Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Department of Justice

OVERSIGHT ★ INTEGRITY ★ GUIDANCE

Audit of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Controls over 

Weapons, Munitions, and 

Explosives

Audit Division 20-041 March 2020

 
 

 

Executive Summary 

Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Controls over Weapons, 

Munitions, and Explosives 

Objectives 

The objectives of this audit were to evaluate: (1) the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) controls over 

weapons, munitions, and explosives; (2) the FBI’s 

compliance with policies governing weapons, munitions, 

and explosives; and (3) the accuracy of the FBI’s 

weapons, munitions, and explosives inventories. 

The audit covers the FBI’s weapons, munitions, and 

explosives inventories from fiscal year (FY) 2016 

through November 2019. To accomplish our objectives, 

we interviewed FBI personnel; evaluated FBI policies 

governing weapons, munitions, and explosives; 

analyzed select data fields in the firearms inventory 

database; and reviewed firearm and explosives 

purchases. We also reviewed documentation related to 

firearms that were reported as lost or stolen during the 

scope of our audit to determine whether the FBI took 

appropriate action. Finally, we assessed compliance 

with FBI policy and conducted physical inventories at 

15 FBI sites. 

Results in Brief 

We found that firearms in our sample were recorded in 

the FBI’s inventory system and in the custody of the 

assigned Special Agent or stored in a secure area as 

required. However, we identified non-compliance issues 

related to the FBI’s ammunition inventories. We also 

identified concerns related to tracking FBI ammunition, 

less lethal munitions, diversionary devices, and 

explosives; and firearms slated for disposal. Finally, we 

identified areas where FBI policies should be established 

or revised to improve the safeguarding of its 

ammunition, less lethal munitions, diversionary devices, 

and explosives. 

Recommendations 

Our report contains 13 recommendations to improve 

the FBI’s controls over its weapons, ammunition, less 

lethal munitions, diversionary devices, and explosives. 

We requested a response to the draft report from the 

FBI, which can be found in Appendix 2. Our analysis of 

that response is included in Appendix 3. 

Audit Results 

As of August 2019, the FBI reported 57,812 firearms in 

its inventory. The FBI also maintains large quantities of 

ammunition for duty use, training, and periodic firearms 

qualifications. In addition, the FBI’s Tactical Section 

and Special Weapons and Tactics teams maintain a 

variety of specialty weapons and less lethal munitions, 

and diversionary devices. The FBI also employs Special 

Agent Bomb Technicians who maintain inventories of 

explosives. 

Controls over Firearms – We found that the FBI has 

strong physical controls over its unassigned firearms, 

and Special Agents are personally responsible for 

properly safeguarding assigned firearms. The FBI 

tracks its firearms using the Asset Management System 

(AMS), its automated property management system. 

During our physical inventory we were able to locate all 

firearms selected for our sample. However, we 

identified over 360 firearms without a designated 

property custodian in AMS, which is against FBI policy. 

We also selected a sample of firearms during our site 

visits and traced all but two of them back to AMS. The 

FBI could not explain the origins of these two firearms, 

or how they came to be in FBI custody. 

We also determined that our sample of firearms 

purchased during a 2 month period were properly 

entered into AMS in a timely manner. Additionally, we 

evaluated the FBI’s controls over firearms approved for 

disposal and identified deficiencies related to the 

accuracy of AMS records for destroyed firearms. 

Lost and Stolen Firearms – We noted that between 

September 2016 and July 2019, 38 FBI Special Agents 

were disciplined for the loss or theft of 45 FBI-issued 

firearms. The FBI suspended 37 and dismissed 1 of the 

Special Agents held responsible for the loss or theft. Of 

the 45 lost or stolen firearms, 24 have been recovered, 

1 of which was used in a crime. We also found that the 

FBI did not maintain complete documentation for 8 of 

the 45 lost or stolen firearms, including its make, 

model, or serial number; and a stolen firearm that was 

subsequently recovered more than 1 year ago was still 

marked as lost or stolen in AMS. 

i 
ii 

Executive Summary 

Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Controls over Weapons, 

Munitions, and Explosives 

Controls over Ammunition – The FBI maintained duty 

ammunition at 14 of the 15 sites we reviewed. We 

found that the FBI stored its ammunition in secured 

areas with access limited to FBI personnel. However, 

we identified weaknesses in the FBI’s ammunition 

tracking and physical inventory policies that increase 

the risk of ammunition being lost or stolen without 

detection. As a result, we found that 6 of the FBI sites 

included in our audit were not tracking over 1.2 million 

rounds of ammunition, and another 7 sites were not 

adequately tracking ammunition. 

Controls over Less Lethal Munitions and 

Diversionary Devices – The FBI maintained less lethal 

munitions and diversionary devices at 6 of the 15 sites 

we reviewed. Despite the lack of a policy establishing 

proper storage requirements, we found that the FBI 

stored its less lethal munitions and diversionary devices 

in a secure area with limited access. However, we 

identified weaknesses in the FBI’s tracking and physical 

inventory policies for less lethal munitions and 

diversionary devices that increases the risk of their 

being lost or stolen without detection. As a result, we 

found that one FBI site was not tracking less lethal 

munitions and diversionary devices and that the 

remaining five sites we visited were not adequately 

tracking them. 

Controls over Explosives – The FBI maintained 

explosives at 8 of the 15 sites we reviewed. We found 

that the FBI properly stored its explosives in accordance 

with FBI policy. However, we found two explosive 

magazines used to store FBI explosives were not owned 

by the FBI, but rather by state and local law 

enforcement agencies. As a result, the bomb 

technicians of these other agencies had emergency 

access to the FBI’s explosives. Additionally, we 

identified weaknesses in the FBI’s explosives tracking 

and physical inventory policies that increase the risk of 

explosives being lost or stolen without detection. As a 

result, we found that only two of the eight sites 

included in our audit were adequately tracking their 

explosives inventories. 

Controls over Firearm and Ammunition Evidence – 

We determined that the FBI had strong physical 

controls over firearm and ammunition evidence and 

access to the Evidence Control Rooms was limited to 

designated personnel and required a keycard, 

combination, and alarm code. The FBI tracks its 

firearms and ammunition evidence using SENTINEL. 

During our physical inventory of firearm and 

ammunition evidence, we located all items selected for 

our sample and traced a sample of firearm and 

ammunition evidence back to SENTINEL. 

However, we identified concerns related to firearm 

evidence sent to the Firearms/Toolmarks Unit (FTU) for 

destruction. Specifically, the current process of 

shipping firearm evidence to the FTU for destruction 

creates a risk that firearms could be lost in transit 

without detection; and firearms are being marked as 

disposed in SENTINEL before the firearms are actually 

destroyed. 
AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S 

CONTROLS OVER WEAPONS, MUNITIONS, AND EXPLOSIVES 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 1 

OIG Audit Approach....................................................................... 1 

AUDIT RESULTS.................................................................................... 3 

Controls over Firearms ................................................................... 3 

Physical Security of Firearms ................................................... 3 

Accuracy of the FBI’s Asset Management System.......................... 3 

Firearm Purchases ................................................................ 4 

Firearm Disposal .................................................................. 5 

Lost and Stolen Firearms ........................................................ 5 

Controls over Ammunition............................................................... 8 

Physical Security of Ammunition............................................... 8 

Ammunition Tracking............................................................. 9 

Results of the Ammunition Inventory ....................................... 10 

Controls over Less Lethal Munitions and Diversionary Devices ................ 10 

Physical Security of Less Lethal Munitions and Diversionary Devices.. 11 

Tracking Less Lethal Munitions and Diversionary Devices .............. 11 

Results of the Less Lethal Munitions and Diversionary Devices 

Inventory ................................................................. 12 

Controls over Explosives ............................................................... 12 

Physical Security of Explosives ............................................... 13 

Tracking Explosives ............................................................. 13 

Results of the Explosives Inventory ......................................... 14 
Explosives Purchases ........................................................... 15 

Controls over Firearm and Ammunition Evidence................................. 15 

Physical Security of Firearm and Ammunition Evidence................. 15 

Accuracy of the FBI’s Firearm and Ammunition Evidence Inventory . 15 

Disposal of Firearm Evidence ................................................. 16 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................... 18 

APPENDIX 1: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY.............................. 20 

APPENDIX 2: THE FBI’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ................. 24 

APPENDIX 3: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY 

OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT ............................... 30 
 

AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S 

CONTROLS OVER WEAPONS, MUNITIONS, AND EXPLOSIVES 

INTRODUCTION 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) currently employs over 13,000 

Special Agents located throughout the world, including over 400 domestic field 

offices and resident agencies, and 91 offices in 75 foreign countries. In support of 

its operations, the FBI maintains weapons, munitions, and explosives, including 

firearms, ammunition, less lethal munitions, diversionary devices, and explosives. 

FBI Special Agents are required to carry a primary-duty handgun, and may 

be issued supplemental handguns, rifles, and shotguns. FBI employees also have 

the option of using authorized personally-owned firearms for duty use, and carrying 

oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray. As of August 2019, the FBI reported 57,812 firearms 

in its inventory, which are tracked through the FBI’s automated property management 

database, the Asset Management System (AMS). The FBI also maintains large 

quantities of ammunition for duty use, training, and periodic firearms qualifications. 

In addition, the FBI’s Tactical Section and Special Weapons and Tactics 

(SWAT) teams maintain a variety of specialty weapons and munitions, including 

fully automatic machine guns; projectile launching devices and less lethal 

projectiles; smoke grenades; and Noise Flash Diversionary Devices, commonly 

referred to as flash bang grenades. 

As a result of its criminal enforcement activity, FBI personnel may seize 

firearms and ammunition as evidence. Firearms and ammunition evidence must be 

tracked using SENTINEL, the FBI’s central recordkeeping and case management 

system. All firearms and ammunition evidence must be stored in a secure Evidence 

Control Room. Additionally, FBI policy requires that firearms and ammunition 

evidence be stored separately, with the firearms packaging identifying the caliber, 

make, model, and serial number. 

OIG Audit Approach 

Our objectives were to evaluate: (1) the FBI’s controls over weapons, 

munitions, and explosives; (2) the FBI’s compliance with policies governing 

weapons, munitions, and explosives; and (3) the accuracy of the FBI’s weapons, 

munitions, and explosives inventories. The scope of our audit generally covers the 

FBI’s inventories of firearms, ammunition, less lethal munitions, diversionary 

devices, and explosives, including firearms and ammunition seized as evidence, 

firearm and explosives purchases, and FBI-issued firearms reported lost or stolen, 

from September 2015 through November 2019. 

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed FBI personnel, including 

officials from the Finance, Inspection, Training, and Laboratory Divisions, as well as 

the Critical Incident Response Group. In addition, we evaluated the FBI’s policies 

governing weapons, munitions, and explosives, and reviewed documentation 

related to firearms and explosives purchases to ensure that acquisitions were 

1 
properly recorded.1 We also reviewed documentation related to firearms that were 

reported as lost or stolen during the scope of our audit to determine whether the 

FBI took appropriate action. Finally, we conducted site work at 15 FBI sites, as 

shown in Table 1.2 

Table 1 

FBI Offices Selected for Audit 

FBI Office FBI Firearms Firearms Evidence 

Denver Division 

Denver Field Office 374 400 

Loveland Resident Agency 27 0

Chicago Division 

Chicago Field Office 1,079 1,439 

Milwaukee Division 

Milwaukee Field Office 289 163 

Madison Resident Agency 32 0 

Sacramento Division 

Sacramento Field Office 333 584 

Stockton Resident Agency 40 0 

Boston Division 

Boston Field Office 451 351 

Providence Resident Agency 75 0 

New Haven Division 

New Haven Field Office 227 311

Training Division 

Firearms Training Unit 1,322 

Defensive Systems Unit 9,212 

Laboratory Division 

Firearms/Toolmarks Unit 7,863 

Critical Incident Response Group 

Tactical Section 1,847 

Hazardous Devices School 31 

 

 

 

Source: The FBI’s AMS; the FBI’s SENTINEL 

The purpose of our site work was to assess the FBI’s compliance with policies 

regarding its weapons, munitions, and explosives, as well as the effectiveness of 

those policies. As applicable, we also conducted a physical inventory of a sample of 

firearms, ammunition, less lethal munitions, diversionary devices, and explosives at 

the sites we visited. In addition, we assessed the FBI’s compliance with policies 

regarding firearms and ammunition seized as evidence. Finally, we conducted a 

physical inventory of a sample of firearm and ammunition evidence. Appendix 1 

contains a more detailed description of our audit objectives, scope, and methodology. 

1 See Appendix 1 for a list of FBI policies we reviewed. 

2 We selected a broad range of FBI offices and functions for our site work, including large 

division offices; smaller Resident Agencies; the FBI’s Training Academy; the Critical Incident Response 

Group’s Tactical Section, and the Hazardous Devices School. 

2 
AUDIT RESULTS 

We found that the FBI has strong physical controls over its unassigned 

firearms and that Special Agents are personally responsible for properly 

safeguarding assigned firearms. However, we identified over 360 firearm inventory 

records that did not include a designated property custodian as required by FBI 

policy. We also identified weaknesses in the FBI’s controls over tracking its 

ammunition, less lethal munitions, diversionary devices, and explosives, which, in 

our judgement, create a risk that these sensitive items may be lost, misplaced, or 

stolen without detection. Specifically, we found that the FBI’s ammunition, less 

lethal munitions, diversionary devices, and explosives tracking and inventory 

requirements were either not specific, or non-existent; as a result, at 14 of the 

sites included in our audit, these items were not tracked or were not adequately 

tracked. In addition, at two sites the FBI is storing its explosives in a magazine 

owned by state and local law enforcement agencies who have emergency access. 

Finally, we identified concerns with the FBI’s firearm evidence disposal process, 

which increases the risk that firearms sent for destruction may be lost during 

shipping. 

Controls over Firearms 

The FBI tracks its firearms inventory using an automated property 

management database known as AMS. The FBI also conducts an annual physical 

inventory of all of its firearms. During our site visits, we performed a physical 

inventory and were able to locate all of the weapons selected for our sample. We 

were also able to trace another sample of weapons back to AMS, although we noted 

some data errors in AMS. Additionally, we identified 369 firearms for which the 

AMS records did not include a designated property custodian as required by FBI 

policy. Finally, from September 2015 through July 2019, the FBI reported 45 of its 

firearms as lost or stolen. 

Physical Security of Firearms 

We found that the FBI had strong physical controls over unassigned firearms. 

Special Agents are personally responsible for properly safeguarding their assigned 

firearms at all times. Additionally, FBI offices have designated staff, Primary 

Firearms Instructors, who are responsible for all firearms that are not issued to an 

employee. When assigned firearms are not in the personal custody of Special 

Agents they must be placed in a secure, locked storage area to prevent 

unauthorized handling. At the 15 FBI sites we visited, we found that all of the 

firearms in our sample were either in the custody of the assigned Special Agent or 

stored in a secure area. 

Accuracy of the FBI’s Asset Management System 

As of August 2019, the FBI reported 57,812 firearms in its inventory. We 

selected a sample of 422 firearms from AMS to ensure that they were physically 

accounted for and accurately tracked in the system. We selected an additional 

3 
 

185 firearms while on site to ensure that the field sites’ AMS records were complete 

and accurate. During our physical inventory, we located all 422 firearms in our 

sample and traced 183 of the additional 185 firearms back to AMS. We were 

unable to trace two firearms back to AMS, both of which were located in a gun safe 

in the Madison Resident Agency. The Firearms Instructor in Madison explained that 

the origins of the firearms were unknown. As a result, the FBI needs to determine 

the rightful owner of these firearms and take appropriate action. Therefore, we 

recommend that the FBI ensure all firearms in its custody are properly entered into 

the appropriate property management system. All FBI-issued firearms should be 

entered into AMS and all firearm evidence should be entered into SENTINEL. 

During our physical inventory, we also identified data errors in AMS for 20 of 

the firearms included in our sample, related to the make, model, serial number, 

location, or assigned user. An FBI official explained that the errors may be 

attributed to invalid or corrupted data fields that occurred during its migration to 

AMS from the FBI’s prior property management system. While these inaccuracies 

did not significantly impact our ability to locate the firearms and the FBI either 

corrected or submitted a service request to correct the errors, it is important that 

the FBI maintains current and accurate information in AMS. 

Additionally, we identified 32 AMS records for the firearms in our sample that 

did not include an assigned property custodian. The FBI’s Personal Property 

Management Policy Guide requires all accountable assets in AMS be assigned to a 

property custodian. This designation is particularly important because property 

custodians are responsible for the stewardship of all assets assigned to them. As a 

result, we expanded our analysis concerning the assignment of property custodians 

to include all 23,201 firearms listed in AMS for the 15 sites included in our audit. 

Based on our expanded analysis, we found that a total of 369 firearms did not have 

an assigned property custodian in AMS. Without a designated property custodian, 

the FBI cannot be assured that all of its firearms are properly safeguarded. 

Therefore, we recommend that the FBI ensure all firearms in its inventory have a 

designated property custodian, in accordance with policy. 

Firearm Purchases 

The FBI’s Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) is responsible for purchasing, 

receiving, and test-firing all new firearms. According to a DSU official, once DSU 

receives a shipment of new firearms, the contents of the shipping container are 

inventoried against the receiving documents. Once all firearms are accounted for, 

the receiving documents are signed and dated, approved by a DSU program 

manager, and forwarded to an Inventory Management Specialist. The Inventory 

Management Specialist then submits a service request in AMS to have the firearm 

entered into the inventory, including all pertinent information such as the firearm 

manufacturer, model, and serial number. Once the record is complete, the firearm 

becomes operational and can be issued to a user. We reviewed a sample of 226 

purchased firearms that were received in July and August 2019. Based on our 

review, we did not identify any concerns related to the FBI’s firearm purchases. 

Additionally, we found that all 226 firearms were correctly entered into AMS. 

4 
 

 

 

 

Firearm Disposal 

We identified concerns related to the record keeping of disposed FBI-issued 

firearms. The FBI’s DSU is responsible for destruction of FBI-issued firearms. A 

DSU official explained that only the DSU Chief, or its designee, can determine 

whether FBI-issued firearms are eligible for destruction, after which the Asset 

Management Unit provides the authority for DSU to destroy weapons. For each 

firearm approved by DSU for destruction, DSU prepares a Form FD-519, 

Requirements and Certification for Cannibalization and Destruction of Equipment; 

photographs the firearm’s serial number; and places the firearm into a cardboard 

box. Once the box contains 50 firearms, it is inventoried and sealed, and the list of 

contents is attached to the outside of the box. The box is then stored in a secure 

vault and wrapped with other sealed disposal boxes prior to being escorted to the 

destruction facility. The disposal process is witnessed by two FBI employees from 

two vantage points and the destruction is certified on the Form FD-519. An 

Inventory Management Specialist uses the serial number photos to verify the 

disposal status of firearm records in AMS and submits a service request in AMS that 

must be approved by the Asset Management Unit before the inventory record is 

updated. We examined the physical security of the disposal boxes and found that 

they were properly stored in a secure area with access limited to designated 

officials. 

However, we found two destroyed FBI prop guns that were still listed in the 

FBI’s active inventory. The property numbers for both prop guns were listed on the 

inventory sheet with serial numbers of 48 other firearms awaiting disposal. 

According to a DSU official, prop guns are non-functioning items used for training. 

They are not actual firearms and do not have serial numbers. However, they are 

assigned an FBI property number and entered into AMS. The DSU official explained 

that since these prop guns did not have serial numbers, the disposal information 

was not recorded in AMS. Because these were not actual firearms, we are not 

making a recommendation related to this issue. 

Lost and Stolen Firearms 

Between September 2015 and July 2019, 38 FBI Special Agents reported 

45 assigned FBI firearms as lost or stolen. We noted that 24 of the 45 lost or 

stolen firearms have been recovered, 1 of which was used in the commission of an 

attempted robbery while outside of the FBI’s custody. 

The details related to the 45 lost and stolen firearms included in our analysis 

are shown in Table 2. 

5 
Table 2 

Lost and Stolen FBI Firearms 

Type 

of 

Loss Type of Firearm 

Firearm 

Recovered 

Involved 

in a Crime Synopsis 

Disciplinar 

y Action 

Stolen Springfield pistol No Unknown Stolen from 

government vehicle 

3-day 

Stolen Colt carbine No Unknown suspension 

Lost Glock pistol No Unknown Inadequately 

safeguarded 

3-day

suspension 

Stolen Springfield pistol No Unknown Inadequately 

safeguarded 

5-day 

Stolen Glock pistol No Unknown suspension 

Stolen Glock pistol No Unknown Stolen from rental car 3-day 

suspension 

Stolen H&K submachine gun No Unknown Stolen from 

government vehicle 

3-day 

Stolen Remington shotgun No Unknown suspension 

Lost Unknown Yes Unknown Left in public 

restroom 

3-day

suspension 

Lost Glock pistol Yes Unknown Left on truck bumper 3-day

suspension 

Stolen Glock pistol No Unknown Stolen from 

government vehicle 

3-day

suspension 

Lost Glock training pistol Yes No 

Failed to record 

issuance of training 

firearm in AMS 

3-day

suspension 

Stolen Rock River carbine No Unknown Stolen from 

government vehicle 

5-day 

Stolen Glock pistol No Unknown suspension 

Stolen Rock River carbine Yes 

Yes, 1 of 2 Stolen from 

government vehicle 

3-day

Stolen H&K submachine gun Yes suspension 

Stolen Glock pistol No Unknown Stolen from 

government vehicle 

7-day

suspension 

Lost Glock pistol Yes Unknown Left in public area 3-day

suspension 

Lost Glock pistol Yes Unknown Misplaced in 

residence 

3-day

suspension 

Lost Unknown Yes Unknown Left in public 

restroom 

3-day

suspension 

Stolen Glock pistol No Unknown Stolen from residence 45-day

suspension 

Stolen H&K submachine gun No Unknown Inadequately 

safeguarded 

3-day

suspension 

Lost Remington shotgun Yes Unknown Left on trunk of car 5-day

suspension 

Lost Handgun Yes Unknown Inadequately 

safeguarded 

3-day

suspension 

Lost Unknown Yes Unknown Left in hotel room 3-day

suspension 

Lost Glock pistol Yes Unknown Misplaced in 

residence 

3-day

suspension 

Lost Glock training pistol No Unknown Misplaced by Special 

Agent 

3-day

suspension 

Lost Glock pistol Yes Unknown Left in hotel restroom 3-day

suspension 

6 
 

Lost Sig Sauer training 

pistol No Unknown 

Assigned Special 

Agent could not 

account for firearm 

during inventory 

3-day 

suspension 

Lost Glock pistol No Unknown Lost during training 

exercise 

3-day 

suspension 

Stolen Glock pistol Yes Unknown Stolen by daughter 3-day 

suspension 

Lost Springfield pistol Yes Unknown Misplaced in 

residence 

5-day 

suspension 

Stolen Glock pistol No Unknown Stolen from personal 

vehicle 

3-day 

suspension 

Lost Glock pistol Yes Unknown Misplaced at prison 

facility 

7-day 

suspension 

Stolen Colt carbine Yes Unknown Stolen from 

government vehicle 

3-day 

suspension 

Stolen Glock pistol Yes Unknown Stolen from hotel 

room 

Dismissal 

Stolen Unknown Yes Unknown Stolen from airport 5-day 

suspension 

Stolen Glock pistol Yes Unknown Stolen from vehicle 3-day 

suspension 

Stolen Glock pistol No Unknown 

Stolen from vehicle 60-day 

suspension Stolen Glock pistol No Unknown 

Stolen Colt carbine No Unknown 

Stolen Glock pistol Yes Unknown Inadequately 

safeguarded 

3-day 

suspension 

Stolen H&K submachine gun No Unknown Inadequately 

safeguarded 

3-day 

suspension 

Stolen H&K submachine gun Yes Unknown Stolen from 

government vehicle 

3-day 

suspension 

Lost Glock pistol Yes Unknown Left in restaurant 3-day 

Source: The FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility 

bathroom suspension 

We reviewed the FBI’s records to determine whether it took disciplinary 

action in response to these lost or stolen firearms incidents. We found that in 37 of 

the 38 incidents, the Special Agent responsible for the loss or theft was suspended 

between 3 and 60 days; the most common suspension was 3 days. For the 

remaining incident, the circumstances of the theft were serious enough to warrant 

dismissal of the Special Agent responsible. 

To ensure the accuracy of the FBI’s tracking information, we reviewed AMS 

records for the 21 lost or stolen firearms that remain missing to confirm that none 

of them appear in the FBI’s active inventory record. Similarly, we attempted to 

confirm that the inventory records for all 24 recovered firearms have been 

appropriately updated in AMS. However, we found that the FBI did not maintain 

complete documentation for 8 of the 45 lost or stolen firearms, including its make, 

model, or serial number. As a result, we were unable to determine if the AMS 

records were accurate. When a firearm is lost or stolen, FBI policy requires Primary 

Firearm Instructors to prepare an Electronic Communication that includes all of the 

details about the incident, including the serial number of the weapon. The Primary 

Firearm Instructor must also prepare a Form FD-500, Report of Lost or Stolen 

7 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Property, that includes the serial number and description of the firearms. The fact 

that the FBI was unable to provide this information indicates that the policy is not 

being properly followed. As a result, we recommend that the FBI ensures that 

complete documentation of lost and stolen FBI firearms is maintained, including all 

pertinent information such as the firearm make, model, and serial number. 

Additionally, a stolen firearm that was subsequently recovered more than 1 year 

ago was still marked as lost or stolen in AMS. In our judgment, AMS should always 

maintain current and accurate inventory data for all firearms. Therefore, we 

recommend that the FBI ensure that the status of all lost or stolen firearms that are 

subsequently recovered is accurately reflected in AMS. 

Finally, we assessed the rate of loss of FBI firearms over a 47-month period 

from September 2015 through July 2019 to determine how it compared to the loss 

rate identified in our prior 2002 and 2007 OIG audits.3 We found that the FBI 

experienced 0.96 losses or thefts per month over the 47-month period from 2015 

to 2019, which is a significant decrease over the monthly loss rates of 7.6 and 3.2 

losses or thefts per month identified in the 2002 and 2007 OIG audits, respectively. 

While the FBI has substantially reduced the rate of lost and stolen firearms since 

our prior audits, it must continuously work toward reducing this rate. 

Controls over Ammunition 

The FBI maintained duty ammunition at 14 of the 15 sites we reviewed. We 

found that the FBI had strong physical controls to ensure that ammunition is stored 

in secure locations at all 14 sites we visited. We also determined that 6 of 14 sites 

were not tracking over 1.2 million rounds of ammunition. Additionally, while the 

eight remaining sites had a method for tracking ammunition, only one site was 

adequately tracking ammunition. In our judgment, the issues we identified related 

to tracking ammunition primarily resulted from the FBI’s inadequate ammunition 

tracking policy. We also identified areas where the FBI ammunition policy could be 

improved. 

Physical Security of Ammunition 

FBI policy requires that ammunition be stored in a secure area with strictly 

controlled access. At all 14 sites that had ammunition inventories, we found that 

the ammunition was kept in a secure storage area. However, at 1 of the 14 sites a 

local task force officer had access to the FBI ammunition storage area. Subsequent 

to our site visit, this office moved its ammunition to a new location and now limits 

access to only designated FBI personnel. As a result, we are not making a 

recommendation related to this issue. 

3 Audit Report 02-27, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Control over Weapons and Laptop 

Computers, August 2002; and Audit Report 07-18, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Control over 

Weapons and Laptop Computers Follow-Up Audit, February 2007. 

8 
 

 

 

Ammunition Tracking 

Strong controls over ammunition require an inventory management system 

that maintains accurate, current, and historical data—to include increases and 

decreases in inventory and the reason for the changes in quantity over time. While 

FBI policy states that Primary Firearms Instructors should account for all 

ammunition usage, the policy does not specify how ammunition should be tracked. 

We believe that this is a control weakness that increases the risk of ammunition 

being lost, misplaced, or stolen without detection. In our judgment, handwritten 

logs should be maintained in the ammunition storage area to facilitate consistent 

use and avoid the necessity for computer access on-site. Handwritten logs also 

ensure that the tracking method includes an audit trail of recorded transactions, 

which is a control that can be circumvented using an electronic inventory log that 

allows the user to overwrite the data. Therefore, we recommend that the FBI 

amend its policy for tracking ammunition to require that all rounds of each type of 

ammunition be tracked using handwritten logs that detail the date, caliber, quantity 

in or out, purpose of the ammunition transaction, and remaining balance; and that 

the FBI require all ammunition tracking logs to be retained for at least 3 years. 

We found that 6 of the 14 FBI sites included in our audit were not tracking 

over 1.2 million rounds of ammunition. The remaining eight sites were using 

various methods to track ammunition, including logging ammunition transactions or 

periodically updating the balance of ammunition on hand. However, the Firearms 

Training Unit was the only site that adequately tracked all ammunition transactions 

in and out of the storage area and maintained a running balance of ammunition on 

hand, which we view as a best practice that the FBI should implement at all offices. 

Table 3 outlines ammunition tracking methods and the related deficiencies we 

identified at the 14 sites included in our analysis. 

Table 3 

Ammunition Tracking Deficiencies 

Site Tracking Methods Tracking Deficiencies 

Handwritten log with Office only recently started tracking 

Denver Field Office transactions and running ammunition; not all ammunition was 

balances being tracked 

Loveland Resident 

Agency None Ammunition was not tracked 

Boston Field Office Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Transactions were not being recorded, 

no historical data, and ending 

balances were not updated regularly 

Providence Resident 

Agency None Ammunition was not tracked 

Chicago Field Office 

Handwritten log with 

transactions and electronic log 

with running balances 

Two separate tracking methods that 

were not reconciled regularly 

Milwaukee Field Office Electronic log showing 

inventory totals Transactions were not being recorded 

Madison Resident 

Agency 

Handwritten log with 

transactions and electronic log 

with running balances 

Office only recently started tracking 

ammunition; two separate tracking 

methods 

9 
 

Sacramento Field Office None Ammunition was not tracked 

Stockton Resident 

Agency None Ammunition was not tracked 

New Haven Field Office None Ammunition was not tracked 

CIRG – Tactical Section 

Handwritten log with 

transactions and electronic log 

with running balances 

No historical running balances 

Defensive Systems Unit None Ammunition was not tracked 

Hazardous Devices 

School 

Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Transactions were not being recorded 

and no historical data 

Firearms Training Unit 

Handwritten log with 

transactions and electronic log 

with running balances 

None 

Source: The FBI and OIG 

Results of the Ammunition Inventory 

In order to assess the accuracy of the FBI’s ammunition inventories, we 

conducted a physical inventory of ammunition at the 14 sites we visited that 

maintained ammunition. As stated previously, 6 of the 14 sites were not tracking 

ammunition; as a result, we could not assess the accuracy of their ammunition 

inventories. For the remaining eight sites that had some type of ammunition 

tracking system, we identified discrepancies between the quantities of ammunition 

on hand and the recorded inventory balance at six sites. In total for the six sites, 

the balances recorded in the ammunition inventory records were understated by 

over 174,000 rounds, meaning that the FBI had more ammunition on hand than 

what was documented. In our judgment, the discrepancies we identified are a 

direct result of the FBI’s insufficient ammunition tracking and inventory policies. 

We also found that the FBI’s policy for conducting periodic physical 

inventories of its ammunition needs improvement. While the FBI requires its offices 

to conduct annual physical inventories of its ammunition, this function is primarily 

performed to allow the Finance Division to account for all FBI assets. In our 

judgment, a physical ammunition inventory should also ensure that the running 

balances on ammunition tracking logs are accurate by reconciling the ammunition 

on hand to the logged inventory balance. However, this is not required by current 

FBI policy. When implemented effectively, this physical inventory practice should 

detect if ammunition goes missing. We observed this form of physical ammunition 

inventory being conducted at the FBI’s Firearms Training Unit and its Tactical 

Section, which we view as a best practice that the FBI should implement agencywide. Therefore, we recommend that the FBI revise its current policy to require its 

offices to conduct a complete inventory of all ammunition on hand on an annual 

basis to ensure all recorded ammunition inventory balances are accurate, and to 

retain those records for at least 3 years. 

Controls over Less Lethal Munitions and Diversionary Devices 

The FBI maintained less lethal munitions and diversionary devices, including 

pepper spray, handheld and projectile chemical agents, breaching munitions, 

smoke grenades, and flash bang grenades, at 6 of the 15 sites we reviewed. We 

10 
 

found that the FBI has strong physical controls over its less lethal munitions and 

diversionary devices at these six sites. However, we identified deficiencies related 

to the FBI’s tracking of its less lethal munitions and diversionary devices. We also 

found that the FBI was not conducting annual physical inventories of its less lethal 

munitions and diversionary devices. 

Physical Security of Less Lethal Munitions and Diversionary Devices 

We found that the FBI has strong physical controls over its less lethal 

munitions and diversionary devices. While the FBI does not have policy outlining 

storage requirements for less lethal munitions and diversionary devices, we 

observed that less lethal munitions and diversionary devices at all six sites were 

kept in a secure storage area. We also found that all six sites limited access to the 

secure storage areas to designated personnel. However, without established 

storage requirements, there is a risk that less lethal munitions and diversionary 

devices may not be properly safeguarded from loss or theft at all FBI locations. In 

our judgment, the FBI should formalize its current storage practices in policy. 

Therefore, we recommend that the FBI establish policy requiring that less lethal 

munitions and diversionary devices must be stored in a secure area, with access 

limited to designated personnel. 

Tracking Less Lethal Munitions and Diversionary Devices 

Strong controls over less lethal munitions and diversionary devices require an 

inventory management system that maintains accurate, current, and historical 

data—to include increases and decreases in inventory and the reason for the 

changes in quantity over time. However, the FBI’s policy merely suggests that 

Primary Firearms Instructors create an inventory system for all expendable 

commodities, and is largely silent with regard to tracking less lethal munitions and 

diversionary devices. In our judgment, this is a control weakness that increases 

the risk of less lethal munitions and diversionary devices being lost, misplaced, or 

stolen without detection. Therefore, we recommend that the FBI establish policy 

for tracking less lethal munitions and diversionary devices that requires all 

quantities of each type of less lethal munition and diversionary device be tracked 

using handwritten logs that detail the date, quantity in or out, purpose of the 

transaction, and remaining balance; and that the FBI require all less lethal munition 

and diversionary device tracking logs to be retained for at least 3 years. 

We found that one of the six FBI sites included in our audit was not tracking 

less lethal munitions and diversionary devices. The remaining five sites were using 

various methods to track these items, only some of which adequately logged 

transactions or kept a running balance of less lethal munitions and diversionary 

devices on hand. While none of these five sites were adequately tracking all less 

lethal munitions and diversionary devices, the Denver and Chicago Field Offices 

tracked usage of flash bang grenades and maintained a record showing which 

Special Agents had these munitions in their custody, which we view as a best 

practice that the FBI should implement at all offices. Table 4 outlines the various 

methods used by the FBI offices we visited to track less lethal munitions and 

11 
 

 

 

 

 

diversionary devices, as well as the deficiencies we found with those tracking 

methods. 

Table 4 

Less Lethal Munition and Diversionary Device Tracking Deficiencies 

Site Tracking Methods Tracking Deficiencies 

Denver Field Office Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Not all transactions were being 

recorded (only flash bang grenades) 

Chicago Field Office Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Not all transactions were being 

recorded (only flash bang grenades) 

Milwaukee Field Office Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Transactions were not being recorded 

and no historical data 

Madison Resident 

Agency 

Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Transactions were not being recorded 

and no historical data 

New Haven Field Office None Less lethal munitions were not tracked 

CIRG – Tactical Section Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Transactions were not being recorded 

and no historical data 

Source: The FBI and OIG 

Results of the Less Lethal Munitions and Diversionary Devices Inventory 

We conducted a physical inventory of less lethal munitions and diversionary 

devices at the six sites that maintained these inventories. We identified 

discrepancies between the quantities of less lethal munitions and diversionary 

devices on hand and the recorded inventory balance at three of the five sites that 

tracked these items. In total, these sites overstated their recorded inventories of 

less lethal munitions and diversionary devices on hand by 87 items. In our 

judgment, the discrepancies we identified are primarily a result of the FBI’s 

deficient less lethal munition and diversionary device tracking and inventory 

policies. 

In addition, we found that the FBI does not require periodic physical 

inventories of its less lethal munitions and diversionary devices. In our judgment, a 

physical inventory of all less lethal munitions and diversionary devices should be 

conducted regularly to ensure all items are properly accounted for on the inventory 

tracking documents. Consequently, we recommend that the FBI require its offices 

to conduct a complete physical inventory of all less lethal munitions and 

diversionary devices on an annual basis and retain those records for at least 

3 years. 

Controls over Explosives 

The FBI maintained explosives at 8 of the 15 sites we reviewed. We found 

that the FBI has strong physical controls over its explosives at all eight locations we 

visited. However, we identified deficiencies related to the FBI’s tracking of its 

explosives. We also found that the FBI was not conducting annual physical 

inventories of explosives. 

12 
 

Physical Security of Explosives 

We found that the FBI has strong physical controls over its explosives. At 

each of the eight sites we visited with an explosives inventory, explosives were 

stored in a secure area with access limited to designated bomb technicians. 

However, we noted that two of the explosive magazines used to store FBI 

explosives were not owned by the FBI, but rather by state or local law enforcement 

agencies. As a result, the bomb technicians of these state and local law 

enforcement agencies had access to the FBI’s explosives inventories. It should be 

noted that these agencies did not store explosives in the same magazine as the 

FBI, and the access they were granted was for emergency purposes only. 

According to an FBI Special Agent Bomb Technician (SABT), it is cost-prohibitive for 

the FBI to maintain its own explosive magazines in field offices with a small number 

of SABTs, which necessitates these types of explosives storage arrangements with 

other law enforcement agencies. In our judgment, the risk posed by granting 

non-FBI employees access to the FBI’s explosives can be mitigated by 

implementing our recommendations related to tracking explosives and conducting 

periodic physical explosives inventories, which are discussed in the following 

sections. Consequently, we are not making a recommendation related to this issue. 

Tracking Explosives 

Strong controls over explosives require an inventory management system 

that maintains accurate, current, and historical data—to include increases and 

decreases in inventory and the reason for the changes in quantity over time. While 

FBI policy requires SABTs to maintain strict accountability and security for all 

explosives, the policy does not specify how SABTs should account for and track 

their explosives inventories. As a result, various methods were used to track 

explosives at the eight sites we visited that maintained explosives. We found that 

only two sites, the FBI’s Hazardous Devices School and the Sacramento Field Office, 

were effectively tracking explosive materials. Both sites maintained hand-written 

logs for each type of explosive material stored in its magazines that tracked all 

movement of explosives in and out of the storage area, and the remaining balance 

on hand. In our judgment, this is a best practice that the FBI should implement 

agency-wide, to ensure explosives are not lost or stolen without detection. 

Therefore, we recommend that the FBI amend its policy requiring all quantities of 

each type of explosive material be tracked by its SABTs using handwritten logs that 

detail the date, quantity in or out, purpose of the transaction, and remaining 

balance; and that the FBI retain all explosives tracking records for at least 3 years. 

Table 5 outlines the various methods used by the FBI offices we visited to track 

explosives and the deficiencies we found with those tracking methods. 

13 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 5 

Explosives Tracking Deficiencies 

Site 

Boston Field Office 

Tracking Methods 

Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Tracking Deficiencies 

Transactions were not being recorded 

and no historical data 

Denver Field Office Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Transactions were not being recorded 

and no historical data 

Chicago Field Office 

Handwritten log showing 

inventory totals and changes 

over time 

The purpose of each change in the 

inventory totals was not documented 

Milwaukee Field Office 

Electronic log showing 

inventory totals with 

handwritten updates 

The purpose of each change in the 

inventory totals was not documented 

New Haven Field Office Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Transactions were not being recorded 

and no historical data 

Sacramento Field Office 

Handwritten log with 

transactions and running 

balance 

None 

CIRG – Tactical Section Electronic log showing 

inventory totals 

Not all transactions were being 

recorded 

Hazardous Devices 

School 

Handwritten log with 

transactions and running 

balance 

None 

Source: The FBI and OIG 

Results of the Explosives Inventory 

We conducted a physical inventory of a sample of explosives at seven of the 

eight sites with an inventory of such items, comparing the inventory log balance to 

the quantity on hand.4 We identified discrepancies between the quantities of 

explosives on hand and the recorded inventory balance at three of the seven sites. 

In total, these sites had 32 fewer explosives on hand than the balance recorded on 

the inventory list. These offices could not explain the cause of the discrepancies 

because they were not maintaining a record of inventory transactions. As a result, 

we could not confirm whether these items were expended, or were lost or stolen 

without detection. In our judgment, the discrepancies we identified are a result of 

the FBI’s deficient explosives tracking and inventory policies. 

Additionally, we found that the FBI does not require periodic physical 

inventories of its explosive materials. In our judgment, a physical inventory of all 

explosives should be conducted regularly to ensure all items are properly accounted 

for on the inventory tracking documents. Consequently, we recommend that the 

FBI require its offices to conduct a complete physical inventory of all explosives on 

an annual basis and retain those records for at least 3 years. 

4 Due to inclement weather and the location of the explosives magazine, we were unable to 

complete a physical inventory of explosives at the Chicago Field Office. 

14 
Explosives Purchases 

The FBI’s Hazardous Devices School is responsible for training and certifying 

public safety bomb technicians, and as such, it purchases large quantities of 

explosives. According to a Hazardous Devices School official, once it receives a 

shipment of explosives, the contents of the shipping container are inventoried 

against the receiving documents and the explosives are added to the inventory. 

The additions are then entered into the handwritten logs and the inventory balances 

are updated. We reviewed a sample of 13 purchases from the Hazardous Devices 

School’s explosives inventory that were received between December 2018 and 

March 2019. Based on our review, we did not identify any concerns related to the 

Hazardous Devices School’s explosives purchases. 

Controls over Firearm and Ammunition Evidence 

The FBI maintained firearms and ammunition seized as evidence at 6 of the 

15 sites included in our audit. We found that the FBI has strong physical controls 

over its firearms and ammunition evidence. During our physical inventory of 

firearms and ammunition evidence, we were able to locate all items in our sample 

and trace a sample of items back to SENTINEL, the FBI’s evidence tracking system. 

However, we identified concerns related to the disposal of firearm evidence. 

Physical Security of Firearm and Ammunition Evidence 

We determined that the FBI has strong physical controls over firearm and 

ammunition evidence. The FBI stores its firearm and ammunition evidence in a 

storage configuration, known as an Evidence Control Room (ECR), which is similar 

at each location. FBI policy requires each ECR to be equipped with an electronic 

keypad, combination lock, and an alarm. Access to the ECR must be limited to 

designated Evidence Control Technicians, and entries must be recorded on an 

access log. At all six ECRs we visited, we found that access to the ECR requires a 

keycard, the combination numbers, and an alarm deactivation code. We also found 

that access was limited to designated Evidence Control Technicians and all six sites 

maintained access logs for recording entries into the ECR. In addition, each site 

had ways to temporarily store evidence outside of the ECR when the evidence 

custodian was unavailable, including lockers or a one-way chute located in the wall 

of the ECR. 

Accuracy of the FBI’s Firearm and Ammunition Evidence Inventory 

The FBI provided us with inventory lists from SENTINEL of firearm and 

ammunition evidence stored in the ECRs at the six sites we visited. In accordance 

with FBI policy, the chain-of-custody information and a complete description, 

including make, model, caliber, and serial number, for all firearm and ammunition 

evidence must be entered into SENTINEL. 

To verify the accuracy of the FBI’s firearm and ammunition evidence 

inventory, we selected an evidence sample consisting of 143 items of firearms and 

ammunition evidence from the inventory lists provided by the FBI to ensure they 

15 
 

were properly accounted for in SENTINEL. In addition, we selected 27 items of 

firearm and ammunition evidence located in the FBI’s ECRs and attempted to trace 

those items back to the inventory lists to ensure that the evidence inventory 

records were complete and accurate. During our physical inventory, we located all 

143 items of firearm and ammunition evidence in our sample and we traced all 27 

items of firearms and ammunition evidence back to the inventory lists. 

Disposal of Firearm Evidence 

We evaluated controls over the FBI’s firearm evidence disposal process and 

identified concerns related to firearm evidence sent to the Firearms/Toolmarks Unit 

(FTU) for destruction. The FBI’s evidence management policy states that the FTU is 

responsible for the destruction of all abandoned firearm evidence. This policy also 

requires the firearm evidence disposal date in SENTINEL to reflect the date that the 

firearm permanently leaves the ECR. Accordingly, Evidence Control Technicians in 

the field ship firearms evidence to the FTU for destruction and mark the item as 

destroyed in SENTINEL using the date it was shipped, rather than the date it was 

destroyed. We recommend that the FBI amend its policy to require Evidence 

Control Technicians to obtain and upload a notification of destruction from the FTU 

prior to marking the firearm evidence as disposed in SENTINEL, and require the 

firearm evidence disposal date in SENTINEL to reflect the date the firearm is 

destroyed. 

According to an FTU official, once the FTU receives abandoned firearms 

evidence slated for disposal, including legal documentation supporting the disposal, 

the firearm is entered into its electronic tracking system and assigned a barcode. 

The firearm is stored in a large box in the FTU's secure destruction room. Once 

that box is filled, two FTU employees scan the barcode of each firearm and place 

the firearm in another container, which is sealed with metal security straps. The 

FTU then sends an electronic request to the FBI’s Asset Management Unit 

requesting approval for the destruction of the firearms and includes a spreadsheet 

listing every firearm to be destroyed. The approval for destruction request 

identifies the destruction date and who will transport the firearms, and states that 

the FTU will maintain control of all firearms until they are melted down and 

destroyed. Upon approval, the sealed containers are escorted to the destruction 

facility and the destruction is witnessed by the FTU official assigned to escort the 

sealed containers to the destruction facility. Once the firearms are destroyed, the 

FTU sends a notification to the Asset Management Unit. 

We determined that the FTU uses a separate inventory system, not 

SENTINEL, to track the firearm evidence it receives. As a result, the FTU is 

unaware of when firearms evidence is shipped to the FTU for disposal. This is 

particularly concerning, because we found two of the ECRs we visited were not 

confirming the delivery of firearm evidence shipped to the FTU for destruction, 

which creates a temporary gap in the chain of custody when firearms marked as 

destroyed could be lost or stolen without detection, particularly during shipping. At 

the remaining four ECRs we visited, the Evidence Control Technicians uploaded 

proof of delivery into SENTINEL when firearm evidence was shipped to the FTU for 

16 
 

destruction, which we view as a best practice that the FBI should implement 

agency-wide. Therefore, we recommend that the FBI require proof of delivery to be 

maintained in SENTINEL for firearms evidence shipped to the FTU for disposal. 

17 
 

 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The FBI has strong physical controls over its weapons, munitions, and 

explosives. However, the FBI needs to ensure all firearms have a designated 

property custodian, and should improve its controls over tracking and accountability 

of its ammunition, less lethal munitions, diversionary devices, and explosives 

inventories. The FBI also needs to improve controls over firearm evidence slated 

for destruction. Without sufficient controls over its sensitive property, the FBI 

cannot be assured that its inventories of weapons, munitions, and explosives are 

adequately safeguarded. Most significantly, the deficiencies we identified increase 

the risk that the FBI’s weapons, munitions, and explosives can be lost, misplaced, 

or stolen without detection. As a result, we make 13 recommendations to improve 

the FBI’s controls over weapons, munitions, and explosives. 

We recommend that the FBI: 

1. Ensure all firearms in its custody are properly entered into the appropriate 

property management system. 

2. Ensure all firearms in its inventory have a designated property custodian, in 

accordance with policy. 

3. Ensures that complete documentation of lost and stolen FBI firearms is 

maintained, including all pertinent information such as the firearm make, 

model, and serial number. 

4. Ensure that the status of all lost or stolen firearms that are subsequently 

recovered is accurately reflected in AMS. 

5. Amend its policy for tracking ammunition to require that all rounds of each 

type of ammunition be tracked using handwritten logs that detail the date, 

caliber, quantity in or out, purpose of the ammunition transaction, and 

remaining balance; and require all ammunition tracking logs to be retained 

for at least 3 years. 

6. Revise its current policy to require its offices to conduct a complete inventory 

of all ammunition on hand on an annual basis to ensure all recorded 

ammunition inventory balances are accurate, and to retain those records for 

at least 3 years. 

7. Establish policy requiring that less lethal munitions and diversionary devices 

must be stored in a secure area, with access limited to designated personnel. 

8. Establish policy for tracking less lethal munitions and diversionary devices 

that requires all quantities of each type of less lethal munition and 

diversionary device to be tracked using handwritten logs that detail the date, 

quantity in or out, purpose of the transaction, and remaining balance; and 

require all less lethal munition and diversionary device tracking logs to be 

retained for at least 3 years. 

18 
 

 

 

9. Require its offices to conduct a complete physical inventory of all less lethal 

munitions and diversionary devices on an annual basis and retain those 

records for at least 3 years. 

10. Amend its policy requiring all quantities of each type of explosive material be 

tracked by its SABTs using handwritten logs that detail the date, quantity in 

or out, purpose of the transaction, and remaining balance; and retain all 

explosives tracking records for at least 3 years. 

11. Require its offices to conduct a complete physical inventory of all explosives 

on an annual basis and retain those records for at least 3 years. 

12. Amend its policy to require Evidence Control Technicians to obtain and 

upload a notification of destruction from the FTU prior to marking the firearm 

evidence as disposed in SENTINEL, and require the firearm evidence disposal 

date in SENTINEL to reflect the date the firearm is destroyed. 

13. Require proof of delivery to be maintained in SENTINEL for firearms evidence 

shipped to the FTU for disposal. 

19 
APPENDIX 1 

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Objectives 

The objectives of the audit were to evaluate: (1) the FBI’s controls over 

weapons, munitions, and explosives; (2) the FBI’s compliance with policies 

governing weapons, munitions, and explosives; and (3) the accuracy of the FBI’s 

weapons, munitions, and explosives inventories. 

Scope and Methodology 

Our audit covers the FBI’s inventories of firearms, ammunition, less lethal 

munitions, diversionary devices, and explosives; and included firearms and 

ammunition seized as evidence, firearm purchases, and FBI-issued firearms 

reported lost or stolen from September 2015 through November 2019. To 

accomplish our objectives, we interviewed personnel responsible for the FBI’s 

inventory of firearms, ammunition, less lethal munitions, diversionary devices and 

explosives at 15 FBI sites throughout the United States, as well as officials at the 

FBI’s Headquarters. This included officials from the Finance, Inspection, Training, 

and Laboratory Divisions, and Critical Incident Response Group. We also evaluated 

the FBI’s policies governing weapons, munitions, and explosives. Our primary 

references were the FBI’s Firearms Policy Guide (0888PG), Personal Property 

Management Policy Guide (0948PG), DSU Principal Firearms Instructor 

Administrative Reference, Hazardous Devices Operations Center Policy 

Guide (0233PG), and the Field Evidence Management Policy Guide (0780PG). 

Additionally, we examined FBI Form FD-281, Receipt for Government Property; 

Form FD-500, Report of Lost or Stolen Property; and Form FD-519, Requirements 

and Certification for Cannibalization and Destruction of Equipment. 

We conducted site work at 15 FBI office locations. We judgmentally selected 

these sites in order to examine a broad range of FBI offices and functions, including 

large division field offices; smaller resident agencies; the Firearms Training Unit; 

the Defensive Systems Unit; the Critical Incident Response Group’s Tactical 

Section; the Hazardous Devices School; and the Laboratory Division’s 

Firearms/Toolmarks Unit. 

The purpose of our site work was to assess the FBI’s compliance with policies 

regarding its weapons, munitions, and explosives, as well as the effectiveness of 

those policies, and to determine if the FBI’s weapons, munitions, and explosives 

inventories were accurate. We also wanted to determine if the FBI’s controls over 

weapons, munitions, and explosives varied among different locations. We 

interviewed officials at each location, including supervisors, primary firearms 

instructors, special agent bomb technicians, and evidence control technicians. We 

observed the physical security of the sites’ weapons, munitions, and explosives 

inventories. We also reviewed firearm records from the Asset Management System 

20 
 

 

(AMS); and tracking documentation for ammunition, less lethal munitions, 

diversionary devices, and explosives. 

We conducted a physical inventory of FBI-owned weapons, munitions, and 

explosives. This included verifying the existence of a sample of firearms at all of 

the sites, which were selected from AMS. We also selected a sample of firearms 

while on-site and traced those items back to AMS, in order to determine if the 

inventory records were complete. We then analyzed select data fields in AMS in 

order to assess the accuracy of those fields. In addition, we conducted physical 

inventories of ammunition, less lethal munitions, diversionary devices, and 

explosives on-hand to determine if all of the items were properly accounted for 

using inventory tracking documentation. Similarly, we conducted a physical 

inventory of firearm and ammunition evidence. This included verifying the 

existence of a sample of firearm and ammunition evidence from SENTINEL at each 

location. We also selected a sample of firearm and ammunition evidence while onsite and traced those items back to the inventory list to determine if the SENTINEL 

records were complete. 

We reviewed documentation related to firearms and explosives purchases to 

ensure that acquisitions were properly recorded. Finally, we reviewed 

documentation related to firearms that were reported as lost or stolen during the 

scope of our audit to determine whether the FBI took appropriate action. 

Statement on Compliance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards 

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards (GAGAS). Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Internal Controls 

In this audit, we performed testing of internal controls significant within the 

context of our audit objectives. We did not evaluate the internal controls of the FBI 

to provide assurance on its internal control structure as a whole. FBI’s 

management is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of internal 

controls in accordance with OMB Circular A-123. Because we do not express an 

opinion on the FBI’s internal control structure as a whole, we offer this statement 

solely for the information and use of the FBI.5 

5 This restriction is not intended to limit the distribution of this report, which is a matter of 

public record. 

21 
 

 

In planning and performing our audit, we identified the following internal 

control components and underlying principles as significant to the audit objectives: 

Internal Control Components & Principles Significant to the Audit Objectives 

Control Environment Principles 

The oversight body should oversee the entity’s internal control system. 

Management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate 

authority to achieve the entity’s objectives. 

Control Activity Principles 

Management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks. 

Management should design the entity’s information system and related control activities to 

achieve objectives and respond to risks. 

Management should implement control activities through policies. 

Information & Communication Principles 

Management should internally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the 

entity’s objectives. 

Monitoring Principles 

Management should establish and operate monitoring activities to monitor the internal control 

system and evaluate the results. 

Management should remediate identified internal control deficiencies on a timely basis. 

We assessed the design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of 

these internal controls and identified deficiencies that we believe could affect the 

FBI’s ability to effectively and efficiently operate, and to ensure compliance with 

laws and regulations. However, because our review was limited to internal control 

components and underlying principles determined to be significant to the audit 

objectives, it may not have disclosed all deficiencies that may have existed at the 

time of this audit. The internal control deficiencies we found are discussed in the 

Audit Results section of this report. 

Sample-based Testing 

To accomplish our audit objectives, we performed sample-based testing for 

our evaluation of the accuracy and completeness of the FBI’s inventories of 

firearms, ammunition, less lethal munitions, diversionary devices, explosives, and 

firearm and ammunition evidence. In this effort, we employed a judgmental 

sampling design to obtain broad exposure to numerous facets of the areas we 

reviewed. This non-statistical sample design did not allow projection of the test 

results to the universe from which the samples were selected. 

Computer-Processed Data 

During our audit, we obtained inventory information from the FBI’s Asset 

Management System (AMS), and SENTINEL. We did not test the reliability of those 

systems as a whole, therefore any findings identified involving information from 

those systems were verified with documentation from other sources. 

We assessed the reliability of the inventory data received from AMS and 

SENTINEL through our physical inventories of FBI-issued firearms and firearm and 

22 
 

ammunition evidence. We compared the data obtained through our physical 

inspection of these items against the information recorded in AMS and SENTINEL to 

ensure it was complete and accurate. We brought any identified discrepancies to 

the attention of the FBI, and worked with FBI employees to correct the 

discrepancies. As a result of these efforts, we determined that the AMS and 

SENTINEL data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

23 
APPENDIX 2 

THE FBI’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT AUDIT REPORT 

U.S. Department or Justice 

Federal Bureau oflnvallgatlon 

935 Pennsylvania AVCDlle NW 

Washington, D.C. 20S35 

The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz 

Inspector General 

Office of the Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20530 

Dear Mr. Horowitz: 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and 

respond to your office's report entitled, Audit of the Federal Bureau of lrrvestigation 's Controls 

over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives. 

We are pleased you recognized "the FBI has strong physical controls over its unassigned 

firearms" as well as "strong physical controls over fireann and ammunition evidence and access 

to the Evidence Control Rooms". We are further pleased that "despite the lack of policy" you 

"found that the FBI stored its less lethal munitions and diversionary devices in a secure area with 

limited aetess''. 

We agree that the FBI must "improve ... controls over its weapons, ammunition, less 

lethal munitions, diversionary devices, and explosives." In that regard, we concur with your 13 

recommendations for the FBI. 

Should you have any questions, feel free to contact me. We greatly appreciate the 

professionalism of your audit staff throughout this matter. 

Sincerely, 

Renae M. McDermott 

Assistant Director 

Training Division 

Enclosure 

24 
RESPONSES TO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S CONTROLS OVER WEAPONS, MUNITIONS, AND 

EXPLOSIVES (19-38) 

I. Recommend that FBI management: Ensure all firearms in its custody are properly 

entered into the appropriate property management system. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The FBI will continue to 

ensure that all firearms are properly entered into the Asset Management System 

(AMS) in accordance with the FBI's Personal Property Management Policy Guide. 

2. Recommend that FBI management: Ensure all firearms in its inventory have a 

designated property custodian, in accordance with policy. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. DSU has coordinated 

with the identified Divisions, and all asset records have been amended to reflect the 

required Custodian. Furthermore AMU has submitted a request to the Information 

Technology Enterprise Services Division to program an addition to the AMS data 

entry process, which requires all property items classified as "08" (Weapons) to 

have-at a minimum-a mandatory field for the assignment of a Custodian prior to 

saving the record. 

In the past year, the FBI has identified a significant turnover within the ranks of the 

Principal Firearms Instructor community. As a result, DSU and FTU have initiated 

the process to: 

A. Revise the Principal Firearms Instructor Administrative Reference (PFIAR) to 

update policies/protocols and which also incorporates OIG observations. 

B. Implement a new-PFI on-boarding procedure which emphasizes principle 

objectives within the PFIAR. 

C. Communicate the aforementioned points (A & B) to all Principal Firearms 

Instructors during the annual PFI conference in April 2020. Establish 

collaborative working groups to further identify issues and resolutions to be 

adopted Bureau-wide via the Firearms Program. 

3. Recommend that FBI management: Ensures that complete documentation of lost 

and stolen FBI firearms is maintained, including all pertinent information such as the 

firearm make, model, and serial number. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The Firearms Policy 

Guide (0888PG) will be updated to reflect current standard operating procedures 

25 
 

(SOPs) and the PFIAR guidelines for lost or stolen weapons. 0888PG is under review 

at this time. 

4. Recommend that FBI management: Ensure that the status of all lost or stolen 

firearms that are subsequently recovered is accurately reflected in AMS. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The Firearms Policy 

Guide (0888PG) will be updated to reflect current standard operating procedures 

(SOPs) and the PFIAR guidelines for lost or stolen weapons which have been 

recovered. 0888PG is under review at this time. 

5. Recommend that FBI management: Amend its policy for tracking ammunition to 

require that all rounds of each type of ammunition be tracked using handwritten logs 

that detail the date, caliber, quantity in or out, purpose of the ammunition transaction, 

and remaining balance; and require all ammunition tracking logs to be retained for at 

least 3 years. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The Firearms Policy 

Guide (0888PG) will be updated to reflect the following addition: "Ammunition 

inventories will be maintained through the use of written inventory sheets showing 

the date of transaction, ammunition name, caliber, transaction in or out, and purpose 

of transaction. These sheets will be maintained for three years .. On an annual basis, 

Field Office and HQ PFis are required to submit an inventory of all on-hand 

ammunition, by caliber and type to FTU. This information is required by Finance 

Division to account for Bureau assets and by DSU for program oversight purposes. 

This inventory is normally initiated in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year." 

6. Recommend that FBI management: Revise its current policy to require its offices 

to conduct a complete inventory of all ammunition on hand on an annual basis to 

ensure all recorded ammunition inventory balances are accurate, and to retain those 

records for at least 3 years. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The Firearms Policy 

Guide (0888PG) will be updated to reflect the following addition: "On an annual 

basis, Field Office and HQ PFis are required to submit an inventory of all on-hand 

ammunition, by caliber and type to FTU. This information is required by Finance 

Division to account for Bureau assets and by DSU for program oversight purposes. 

This inventory is normally initiated in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year and will be 

maintained for three years." 

26 
 

7. Recommend that FBI management: Establish policy requiring that less lethal 

munitions and diversionary devices must be stored in a secure area, with access 

limited to designated personnel. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The FBI/CIRG/factical 

Section is currently in the process of consolidating and updating three policies into 

one Tactical Policy Guide. The new Tactical Policy Guide will include storage 

requirements for less lethal munitions and diversionary devices and limit the access 

into this secure area to designated personnel. 

8. Recommend that FBI management: Establish policy for tracking less lethal 

munitions and diversionary devices that requires all quantities of each type of less 

lethal munition and diversionary device to be tracked using handwritten logs that 

detail the date, quantity in or out, purpose of the transaction, and remaining balance; 

and require all less lethal munition and diversionary device tracking logs to be 

retained for at least 3 years. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The FBI/CIRG/Tactical 

Section is currently in the process of consolidating and updating three policies into 

one Tactical Policy Guide. The new Tactical Policy Guide will include guidance on 

tracking less lethal munitions and diversionary devices. This new guidance will 

detail the use of handwritten logs to include date, quantity in or out, purpose of the 

transaction, and remaining balance. Additionally it will mandate that the tracking be 

retained for at least 3 years. 

9. Recommend that FBI management: Require its offices to conduct a complete 

physical inventory of all less lethal munitions and diversionary devices on an annual 

basis and retain those records for at least 3 years. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The FBI/CIRG/factical 

Section is currently in the process of consolidating and updating three policies into 

one Tactical Policy Guide. The new Tactical Policy Guide require offices to conduct 

a complete physical inventory of all less lethal munitions and diversionary devices 

annually and retain the records for at least 3 years. 

10. Recommend that FBI management: Amend its policy requiring all quantities of 

each type of explosive material be tracked by its SABTs using handwritten logs that 

·detail the date, quantity in or out, purpose of the transaction, and remaining balance; 

and retain all explosives tracking records for at least 3 years. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The FBI/CIRG/CounterIED Section will draft interim policy on the responsibilities and requirements 

associated with explosives storage and accountability to ensure FBI personnel adhere 

27 
 

to established Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to prevent the loss or theft of 

explosives without detection. As part of the interim policy, the explosives inventory 

procedures used by the FBI's Hazardous Devices School will be implemented in the 

procedures. The FBJ/CIRG/Counter-IED Section is currently revising the Hazardous 

Devices Operations Center Policy Guide (0233PG, April 23, 2010). While the PG is 

being finalized and approved, it is necessary to provide interim policy to inform FBI 

personnel of the responsibilities and requirements for explosives control and storage. 

To maintain explosives inventory records, the FBI/CIRG/Counter-IED Section will 

establish a control file in Sentinel, the FBI's central record.keeping system, for field 

office reporting of bi-annual explosives inventories and transaction logs. The 

Sentinel records will be maintained for at least three years. 

11 . Recommend that FBI management: Require its offices to conduct a complete 

physical inventory of all explosives on an annual basis and retain those records for at 

least 3 years. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. Through the 

FBI/CIRG/Counter-IED Section interim policy for explosives storage and 

accountability, FBI personnel will adhere to a standardized explosives tracking and 

inventory process and log all movement of explosives in and out of approved storage 

locations. FBI field offices will be required to conduct a complete physical inventory 

of all explosives on a bi-annual basis and document inventories with transaction logs 

to the appropriate Sentinel files for FBI/CIRG/Counter-IED Section review. The 

FBI/CIRG/Counter-IED Section will establish a control file in Sentinel for field 

office reporting of bi-annual explosives inventories and transaction logs and will 

maintain records for at least three years. 

12. Recommend that FBI management: Amend its policy to require Evidence Control 

Technicians to obtain and upload a notification of destruction from the FTU prior to 

marking the firearm evidence as disposed in SENTINEL, and require the firearm 

evidence disposal date in SENTINEL to reflect the date the firearm is destroyed. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. As such, the Laboratory 

Division (LD) proposes the following changes to address the recommendation: 

A. As noted in the FBI response to Recommendation 13, the Field Evidence 

Management Policy Guide will be changed to require the ECT to disposition 

the weapon in Sentinel by using the date ofreceipt of the weapon(s) by the 

LD. The date is obtained from the documentation of delivery provided by the 

trackable carrier (see LD response to OIG Recommendation 13, Item 4). 

B. The LD has always issued an Electronic Communication (EC) in Sentinel 

when the final destruction of submitted firearms occurs. This EC includes the 

serial number and the FBI Case ID for each destroyed firearm. The EC will 

28 
 

be modified by the LD so that all Field Offices/Resident Agencies ECTs, who 

have submitted firearms for the most recent destruction, receive the EC via 

Sentinel. 

C. The Field Evidence Management Policy Guide will be changed to require 

ECTs, upon receipt of the latest LD's firearms destruction EC via Sentinel, to 

upload that EC into their relevant case file(s) to document the final destruction 

of the related firearm(s). 

13. Recommend that FBI management: Require proof of delivery to be maintained in 

SENTINEL for firearms evidence shipped to the FTU for disposal. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The Laboratory Division 

(LD) proposes the following changes to address this recommendation: 

The LD will modify the Field Evidence Management Policy Guide to require the 

following actions when firearms are shipped from FBI Fields Offices/Resident 

Agencies to the LD for destruction: 

A. The respective ECT prepares the firearm for shipment to the LD for 

destruction. 

B. The ECT ships the weapon(s) to the LD through a trackable carrier. 

C. The ECT serializes the return receipt from the trackable carrier (e.g. 

Registered Mail or FedEx signature page) into Sentinel and maintains a hard 

copy of the return receipt with the FD-1004 for future storage of these 

documents in the IA envelope. 

D. ECT dispositions the weapon in Sentinel as disposed, using the date on the 

receipt from the trackable carrier which confirms the weapon(s) has (have) 

been received by the LO for destruction. 

29 
 

APPENDIX 3 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS 

NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT 

The OIG provided a draft of this audit report to the FBI. The FBI’s response 

is incorporated in Appendix 2 of this final report. In response to our audit report, 

the FBI concurred with our recommendations and discussed the actions it will 

implement in response to our findings. As a result, the status of the audit report is 

resolved. The following provides the OIG analysis of the response and summary of 

actions necessary to close the report. 

Recommendations for the FBI: 

1. Ensure all firearms in its custody are properly entered into the 

appropriate property management system. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. The FBI stated in 

its response that it will continue to ensure that all firearms are properly 

entered into the Asset Management System in accordance with the FBI’s 

Personal Property Management Policy Guide. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the FBI has identified the rightful owner of the two firearms 

of unknown origin found in the Madison Resident Agency and taken 

appropriate action. 

2. Ensure all firearms in its inventory have a designated property 

custodian, in accordance with policy. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the 

FBI stated that the Defensive Systems Unit has amended all asset records to 

reflect the required custodian. Additionally, the Asset Management Unit has 

submitted a request to program an addition to the AMS data entry process 

that requires all weapons to have an assigned property custodian before the 

record can be saved. Further, the FBI will revise the Principal Firearms 

Instructor Administrative Reference (PFIAR) to update policies and protocols 

incorporating OIG observations, and communicate these points during the 

annual PFI conference in April 2020. Finally, the FBI stated that it would 

establish collaborative working groups to further identify firearm-related 

issues and resolutions to be adopted throughout the FBI. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the FBI has reprogrammed the AMS data entry process 

requiring all weapons to have an assigned property custodian before the 

record can be saved and the PFIAR has been updated to incorporate OIG 

observations. 

30 
3. Ensures that complete documentation of lost and stolen FBI firearms 

is maintained, including all pertinent information such as the firearm 

make, model, and serial number. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. The FBI stated in 

its response that it will update the Firearms Policy Guide and the PFIAR to 

reflect current standard operating procedures and guidelines for lost or stolen 

weapons. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the FBI has updated the Firearms Policy Guide and PFIAR 

guidelines for lost or stolen weapons. 

4. Ensure that the status of all lost or stolen firearms that are 

subsequently recovered is accurately reflected in AMS. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. The FBI stated in 

its response that it will update the Firearms Policy Guide and the PFIAR to 

reflect current standard operating procedures and guidelines for recovered 

lost or stolen weapons. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the FBI has updated the Firearms Policy Guide and PFIAR 

guidelines for recovered lost or stolen weapons. 

5. Amend its policy for tracking ammunition to require that all rounds of 

each type of ammunition be tracked using handwritten logs that 

detail the date, caliber, quantity in or out, purpose of the ammunition 

transaction, and remaining balance; and require all ammunition 

tracking logs to be retained for at least 3 years. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the 

FBI stated that the Firearms Policy Guide will be updated to require 

ammunition inventories to be maintained through the use of handwritten 

inventory sheets showing the date of transaction, ammunition name, caliber, 

transaction in or out, and purpose of the transaction. These sheets will be 

maintained for 3 years. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the Firearms Policy Guide has been updated to require all 

ammunition inventories to be maintained using handwritten logs showing the 

transaction date, caliber, quantity in or out, purpose of the ammunition 

transaction, and remaining balance on hand; and for these logs to be 

retained for 3 years. 

31 
6. Revise its current policy to require its offices to conduct a complete 

inventory of all ammunition on hand on an annual basis to ensure all 

recorded ammunition inventory balances are accurate, and to retain 

those records for at least 3 years. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. The FBI stated in 

its response that it will update the Firearms Policy Guide to require PFIs, on 

an annual basis, to submit an inventory of all ammunition on hand, by caliber 

and type, to the Firearms Training Unit, and maintain the inventory for 

3 years. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the FBI has updated the Firearms Policy Guide requiring PFIs 

to conduct an annual physical inventory of all ammunition on hand to ensure 

the inventory balances on the handwritten tracking logs are accurate. 

7. Establish policy requiring that less lethal munitions and diversionary 

devices must be stored in a secure area, with access limited to 

designated personnel. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the 

FBI stated that the Tactical Section is currently consolidating and updating 

three policies into one Tactical Policy Guide that will include storage 

requirements for less lethal munitions and diversionary devices, and limit 

access to the secure storage area to designated personnel. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the Tactical Policy Guide has been implemented, establishing 

secure storage requirements for less lethal munitions and diversionary 

devices, and limiting access to the storage area to designated personnel. 

8. Establish policy for tracking less lethal munitions and diversionary 

devices that requires all quantities of each type of less lethal 

munition and diversionary device to be tracked using handwritten 

logs that detail the date, quantity in or out, purpose of the 

transaction, and remaining balance; and require all less lethal 

munition and diversionary device tracking logs to be retained for at 

least 3 years. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. The FBI stated in 

its response that the Tactical Section is currently consolidating and updating 

three policies into one Tactical Policy Guide that will establish guidance on 

tracking less lethal munitions and diversionary devices using handwritten 

logs that include the date, quantity in or out, purpose of the transaction, and 

remaining balance. The policy guide will also require the tracking logs to be 

retained for at least 3 years. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the Tactical Policy Guide has been implemented, establishing 

32 
 

the requirement to track less lethal munitions and diversionary devices using 

handwritten logs that detail the date, quantity in or out, purpose of the 

transaction, and remaining balance on hand; and mandate that the logs be 

retained for at least 3 years. 

9. Require its offices to conduct a complete physical inventory of all less 

lethal munitions and diversionary devices on an annual basis and 

retain those records for at least 3 years. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the 

FBI stated that the Tactical Section is currently consolidating and updating 

three policies into one Tactical Policy Guide that will require offices to conduct 

a complete annual physical inventory of all less lethal munitions and 

diversionary devices and retain the records for at least 3 years. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the Tactical Policy Guide has been implemented, requiring 

offices to conduct a complete annual physical inventory of all less lethal 

munitions and diversionary devices and retain the records for at least 

3 years. 

10. Amend its policy requiring all quantities of each type of explosive 

material be tracked by its SABTs using handwritten logs that detail 

the date, quantity in or out, purpose of the transaction, and 

remaining balance; and retain all explosives tracking records for at 

least 3 years. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. The FBI stated in 

its response that the Counter-IED Section is currently revising the Hazardous 

Devices Operations Center Policy Guide. While the Policy Guide is being 

finalized and approved, the Counter-IED Section will draft interim policy on 

the responsibilities and requirements associated with explosives storage and 

accountability to ensure that FBI personnel adhere to established Standard 

Operating Procedures to prevent the loss or theft of explosives without 

detection. The explosives inventory procedures used by the Hazardous 

Devices School will be implemented through this interim policy. To maintain 

explosives inventory records, the Counter-IED Section will establish a control 

file in Sentinel, the FBI’s central recordkeeping system, for field office 

reporting of bi-annual explosives inventories and transaction logs, which will 

be maintained for at least 3 years. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the interim policy has been established, and incorporated 

into the revised Hazardous Devices Operations Center Policy Guide, requiring 

all quantities of each type of explosive material be tracked using handwritten 

logs that detail the date, quantity in or out, purpose of the transaction, and 

remaining balance; and that those explosives tracking records are retained 

for at least 3 years. 

33 
 

11. Require its offices to conduct a complete physical inventory of all 

explosives on an annual basis and retain those records for at least 

3 years. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. The FBI stated in 

its response that the interim policy will require FBI personnel to adhere to a 

standardized explosives tracking and inventory process and log all movement 

of explosives in and out of approved storage locations. Specifically, the FBI 

field offices will be required to conduct a complete physical inventory of all 

explosives on a bi-annual basis and document inventories with transaction 

logs to the appropriate Sentinel files for review by the Counter-IED Section. 

These records will be maintained for at least 3 years. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the interim policy has been established, and incorporated 

into the revised Hazardous Devices Operations Center Policy Guide, requiring 

field offices to conduct a complete bi-annual physical inventory of all 

explosives on hand and retain those records for at least 3 years. 

12. Amend its policy to require Evidence Control Technicians to obtain 

and upload a notification of destruction from the FTU prior to 

marking the firearm evidence as disposed in SENTINEL, and require 

the firearm evidence disposal date in SENTINEL to reflect the date 

the firearm is destroyed. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the 

FBI explained that the Laboratory Division has always issued an Electronic 

Communication (EC) in Sentinel when the final destruction of submitted 

firearms occurs. This EC will be modified so that all field office Evidence 

Control Technicians (ECTs), who have submitted firearms for destruction, 

receive the EC via Sentinel. The FBI also stated that the Laboratory Division 

proposes that the Field Evidence Management Policy Guide be changed to 

require the following actions: 

(a) Require the ECT to disposition weapons in Sentinel by using the 

date of receipt of the weapon by the Laboratory Division. The 

date will be obtained from the documentation of delivery 

provided by the trackable carrier, which confirms the weapon 

has been received by the Laboratory Division. 

(b) Require the ECTs, upon receipt of the latest Laboratory 

Division’s firearms destruction EC via Sentinel, to upload that EC 

into their case file to document the final destruction of the 

related firearm. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that: (1) the EC in Sentinel communicates the final destruction 

date to the appropriate ECT; and (2) the Field Evidence Management Policy 

Guide has been revised to require the firearm disposal date to reflect the 

34 
date of delivery to the Laboratory Division, and the final disposition EC to be 

included in the case file. 

13. Require proof of delivery to be maintained in SENTINEL for firearms 

evidence shipped to the FTU for disposal. 

Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the 

FBI stated that the Laboratory Division proposes changes to the Field 

Evidence Management Policy Guide to require the following actions when 

firearms are shipped to the Laboratory Division for destruction: 

(a) The respective ECT prepares the firearm for shipment to the 

Laboratory Division. 

(b) The ECT ships the weapon to the Laboratory Division through a 

trackable carrier. 

(c) The ECT serializes the return receipt from the trackable carrier 

(e.g., Registered Mail or FedEx signature page) into Sentinel 

and maintains a hard copy of the return receipt. 

(d) ECT dispositions the weapon in Sentinel as disposed, using the 

date on the receipt from the trackable carrier which confirms the 

weapon has been received by the Laboratory Division for 

destruction. 

This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation 

supporting that the Field Evidence Management Policy Guide has been 

revised to require the disposal procedures described in the FBI’s response. 

35 
 

 

 

-

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) is a 

statutorily created independent entity whose mission is to detect and deter 

waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and to

promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s operations.

To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct regarding DOJ 

programs, employees, contractors, grants, or contracts please visit or call the

DOJ OIG Hotline at oig.justice.gov/hotline or (800) 869-4499.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20530 0001

Website

oig.justice.gov

Twitter

@JusticeOIG

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JusticeOIG

Also at Oversight.gov