaty, but also broadly. 
18 

Mr. MCKEON. Congressman Larsen, I spent a good deal of time 

in December in this room with your colleagues and the colleagues 

on the House Foreign Affairs Committee on this issue, so I would 

refer you for an in-depth discussion there. But in brief, what we 

have done is looked at Russia’s activities, not just in regard to its 

violations of the INF Treaty but its other behavior in Europe and 

its fairly belligerent rhetoric, and made a number of investments 

in the defense of Europe and in technologies that will be utilized 

in Europe against the A2/AD [anti-access/area denial] challenge 

that Russia poses, including because of their development of this 

noncompliant INF missile. 

So we are putting a lot of thought, work into it at EUCOM [European Command] and in the Department, and a lot of resources 

to respond to what we see as a much broader Russian challenge, 

not just in its behavior in INF but what they have done in 

Ukraine, some of the rhetoric. And there are some other treaties 

where we have compliance concerns including the Open Skies Treaty. 

If I could amend briefly the answer before, Mr. Larsen, and we 

will get you a written answer. I may have misspoken. Our understanding is the $350 billion to $450 billion estimate is for modernization over more than a decade. But I will clarify that for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 75.] 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. With that, we will recess for 5 minutes 

while we move to room 2216 for the closed portion of this hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 24, 2016 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 24, 2016 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 24, 2016 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. MCKEON. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the total cost of U.S. nuclear forces at $348 billion over the 10-year period of FY 2015 through FY 

2024. This estimate included both sustainment of the existing force and modernization, for both DOD and DOE, as well as Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3). The CBO estimate also included a $49 billion projection for cost 

growth. 

The FY 2015 Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear 

Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear Command and Control System Specified in 

Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (the 

‘‘1043 Report’’) projected a total cost of $298 billion for U.S. nuclear forces over the 

same period of FY 2015 through FY 2024. After accounting for the CBO’s projection 

of cost growth, the two estimates for 10-year total cost are approximately equal. 

While multi-decade cost estimates are of questionable utility, we expect the total cost for DOD nuclear modernization to be in the range of $350 billion-$450 billion 

over the next two decades (FY 2017 through FY 2036), with a projected average cost 

of about $19 billion per year. In addition to these modernization costs, about $12 

billion of the annual DOD budget is currently allocated to sustainment and operation of existing nuclear forces and Nuclear Command, Control, & Communications 

(NC3). [See page 18.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE 

Admiral HANEY. DOD user total supported commercial SATCOM throughput is 

8.024 Gbps, and the total MILSATCOM supported throughput is 17.578 Gbps. Total 

usage equates to 25.601 Gbps of which 31.3 percent is commercial. Reference: Active 

Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Usage by Department of Defense (DOD) 

Users, DISA IE53, May 2016 [See page 15.] 

Admiral HANEY. a. Eutelsat 70B (E70B); Coverage area: the Middle East, Central 

Asia, South East Asia, Australia, Europe, and parts of Africa b. Eutelsat 36B 

(E36B); Coverage area: the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe, Africa and Russia 

c. Eutelsat 21B (E21B); Coverage area: the Middle East, Central Asia, Europe, and 

North Africa d. Intelsat 906 (IS 906); Coverage area: the Middle East and India e. 

Intelsat 22 (IS 22); Coverage area: the Middle East, Africa, and Europe [See page 

15.] 

Admiral HANEY. USSTRATCOM lacks the necessary operational fidelity to definitively address these questions; however, initiatives are being taken to eliminate 

these data gaps. The DOD has directed creation of service alternatives to address 

fiscal, operational, and policy challenges, and ‘‘specific pathfinder activities’’ the 

DOD should undertake that could improve commercial SATCOM acquisition and 

management. DOD has charged DISA and Air Force with pathfinder development 

and execution. The DISA acquisition pathfinders are intended to help DOD understand its global commercial SATCOM requirements & utilization while analyzing alternative commercial leases in the short-term. The Air Force pathfinders are intended to investigate better ways to buy commercial SATCOM in the long term. 

Currently, Air Force and DISA have 5 pathfinder projects each in various stages of 

development and execution. DISA pathfinder initiatives will not be completed in 

FYI 7. The Pathfinders are being institutionalized into a business process that will 

be executed in an iterative fashion and will support preparation of the annual wideband SATCOM Plan. Air Force Pathfinder 1 is complete with the four remaining 

expected to be incrementally completed through 2019. Furthermore, the Joint Staff 

has approved a Commercial SATCOM Centralized Management (CSCOM) Concept 

of Operations (CONOPS) leveraging the pathfinders to investigate more efficient 

means of operationally managing an enterprise pool of COMSATCOM bandwidth for 

the DOD, particularly in the more competitive or contested environments. [See 

page 15.] 

Admiral HANEY. Yes, globally. a. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) study 

‘‘Restoring SATCOM in a Degraded Environment’’ concluded, successful Operations 

Plan (OPLAN) execution is at risk due to insufficient SATCOM capacity and is com-
76 

pounded in a degraded environment. b. Current day to day lower priority missions* 

(i.e. training, exercise, VIP support, RDT&E and Miscellaneous) go unfulfilled due 

to lack of funds and/or capacity and coverage shortfalls in various geographic regions. Most priority missions are successfully executed; however, these missions 

may also be challenged due to user saturation or on-orbit availability in South West 

Asia (SWA), Africa, and portions of the Pacific. [See page 15.] 

* Mission priority is in accordance with CJCSI 6250.01 SATCOM Priority Table 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 24, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Why is it important that NATO declare operational capability of the 

European Phased Adaptive Approach this summer when the Alliance gathers for the 

Warsaw Summit? 

Mr. MCKEON. EPAA Phase II provides NATO (Ballistic Missile Defense) (BMD) 

with a roughly tenfold increase in capability since NATO declared Interim BMD Capability at the Chicago Summit. This tenfold increase comes from Aegis Ashore in 

Romania; four Aegis BMD capable ships homeported at Rota, Spain; a more capable 

interceptor; a more capable Aegis weapons system; and an improved NATO command and control system. A NATO declaration of BMD IOC at the Warsaw Summit 

sends three important messages: first, that the United States is committed to the 

defense of our deployed forces and Allies by increasing the capability of NATO 

BMD; second, that Allies recognize the importance of this contribution; and third, 

that NATO follows through on its security commitments. 

Mr. ROGERS. When you testified in December of 2014 and in December of 2015, 

you promised this subcommittee, and a sister subcommittee on another committee, 

a briefing on the military options that have been promised to respond to the Russian Federation’s violations of the INF treaty. That briefing has not yet happened. 

When will that briefing occur? 

Mr. MCKEON. I understand that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is working 

to arrange a time of brief Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Cooper. 

Mr. ROGERS. We received a response to a question for the record you were asked 

in December concerning press reporting of negotiations with Pakistan concerning 

nuclear weapons. The response indicated there were no discussions that would lead 

to a ‘‘legally binding’’ agreement. To be clear, are there any discussions, including 

those that would lead to an agreement that would not be legally-binding? 

Mr. MCKEON. I believe the question for the record to which you refer was directed 

to the State Department. I defer to the State Department to provide additional information. 

Mr. ROGERS. Recently, I saw a press report that the United States floated to Russia a proposal to undertake further nuclear arms reductions. I have to ask, is this 

true? Have the Russians in any way even attempted to resolve their violation of the 

INF treaty? Has it done anything to resolve compliance concerns on the Open Skies 

Treaty? How about the Biological Weapons Convention? The Chemical Weapons 

Convention? 

Mr. MCKEON. The United States has and will only consider nuclear reductions 

that are in the U.S. national security interest and that of our allies and partners. 

In June 2013, President Obama stated U.S. willingness to negotiate up to a onethird reduction in deployed strategic warheads from the level established by the 

New START Treaty. Although the Administration’s desire for such a negotiation remains, progress requires a willing partner and a conducive strategic environment, 

which we do not have currently. 

Russia has not been forthcoming with any information related to the existence of 

its Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty noncompliant missile. 

With regard to the Open Skies Treaty, the United States continues to engage with 

Russia and other Treaty Parties in the Open Skies Consultative Commission in an 

effort to resolve our compliance concerns and to improve Treaty implementation. In 

the meantime, we have adopted a very strict interpretation of our Treaty obligations, given Russia’s failure to address these concerns to date. We are working with 

allies and partners to engage Russia on a path to full implementation. Open Skies 

observation flights by the United States and other Treaty Parties continue over Russia regularly and most of these proceed without issues arising. 

The United States still cannot confirm Russia’s compliance with the Biological 

Weapons Convention, as it remains unclear whether Russia has fulfilled the obligations inherited from the Soviet Union to destroy completely or divert to peaceful 

purposes items specified in Article I of the Convention. 

Similarly, the United States still cannot confirm Russia’s compliance with the 

Chemical Weapons Convention, as it is unclear if Russia has met its obligations for 
80 

declaration of its chemical weapon stockpiles, production facilities, and development 

facilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why has the President consistently supported the ICBM leg of the 

triad? Why does it continue to be relevant? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force provides the 

President with an important and unique contribution to our overall deterrent capabilities. ICBMs provide our most rapid response capability, and current U.S. nuclear 

posture preserves that responsiveness and strengthens strategic stability by maintaining most ICBMs on alert. The ICBM force also ensures that no adversary could 

launch a comprehensive counterforce attack on the United States by striking only 

a few targets. Finally, ICBM upload capability provides the ability to hedge against 

geopolitical surprise and technical problems in other parts of the arsenal. These attributes continue to contribute significantly to maintaining strategic stability. 

Mr. ROGERS. As a policy matter, what should an adversary know if it thinks about 

attacking our MW and NC3 satellites? Is that adversary crossing a redline by taking 

our our protected comms and eyes that are designed to maintain situational awareness during a nuclear war? These capabilities are special, right? 

Mr. MCKEON. Adversaries should understand that any attack against the United 

States, including attacks on critical U.S. military systems, would result in a U.S. 

response that would impose costs that far outweigh the benefits they hope to 

achieve. Attempts to degrade our ability to detect or respond to nuclear attack 

would be particularly dangerous for them and not worth the associated risk. 

Mr. ROGERS. Should any decisions be made by the services or components that 

would deprive the President of decision time when it comes to nuclear attacks and 

nuclear responses? 

Mr. MCKEON. In general, the Department of Defense (DOD) supports maximizing 

the President’s decision time in crises, and providing the President with as much 

information as possible to inform his decisions. DOD continues to take steps to ensure that our Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications capabilities meet 

national requirements, and the Military Departments play a vital role in that process. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is nuclear deterrence the highest priority of the Department of Defense? Does the Obama Administration believe 7% of our defense budget for a decade or so is a price worth paying for modernizing our nuclear deterrent? If top-line 

budget relief is not provided, does the administration believe it should: (1) make 

cuts within the nuclear portfolio; (2) make cuts in the conventional portfolio to keep 

the nuclear portfolio whole? 

Mr. MCKEON. Nuclear deterrence is the highest priority of the Department and 

we are committed to ensuring a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. This requires 

adequate and consistent funding of modernization programs that cannot be delayed 

further without putting the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear forces 

at significant and unacceptable risk. 

Although multi-decade cost estimates are of questionable utility, we expect the 

total cost of modernization to be in the $350 billion to $450 billion range. Peak projected funding occurs in the 2026–2035 timeframe, with a maximum of $26 billion 

in Fiscal Year (FY) 2030. The projected average cost is $19 billion per year from 

FY 2017 through FY 2036. The peak fraction of the defense budget will depend on 

the size of the overall budget at that time, and is currently not known. We can say, 

however, that $19 billion to $26 billion corresponds to 3.3–4.5 percent of the President’s FY 2017 budget request. In addition to modernization costs, sustainment and 

operation of existing nuclear forces and Nuclear Command, Control, & Communications currently accounts for about two percent of the DOD budget. 

The Administration’s nuclear sustainment and modernization plan is necessary, 

and it is affordable, if prioritized appropriately by the Department of Defense, Congress, and the Nation. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain to us why the Administration is pursing the new air 

launched cruise missile, the LRSO? Is the Administration’s commitment to this capability iron-clad? Does the Administration believe LRSO is destabilizing? 

Mr. MCKEON. The Administration’s decision to develop a Long-Range Standoff 

(LRSO) cruise missile to replace the aging Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is 

essential to maintain the ALCM’s unique contribution to stable and effective deterrence. The current system is already decades beyond its planned service life, and 

its viability will be challenged over the next decade by advanced air defenses. 

Cruise missiles provide capabilities that complement rather than duplicate that 

of a stealth bomber. Standoff capability extends the effective range of our bomber 

fleet and complicates the air defense problem facing any country seeking to negate 

the air component of our deterrent. As air defense capabilities continue to improve 
81 

and proliferate, we cannot assume our technological lead will forever ensure unchallenged U.S. bomber operations over any target in any theater. 

The ALCM provides an important contribution to the range of credible options 

available to the President for responding to nuclear attack. And because aircraft can 

be visibly deployed and flown during a crisis, they provide a forceful reminder to 

an adversary contemplating aggression that the risk it faces is real. The ability to 

respond proportionately to a limited nuclear attack strengthens our ability to deter 

such attacks from ever taking place. This is critical in a world where we must not 

only avoid unintended escalation, but also deter deliberate nuclear escalation like 

that envisioned in Russia’s current strategy. 

The LRSO will contribute to strategic stability by retaining a response option that 

does not pose the threat of a disarming surprise attack against Russia or China. 

The process of alerting strategic bombers is observable, and the aircraft and the 

missile must spend hours flying towards their targets. Thus, ALCMs provide more 

potential for warning than do either ballistic missiles or ground- and sea-launched 

cruise missiles forward-deployed in theater or aboard ships on station. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the goal of U.S. nuclear forces? Do we merely wish to ‘‘deter’’ 

nuclear weapons use against the U.S. and its allies? Do we also plan to ‘‘defeat’’ a 

nuclear-armed adversary if deterrence fails? 

Admiral HANEY. U.S. nuclear forces contribute to our national security interests 

in peacetime, crisis, and conflict by deterring potential adversaries and assuring allies around the world. They are an indispensable component in preserving strategic 

stability. 

The President’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the fundamental 

role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exists, 

is to deter nuclear attack on the U.S., our allies, and partners—recognizing that 

there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may 

still play a role in deterring a conventional or chemical-biological weapon attack 

against the U.S. or its allies and partners. The NPR also lists five key objectives 

that frame U.S. nuclear weapons policies and postures. Specifically, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons 

in U.S. national security strategy; maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at 

reduced nuclear force levels; strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. 

allies and partners; and sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 

While the NPR provides the framework and guiding principles of U.S. nuclear 

forces, there is prudence in further articulating the role of these capabilities. 

The 2013 Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States notes 

another key objective of U.S. nuclear weapons policies and posture, namely, to contribute to the President’s options for achieving U.S. and allied objectives if deterrence fails. 

As stated in 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, our nuclear forces contribute to 

deterring aggression against U.S. and allied interest in multiple regions, assuring 

U.S. allies that our extended deterrence guarantees are credible, and demonstrating 

that we can defeat or counter aggression if deterrence fails. This includes the security and vital interests of our allies and partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Asia, and the Pacific. U.S nuclear forces also help convince potential adversaries that they cannot successfully escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression against the United States or our allies and partners. 

Further, our extended deterrent reduces the likelihood of nuclear proliferation. 

Beyond the implications this has for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the ability of the U.S. to dissuade acquisition by others minimizes strategic risk. More to 

the point, the nuclear and conventional dialogue as well as cooperation we enjoy 

with our allies present a more cohesive and ardent challenge to potential adversaries. Invariably, the U.S. extended deterrence policy guarantees the safety and security of our allies under the any scenario when their very existence and way of 

life may be threatened. 

Ultimately, deterrence is about conducting integrated and combined operations 

and activities. It requires a comprehensive understanding of the strategic environment from an adversary’s point of view. It’s about communicating capability and intent. Whether we are deterring aggression in space, cyberspace, or nuclear—our actions and capabilities must convince any adversary that they cannot escalate their 

way out of a failed conflict—and that restraint is always the better option. Our adversaries must appreciate that the U.S. is not limited to a single domain or axis 

and that we are capable of responding in a time, place and domain of our choosing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why has the President consistently supported the ICBM leg of the 

triad? Why does it continue to be relevant? Why is keeping the Milestone A decision 

on schedule important to you? What are your views on ‘‘commonality’’ in the devel-
82 

opment of the Minuteman III replacement, the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent 

(GBSD)? 

Admiral HANEY. The Administration’s nuclear posture and defense reviews affirmed previous findings that a nuclear Triad delivers the best mix of unique and 

complimentary capabilities to accomplish our national strategy and policy objectives 

of deterring adversaries and assuring allies. The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

(ICBM) force continues to provide the most responsive capability that maximizes decision space. ICBMs also provide a highly reliable and cost effective deterrent capability as part of a credible Triad. Any attempt to defeat the geographically dispersed 

ICBM force would require an adversary to execute a complex strategic attack. This 

‘high cost to attack’ reinforces stability by reducing the incentive for an adversary 

to execute such a strategy. 

Maintaining the development and deployment schedule for Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is essential; it is a ‘just-in-time’ program to replace the aged 

Minuteman III ICBM force. Any program delay would risk introducing strategic capability gaps if GBSD is not deployed in sufficient time to gain confidence in the 

weapon system prior to Minuteman III retirement. 

Commonality between Air Force and Navy ballistic missile programs may offer 

benefits in terms of decreased development and procurement costs and reduced 

schedule risk as we modernize both forces. Technical risk associated with common 

components and subsystems can be effectively managed through wise procurement 

strategies and robust testing and surveillance programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. Should any decisions be made by the services or components that 

would deprive the President of decision time when it comes to nuclear attacks and 

nuclear responses? 

Admiral HANEY. To maximize Presidential decision space, the United States must 

sustain and modernize its nuclear deterrence capability. This involves more than 

just the platforms that make up the nuclear TRIAD, it also requires an appropriate 

intelligence and sensing apparatus to provide indication and warning of incoming 

threats; assured National and Nuclear Command, Control and Communications; a 

credible missile defense system that defends against limited attacks; and a resilient 

space and cyberspace architecture. 

The President’s budget for 2017 supports this needed sustainment and modernization. USSTRATCOM continues to work closely with the Services and Office of the 

Secretary of Defense leadership to ensure the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent 

capabilities to facilitate current and future strategic capability and maximize Presidential decision space. 

Mr. ROGERS. Should we view the ITWAA and NC3 capabilities as legs of the 

TRIAD? Have we been paying enough attention to ITWAA and its enablers? Are you 

comfortable with the plan to evolve these capabilities—and that we’ll all stick with 

it—to ensure a survivable capability? 

Admiral HANEY. Our nuclear deterrent is foundational to America’s defense; it is 

a synthesis of dedicated sensors, assured command and control, a triad of delivery 

systems, nuclear weapons, enabling infrastructure, trained and ready people, and 

treaties and nonproliferation activities. All remain essential to our national security 

and continue to provide a stabilizing force in the global geopolitical fabric of the 

world. Each provides unique and complementary attributes that together underpin 

strategic deterrence and stability. 

Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) and Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3) are critical aspects of our comprehensive 

efforts to achieve deterrence and assurance. Our ITW/AA capabilities provide indications and assessments supporting escalation control options and attack attribution. 

NC3 assets support our national-decision making process across a spectrum of scenarios, and provide the President and his key advisors the right information to expand decision space. 

ITW/AA and NC3 capabilities must be survivable and endurable. They provide the 

‘connective tissue’ of a credible and effective Triad and facilitate comprehensive deterrence, assurance, and escalation control. I am encouraged by the Defense Department’s renewed focus on ITW/AA and eagerly anticipate tangible NC3 capability 

modernization results. 

The FY17 President’s Budget adequately addresses our ITW/AA and NC3 needs. 

However, while we have made significant investment gains in these capabilities, we 

must remain vigilant to safeguard funding identified for recapitalization efforts to 

ensure capabilities effectively address emerging threats across the conflict spectrum 

and meet mission requirements, from the President to the warfighter. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the military requirement for extended deterrence in Europe? 

Why is the life extension of the B61 gravity bomb important to Europe’s security? 
83 

Admiral HANEY. The three legs of the U.S. Nuclear Triad, nuclear command, control, and communications system (NC3), supporting infrastructure, space and early 

warning sensors, cyberspace, and ballistic missile defenses are critical components 

of our strategic deterrent forces that provide unique and complimentary capabilities 

that deter our adversaries and assure allies and partners. As such, the U.S. remains 

committed to supporting an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defense capabilities to meet NATO deterrence and extended deterrence objectives in 

Europe. Legacy B61–3/4 weapons are the only U.S. nuclear weapons deployed 

OCONUS to meet the nuclear portion of our NATO commitment. This is increasingly important to security in Europe as Russia continues to modernize its nuclear 

forces and make overt threats to NATO countries. These weapons are well beyond 

their intended service life, and the B61–12 Life Extension Program (LEP) will replace them with a single, modern variant to sustain our commitment to NATO. In 

addition to meeting NATO commitments the B61–12 is being designed to meet 

USSTRATCOM requirements and extended deterrent/assurance commitments to allies worldwide including the Asia-Pacific region. 

In the next decade, B61–12 will be the sole nuclear gravity bomb in the U.S. 

stockpile. Gravity weapons offer the most diverse and flexible options to meet both 

OPLAN requirements and regional scenarios. The B61–12 LEP is an essential element of our stockpile sustainment and modernization strategy and supports our nuclear non-proliferation goals, by ensuring continued support to allies and negating 

their need to develop their own nuclear programs. Ultimately, the B61–12 will be 

fielded on legacy (B–2) and future bombers (B–21—Long Range Strike-Bomber) and 

dual capable aircraft (DCA). This program demonstrates a strong U.S. commitment 

to modernize and deploy a capable deterrent/assurance force while directly supporting U.S. non-proliferation goals. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the way ahead for the JSPOC (Joint Space Operations Center) and the JICSPOC (Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center)? Does 

it make sense to be maintain two facilities? 

Admiral HANEY. The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air 

Force Base (AFB), is charged with conducting day-to-day operations, to include supporting coalition forces in theater. The Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) at Schriever AFB will provide an operational experimentation and test environment to develop the tools, relationships, processes and procedures that will be effective in a contested space environment. We are in the process 

of reviewing the JICSpOC concept while also working to improve JSpOC functionality in the areas of Space Situational Awareness for both commercial and Allied nation systems, and global theater support. 

Mr. ROGERS. As you know, the Air Force is completing its analyses of alternatives 

for the OPIR and AEHF systems. What are the risks of ‘‘disaggregation’’ of these 

capabilities? 

Admiral HANEY. Space capabilities are a vital component of comprehensive deterrence and assurance and are critical to supporting our deployed forces and our national decision-making processes. However, space has become an increasingly contested, degraded, and operationally limited domain. As the threat to our space capabilities continues to rise, so too must the resiliency of our space assets. 

Disaggregation is an effort to improve our resiliency in space, and is one of several factors being considered in the development of future Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) and protected Satellite Communications (SATCOM) architectures. 

The Defense Department continues to assess the benefits and risks associated with 

different architectures. USSTRATCOM, among other stakeholder organizations, is 

engaged with Air Force Space Command to carefully examine cost, schedule, performance, protection, resilience, and user segment synchronization and transition 

risk to inform future investment and strategy decisions. We are confident the potential risks and benefits of disaggregation will be fully explored and accounted for in 

this process. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is your professional military opinion as to why the United 

States needs LRSO? Can we use JASSM–ER for a nuclear stand-off capability and 

simply cancel LRSO? Why or why not? 

Admiral HANEY. The U.S. needs the Long Range Stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile’s 

range and ability to penetrate air defenses to provide the necessary global target 

coverage that denies adversaries any geographic sanctuary for high value targets. 

Maintaining a credible stand-off capability is an essential element of both effective 

strategic deterrence and extended deterrence to NATO and our Asia-Pacific allies. 

Sustaining this stand-off capability is especially important as adversaries continue 

to seek anti-access/area denial (A2AD) advantages that limit U.S. operational effectiveness. 
84 

Cancelling the LRSO and using the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, Extended Range (JASSM–ER) for a nuclear stand-off capability will not work. JASSM– 

ER’s range is not sufficient to hold adversary targets at risk, and JASSM–ER was 

never designed to accommodate a nuclear warhead. Re-designing JASSM–ER to increase its range and certify it for nuclear use would require resources and time in 

excess of those projected for the current LRSO program. 

The LRSO cruise missile is needed to replace the aging Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), whose viability will be challenged by advanced air and missile defenses. ALCM is decades past its planned service life, and facing reliability challenges. The LRSO is needed to support the bomber force well into the future. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is your professional military opinion as to why the United 

States needs GBSD? If we simply life extended Minuteman III, would it be capable 

of meeting your nuclear deterrence requirements? Why or why not? 

Admiral HANEY. Our nuclear Triad consists of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

(ICBMs), Ballistic Missile Submarines, Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, and nuclear 

capable heavy bombers and associated tankers. Each leg of the Triad provides 

unique and complementary attributes that together underpin strategic deterrence 

and stability. The Triad provides a hedge against technical problems or changes in 

the security environment and must consist of independently viable weapons systems 

and platforms which present adversaries with a complex, multi-pronged problem. 

Our ICBM force provides a responsive, highly reliable and cost effective deterrent 

capability. The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) is an essential investment to ensure the U.S. maintains an effective land-based strategic ballistic missile 

capability as part of a credible nuclear Triad. While we have successfully extended 

Minuteman III several times, continued life extensions will not maintain weapon 

system effectiveness. This option was assessed as more costly than developing and 

fielding GBSD. The U.S. will encounter a strategic capability gap if GBSD is not 

fielded prior to the age-out and retirement of the Minuteman III ICBM. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the minimum number of Ohio-class replacement submarines 

that are required to fulfill STRATCOM’s requirements for sea-based deterrence? 

Please be specific and explain why having only 10 replacement submarines is insufficient. 

Admiral HANEY. Our nuclear Triad consists of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, 

Ballistic Missile Submarines, Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, and nuclear capable 

heavy bombers and associated tankers. Each leg of the Triad provides unique and 

complementary attributes that together underpin strategic deterrence and stability. 

The Triad provides a hedge against technical problems or changes in the security 

environment and must consist of independently viable weapons systems and platforms which present adversaries with a complex, multi-pronged problem. 

The Ohio-class SSBN fleet is undergoing significant sustainment efforts to maintain our nation’s required high operational availability and extend the life of the D5 

ballistic missile. Twelve Ohio-class Replacement Program (ORP) submarines is the 

minimum number required to meet USSTRATCOM’s sea-based deterrent requirements. The program of record determined this number through detailed analysis of 

operational requirements, patrol and maintenance cycles, and current/postulated 

threats. Fielding fewer than 12 ORP submarines would introduce unacceptable strategic capability risk in our most survivable leg of the Triad. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. How do we ensure that we effectively deter Russia and other adversaries without increasing risks of undermining strategic stability, increase the risks 

of miscalculation or causing a nuclear arms race? 

Mr. MCKEON. We seek to maintain a nuclear deterrent that is robust and stable, 

rather than one that is necessarily reactive to every action of potential adversaries. 

This remains best served by sustaining the nuclear Triad and Dual-Capable Aircraft 

(DCA) with a diverse range of nuclear explosive yields and delivery modes. The 

Triad and DCA provide the flexibility, responsiveness, and survivability we need to 

meet and adapt to the challenges of a dynamic 21st century security environment, 

including those posed by Russia, without the need to mirror every potential adversary, system-for-system and yield-for-yield. Thus, the Administration’s plan focuses 

on sustaining and modernizing current platforms, delivery systems, and warheads 

to preserve existing military capabilities in the face of evolving threats, rather than 

developing new nuclear warheads with new military capabilities. In addition to positioning us to address deterrence threats as they emerge, this approach bolsters strategic stability by decreasing incentives for a future arms race without seeking the 

ability to negate Russia’s strategic deterrent capabilities. 
85 

Mr. COOPER. What is DOD’s plan to stop reliance on the RD–180 engine and ensure reliable access to space within the next few years? 

Admiral HANEY. Space capabilities are a vital component of comprehensive deterrence and assurance and are critical to supporting our deployed forces and our national decision-making processes. However, space has become an increasingly contested, degraded, and operationally limited domain. As the threat to our space capabilities continues to rise, so too must the resiliency of our space assets. Improved 

launch capabilities will help assure the resiliency of our space-based capabilities. 

USSTRATCOM requires effects from the space domain to execute its assigned responsibilities. Critical Space capabilities include communications; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); missile warning; and Positioning Navigation 

Timing. We rely heavily upon Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) to deploy these 

critical systems and are closely coordinating with AFSPC to study options to field 

reliable and robust domestic launch capabilities. 

Mr. COOPER. How do we ensure that we effectively deter Russia and other adversaries without increasing risks of undermining strategic stability, increase the risks 

of miscalculation or causing a nuclear arms race? 

Admiral HANEY. Ensuring a robust deterrent without undermining stability, increasing the risk of miscalculation or causing an arms race was, during the Cold 

War, a continuously monitored and aggressively studied balancing problem. PostCold War, less attention was placed on this problem. Today, we must again more 

diligently monitor and assess strategic stability. 

The basic tenets of strategic stability remain the same. First, stable strategic deterrence is underpinned by force structure and posture that ensure neither the 

United States nor or Russia could gain significant advantage by attempting a disarming first strike on the other’s nuclear forces. 

Arms control treaties are a second key aspect of managing strategic stability. 

They provide increased transparency into each nation’s activities and provide an 

upper limit on capabilities. The transparency provided by the New START Treaty 

has (to date) been adhered to regarding strategic nuclear weapons between the 

United States and Russia. 

Third, interactions with Russia across all elements of the U.S. government are 

key to ensuring actions taken by both sides do not inadvertently trigger destabilizing activities. While these discussions and exchanges are not a panacea, they 

are a key component to avoiding misperceptions. 

Fourth, we must have a comprehensive understanding and perception of the strategic environment from an adversary’s point of view. This requires a robust foundational intelligence capability. 

Fifth, we must work diligently to ensure our whole of government activities are 

internally consistent with our objectives. Words and actions must be unambiguously 

coherent regarding the National Security Interests of the United States. This is 

much easier said than done. Thus, there is a need for increased diligence across the 

U.S. government in this regard. 

Finally, we must continue to pursue the modernization of the force in a manner 

that is consistent with replacing and maintaining the necessary capability, while 

avoiding the perception of increasing the scale or scope of these capabilities. This 

must be appropriately balanced given the modernization and development of nuclear 

weapon capabilities by other nation states that in some cases are expanding their 

capabilities. Again, increased diligence is necessary to ensure strategic stability is 

preserved. We must continue to provide a safe, secure, effective and ready nuclear 

deterrent as a top priority that includes: 

• An appropriate intelligence and sensing apparatus to give indications and warnings of incoming threats 

• Assured National and Nuclear Command, Control and Communications 

• A visible TRIAD of platforms including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and Bombers with associated systems that 

includes an Air Launched Cruise Missile. Refueling tankers are also needed to 

support the Bomber leg of the TRIAD 

• A credible Missile Defense system that defends against limited attacks 

• A resilient Space and Cyberspace architecture 

• A robust conventional force. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAKAI 

Mr. TAKAI. How has STRATCOM/JFCC Space reoriented operations to support 

PACOM? 
86 

Mr. MCKEON. The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) provides space-based 

capabilities in support of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) operations. These capabilities include day-to-day missile warning; satellite communications; positioning, 

navigation, and timing; and nuclear detonation detection capabilities. JSpOC also 

provides Offensive Space Control (OSC) effects, which influence USPACOM planning for future contingencies. 

The Joint Functional Component Command Space (JFCC Space) supports 

USPACOM through its Non-Kinetic Duty Officer (NKDO). The NKDO offers options 

for space protection capabilities in the event of an emergent counter-space event in 

USPACOM’s Area of Responsibility. This connection, which is essential to a strong 

relationship with USPACOM, supports theater operations and protects existing 

space capabilities. 

Mr. TAKAI. Admiral Haney—What is your assessment of the risk to space services 

that are so vital to our Joint Force? Is risk increasing? How is Strategic Command 

evolving from operating in space in a peaceful environment, to one which is contested by potential adversaries? 

Admiral HANEY. Space is no longer a sanctuary from conflict, and our space forces 

must be able to contend with both natural and man-made hazards. The risks increase as other nations field and improve capabilities designed to counter the U.S. 

space advantage. 

Recognizing that most organizations share the same risks of operating in the 

space domain, we are working to meet the challenges through improved partnerships with international and commercial agencies and throughout our Intelligence 

Community. We are also making meaningful space investments to defend ourselves 

and assure space operations throughout all levels of conflict. 

We are investing in efforts to improve stability, resiliency, and assurance of our 

space operations. This includes updated Battlefield Management Command and 

Control (BMC2) systems, integration of Department of Defense and Intelligence 

Community space capabilities and operations, and building up responsive measures 

to defend space-enabled capabilities. 

Existing and expanding potential adversary capabilities are included in our exercises and learning processes. 

We have a deliberate approach as Commander, United States Strategic Command, participates in DOD Defense Space Councils and Deputy’s Management Action Groups, and also is a co-chair with Ms. Betty Sapp, Director National Reconnaissance Office, of the Joint Space Doctrine and Tactics Forum (JSDTF). The 

JSDTF’s goals are to ensure U.S. space policy, doctrine, operational concepts, strategies and planning scenarios reflect that space is a contested domain, populated by 

dynamic actors. Through the JSDTF, we have already made significant improvements in the integration of exercises and wargames, and are revising associated 

joint doctrine, as well as new tactics, techniques and procedures for our space operators. The JSDTF will foster the transformation of how the U.S. operates in space 

by promoting seamless functionality between the DOD and Intelligence Community. 

Another key initiative is the establishment of the Joint Interagency Combined 

Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) located at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado. This center combines the efforts of USSTRATCOM, Air Force Space Command, and the Intelligence Community with a goal to create unity of effort and facilitate information sharing across the national security space enterprise. The 

JICSpOC will ensure the space enterprise meets and outpaces emerging and advanced space threats and will provide vital information for national leadership, allies, partners and the Joint Force. It will also serve to enhance the Nation’s deterrent posture by demonstrating the United States is prepared when our space capabilities are threatened. 

Mr. TAKAI. Admiral Haney—As you know, the current U.S. Space Surveillance 

Network optical sensors can only operate at night. 24/7 monitoring is essential to 

monitor and defend vital space-based assets. I’m aware of certain proven prototype 

optical systems capable of daytime and night operations. What are your plans to 

make that an operational capability? 

Admiral HANEY. Space capabilities are a vital component of comprehensive deterrence and assurance and are critical to supporting our deployed forces and our national decision-making processes. However, space has become an increasingly contested, degraded, and operationally limited domain. Our ability to monitor the space 

environment is increasingly vital given recent advancements in adversary counterspace capabilities. The proof-of-concept work on daylight optical systems is encouraging and points to a potential role for these sensors as a part of our Space Surveillance Network (SSN). We continue to investigate the utility, limitations and cost 

benefit of this technology to improve our space surveillance capability within resource constraints. 
87 

† The original graphic submitted is retained in subcommittee files. 

Mr. TAKAI. How has STRATCOM/JFCC Space reoriented operations to support 

PACOM? 

Admiral HANEY. Space capabilities are a vital component of comprehensive deterrence and assurance and are critical to supporting our deployed forces and our national decision-making processes. Our national space capabilities allow us to globally 

navigate, communicate, and observe events in areas where non-space sensors are 

not feasible. 

USSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Command Space (JFCC SPACE), 

through the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), provides space-based capabilities in support of United States Pacific Command (PACOM) operations in the following ways: 

• Day-to-day environmental monitoring 

• Satellite Communications (SATCOM) 

• Positioning, Navigation and Timing capabilities 

• Theater Missile Warning Battlespace Awareness 

• and Combat Search and Rescue support 

In addition to meeting Department of Defense mission sets, JFCC SPACE provides oversight of the commercial SATCOM systems utilized in PACOM through the 

Commercial Integration Cell. JFCC SPACE supports allied countries and commercial entities in PACOM through Space Situational Sharing Agreements with 

USSTRATCOM. These countries include Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia. Our Pacific Allies rely on JFCC SPACE to provide navigation accuracy 

through GPS constellation management. USSTRATCOM’s Purposeful Interference 

Response Team, liaisons with JFCC SPACE in ensuring the health and protection 

of the constellation. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Can you share with the committee the planning (including the 

estimated development and production timelines and decision points) and cost estimates for nuclear modernization, including for nuclear modernization beyond 2025? 

When does the funding bow-wave occur? 

Mr. MCKEON. The graphic below shows the projected costs and associated 

timelines for DOD nuclear modernization.† Peak projected funding occurs in the 

2026–2035 timeframe. The total projected cost from Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 through 

FY 2036 is $381 billion, for an average of $19 billion per year. It should be noted 

that the Long-Range Strike Bomber will have both nuclear and conventional strike 

capabilities. 

Nuclear Enterprise Recapitalization 

The following key development and production dates fall within this time period: 
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• W76–1 Life Extension Program: FY 2019 Production complete; • B61–12 Life Extension Program: FY 2020 First Production unit (FPU); • W88 ALT 370: FY 2020 FPU; • F–35A Dual Capable Aircraft: FY 2025 Nuclear Operational Certification Complete; • W80–4 warhead: FY 2025 FPU; • Long-Range Standoff weapon (LRSO): FY 2026 FPU; • B21 bomber: Mid-2020s initial capability; • Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD): FY 2029 Initial Operational Capability (IOC); • Interoperable Warhead 1 (IW1): FY 2030 planned FPU; • OHIO Replacement: FY 2031 First Patrol; and • IW2: FY2034 planned FPU. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How is the DOD addressing concerns that the Long-Range 

Stand-Off weapon may be destabilizing? 

Mr. MCKEON. We appreciate the opportunities that congressional hearings provide to reiterate publicly the important role of the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) 

cruise missile in a nuclear modernization program designed to maintain strategic 

stability with Russia and China. The LRSO will sustain the deterrent capabilities 

currently provided by the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), which has contributed to strategic stability for decades by providing a response option that does not 

pose the threat of a disarming surprise attack to Russia or China. The process of 

alerting strategic bombers is observable, and the aircraft and the missile must 

spend hours flying towards their targets. Thus, ALCMs provide more potential for 

warning than do either ballistic missiles or ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles 

forward-deployed in theater or aboard ships on station. 

The LRSO will help maintain strategic stability at the lowest possible number of 

nuclear weapons consistent with sustaining options for effective deterrence, and 

without developing new nuclear warheads. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Can you share with the committee the planning (including the 

estimated development and production timelines and decision points) and cost estimates for nuclear modernization, including for nuclear modernization beyond 2025? 

When does the funding bow-wave occur? 

The Department of Defense, in cooperation with the National Nuclear Security 

Agency (NNSA), developed a long-term nuclear modernization and recapitalization 

plan that maintains a credible strategic deterrent force. The plan delivers required 

modern and reliable strategic and extended deterrence capabilities as legacy systems retire. 

Specifics of the plan, including cost estimates and schedule, are reported in the 

Defense Department’s ‘Annual Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear 

Weapons Command and Control System’. 

The nuclear modernization bow-wave starts in or about 2021 and will peak in the 

mid to late 2020s. Spending on the nuclear enterprise is predicted to rise to 5–6% 

of U.S. defense spending as specified in the Congressional Budget Office’s ‘‘Projected 

Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024’’ report. This level of investment is appropriate given the contribution of U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities to our National security and global stability. If we assume historical averages, funding for the 

nuclear enterprise should return to 3–4% of the defense budget following this period 

of critical modernization. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. A recent article in the Daily Beast noted a STRATCOM requirement that the new ICBM must be more accurate. Please explain what the added 

accuracy and capability requirements are for the GBSD. Is the Air Force looking at 

using technology that the Navy has already developed? 

Admiral HANEY. Our nuclear Triad consists of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

(ICBMs), Ballistic Missile Submarines, Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, and nuclear 

capable heavy bombers and associated tankers. Each Triad leg provides unique and 

complementary attributes that together underpin strategic deterrence and stability. 

The Triad provides a hedge against technical problems or changes in the security 

environment and must consist of independently viable weapons systems and platforms which present adversaries with a complex, multi-pronged strategic problem. 

Our ICBM force provides the most responsive capability that maximizes Presidential decision time. The ICBM force also provides a highly reliable and cost effective deterrent capability as part of a credible Triad. 

USSTRATCOM fully supports the Air Force plan to develop and deploy a Minuteman III replacement, called the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), which 

maintains strategic effectiveness beyond 2030. One component of maintaining ICBM 

effectiveness is ensuring the missile’s accuracy across its full operational range. This 
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can be affordably accomplished at low technical risk by utilizing existing, mature 

ballistic missile guidance components which improve performance over 1970s-era 

Minuteman technology. 

The GBSD program is exploring commonality opportunities at the system and 

subsystem levels to minimize non-recurring engineering cost, reduce lifecycle cost, 

and gain production efficiencies. Regarding accuracy, the Air Force and industry 

partners are currently examining existing U.S. Navy Trident II D5 ballistic missile 

guidance systems to leverage for the GBSD missile. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What contracts does STRATCOM have with universities or think 

tanks to support nuclear deterrence thinking and policy? What entities are these 

contracts with and what are the value of these contracts? 

Admiral HANEY. USSTRATCOM’s University Affiliated Research Center (UARC) 

for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) is a 5-year contract in partnership with the University of Nebraska. The purpose of a UARC is to focus a highlevel, world-class research university on a specific, enduring, technically hard problem to create a continuity of research, focus and generate unconventional thoughts 

to solve critical problems, and help train the next generation of strategic thinkers. 

There are five task orders directly sponsored by USSTRATCOM/J5 supporting nuclear deterrence thinking and policy and their assigned value is $500K: Behavioral 

Influence ($146K), Deterrence Strategic Stage Set ($115K), Risk of Extended Deterrence ($73K), Development/Assessment of Narrative Counter-Narrative ($95K) and 

Horizontal and Vertical Nuclear Proliferation ($71K). 

Additionally, USSTRATCOM has formed a Deterrence and Assurance Academic 

Alliance. The Alliance is not a contracted entity but is a collaborative partnership 

with 22 regional and national universities. We have four objectives for the Alliance: 

develop the next generation of deterrence professionals, regularize our relationships 

with Academia, open a continuous and robust communication with Academia, and 

stimulate new thinking in deterrence and assurance studies. The Alliance is moving 

into its second year and continues to grow. We currently have eight student teams 

and advisors at local universities and three National Defense University 

STRATCOM Scholars conducting research on deterrence and assurance issues. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Can you share with the committee the analysis that led to the 

specific number of 50–80 for the requirement for annual pit production? When does 

DOD require 50–80 pits per year? How many are needed to address geopolitical uncertainty and how many are to address technical uncertainty? 

Admiral HANEY. An assessment of the Nuclear Weapon Pit Production Requirements Report to Congress1, dated January 16, 2014, confirmed the requirement for 

achieving 50–80 pits per year production capacity by 2030. This requirement was 

developed from the following factors: 

1) U.S. policy objectives to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent 

is contingent on the national capability to produce plutonium pits. 

2) Pit aging studies conclude pits will not have unlimited lifetimes. Even with pit 

reuse, plutonium work may be required to assure weapon safety, security and 

long term reliability to preclude the need for weapon testing. 

3) The ability to produce plutonium pits in sufficient quantity and timeliness to 

address technical issues is essential to the long term reduction of the non-deployed weapon stockpile. Future stockpile reductions are central to U.S. nonproliferation goals. 

1 P.L. 112–239; FY13 NDAA, Sec. 3147 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How is the DOD addressing concerns that the Long-Range 

Stand-Off weapon may be destabilizing? 

Admiral HANEY. Our nuclear Triad consists of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

(ICBMs), Ballistic Missile Submarines, Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM), and 

nuclear capable heavy bombers and associated tankers. Each Triad leg provides 

unique and complementary attributes that together underpin strategic deterrence 

and stability. The Long Range Stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile is integral to the airleg of the Triad and provides the U.S. flexible and tailorable options in response to 

a wide range of strategic and regional crises. LRSO also presents the adversary a 

complex problem to defend against. 

The LRSO cruise missile is not a ‘new’ nuclear weapon and, in the context of strategic deterrence, is not destabilizing. LRSO represents a modernization of an existing U.S. nuclear capability. Like the current ALCM, LRSO provides the President 

a variety of tailorable options to deter adversary nuclear use, including the ability 

to counter ‘escalate-to-deescalate’ strategies. Maintaining a credible stand-off nuclear capability contributes to stability by assuring allies of U.S. deterrence commitments and discouraging them from pursuing their own nuclear capabilities. 
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Mr. GARAMENDI. What can the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon (LRSOs) accomplish 

that the nuclear ballistic missile submarines and the land-based missiles (ICBMs) 

cannot? 

Admiral HANEY. This Administration’s thorough review of the nuclear deterrent 

force affirmed previous findings that maintaining a credible and effective nuclear 

Triad, with its unique and complimentary deterrent attributes, represented the best 

approach to meeting our national security and global stability objectives. The Long 

Range Stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile is integral to the air-leg of the TRIAD and 

provides the President flexible and tailorable options in response to a wide range 

of strategic and regional crises. 

The LRSO’s range and ability to penetrate air defenses provides the necessary 

global target coverage that denies adversaries any geographic sanctuary for high 

value targets. Unlike ballistic missiles, forward deployable LRSO cruise missiles are 

visible and clearly demonstrate U.S. resolve and commitment to allies and partners. 

Additionally, LRSO cruise missiles can be rapidly loaded and deployed in response 

to technical issues or operational vulnerabilities with other TRIAD systems. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. In a June 2014 letter on behalf of the Nuclear Weapons Council, 

Mr. Kendall noted that ‘‘without the LRSO’s advanced stand-off capability, the 

bomber leg of the Triad will gradually become a symbol if our decline rather than 

a bellweather of enduring American strength.’’ If the air-leg of triad will become a 

symbol of our decline without the LRSO, what is the value of spending at least $10 

billion on modernizing the B61 bomb? 

Admiral HANEY. Long Range Stand-off (LRSO) combined with B–21 (Long Range 

Strike-Bomber) ensures effectiveness in anti-access/area denial environments and 

has the stand-off range to deny an adversary any geographic sanctuary. The combination of stand-off cruise missiles and gravity weapons offer the most diverse delivery options, providing the President flexible and tailorable options across a wide 

range of strategic and regional crises. Gravity weapons are the only U.S. nuclear 

weapons permanently deployed out of the continental U.S., and are essential to 

maintaining our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

The B61–12 Life Extension Program (LEP) will provide a modern gravity nuclear 

weapon to ensure the B–2 bomber remains a viable U.S. nuclear platform for the 

foreseeable future. The B61–12 LEP will replace the aged B61–3/4/7/10 and B83– 

1 bombs with a single, modern reliable weapon resulting in ∼50% fewer deployed 

gravity weapons. This significant reduction in the U.S. gravity nuclear weapons 

stockpile directly supports non-proliferation goals while still maintaining a robust 

strategic & NATO deterrent capability. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. STRATCOM sets requirements for nuclear deterrent, but does 

not have responsibility to pay for the associated costs of modernizing these platforms. How does STRATCOM evaluate costs? 

Admiral HANEY. The Administration’s nuclear posture and defense reviews such 

as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, 2013 Report on Nuclear Weapons Employment 

Strategy, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 2015 National Military Strategy affirmed previous findings that a nuclear Triad delivers the best mix of unique 

and complimentary capabilities to accomplish our national strategy and policy objectives of deterring adversaries and assuring allies. USSTRATCOM works closely with 

the Services and other stakeholders to ensure the sustainment and modernization 

programs necessary to support our strategic deterrence and assurance missions are 

adequately resourced. These efforts are already paying off; joint efforts on fuze modernization are projected to save the Air Force approximately $600M. Similar efforts 

promise to continue to pay dividends both in the sustainment of existing and development of follow-on systems. USSTRATCOM also fully participates in the joint requirements validation process, which is cost informed and in Service requirements 

trade-space deliberations. 

The cost to sustain a viable nuclear deterrent is not trivial, but it is important 

to keep these costs in perspective. Today we spend approximately 3% of the Defense 

Department’s budget in support of the nuclear enterprise. Investments in the nuclear enterprise are projected to rise to 5–6% of defense spending in the next 10 

years as specified in the Congressional Budget Office’s ‘‘Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024’’ report. This investment is appropriate given the contribution of our nuclear forces to our National security and global stability. If we 

assume historical averages, funding for the nuclear enterprise should return to 3– 

4% of defense spending following this period of critical modernization. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Will the LRSO be more accurate and re-targetable in flight? 

Admiral HANEY. Yes, the Long Range Stand-off (LRSO) will be more accurate due 

to advances in current missile guidance technology than the current Air Launched 

Cruise Missile which utilizes 1970s technology. There is no requirement to make 

LRSO re-targetable in flight. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING 

Dr. FLEMING. Could you comment on the Weapons Storage Facility recapitalization program, in terms of your assessment of the timeline and the importance of 

the program’s plan to restore the Weapons Storage Facility at Barksdale Air Force 

Base to enable storage and training with weapons at both B–52 operating locations, 

and could you commit to keep me and this committee updated on this project? 

Admiral HANEY. Weapons storage area (WSA) modernization is important to ensuring the Nation’s nuclear deterrence capability remains safe, secure, and effective 

in the decades ahead. The Air Force has a deliberate and comprehensive plan—the 

Weapons Storage Facility (WSF) Investment Strategy—that will replace existing 

WSAs with modern WSFs. In the FY17 PB Future Years Defense Program, the Air 

Force investment includes a WSF at Barksdale Air Force Base beginning in FY18. 

USSTRATCOM working in partnership with the Air Force, will keep the Committee 

informed on this project. 

Dr. FLEMING. Could you explain why it is important to buy a new long-range 

standoff weapon (LRSO) given the capabilities available with the Long Range Strike 

Bomber (LRS–B)? Also, given the importance of the LRSO, it was interesting to see 

that the NNSA and the Air Force’s Fiscal Year 17 requests for this program were 

lower than expected—does this request allow for this capability to be produced and 

deployed as scheduled? 

Admiral HANEY. The B–21 Long-Range Strike Bomber and Long Range Stand-off 

(LRSO) cruise missile are essential to meet our nation’s strategic deterrence and assurance requirements. Both are integral to the Triad by providing the President 

flexible and tailorable options in response to a wide range of strategic and regional 

crises. The B–21 and LRSO’s range and ability to penetrate air defenses provides 

the necessary global target coverage that denies adversaries any geographic sanctuary for high value targets. Maintaining a credible penetrating and stand-off nuclear capability contributes to stability by assuring allies of U.S. deterrence commitments and discouraging them from pursuing their own nuclear capabilities. 

Delays in FY16 contract awards reduced the amounts required in FY17. NNSA 

reduced their PB17 to maintain warhead development synchronization with the Air 

Force’s missile program. The Air Force and NNSA PB17 requests still allow for production and deployment as scheduled to meet USSTRATCOM’s deterrence mission 

requirements. 

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