[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 244 (Friday, December 18, 2020)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 82750-82795]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-27506]



[[Page 82749]]

Vol. 85

Friday,

No. 244

December 18, 2020

Part IV





Department of Justice





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Executive Office for Immigration Review





8 CFR Parts 1003, 1103, 1208, et al.





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Executive Office for Immigration Review; Fee Review; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 85 , No. 244 / Friday, December 18, 2020 / 
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 82750]]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Executive Office for Immigration Review

8 CFR Parts 1003, 1103, 1208, 1216, 1240, 1244, and 1245

[EOIR Docket No. 18-0101; A.G. Order No. 4929-2020]
RIN 1125-AA90


Executive Office for Immigration Review; Fee Review

AGENCY: Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of Justice.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: On February 28, 2020, the Department of Justice (``the 
Department'' or ``DOJ'') published a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(``NPRM'' or ``proposed rule'') that would increase the fees for those 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (``EOIR'') applications, 
appeals, and motions that are subject to an EOIR-determined fee, based 
on a fee review conducted by EOIR. The proposed rule would not affect 
fees established by the Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'') with 
respect to DHS forms for applications that are filed or submitted in 
EOIR proceedings. The proposal would not affect the ability of aliens 
to submit fee waiver requests, nor would it add new fees. The proposed 
rule would also update cross-references to DHS regulations regarding 
fees and make a technical change regarding requests under the Freedom 
of Information Act (``FOIA''). This final rule responds to comments 
received in response to the NPRM and adopts the fee amounts proposed in 
the NPRM without change.

DATES: This rule is effective on January 19, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director, 
Office of Policy, Executive Office for Immigration Review, 5107 
Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041, telephone (703) 305-0289 (not a 
toll-free call).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Summary of the Proposed Rule

    On February 28, 2020, the Department published an NPRM that would 
increase the fees for those EOIR applications, appeals, and motions 
that are subject to an EOIR-determined fee, based on a fee review 
conducted by EOIR. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Fee Review, 
85 FR 11866 (Feb. 28, 2020). The proposed rule would not affect fees 
established by DHS with respect to DHS forms for applications that are 
also filed or submitted in EOIR proceedings. The proposal would not 
affect the ability of aliens to submit fee waiver requests, nor would 
it add fees for any EOIR forms or applications other than those which 
currently have a fee imposed. The proposed rule would also update 
cross-references to DHS regulations regarding fees to match changes to 
the organization and structure of DHS's regulations regarding fees for 
applications and make a non-substantive correction to the regulatory 
cross-reference for requests under the FOIA.

A. Authority and Legal Framework

    The Department published the proposed rule pursuant to its 
authority to charge fees, also referred to as user charges. 85 FR at 
11866-67.
    Pursuant to section 286(m) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(the ``Act'' or ``INA'') (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)), the Attorney General and 
the Secretary of Homeland Security may charge fees for adjudication and 
naturalization services at a rate that would ensure recovery of both 
the full cost of providing all such services, including similar 
services that may be provided without charge to certain categories of 
aliens, and any additional administrative costs associated with the 
fees collected.\1\ 85 FR at 11867. Accordingly, adjudication fees, as 
designated in the regulations, are deposited into the Immigration 
Examinations Fee Account (``IEFA'') in the Treasury of the United 
States and ``remain available until expended to the Attorney General 
[or the Secretary] to reimburse any appropriation the amount paid out 
of such appropriation for expenses in providing immigration 
adjudication and naturalization services and the collection, 
safeguarding and accounting for fees deposited in and funds reimbursed 
from the [IEFA].'' INA 286(n), 8 U.S.C. 1356(n); see also 85 FR at 
11867.\2\ The Act authorizes the Attorney General and Secretary of 
Homeland Security to promulgate regulations to carry out this 
authority. INA 286(j), 8 U.S.C. 1356(j).
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    \1\ Following the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (``HSA''), the 
Attorney General retained the same authority and functions related 
to immigration and naturalization of aliens exercised by EOIR or the 
Attorney General prior to the HSA's effective date. Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135; see INA 
103(g)(1) (8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(1)). Further, the Attorney General 
retained the authority to perform actions as necessary, including 
promulgating regulations, in order to carry out authority under the 
immigration laws. See INA 103(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(2).
    \2\ All other payments received for fees and administrative 
fines and penalties are deposited into the Treasury as miscellaneous 
receipts, not including some exceptions that are irrelevant for the 
purposes of this final rule. See INA 286(c), 8 U.S.C. 1356(c); 85 FR 
at 11867.
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    In addition, the Department notes that this rule is also authorized 
by title V of the Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1952 
(``IOAA''), Public Law 82-137, 65 Stat. 268, 290 (1951) (codified at 31 
U.S.C. 9701). The IOAA provides government-wide authority to charge 
fees to individuals who receive special services from an agency. 31 
U.S.C. 9701(a)-(b).\3\ Those fees must be ``fair'' and based on 
government costs, value provided to the recipient, the public policy or 
interest served, and other relevant factors. Id.
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    \3\ Title V of the IOAA was first codified at 31 U.S.C. 841. In 
1982, the language from title V of the IOAA was subsequently 
codified, with minor changes and the addition of paragraphing, at 31 
U.S.C. 9701. Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Public Law 97-258, 96 Stat. 877, 
1051 (revising, codifying, and enacting without substantive change 
certain general and permanent laws, related to money and finance, as 
title 31, United States Code, ``Money and Finance'').
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    The proposed rule is likewise consistent with Circular No. A-25 
Revised,\4\ which has been determined to be a ``proper construction'' 
of the IOAA,\5\ and provides guidance to executive branch agencies 
regarding the scope and types of activities that may be covered by user 
fees and how to set such fees. Covering all Federal activities, 
including agency programs, that convey special benefits to recipients 
beyond those that the general public receives, it instructs agencies to 
review user charges for such activities biennially. See Circular No. A-
25 Revised at sec. 8(e); see also 31 U.S.C. 902(a)(8) (directing an 
``agency Chief Financial Officer'' to ``review, on a biennial basis, 
the fees, royalties, rents, and other charges imposed by the agency for 
services and things of value it provides, and make recommendations on 
revising those charges to reflect costs incurred by it in providing 
those services and things of value'').
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    \4\ Circular No. A-25 was published in 1959. Circular No. A-25 
Revised rescinded and replaced Circular No. A-25 and its 
accompanying Transmittal Memoranda 1 and 2. See Office of Management 
and Budget (``OMB'') Circular A-25, 58 FR 38142, 38144 (July 15, 
1993).
    \5\ See Fed. Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 
345, 349-51 (1974).
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B. Purpose of the Proposed Rule

    Before the proposed rule's publication, the Department had fallen 
out of compliance with Circular No. A-25 Revised and 31 U.S.C. 
902(a)(8) regarding the review of EOIR's fees on a biennial basis. For 
over 30 years the Department did not either review or update the fees 
charged for applications, appeals, and motions for which EOIR levies a 
fee. See 85 FR at 11869.

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Accordingly, in order to ensure compliance with the IOAA (31 U.S.C. 
9701), section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)), 31 U.S.C. 
902(a)(8), and Circular No. A-25 Revised, ``EOIR conducted a 
comprehensive study using activity-based costing to determine the cost 
to EOIR for each type of application, appeal, and motion for which EOIR 
levies a fee under 8 CFR 1103.7(b).'' Id.
    Through the 3-phase study, EOIR determined the cost for each form 
and motion by allocating average direct salary costs to each step in an 
average process map for how the fee, application, or motion works 
through the adjudicatory process. See 85 FR at 11869. In other words, 
EOIR totaled the total salary costs for the different EOIR staff 
involved in the processing and adjudication for each form and motion, 
based on the average time each type of official spends on that 
processing and adjudication, to determine an average processing cost. 
See id. Despite EOIR's authority to recover the full cost of providing 
adjudication services, EOIR's study did not include costs aside from 
the direct salary costs for the involved staff. Specifically, the study 
did not include: (1) Overhead costs, which the Department determined 
would occur regardless of how many applications, appeals, or motions to 
which a fee applies are filed; (2) non-salary benefits, which may vary 
greatly from person to person depending on which benefits, if any, are 
selected; or (3) costs associated with filing related documents that 
may be submitted with the application, appeal, or motion to which a fee 
applies. Id.
    Despite including only the direct salary costs in this cost study, 
the results clearly demonstrated that the processing costs for the 
applications, appeals, and motions to which a fee applies under 8 CFR 
1103.7(b) significantly exceed the fees imposed in 1986. 85 FR at 
11870. Accordingly, the Department issued the NPRM to begin rulemaking 
to update the fees in accordance with the processing costs identified 
by the EOIR fee study so that the fee amounts ``more accurately reflect 
the costs for EOIR's adjudications of these matters.'' Id.
    Because the proposed rule roughly matched the new fee amounts with 
the processing costs that were identified by a study that did not 
consider the complete cost to the agency, as explained above, the 
proposed rule inherently subsidized the costs of adjudicating these 
applications, appeals, and motions. In other words, the updated fee 
amounts balance ``the public interest in ensuring that U.S. taxpayers 
do not bear a disproportionate burden in funding the immigration 
system'' with the fact that ``these applications for relief, appeals, 
and motions represent statutorily provided relief and important 
procedural tools that serve the public interest and provide value to 
those who are parties to the proceedings by ensuring accurate 
administrative proceedings.'' Id. Put more simply, the proposed rule 
intentionally put forth fee amounts that were less than the cost to the 
agency in order to effectively serve the public interest.
C. Provisions of the Proposed Rule
    In determining the fees to charge, the agency considered the 
various public policy interests involved, including ensuring that 
immigration courts continue to be accessible for aliens seeking relief 
and that U.S. taxpayers do not bear a disproportionate burden in 
funding the immigration system. See id. Based on the cost study and 
these considerations, the NPRM proposed the following changes to EOIR's 
fees:
    1. Increase the fee for Form EOIR-26 from $110 to $975.
    2. Increase the fee for Form EOIR-29 from $110 to $705.
    3. Increase the fee for Form EOIR-40 from $100 to $305.
    4. Increase the fee for Form EOIR-42A from $100 to $305.
    5. Increase the fee for Form EOIR-42B from $100 to $360.
    6. Increase the fee for Form EOIR-45 from $110 to $675.
    7. Increase the fee for filing a motion to reopen or reconsider 
from $110 before both the immigration courts within the Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge (``OCIJ'') and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(``BIA'' or ``Board'') to $145 if either motion is filed before the 
OCIJ, and $895 if either motion is filed before the BIA.
    The NPRM also proposed numerous technical corrections to fee-
related citations to both DHS's regulations in chapter I and EOIR's 
regulations in chapter V of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
following DHS's publication of an NPRM regarding DHS-imposed fees. U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee Schedule and Changes to 
Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 84 FR 62280 
(Nov. 14, 2019). The Department's NPRM included proposed changes to 
cross-references to those DHS regulations as used in EOIR's regulations 
to ensure that all cross-references were accurate in accordance with 
DHS's proposed rule. See 85 FR at 11871-72.
    Finally, the proposed rule made additional technical corrections to 
EOIR's regulations to correct cross-references, both to a provision 
regarding requests pursuant to FOIA and to EOIR's own fee-related 
regulations. 85 FR at 11872.
    More specifically, the NPRM proposed the following changes to 
EOIR's regulations.
a. Part 1003--Executive Office for Immigration Review
    First, the NPRM proposed to amend 8 CFR part 1003 by updating 
citations contained in this part. In accordance with DHS's rulemaking, 
the NPRM proposed to change ``8 CFR 103.7(a)'' to ``Sec.  1103.7(b)'' 
in Sec.  1003.8(a)(4)(ii), and it proposed to change ``8 CFR 103.7'' to 
``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in Sec.  1003.24(a) and (c).
b. Part 1103--Appeals, Records, and Fees
    Also, in accordance with DHS's rulemaking, the NPRM proposed to 
amend 8 CFR 1103.7 by changing (1) the citation ``8 CFR 103.7(a)(1)'' 
to ``8 CFR 103.7(a)'' in paragraph (a)(3); (2) the citation ``8 CFR 
103.7(a)(2)'' to ``8 CFR 103.7(c) and 8 CFR 106.1'' in paragraph 
(a)(3); and (3) the citation ``8 CFR 103.7'' to ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR 
part 106'' in paragraph (b)(4)(ii). In addition, the NPRM proposed 
revising paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of Sec.  1103.7 to clarify that despite 
DHS's proposed assignment of a $50 fee for filing a Form I-589, 
Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, such fee would 
not apply for a Form I-589 filed with an immigration judge ``for the 
sole purpose of seeking withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) 
of the Act or protection under the Convention Against Torture 
regulations.''
    Next, the NPRM proposed to revise paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), and 
(b)(4)(i) to reflect the updated fee amounts. Paragraph (b)(1) would 
contain updated fees for Forms EOIR-26, -29, and -45. Paragraph (b)(2) 
would contain updated fees for motions to reopen or to reconsider 
before the immigration court and motions to reopen or to reconsider 
before the BIA. Paragraph (b)(4)(i) would contain updated fees for 
Forms EOIR-40, -42A, and -42B.
    The NPRM also proposed to revise paragraph (d) to correct a cross-
reference to the regulations regarding FOIA. The current regulation 
incorrectly stated that the FOIA regulation is located at 28 CFR 16.11, 
and the NPRM corrected that cross-reference to 28 CFR 16.10.

[[Page 82752]]

c. Part 1208--Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal
    The NPRM proposed to amend 8 CFR 1208.7 to change the citation 
``Sec.  103.7(c)'' to ``8 CFR 106.3'' in paragraph (c), in accordance 
with DHS's proposed rule.
d. Part 1216--Conditional Basis of Lawful Permanent Residence Status
    Also in accordance with DHS's rulemaking, the NPRM proposed to 
amend 8 CFR part 1216. In Sec.  1216.4, the NPRM proposed to change the 
citation ``Sec.  103.7(b)'' to ``Sec.  106.2'' in paragraph (a)(1). It 
also proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  103.7(b)'' to ``Sec.  
106.2'' in paragraph (b). In Sec.  1216.6, the NPRM proposed to change 
the citation ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1)'' to ``Sec.  106.2'' in paragraph 
(a)(1).
e. Part 1235--Inspection of Persons Applying for Admission
    Also in accordance with DHS's rulemaking, the NPRM proposed to 
amend 8 CFR 1235.1 to change the citation ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1)'' to 
``Sec.  103.7(d)'' in paragraphs (e)(1)(iii), (e)(2), and (f)(1). This 
final rule, however, does not adopt that change because an intervening 
rulemaking, Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible 
Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, signed by the Attorney General and the 
Acting Secretary of Homeland Security on December 2, 2020, removed and 
reserved 8 CFR 1235.1 altogether.
f. Part 1240--Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the 
United States
    The NPRM proposed to amend 8 CFR part 1240 to correct cross-
references to EOIR's own regulations. In Sec.  1240.11, the NPRM 
proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1) of 8 CFR chapter 
I'' to ``Sec.  1103.7(b)(1) of this chapter'' in paragraph (f). In 
Sec.  1240.20, the NPRM proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  
103.7(b) of 8 CFR chapter I'' to ``Sec.  1103.7(b) of this chapter'' in 
paragraph (a).
g. Part 1244--Temporary Protected Status for Nationals of Designated 
States
    The NPRM proposed to amend 8 CFR part 1244 in accordance with DHS's 
proposed rulemaking. In Sec.  1244.6, the NPRM proposed to change the 
citation ``Sec.  103.7 of this chapter'' to ``8 CFR 106.2''. Further, 
in Sec.  1244.20, the NPRM proposed to change the citation ``8 CFR 
103.7(b)'' to ``8 CFR 106.2'' in paragraph (a).
h. Part 1245--Adjustment of Status to that of Person Admitted for 
Permanent Residence
    The NPRM proposed to amend 8 CFR part 1245 in accordance with DHS's 
proposed rule.
    In Sec.  1245.7, the NPRM proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  
103.7 of this chapter'' to ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR 103.17'' in 
paragraph (a).
    In Sec.  1245.10, the NPRM proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  
103.7(b)(1) of this chapter'' to ``8 CFR 106.2'' in paragraph (c).
    In Sec.  1245.13, the NPRM proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  
103.7(b)(1)'' to ``Sec.  106.2'' in paragraphs (e)(1), (g), (j)(1), and 
(k)(1), and it proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1)'' to 
``Sec.  103.7(a)(2)'' in paragraph (e)(2).
    In Sec.  1245.15, the NPRM proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  
103.7(b)(1) of this chapter'' to ``8 CFR 106.2'' in paragraph 
(c)(2)(iv)(A), and it proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  
103.7(c)'' to ``Sec.  106.3'' in paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B). Further, in 
1245.15, the NPRM proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1)'' 
to ``Sec.  106.2'' in paragraph (h)(1), (n)(1), and (t)(1), and it 
proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1)'' to ``Sec.  
103.2(a)(2)'' in paragraph (h)(2).
    In Sec.  1245.20, the NPRM proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  
103.7(b)(1)'' to ``Sec.  106.2'' in paragraphs (d)(1), (f), and (g).
    In Sec.  1245.21, the NPRM proposed to change the citation ``Sec.  
103.7(b)(1) of this chapter'' to ``8 CFR 106.2'' in paragraph (b)(2), 
and it proposed to change the citation ``8 CFR 103.7(b)(1)'' to ``8 CFR 
106.2'' in paragraphs (h) and (i).

II. Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

A. Summary of Public Comments

    The comment period for the NPRM closed on March 30, 2020, with 601 
comments received.\6\ Organizations (including non-governmental 
organizations, legal advocacy groups, non-profit organizations, and 
religious organizations), congressional committees, and groups of 
members of Congress submitted 157 comments, and individual commenters 
submitted the rest. Most individual comments opposed the NPRM. All 
organizations but one opposed the NPRM.
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    \6\ The Department reviewed all 601 comments submitted in 
response to the rule; however, the Department did not post five of 
the comments to regulations.gov for public inspection. Of these 
comments, three were duplicates of another comment written by the 
same commenter, one was a blank comment without any attachment, and 
one was a comment specific to a prior agency rulemaking.
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B. Comments Expressing Support for the Proposed Rule

    Comment: Some individuals and one organization expressed support 
for the NPRM. Some supportive commenters noted the length of time since 
EOIR last reviewed and updated its fees and agreed that the fee amounts 
should be brought more in line with the modern processing costs to the 
agency and the costs imposed by United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (``USCIS'') for similar forms or services.
    One commenter noted that the criminal and civil court systems also 
impose fees and fines. Commenters expressed gratitude that the rule 
would protect taxpayer dollars and stated that taxpayers should not 
have to be burdened by or pay for immigration-related costs and the 
immigration court system for non-citizens. Instead, commenters stated 
that immigrants need to pay for their own immigration-related expenses.
    Two commenters characterized the current status quo without the 
rule as allowing some form of ``free'' immigration, which commenters 
stated should not be allowed.
    Commenters also expressed a belief that the United States cannot 
afford the current immigration system any longer.
    One commenter noted that the commenter's father was an immigrant 
who paid all his own immigration-related costs.
    Response: The Department appreciates the commenters' support for 
the rule.
    Comment: Four commenters who supported the Department's reasoning 
for increasing EOIR's fees suggested that the Department should 
consider a more modest fee increase instead of the full amounts 
proposed. These commenters were concerned that the proposed amounts 
might be too large and too sudden for people to afford, could render 
services unattainable, or are simply too high. On the other hand, two 
commenters suggested that the fees should instead be set at a higher 
amount.
    One commenter suggested that the Department should require 
supporting documents for any fee-waiver requests. One commenter 
suggested in the future the Department should propose smaller increases 
every few years instead of waiting a lengthy period of time to impose 
such a substantial fee increase.
    Response: The Department appreciates the commenters' suggestions 
and has taken the suggestions under advisement. Regarding suggestions 
about the proposed changes to the fee amounts, further discussion on 
the

[[Page 82753]]

specific fee amounts to be imposed is contained below in Section II.C.4 
of this preamble and further discussion on fee waivers is contained 
below in Section II.C.5. The Department also acknowledges the comment 
regarding not waiting thirty years to increase fees again in the future 
and, going forward, expects to adhere more closely to the biennial fee 
review timetable established by the Office of Management and Budget 
(``OMB'') and Congress.

C. Comments Expressing Opposition to the Proposed Rule

1. General opposition
    Comment: Numerous commenters expressed general opposition to the 
NPRM and provided little to no reasoning for their opposition.\7\ Many 
commenters asked the Department to withdraw the NPRM with no supporting 
rationale. Other commenters expressed opposition to the NPRM based 
generally upon their belief that it undermines American values. One 
commenter opposed the NPRM as ``rule by executive decree'' that eroded 
the separation between Congress and the Executive Branch.
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    \7\ Several comments expressed various USCIS-related concerns, 
such as opposition to USCIS-imposed fees for appeals and waiver 
requests. As a component of DHS, USCIS is a distinct agency from 
EOIR, a component of DOJ. This rule does not affect fees established 
by DHS. See 85 FR at 11866. Therefore, such concerns are outside the 
scope of this rulemaking.
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    Response: The Department is unable to provide a detailed response 
to comments that express only general opposition without providing 
reasoning for such opposition, but the Department reiterates the need 
to implement this rulemaking in accordance with authority under section 
286 of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356) and the IOAA, especially in light of the 
length of time since EOIR's fees were last reviewed, notwithstanding 
Circular No. A-25 Revised and 31 U.S.C. 902(a)(8). In subsequent 
sections of this final rule, the Department responds to comments that 
provided specific points of opposition or reasoning underlying their 
opposition.
    Further, the Department disagrees that the rule undermines American 
values. The rulemaking is promulgated in accordance with the IOAA and 
section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)), which statutorily 
authorize DOJ to charge fees for immigration adjudication and 
naturalization services. Accordingly, since promulgation of this rule 
is squarely within the Department's congressionally authorized purview, 
the Department believes that this rule furthers American values, 
including the rule of law.
    The rule does not constitute ``rule by executive decree.'' Section 
286(j) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(j)) authorizes the Attorney General to 
promulgate regulations to carry out section 286 of the Act. The 
Administrative Procedure Act (``APA'') establishes rulemaking 
procedures that agencies must follow when engaging in regulatory 
activity. See generally 5 U.S.C. 553. The Department properly exercised 
its regulatory authority under section 286(j) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 
1356(j)) and followed all relevant APA procedures. Further, the IOAA 
provides additional authority for this action. See Section II.C.9. of 
this preamble for further discussion.
2. Opposition to Current United States Immigration System
    Comment: Numerous commenters expressed general opposition to the 
current U.S. immigration system as a whole and included the following 
perceived concerns: Inefficiencies throughout the system; problems with 
agency management and personnel; poor treatment of refugees and 
immigrants in comparison to the United States' wealth and the 
inscription on the Statue of Liberty; funding for a border wall; 
politicization of immigration-related issues; and implementation of 
recent immigration policies, such as the Migrant Protection Protocols 
(``MPP'') and immigration judge performance measures, which commenters 
described as ``case completion quotas.''
    Many commenters emphasized the positive contributions of immigrants 
to American society and the economy; relatedly, commenters stated that 
taxpayers should share some of the cost burden for the forms, 
applications, or motions affected by this rule because the United 
States benefits from immigration. These commenters supported 
simplifying the immigration system so that immigrants may more readily 
immigrate to the United States and join American communities. 
Commenters also alleged that, if implemented, the rule would result in 
a decline in immigration, promote inequality within the immigration 
system, and overall harm the country.
    Response: Commenters' concerns regarding the immigration system as 
a whole and interest in more sweeping changes to the immigration system 
are far outside the scope of this rulemaking. The rule amends EOIR 
regulations specifically in regard to fees for applications, motions, 
and forms before EOIR. More specifically, and in accordance with EOIR's 
fee review, the rule increases fees for EOIR applications, appeals, and 
motions in accordance with the authority discussed in Section I.A of 
this preamble and EOIR's 2018 fee study; updates cross-references and 
discussion of DHS regulations regarding fees in response to DHS's 
rulemaking regarding its immigration fees; and makes technical changes 
regarding FOIA requests and other internal cross-references. See 
generally 85 FR 11866. Accordingly, comments concerning Federal 
immigration policy across the Government and the immigration system as 
a whole are outside the rule's limited scope of EOIR fees.
3. Objections to Fee Increases as a Funding Mechanism for EOIR
    Comment: Commenters opposed the NPRM by stating that fees should 
not serve as a funding mechanism for EOIR's adjudication costs for 
various reasons: The Department is not statutorily required to recover 
the full cost of adjudications; the Department lacks authority to 
recover the full cost; and the Department, as a congressionally 
appropriated agency (rather than a fee-based agency), should be funded 
through such appropriations rather than fees. Further, commenters found 
the Department's determination that it was necessary to update its fees 
despite being an appropriated agency inadequate and conclusory. 
Commenters stated that congressional appropriations could adequately 
support EOIR operations. Some commenters stated that congressional 
appropriations would have been sufficient, but asserted that the 
President had diverted EOIR funding toward building a wall on the 
Southern border with Mexico.
    Some commenters explained that fees need not recover the full cost 
because taxpayers should subsidize the fees in order to keep the 
relevant forms, applications, or motions ``affordable'' and 
``accessible'' for certain people, such as asylum seekers, who would be 
unable to cover the full proposed fees. One commenter suggested the 
Department should in fact impose no fees. Another commenter suggested 
that EOIR should request additional congressional appropriations if the 
agency is concerned about the budgetary impacts of filing processing.
    One commenter alleged that the Department exceeded its statutory 
authority because section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)) does not 
authorize ``[r]aising fees that were previously sufficient, or near 
sufficient, by seven, eight, and even nine times their current 
amount.''

[[Page 82754]]

    Response: As an initial matter, commenters are correct that the 
Department, including EOIR, is funded by congressional appropriations. 
See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Public Law 116-93, 
133 Stat. 2317, 2396 (Dec. 20, 2019) (appropriating to EOIR 
``$672,966,000, of which $4,000,000 shall be derived by transfer from 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review fees deposited in the 
`Immigration Examinations Fee' account, and of which not less than 
$18,000,000 shall be available for services and activities provided by 
the Legal Orientation Program''). It retains authority, however, to 
charge fees for immigration adjudications to recover up to the full 
costs expended by the agency in providing such services. INA 286(m), 8 
U.S.C. 1356(m); see also Circular No. A-25 Revised (available at 58 FR 
38142 (July 15, 1993)); 31 U.S.C. 9701(a)-(b) (encouraging agencies to 
be as self-sustaining as possible). Although the statutory authority 
requires consideration of various relevant factors, it is not 
restricted by a strict limit or cap, conditions related to taxpayer 
contributions or congressional appropriations, or principles of 
``affordability'' or ``accessibility''; therefore, the Department's 
authority to impose fees is not limited in the ways proposed by the 
commenters. Despite its statutory authority and a rise in caseload and 
adjudication costs, EOIR's fees have not been updated since 1986--over 
thirty years ago.
    While the Department agrees with commenters that some agency costs 
are covered by appropriation, this does not obviate the purpose of the 
rulemaking, which is to lower costs to the taxpayers while still 
ensuring access to the immigration courts, as appropriated funds 
reflect costs to taxpayers. Commenters are incorrect that any of EOIR's 
appropriated funds have been diverted outside the agency to fund 
construction of a border wall. Moreover, some of EOIR's funding--e.g., 
the funding for the general Legal Orientation Program (LOP)--cannot be 
re-purposed to offset costseven though a portion of that funding itself 
has been found to be financially wasteful. See LOP Cohort Analysis 
(Phase I) (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1091801/download; LOP Cohort Analysis Addendum (Phase I) (Jan. 29, 2019), and 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1125596/download.
    The sufficiency of EOIR's congressional appropriations is 
irrelevant for the purpose of this rule, which is to ensure EOIR fees 
more accurately reflect the costs for EOIR's adjudications, consistent 
with the Department's authority to impose fees under the IOAA (31 
U.S.C. 9701) and section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)). These 
authorities demonstrate a congressional intent that, to the extent 
possible, agencies should levy a fee designed to ensure maximum self-
sufficiency, even if the overall budget is supported and funded via 
congressional appropriations.
    The updated fees are based on an assessment that accounted only for 
direct salary costs required for processing those documents subject to 
the rule. See 85 FR at 11869 (explaining that the survey did not 
consider overhead costs, costs of non-salary benefits, or costs 
associated with processing corresponding applications or documents that 
may be filed with the applications, appeals, and motions subject to the 
rule). Accordingly, the updated fees are based on a reduced estimate of 
the processing costs and, thus, inherently do not cover all related 
costs. The proposed rule did not, and the final rule does not, purport 
to cover all costs; instead, the rule seeks to update fees so that the 
fee amounts ``more accurately reflect the costs for EOIR's 
adjudications of these matters'' while at the same time balancing 
``both the public interest in ensuring that the immigration courts are 
accessible to aliens seeking relief and the public interest in ensuring 
that U.S. taxpayers do not bear a disproportionate burden in funding 
the immigration system.'' 85 FR at 11870.
    The Department never intended for this rulemaking to update fees in 
order to recover the entirety of processing costs or to fully fund 
EOIR's adjudication costs. On the contrary, the Department balanced the 
public policy interest maintaining accessibility of the immigration 
courts for aliens while ensuring that U.S. taxpayers do not pay a 
disproportionate amount to fund the immigration court system. 85 FR at 
11870. Indeed, as explained in the NPRM, the Government seeks to 
``recoup some of its costs when possible and . . . also protect the 
public policy interests involved.'' Id.
4. Objections to Amount of Fee Increases
    Comment: Commenters generally objected to the amount of fee 
increases, stating that the fee increases were too high.
    Commenters asserted that one of the Department's justifications for 
its proposed adjusted fees was premised on a miscalculation. 
Specifically, commenters stated that the Department calculated what the 
estimated increase in fees would have been if the Department had raised 
its fees on an annual basis since it last adjusted fees in 1986 by 
calculating the compound annual growth rate (``CAGR''), but asserted 
that the Department miscalculated the CAGR in some of the filings 
addressed in the NPRM: The Forms EOIR-40 and -42A and motions to reopen 
before the immigration court. See 85 FR at 11874. Commenters asserted 
that although these alleged miscalculations were small, they called the 
Department's computational accuracy into question in arriving at the 
proposed fees.
    Commenters asserted that the Department calculated the CAGR for 
Form EOIR-40 and Form EOIR-42A as 3.33 percent by inputting the $305 
proposed fees, $100 current fees, and the 33-year time period. 
Commenters asserted that the Department was 0.11 percent too low in its 
calculation, which should have yielded 3.44 percent CAGR for these 
forms. Likewise, commenters asserted that the Department miscalculated 
the CAGR for Form EOIR-42B, at a 3.84 percent CAGR. Commenters asserted 
that to reach this CAGR, the Department should have input the $360 
proposed fee for the Form EOIR-42B, as well as the $100 current fee for 
the form, and the 33-year time period passing between 1986 and 2019 to 
get a 3.96 percent CAGR. Instead, DOJ calculated a 3.84 percent CAGR 
for this form. Commenters also asserted that the Department 
miscalculated the CAGR for motions to reopen before the immigration 
court, which it calculated as 0.82 percent. Commenters stated that the 
Department should have input the proposed $145 fee to file a motion to 
reopen before the immigration court, the $110 current fee for this 
motion, and the 33-year timespan to reach a 0.84 percent CAGR.
    Commenters similarly criticized the Department's methodology in 
calculating the costs for each application because the Department did 
not provide justification or explanation on how the Department 
determined the estimated costs. Additionally, commenters objected to 
the fees based on the assertion that the fee increases are unrelated to 
the cost of inflation.
    Commenters further objected to the Department's estimates of the 
costs associated with processing applications because they were based 
on current processing methods and failed to account for foreseeable 
changes in future processing costs. As an example of a consideration 
the Department failed to include, commenters cited the increased 
prevalence of affirmances without opinion (``AWO'') on appeals to the 
BIA following the publication of the

[[Page 82755]]

final rule, Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, 
Referral for Panel Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 
84 FR 31463, on September 3, 2019. Commenters also asserted that the 
Department failed to consider that the proposed rule would have the 
effect of reducing the number of case filings, which would result in a 
decrease to the Department's expenses. Commenters objected to the 
Department's inclusion of $327.83 of administrative costs in the total 
costs of appeal, which they stated was one third of the overall 
calculated cost.
    Commenters expressed concern regarding the Department's reliance on 
a spring 2018 study conducted within the Department. Commenters 
asserted that the Department failed to provide necessary detail about 
the survey process and therefore the commenters were concerned because 
they were unable to verify the validity of the study.
    Commenters suggested that, at a minimum, the Department should have 
addressed whether aliens who are currently making the relevant filings 
are able to afford the filing fees and should have set fees at a level 
that most individuals are able to pay.
    Commenters also suggested that recently implemented ``case 
completion quotas'' would affect the EOIR cost analysis, because 
immigration judges would take less time to make decisions.
    Response: The Department notes that some commenters believe that 
the Department miscalculated the CAGR for Form EOIR-40, Form EOIR-42A, 
and motions to reopen before the immigration court. Regardless of any 
miscalculations with respect to the CAGR, as commenters recognized, the 
Department's calculations differed from the commenters' recommended 
calculations to a small degree (.11, .12, and .02 percent 
differentials, respectively) such that they could be attributed to 
differences in rounding estimates. Even assuming, arguendo, that the 
commenters' assertions are correct, the Department notes that such 
calculations need not be exact, so long as the ``fees are no greater 
than the rough actual cost of providing the services.'' Ayuda, Inc. v. 
Att'y Gen., 661 F. Supp. 33, 36 (D.D.C. 1987) (``Ayuda I'') (emphasis 
added), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (``Ayuda II''); see also 
Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1094, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (``To be valid, a fee need only bear a reasonable relationship to 
the cost of the services rendered by the agency.'' (emphasis in 
original)). In addition, these calculations were provided for 
illustrative purposes only and are unrelated to the underlying 
calculations of the new fee amounts based on the agency's adjudicatory 
costs.\8\ The Department notes, for example, its decision to round 
several of its fees to the nearest five-dollar increment and its 
decision to round the average of actual costs for motions to reopen and 
reconsider before the immigration courts. 85 FR at 11870. The 
Department notes that it did not receive any comments objecting to this 
decision. Accordingly, the Department believes that its calculations 
are reasonable and fair given the rough actual cost of providing the 
services and will not make any alterations to the proposed fees on this 
basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Further, the CAGR calculations have been updated below in 
section IV.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The inclusion of administrative costs in EOIR's cost calculations 
when determining the new fees was appropriate. Administrative costs are 
essential to the processing and, in turn, the adjudication of these 
applications, appeals, and motions and are part of a long-standing 
process necessary to handle the volume of appeals with expediency, 
appropriate case management, and ensuring that parties before the BIA 
receive appropriate notice that is essential for due process. See Board 
of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual, Board of Immigration Appeals, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1250701/download (last updated 
Oct. 5, 2020) (describing duties of Clerk's Office at 1.3(e)). Further, 
while the Department agrees with commenters that some costs are covered 
by appropriations, this does not obviate the purpose of the rulemaking, 
which is to lower costs to the taxpayers while still ensuring access to 
the immigration courts, as appropriated funds necessarily reflect costs 
to taxpayers. Moreover, regardless of appropriations, OMB Circular No. 
A-25 Revised and 31 U.S.C. 902(a)(8) instruct agencies to review fees 
biennially and to recommend revisions to fees to reflect costs 
incurred.
    The Department disagrees with commenters' concerns that it did not 
adequately explain its methodology or justification for increasing 
costs. The Department has clearly stated that its purpose for the 
rulemaking is to ensure that U.S. taxpayers do not bear a 
disproportionate burden in funding the immigration system while also 
ensuring that immigration courts remain accessible to aliens seeking 
relief. 85 FR at 11870. Neither OMB Circular No. A-25 Revised nor 31 
U.S.C. 9701 indexes or otherwise limits a government agency's ability 
to increase fees only to the level of inflation. Moreover, the 
underlying costs that go into EOIR's fee calculations--e.g., salary 
costs--are not necessarily indexed to inflation, making an inflation 
percentage a poor metric for calculating appropriate fees. 
Additionally, the Department has explained its methodology in 
calculating the CAGR and its consideration of the availability of fee 
waivers. 85 FR at 11874 (``Taken over the 33-year timespan from 1986 to 
2019, the proposed fee increases would represent compound annual growth 
rates ranging from 0.82 percent to 6.84 percent. As demonstrated in the 
chart above, these increases are marginal in terms of inflation-
adjusted dollars. While EOIR recognizes that the new fees will be more 
burdensome, fee waivers are still possible for those who seek them.''). 
However, in light of numerous comment requests, the Department is 
publishing the data collected in its spring 2018 study, accompanied by 
an updated dataset that was applied to that study when finalizing this 
rule, upon which it has based its calculations in the docket of this 
rulemaking. This data should further illustrate the Department's 
careful process and data-driven consideration behind setting the new 
fees. The Department disagrees with commenters' statements that the 
Department has failed to consider future changes to foreseeable 
processing costs. Commenters' suggestions that processing costs would 
change as a result of more AWO decisions, fee waiver adjudications, 
three-member BIA decisions, and use of video teleconferencing (VTC) are 
too speculative, illogical, or not supported by evidence. For example, 
regarding the use of VTC, EOIR must engage in the same adjudicatory 
steps, which would presumably result in the same processing costs as 
with in-person hearings. Similarly, EOIR engages in the same 
adjudicatory steps to determine whether a decision is issued by one 
Board member or a three-member panel, so the processing costs of those 
steps would be largely unaltered. See 8 CFR 1003.1(e). Moreover, 
although the number of appeals has increased significantly in the past 
three years, and is expected to continue increasing, the specific mix 
of decisions produced by those appeals--e.g., AWO, summary dismissals, 
single-member decisions, three-member panel decisions--is impossible to 
predict and depends on the facts of each appeal applied to the relevant 
regulatory criteria. See Exec. Office for Immigration Rev. Adjudication 
Statistics: All Appeals

[[Page 82756]]

Filed, Completed, and Pending, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., July 
14, 2020, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248506/download; 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(2); 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(4)-(6). Commenters opined 
that because of the higher fees associated with filings, there might be 
a possible reduction in case filings; however, neither the projection 
that a significant number of aliens would be unable to afford filing 
fees nor the projection that there would be a reduction in filings is 
supported by evidence. Some commenters stated that the Department did 
not appropriately consider whether cases decided by the BIA would be 
precedential or non-precedential; however, the Department fails to see 
how the precedential impact of a case would affect processing costs for 
an individual case. Moreover, as the fee charged for an appeal is 
unrelated to the subject-matter of that appeal, there is no basis to 
expect that the changes to the appeal fees will cause more or fewer 
decisions to be designated as precedential.
    With respect to comments that the Department should have set the 
filing fees at a rate that most aliens would be able to pay, the 
Department notes that it does not generally have an alien's financial 
records at its disposal for review. In those circumstances in which the 
agency might have such information available, it is due to the 
information's submission in support of fee waivers filed under the 
current fee schedule--submissions made by a group of people who would 
be in the same circumstance under the new amounts. Moreover, to the 
extent the Department possesses information that may serve as a proxy 
for an alien's financial status--e.g., the ability of an alien to 
retain representation or the ability of an alien to pay application 
fees set by DHS, which are generally much higher than those set by 
EOIR--that information suggests that most aliens would be able to 
afford EOIR's proposed fees.
    Comment: Commenters also stated that the Department's calculations 
are flawed because its calculations are based on the cost to the 
taxpayer per adjudication, but the Department does not break down the 
number of appeals filed by the Government as compared with the number 
of appeals filed by the alien. The commenters asserted that it is 
fundamentally flawed logic to calculate the cost to the taxpayer of the 
current number of appeals without specifying how many appeals are filed 
by DHS, particularly in light of anecdotal evidence that DHS has 
recently filed appeals in a higher percentage of cases than in the 
past. Commenters noted that DHS does not have a filing fee associated 
with its appeals, so there is no incentive for DHS to limit its filings 
to meritorious appeals. Similarly, commenters averred that if the 
Department's concern relates to the high pending case load, then DHS 
should bear some financial responsibility in the process because DHS 
has control over the number of cases filed and therefore initiated 
before immigration courts.
    Response: Commenters misconstrue the Department's analysis 
regarding the basis for the new fees. As explained in the NPRM, EOIR 
conducted a comprehensive study using activity-based costing to 
determine the cost to EOIR for each form and motion for which EOIR 
imposes a fee under 8 CFR 1103.7(b). 85 FR at 11869. This study was 
completed to comply with the IOAA and section 286(m) (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)) 
of the Act; it was not a response to the high pending case load, though 
the increased volume in recent years highlights the Department's 
failure to bring the fees more in line with the current costs. Through 
the 3-phase study, EOIR determined the cost for each form and motion by 
allocating average direct salary costs to each step in an average 
process map for how the fee, application, or motion works through the 
adjudicatory process. See id. In other words, EOIR totaled the total 
salary costs for the different EOIR staff involved in the processing 
and adjudication for each form and motion, based on the average time 
each type of official spends in that processing and adjudication, to 
determine an average processing cost. See id.
    The processing costs identified by the fee study, and in turn the 
new amounts to be charged for these forms and applications, are, as a 
result, not tied to the volume of the forms or motions filed, either in 
total or by DHS. Instead, for example, the identified cost for the 
adjudication of a Form EOIR-26 for an appeal to the BIA from an 
immigration judge decision, as determined by the study, would be the 
same if the Department received one appeal as it would be if EOIR 
received any other number. This is because it would take the same time, 
considered as an average, for the different BIA staff members to 
process each individual appeal. Accordingly, the relative volume of 
appeals (or other forms or motions) DHS files, including trends in 
those filings, is irrelevant to the Department's determination to 
update the fee amounts. Nevertheless, in response to the commenters' 
concerns, the Department has recalculated the receipts reflected in the 
NPRM to attempt to best account only for those filings by aliens and 
the resulting costs to the taxpayers.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ The Department notes that the numbers do include jointly 
filed motions, though those types of filings do not incur a fee to 
the alien. In addition, the Department notes that the fee collection 
amounts in columns 6, 7, and 8 of this chart are over-inclusive as 
they do not include fee waivers that were approved. As indicated in 
the proposed rule, approximately 36 percent of these fees were not 
received in 2018 due to fee waivers. 85 FR at 11869 n.11.

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[[Page 82757]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.021

    The Department also disagrees that the lack of a set fee for DHS 
incentivizes DHS to file non-meritorious forms or motions any more than 
the relatively low fees currently in place incentivize respondents to 
file non-meritorious forms or motions. DHS is represented before EOIR 
by attorneys from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (``ICE''), 
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, in Field Offices around the 
country. DHS attorneys are bound by the same standards of professional 
conduct as private attorneys, and the Department expects all EOIR 
practitioners to behave in a professional manner consistent with such 
obligations, including by not filing knowingly unmeritorious appeals or 
other applications or motions. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct 
R. 3.1 (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_1_meritorious_claims_contentions/ (``A lawyer shall not bring or 
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless 
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, 
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ These numbers include both motions to reopen and motions to 
reconsider filed at the immigration court level.
    \11\ These numbers include both motions to reopen and motions to 
reconsider filed at the BIA level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: Commenters noted that the fees in the NPRM are higher than 
fees charged in various Federal courts. Some commenters opined that 
EOIR's fees should be lower than Federal court fees due to the breadth 
of issues covered in some Federal courts, as well as their structural 
complexity. Additionally, commenters stated that the proposed fees are 
higher than the fees charged by several other agency bodies that 
perform adjudicative functions. In light of these comparisons, 
commenters asserted that the fees in the NPRM are unreasonable. One 
commenter stated that the BIA appeal fee would be the highest appeal 
fee charged by any court.
    Response: The immigration court system is distinct from the Federal 
court system. Immigration judges are appointed as administrative judges 
by the Attorney General to conduct specified proceedings under the Act 
and by regulation, and the BIA is an administrative tribunal that 
primarily decides appeals from immigration judges. See 8 CFR 
1003.10(a); 8 CFR 1003.1(b). In contrast, Federal courts are 
established under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and Article III 
judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See 
U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 1.
    The Department is authorized to charge fees for immigration 
adjudication and naturalization services and to set those fees at a 
level that ensures full recovery of providing such services. INA 
286(m), 8 U.S.C. 1356(m); see also 31 U.S.C. 9701(a) (explaining that 
``each service or thing of value provided by an agency . . . to a 
person . . . is to be self-sustaining to the extent possible''). In 
contrast, the Federal court system is not explicitly required by 
statute to focus on cost recovery and burdens to taxpayers when setting 
fee schedules. See generally 28 U.S.C. ch. 123.
    Moreover, Article III courts pass along additional costs to 
litigants that EOIR does not, making a simple comparison of appeal fees 
misleading.\12\ For example, appellants in civil cases in Article III 
courts may be required to post an appellate bond to ensure payment of 
costs on appeal, which is not a requirement for an appeal within EOIR. 
See Fed. R. App. P. 7. Similarly, the appellant in an Article III case 
is generally required to pay for the cost of the transcript of the 
proceeding below, whereas the BIA provides a transcript to both parties 
at no cost. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(4). Once these additional costs 
are factored into the cost of an appeal in Federal court, it is not 
clear that the cost of a Federal appeal from a district court decision 
is lower than the cost of an appeal from an immigration judge to the 
BIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ Commenters appear to draw a comparison between appeals of 
immigration judge decisions to the BIA and petitions for review of 
BIA decisions filed in Federal court, but that comparison mixes 
appeals from a trial level to an appellate level with petitions for 
review from a final agency decision filed directly at the appellate 
level. A more appropriate comparison would be comparing only appeals 
from a trial level to an appellate level and, thus, comparing 
appeals from an immigration court to the BIA with appeals from a 
Federal district court to a circuit court of appeals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding commenters' assertions about Federal courts dealing with 
more complex and wider-ranging issues, the IOAA sets out a list of 
factors for consideration when setting fee amounts: Fairness, ``the 
costs to the Government,'' ``the value of the service or thing to the 
recipient,'' the ``public policy or interest served,'' and ``other 
relevant facts.'' 31 U.S.C. 9701(b). Even if the ``breadth of issues'' 
before a court or the issues' ``structural complexity'' could be 
considered an ``other relevant fact'' under the IOAA, the Department 
disputes that either of those factors could even be quantified, as 
suggested

[[Page 82758]]

by the commenters. Moreover, courts have determined that fees ``need 
only bear a reasonable relationship to the cost of services rendered by 
the agency.'' Ayuda I, 661 F. Supp. at 36 (quoting Nat'l Cable 
Television Ass'n, 554 F.2d at 1108).
    The Department also disagrees with commenters' comparisons of 
EOIR's fees with fees charged by other agencies and the conclusion that 
EOIR's fees are consequently unreasonable. First, the Ayuda court 
succinctly resolved the first argument: ``Plaintiffs' final challenge 
to the amount of the fees involves the assertion that they are 
excessive compared with certain court fees and emphasizes that other 
agencies are not charging for similar services within the purview of 
the statutes they administer. None of these observations are relevant. 
Each agency is entitled to set its own fees as it chooses and make its 
own decisions. Additionally, the missions of other agencies do not 
exclusively focus on handling matters of those without lawful status in 
the United States. The acts of one are not controlling on another.'' 
Ayuda I, 661 F. Supp. at 36. Second, as previously explained, the court 
found that fees must be reasonably related to the cost of the service 
provided. See id. Accordingly, the Department finds comments to the 
contrary unsupported by case law and retains the updated fee amounts as 
proposed in the NPRM.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ The Department does note that even if comparisons to other 
agencies were relevant, the fees charged by other agencies 
adjudicating immigration-related applications have been 
substantially higher than fees charged by EOIR for many years. For 
example, the current fee for an appeal or motion charged by USCIS is 
$675, which is well above EOIR's current $110 fee and will remain 
significantly higher than EOIR's new fee for a motion to reopen 
filed with an immigration court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: Commenters opposed the NPRM because they believed that the 
proposed increases in fees, which would establish fees three to eight 
times higher than existing fees, would result in many more applications 
for fee waivers. Commenters asserted that the Department did not 
account for the fact that this increased number of fee waiver requests 
would add costs and divert judges' time from substantive claims. 
Commenters opined that this was particularly true with respect to the 
costs recouped from the $50 fee for asylum applications, and one 
commenter noted that EOIR should be making it more efficient to apply 
for asylum rather than requiring additional hurdles.
    Commenters also predicted that because more people would request 
fee waivers for the increased fees, EOIR would likely lose revenue, 
rather than make revenue.
    Additionally, commenters stated that in DHS's proposed fee 
schedule, USCIS would exclude asylum seekers from eligibility for a fee 
waiver, and commenters expressed concern that the Department would 
similarly do so. Another commenter expressed concerns about the fee 
waiver process for USCIS.
    Commenters asserted that if the Department were to impose a filing 
fee for asylum applications, the fee waiver process should be clear, 
reviewable, and robust. One commenter recommended that a one-page fee 
waiver form specifically for asylum applications be made available in 
several languages. The commenter explained that it would be comparable 
to proceeding in forma pauperis, common in the Federal court system.
    One commenter noted that Federal courts give a party 21 days to pay 
the fee or file a renewed fee waiver request following a denied fee 
waiver request. That commenter noted that while a fee waiver is 
available for individuals before EOIR, it is not comparable to the 
policies in the Federal court system.
    Second, commenters alleged that the fee waiver process is an 
insufficient remedy for low-income individuals because determinations 
are inconsistent. Commenters explained that, in their experience, some 
immigration courts granted fee waivers as a matter of course, while 
other immigration courts rarely granted fee waivers at all. Some 
commenters noted that, while USCIS provides criteria for fee waivers, 
it was impossible to know the criteria by which EOIR adjudicates fee 
waiver requests and that the lack of standards could be considered 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). Commenters 
suggested that criteria could include specific documentation to file 
with the request and qualification guidelines, such as income 
thresholds, for eligibility. Commenters also noted that relevant 
information about fee waivers is not provided by immigration judge 
advisals or the Practice Manuals, and, when information is provided 
(e.g., chapter 3.4(d) of the Immigration Court Practice Manual), such 
information is inconsistent among various sources. See Immigration 
Court Practice Manual, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1258536/download (last updated Nov. 18, 
2020); Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Rev., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1250701/download (last updated Oct. 5, 2020). Commenters were also concerned 
that fee waivers, if granted, constitute a negative factor in a public 
charge determination.
    Third, commenters opposed fee waivers as a viable solution because 
of the discretionary nature of fee waiver determinations. One 
organization opposed the rule, stating that the ``possibility of a 
discretionary fee waiver does not serve the same function as a 
reasonable fee that most individuals subject to EOIR proceedings can 
afford.'' The organization explained that requesting a fee waiver under 
the current fee waiver process does not equate to paying the associated 
fee with an application because paying the fee provides, as a matter of 
right, an opportunity to have such application adjudicated by the 
agency while requesting a fee waiver ``simply provides the adjudicator 
with the option of granting a fee waiver and then considering the 
merits of the underlying filing. . . . Although immigration judges may 
grant a fee waiver if individuals establish that they are unable to 
pay, the regulations do not require them to grant fee waivers even to 
an individual who has provided proof of inability to pay.'' Relatedly, 
commenters expressed skepticism of such discretion, stating that 
immigration judges are not independent and are instead subject to the 
Attorney General's guidance and orders. For aliens who file a Form 
EOIR-26A and lack work authorization, another commenter suggested that 
the Department institute a rebuttable presumption that the alien is 
unable to pay the fee.
    Some commenters stated that it was proper for the Department to 
rely on taxpayers to subsidize adjudication costs, rather than rely on 
fee increases and fee waivers, stating, for example, ``[t]he burden of 
correcting for unjust outcomes SHOULD be bourne [sic] by society (e.g. 
the `taxpayers') not by the affected person alone.''
    One commenter was also concerned that the proposed high fees would 
deter individuals from even considering filing the applications.
    One commenter explained that the lack of guaranteed representation 
in immigration proceedings exacerbated concerns regarding fee waivers, 
and an organization explained several other aspects about the current 
fee waiver process that are problematic, including the signature 
requirement and procurement of income documentation.
    Overall, commenters recommended that the Department make fee 
waivers more ``broadly available.''
    Response: While the Department agrees that it is possible--and 
perhaps even probable--that the increased fees

[[Page 82759]]

may lead more aliens to seek a fee waiver than would without this rule, 
specific concerns regarding the effects of such fee waivers on 
adjudications or the ultimate total volume of fee waiver applications 
that EOIR will receive are speculative. Respondents' financial 
information submitted in support of fee waiver requests has not been 
tracked or universally evaluated to provide any indication that an 
increase in fees, regardless of amount, will necessarily result in an 
increase in fee waiver applications. Moreover, for most of the proposed 
fees, respondents' general ability to obtain work authorization while 
an application is pending, their access to financial resources allowing 
them to travel to the United States in the first instance, their access 
to financial resources in the United States for a sufficient period of 
time necessary to even trigger the need for a filing that requires a 
fee, their general ability to obtain representation, their general 
ability to pay existing fees for applications or for ancillary 
applications, and the ultimate importance of the benefit they seek 
(i.e., legal status or being able to remain in the United States 
indefinitely) are all potential countervailing considerations that 
would not necessarily support the conclusion that the proposed fee 
increases will inevitably lead to more fee waiver applications. Put 
more simply, a respondent who could not afford a lesser amount will 
presumably not be able to afford the new, higher amount, but it is 
speculative to assert that all who could afford the lower amount will 
necessarily not be able to pay the higher fee. Rather, a particular 
subset of those who can afford the current fees currently may not be 
able to after the increases, but the precise size of that subset, 
though potentially not as large as commenters suggested for the reasons 
given above, is not estimated.
    EOIR has adjudicated fee waivers for many decades, and both Board 
members and immigration judges are experienced in adjudicating such 
requests. Although differences in adjudicatory outcomes are inherent in 
any system rooted in adjudicator discretion, there is no evidence that 
Board members or immigration judges would be unable or unwilling to 
adjudicate fee waiver requests consistent with applicable law and their 
respective independent judgment and discretion. See 8 CFR 
1003.1(d)(1)(ii), 1003.10(b). Commenters have not presented any 
evidence that EOIR would not continue to grant appropriate fee waivers. 
See Ayuda II, 848 F.2d at 1299 n.4 (``Appellants intimate that the 
waiver provision, 8 CFR 103.7(c)(1) (1986), does not in fact mitigate 
the deterrent effect of the increased fees because the Attorney General 
retains discretion to decline to waive the fees even after an applicant 
has demonstrated his or her inability to pay. We have been directed to 
no evidence, however, that the Attorney General has in fact exercised 
his discretion in this manner.''). Any calculations attempted by the 
Department to ``account for'' the effects of fee waiver adjudications 
in light of the updated fees would be unreliable because fee waivers 
are discretionary by nature and the updated fees have not been in 
force. Accordingly, while the Department acknowledges that it did not 
include in the NPRM projected costs related to adjudication of fee 
waivers resulting from the rule, the Department disagrees that 
inclusion of such costs is necessary or beneficial. Moreover, including 
such costs would have likely led to a greater fee increase. Further, 
because concerns regarding lost revenue are ``purely speculative,'' the 
Department is unable to respond.\14\ In addition, the agency is 
committed to ongoing review and, as necessary, updating of its fees. If 
the new fees lead to unanticipated results, the agency can evaluate 
those results upon its next biennial review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 n.58 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (per curiam). ``In determining what points are 
significant, the `arbitrary and capricious' standard of review must 
be kept in mind. Thus only comments which, if true, raise points 
relevant to the agency's decision and which, if adopted, would 
require a change in an agency's proposed rule cast doubt on the 
reasonableness of a position taken by the agency. Moreover, comments 
which themselves are purely speculative and do not disclose the 
factual or policy basis on which they rest require no response. 
There must be some basis for thinking a position taken in opposition 
to the agency is true.'' Id. The purpose of updating the fees is to 
better align the fees with the agency's current processing and 
adjudication costs following an over 30-year period in which the 
fees were not updated, not to subsidize the Department's, including 
EOIR's, congressional appropriations. As a result, the number of fee 
waivers requested does not directly correlate with the Department's 
total revenue. Accordingly, even if the number of fee waiver 
requests increased, the Department's conclusions in the rulemaking 
would still be reasonable: Processing costs would continue to exceed 
the assessed fees, hence the decision to update the fees to more 
accurately reflect and recover EOIR's adjudication costs. Further, 
commenters' concerns on this point provide no factual or policy 
bases to which the Department may provide a response; thus, the 
Department finds such concerns to be mere speculation and is unable 
to provide a response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding commenters' concerns with USCIS's proposed fee waiver 
regulations regarding the Form I-589 application or USCIS's fee waiver 
process in general, the Department notes that USCIS is a component of 
DHS, which is a separate agency from DOJ, of which EOIR is a component. 
See Operational and Support Components, Department of Homeland 
Security, https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components (last 
updated Nov. 17, 2018). Further, this rulemaking specifically involves 
EOIR fees, and the USCIS fees and applications referenced by the 
commenters pertain to a separate USCIS-specific rulemaking. See U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee Schedule and Changes to 
Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 84 FR 62280 
(Nov. 14, 2019) (proposed rule); 85 FR 46788 (Aug. 3, 2020) (final 
rule).\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ The final rule related to fees charged by DHS was 
preliminarily enjoined by two federal district courts prior to its 
effective date. Immigrant Legal Resource Ctr. v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-
05883-JSW, 2020 WL 5798269 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020); Nw. 
Immigrants Rights Proj. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 
No. 19-3283 (RDM), 2020 WL 5995206 (Oct. 8, 2020). Although this 
final rule updates cross-references in EOIR's regulations to DHS's 
regulations to account for the DHS rule's amendments of DHS's 
regulations, the DHS fees remain governed by DHS's previous 
regulations while the aforementioned injunctions remain in effect. 
Because the ultimate resolution of the litigation challenging the 
DHS fee rule is unknown, this final rule amends EOIR's regulations 
to include cross-references to both the previous DHS regulations and 
the new regulations to ensure that the cross-references do not 
become inaccurate regardless of how the litigation is resolved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, this rule does not amend the current procedure regarding 
how DHS forms are treated in immigration court. Accordingly, this rule 
does not change the practice that neither the BIA nor the immigration 
judge may grant a fee waiver ``with respect to the fee prescribed for a 
Department of Homeland Security form or action that is identified as 
non-waivable in regulations of the Department of Homeland Security.'' 8 
CFR 1103.7(c). Accordingly, the waivability of the fee for the Form I-
589 filed with USCIS is ultimately determined by DHS's regulations and 
the waivability of the fee for the Form I-589 filed with EOIR is 
determined by the DOJ regulation that, in turn, cross-references DHS 
regulations.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ The Department notes that DHS's 2019 fee NPRM proposed 
reorganizing its regulations regarding fee waivers. Compare 8 CFR 
103.7(c), with 84 FR 62363 (proposed 8 CFR 106.3 (Fee waivers and 
exemptions)). That reorganization was adopted by a final rule, 85 FR 
at 46920, but that rule was subsequently enjoined before it took 
effect. See note 16, supra. To the extent that DHS's regulations 
allow a fee waiver for a DHS form, the Department would continue to 
apply that same fee waiver eligibility for the form when it is 
submitted to EOIR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The rule makes no substantive amendments to EOIR's asylum 
regulations located at 8 CFR part 1208 or DHS's fee schedule. See 8 CFR 
1103.7(b)(4)(ii). Further, the Department

[[Page 82760]]

continues to apply USCIS fees in accordance with the regulation at 8 
CFR 1103.7(b)(4)(ii). For these reasons, comments related to USCIS's 
asylum application and the corresponding $50 fee are outside the scope 
of this rulemaking.
    Regarding comments referencing USCIS's criteria for fee waivers and 
the Department's lack of similar, consistent criteria and information 
dissemination, the Department appreciates this feedback. At present, 
USCIS adjudicates 22 applications eligible for a fee waiver, 8 CFR 
103.7(c)(3)-(4),\17\ including many that are not adjudicated by EOIR, 
such as applications for naturalization. Thus, USCIS receives many more 
fee waiver requests than EOIR.\18\ Further, fee waivers directly impact 
USCIS's budget and, thus, its operations as a generally fee-funded 
agency. For example, USCIS recently estimated that it would forgo over 
$900 million due to fee waivers and exemptions, which is significantly 
more than EOIR's total budget. See 84 FR at 62298. Consequently, it is 
appropriate for USCIS to have more defined criteria for fee waivers 
than EOIR because the two agencies are not similarly situated in terms 
of the impact of such waivers. Nevertheless, the Department may 
consider the issue further in a future rulemaking should a need for 
additional clarifications regarding adjudication of fee waivers arise 
following this rule's implementation. Moreover, the Department also 
notes that nothing precludes the Board, which receives most fee waiver 
requests and has extensive experience adjudicating them, from issuing a 
precedential decision regarding the appropriate criteria for a fee 
waiver, consistent with its authority to ``provide clear and uniform 
guidance to [DHS], the immigration judges, and the general public on 
the proper interpretation and administration of the [INA] and its 
implementing regulations.'' 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ If the current injunctions against the DHS fee rule are 
lifted, DHS's fee waiver provisions will be located in 8 CFR 106.3.
    \18\ USCIS estimates receipt of approximately 1.5 million 
applications in FY 2019/2020 without a fee payment, which is 
significantly higher than EOIR's receipt of all applications and 
higher than EOIR's total pending caseload. See 84 FR at 62288.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Despite commenters' allegations that fee waivers are inconsistent 
around the country, the Department has no evidence or data, and none 
was provided by commenters, regarding the specific adjudications of fee 
waivers that would support such statements.
    The Department disagrees with commenters that the discretionary 
nature of fee waivers is problematic. Fee waiver determinations are a 
matter of discretionary authority and are based upon the unique facts 
of each case. See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), 1103.7(c). When 
evaluating such requests, EOIR adjudicators, including immigration 
judges and Board members, exercise independent judgment and discretion. 
See 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), 1003.10(b). The appropriate regulations, 8 
CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), 1103.7(c), clearly delineate the 
requirements for fee waivers, and the Department expects its 
adjudicators to issue fee waiver determinations in a fair manner and 
consistent with the regulations. The Attorney General does not mandate 
a specific outcome for fee waiver determinations.
    Given this discretionary nature, filing a fee waiver request does 
not automatically render the request granted. Moreover, the Department 
has determined, and courts agree, that the fee waiver process is a 
proper, viable solution for aliens who may be unable to pay updated 
fees. See Ayuda II, 848 F.2d at 1299 & n.4 (holding, in part, that the 
alleged deterrent effects of increased fees are ``mitigated by the 
provision for waiver of fees for aliens who certify their inability to 
pay'').
    The Department agrees with commenters that some taxpayer 
subsidization for the costs of processing and adjudicating these EOIR 
applications and motions is appropriate; however, the Department 
disagrees with the extent of the commenters' recommended subsidization. 
As stated in the NPRM, the updated fees do not cover the full 
adjudication costs. See 85 FR at 11868-69. Some costs--such as overhead 
costs, cost of non-salary benefits, or costs related to corresponding 
applications or documents accompanying items for which the Department 
updated fees--were not included in the Department's calculations and 
are subsequently covered by congressional appropriation, which is 
funded, in part, by taxpayer dollars. See id. Accordingly, individuals 
who pay the updated fees will not bear the full adjudication costs, but 
taxpayers will also not bear a disproportionate share of the costs. See 
85 FR at 11870.
    The Department acknowledges commenters' concerns that fees may 
affect an individual's decision to file an application, but there is no 
evidence that filing fees discourage individuals from filing for lawful 
immigration status to which they believe they are entitled.\19\ The 
Department also emphasizes that an EOIR fee waiver remains available 
for those individuals who aver that they cannot pay the fee, and 
individuals should utilize the fee waiver process if they are concerned 
about the ability to pay fees. See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), 
1103.7(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ To the extent that increased filing fees may discourage 
individuals without valid claims from pursuing non-meritorious 
applications for dilatory purposes, the Department does not believe 
that possible consequence is sufficiently compelling to warrant not 
changing the fees to the levels proposed in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The remaining concerns likewise exceed the bounds of this 
rulemaking. The rule does not change the regulations regarding 
representation, or, as repeatedly mentioned, eligibility for fee 
waivers, which includes the signature requirement and income 
documentation. See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), 1103.7(c); see 
generally 8 CFR part 1292; 8 CFR 1003.16(b).
5. Concerns With Fee Increases for Filing Appeals With the BIA
    Comment: Commenters' primary concerns regarding the proposed fee 
($975) for appeals to the BIA were that the fee is too high and too 
expensive for aliens in proceedings to afford and that, as a result, 
the fee will foreclose aliens' access to due process via administrative 
and, in turn, Federal appellate review of the immigration judge's 
decision(s). Commenters indicated a belief that this concern is 
exacerbated by the proposal to increase the fee by such a significant 
amount in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many commenters 
highlighted that the proposed fee is an 800 percent increase (or a 
multiple of 8.6) from the $110 fee currently attached to appeals.
    Commenters highlighted particular classes of aliens who commenters 
believe would have a particularly difficult time paying the proposed 
fee, including individuals in immigration detention, asylum seekers, 
and ``working class'' respondents.
    One commenter argued that the proposed fee is particularly 
unreasonable due to the number of BIA decisions issued as AWO, which 
the commenter says are ``little more than a stepping-stone on the way 
to actual review by a circuit court.'' See 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(4).
    Commenters compared the fee increase for filing an appeal to the 
BIA to other government programs that were struck down for conditioning 
access to services based on an individual's ability to pay and 
discriminating between indigent and non-indigent individuals. See, 
e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-82 (1971) (holding that 
due process of law prohibits a State from denying individuals access to 
the

[[Page 82761]]

courts for the purposes of divorce proceedings based solely on an 
ability to pay); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959) (``There is 
no rational basis for assuming that indigents' motions for leave to 
appeal will be less meritorious than those of other defendants. 
Indigents must, therefore, have the same opportunities to invoke the 
discretion of the Supreme Court of Ohio.''); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that a State cannot condition access to a 
trial transcript on the ability to pay and explaining that ``[t]here 
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on 
the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as 
adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy 
transcripts.'').
    Commenters expressed concerns that the proposed rule would 
effectively render immigration judge decisions as final orders because 
the proposed fee increases would make it financially impossible for 
aliens to afford to pursue appeals before the BIA. See 8 CFR 1003.39 
(``Except when certified to the Board, the decision of the Immigration 
Judge becomes final upon waiver of appeal or upon expiration of the 
time to appeal if no appeal is taken whichever occurs first.''). 
Commenters suggested that it is particularly important for aliens to 
have access to appeals because immigration judges do not have 
sufficient time to devote to each case and because ``it is not uncommon 
for immigration judges to make errors.'' Commenters stated that 
appellate review was necessary to correct errors that resulted in 
significant variations in grant rates of applications between 
immigration courts. Commenters also stated that criticism of EOIR by 
the circuit courts demonstrated the necessity of BIA appeals for aliens 
who seek to assert their rights.
    Commenters stated that recent administrative changes to immigration 
procedures make an alien's access to appeals and motions more important 
than ever. Specifically, commenters cited the following: The 
implementation of performance metrics for immigration judges; the 
implementation of a special docket for families who have arrived 
recently in the United States; docket shuffling; inaccurate court dates 
in Notices to Appear and Notices of Hearing; recent guidance on 
administrative closure determinations; recent guidance on continuance 
determinations; recent case-processing requirements for the BIA; and 
recent guidance on termination and dismissal determinations. Commenters 
also asserted that EOIR has become politicized by instituting an Office 
of Policy and appointing sitting immigration judges with asylum-denial 
rates of over 90 percent as permanent members of the BIA who could 
participate in precedential decision making. Commenters asserted that, 
because of these practices and policies, immigration judges are 
incentivized to issue removal orders and aliens face an increased 
likelihood of wanting to file appeals with the BIA. In support of these 
concerns with the immigration court system, commenters noted that the 
courts of appeals have at times similarly criticized the immigration 
courts. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 
2005) (``[T]he adjudication of [immigration] cases at the 
administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal 
justice.'') Commenters further asserted that it was disingenuous for 
the Department to argue that increased appeals have become such a 
burden as to necessitate the promulgation of this rule when the 
increase in appeals has been a direct result of these Department 
actions.
    Commenters further asserted that the increase in fees would prevent 
noncitizens from accessing Federal court review because they would be 
unable to afford the fees to appeal to the BIA, which is required for a 
decision to be administratively final for judicial review. See INA 
242(a), 8 U.S.C. 1252(a) (allowing for judicial review of a ``final 
order of removal''); see also, e.g., J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 
1029 (9th Cir. 2016) (``Despite the gravity of their claims, the minors 
cannot bypass the immigration courts and proceed directly to district 
court. Instead, they must exhaust the administrative process before 
they can access the federal courts.''). Commenters averred that the 
proposed rule demonstrates the Department's attempt to avoid oversight 
from the Federal courts by making appeals inaccessible. One commenter 
noted that the proposed fee for an appeal will increase the total cost 
for adjudication for aliens who go on to file a petition for review in 
Federal court to $1,475. Commenters characterized this effect of the 
rule as allowing ``the administration to both set immigration policy 
and adjudicate it without meaningful review by an independent 
judiciary,'' noting that the Seventh Circuit recently criticized the 
BIA for failing to abide by its instructions. See Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, 
947 F.3d 1033, 1035-36 (7th Cir. 2020) (``In sum, the Board flatly 
refused to implement our decision. . . . We have never before 
encountered defiance of a remand order, and we hope never to see it 
again. Members of the Board must count themselves lucky that Baez-
Sanchez has not asked us to hold them in contempt . . . .'').
    Commenters indicated a belief that the proposed fee for an appeal 
is purposefully designed to limit aliens' access to due process or to 
dissuade aliens from filing an appeal. Commenters characterized the 
proposal as an intentional barrier to filing an appeal.
    Commenters noted that appeals have secondary benefits beyond those 
which accrue to the appealing party alone. For example, appeals are the 
vehicle for the BIA to publish precedential decisions, which help the 
development of case law to properly implement the law in different and 
evolving circumstances and which help ensure consistency across the 
country. Commenters explained that this development of case law 
benefits the Nation generally by ensuring that the immigration laws are 
accurately and consistently applied.
    Commenters noted that the proposed fee will be particularly 
difficult for aliens to raise in the 30 days allowed for an alien to 
file an appeal from an immigration judge's final decision.
    Commenters explained that the rule is particularly harsh because 
the Department will not refund fees even when the noncitizen prevails 
on his or her appeal. Commenters asserted that when the BIA determines 
that an immigration judge erred it necessarily means that the 
noncitizen was treated unfairly by the immigration judge. While 
recognizing that the Equal Access to Justice Act does not directly 
apply in removal proceedings, commenters asserted that the Department 
could nonetheless refund appeal fees when noncitizen litigants are 
successful.
    Response: First, the Department rejects commenters' allegations 
that the proposed rule is purposefully designed to limit access to 
appeals or impede aliens' due process rights. As explained in the NPRM, 
the rule is designed to ensure that the Department exercises its 
authorities under the IOAA, section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 
1356(m)), and OMB's Circular No. A-25 Revised. See 85 FR at 11866-67. 
Although the rule changes the amount that would be charged for filing 
an appeal, the Department has been careful through the entire process 
to ensure that it does not affect the availability of a fee waiver.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ For further discussion of the availability of fee waivers, 
see section II.C.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As explained in the NPRM, the proposed fee for an appeal was 
determined following a comprehensive

[[Page 82762]]

activity-based cost study that determined the cost incurred by EOIR to 
process those applications, appeals, and motions for which EOIR levies 
a fee. See 85 FR at 11868-70. The Department proposed the $975 fee for 
filing an appeal with the BIA only after (1) determining the 
appropriate staff levels and time required to process and adjudicate 
each appeal and the average salary rates for applicable staff levels, 
based on data from the Office of Personnel Management (``OPM'') and the 
General Services Administration (``GSA''); (2) developing step-by-step 
process maps, with assigned times and staff levels, for how the BIA 
processes each appeal; and (3) allocating the salary costs from the GSA 
and OPM data to each step in the process, based on the time the step 
takes, the average salary of the responsible staff, and the percentage 
of total cases in which the step occurs. 85 FR at 11869. The Department 
acknowledges that $975 is an increase from the $110 fee that has been 
levied since 1986, though it amounts to an average annual increase of 
only slightly more than $25 per year. Nevertheless, that is the amount 
that in fact represents the agency's best estimate of the current 
processing costs for appeals, which are complex adjudications that 
require significant staffing input.
    In response to the commenter who argued that the proposed fee is 
unreasonable due to the BIA's issuance of AWO decisions, the Department 
notes that $975 is an average processing cost. Some appeals, such as 
those that raise multiple issues on appeal or that involve a 
particularly complex set of facts, take more time to adjudicate than 
others. By regulation, Board members are to issue an AWO for certain 
less complex cases. 8 CFR 1003.1(e)(4). Because the determination of 
whether a case is appropriate for an AWO is a matter of legal judgment 
for the Board member after the initial review of the appeal, it would 
not be possible to charge one, possibly lower, fee for appeals in which 
the immigration judge order is ultimately affirmed without an opinion 
and a different fee for appeals that result in a written BIA decision. 
Instead, the Department believes it is reasonable to charge a single 
average processing cost for all appeals.
    Fees cannot be based upon the reason for appeal or the result of 
the appeal. Fees are levied based on averages; this is common practice 
throughout government. For example, DHS charges a flat filing fee that 
is based on the average complexity of that filing's adjudications. See, 
e.g., 84 FR at 62309 (proposing fee changes to H-2A and H-2B visas 
based on average adjudication times estimated by USCIS). To illustrate, 
DHS charges the same filing fee for an N-400, Application for 
Naturalization, regardless of whether the applicant is an 18-year-old 
who has not traveled outside of the United States since entry or an 80-
year-old who has traveled back to his or her country of origin once a 
year for several decades. Adjudicating eligibility for the latter is 
likely to be far more complex and time-consuming.
    In response to comments suggesting that variations in grant rates 
and circuit court criticism demonstrate the necessity for appellate 
review, the Department reiterates that nothing in this rule forecloses 
appellate review by the Board. Further, discussions of grant rate 
disparities often do not account for the unique factors of each case or 
the relevant applicable law, including variations in circuit law. 
Moreover, they frequently also do not account for ecological inference 
problems by attempting to draw conclusions about individual 
adjudicators based solely on aggregate data.
    The Department also notes that criticism is to be expected at times 
for any adjudicatory body, and that the vast majority of cases go 
without such critique.\21\ See Exec. Office for Immigration Rev. 
Adjudication Statistics: Circuit Court Remands Filed, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Rev., July 14, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1199211/download (showing drop in circuit court remands filed from 
1,081 in 2010 to 602 in 2019, and 134 in the first quarter of 2020). 
Moreover, as only the alien can appeal a case to Federal court, 
assertions based on circuit court decisions present only part of the 
overall picture of adjudications. Further, the Department states again 
that it does not believe that this rulemaking will limit an alien's 
right to seek appellate review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ The Department unequivocally rejects comments impugning the 
integrity or competence of its adjudicators and the suggestion that 
they behave incompetently or unethically solely because they do not 
grant every request for relief that the commenters believe should be 
granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As stated in the NPRM, this rule does not foreclose or limit the 
ability of aliens to seek a fee waiver for the appeal fee. See 8 CFR 
1003.8(a)(3) (``The Board has the discretion to waive a fee for an 
appeal, motion to reconsider, or motion to reopen upon a showing that 
the filing party is unable to pay the fee.''); 85 FR at 11871. To the 
extent that an individual in immigration proceedings is concerned about 
his or her ability to pay the fee for an appeal, the Department expects 
that such an alien would file the Form EOIR-26A, Fee Waiver Request, 
and proceed with his or her case in the same manner as before the 
change in the fee.
    Accordingly, the Department disagrees that the appeal fee is akin 
to other court fees cited by commenters that have been struck down for 
conditioning access on the ability to pay. See, e.g., Boddie, 401 U.S. 
371; Burns, 360 U.S. 252; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. In those cases there 
was no allowance made for individuals who were unable to pay the state-
imposed fee. See, e.g., Griffin, 351 U.S. at 14 (``Indigent defendants 
sentenced to death are provided with a free transcript at the expense 
of the county where convicted. In all other criminal cases defendants 
needing a transcript, whether indigent or not, must themselves buy 
it.'' (footnote omitted)). Here, however, the proposed fee does not 
prevent indigent individuals from accessing the BIA's administrative 
review, and in turn the Federal courts, because a fee waiver remains 
available for those who are unable to pay the fee. 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3).
    In addition, because fee waivers remain available and the rule will 
not prevent aliens from filing an appeal with the BIA, the Department 
also disagrees with commenters that the increased fee for filing a BIA 
appeal will render immigration judge decisions final orders or 
foreclose Federal judicial review of EOIR decisions through alien-
initiated petitions for review.\22\ To the extent that commenters 
believe that EOIR policies or procedures have increased the frequency 
or need for filing an appeal from an immigration judge to the BIA and, 
in turn, from the BIA to a circuit court, the Department believes that 
aliens' access to appeals is protected through the fee waiver allowance 
as explained above.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ To the extent that commenters argued that the fee for an 
appeal is too high when considered together with the cost for filing 
a petition for review at the circuit court, the Department notes 
that consideration of any possible Federal court costs is unrelated 
to the expenses incurred by EOIR to process the appeal and outside 
the scope of this rule. Moreover, this comment presumes that the 
alien's appeal at the BIA will be unsuccessful, which is not 
necessarily the case, or that the BIA's decision is somehow legally 
deficient, which is a presumption the Department declines to make. 
Nevertheless, EOIR notes that other court systems also provide for 
fee waivers in recognition of the fact that some parties will be 
unable to pay fees relevant to their cases. Further discussion of 
the comparison of this rule's fees with the costs of other court 
systems is contained at Section II.C.4 of this preamble.
    \23\ In addition, despite commenters' concerns that recent 
Department and EOIR policies and procedures have resulted in greater 
error rates or other problematic decisions, the Department notes 
that in fact remands from the circuit courts to the BIA have 
decreased in recent years even as EOIR's total adjudication volume 
has increased. See Exec. Office for Immigration Rev. Adjudication 
Statistics: Circuit Court Remands Filed, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Rev., July 14, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1199211/download; Exec. Office for Immigration Rev. 
Adjudication Statistics: New Cases and Total Completions, Exec. 
Office for Immigration Rev., Jan. 23, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1238741/download.

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[[Page 82763]]

    As explained above, commenters argued that BIA appeals have 
benefits beyond the individual direct benefits related to an alien's 
particular personal interest in his or her case and that, as a result, 
the appeal fee is too high. First, the Department believes that the 
overarching purpose of each individual appeal is the individual benefit 
for the appealing party who seeks to correct an alleged error of law. 
At the same time, however, the Department agrees that administrative 
and appellate review can, at times, provide national benefits for 
immigration adjudications, such as providing clarity on complex topics 
that in turn creates efficiencies for immigration judges. See, e.g., 
Amicus Invitation No. 20-24-02, Board of Immigration Appeals, Feb. 24, 
2020, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1251526/download (welcoming amicus curiae briefs regarding selected issues 
involving Notices to Appear). The Department believes that this public 
interest is balanced against the need to recover EOIR's costs for 
providing an individual service and benefit for the appealing party by 
the Department's choice not to set the fees at amounts that would 
account for full cost recovery by including (1) overhead costs, (2) 
cost of non-salary benefits, and (3) costs that stem from processing 
corresponding applications or documents that may be filed in 
conjunction with those items for which EOIR charges a fee. See 85 FR at 
11869. Had these items been included in the analysis, the fee required 
to align with EOIR's processing costs would assumedly have been higher 
than $975.
    Regarding commenters' concerns that the appeal fee will be 
difficult to raise in the time period allowed for filing an appeal with 
the BIA, see 8 CFR 1003.38(b) (instructing that appeals must be filed 
with the BIA within 30 calendar days after the immigration judge 
decision), the Department notes that the public will be on notice about 
the new fee amount as of this rule's publication. The new fee will be 
stated in the regulations at 8 CFR 1103.7(b)(1), published in the 
instructions to the EOIR-26 appeal form, and published on the EOIR 
website where EOIR forms are made available. Moreover, immigration 
judges are required in every removal case to ascertain that an alien 
has received a copy of the alien's appeal rights, which typically 
includes the appeal form and instructions that will provide information 
on both the fee and the fee waiver process. 8 CFR 1240.10(a)(3). An 
alien who is concerned that he or she may wish to appeal the 
immigration judge's decision should, accordingly, use that time between 
the initiation of the proceeding and the immigration judge's issuance 
of a final decision to begin arranging funds for the future payment of 
the appeal.
    Finally, the Department disagrees with commenters that the 
Department should refund appeal fees when the alien succeeds on the 
merits. This argument misses the Department's purpose to more 
accurately reflect the Department's costs in processing and 
adjudicating the appeal. See 85 FR at 11870. EOIR's costs for the 
adjudication of an appeal are the same regardless of which party 
prevails on the merits, and the fact that the alien may ultimately 
demonstrate error by the immigration judge does not lessen the cost 
incurred by the BIA staff, attorneys, and Board members who were 
involved in the determination of the alien's success.
6. Concerns With Fee Increases for Cancellation of Removal Forms
    Comment: Commenters expressed concern regarding the increased fees 
for applications for cancellation of removal (Forms EOIR-42A and -42B). 
Some commenters noted that applicants for these forms of relief have 
remained in the United States for many years, creating ties between 
applicants and their communities. Commenters explained that because 
applicants would likely be unable to afford the NPRM's increased fees 
for cancellation of removal, these communities would be negatively 
impacted by the severance of those ties.
    Specifically regarding the Form EOIR-42B, Application for 
Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain 
Nonpermanent Residents, commenters noted that successful applicants 
must demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a 
qualifying relative who is either a United States citizen or a lawful 
permanent resident. See INA 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(D). 
According to commenters, this level of hardship often additionally 
results in economic hardship for the applicant. For example, commenters 
pointed to economic hardship that results from the applicant's 
qualifying relatives suffering severe medical issues.
    Further, some commenters noted that applicants for cancellation of 
removal are unable to procure employment authorization until after the 
application is filed. Thus, some commenters opined that some applicants 
for cancellation of removal would be unable to generate the necessary 
income to pay the increased fees.
    As to those applicants for cancellation of removal under the 
Violence Against Women Act (``VAWA''), see INA 240A(b)(2) (8 U.S.C. 
1229b(b)(2)), commenters asserted that the increase in fees would run 
``contrary to congressional intent to strengthen protections for 
victims of intra-familial violence.'' In support of this, some 
commenters noted that affirmative applications to USCIS for relief 
under VAWA have no filing fees.
    Response: Whether communities in the United States will suffer 
greater harm due to an increased number of unlawful aliens departing 
the country rather than filing applications for cancellation of removal 
is both speculative and beyond the scope of this rulemaking. To the 
extent that commenters are concerned that eligible aliens will not file 
applications for cancellation of removal due to the increased cost, the 
Department notes that both immigration judges and the BIA would 
continue to entertain requests from aliens for fee waivers and retain 
the discretionary authority to grant such waivers upon a showing that 
the alien is unable to pay. See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), 
1103.7(c). Moreover, the Department does not expect that individuals 
who have resided in the United States for at least seven or ten years 
before being placed in immigration proceedings will generally be 
destitute, and there is no evidence that the filing fee will dissuade 
an alien with a valid claim--as opposed to one filing an application 
for dilatory purposes--from pursuing that claim.
    As to the comments regarding the economic hardship faced by aliens 
filing Form EOIR-42B, the Department again notes the availability of 
requests for fee waivers. Although some aliens may be unable to afford 
the fee for an application based on the timing of work authorization, 
the Department notes that this will vary by case, and for those aliens 
for whom it is true, the Department refers commenters to its prior 
discussion of fee waivers. Further, the Department disagrees that 
evidence an alien's removal would cause his or her qualifying family 
member an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship is related to the 
alien's hypothetical ability to pay the application fee. Instead, it 
misplaces the analysis, which focuses on the future harm to the family 
without the alien's presence rather than a current consideration of the 
alien's financial

[[Page 82764]]

picture with his or her residence in the United States.
    To the extent commenters expressed concern that applicants for 
cancellation of removal may not be able to afford the new fee because 
they lack employment authorization documents, the Department first 
notes that such an assumption is not true for all cancellation 
applicants. Instead, all applicants who would submit the Form EOIR-42A, 
Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent 
Residents, are lawful permanent residents who must have had that status 
for at least five years. INA 240A(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1). All 
lawful permanent residents are entitled to employment authorization. 
See 8 CFR 274a.12(a)(1). Second, eligibility for cancellation of 
removal for nonpermanent residents requires the alien to demonstrate 
certain levels of harm to a qualifying family member, demonstrating 
that the alien has other individuals from whom they may be able to seek 
assistance in paying the fee. See INA 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. 
1229b(b)(1)(D); INA 240A(b)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v). 
Further, all such applicants must have resided in the United States for 
at least ten years prior to being placed in removal proceedings, 
indicating that they do possess access to available resources to live 
in the United States and that such resources would presumably assist 
them in paying the application fee. Finally, the Department again 
emphasizes that a fee waiver remains available for a cancellation 
applicant, such as possibly an applicant without employment 
authorization, who is unable to pay the fee. See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 
1003.24(d), 1103.7(c).
    The Department disagrees that an increase in the fee for 
applications for cancellation of removal runs contrary to congressional 
intent. Congress's stated intent in enacting VAWA was to combat 
violence and crimes against women. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 25-27 
(1993); S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 37-38, 41 (1993). The original act, and 
its subsequent reauthorizations, provided various protections for 
victims of domestic and sexual violence. 159 Cong. Rec. S44-01 (Jan. 
22, 2013) (statement of Sen. Reid). One such protection is the unique 
avenue of cancellation of removal available to certain victims of 
domestic violence. See INA 240A(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2)(A). 
Congress instructed only that aliens seeking, inter alia, VAWA 
cancellation of removal must be permitted ``to apply for a waiver of 
any fees''--not that no fee apply in all cases. William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (``TVPRA''), 
Public Law 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5054 (adding paragraph (7) to 
section 245(l) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1255(l))). Accordingly, the 
increased fee, in conjunction with the fee waiver, does not obstruct 
the availability of such discretionary relief, just as the previous 
$100 fee did not impede the availability of VAWA cancellation of 
removal.
7. Concerns With Fee Increases for Motions To Reopen or Reconsider
    Comment: Some commenters also expressed concerns specifically with 
the proposed fee increases that would apply to motions to reopen or 
motions to reconsider. See 85 FR at 11870.\24\ As with comments 
regarding the fees generally, commenters expressed a belief that the 
proposed fee increase for these motions, particularly for motions 
before the BIA, is too high. Commenters expressed concern that although 
the INA provides a statutory right to file a motion to reopen as well 
as a motion to reconsider, see INA 240(c)(6)-(7) (8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6)-
(7)), the proposed fees will prevent aliens from being able to access 
these procedural options or discourage aliens from filing available 
motions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ To the extent commenters conflated the fees for motions to 
reopen with the fees for an appeal, the Department notes that fees 
for appeals are discussed above in Section II.C.5 of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters stated that recent EOIR procedures and policies have 
also resulted in increased numbers of in absentia removal orders, 
necessitating the filing of motions to reopen and rescind such orders. 
Commenters described motions to reopen and reconsider as essential 
tools for the protection of due process, noting their usage to, for 
example, seek redress for ineffective assistance of counsel and 
demonstrate changed country conditions in the country of removal. Other 
commenters noted that motions to reopen allow children who are granted 
Special Immigrant Juvenile (``SIJ'') visas (INA 101(a)(27)(J) (8 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(27)(J))), trafficking survivors who are granted T nonimmigrant 
visas (INA 101(a)(15)(T) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(T))), and crime victims 
who are granted U nonimmigrant visas (INA 101(a)(15)(U) (8 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(15)(U))) to reopen their prior proceedings and gain long-term 
stability for their immigration status. Accordingly, commenters argue 
that these individuals would remain at risk of removal despite 
qualifying for special forms of protection. In other words, commenters 
argued that the proposed fees will prevent individuals from getting a 
``second chance.''
    Response: The Department disagrees that this rule will prevent 
aliens from accessing their statutory right to file a motion to reopen 
or a motion to reconsider \25\ or leave aliens without access to these 
procedural options.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ To the extent commenters may have implied that the 
Department cannot charge a fee for a motion to reopen or reconsider 
because the INA generally affords aliens the right to file such a 
motion, the Department disagrees. Other forms of relief for which 
the Department and DHS charge fees are included in the INA, see, 
e.g., INA 240B (8 U.S.C. 1229b) (cancellation of removal), but there 
has never been any indication that a fee is inappropriate simply 
because the relief is in the INA. In fact, such logic is 
contradicted by section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)), which 
provides rules for the imposition of fees for ``adjudication and 
naturalization services''--services that are directly guided by the 
INA's provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted by the commenters, the increase for the fee for a motion 
to reopen or reconsider when the proceeding is before the BIA is a 
notable increase, from $110 to $895. However, as explained in the NPRM, 
the new fees represent EOIR's cost to adjudicate motions to reopen and 
reconsider, less the overhead costs, cost of non-salary benefits, or 
costs stemming from processing documents that correspond with those for 
which a fee applies. See 85 FR at 11869-71. This analysis is consistent 
with the Department's obligations under section 286(m) of the Act (8 
U.S.C. 1356(m)) and the IOAA, 31 U.S.C. 9701(a).\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ Further discussion of the proposed fee amounts in general 
is contained above in Section II.C.4 of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although some aliens will be required to pay a greater amount to 
file a motion to reopen or reconsider under this rule than without its 
implementation, the Department disagrees that aliens will be prevented 
from filing a motion to reopen or reconsider simply due to an inability 
to pay the higher fee.\27\ Consistent with longstanding practice, a fee 
waiver remains available for motions to reopen and motions to 
reconsider. See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3) (``The Board has the discretion to 
waive a fee for an appeal, motion to reconsider, or motion to reopen 
upon a showing that the filing party is unable to pay the fee.''); 8 
CFR 1003.24(d) (``The immigration judge has the discretion to waive a 
fee for a motion or application for relief upon a showing that the 
filing party is unable to pay the fee.''). EOIR adjudicators act with 
independent discretion when making all legal determinations, and the 
Department expects adjudicators to adjudicate fee waivers fairly and 
consistent with the regulations. In

[[Page 82765]]

addition, the Department notes that the rule does not change the 
exceptions to the otherwise applicable fee for a motion to reopen or 
reconsider. See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(2)(i)-(viii); 8 CFR 1003.24(b)(2)(i)-
(viii). Thus, filing a motion to reopen an in absentia order of removal 
premised on a lack of notice will continue to not require a filing fee. 
8 CFR 1003.24(b)(2)(v). Further, the filing fee for a motion to reopen 
would not apply if, inter alia, the ``motion is agreed upon by all 
parties and is jointly filed.'' 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(2)(vii); 8 CFR 
1003.24(b)(2)(vii). Accordingly, joint motions to reopen following the 
approval of U or T nonimmigrant visas will also continue to not require 
a filing fee. 8 CFR 214.14(c)(5)(i); 8 CFR 214.11(d)(9)(ii); 8 CFR 
1003.24(b)(2)(vii).\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Further discussion of fee waiver availability is contained 
above in Section II.C.5 of this preamble.
    \28\ The approval of an SIJ visa, if the priority date is 
current, may allow an alien to seek reopening in order to apply for 
adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), (h). The fee for the Form I-
485, Application for Adjustment of Status, is either $750 or $1140, 
depending on the age of the applicant and whether the applicant is 
filing the application with a parent. Thus, the Department expects 
that an individual with an approved, current SIJ visa who is able to 
pay this underlying application fee would, in many cases, also be 
able to pay the fee for a motion to reopen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. Concerns With Imposing $50 Fee for Asylum Applications
    Comment: Commenters objected to the NPRM because they claimed that 
it would result in a $50 filing fee for asylum applications. Commenters 
asserted that such a fee would be immoral. A commenter stated that the 
fee would establish a ``pay for play'' system for those fleeing 
persecution. Commenters stated that a fee for asylum relief was akin to 
applicants having to pay a price for their survival. Commenters also 
stated that an asylum-application fee would be unprecedented. 
Commenters stated that in the past, ``the process of seeking asylum has 
been subsidized entirely by surcharges on other fee applications.'' 
Many commenters who are legal service providers stated that a large 
number of their clients would be negatively impacted by the proposed 
rule but did not provide specific data to support this assertion. Many 
commenters suggested that asylum applications should be free while 
other commenters stated that the Department should provide a better 
justification for imposing a fee on asylum applications.
    Some commenters stated that the NPRM misstated that the proposed 
rule would not add any new fees because, commenters stated, a $50 
filing fee for asylum applications would be new. Commenters stated that 
the NPRM did not reference an asylum fee in the charts that the 
Department used to discuss other fee increases.\29\ See 85 FR at 11871.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Commenters did not comment specifically regarding fee 
increases proposed by DHS for other DHS applications adjudicated by 
EOIR--e.g., I-485, I-601, I-751, I-821, I-881--which were also not 
included in the chart of fees for EOIR applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters asserted that asylum protection is an internationally 
guaranteed human right and stated that denying protection for asylum 
seekers based on their ability to pay the filing fee would violate the 
United States' treaty obligations, as a signatory to the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (``Protocol'' or ``1967 Protocol''), 
which incorporates Articles 2 to 34 of the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (``Refugee Convention''); domestic laws, such as 
the Refugee Act of 1980; international principles of non-refoulement; 
and regulations. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6233, 6259-6276; Refugee Act of 1980, Public 
Law 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. Commenters cited Article 29(1) of the Refugee 
Convention, which commenters asserted prohibits any physical charges 
``whatsoever'' other than those that may be ``levied on [signatories'] 
nationals in similar situations,'' for example by requiring asylum 
seekers in the United States to pay income taxes.
    Commenters stated that a large majority of signatories to the 
Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol do not charge a fee for asylum 
applications. A commenter stated that if the United States were to 
charge a filing fee for asylum applications, it would be joining ``an 
adversary on which [the United States] imposes sanctions (Iran), a 
small island nation (Fiji), and one that has been condemned by an 
independent body of the United Nations Human Rights Council for its 
mistreatment of asylum seekers (Australia).'' Commenters asserted that, 
of those three countries, Australia's fee is half of the proposed fee, 
Fiji offers a fee waiver, and Iran's fee applies only to families of 
five or more and allows exemptions.
    Commenters expressed concern that if the United States began 
charging filing fees for asylum applications, other countries might 
follow suit. Commenters stated that such a pattern could have 
detrimental effects on refugee resettlement at a time when the number 
of refugees and displaced people ``are at historic highs.'' Commenters 
stated that charging a fee for asylum applications could render the 
entire international framework to safeguard humanitarian protections 
for asylum seekers vulnerable because it would undermine longstanding 
international agreements that asylum is intended to provide relief and 
support. Commenters suggested that charging a fee for asylum 
applications, but not for withholding of removal or Convention Against 
Torture (``CAT'') applications, suggested that the Department 
recognized that it would run afoul of international law to deny 
protection to individuals who could not afford it and indicated an 
attempt to keep people from accessing ``full protection as they should 
under our Constitution.''
    Commenters expressed concern that the fee would prevent asylum 
seekers who cannot afford the fee from applying for asylum altogether 
in the event that their requests for a fee waiver are also denied.
    Commenters explained that sometimes it is best practice for each 
member of a family to file an individual asylum claim because long-
standing precedent upon which a lead applicant's claim is based could 
be overturned. If asylum applicants would be required to pay a filing 
fee for each member of their family, and possibly all dependents, the 
actual financial burden would then be much greater than $50. Commenters 
suggested that the rule, if issued, should clarify that there is no fee 
for dependents' asylum applications. Commenters stated that to not do 
so might result in hundreds of dollars of fees for asylum applicants. 
Commenters offered the example that a family of five--two parents and 
three children--might have five primary asylum applications, as well as 
each spouse listed as a dependent on the other spouse's application and 
each child listed as a dependent on each parent's Form I-589 for a 
total of 10 separate dependent applications and 15 applications 
altogether. Commenters expressed concerns that if the Department did 
not make such an exception, family units of asylum seekers would be 
forced to choose to only file one asylum application in order to save 
money.
    Commenters stated that the $50 fee would pose an even heavier 
burden in cases where asylum seekers had to pay for counsel, which, 
commenters stated, is critical in an asylum case.
    Commenters stated that they believe asylum-seekers face unique 
vulnerabilities that could hinder them from being able to afford a $50 
filing fee for asylum applications. For example, commenters stated that 
asylum seekers often use all of their savings to travel to the United 
States such that even a $50 additional expense would pose a significant 
burden. Additionally,

[[Page 82766]]

commenters stated, asylum applicants often arrive to the United States 
financially indebted to those who assisted them with their journey. 
Commenters expressed concerns that establishing filing fees for asylum 
applications could provide smugglers and traffickers with additional 
opportunities to exploit asylum seekers. Commenters also noted that, 
because asylum-seekers must file their applications for asylum within 
one year of their arrival to the United States, they may not have the 
time to accrue the resources to pay the filing fee for their 
applications.
    Commenters also stated that asylum seekers must wait until 150 days 
after they file their applications to apply for an employment 
authorization document (``EAD'') and that the EAD would not be issued 
until after the application has been pending for 180 days. See 8 CFR 
208.7(a)(1). Accordingly, commenters asserted, asylum seekers cannot 
begin to financially stabilize themselves until six months after their 
applications have been filed. Commenters noted that proposed DHS rules, 
if implemented, would eliminate the requirement that USCIS process EAD 
applications within 30 days of filing and would lengthen the amount of 
time that asylum seekers would have to wait to file their EAD 
applications to 365 days after their asylum applications have been 
filed. See Removal of 30-Day Processing Provision for Asylum Applicant-
Related Form I-765 Employment Authorization Applications, 84 FR 47148 
(Sep. 9, 2019); see also Asylum Application, Interview, and Employment 
Authorization for Applicants, 84 FR 62374, 62377 (Nov. 14, 2019).\30\ 
Commenters suggested that the combined effect of DHS's rules and EOIR's 
policies would encourage asylum seekers to engage in unauthorized 
employment. Commenters asserted that it would be unreasonable to 
require an asylum seeker who is not lawfully permitted to work to pay a 
fee for filing his or her asylum application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ DHS has subsequently published both of these rules as 
final. Removal of 30-Day Processing Provision for Asylum Applicant-
Related Form I-765 Employment Authorization Applications, 85 FR 
37502 (June 22, 2020); see also Asylum Application, Interview, and 
Employment Authorization for Applicants, 85 FR 38532 (June 26, 
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also noted that asylum seekers are generally prohibited 
from receiving public benefits and thus do not have access to a 
``safety net.'' Commenters also stated that asylum-seekers often have 
few, if any, contacts in the United States on whom they can rely. 
Commenters stated that when asylum-seekers first arrive in the United 
States, they may not be able to open a bank account, have access to a 
credit card, or have any prior experience with money orders.
    Commenters stated that ``[t]echnical glitches'' regularly lead to 
rejections of applications to USCIS but did not specify further the 
sort of glitches to which they were referring.
    Commenters also raised concerns that the Department did not 
properly explain how individuals who are subject to the MPP, and are 
not actually in the United States, would be required to pay such a fee 
as they do not have physical access to the immigration courts.
    Commenters stated that in the past, the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (``INS'') withdrew a proposed rule that would 
have required a fee for a Form I-730, Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition, 
on the basis that ``[u]nlike some benefits sought by asylees, a 
relative petition may be filed at a time when the asylee has recently 
arrived in the United States and is most unlikely to be financially 
self-sufficient.'' Fees for Processing Certain Asylee/Refugee Related 
Applications, 58 FR 12146, 12147 (Mar. 3, 1993). Commenters asserted 
that such difficulties would be exacerbated with respect to children, 
who would be less likely to have the knowledge and capacity to fill out 
a fee waiver request.
    Commenters stated that USCIS had, in its 2019 proposed rule 
regarding its fees, considered a distinction between affirmative and 
defensive asylum applications. For example, commenters noted that USCIS 
declined to impose a filing fee for asylum applications by 
unaccompanied children whose cases originated in immigration court, 
noting that it did not wish to create any delays for children in 
removal proceedings; however, USCIS did propose a $50 fee for 
unaccompanied minors who filed affirmatively and are not in removal 
proceedings. See 84 FR at 62319. Commenters asserted that the 
Department could not justify imposing a filing fee for defensive asylum 
applications solely by relying on USCIS's decision to charge a filing 
fee for affirmative asylum applications. Commenters stated that the 
Department did not engage in independent analysis, such as an activity-
based analysis, to justify setting such a fee.
    Commenters asserted that it was difficult to assume that the 
Department would be acting in good faith in implementing a fee for 
asylum applications in light of recent administrative actions that 
commenters purport were taken to limit asylum seekers from succeeding 
on their claims. Specifically, commenters referenced ``metering,'' the 
MPP, Asylum Cooperative Agreements, and DHS's Prompt Asylum Claim 
Review and Humanitarian Asylum Claim Review Process, among other 
things.
    Commenters expressed concern about the impact that imposing such a 
fee would have on motions to reopen and appeals based on applications 
for asylum. Specifically, commenters expressed concerns that the $50 
filing fee would trigger other fees related to their asylum claims. 
Commenters stated that existing regulations only charge fees for 
motions to reopen if they are based exclusively on an application for 
relief that in turn requires a fee. Commenters stated that while 
motions to reopen based on an asylum application would not have 
previously carried an associated fee, under the NPRM, motions to reopen 
based on asylum applications could potentially require movants to pay 
the full, proposed filing fee of $145 for motions to reopen before an 
immigration judge and $895 for motions to reopen filed before the BIA. 
Commenters asserted that such fees would be unaffordable and undermine 
an alien's statutory right to a motion to reopen.
    Additionally, commenters stated that an asylum seeker might have to 
pay up to $975 to file an appeal if his or her application is denied by 
the immigration judge. Commenters stated that it would be unreasonable 
to expect asylum seekers to pay such fees. Commenters noted the Supreme 
Court's statement that that ``there is a public interest in preventing 
aliens from being wrongfully removed, particularly to countries where 
they are likely to face substantial harm.'' Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 
418, 436 (2009). Commenters stated that the Department did not 
adequately consider the cumulative effect of these fees on asylum 
applications. Commenters expressed concern that DHS's proposed rules, 
which could increase the amount of time that it would take for asylum 
seekers to obtain work authorization, in conjunction with EOIR's 
policies to expedite asylum adjudications before the court, could 
result in asylum seekers being required to pay the proposed $975 filing 
fee to appeal their asylum decision to the BIA before having received 
employment authorization that would allow them to do so.
    Commenters stated that detained individuals would be particularly 
impacted by the NPRM because of their limitations on earning money 
while in detention. Commenters recommended that detained individuals be 
exempted from paying the $50 asylum filing fee.

[[Page 82767]]

    Commenters stated that imposing a fee on asylum seekers would place 
an undue burden on nonprofit organizations and faith-based 
organizations that serve asylum seekers because in situations where 
asylum seekers could not afford the proposed filing fee or have their 
fee waiver rejected, such organizations might feel compelled to pay the 
fee themselves. Commenters stated that if this becomes common practice, 
legal service providers would have fewer resources to expend on their 
core missions of providing legal representation, which would ultimately 
lead to decreased representation rates. Commenters stated that pro se 
applicants, children, LGBTQ individuals (who commenters stated are 
often ostracized and isolated by their families), and detained 
individuals would be disproportionately impacted by the rule. 
Commenters noted that there is no right to appointed counsel in asylum 
proceedings.
    A commenter asserted that the Department did not properly consider 
``extraordinary public comments against charging for asylum.'' For 
example, commenters stated, Congress had previously admonished USCIS to 
refrain from charging a fee for humanitarian applications, such as 
asylum, directed that it should consult with the USCIS Ombudsman's 
office before imposing such fees, and required it to brief Congress on 
the possible impact that such fees might have. See 165 Cong. Rec. 
H11021 (2019).
    Commenters stated that the NRPM would not comply with international 
law and that the continued availability of statutory withholding of 
removal or protection under the CAT regulations for those who are 
deemed ineligible for failure to pay the filing fee or be granted a fee 
waiver would not be a sufficient alternative. Specifically, commenters 
asserted that statutory withholding of removal or protection under the 
CAT regulations are lesser forms of relief, as they still result in a 
final order of removal that can be executed at a later date, do not 
provide a path to lawful permanent residence or citizenship, do not 
allow for derivative relief for family members, and do not confer a 
form of relief that would permit recipients to petition for family 
members to join them in the United States or to travel to visit family 
members abroad. Additionally, commenters stated that it is more 
difficult to demonstrate eligibility for statutory withholding of 
removal or protection under the CAT regulations. Commenters stated that 
the NPRM would lead to at least some individuals who could meet the 
lower threshold for asylum having to forgo protection because they 
could not afford the filing fee, would not receive a fee waiver, and 
would not be able to meet the higher threshold of statutory withholding 
of removal or protection under the CAT regulations.
    Commenters further asserted that the Department did not adequately 
explain why it imposed a filing fee for asylum applications but not for 
the adjudication of statutory withholding of removal or protection 
under the CAT regulations. Commenters opined that to do so would be 
irrational and appeared to be punitive. Commenters stated that, in 
particular, the Department did not adequately justify why it should 
charge a fee for one application for relief where the immigration judge 
would be required to consider identical evidence regardless of whether 
the alien's application is for asylum or for statutory withholding of 
removal. Commenters also noted that when an individual applies for 
asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT 
regulations, the immigration judge considers the claims simultaneously. 
Commenters further asserted that, while immigration judges would not 
have to adjudicate filing-deadline issues in statutory withholding of 
removal claims, asylum and statutory withholding of removal require 
consideration of otherwise identical evidence of persecution on account 
of a protected ground. Other commenters stated that very few applicants 
would apply statutory withholding of removal or protection under the 
CAT regulations to the exclusion of asylum.
    Some commenters suggested that EOIR create its own form to be used 
for asylum applications, statutory withholding of removal applications, 
and applications for protection under the CAT regulations, and not use 
DHS's form. Commenters also recommended that, if the Department does 
not rescind the NPRM, it should clarify that an asylum seeker need only 
pay the fee one time, and not upon filing a new Form I-589 that might 
correct erroneous information or more fully explain the basis for their 
claim.
    Response: The Department notes that USCIS is a component of DHS, 
which is a separate agency from the Department, of which EOIR is a 
component. See Operational and Support Components, Department of 
Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components (last updated Nov. 17, 2018). Further, this rulemaking 
specifically involves EOIR fees, and the USCIS fees and applications 
referenced by the commenters pertain to a separate USCIS-specific 
rulemaking. See 85 FR at 11866; 84 FR at 62280.
    Because DHS determines the fee for DHS applications, including 
those that are also adjudicated by the Department, and because Form I-
589 is a DHS application, most of the comments regarding DHS's $50 fee 
for an asylum application are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. The 
Department's NPRM did not purport to propose changes to the well-
established regulatory provisions distinguishing between fees for DHS 
forms and fees for EOIR forms, and fees for DHS forms adjudicated by 
EOIR, including the Form I-589, continue to be set by DHS.\31\ See 8 
CFR 1103.7(b)(4)(ii); see also Exec. Office for Immigration Rev.; 
Definitions; Fees; Powers and Authority of DHS Officers and Employees 
in Removal Proceedings, 69 FR 44903, 44904 (July 28, 2004) (stating 
that provisions related to charging the same fees as DHS for DHS-
managed forms ``reflect current practice and reduce that practice to 
regulatory form.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The Department notes that DHS proposed a fee for the Form 
I-589 asylum application for such applications filed with DHS. See 
84 FR at 62318. DHS noted that whether such fee would apply to 
asylum applications filed with the Department would be ``subject to 
the laws and regulations governing the fees charged in EOIR 
immigration proceedings.'' Id. As indicated in the NPRM, the 
regulation governing fees in EOIR proceedings for application forms 
published by DHS, 8 CFR 1103.7(b)(4)(ii), relies on the fees 
established by DHS for those applications. Consequently, because the 
Form I-589 is a DHS form, the DHS regulation setting the fee for 
that form determines the fee charged for it in EOIR immigration 
proceedings, and neither the NPRM nor the final rule purports to 
change that structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DHS collects the fees for all forms submitted in EOIR proceedings, 
see 8 CFR 1003.24(a) (``All fees for the filing of motions and 
applications in connection with proceedings before the immigration 
judges are paid to the Department of Homeland Security.''), and the 
Department believes that creating a new system that would require 
different fees for the Form I-589 application depending on the agency 
that will adjudicate the application would create unnecessary confusion 
for parties.\32\ Further, the bases highlighted

[[Page 82768]]

by DHS as the reason to impose a fee for Form I-589 applications, 
including increased volume of applications that represent a significant 
increase in their adjudicatory caseload, apply similarly to EOIR's 
adjudications. See 84 FR at 62318; Exec. Office for Immigration Rev. 
Adjudication Statistics: Total Asylum Applications, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Rev., July 14, 2020, available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1106366/download (showing a significant increase in 
asylum applications filed with EOIR in recent fiscal years, from a low 
of 32,888 in Fiscal Year 2010 to a record high of 211,794 in Fiscal 
Year 2019). Moreover, section 208(d)(3) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 
1158(d)(3)) authorizes the imposition of a fee on applications for 
asylum. In addition, because DHS sets the fee for the Form I-589, as a 
DHS form, DHS's regulations would control whether or not the fee 
applies if an alien submits a new or updated Form I-589 for some 
reason.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ The Department acknowledges that the Form I-881 has had a 
separate fee depending on where the form is filed for over 20 years. 
See Suspension of Deportation and Special Rule Cancellation of 
Removal for Certain Nationals of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Former 
Soviet Bloc Countries, 64 FR 27856, 27867-68 (May 21, 1999) 
(establishing a fee of up to $430 if the application was filed with 
the INS or $100 if filed before EOIR). Current DHS regulations set 
the fee differently for a Form I-881 filed by an individual with DHS 
than for one filed with EOIR; if DHS refers the Form I-881, there is 
no additional fee. 8 CFR 106.2(a)(41) (replacing 8 CFR 
103.7(b)(1)(i)(QQ) if the injunctions against the DHS fee rule are 
lifted). Given both the anomalous nature of the Form I-881 as the 
only application, out of several, jointly adjudicated by the 
Department and DHS with separate fees and the declining frequency 
with which it is filed due to the declining pool of eligible 
applicants--each of whom must have taken some relevant action in the 
United States in either 1990 or 1991, see 8 CFR 1240.61(a)--the 
Department does not believe that a system of two separate fees for 
the Form I-589 could similarly be accomplished without increased 
confusion. Moreover, the separate fee structure for the Form I-881 
is contained within regulations pertaining to DHS, not EOIR, and DHS 
has not chosen to alter that structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the same reasons, the Department declines to implement 
commenters' recommendations for EOIR to create its own form for asylum, 
statutory withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT 
regulations.\33\ DHS's and EOIR's adjudications of such claims are so 
intertwined that the current one-form system is the most efficient 
procedure, and the joint form is also easier for applicants as it 
reduces the number of forms that an applicant would have to complete 
and submit for the same asylum claim.\34\ The same asylum claim may be 
considered and adjudicated before both USCIS and EOIR. See, e.g., 8 CFR 
208.14(c)(1) (directing asylum officers to refer applications to EOIR 
if the asylum officer does not grant the affirmative application of an 
inadmissible or deportable alien). With respect to unaccompanied alien 
children (``UACs''), following the TVPRA, USCIS asylum officers have 
original jurisdiction over an asylum application submitted by 
individuals who are otherwise in removal proceedings before EOIR. See 
INA 208(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(3)(C) (``An asylum officer . . . 
shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an 
unaccompanied alien child . . . .''). If the asylum officer does not 
grant the UAC's asylum application, the UAC may raise the same claim 
again during removal proceedings before EOIR. See INA 208(b)(3)(C), 8 
U.S.C. 1158(b)(3)(C) (establishing ``initial jurisdiction'' with USCIS 
(emphasis added)); see also 8 CFR 208.14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ In addition, the Department notes that even if the 
Department creates a DOJ version of the Form I-589, such an 
application could have a fee imposed in the same manner as DHS has 
proposed. See, e.g., 8 CFR 1103.7(b)(4)(i) (setting fees for DOJ-
controlled forms for applications for relief).
    \34\ The Department notes that there are multiple forms 
adjudicated by both it and DHS, in addition to the Form I-589--e.g., 
Form I-485, Form I-601, Form I-751, Form I-821, and Form I-881. The 
current one-form system for all of these applications has served 
both agencies well, and the Department sees no reason to create a 
carve-out solely for the Form I-589. Moreover, creating separate 
forms for some applications adjudicated by both agencies but not for 
all such forms would increase the likelihood of confusion by aliens 
regarding the appropriate form to file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department notes that the filing fees associated with DHS-
issued applications are set by DHS and will continue to be set by DHS, 
as neither the NPRM nor this final rule purports to change that 
longstanding practice. Thus, the Department disagrees with comments 
stating that the NPRM misstated that the rule would not add any new 
fees. See 85 FR at 11866. Although the NPRM did not reference the $50 
asylum fee in charts illustrating changes to EOIR-controlled fees--or 
any other proposed fee increases by DHS for DHS-issued forms, e.g., 
Form I-485, Form I-601, Form I-751, Form I-821, or Form I-881, that are 
adjudicated by both DHS and the Department--the Department explicitly 
discussed DHS's proposed rule to implement a $50 fee for asylum 
applications on the Form I-589, as well as the Department's reasoning 
for charging the DHS-set fee for DHS-issued forms. See 85 FR at 11871. 
Thus, the NPRM provided notice about any potential fee increases 
occasioned by DHS's proposed rulemaking, including for asylum 
applications.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ The Department further notes that DHS has not assessed a 
$50 fee for asylum applications filed by a UAC in removal 
proceedings. 85 FR at 46809.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department disagrees with commenters' concerns that a $50 
filing fee would be unaffordable, thus discouraging or preventing 
individuals from filing meritorious asylum claims. Cf. Ayuda I, 661 F. 
Supp. at 35 (rejecting concern that increased fees would limit access 
to courts). The Department agrees with DHS's position that $50 is a fee 
that could be paid in one payment, would not take an unreasonable 
amount of time to save, and would not be so high as to be unaffordable, 
even to indigent aliens. 84 FR at 62320. The Department notes that 
generalized statements and anecdotal reports about asylum seekers' 
financial status do not provide information about actual hardship. To 
the extent that commenters are concerned that an asylum fee could lead 
to additional, higher fees for appeals or motions to reopen associated 
with an asylum claim, the Department notes that fee waivers will 
continue to be available for EOIR-prescribed fees pursuant to 8 CFR 
1103.7(c), which remains unchanged by the rule. See 8 CFR 1103.7(c) 
(``For provisions relating to the authority of the Board or the 
immigration judges to waive any of the fees prescribed in paragraph (b) 
of this section, see 8 CFR 1003.8 and 1003.24.''); Ayuda I, 661 F. 
Supp. at 35 (``Moreover, these concerns [about deterrent effect of 
increased fees] are wholly overstated inasmuch as INS regulations 
excuse the requirement to pay in the event the alien certifies 
inability to pay.''). This includes a motion to reopen based on an 
asylum application and appeals to the BIA.
    The Department recognizes commenters' concerns that asylum seekers 
may face unique challenges that would make raising a substantial sum of 
money difficult, including, for example, the costs expended on travel 
to the United States, the one-year filing deadline, indigent status, 
and waiting periods for employment authorization.\36\ The Department 
also acknowledges that those seeking services from non-profit 
providers, by the nature of the very services they provide, would have 
clients with incomes that would make any fee challenging. The 
Department, however, believes that such challenges have been properly 
considered in DHS's proposal to establish a $50 fee, which falls well 
below an amount that would recuperate the full cost of consideration of 
asylum applications, as permitted by section 208(d)(3) of the Act (8 
U.S.C. 1158(d)(3)). See 84 FR at 62319-20. The Department disagrees 
that a $50 filing fee would provide traffickers and smugglers with 
additional opportunities to exploit asylum seekers and commenters have 
not presented evidence to support their position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ The Department notes that some of these factors, including 
an alien's ability to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars for 
travel to the United States, actually undermine the commenters' 
concerns that aliens with valid asylum claims will be unable to pay 
the proposed fee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department disagrees with comments that a $50 fee for asylum 
applications would violate human rights or U.S. treaty obligations. The 
USCIS rule is consistent with the United States' obligations as a 
signatory to the 1967

[[Page 82769]]

Protocol, which incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee 
Convention.\37\ The rule is also consistent with U.S. obligations under 
Article 3 of the CAT, as codified in the regulations. See 8 CFR 
1208.16-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ The Department also notes that neither of these treaties is 
self-executing and therefore they are not directly enforceable in 
U.S. law unless implemented under domestic law. INS v. Stevic, 467 
U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984) (``Article 34 merely called on nations to 
facilitate the admission of refugees to the extent possible; the 
language of Article 34 was precatory and not self-executing.''); Al-
Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 743 (3d Cir. 2005) (``The 1967 
Protocol is not self-executing, nor does it confer any rights beyond 
those granted by implementing domestic legislation.''); Auguste v. 
Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir. 2005) (CAT ``was not self-
executing''); see also INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984) 
(describing provisions of the Convention and Protocol as ``precatory 
and not self-executing'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Specifically, to the extent that the asylum application fee is 
considered a ``fiscal charge'' for purposes of Article 29(1) of the 
Refugee Convention--as incorporated by reference in the 1967 Protocol--
the proposed $50 fee would be in accord with that provision, which 
limits fiscal charges charged to refugees to an amount not higher than 
those charged by the United States to U.S. nationals in similar 
situations. And Congress, as evidenced by the express authority 
conferred in section 208(d)(3) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(3)), has 
clearly indicated that charging a fee for asylum applications would not 
run contrary to U.S. obligations. See INA 208(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(d)(3) (``The Attorney General may impose fees for the 
consideration of an application for asylum'').
    Because the USCIS rule does not impose a fee for statutory 
withholding of removal or protection under the CAT regulations, the 
rule would still be consistent with the 1951 Refugee Convention's, 1967 
Protocol's, and the CAT's non-refoulement provisions. See R-S-C- v 
Sessions, 869 F.3d 1176, 1188 n.11 (10th Cir. 2017) (explaining that 
``the Refugee Convention's nonrefoulement principle--which prohibits 
the deportation of aliens to countries where the alien will experience 
persecution--is given full effect by the Attorney General's 
withholding-only rule''); Cazun v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 856 F.3d 249, 257 & 
n.16 (3d Cir. 2017); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 240, 241 (5th 
Cir. 2016); Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (explaining that Article 3 of the CAT, which sets out the non-
refoulement obligations of signatories, was implemented in the United 
States by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, 
Public Law 105-277, sec. 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681, 2631-822) and its 
implementing regulations); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 429, 441 (1987) (``[Withholding of removal] corresponds to Article 
33.1 of the Convention . . . . [Asylum], by contrast, is a 
discretionary mechanism which gives the Attorney General the authority 
to grant the broader relief of asylum to refugees. As such, it does not 
correspond to Article 33 of the Convention, but instead corresponds to 
Article 34.'' (emphasis in original)).
    Commenters' assertions that statutory withholding of removal and 
protection under the CAT regulations essentially trap individuals in 
the United States are beyond the scope of this rulemaking, as nothing 
in the NPRM purported to propose changes to the regulations governing 
eligibility for those forms of protection or the restrictions attendant 
to them. Similarly, the NPRM did not purport to overrule Matter of I-S- 
& C-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 432 (BIA 2008), which requires the entry of an 
order of removal for aliens granted statutory withholding of removal or 
protection under the CAT regulations. Thus, although an individual who 
has been granted these forms of protection is not guaranteed return to 
the United States if he or she leaves the country, these forms of 
protection do not prevent individuals from traveling outside the United 
States. See Cazun, 856 F.3d at 257 n.16. To the extent commenters 
raised concerns that recipients of statutory withholding or CAT 
protection must apply annually for work authorization, the Department 
does not adjudicate applications for employment authorization, and such 
concerns are far beyond the scope of this rule.
    In response to comments regarding previous rulemakings by the 
former INS, which decided not to implement a fee requirement for the 
Form I-730, Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition because aliens generally 
filed such petitions shortly after their arrival to the United States, 
the Department notes that the cited rulemaking was published in the 
Federal Register on March 3, 1993, 58 FR 12146, several years prior to 
Congress's express grant of authority to the Department to charge fees 
for asylum applications, employment authorizations, and asylum-related 
adjustment of status. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Public Law 104-208, div. C, tit. V, 110 
Stat. 3009, 3009-693 (Sep. 30, 1996); INA 208(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(d)(3). The Department further notes that adjudication of the Form 
I-730 is not comparable to the significantly lengthier and more in-
depth adjudication required for a Form I-589. At the same time, the 
increased volume of applications for asylum represents a significant 
increase in the Department's adjudicatory workload. See Exec. Office 
for Immigration Rev. Adjudication Statistics: Total Asylum 
Applications, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., July 14, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1106366/download (showing a significant 
increase in asylum applications filed with EOIR in recent fiscal years, 
from a low of 32,888 in Fiscal Year 2010 to a record high of 211,794 in 
Fiscal Year 2019). Thus, the Department does not believe that the 
former INS's articulated reasons for not implementing a fee are 
persuasive when applied to current considerations regarding the Form I-
589. Regardless, whether to charge a fee for a Form I-730 does not 
necessarily dictate whether a fee for the Form I-589 is warranted, and 
although DHS has promulgated a $50 fee for the latter, it maintains no 
fee--nor even a proposed fee--for the former.
    The Department disagrees with comments that it would be irrational 
to charge a filing fee for an asylum claim filed on a Form I-589, but 
not for statutory withholding of removal or CAT claims filed on the 
same form. The Department reiterates that DHS is acting within its 
express statutory authority to implement such fees for asylum claims 
for the reasons articulated above. See INA 208(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(d)(3).
    The Department also disagrees with commenters' assertions that 
asylum and withholding of removal demand identical considerations. As 
discussed above, asylum is a discretionary form of relief, while 
statutory withholding of removal is not. Accordingly, for asylum 
claims, adjudicators must consider additional evidence with respect to 
whether an alien merits a favorable exercise of discretion in granting 
asylum relief. As a discretionary form of relief, asylum is also 
subject to numerous additional statutory and regulatory requirements 
that statutory withholding of removal is not. For example, asylum 
seekers are subject to filing deadline requirements, limitations on 
multiple applications for relief, numerous criminal exceptions to 
eligibility, the firm-resettlement bar, and the safe-third country bar. 
See INA 208(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2); INA 208(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(b)(2). Additionally, the Attorney General has the express 
authority to impose additional limitations and conditions on asylum 
eligibility. INA 208(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C).

[[Page 82770]]

9. Violates the Administrative Procedure Act
    Comment: Commenters stated generally that the Department should 
withdraw the NPRM for procedural deficiencies, including that the 
Department did not adequately justify the rule, the rule was arbitrary 
and capricious, and the rule was outside of the scope of the 
Department's delegated authority. Specifically, commenters stated that 
the Department did not give adequate time for comments. Commenters 
objected to the Department's choice to allow for a 30-day comment 
period in lieu of a 60-day comment period and stated that the 
Department did not explain the basis for this decision. Commenters 
stated that the Department acknowledged that the proposed rule was a 
``significant regulatory action'' pursuant to Executive Order 12866, 
but it failed to discuss or provide a rational basis for departing from 
the mandated 60-day comment period for such actions. Some commenters 
suggested that a 30-day comment period deviated from the Department's 
``usual'' comment period of 60 days.
    Commenters expressed confusion over the urgency of having a shorter 
comment period after the Department waited over thirty years to adjust 
fees. Commenters noted that, because EOIR had not changed its fees in 
over three decades, it was even more important for the public to have 
sufficient notice and, before commenting, time to understand EOIR's 
reasons and methodology behind the proposed increases, as well as how 
EOIR plans to ensure that vulnerable, low-income individuals will have 
access to proceedings. Commenters suggested that, on this basis, the 
Department should withdraw the NPRM and suggested that, if it were to 
reissue the rule in the future, the Department should allow for a 
longer comment period.
    Commenters stated that they did not have sufficient notice because 
the NPRM did not adequately explain a DHS proposed rule that is cross-
referenced in the regulatory language and that proposed rule's 
potential impact on an asylum applicant's ability to apply for fee 
waivers for appeals. Commenters asserted that the NPRM's stated purpose 
of balancing accessibility of the EOIR applications and motions for 
which the Department imposes a fee against saving taxpayer money was 
inadequate because EOIR has not taken other less expensive, burdensome, 
or prejudicial procedural improvements that would speed up the 
resolution of cases and potentially reduce costs associated with 
adjudications. Commenters stated that the Department did not present 
sufficient facts showing that it fully considered the public policy 
interest in accessibility to EOIR proceedings and that the Department 
instead relies on conclusory statements. Commenters stated that, rather 
than reducing the costs of adjudications, the proposed rule limited 
access to adjudications.
    Commenters noted that numerous immigration and legal service 
providers requested an extension of the 30-day comment period. The 
commenters noted that USCIS had previously complied with a similar 
request in response to its own proposed rule to raise USCIS application 
fees, see 84 FR 67243 (Dec. 9, 2019), but the Department neither 
extended the comment deadline nor responded to the request. Commenters 
also stated that the Department should withdraw the NPRM or extend the 
comment period due to the novel coronavirus (``COVID-19'') pandemic. 
Specifically, commenters stated that it was unreasonable to expect the 
public to submit comments by March 30 on the changes proposed as they 
adjusted to new challenges, such as learning to perform their jobs 
remotely, not having access to hard copies of resources and background 
materials, and having to provide childcare. A commenter also stated 
that, in response to the pandemic, ``immigration procedures have been 
changing on a daily basis, forcing immigration practitioners to keep up 
and inform clients of this ever-changing landscape.''
    Commenters asserted that numerous organizations submitted a letter 
requesting that the comment period be delayed due to the disruptions 
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Department has not responded 
to this request. Commenters stated that an additional 30-day comment 
period would ensure that individuals who are sick or caring for 
somebody who is sick would still have the opportunity to submit a 
public comment.
    Commenters also expressed a belief that the Department should not 
implement the proposed fee increases at this time due to the economic 
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. At least one commenter acknowledged 
that while the Department could implement the rule despite public 
comments, it would need to read all comments received and show that 
they were considered, and that such consideration might slow down 
efforts for the Department to move forward with the rulemaking process. 
Commenters also objected to the NPRM because it did not include any of 
the underlying data that the public would need to assess whether the 
Department's fee calculation was accurate or reasonable. Commenters 
acknowledged that the Department explained the process that it employed 
when polling its staff about work flow concerning particular types of 
applications, but stated that the Department only provided the 
conclusions, and not the underlying data, as part of the rulemaking 
record. Commenters stated that they had requested this data and the 
underlying study from OMB but that they had not received the 
information by the date of their comment submission. Commenters also 
stated that the Department did not state the amount of time expended by 
each person involved in an application for relief. Commenters asserted 
that this lack of information rendered it impossible for the public to 
assess whether the proposed fee structure is arbitrary and that the 
Department should withdraw the NPRM because it did not make this data, 
including the 2018 study, publicly available. Commenters also stated 
that they had submitted FOIA requests to the Department, seeking data 
on the number of fee waivers that had been filed, granted, and denied 
and additional information regarding the underlying cost study that was 
the basis for the NPRM. Commenters explained that if the Department 
raises EOIR fees, it would be crucial to make fee waivers broadly 
available and that such information was important to providing 
comprehensive responses to the NPRM.
    Commenters stated that, as of the date of their comment submission, 
they had not received a response to the FOIA request, and that DOJ 
should withdraw the NPRM based on its failure to provide this 
information. Several commenters qualified their comment responses, 
stating that their responses were as complete as possible given the 
lack of data provided by the Department but that their responses could 
not be complete without such data. Commenters stated that the 
Department had not given an explanation for why it had not increased 
EOIR fees for 33 years. Due to the lack of an explanation, commenters 
presumed that it was a policy choice designed to keep fees affordable 
to allow access to justice in the immigration system. Commenters stated 
that the Department erroneously interpreted the statutory term ``fair'' 
as it related to the fee determinations. Commenters stated that it was 
irrational for the Department to suggest that the proposed fees were 
intended to significantly increase revenue for the Federal Government 
but was also not an

[[Page 82771]]

economically significant rule under Executive Order 12866, i.e., a rule 
that would increase revenue by $100 million or more. Other commenters 
noted that the proposed rule would not comply with Executive Orders 
12866 and 13563 because the Department did not accurately assess the 
costs and benefits, determine that the benefits outweigh the costs, 
maximize the net benefits, or tailor the proposed rule to impose the 
least burden on society. Commenters stated that the Department failed 
to consider the costs that deterring individuals from pursuing 
meritorious claims would have on individuals, families, employers, 
State and local governments, the economy, and society as a whole.
    Response: The Department disagrees with comments suggesting that 
the NPRM, rule, or rulemaking process violates the APA. The fees are 
based on a cost study, and the Department is acting within its 
statutory authority to reflect the costs associated with present-day 
costs after more than 30 years without adjusting fees. As stated above, 
the Department is releasing the underlying data from its 2018 fee study 
in response to multiple requests for it. The Department is also 
including its updated dataset for full transparency.
    Regarding commenters' further statements that the Department has 
not responded to commenters' FOIA request(s), the Department will 
continue to respond to any FOIA requests in accordance with FOIA and 
the relevant regulations. Specific concerns regarding EOIR's FOIA 
responses should be directed to the EOIR Office of General Counsel: 
U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
Office of General Counsel--FOIA Service Center, 5107 Leesburg Pike, 
Suite 2150, Falls Church, VA 22041, Email address: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#97d2d8dec5b9d1d8ded6c5f2e6e2f2e4e3e4d7e2e4f3f8fdb9f0f8e1"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="bdf8f2f4ef93fbf2f4fcefd8ccc8d8cec9cefdc8ced9d2d793dad2cb">[email protected]</span></a>, FOIA Public Liaison: Crystal Souza, 
Telephone: 703-605-1297.
    The Department believes the 30-day comment period was sufficient to 
allow for a meaningful public input, as evidenced by the significant 
number of public comments received, including 157 detailed comments 
from interested organizations. Further, commenters did not suggest or 
indicate what additional issues the comment period precluded them from 
addressing; to the contrary, the comments received reflect both a 
breadth and a level of detail that suggest that the period was more 
than sufficient. Additionally, to the extent that commenters referred 
to other proposed rulemakings as a basis for asserting the comment 
period should have been longer, their comparisons are inapposite. No 
other proposed rulemaking cited by commenters addressed a small, 
discrete number of applications that are well established and with 
which aliens and practitioners have been quite familiar with for 
decades. In short, the Department acknowledges and has reviewed 
commenters' concerns about the 30-day comment period, but those 
comments are unavailing for all of the reasons given herein.
    The APA does not require a specific comment period length. See 
generally 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-(c). Similarly, although Executive Orders 
12866 and 13563 provide that the comment period should generally be at 
least 60 days, it is not required. Federal courts have presumed 30 days 
to be a reasonable comment period length. For example, the D.C. Circuit 
recently stated that ``[w]hen substantial rule changes are proposed, a 
30-day comment period is generally the shortest time period sufficient 
for interested persons to meaningfully review a proposed rule and 
provide informed comment,'' even when ``substantial rule changes'' are 
proposed. Nat'l Lifeline Ass'n v. FCC, 921 F.3d 1102, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 
2019) (citing Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
Litigation has mainly focused on the reasonableness of comment periods 
shorter than 30 days, often in the face of exigent circumstances. See, 
e.g., N.C. Growers' Ass'n, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 
770 (4th Cir. 2012) (analyzing the sufficiency of a 10-day comment 
period); Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(7-day comment period); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 
1309, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981) (7-day comment period).
    The Department is not obligated to extend the notice and comment 
period at the public's request. Regarding DHS's extension of the 
comment period for its fee rule, the Department notes that, at the time 
DHS extended the comment period, DHS provided supplemental information 
that changed some of the calculations underlying the proposed rule. 84 
FR at 67243. The Department finds the circumstances of DHS's extension 
distinguishable from the Department's proposed rule, which does not 
involve any relevant changed information . The Department believes that 
the COVID-19 pandemic has no effect on the sufficiency of the 30-day 
comment period. Employers around the country have adopted telework 
flexibilities to the greatest extent possible, and the Department 
believes that interested parties can use the available technological 
tools to prepare their comments and submit them electronically. Indeed, 
nearly every comment was received in this manner. Further, some of the 
issues identified by commenters--e.g., childcare--would apply 
regardless of the length of the comment period and would effectively 
preclude rulemaking by the Department for the duration of the COVID-19 
pandemic. The Department finds no basis to suspend all rulemaking while 
the COVID-19 pandemic is ongoing. Overall, the Department believes that 
the COVID-19 pandemic has not limited the public's ability to 
meaningfully engage in the notice and comment period.
    In addition, regarding commenters' concerns that the Department 
should delay implementation of this rule due to the economic effects of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the Department again emphasizes that an alien 
who is unable to pay the fee may, consistent with current practice, 
apply for a fee waiver.
    The Department gave the public sufficient notice of the rule's 
impact as it cross-references DHS's proposed rule. See 84 FR at 62280. 
The Department notes that this rulemaking does not alter EOIR's long-
standing procedures with respect to how DHS-issued forms are treated in 
EOIR proceedings, and thus the public has had adequate notice that any 
changes that DHS makes to its fees through its own rulemaking would 
affect fees for DHS-issued forms filed with EOIR. See 8 CFR 
1103.7(b)(4)(ii). While this rule updates cross-references to match 
DHS's proposed changes to DHS's regulations, the practices remain the 
same. To the extent that commenters believe they should have additional 
time for notice and comment to understand the Department's plans to 
ensure that low-income individuals will continue to have access to 
proceedings, the Department notes that its procedures with respect to 
fee waivers remain the same, including fee waivers associated with DHS-
issued forms. 8 CFR 1103.7(c).
    In response to commenters' concerns that this rulemaking does not 
fully accomplish balancing costs to the taxpayer against accessibility 
to the immigration courts, the Department notes, as discussed in part 
I.B, supra, that it fully considered the public interest, including 
access to the immigration courts, balanced against the cost to 
taxpayers in electing to not recoup the full costs of adjudications in 
assessing fees. The Department's policy has not changed since the last 
time it assessed fees. As when the Department last updated EOIR's fees, 
the proposed changes in the NPRM ``are necessary to place the financial 
burden of providing special services and benefits, which do

[[Page 82772]]

not accrue to the public at large, on the recipients.'' Powers and 
Duties of Service Offices; Availability of Service Records, 51 FR 
39993, 39993 (Nov. 4, 1986). Thus, fees ``have been adjusted to more 
nearly reflect the current cost of providing the benefits and services, 
taking into account public policy and other pertinent facts.'' Id. In 
short, as it did previously, the Department fully considered public 
interest when reviewing and updating its fees for the first time in 
over 30 years.
    Moreover, as the Department discussed in the NPRM, it intentionally 
did not include a variety of costs in its fee analysis to more fully 
ensure the fees remained at a level reflected by the public interest. 
85 FR at 11869 (``EOIR's decision not to include overhead and non-
salary benefits in the calculation of actual costs also accounts for 
the public interest in having non-parties bear some of the cost burden 
for filing documents associated with proper application of the law as 
it pertains to the statutory right to appeal or apply for certain forms 
of relief.''). Factoring in additional costs would almost inevitably 
have led to even higher proposed fees, which is a result commenters 
would have opposed even though, paradoxically, some of those same 
commenters criticized the Department for not conducting further 
analyses that would have likely required including such costs. In 
short, the Department recognizes that most commenters, as a matter of 
policy preference, oppose any fee increase at all because fees have 
remained artificially and inappropriately low for over three decades. 
Nevetheless, commenters did not persuasively explain why the Department 
should maintain that posture, especially when it conflicts with 
longstanding law and policy, nor identify shortcomings in the 
Department's analysis that, if remedied, would not have actually 
increased fees to a greater degree.
    The Department disagrees with comments suggesting that this rule 
would deter individuals from pursuing meritorious claims, though it 
acknowledges that it may have some deterrent effect on individuals 
pursuing non-meritorious or otherwise dilatory claims. Nevertheless, 
such speculative deterrent effects are not supported by any evidence 
presented to the Department.
    In response to commenters' statements that the Department had not 
adequately explained why it has not increased fees for 33 years, the 
Department notes that such a lack of action was a shortcoming by the 
agency that it is currently remedying, as stated in the NPRM. See 85 FR 
at 11869 (``EOIR is now proposing this rule to remedy the failure to 
update the fees in past years.''). Regardless of the reason for this 
lapse in reassessment, the Department is presently acting within its 
authority to charge fees, as discussed in the NPRM. 85 FR at 11872; see 
31 U.S.C. 9701(a)-(b); Circular No. A-25 Revised at sec. 8(e); INA 
286(m), 8 U.S.C. 1356(m).
    The Department believes that the newly established fees are fair. 
The Department has set the new fees based upon data gathered from an 
activity-based cost analysis. As stated in the NPRM, EOIR's calculation 
of fees has factored in both ``the public interest in ensuring that the 
immigration courts are accessible to aliens seeking relief and the 
public interest in ensuring that U.S. taxpayers do not bear a 
disproportionate burden in funding the immigration system.'' 85 FR 
11870; see Ayuda I, 661 F. Supp. at 36 (dismissing position that fees 
were ``arbitrarily and capriciously unreasonable'' where former INS-
implemented fees that were ``no greater than the rough actual cost of 
providing the services'').
    Regarding commenters' allegations that the Department's analysis 
under Executive Order 12866 is inadequate, the Department disagrees. 
The Department has properly considered the rule's economic effects and 
determined, in coordination with OMB, that the rule is not likely to 
have a significant economic effect. Moreover, as the difference in fee 
collections illustrates, the impact on the economy is clearly less than 
$100 million.
10. Violates Due Process
    Comment: Commenters argued that immigration proceedings must not 
infringe on aliens' due process rights, citing Salgado-Diaz v. 
Gonzales, 395 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (as amended) 
(``Immigration proceedings, although not subject to the full range of 
constitutional protections, must conform to the Fifth Amendment's 
requirement of due process.''), and Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 
1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (``A full and fair hearing is one of the due 
process rights afforded to aliens in deportation proceedings.''). 
Similarly, relying on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001), 
commenters asserted that the increased fees act as barriers to appeal 
orders of removal, thus violating immigrants' constitutionally 
protected due process rights.
    Commenters asserted that the proposed fee increases would make it 
impossible for many noncitizens to pursue their statutory rights to 
seek many of the specific applications, appeals, and motions at issue 
in the NPRM. See, e.g., INA 240A, 8 U.S.C. 1229b (cancellation of 
removal); INA 240(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(5) (appeals of immigration 
judge decisions); INA 101(a)(47)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(47)(B) (same); 
INA 240(c)(6), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(6) (motions to reconsider); INA 
240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7) (motions to reopen); INA 244(a), 8 
U.S.C. 1254(a) (1995) (suspension of deportation). Commenters stated 
that the rule even appears to have been designed in order to yield such 
outcomes and that ``[w]here fees have an impact on individuals' ability 
to exercise their statutory and regulatory rights, agencies necessarily 
must consider ability to pay to avoid infringing upon those rights.''
    Relatedly, commenters stated that the cost of pursuing relief could 
violate due process if it forecloses a party's opportunity to be heard, 
citing Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380 (``Just as a generally valid notice 
procedure may fail to satisfy due process because of the circumstances 
of the defendant, so too a cost requirement, valid on its face, may 
offend due process because it operates to foreclose a particular 
party's opportunity to be heard.''). Commenters disagreed with the 
NPRM's reasoning that unmet costs justified fee increases, explaining 
that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected that reasoning as a sufficient 
basis for denying indigent individuals access to the courts. See id. at 
381 (rejecting justification of fees based on allocating scarce 
resources and deterring frivolous litigation and finding that ``none of 
these considerations is sufficient to override the interest of these 
plaintiff-appellants in having access to the only avenue open for 
dissolving their allegedly untenable marriages.'').
    Commenters expressed concerns that the proposed rule continues 
administrative trends to speed up removals without providing 
noncitizens with fair opportunities to present their cases in court. 
Commenters opined that the current administration was taking steps to 
emphasize deporting aliens over due process in EOIR proceedings and 
stated that it had taken similar steps to turn USCIS, a benefits-
granting agency, into an enforcement agency.
    Commenters alleged that EOIR must ensure that fees remain 
``accessible'' and ``affordable'' in order to ensure due process is 
extended to all individuals, regardless of income. The proposed fees, 
commenters alleged, are neither accessible nor affordable, especially 
in the context of appeals, given that aliens would have only 30 days 
from the immigration judge decision to file an appeal and pay the 
increased fee.

[[Page 82773]]

    Response: The rule does not infringe upon due process rights. 
Aliens continue to receive a ``full and fair hearing,'' see Gutierrez, 
662 F.3d at 1091, before an immigration judge to present their case. 
Gutierrez further explained that the hearing must not be ``so 
fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably 
presenting his case.'' Id. at 1091 (quoting Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 
439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006)). ``Where an alien is given a full 
and fair opportunity to be represented by counsel, prepare an 
application for . . . relief, and to present testimony and other 
evidence in support of the application, he or she has been provided 
with due process.'' Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 926-27 
(9th Cir. 2007). The rule does not alter proceedings before an 
immigration judge; further, statutory provisions cited by commenters 
remain unchanged. Appeals, motions, and other forms of relief remain 
available; the rule only updates the fees to file applications for such 
relief while at the same time keeping fee waivers as an available 
option for aliens who cannot pay the fee. Accordingly, allegations that 
the rule proposed to change proceedings in a way that deprives aliens 
of due process is unfounded.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Due process does not require a right to appeal at all, even 
in the criminal context. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 
(2005) (``The Federal Constitution imposes on the States no 
obligation to provide appellate review of criminal convictions.'' 
(citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894)); accord 
Guentchev v. INS, 77 F.3d 1036, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 1996) (``The 
Constitution does not entitle aliens to administrative appeals. Even 
litigants in the federal courts are not constitutionally entitled to 
multiple layers of review. The Attorney General could dispense with 
the Board and delegate her powers to the immigration judges, or 
could give the Board discretion to choose which cases to review (a 
la the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration, or the 
Supreme Court exercising its certiorari power).'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Likewise, the rule is distinct from Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, which 
was relied upon by commenters. Zadvydas examined liberty interests in 
the context of detention that was indefinite and possibly permanent. 
Id. at 696. In fact, the Court explicitly provided that ``the issue we 
address is whether aliens that the Government finds itself unable to 
remove are to be condemned to an indefinite term of imprisonment within 
the United States.'' Id. at 695. The rule at hand, however, involves 
updating fees in accordance with section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 
1356(m)) and the agency's authorities for certain appeals, 
applications, and motions filed with EOIR. See generally 85 FR 11866. 
Updating fees to recover costs for providing services, in accordance 
with statutory authority, does not mandate or implicate detention in a 
way that Zadvydas would directly apply, and not all processes provided 
by law and regulation are constitutionally required. Nevertheless, the 
rule comports with foundational principles of due process, outlined in 
Zadvydas and numerous cases preceding and subsequent to that decision, 
because it does not alter regulations providing notice to aliens (8 CFR 
1003.18(a), (b)), the alien's opportunity to present his or her case (8 
CFR 1240.10), the option to be represented by counsel (8 CFR 
1003.16(b), 1240.3), the ability to file an application for relief (8 
CFR 1240.1(a), 1240.11), or the opportunity to provide evidence or 
testimony in support of the application (8 CFR 1240.7).
    As Section II.C.4 of this preamble extensively explains, the rule 
preserves the ability to submit fee waiver requests. Contrary to 
commenters' assertions, the Department considered aliens' ability to 
pay in updating the fees and subsequently retaining the fee waiver 
process, as reflected in the NPRM. The Department explained that 
``[w]hile EOIR recognizes that the new fees will be more burdensome, 
fee waivers are still possible for those who seek them'' and, 
accordingly, that EOIR would continue to ``entertain requests for fee 
waivers . . . and waive a fee for an application or motion upon a 
showing that the filing party is unable to pay.'' 85 FR at 11871, 
11874.
    The Department disagrees with commenters' assertions that Supreme 
Court precedent undermines the NPRM's reasoning that because EOIR's 
processing costs ``consistently exceed the assessed fees,'' updating 
fees is necessary to ``recoup some of [the Government's] costs when 
possible.'' 85 FR at 11870. In Boddie, 401 U.S. 371, one case cited by 
the commenters, the Court considered a state's required $60 fee to file 
for divorce. Because payment of the fee determined ``access to the 
judicial process in the first instance'' and the appellants had proven 
their inability to afford such fee, the Court found that the fee barred 
individuals ``from the only forum effectively empowered to settle their 
disputes,'' thus depriving them of their due process rights. Id. at 
375-76. However, Boddie's holding was based on the fact that plaintiffs 
were prevented altogether from accessing the judicial process required 
to end their marriages unless they paid the $60 fee. In contrast, 
separate and apart from this rule, aliens are provided an opportunity, 
at no charge, to present their case in a hearing before an immigration 
judge, and a fee waiver remains available to aliens who are unable to 
pay for the application or motion, including an appeal, they wish to 
pursue. Further, the updated fees apply to certain applications for 
discretionary forms of relief, in which aliens have no due process 
rights,\39\ and applications for appeals and motions, which are filed 
after an immigration judge issues a final decision. Accordingly, the 
rule does not wholly preclude aliens from their opportunity to be 
heard, and so the holding in Boddie is distinguishable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ ``[B]ecause discretionary relief is necessarily a matter of 
grace rather than of right, aliens do not have a due process liberty 
interest in consideration for such relief.'' United States v. 
Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 104 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Ticoalu v. 
Gonzales, 472 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2006); Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 
F.3d 425, 429-30 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 313 
F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2002); Oguejiofor v. Att'y Gen., 277 F.3d 
1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The cases cited by commenters are also distinguishable because they 
involve, as commenters note, discrimination based on poverty, but the 
rule does not discriminate on any basis. Fees apply equally to all 
applicants regardless of financial status, and fees may be waived upon 
a showing of the filing party's inability to pay. See 8 CFR 
1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), 1103.7(c). The rule does not discriminate on 
its face or in its application--it does not act as a blanket 
prohibition on people without financial means from submitting the 
applications, appeals, and motions at issue. Rather, the fees apply 
equally to all aliens unless an alien's fee waiver request is granted 
by an immigration judge or the BIA, based upon a showing of the alien's 
inability to pay. See 85 FR at 11871.
    The Department disagrees that the rule acts to ``speed up 
removals'' without providing opportunities for aliens to present their 
cases. The rule only increases fees for certain applications, appeals, 
and motions due to the rising adjudication costs that greatly exceed 
current fees. The rule does not alter proceedings in any way. Contrary 
to commenters' claims, the Department does not emphasize deporting 
aliens over due process: Immigration judges and the BIA continue to 
exercise independent judgment and discretion in applying the 
immigration laws to each unique case before them. 8 CFR 
1003.1(d)(1)(ii), 1003.10(b). Further, commenters' claims alleging 
USCIS's enforcement-related activities impeding due process are 
unrelated to EOIR's rule. As part of DOJ, EOIR is a separate agency 
from USCIS, which is part of DHS. See Operational and Support 
Components, Department of Homeland Security, https://

[[Page 82774]]

www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components (last updated Nov. 17, 
2018).
    By retaining the current fee waiver process, the Department ensures 
that aliens who aver that they are unable to pay have an avenue to 
request consideration of an appropriate application, appeal, or motion. 
The Board has possessed explicit, discretionary authority to waive an 
appeal or motion fee since 1953, 18 FR 3526, 3527 (Jun. 11, 1953), and 
there is no evidence that the Department's longstanding fee waiver 
process is inadequate or ineffective to address situations in which an 
alien is genuinely unable to pay a relevant fee. Regarding the 
commenters' concerns with the 30-day period from an immigration judge 
decision to file an appeal and pay the fee, the Department again notes 
that the public will be on notice about the new fee amount as of this 
rule's publication. An alien who is concerned that he or she may wish 
to appeal the immigration judge's decision should, accordingly, use 
that time between the initiation of the proceeding and the immigration 
judge's issuance of a final decision to begin arranging funds for the 
future payment of the appeal.
11. Fee Increases Will Have Negative Effects on EOIR/Immigration System
    Comment: Commenters indicated a wide range of disparate concerns 
that the NPRM will have potential negative effects on the functioning 
of EOIR and the U.S. immigration system.
    Commenters stated that it would exacerbate the ``already strenuous 
situation on our southern border,'' the ``dismal . . . asylum system,'' 
and aliens' access to courts. Relatedly, commenters stated there was no 
reason to believe that updated fees would improve the BIA's case 
completion rate, which they noted has continuously decreased. Another 
commenter explained that the NPRM would discourage even those with 
meritorious claims from pursuing them in EOIR proceedings.
    Commenters explained that the rule diminished the institutional 
integrity of EOIR and would have cumulative negative, and in some cases 
irreversible, effects on aliens who would be unable to afford the fees, 
those aliens' families, and their communities. One commenter 
anticipated increased crime in these communities because aliens would 
lack options for relief. One commenter expressed concern that the NPRM 
would cause predatory lenders to prey on aliens.
    Several commenters opined that the increased fees would incentivize 
unlawful immigration, which would also lead to more undocumented 
workers in the United States. Another commenter further explained that 
unlawful immigration would lead to a shift in costs from adjudication 
(EOIR) to enforcement (ICE). One commenter stated that no evidence 
exists to demonstrate that possible difficulties with processing upon 
entry has any deterrent effect on aliens' decisions to enter the United 
States.
    Many commenters opposed the NPRM because they alleged that it would 
negatively affect representation rates. Some commenters expressed 
concern that the increased fees would place aliens in a position of 
choosing between paying the fee or obtaining counsel. Commenters 
explained that aliens who choose to pay the fee and have nothing left 
to obtain counsel would then appear pro se for their hearings. One 
commenter stated that this would ``interfere with the statutorily 
granted right to counsel for alien respondents,'' while another 
commenter stated that this violated the ``American principle of legal 
representation for all.'' One commenter stated that ``substantial 
evidence [shows] that having counsel makes a critical difference in the 
outcome of one's case.''
    Numerous commenters expressed concerns that the rule would 
negatively affect legal service providers. For example, commenters 
emphasized that legal aid organizations, small firms, and attorneys 
providing pro bono services would be unable to routinely pay the fees 
for their clients. According to commenters, they would be forced to 
assist fewer aliens, especially indigent aliens and children, which 
would also preclude law students from gaining valuable experience and 
reduce the availability of pro bono counsel generally. Commenters 
further suggested that, overall, this would cause the courts additional 
costs and delays. Other commenters expressed concerns that the funds 
used to pay their clients' fees would come at the expense of other 
programmatic elements of their budget; thus, they would be less able to 
provide comprehensive services to aliens. Some commenters stated that 
the higher fees and resulting fee waivers would increase the time that 
an attorney spends on a case, which would compound the burden on both 
legal aid organizations and firms, such that they would be more 
hesitant to take these cases. Several commenters noted that attorneys 
would be forced to spend more time on fee waiver applications rather 
than substantive issues, which could relatedly cause them to turn away 
clients for lack of time and resources to represent them. Further, one 
commenter expressed concern that the increased fees would make aliens 
susceptible to fraud by notarios because aliens would be forced to seek 
the services of fraudulent notarios in place of licensed counsel.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ ``The term `notario publico' is particularly problematic in 
that it creates a unique opportunity for deception. The literal 
translation of `notario publico' is `notary public.' While a notary 
public in the United States is authorized only to witness the 
signature of forms, a notary public in many Latin American (and 
European) countries refers to an individual who has received the 
equivalent of a law license and who is authorized to represent 
others before the government. The problem arises when individuals 
obtain a notary public license in the United States, and use that 
license to substantiate representations that they are a `notario 
publico' to immigrant populations that ascribe a vastly different 
meaning to the term,'' and may not realize that, in the United 
States, a notary public is not authorized to provide representation 
or legal assistance to individuals in immigration proceedings. About 
Notario Fraud, American Bar Association, July 19, 2018, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/immigration/projects_initiatives/fight-notario-fraud/about_notario_fraud/ (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters expressed concern that an increase in fee waivers 
would further ``backlog'' the immigration courts. A commenter explained 
that immigration judges make ``bad decisions'' when under such 
pressure. Other commenters explained that more aliens would file fee 
waiver requests, thereby increasing the caseload in immigration courts 
and at the BIA and diverting resources from substantive claims to fee 
waiver adjudication. Commenters alleged that the NPRM failed to 
consider this inevitable burden. One commenter explained that 
increasing the caseload would further extend proceedings, forcing 
derivative family members to file separate applications that would also 
increase the caseload.
    Commenters stated that the burden on immigration judges to 
implement the $50 asylum fee would exceed the monetary gain from 
charging the fee. One commenter stated that increased fees on H-1B 
visas and temporary guest worker visas would hurt American businesses. 
Another commenter explained that USCIS almost always issues Requests 
for Evidence (USCIS Form I-797), requiring additional filing fees, to 
support USCIS fee waiver requests (USCIS Form I-912).
    Response: Overall, the Department finds these general concerns 
about possible negative effects too speculative to warrant changes to 
the NPRM, and the Department disagrees with commenters' concerns about 
the rule's extensive negative impact. Nevertheless, the Department 
responds to the different concerns below.

[[Page 82775]]

    The Department disagrees with allegations that the rule would have 
a definitive impact at the border because the rule makes no amendments 
to various policies related to the border or border enforcement, only 
to applications and motions submitted during immigration proceedings 
before EOIR. Similarly, because the rule makes no substantive 
amendments to EOIR's asylum regulations in 8 CFR part 1208, the 
Department disagrees it would have an impact on the ``dismal . . . 
asylum system,'' as characterized by commenters.
    Commenters are correct that the BIA's case completions have 
decreased or remained stagnant in recent years. See Exec. Office for 
Immigration Rev. Adjudication Statistics: Case Appeals Filed, 
Completed, and Pending, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., July 14, 
2020, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1248501/download. However, 
this rule is not designed to improve BIA completion rates. Instead, the 
purpose is to better align the fees charged for EOIR applications and 
motions with the costs of the agency to provide immigration 
adjudication and naturalization services. See generally 85 FR 11866.
    Further, the Department disagrees with allegations of the 
widespread effects on families, communities, crime rates, and predatory 
lending tactics. The Department continues to offer the same options for 
relief, including fee waivers for aliens who cannot pay a fee imposed 
by EOIR, and such concerns are extremely attenuated.
    The Department declines to respond to commenters' speculative 
concerns regarding an increase in unlawful immigration and aliens' 
ability to obtain counsel, including effects on legal service 
providers. As previously explained, the rule updates EOIR fees to 
recover costs of the agency in providing particular services. Unlawful 
immigration and access to counsel are affected by a number of factors 
beyond the cost of applications and appeals, and commenters provided no 
factual or policy bases for the Department to consider. Further, the 
rule was not proposed to curb unlawful immigration, deter aliens from 
entry, or increase aliens' access to counsel. Accordingly, the 
Department finds such concerns to be mere speculation and is thus 
unable to provide a response. See Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 35 
n.58.\41\ Additionally, the Department reiterates the continued 
availability of fee waivers available to aliens who are unable to 
afford the cost of an application or appeal. The Department also notes 
that, contrary to some commenters' assertions, aliens have a right to 
representation at their own expense, but the Government is not required 
to provide such representation. Accordingly, the Government is also not 
required to subsidize representation through artificially low fees or 
by ignoring OMB and statutory directives for over three decades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See also footnote 18 supra for further discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department disagrees that the burden placed on aliens due to 
the increased fees is excessive or undue. When calculating the fee 
increase pursuant to its statutory authority, the Department carefully 
balanced the public policy interest of maintaining accessibility of the 
immigration courts for aliens and the public interest in ensuring that 
U.S. taxpayers do not bear a disproportionate burden in funding the 
immigration system. 85 FR at 11870.
    Additionally, commenters' assertions concerning the burden of 
increased fees on organizations and the private bar falls outside the 
limited scope of this rulemaking.
    While the Department is likewise concerned about notario fraud, 
see, e.g., Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Notario Notice (July 22, 
2009), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/notarionoticenational072209, the 
commenter's statement is both speculative and outside of the scope of 
this rulemaking.
    As to the various comments regarding the increasing pending 
caseload, the Department recognizes that an increase in fee waiver 
requests is possible; yet, it is the Department's view that the 
increase alone will not substantially increase the burden on either the 
immigration courts or the BIA. Moreover, immigration judges and Board 
members have extensive experience dealing with fee waivers and would 
not be expected to have any difficulty adjusting to any increase in fee 
waiver requests.
    Commenters' concerns related to H-1B visas, temporary guest worker 
visas, and the Form I-797 are outside the scope of this rulemaking. 
EOIR is a separate agency from USCIS, which is part of DHS. Relatedly, 
the rule makes no substantive amendments to DHS's fees schedule, and 
the Department continues to apply USCIS fees in accordance with the 
regulation at 8 CFR 1103.7(b)(4)(ii).
    Comment: Commenters also asserted that the proposed fees will 
result in an imbalance between DHS and aliens because DHS is exempted 
from paying a fee and that this imbalance may influence the future 
development of the law by further exacerbating an ``asymmetry of 
resources and skew outcomes in favor of removal.'' Commenters stated 
that such inequity would be contrary to both Supreme Court and agency 
precedent, both of which caution against allowing one party to 
unilaterally control adversarial proceedings. Commenters cited 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008), in which the Supreme 
Court rejected an argument that would allow ``the political branches to 
govern without legal constraint.'' Commenters also cited BIA precedent 
in Matter of Diaz-Garcia, 25 I&N Dec. 794, 796 (BIA 2012), in which the 
BIA held that the unlawful removal of an alien during the pendency of a 
direct appeal does not deprive the BIA of jurisdiction over the case. 
Specifically, the BIA rejected DHS's interpretation because it would 
allow DHS ``to unilaterally deprive the [BIA] of further jurisdiction'' 
over a case. Id.
    Commenters suggested that ICE should also be required to pay for 
its appeals to the BIA, asserting that EOIR could collect a substantial 
amount of fees without overburdening aliens who are defending their 
rights before the courts. Commenters also suggested that DHS be 
required to pay a filing fee for each Notice to Appear (``NTA'') in 
addition to each Notice of Appeal. Commenters remarked that, under the 
NPRM, DHS unfairly bears no costs for initiating proceedings while 
aliens must pay the updated fees to appeal. Commenters relatedly 
explained that if EOIR was concerned about the increased caseload, it 
should charge DHS--the entity responsible for the growing caseload due 
to its changed enforcement priorities--for filing NTAs and Notices of 
Appeal, rather than charge aliens defending themselves with 
applications they are statutorily entitled to file. Similarly, one 
organization suggested that, in accordance with the IOAA's mandated 
consideration of fairness in charging fees, EOIR charge an 
``intergovernmental user fee on federal agency filings that is 
equivalent to fees imposed on noncitizen users.'' The organization 
explained that such fees were ``not uncommon or rare.''
    Response: Commenters' concerns that the fees will create an 
imbalance between DHS and aliens and that such imbalance will in turn 
affect the development of case law are entirely speculative. As 
discussed above, to the extent that an alien is unable to pay the new 
fees, a fee waiver remains available. 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d). 
Accordingly, aliens who are unable to pay the fee may continue to file 
appeals of unfavorable immigration judge decisions should they so 
choose.

[[Page 82776]]

    In no way is the decision to better align the fees for these EOIR 
applications and motions with the Government's adjudication costs akin 
to the argument in Boumediene that the aliens in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
did not have described rights because the Suspension Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution does not apply to an area where the United States does not 
claim sovereignty. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753-71. Here, for example, 
even where DHS files the appeal with the BIA, the BIA reviews all 
questions of law, discretion, and judgment de novo. See 8 CFR 
1003.1(d)(3)(ii).
    The Department declines to adopt commenters' suggestions to charge 
new intra-governmental fees for DHS-initiated filings, such as for 
NTAs. The NTA is the initial document that initiates most immigration 
court proceedings. See INA 239(a), 8 U.S.C. 1229(a). Such a suggestion 
is beyond the scope of the NPRM and would require contemplation and 
analysis of filing fees for other government case-initiation documents 
for cases adjudicated by EOIR, such as the amount of a fee for a 
complaint filed with the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing 
Officer pursuant to INA 274A, 8 U.S.C. 1324a; INA 274B, 8 U.S.C. 1324b; 
and INA 274C, 8 U.S.C. 1324c. Moreover, the Department declines to 
impose a fee for the receipt and processing of NTAs at this time. The 
Department finds that NTAs serve the purpose of ensuring that aliens in 
removal proceedings are provided with written notice of important 
information regarding their removal proceedings. See INA 239(a), 8 
U.S.C. 1229(a). The Department similarly does not collect fees for 
other notices that DHS serves upon parties for the purpose of ensuring 
that parties are provided with important information that may affect 
their proceedings, even where service of such notice also incurs 
responsibilities on the immigration court. See, e.g., 8 CFR 1003.47(d) 
(``DHS . . . shall provide a biometrics notice and instructions to the 
respondent for such procedures. The immigration judge shall specify for 
the record when the respondent receives the biometrics notice and 
instructions and the consequences for failing to comply with the 
requirements of this section.''). Moreover, no provision of the INA or 
any other statute authorizes the Department to impose a fee for the 
issuance of an NTA, and the Department is unaware of any authority it 
possesses to do so. See Authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
to Collect Annual Charges from Federal Agencies, 15 Op. O.L.C. 74, 75 
(1991) (``It is settled law that federal agencies may not charge other 
federal agencies user fees under [title 31] section 9701[.]'').
12. Discussion of How Funds Raised Will Be Used
    Comment: Other commenters stated that the cost calculations 
improperly included costs that EOIR incurred for actions that only 
helped DHS, and commenters disagreed that fee proceeds resulting from a 
fee increase in accordance with such calculations should fund those 
actions. For example, commenters suggested that the Department should 
not consider the following costs to the agency: Wired network access 
for ICE in immigration court; spending additional time scrutinizing 
respondent filings; maintaining databases that immediately notify ICE, 
but not respondents, of EOIR rulings; establishing and maintaining VTC; 
new immigration judge training; EOIR trainings; and cases that circuit 
courts have found to be improper. Some commenters suggested that EOIR 
was seeking to profit off of aliens who appear before the court. 
Commenters stated that the Department's reliance on the IOAA, section 
286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)), and Ayuda II, 848 F.2d at 1301, 
as current sources of authority was misguided because those sources of 
authority predate the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (``HSA''), Public 
Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. Commenters also generally disagreed with 
the Department's discussion of Ayuda I, Ayuda II, and National Cable 
Television Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1094, in the NPRM.
    One commenter stated that despite the Department's position that it 
is permitted to charge ``user fees'' to recipients who receive 
``special benefits,'' 85 FR at 11866-67, aliens in removal proceedings 
are not voluntarily accessing a benefit system, unlike aliens 
affirmatively seeking benefits from USCIS. Instead, they are being 
```prosecuted' '' by DHS for immigration violations. Commenters 
acknowledged that immigration court proceedings are civil, but 
nonetheless asserted that aspects of the system are more akin to 
criminal proceedings, and equated charging cost-prohibitive fees for 
cancellation of removal, suspension of deportation, or asylum to 
charging criminal defendants for making affirmative defenses in cases 
in which they face prosecution.
    One commenter also expressed concerns that the proposed fees that 
would be collected might be transferred to ICE, ``the very agency 
prosecuting and appealing these cases, and in some instances holding 
the noncitizens in detention,'' and would not be used for immigration 
adjudications. Specifically, commenters stated that the rulemaking did 
not make clear that the proposed fees, if collected, would be used to 
fund the immigration court system, citing the Board of Immigration 
Appeals Practice Manual and the Immigration Court Practice Manual, 
which state that EOIR fees for immigration court applications are paid 
to DHS, not the Department. See Board of Immigration Appeals Practice 
Manual ch. 3.4(i), Board of Immigration Appeals, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1250701/download (last updated Feb. 20, 
2020); Immigration Court Practice Manual ch. 3.4(a), Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1258536/download (last updated July 2, 2020). Commenters also asserted 
that the NPRM did not state that the Department needed the fees 
collected to meet its costs or that it had a funding shortfall.
    Commenters opposed funding numerous immigration-related measures, 
including funding for private prisons, maintaining ICE detention 
facilities, hiring Border Patrol Agents, building a border wall, and 
developing immigrant detention policies. Commenters suggested that 
cutting costs by reducing such activities could prevent the need for 
increasing fees.
    Response: Commenters observed that the IOAA, section 286(m) of the 
Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)), and the Ayuda decision predate the HSA. 
However, contrary to the commenters' statements, this does not 
undermine the Department's reliance on such sources of authority and 
judicial guidance. Following the creation of DHS by the HSA, Congress 
explicitly affirmed that ``[t]he Attorney General [retained the same] 
authorities and functions under [the INA] and all other laws relating 
to the immigration and naturalization of aliens as were exercised by 
[EOIR], or by the Attorney General with respect to [EOIR],'' prior to 
the effective date of the HSA. INA 103(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(1). 
These authorities and functions include the authority to promulgate 
regulations; prescribe bonds, reports, entries, and other papers; issue 
instructions; review administrative determinations in immigration 
proceedings; delegate authority; and perform other acts as the Attorney 
General determines are necessary to carry out the Attorney General's 
authorities under the immigration laws. INA 103(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. 
1103(g)(2). In sum, the Attorney General retained the same authority to 
implement fees after passage of the HSA as before passage of the HSA, 
just as the Attorney General may continue to take

[[Page 82777]]

actions related to other INA provisions that predate the HSA, such as 
asylum under section 208 of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1158). The Attorney 
General continues to operate under his express statutory authority to 
carry out the provisions of section 286 of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356). INA 
286(j), 8 U.S.C. 1356(j) (``The Attorney General may prescribe such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this section.''). Commenters have not pointed to any language in the 
HSA that would suggest otherwise.
    Commenters are incorrect that the Department included costs that 
EOIR incurs for actions that only help DHS when determining the new 
fee. As stated in the NPRM, EOIR conducted a cost study that considered 
the direct salary costs required for each step in the processing and 
adjudications of those applications, appeals, and motions for which 
EOIR levies a fee. 85 FR at 11869. The Department did not include any 
other costs, such as the cost of network access, maintenance of EOIR 
databases, EOIR adjudicator training, or other non-direct salary costs, 
although those costs could have been included in accordance with the 
law. Id.
    In response to commenters' assertions that fees associated with 
``adjudication and naturalization services'' do not include 
adjudications before EOIR, the Department notes that no such limitation 
is included in the statutory language. INA 286(m), 8 U.S.C. 1356(m). At 
the time that Congress enacted section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 
1356(m)), the Department adjudicated both benefits applications 
(through the former INS) that would now be adjudicated before USCIS as 
well as applications submitted for purposes of removal defense. 
Therefore, the term ``adjudication,'' as used in section 286(m) of the 
Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)), can be reasonably read to include EOIR 
adjudications. Further, prior to the enactment of section 286(m), the 
Department had implemented a number of fees pertaining to adjudications 
before EOIR, such as filing an application for a stay of deportation, 
filing an application for suspension of deportation, filing an appeal 
before the BIA, and filing a motion to reopen or reconsider. See 51 FR 
at 39993-94; Ayuda II, 848 F.2d at 1298 n.2. Nothing in the language of 
section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)) suggests that Congress 
intended to limit or deviate from the Department's existing practice to 
charge fees for adjudications associated with EOIR, and this rule 
builds on this history of charging EOIR fees.
    Additionally, the Department believes that both National Cable 
Television Ass'n and Ayuda highlight that existing case law supports 
the Department's position that the IOAA gives the Attorney General 
broad authority to set fees. The Department notes that the commenters 
have not cited any case law that would limit the Department's authority 
to set or increase existing fees for applications and motions filed 
before EOIR, so long as the fee amounts do not exceed the cost of 
providing the required service, including similar services that may be 
provided without charge to certain categories of aliens, and any 
additional administrative costs associated with the fees collected, and 
otherwise comply with the IOAA (31 U.S.C. 9701). Accordingly, the 
Department disagrees with commenters' suggestions that its citations to 
these cases are misguided.
    The Department notes that even assuming arguendo, as commenters 
asserted, that the fees described in National Cable Television Ass'n 
are distinguishable from those in this rulemaking, the IOAA confers 
broad authority upon agency heads, including the Attorney General, to 
establish fees, as is ``unmistakably'' supported by case law. Ayuda II, 
848 F.2d at 1300 (citing Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, 554 F.2d at 
1101). Accordingly, the Department has properly relied on National 
Cable Television Ass'n as a source of interpretive guidance.
    The Department also believes that commenters' objections to the 
Department's reliance on Ayuda II as interpretive authority are 
unfounded. Specifically, commenters attempted to distinguish between 
Ayuda II and the proposed rule because Ayuda II was filed prior to the 
enactment of section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)). Compare 
Ayuda II, 848 F.2d 1297 (decided June 10, 1988), with Public Law 100-
459, sec. 209(a), 102 Stat. 2609 (Oct. 1, 1988) (adding subsections 
(m)-(p) to section 286 of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356)). The commenters did 
not specify how a subsequent express grant of the authority that Ayuda 
II determined that EOIR had, to charge fees associated with 
proceedings, would undermine Ayuda II's reasoning, rather than 
strengthening it. See Ayuda II, 848 F.2d at 1301 (``In light of settled 
law, we are constrained to conclude that the INS fees at issue are for 
a `service or thing of value' which provides the recipients with a 
special benefit.''); INA 286(m), 8 U.S.C. 1356(m) (authorizing DOJ to 
charge fees for immigration adjudication and naturalization services at 
a level to ``ensure recovery of the full costs of providing all such 
services, including the costs of similar services provided without 
charge to asylum applicants or other immigrants''). Accordingly, the 
Department believes that this rulemaking is well supported by Ayuda II, 
848 F.2d at 1301, as well as the statutory sources of authority. See 31 
U.S.C. 9701; INA 286(m), 8 U.S.C. 1356(m).
    With respect to commenters' concerns that fees associated with EOIR 
proceedings are not charges for ``special benefits'' pursuant to the 
IOAA and Circular No. A-25 Revised, the Department notes that the term 
``special benefits'' has been interpreted broadly to include fees 
associated with applications and motions included in the rulemaking. 
See Ayuda II, 848 F.2d at 1301 (determining that ``the breadth of the 
[IOAA's] language and the courts' generous reading of the provision in 
question'' require a finding that ``the INS fees at issue are for a 
`service or thing of value' which provides the recipients with a 
special benefit'').\42\ The Department also notes that it is not adding 
any new fees for EOIR-issued forms, and that it has been charging fees 
for these applications and motions since at least 1986. See 85 FR at 
11866; 51 FR at 39993. To date, no authority has directed that these 
fees are not ``special benefits'' pursuant to the IOAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ The fees at issue included: (1) A decrease from $50 to $35 
in the fee for filing a petition to classify preference status of an 
alien on the basis of profession or occupation; (2) an increase from 
$70 to $125 in the fee for filing an application for a stay of 
deportation; (3) an increase from $75 to $100 in the fee for filing 
an application for suspension of deportation; (4) an increase from 
$50 to $110 in the fee for filing an appeal from any decision under 
the immigration laws in any proceeding (except a bond decision) over 
which the BIA has appellate jurisdiction; (5) an increase from $50 
to $110 in the fee for filing a motion to reopen or reconsider any 
decision under the immigration laws, with certain exceptions; and 
(6) elimination of the $50 fee for filing a request for temporary 
withholding of deportation. See Ayuda II, 848 F.2d at 1298 n.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, as commenters acknowledged, immigration proceedings 
are civil in nature, not criminal. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 
1032, 1038-39 (1984); Guti v. INS, 908 F.2d 495, 496 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(per curiam) (holding Bail Reform Act inapplicable to immigration 
proceedings). Thus, applications and motions in immigration proceedings 
are not precisely analogous to affirmative defenses raised in criminal 
proceedings. Moreover, even if they were akin to affirmative defenses, 
Congress has not directed courts to recoup adjudication costs the way 
it has administrative agencies through the IOAA.
    In response to commenters' concerns that they are unsure about how 
the fees collected would be allocated, the

[[Page 82778]]

Department reiterates that the fees will be deposited into the IEFA 
pursuant to section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)). 85 FR at 
11867. The Department rejects any allegations that it would profit off 
of any fees that it would collect pursuant to this rulemaking. All 
adjudication fees that are designated in regulations are deposited in 
the IEFA in the Treasury of the United States. Id. Although the fees 
for EOIR applications and motions are paid to DHS, as noted by 
commenters, DHS does not retain the fee amounts as an addition to DHS's 
budget. Deposits into the IEFA ``remain available until expended to the 
Attorney General [or the Secretary] to reimburse any appropriation the 
amount paid out of such appropriation for expenses in providing 
immigration adjudication and naturalization services and the 
collection, safeguarding and accounting for fees deposited in and funds 
reimbursed from the [IEFA].'' INA 286(n), 8 U.S.C. 1356(n).
    Except as noted in consideration of the public interest, the 
Department included all operational costs in evaluating fee levels as 
described in the NPRM. 85 FR at 11869. The Department notes that such 
costs are associated with maintaining well-functioning immigration 
proceedings that balance due process and efficiency interests, which is 
of interest to both DHS and respondents, as well as the general public, 
and that the Attorney General may charge fees for adjudication and 
naturalization services at a rate that would ensure recovery of both 
the full cost of providing all such services, including similar 
services that may be provided without charge to certain categories of 
aliens, and any additional administrative costs. INA 286(m), 8 U.S.C. 
1356(m).
    Commenters' suggestions regarding immigration detention and non-
EOIR programs are outside the scope of this rulemaking and, more 
generally, outside the purview of the Department. ICE, which is 
responsible in part for immigrant detention policies and facilities, 
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, of which Border Patrol agents 
are a part, are components within DHS. See Operational and Support 
Components, Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components (last updated Nov. 17, 2018). The 
Department does not have authority over how DHS implements its 
authority on these topics, and the budgetary choices made by DHS could 
not in turn be altered to support EOIR's adjudications without 
congressional action.
13. Policy Disagreements and Concerns
    Comment: Commenters expressed multiple objections to the NPRM 
related to policy decisions surrounding family separation and harm to 
discrete populations.
    Commenters opposed the NPRM, stating that it would separate 
families.\43\ Commenters explained that aliens would be unable to 
afford the proposed increased application fees for all family members. 
Further, commenters were concerned that aliens unable to afford to 
appeal immigration judge decisions would face deportations, thus 
separating families of mixed legal status. Commenters feared that such 
separation would subsequently result in children raised without both 
parents, removal to countries where aliens have little to no ties, 
family members burdened to assist separated family members, aliens 
remaining in the United States needing and seeking public assistance, 
furthered emotional and mental harm, and numerous other hardships 
related to financial and physical wellbeing. For these reasons, 
commenters asserted that the rule would destroy family unity, which 
they alleged is a bedrock principle of immigration law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ This section responds to comments regarding family 
separation, except in the context of statutory withholding of 
removal and protection under the CAT. For comments concerning family 
separation in that context, see Section II.C.8 of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters were also concerned that the rule would harm discrete 
groups of aliens, specifically UACs, detainees, women, and victims of 
trafficking and domestic violence, thereby inflicting or furthering 
mental health consequences. One commenter explained that ``[a]ll 
immigrants, by virtue of being away from their home country, are 
considered vulnerable. For those who do not have the financial 
resources to support themselves in a new country, poverty creates 
additional vulnerability.'' Accordingly, commenters were concerned that 
the rule would have significant consequences, in addition to its 
effects on mental health, for specific populations.
    For UACs, commenters emphasized they are by definition in an 
already vulnerable state and typically lack financial resources, which 
results in a significant need for pro bono counsel. Commenters stated 
that because UACs would be unable to afford increased fees, the new 
fees would be passed on to organizations and counsel and ultimately 
result in fewer pro bono organizations and attorneys who will be both 
willing and able to provide pro bono services to UACs. Further, 
commenters alleged that, in their experience, fee waivers for UACs have 
been consistently denied by DHS and are, therefore, an insufficient 
remedy for this population. In this way, commenters opposed the NPRM as 
a violation of UAC rights to access to the legal system and protection 
from deportation, which commenters asserted are protected by domestic 
and international law. Relatedly, one commenter opposed the rule based 
on its effect on applicants for SIJ classification. Stating that those 
children need ``unfettered access to BIA appellate review and motions 
to reopen or reconsider,'' the commenter asserted that the NPRM's 
increased fees will place an unnecessary burden on applicants for SIJ 
classification to demonstrate financial inability in requesting a fee 
waiver, which they have already demonstrated because ``SIJ[ ] 
petitioners and recipients, by definition, have already lost the 
financial and emotional support of one parent, if not both.''
    With regard to detainees, commenters expressed the same concerns 
regarding their vulnerability, financial hardship, and difficulty 
securing representation. Commenters were concerned that detainees would 
either lack the necessary money to pay fees, encounter difficulty 
securing representation who could pay the increased fees, or be unable 
to navigate the fee waiver process on their own based on lacking 
resources in detention facilities.
    Commenters also explained that the rule would negatively impact 
women and girls because they typically earn less than their male 
counterparts and are therefore less likely to be able to pay increased 
fees. Further, commenters explained that women and girls are more 
likely to have experienced gender-based domestic violence and related 
harms, upon which their applications for relief are based.
    Commenters alleged that victims of domestic violence and 
transgender individuals are also significantly impacted by the rule 
because they lack adequate finances, have increased vulnerabilities, 
and may have suffered specific previous trauma.
    Several commenters emphasized the consequences to trafficking 
victims imposed by the rule. Commenters stated that trafficking victims 
were especially vulnerable, given the harm imposed by their 
traffickers. Commenters explained that because trafficking victims are 
financially dependent on their traffickers, the increased fees will 
likely preclude them from pursuing review before the BIA and the 
Federal courts. In addition, commenters explained that trafficking 
victims lack both the funds to

[[Page 82779]]

pay the increased fees and the documentation required to apply for a 
fee waiver, and, further, that immigration judges oftentimes lack 
understanding of the issues involved in human trafficking. Without 
access to courts, commenters stated, trafficking victims would be 
deprived of congressionally authorized forms of relief and may be 
subject to further exploitation and abuse.
    Response: The Department disagrees that the rule will separate 
families and harm discrete populations.
    First, with regard to family separation, the commenters' concerns 
are entirely speculative and neglect the availability of a fee waiver. 
The rule does not require removal of particular family members or 
parents, nor does it preclude family members or parents from applying 
for such forms of relief. Rather, the rule simply increases fees for 
various applications for relief. See generally 85 FR 11866. The 
Department disagrees with the commenters' reasoning because multiple 
intervening factors must subsequently occur before family separation 
would result, and commenters' assertions that each intervening event 
will necessarily occur as alleged are speculative. Moreover, the merits 
of a case determine whether a removal order is entered, and the rule 
has no bearing on the relative merits of any applications filed in 
immigration proceedings.
    Nevertheless, the Department reiterates the availability of a fee 
waiver for any alien, including children, parents, and family members, 
who is unable to pay the assigned fee for the applications or motions 
implicated by the rule. See 85 FR at 11868. Aliens may apply for a fee 
waiver, upon which the immigration judge or the BIA may exercise 
discretionary authority to waive the fee for the application. See 8 CFR 
1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), and 1103.7(c). The fee waiver process was 
established to assist aliens who are unable to pay.
    As noted in the NPRM, EOIR estimated that 36 percent of fee-related 
filings did not result in a collection of fees due to fee waivers. Out 
of 19,874 completed case appeals or motions decided by the Board in FY 
2019, it granted, either tacitly or explicitly, approximately 5,499 fee 
waivers and recorded no fee waiver requested for approximately 14,322 
cases. Although the Board does not track fee waiver denials separately, 
the data suggest that, at most, the Board denied 53 fee waiver requests 
in FY 2019.\44\ Consequently, concerns about the inability of 
respondents to obtain fee waivers are unfounded.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Depending on the nature of the denial of the fee waiver 
request (e.g., a denial based on the submission of an unsigned or 
incomplete Fee Waiver Request Form, Form EOIR-26A), some fee waiver 
requests that are initially denied may subsequently be granted if 
the request is corrected.
    \45\ Information on fee waiver grants and denials at the 
immigration court level is not tracked by the Department. 
Nevertheless, the denial of a fee waiver would lead to the 
immigration judge denying an application or motion, which is then 
appealable to the Board, including with a potential fee waiver 
request for the appeal. Consequently, a respondent whose fee waiver 
request is denied by an immigration judge has recourse to review 
that decision as part of an appeal to the Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Department reiterates that respondents may access 
the List of Pro Bono Legal Service Providers, maintained by the 
Department's Office of Legal Access Programs. See 8 CFR 1003.61. This 
list contains contact information for pro bono legal service providers 
and referral services that refer aliens to pro bono counsel. See List 
of Pro Bono Legal Service Providers, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/list-pro-bono-legal-service-providers 
(last updated Apr. 14, 2020).
    Second, the Department disagrees that the rule harms the specified 
populations--UACs, detainees, women, transgender individuals, and 
victims of trafficking and domestic violence.\46\ With the continued 
availability of fee waivers, in addition to the List of Pro Bono Legal 
Service Providers previously described, the rule provides a mechanism 
for aliens who are unable to pay to seek a waiver of the fees. 
Moreover, many of these populations have paid EOIR filing fees for 
years--e.g., for motions to reopen or Forms EOIR-42A or EOIR-42B--with 
no indication that the fees affect those populations any differently 
than the alien population as a whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ The Department reiterates that DHS has not assessed a $50 
fee for asylum applications filed by a UAC in removal proceedings. 
84 FR at 62319.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department disagrees that fee waivers are not a viable option. 
Fee waiver determinations are based upon an immigration judge's 
exercise of discretionary authority following a case-by-case analysis. 
See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), and 1103.7(c). Despite commenters' 
anecdotal and unsubstantiated allegations that fee waivers for any 
particular population are consistently denied, the Department has no 
data to indicate such a practice.\47\ In regard to the effects cited by 
commenters that the rule would have on various populations, such 
effects are wholly speculative and depend most significantly on the 
merits of the particular case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Indeed, because there was until recently no fee for an 
asylum application and because most other relevant applications for 
the populations identified--e.g., nonimmigrant visas for victims of 
human trafficking, special immigrant visas for certain categories of 
juveniles, or immigrant visas for certain victims of domestic 
violence--are adjudicated by DHS, it is implausible that EOIR has 
``consistently denied'' fee waivers for these populations. Moreover, 
to the extent that some commenters allege that all aliens are 
``vulnerable,'' EOIR's fee waiver statistics noted above and 
previously, 85 FR at 11869, do not indicate that it consistently 
denies such waivers to all aliens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

14. Bad Motives
    Comment: Some commenters who opposed the NPRM alleged that it was 
based on anti-immigrant sentiment to discourage appeals, reduce 
immigration judge authority, and curb access to courts by ``pricing 
out'' certain aliens. Numerous commenters expressed different versions 
of the sentiment that the NPRM was ``cruel,'' such as stating that the 
rule was ``downright cruel,'' ``evidence[d] the agency's lack of 
compassion,'' or constituted a ``cruelly excessive extra burden on 
those already burdened by the bureaucratic processes involved in 
immigration review.''
    Other commenters opposed the NPRM for discriminating against non-
white, low-income people. One commenter described it as a ``race-based 
wealth test.'' Some commenters alleged that the rule targets the poor 
because it makes immigration available only to the wealthy who can 
afford the increased fees. Commenters explained that low-income aliens 
would be without redress, ``simply because they are poor.'' Commenters 
tried to illustrate their position by citing a Federal Reserve report 
stating that 40 percent of all Americans would struggle to pay an 
unexpected $400 bill. See Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. 
Households in 2018--May 2019, Federal Reserve, https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2019-economic-well-being-of-us-households-in-2018-dealing-with-unexpected-expenses.htm (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2020). Commenters also asserted that many aliens' struggle to 
retain representation in removal proceedings provided further evidence 
that aliens would likely struggle to pay the higher fees, but did not 
offer any evidence that aliens are unable to obtain counsel due to 
prohibitive cost.
    Response: The Department disagrees that the rule is cruel or 
discriminatory, or that it targets the poor. The rule was not based on 
ill-conceived or anti-immigrant motives, and the NPRM was not meant to 
discourage appeals, reduce immigration judge authority, or curb access 
to courts.

[[Page 82780]]

    Generally, the NPRM proposed to amend EOIR regulations involving 
fees. More specifically, and in accordance with EOIR's fee review, it 
proposed to increase fees for EOIR applications, appeals, and motions; 
update cross-references to DHS regulations regarding fees; and make a 
technical change regarding FOIA requests. See generally 85 FR 11866. 
The rule does not amend EOIR's regulations regarding fees established 
by DHS for DHS forms filed or submitted in EOIR proceedings, nor does 
the rule add new fees or affect an alien's ability to apply for a fee 
waiver request. See id.
    The changes in this final rule apply to any alien who files a 
relevant form under the rule, unless the alien applies for and receives 
a fee waiver. In this way, the rule does not discriminate, and it 
targets no particular group. The rule applies equally to all aliens, 
and fees charged are based on the application filed, contrary to 
commenters' assertions that the rule is discriminatory.
    Further, the rule does not target the ``poor'' or low-income 
individuals in proceedings. As explained above, a fee waiver remains 
available for individuals who are unable to pay the fee. 8 CFR 
1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d). Accordingly, the Department disagrees that an 
alien's access to the EOIR applications or motions for which EOIR 
imposes a fee is conditioned in any way on a wealth test or other 
financial status. With respect to the Federal Reserve report that was 
cited by commenters regarding Americans' ability to pay unexpected 
fees, the Department notes that publication of this rule provides 
notice to the public such that individuals who have a valid claim for 
relief will have time to prepare for filing any associated applications 
or motions, including filing fees. Accordingly, such fees are not 
necessarily unexpected. Additionally, the Department notes that the 
above-cited report by the Federal Reserve states that 39 percent of 
adults would have ``more difficulty'' paying an unexpected fee, with 
``more difficulty'' defined as an individual being unable to pay with 
cash or a cash equivalent at the time of the bill. Only 12 percent of 
Americans would be unable to pay. Those aliens who fall into a similar 
category of the 12 percent of Americans who would be unable to pay at 
all might be eligible for a fee waiver pursuant to Sec.  1103.7(c).
    The Department also disagrees with commenters' assertions that the 
rule is ``cruel.'' As explained in the NPRM, EOIR's processing costs 
currently exceed the assessed fees for EOIR applications for relief, 
appeals, and motions, which have not changed since 1986. 85 FR at 
11870. Accordingly, the rule updates EOIR's fees to more accurately 
reflect the processing costs incurred by the agency in providing such 
services. See id. The updated fees do not recover the full costs of the 
services; rather, the updates more accurately reflect the costs for the 
Department to provide such services. The Department recognizes that its 
services are significant procedural tools that serve the public 
interest and facilitate accurate administrative proceedings. Id. 
(citing Ayuda II, 848 F.2d at 1301). In this way, the Department 
preserves access to courts and the appeal process. Given this value, 
the Department was also careful to update its fees in accordance with 
the known, quantifiable costs of direct salaries, rather than variable 
costs such as overhead and non-salary benefits, thereby balancing the 
need to update fees with public policy interests. See generally 85 FR 
11869. Consequently, the Department disagrees that the rulemaking 
updating the fees is ``cruel.''
15. Other Suggestions
    Comment: Commenters suggested that, rather than raising fees as 
proposed by the NPRM, EOIR could transfer $8 million of unclaimed bond 
money to EOIR pursuant to section 286(r) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(r)).
    Response: Given the limitations of section 286(r)(3) of the Act (8 
U.S.C. 1356(r)(3)) identified by the commenters, the Department 
reiterates its decision in the NPRM to raise fees in accordance with 
the authority in section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)). See 85 
FR at 11866, 11870. Subsection (r)(3) limits refunds to the agency in 
the following scenarios: (1) Expenses incurred to collect breached 
bonds and (2) expenses associated with the detention of aliens. INA 
286(r), 8 U.S.C. 1356(r). Therefore, recovery of processing costs 
through updating fees is proper and consistent with the agency's 
statutory authority in section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)) 
rather than section 286(r) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(r)).
    Comment: Commenters suggested that the Department should clarify 
that if an asylum seeker properly submits a fee waiver application that 
is rejected by the immigration judge, the asylum seeker's application 
would qualify for an extraordinary circumstances exception and the 
asylum seeker would not be denied asylum based on the one-year filing 
deadline. Commenters further explained that this clarification should 
be made notwithstanding the language of the Immigration Court Practice 
Manual, which states that ``[i]f a filing is submitted without a 
required fee and the request for a fee waiver is denied, the filing 
will be deemed defectively filed and may be rejected or excluded from 
evidence.'' Immigration Court Practice Manual ch. 3.4(d), Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge, https://www.justice.gov/file/1250706/download 
(last updated July 2, 2020).
    Commenters urged the Department to adopt relaxed fee waiver rules 
for particular individuals including but not limited to those who are: 
Detained, UACs, deemed mentally incompetent, or subject to the MPP. 
Commenters also recommended that such individuals be considered 
presumptively eligible for a fee waiver.
    Response: The Department declines to adopt suggestions regarding 
fee waivers for asylum applications and the extraordinary circumstances 
exception. EOIR did not propose altering its longstanding fee waiver 
structure in the NPRM, and there is no supporting evidence that any 
such revisions are necessary. The NPRM addressed neither EOIR's 
longstanding regulations regarding fee waivers, 8 CFR 1103.7(c), nor 
the provisions relating to extraordinary circumstance determinations, 8 
CFR 1208.4(a)(5).\48\ The Department also declines to adopt relaxed fee 
waiver rules for certain individuals, including commenters' suggestion 
regarding presumptive eligibility. Fee waiver determinations are based 
on an alien's financial situation, and an alien's presence or absence 
in any asserted group says little about that particular alien's 
financial status. For example, 87 percent of aliens who have an asylum 
application pending before EOIR have representation, suggesting that 
such aliens may possess financial resources--or the access to such 
resources--that would not support providing presumptive fee waiver 
eligibility for all such aliens. Similarly, many detained aliens are 
lawful permanent residents who possess employment authorization and may 
have significant financial resources, making a presumption that they 
are entitled to a fee waiver inappropriate. Finally, these groups have 
existed for years, and there is no evidence that the existing fee 
waiver procedure, which is unchanged, is inadequate to address 
individual circumstances in individual cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ The Department also notes that the one-year filing deadline 
for asylum applications does not apply to UACs. 8 U.S.C. 
1158(a)(2)(E).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: One commenter complained about the EOIR process for 
accepting fees, which requires filers to pay through USCIS. The filer

[[Page 82781]]

recommended that EOIR accept fees electronically for all filings, 
whether at the immigration courts or the BIA. Another commenter argued 
that, rather than significantly increasing the fees, EOIR should focus 
on making filing processing more efficient, thereby reducing the costs 
needed to process filings requiring fees.
    Response: The Department does not believe that any revisions to 8 
CFR 1103.7(a) that would change the payment process are needed at this 
time; subsequently, payments must continue to be made in accordance 
with the regulation. Nevertheless, while electronic payment methods are 
not currently available for EOIR fees, the Department continues to 
modernize its technological capabilities. See Welcome to the EOIR 
Courts & Appeals System (ECAS) Information Page, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Rev., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/ECAS (last updated Sept. 
8, 2020); see also EOIR Electronic Filing Pilot Program, 83 FR 29575 
(June 25, 2018) (establishing a pilot electronic system for filing and 
case management). As EOIR continues to move toward further electronic 
system developments, the Department expects EOIR to also move toward 
additional electronic payment capabilities, including reducing the need 
to use DHS as a payment intermediary for the immigration courts.
    Further, the Department continues to evaluate ways in which it may 
increase the ``productivity and timeliness of case processing by 
setting appropriate standards, streamlining procedures, and 
implementing staff-generated recommendations.'' See About the Office: 
Goals, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last updated Aug. 14, 2018). To that end, the Department 
has already made various changes to improve efficiency at EOIR,\49\ and 
the Department appreciates commenters' suggestions on improving 
efficiency. Nevertheless, under statutory authority in section 286(m) 
of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)), the Department finds that updating fees 
properly allows the agency to recoup some of its processing costs, and 
thus declines to change the regulatory language of the NPRM with the 
publication of this final rule. See 85 FR at 11866, 11870.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ The Department has recently undertaken several initiatives 
to improve efficiency. The Department has prioritized immigration 
judge hiring, increasing the number of immigration judges from 245 
in 2010 to 446 in the first quarter of 2020. See Exec. Office for 
Immigration Rev. Adjudication Statistics: Immigration Judge (IJ) 
Hiring, Oct. 2020, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242156/download. Further, the Department increased the number of appellate 
immigration judges authorized to serve on the BIA from 17 to 21 in 
2018. Expanding the Size of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 83 FR 
8321 (Feb. 27, 2018). Recently, the Department announced that it has 
further increased this number to 23. Expanding the Size of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals, 85 FR 18105 (Apr. 1, 2020); EOIR Announces 
Three New Appellate Immigration Judges, Exec. Office for Immigration 
Rev., Aug. 7, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1302796/download. EOIR has also taken steps to ensure that courtrooms are 
utilized to the maximum extent during business hours. James R. 
McHenry III, Policy Memorandum 19-11: No Dark Courtrooms, Exec. 
Office for Immigration Rev., Mar. 29, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1149286/download (memorializing policies to reduce and 
minimize the impact of unused courtrooms and docket time).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: One organization argued that the main driver of increased 
EOIR case receipts, which EOIR relies on as justification for these fee 
increases, are the actions of DHS and EOIR itself. For example, the 
organization explained that DHS has significantly increased its removal 
operations, which results in more relief applications being filed once 
aliens are placed into removal proceedings. Similarly, the organization 
stated that DHS and EOIR policies designed to limit asylum eligibility 
necessarily result in increases in applications for other forms of 
potential relief. The organization argued that these limitations, 
coupled with EOIR's case completion goals for immigration judges, 
result in increased denials of relief applications and lead to the 
increased filing of appeals and motions to reopen or reconsider.
    Response: Although the Department acknowledges that new case 
filings reached record levels in FY 2019, Executive Office for 
Immigration Review Workload and Adjudication Statistics, New Cases and 
Total Completions-Historical (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1139176/download (showing 545,729 new cases filed in FY 
2019, the highest single-year total since EOIR was established in 
1983), that number supports the Department's need to review and update 
its fee structure regardless of the cause. Moreover, the Department 
finds unpersuasive the commenter's tacit suggestion that if DHS 
declined to enforce the laws against illegal immigration, then it would 
file fewer cases with EOIR, which would, in turn, have fewer cases to 
adjudicate and, thus, not need to raise fees. The Department recognizes 
the commenter's policy disagreement with DHS's immigration enforcement 
priorities, but that disagreement is beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking. Moreover, DHS, not EOIR, is statutorily tasked by Congress 
with ``[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and 
priorities,'' Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, sec. 
402(5), 116 Stat. 2135, 2178 (codified at 6 U.S.C. 202(5)), and it is 
not appropriate for EOIR to review DHS's decision to initiate 
proceedings to remove an alien from the United States. See, e.g., 
Matter of Quintero, 18 I&N Dec. 348, 350 (BIA 1982) (``Once deportation 
proceedings have been initiated by the District Director, the 
immigration judge may not review the wisdom of the District Director's 
action''); see also Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1304 (9th Cir. 
1977) (per curiam) (``The immigration judge is not empowered to review 
the wisdom of the [now DHS] in instituting the proceedings.'').
    The Department disagrees with commenters' allegations that 
Government policies necessarily result in increases in applications for 
other forms of potential relief. Individuals choose to file motions, 
appeals, and applications for relief or protection based on their own 
individual circumstances, none of which affect the Department's 
authority under section 286(m) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)) to charge 
fees. Moreover, all types of relief from removal have their own 
eligibility criteria--e.g., cancellation of removal for certain 
nonpermanent residents, INA 240A(b) (8 U.S.C. 1229b(b))--and there is 
no statutory link between eligibility for asylum and eligibility for 
some other form of relief. To the contrary, eligibility for most other 
forms of relief from removal require either some significant period of 
residence in the United States, e.g., INA 240A(b)(1)(A) (8 U.S.C. 
1229b(b)(1)(A)) (requiring ten years of continuous physical presence in 
the United States), or some established connection to an employer or a 
relative who could petition on behalf of the alien, e.g., INA 203(a), 
(b) (8 U.S.C. 1153(a), (b)) (preference allocation system for immigrant 
visas based on familial relationships or employment). Consequently, 
rules restricting asylum eligibility for recent or future arrivals to 
the United States have little expected impact on applications for other 
types of relief. In short, there is no basis for the commenters' 
alleged link between Government asylum policies and increased 
applications for other types of relief from removal.
    Commenters also did not substantiate their assertions that 
Government policies have led to increased appeals or motions to reopen 
or reconsider, and their allegations rest on the implicit premise that 
either immigration judges are unethical or incompetent--and, thus deny 
otherwise meritorious claims that then require appeals or motions to 
reopen--or aliens without meritorious claims should not be charged

[[Page 82782]]

appropriate fees for filing appeals or motions to reopen. Neither 
assertion, however, is a persuasive reason for forgoing the fee review 
and increases proposed by the Department. Again, the appropriateness of 
filing a motion or appeal rests on the individual circumstances of the 
alien, not on any particular policy of the Government.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ The commenter provided no empirical substantiation for the 
assertion that performance measures implemented for immigration 
judges lead to increased denials of applications, nor is there any 
logical basis to support such an assertion. The immigration judge 
performance measure cited by commenters is based on completions, not 
outcomes, and whether an immigration judge grants or denies relief 
is wholly irrelevant to the measure. Rather, the commenter again 
appears to be asserting that immigration judges are either unethical 
or incompetent--and, thus, deny applications based on factors other 
than the record and applicable law--but that assertion is unfounded 
and not well taken by the Department. See United States v. Chem. 
Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) (``The presumption of 
regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and, in 
the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that 
they have properly discharged their official duties.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

16. Miscellaneous
    Comment: Commenters stated that the proposed fees in the NPRM were 
unfair because of the disparity between EOIR's adjudications budget and 
the DHS's enforcement budget. Specifically, commenters asserted that it 
was unfair for the Department to pass the costs of adjudications on to 
aliens where the United States was willing to ``pay billions of 
dollars'' in enforcement operations.
    Response: The Department disagrees that the fees are ``unfair.'' 
While the Department submits an annual budget request, Congress 
ultimately determines agency budget allocations through the 
appropriations process, and the Department does not have any control 
over the funds appropriated to DHS, a separate agency, for enforcement 
operations. At the same time, and independent of the appropriations 
process, Congress has authorized the Department to charge fees for 
immigration adjudication, and expressed its general sense that agencies 
should impose fees in order to be as self-sustaining as possible, 31 
U.S.C. 9701(a). INA 286(m), 8 U.S.C. 1356(m). The Department exercises 
such statutory authority in updating the fees to more accurately 
reflect EOIR's processing costs, and the Department finds that proper 
exercise of statutory authority is not ``unfair.''
    Comment: Regarding the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, 
which protects the right of individuals to appeal to courts for dispute 
resolution, see Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 
(2011), commenters explained that ``absent a uniform, accessible, 
rational fee-waiver process that allows indigent individuals to 
consistently have fees waived--and . . . there is no evidence that EOIR 
has such a process--the proposed changes violate that constitutional 
right.''
    Response: The rule does not violate the Petition Clause of the 
First Amendment, which secures the right ``to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.'' U.S. Const. amdt. I. Commenters cited 
Borough of Duryea, 564 U.S. 379, which states that ``the Petition 
Clause protects the right of individuals to appeal to courts and other 
forums established by the government for resolution of legal 
disputes.'' Id. at 387. The contours of the Petition Clause have not 
definitely been extended to include aliens \51\ implicated by the rule 
at hand; however, even assuming that aliens possess rights under the 
Petition Clause, the rule does not alter the longstanding ability of 
aliens to access the immigration courts and to appeal a decision by an 
immigration judge. INA 240(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(5); see also 8 CFR 
1240.13(d). The rule only proposed changes to the fee that must be 
submitted with such application. Further, although the Department 
disagrees that the Petition Clause mandates a particular fee waiver 
process, the rule does not disturb the longstanding regulatory 
allowance for a fee waiver for aliens unable to afford the new fees. 
This process applies uniformly to all aliens in proceedings, and 
determinations whether to grant a fee waiver request are discretionary. 
See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), 1103.7(c). The Department believes 
this process is rational and accessible and allows for individuals to 
have fees waived upon a discretionary determination of inability to 
pay.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Constitutional protections do not necessarily apply equally 
to U.S. residents and non-residents alike. For example, the Court 
has suggested that `` `the people' protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom 
rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, 
refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or 
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country 
to be considered part of that community.'' United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). Courts, however, have not 
definitively determined the extent and application to aliens of the 
Petition Clause of the First Amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: Commenters objected to the NPRM's justification that 
raising fees would save taxpayer money. Specifically, commenters 
asserted that only a small portion of money collected from income taxes 
went toward EOIR's operations. Specifically, the commenters stated that 
out of the average amount of money that each of the 143.3 million 
taxpayers paid in 2017, which amounted to approximately $11,165, only 
$2.79 went to fund EOIR, as compared with $108.86 per taxpayer to CBP 
and $69.08 per taxpayer to ICE.
    Response: The Department presented a number of factors underlying 
the updated fees, including taxpayer subsidization. Based on 
recalculations to exclude DHS-only motions, the chart provided in the 
NPRM is updated below.

[[Page 82783]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.022

    To reiterate, in 2018 alone, U.S. taxpayers subsidized fee-based 
forms and motions by at least $41.5 million. 85 FR at 11869. As 
previously mentioned, the congressional appropriations process 
determines the amount of funding each agency receives. Commenters may 
disagree with the amount of money EOIR receives in comparison to other 
agencies, but beyond submitting a budget request, EOIR plays no role in 
determining the amount of funding it ultimately receives or the overall 
allocation of funding among agencies. Moreover, the Department 
maintains that consideration of taxpayer subsidization is one of many 
significant factors underlying its decision to update fees. Even if the 
cost per taxpayer were minimal, $41,570,053 in total is not an 
insignificant amount, and the Department disagrees with subsidizing 
fee-based forms to that extent using taxpayer dollars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ Approximately 36 percent of these fees were not received 
due to fee waiver approvals. The impact of the waivers themselves is 
to provide a Government subsidy because the Government absorbs 
required costs on behalf of an individual who is subject to the fee. 
The taxpayer subsidization, therefore, is greater than the number 
provided in this chart.
    \53\ These numbers include both motions to reopen and motions to 
reconsider filed at the Board level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: Commenters objected to the Department's description of its 
interests as purportedly being identical to those of DHS. Commenters 
explained that ``EOIR itself should be representing the equally 
important `Federal interest' of fairness and justice for all parties 
who appear before the immigration court and BIA.'' Further, commenters 
asserted that the Department did not conduct an independent analysis of 
its obligations in setting fees but instead simply adopted the analysis 
from USCIS.
    Response: The Department disagrees with commenters that it ever 
purported to have identical interests to DHS when DHS is a party before 
the agency in immigration proceedings. At issue is the following 
statement from the NPRM: ``As DHS is the party opposite the alien in 
these proceedings, EOIR's hearings provide value to both aliens seeking 
relief and the Federal interests that DHS represents.'' 85 FR at 11870. 
Through that statement, the Department sought to explain that revenue 
from updated fees would advance the public interest of ensuring 
accurate administrative proceedings, which in turn benefits both the 
alien and DHS. EOIR's interests are not identical to DHS's interests in 
immigration proceedings. EOIR administers the Nation's immigration laws 
through adjudication of removal cases and claims to defend against such 
removal, while DHS represents the Government's interest in enforcing 
such laws. In this way, EOIR provides fair and just proceedings for all 
parties before the agency, and the updated fees ensure that EOIR 
continues to provide such services. See 85 FR at 11870.
    The Department also disagrees with commenters' allegations that the 
agency failed to conduct an independent analysis from USCIS. Both 
agencies exercise authority to set fees pursuant to section 286(m) of 
the Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)). Further, both agencies follow non-statutory 
guidance from OMB in exercising such authority. Accordingly, the 
analysis contained in EOIR's NPRM (85 FR 11866) is reasonably similar 
to the analysis contained in USCIS's NPRM (84 FR 62280). 
Notwithstanding this same statutory conferral of authority, the 
Department reiterates that it conducts its own independent analyses 
throughout its rulemaking

[[Page 82784]]

activities as a separate agency from DHS.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ However, as stated elsewhere, the Department's analysis and 
fee-setting decisions only apply to those applications, appeals, or 
motions controlled by the Department and not to forms that are 
maintained by DHS, such as the Form I-589. Accordingly, the 
Department does not conduct analyses for fees set by DHS for DHS 
forms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: Commenters compared the NPRM to policies under prior 
administrations that established a streamlined appeal system whereby 
the BIA could affirm immigration judge decisions without opinion. 
Commenters asserted that under such procedures, litigants did not 
receive justice at the BIA and the number of Federal appeals increased. 
By contrast, commenters stated, when the BIA rescinded a number of the 
streamlining policies, Federal appeals dropped. The commenters opined 
that the NPRM would similarly burden the Federal courts by creating a 
new source of appeals: Denial of the fee waiver and subsequent 
dismissal of the appeal for lack of timely filing. The commenters 
opined that such appeals would likely be remanded to the BIA, 
increasing the backlog there. The commenters asserted that any money 
taken in by the fees paid under the NPRM would likely be expended by 
the Federal courts and Department attorneys ``in processing and likely 
remanding hundreds or thousands of cases in which fee waiver requests 
have been wrongly denied.''
    Response: The Department disagrees with commenters' assertions that 
the increase in fees would result in an undue burden on Federal courts. 
As stated in the NPRM, this rule does not foreclose or limit the 
ability of aliens to seek a fee waiver for the appeal fee before the 
BIA. See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3); 85 FR at 11871. An alien who is unable to 
pay for the increased fee of an appeal would file the EOIR-26A, Fee 
Waiver Request. The availability of the fee waiver ensures aliens' 
continued access to the BIA, and in turn the Federal courts.
    Moreover, the Department is unable to respond to commenters' 
assertions that there will be an increase in appeals of denied fee 
waivers because these concerns are merely speculative and beyond the 
scope of this rulemaking. Nothing in this rule affects the adjudication 
process of fee waiver applications and therefore does not implicate the 
need for additional appeals of fee waiver denials.
    Comment: Commenters also asserted that the proposed rule will 
operate as an unlawful tax for individuals who rely on the immigration 
court system for relief. Commenters cited Article 29 of the Refugee 
Convention, which bars imposing on refugees ``duties, charges or taxes, 
of any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or 
may be levied on [signatories'] nationals in similar situations.'' One 
commenter asserted that the proposed rule violated Article 25 of the 
Convention because although ``fees may be charged for the services 
mentioned [t]herein,'' those ``fees shall be moderate and commensurate 
with those charged to nationals for similar services.''
    Response: As previously explained in Section II.C.8 of this 
preamble, the rule does not violate Article 29 of the Refugee 
Convention. That reasoning also applies to Article 25's requirement 
that certain fees charged to refugees must be ``moderate and 
commensurate with those charged to nationals for similar services.'' 
Examples of such services are the Form I-130, Petition for Alien 
Relative, $560, and Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or 
Special Immigrant, $450. See 8 CFR 106.2(a)(6), (16). Accordingly, the 
Department finds that fees charged to refugees under the rule are 
reasonably commensurate with fees charged to nationals, such that the 
rule upholds United States treaty obligations.

III. Provisions of the Final Rule

    The Department has considered and responded to the comments 
received in response to the proposed rule. In accordance with the 
authorities discussed above in Section I.A of this preamble, the 
Department is now issuing this final rule to finalize the NPRM. The 
final rule adopts the fee amounts set out in the proposed rule as final 
for the reasons discussed above in Section II of this preamble in 
responses to the comments received. As a result, the fees for those 
forms, motions, and applications for which EOIR charges a fee will be 
as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.023

    Applying the same 36 percent fee waiver rate \55\ that EOIR 
previously estimated, see 85 FR at 11869 n.11,\56\ these new fees would 
be expected to result in the fee revenues for Fiscal Year 2021 that are 
reflected in the table below.\57\ The table also presents the 
incremental fee revenue that would be

[[Page 82785]]

paid \58\ by applicants or by others assisting the applicants, 
including family, friends, or social agencies. Aggregating this 
incremental fee revenue across fee types gives an estimate of the 
transfer effects of the rule, which are estimated to be about $45.2 
million in FY 2021. This incremental fee revenue is estimated based on 
an assumption that the fee increases will not lead to a reduction in 
applications. The incremental fee revenue also represents an estimate 
of the expected transfer effects of the rule from applicants, and 
individuals or groups assisting those applicants, to the Federal 
Government. The table also provides the actual cost to the Government 
of providing the covered services based on the Government's activity-
based costing study for these services.
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    \55\ The fee waiver rate was not applied to the EOIR-29 or the 
EOIR-45 due to the low number of filings projected. For the other 
forms, the impact of the waivers themselves is to provide a 
Government subsidy because the Government absorbs required costs on 
behalf of an individual who is subject to the fee. The taxpayer 
subsidization, therefore, is greater than contemplated by the 
incremental fee revenue alone.
    \56\ The Department notes that this rate may be low as more 
aliens may file for fee waivers and, thus, more waivers may be 
granted following the implementation of this rule. However, EOIR is 
unable to more specifically predict future fee waiver grant rates 
because each fee waiver request is an individual adjudication and 
because EOIR does not have data on the average income of aliens who 
file these forms and motions today or other data that would be 
required to increase this prediction's accuracy.
    \57\ The Department notes that FY 2021 began prior to the 
publication of this final rule. The projections for FY 2021 presumed 
that the new fees would be in effect for the entire fiscal year.
    \58\ Incremental fee revenue was calculated by applying the FY 
2021 projected filings to former and new fee amounts, including the 
36% of forms with approved fee waivers.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.024

    In addition, this final rule, like the NPRM, includes regulatory 
cross-reference changes and corrections for the reasons discussed above 
in Section II. However, because the USCIS final rule is currently 
enjoined as noted above, this final rule revises EOIR's cross-
references to direct the reader to both 8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106 
in order to prevent confusion and ensure consistency regardless of how 
the litigation over that rule is resolved. In addition, this final rule 
includes an additional correction to the cross-reference to 8 CFR 
103.7(c) in 8 CFR 1245.13(g) that was inadvertently not included in the 
similar changes set out in the NPRM.
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    \59\ The cost to the Government is the product of the projected 
number of filings and the cost calculated in the activity-based 
costing study.
    \60\ FY 2021 projections were calculated applying the average 
percent change over ten fiscal years to FY 2020 estimated receipts. 
EOIR calculated the FY 2020 estmated receipts as follows. First, 
EOIR added the first three quarters of FY 2020 receipts and divided 
by three to get an estimate for the last quarter of FY 2020. Second, 
EOIR added together the first three quarters along with the 
estimated last quarter to get the total. Next, the agency calculated 
the percent increase or decrease between each fiscal year and the 
average percent change.
    \61\ Projections result in zero filings of Form EOIR-29. Each 
filing would cost the Government $704.81 based on the activity-based 
costing study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Regulatory Requirements

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Department has reviewed this regulation in accordance with the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (``RFA''), as 
amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996, Public Law 104-121, tit. II, 110 Stat. 847, and has determined 
that this rule would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. The rule would not regulate 
``small entities'' as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(6). Only 
individuals, rather than entities, are responsible for paying the fees 
affected by this proposed rule. This position reflects the Department's 
consistent view for decades regarding fees in EOIR proceedings. See, 
e.g., Powers and Duties of Service Officers; Availability of Service 
Records, 51 FR 2895 (Jan. 22, 1986) (proposed rule for changes to 
EOIR's fee schedule for appeals and motions) (``In accordance with 5 
U.S.C. 605(b), the Attorney General certifies that the rule will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.''); 51 FR at 39994 (final rule adopting in pertinent part the 
proposed changes to the fee schedule) (maintaining the position that 
changes to the fee schedule will not have a significant impact on a 
substantial number of small entities). The Department is unaware of any 
challenge to this position and finds no reason to depart from that 
well-established position. The rule applies to aliens in immigration 
proceedings, who are individuals, not entities. See 5 U.S.C. 601(6). 
The rule does not limit in any way the ability of practitioners to 
accept cases, manage dockets, or assess fees. Indeed, nothing in the 
rule in any fashion regulates the legal representatives of such 
individuals or the organizations by which those representatives are 
employed, and the Department is unaware of cases in which the RFA's 
requirements have been applied to legal representatives of entities 
subject to its provisions, in addition to or in lieu of the entities 
themselves. See 5 U.S.C. 603(b)(3) (requiring that an RFA analysis 
include a description of and, if feasible, an estimate of the number of 
``small entities'' to which the rule ``will apply''). To the contrary, 
case law indicates that indirect effects on entities not regulated by a 
proposed rule are not subject to an RFA analysis. See, e.g., Mid-Tex 
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(``[W]e conclude that an agency may properly certify that no regulatory 
flexibility analysis is necessary when it determines that the rule will 
not have a significant

[[Page 82786]]

economic impact on a substantial number of small entities that are 
subject to the requirements of the rule. . . . Congress did not intend 
to require that every agency consider every indirect effect that any 
regulation might have on small businesses in any stratum of the 
national economy. That is a very broad and ambitious agenda, and we 
think that Congress is unlikely to have embarked on such a course 
without airing the matter.''); Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 
F.3d 855, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (``Contrary to what 
[petitioner] supposes, application of the RFA does turn on whether 
particular entities are the `targets' of a given rule. The statute 
requires that the agency conduct the relevant analysis or certify `no 
impact' for those small businesses that are `subject to' the 
regulation, that is, those to which the regulation `will apply.' . . . 
The rule will doubtless have economic impacts in many ectors of the 
economy. But to require an agency to assess the impact on all of the 
nation's small businesses possibly affected by a rule would be to 
convert every rulemaking process into a massive exercise in economic 
modeling, an approach we have already rejected.'' (citing Mid-Tex, 773 
F.2d at 343)); see also White Eagle Coop. Ass'n v. Conner, 553 F.3d 
467, 480 (7th Cir. 2009) (``The rule that emerges from this line of 
cases is that small entities directly regulated by the proposed 
[rulemaking]--whose conduct is circumscribed or mandated--may bring a 
challenge to the RFA analysis or certification of an agency. . . . 
However, when the regulation reaches small entities only indirectly, 
they do not have standing to bring an RFA challenge.'').
    Further, the Department has consistently maintained this position 
regarding immigration regulations aimed at aliens, rather than 
practitioners who represent aliens, including much broader and more 
sweeping rulemakings. See, e.g., Inspection and Expedited Removal of 
Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal 
Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 FR 444, 453 (Jan. 3, 1997) 
(certifying that the rule would not have a significant impact on a 
substantial number of small entities because it ``affects only Federal 
government operations'' by revising the procedures for the 
``examination, detention, and removal of aliens''). That conclusion was 
reiterated in the interim rule, 62 FR 10312, 10328 (Mar. 6, 1997), 
which was adopted with no noted challenge or dispute. This final rule 
is similar, in that it, too, affects only the operations of the Federal 
Government by amending certain discrete categories of fees related to 
immigration forms filed by aliens. The Department thus believes that 
the experience of implementing the prior rules cited above supports its 
conclusion that there is no evidence that this final rule will have a 
significant impact on small entities as contemplated by the RFA.

B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    This rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local, and 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year, and it will not significantly or 
uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no actions were deemed 
necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 
1995.

C. Congressional Review Act

    This rule is not a major rule as defined by the Congressional 
Review Act. 5 U.S.C. 804(2). This rule would not result in an annual 
effect on the economy of $100 million or more; a major increase in 
costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, government 
agencies, or geographic regions; or significant adverse effects on 
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on 
the ability of United States-based companies to compete with foreign-
based companies in domestic and export markets.

D. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13771

    Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess all 
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if 
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize 
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public 
health, and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). 
Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of using the best 
available methods to quantify costs and benefits, reducing costs, 
harmonizing rules, and promoting flexibility. Executive Order 13771 
directs agencies to reduce regulation and control regulatory costs and, 
for all qualifying regulations, to identify at least two existing 
regulations for elimination.
    This rule has been drafted in accordance with the principles of 
Executive Order 12866, section 1(b), and Executive Order 13563. The 
Department considers this rule to be a ``significant regulatory 
action'' under section 3(f)(3) of Executive Order 12866 because it 
materially alters user fees, but it is not an economically significant 
action because the annual effect on the economy is less than $100 
million annually. Accordingly, this rule has been submitted to OMB for 
review. This rule imposes transfer payments between the public and the 
Government and does not impose any new cost burdens that will need to 
be offset under Executive Order 13771. Thus, this rule is not subject 
to the requirements of Executive Order 13771.
    In the spring of 2018, EOIR conducted a comprehensive study using 
activity-based costing to determine the cost to EOIR for each type of 
application, appeal, and motion for which EOIR levies a fee under 8 CFR 
1103.7(b). EOIR's methodology for conducting this comprehensive study 
was as follows:
    First, in the survey-data phase, EOIR gathered survey data and 
consulted with OCIJ and BIA experts to determine the appropriate staff 
positions involved and the average time required to process and 
adjudicate each fee-based form or motion. EOIR also researched data 
from OPM and the GSA to determine the average salary rates for the 
applicable staff positions, including both Federal employees and EOIR 
contractors.
    Second, in the process-mapping phase, EOIR developed step-by-step 
process maps, with assigned times and staff positions, for each fee-
based form or motion processed in the OCIJ and the BIA. OCIJ and BIA 
experts validated any assumptions made during the process-mapping 
phase.
    Third, in the activity-based-costing phase, EOIR allocated the 
salary costs from the GSA and OPM data to each step in the process, 
based on the amount of time the step takes, the average salary of the 
responsible staff, and the percentage of total cases in which the step 
occurs. As discussed above, EOIR did not include other costs, such as 
the overhead costs for EOIR space that is used for processing 
applications, fringe benefits received by EOIR staff and contractors, 
interpreter costs, Federal Records Center costs, non-EOIR government 
agency costs, or the costs and time to process any non-fee-based 
application that is submitted in conjunction with a motion to reopen or 
reconsider. See 8 CFR 1003.23(b)(3) (``Any motion to reopen for the 
purpose of acting on an application for relief must be accompanied by 
the appropriate application for relief and all supporting 
documents.''). These costs were not included in the analysis because 
they represent costs that are incurred regardless of processing fee-
based motions or forms or because they

[[Page 82787]]

are not applicable in every adjudication of a fee-based motion or form, 
and DOJ did not employ a methodology to assign such costs equitably to 
various motion or form types.
    EOIR used this methodology to calculate an estimated cost for 
processing each form or motion for which EOIR levies a fee. The results 
of the activity-based-costing analysis are as follows:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.025


[[Page 82788]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.026


[[Page 82789]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.027


[[Page 82790]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.028


[[Page 82791]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.029

    As discussed above, these estimated costs calculated from the study 
demonstrate that EOIR's processing costs exceed the currently assessed 
fees for every fee-based form or motion processed byy EOIR. 
Accordingly, this rule raises the fees for these filiings.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.032

    To determine the economic impact of this rule, EOIR compared 
current fee collection levels and the fee collections that would have 
been generated by the proposed fees, as applied to filings from FY 
2018.\62\ In FY 2018, EOIR received more than 90,000 applications, 
appeals, and motions for which EOIR levies a fee. If fees had been 
collected for each of those filings at the current fee levels, EOIR 
would have collected $9.6 million in revenue. If, instead, the 
aforementioned FY 2018 filings had been charged the fees established by 
this rule, fee revenue for that fiscal year would have been 
approximately $51.1 million. In sum, the rule will cause applicants to 
pay approximately $41.4 million in fee revenue beyond that which would 
be expected if the filing fees were not changed. Comparing current fee 
collection levels with fee collections that would have been generated 
by the new fees in inflation-

[[Page 82792]]

adjusted dollars \63\ shows that the total revenue would have been 
approximately $22 million, or a difference of approximately $12.4 
million. EOIR, however, does not require a fee in every circumstance 
when a party files one of the affected forms or motions. Instead, there 
are certain circumstances when the normal filing fee does not apply, 
and this rule does not impact immigration judges' and the BIA's 
discretionary authority to waive a fee upon a showing that the filing 
party is unable to pay. See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(2)-(3), 1003.24(b)(2), (d), 
1103.7(c). Therefore, the actual fee collection that results from this 
rule may in fact be lower than stated above, which would result in a 
lower cost to applicants than the collection projections outlined in 
this cost analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Data documenting the FY 2018 filings were obtained from the 
EOIR Database on July 16, 2020, applying a dataset from Aug. 7, 
2019.
    \63\ This calculation was made by applying the consumer price 
index from January 1986 (109.6) to the real dollars calculation as 
compared to January 2019 (251.7). Historical Consumer Price Index 
for All Urban Consumers, Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables/supplemental-files/historical-cpi-u-202009.pdf (last accessed Nov. 12, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the continued availability of fee waivers, the Department 
does not believe that these fees will have a material impact on the 
volume of filings received annually. Indeed, because these forms and 
applications are connected with immigration benefits and applications 
and must be filed as a precursor to an alien obtaining the desired 
relief or processes--which may determine whether the alien is able to 
remain lawfully in the United States or is removed to a country to 
which he or she has repeatedly demonstrated a desire not to return--the 
Department expects the demand for filing these forms and motions to be 
relatively inelastic, particularly due to the relatively modest nature 
of the increases (i.e. less than $1000), their comparative similarity 
with fees imposed by USCIS, and the ability of many aliens to obtain 
access to financial resources which may be used to pay for them. Thus, 
the Department expects that aliens will continue to file the forms at 
roughly the same or similar rates as today following this rule's 
implementation.
    Ultimately, EOIR estimates the following filing numbers for these 
forms and motions in FY 2021:\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ FY 2021 projections were calculated applying the average 
percent change over ten fiscal years to FY2020 estimated receipts. 
EOIR first calculated the FY 2020 estimated receipts by adding the 
first three quarters of FY2020 receipts, divided by three, to 
itself. Next, the agency calculated the percent increase or decrease 
between each fiscal year and the average percent change.
    \65\ These numbers include both motions to reopen and motions to 
reconsider filed at the immigration court level.
    \66\ These numbers include both motions to reopen and motions to 
reconsider filed at the BIA level.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.030

    Transfers to EOIR from the actual revenues flow from the individual 
applicants to the IEFA administered by DHS and then to EOIR in a fixed 
amount regardless of the decreased subsidy to filing aliens.\67\ Though 
the fees may seem high as compared to the current fees, the agency has 
not increased its fees since 1986. Taken over the 33-year timespan from 
1986 to 2019, the fee increases represent compound annual growth rates 
ranging from 0.84 percent to 6.84 percent. While EOIR recognizes that 
the new fees will be more burdensome, individuals may still apply for a 
fee waiver for these fees pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), 
1103.7(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ As also discussed above, the Department did not include in 
the NPRM projected costs related to adjudication of fee waivers 
resulting from the rule, nor did it include overhead costs, non-
salary benefits, and costs associated with filing corollary 
documents that may be submitted with the application, appeal, or 
motion to which a fee applies. The inclusion of such costs would 
have likely led to greater fee increases and, thus, imposed greater 
costs on aliens.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR18DE20.031


[[Page 82793]]


    The Department determined that it is appropriate to move forward 
with full implementation of these new fees with one effective date. The 
Department considered commenters' suggestions, discussed above, that 
the Department should phase in the new fees. However, the Department 
again notes the significant length of time since the Department has 
updated the fees for these forms, applications, and motions. In 
addition, members of the public, including aliens in immigration 
proceedings who would be required to pay the new fee amounts if they do 
not seek or are not granted a fee waiver, have been on notice of the 
possible new fee amounts since the proposed rule's publication in 
February 2020. And as stated above, the Department does not believe a 
phased implementation is needed to provide individuals additional time 
to prepare for the new fees as fee waivers remain available by 
regulation for individuals who are unable to afford the new fee amount. 
See 8 CFR 1003.8(a)(3), 1003.24(d), 1103.7(c). Further, the Department 
notes that the closest comparable agency, USCIS, generally does not 
phase in fee increases even when they may be perceived as significant, 
and the Department is unaware of any difficulties that practice has 
created.
    Finally, as the Department discussed, the increase in fees may 
constitute an additional cost to an individual alien in the amount of 
the relevant increase, depending on the particular circumstances of 
each individual alien.\68\ It is also possible--and perhaps even 
probable--that the increased fees may lead additional aliens to seek a 
fee waiver than would without this rule, though the precise size of 
that group of aliens, though likely small for the reasons given, supra, 
is not estimated. Otherwise, the rule will impose minimal additional 
costs to the Government, as the Department has adjudicated fee waivers 
for many decades, and both Board members and immigration judges are 
experienced in adjudicating such requests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ As also discussed above, the Department did not include in 
the NPRM projected costs related to adjudication of fee waivers 
resulting from the rule, nor did it include overhead costs, non-
salary benefits, and costs associated with filing corollary 
documents that may be submitted with the application, appeal, or 
motion to which a fee applies. The inclusion of such costs would 
have likely led to greater fee increases and, thus, imposed a 
greater costs on aliens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism

    This rule will not have substantial direct effects on the States, 
on the relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with section 6 of 
Executive Order 13132, it is determined that this rule would not have 
sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a 
federalism summary impact statement.

F. Executive Order 12988: Criminal Justice Reform

    This rule meets the applicable standards set forth in sections 3(a) 
and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988.

G. Paperwork Reduction Act

    This rule does not propose new ``collection[s] of information'' as 
that term is defined under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public 
Law 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (codified at 44 U.S.C. 3501-3521) (``PRA''), 
and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR part 1320. There are no 
substantive changes to the forms as a result of this rulemaking; the 
only changes being proposed are revisions to the fee amounts for the 
existing forms for which EOIR sets the fees. The Department will be 
coordinating separately regarding updates to the existing forms under 
the PRA.

List of Subjects

8 CFR Part 1003

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration, Legal 
Services, Organization and functions (Government agencies).

8 CFR Part 1103

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration.

8 CFR Part 1208

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

8 CFR Part 1216

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens.

8 CFR Part 1240

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens.

8 CFR Part 1244

    Administrative practice and procedure, Immigration.

8 CFR Part 1245

    Aliens, Immigration, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, the 
Attorney General amends title 8, chapter V of the Code of Federal 
Regulations as follows:

PART 1003--EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

0
1. The authority for part 1003 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 6 U.S.C. 521; 8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 
1154, 1155, 1158, 1182, 1226, 1229, 1229a, 1229b, 1229c, 1231, 
1254a, 1255, 1324d, 1330, 1361, 1362; 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 1746; sec. 
2 Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1950; 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 1002; 
section 203 of Pub. L. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2196-200; sections 1506 
and 1510 of Pub. L. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1527-29, 1531-32; section 
1505 of Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-326 to -328.


Sec.  1003.8  [Amended]

0
2. Section 1003.8 is amended by removing the citation ``8 CFR 
103.7(a)'' and adding, in its place, the citation ``Sec.  1103.7(b)'' 
in paragraph (a)(4)(ii).


Sec.  1003.24  [Amended]

0
3. Section 1003.24 is amended by removing the citation ``8 CFR 103.7'' 
and adding, in its place, the words ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' 
in paragraphs (a) and (c)(1).

PART 1103--APPEALS, RECORDS, AND FEES

0
4. The authority for part 1103 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1304, 1356; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 28 
U.S.C. 509, 510.

0
5. Section 1103.7 is amended by:
0
a. Removing the citation ``8 CFR 103.7(a)(1)'' and adding, in its 
place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7'' in paragraph (a)(3);
0
b. Removing the citation ``8 CFR 103.7(a)(2)'' and adding, in its 
place, the words ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in paragraph 
(a)(3);
0
c. Removing the citation ``8 CFR 103.7'' and adding, in its place, the 
words ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in paragraph (b)(4)(ii); and
0
d. Revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (2), (b)(4), and (d).
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  1103.7  Fees.

* * * * *
    (b) Amounts of Fees--(1) Appeals. For filing an appeal to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals, when a fee is required pursuant to 8 CFR 
1003.8, as follows:
    Form EOIR-26. For filing an appeal from a decision of an 
immigration judge--$975.
    Form EOIR-29. For filing an appeal from a decision of an officer of 
the Department of Homeland Security--$705.

[[Page 82794]]

    Form EOIR-45. For filing an appeal from a decision of an 
adjudicating official in a practitioner disciplinary case--$675.
    (2) Motions. For filing a motion to reopen or a motion to 
reconsider, when a fee is required pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.8 or 1003.24, 
as follows:
    Motion to reopen or motion to reconsider before the immigration 
court--$145.
    Motion to reopen or motion to reconsider before the Board of 
Immigration Appeals--$895.
* * * * *
    (4) Applications for Relief--(i) Forms published by the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review. Fees for applications for relief shall 
be paid in accordance with 8 CFR 1003.8(b) and 1003.24(c) as follows:
    Form EOIR-40. Application for Suspension of Deportation--$305.
    Form EOIR-42A. Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain 
Permanent Residents--$305.
    Form EOIR-42B. Application for Cancellation of Removal and 
Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents--$360.
    (ii) Forms published by the Department of Homeland Security. The 
fees for applications published by the Department of Homeland Security 
and used in immigration proceedings are governed by 8 CFR 103.7 and 8 
CFR part 106. Consistent with 8 CFR 106.2, no fee shall apply to a Form 
I-589 filed with an immigration judge for the sole purpose of seeking 
withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act or protection 
under the Convention Against Torture regulations.
* * * * *
    (d) Requests for records under the Freedom of Information Act. Fees 
for production or disclosure of records under 5 U.S.C. 552 may be 
waived or reduced in accordance with 28 CFR 16.10.

PART 1208--PROCEDURES FOR ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

0
6. The authority for part 1208 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1158, 1226, 1252, 1282; Title 
VII of Public Law 110-229.


Sec.  1208.7  [Amended]

0
7. Section 1208.7 is amended by removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(c) of 
this chapter'' and adding, in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7 
and 8 CFR part 106'' in paragraph (c) introductory text.

PART 1216--CONDITIONAL BASIS OF LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENCE STATUS

0
8. The authority for part 1216 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1154, 1184, 1186a, 1186b, and 8 
CFR part 2.


Sec.  1216.4  [Amended]

0
9. Section 1216.4 is amended by removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(b) of 
8 CFR chapter I'' and adding, in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 
103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in paragraph (a)(1).


Sec.  1216.5  [Amended]

0
10. Section 1216.5 is amended by removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(b) of 
8 CFR chapter I'' and adding, in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 
103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in paragraph (b).


Sec.  1216.6  [Amended]

0
11. Section 1216.6 is amended by removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1) 
of 8 CFR chapter I'' and adding, in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 
103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in paragraph (a)(1).

PART 1240--PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE REMOVABILITY OF ALIENS IN THE 
UNITED STATES

0
12. The authority for part 1240 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1158, 1182, 1186a, 1186b, 1225, 1226, 
1227, 1228, 1229a, 1229b, 1229c, 1252 note, 1361, 1362; secs. 202 
and 203, Pub. L. 105-100 (111 Stat. 2160, 2193); sec. 902, Pub. L. 
105-277 (112 Stat. 2681).


Sec.  1240.11  [Amended]

0
13. Section 1240.11 is amended by:
0
a. Removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1) of 8 CFR chapter I'' and 
adding, in their place, the words ``Sec.  1103.7(b)(1) of this 
chapter'' in paragraph (f); and
0
b. Removing the citation ``8 CFR 103.7(b)(1)'' and adding, in its 
place, the words ``Sec.  1103.7(b)(4) of this chapter'' in paragraph 
(f).


Sec.  1240.20  [Amended]

0
14. Section 1240.20 is amended by removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(b) 
of 8 CFR chapter I'' and adding, in their place, the words ``Sec.  
1103.7(b) of this chapter'' in paragraph (a).

PART 1244--TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR NATIONALS OF DESIGNATED 
STATES

0
15. The authority for part 1244 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1254, 1254a note, 8 CFR part 2.


Sec.  1244.6  [Amended]

0
16. Section 1244.6 is amended by removing the words ``Sec.  103.7 of 
this chapter'' and adding, in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7 
and 8 CFR part 106''.


Sec.  1244.20  [Amended]

0
17. Section 1244.20 is amended by removing the citation ``8 CFR 
103.7(b)'' and adding, in its place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 
CFR part 106'' in paragraph (a).

PART 1245--ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS TO THAT OF PERSON ADMITTED FOR 
PERMANENT RESIDENCE

0
18. The authority for part 1245 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1182, 1255; section 202, Public 
Law 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193; section 902, Public Law 105-277, 
112 Stat. 2681; Title VII of Public Law 110-229.


Sec.  1245.7  [Amended]

0
19. Section 1245.7 is amended by removing the words ``Sec.  103.7 of 
this chapter'' and adding, in their place, the words ``8 CFR 103.7 and 
8 CFR 103.17'' in paragraph (a).


Sec.  1245.10  [Amended]

0
20. Section 1245.10 is amended by removing the words ``Sec.  
103.7(b)(1) of this chapter'' and adding, in their place, the citation 
``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in paragraph (c) introductory text.


Sec.  1245.13  [Amended]

0
21. Section 1245.13 is amended by:
0
a. Removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1) of 8 CFR chapter I'' and 
adding, in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' 
in paragraphs (e)(1), (g), (j)(1), and (k)(1);
0
b. Removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1) of 8 CFR chapter I'' and 
adding, in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7'' in paragraph 
(e)(2); and
0
c. Removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(c) of 8 CFR chapter I'' and adding, 
in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in 
paragraph (g).


Sec.  1245.15  [Amended]

0
22. Section 1245.15 is amended by:
0
a. Removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1) of this chapter'' and adding, 
in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in 
paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(A);
0
b. Removing words ``Sec.  103.7(c) of 8 CFR chapter I'' and adding, in 
their place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in 
paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B); and

[[Page 82795]]

0
c. Removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1) of 8 CFR chapter I'' and 
adding, in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' 
in paragraphs (h)(1) and (2), (n)(1), and (t)(1).


Sec.  1245.20  [Amended]

0
23. Section 1245.20 is amended by removing the words ``Sec.  
103.7(b)(1) of 8 CFR chapter I'' and adding, in their place, the 
citation ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in paragraphs (d)(1), (f), 
and (g).


Sec.  1245.21  [Amended]

0
24. Section 1245.21 is amended by:
0
a. Removing the words ``Sec.  103.7(b)(1) of this chapter'' and adding, 
in their place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in 
paragraph (b)(2); and
0
b. Removing the citation ``8 CFR 103.7(b)(1)'' and adding, in its 
place, the citation ``8 CFR 103.7 and 8 CFR part 106'' in paragraphs 
(h) and (i).

     Dated: December 9, 2020.
William P. Barr,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 2020-27506 Filed 12-15-20; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-30-P


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