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i 

99–625 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–94] 

THE CHALLENGE OF CONVENTIONAL AND 

HYBRID WARFARE IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC 

REGION: THE CHANGING NATURE OF 

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND 

ITS EFFECT ON MILITARY PLANNING 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 24, 2016 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee on Armed 

Services ................................................................................................................. 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Harris, ADM Harry B., Jr., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ............. 3 

Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, United Nations Command, 

Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces–Korea ....................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Harris, ADM Harry B., Jr. .............................................................................. 43 

Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M. ............................................................................. 67 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Castro ......................................................................................................... 85 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 86 

Mr. Nugent ........................................................................................................ 88 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 86 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 85 

Mr. Takai .......................................................................................................... 87 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 85 

(1) 

THE CHALLENGE OF CONVENTIONAL AND HYBRID WARFARE IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC REGION: THE CHANGING 

NATURE OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND ITS 

EFFECT ON MILITARY PLANNING 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 24, 2016. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Events of recent days remind us that American national security 

cannot focus just on the Middle East or Africa or Europe; there are 

real and growing threats facing us in Asia as well. The erratic 

North Korean regime persistently marches toward more sophisticated nuclear weapons and longer range missiles, despite past 

agreements it has signed and despite pressure from China and others. Meanwhile, China is also marching steadily toward making the 

South China Sea a private lake, fully under Chinese control. Again, 

regardless of the promises made or the pressure applied, it moves 

ahead with its own agenda. 

While we in the country are understandably alarmed at these developments, we have got to go beyond concern and decide how we 

will respond as we carry out our constitutional duties to raise and 

support, provide and maintain the military forces of the United 

States. The threats facing us in Asia cover a wide spectrum of military capability: from new, modern nuclear warheads that are steadily being produced by the Chinese and determined efforts by North 

Korea to upgrade its nuclear arsenal to missiles of increasing range 

and lethality to hybrid war-like tactics, which we have seen in 

other theaters as well. 

To me, this means we must have a credible nuclear deterrent. 

We must have missile defense. We must have sufficient naval presence in order to deter some of what we are seeing in Asia. We also 

must work with key allies in the regions, strong allies, such as 

Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Australia, among others. 

Only together can we ensure that this vital region of the world continues to be an economic engine and continue—and will have peace 

and stability in the future. 

We are very grateful to have our witnesses today to help talk 

about the key role the United States military plays in achieving 
2 

those goals. Before I turn to them, I will yield to the distinguished 

acting ranking member, Mrs. Davis from California. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And if I may, I want to ask unanimous consent to submit our 

Ranking Member Smith’s statement for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mrs. DAVIS. And I also wanted to welcome Admiral Harris and 

General Scaparrotti and to thank you for appearing before our committee today. 

The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is critical to our national interests. 

And despite your best efforts in promoting growth and prosperity 

through our committed presence and engagement, the challenges 

that we face, as you well know, are no small task. The North Korean regime resorts to brinkmanship and open provocation to further its objectives. North Korea’s nuclear tests have openly defied 

the international call for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and the 

regime uses hybrid and asymmetric warfare to reinforce its survivability and to exert undue influence. 

As the chairman noted, we must work with our allies in the region to contain the North Korean regime and deter further aggression and, of course, be prepared to act if necessary. Reinforcing our 

missile defense posture on the peninsula in coordination with 

South Korea is one step in the right direction. 

China continues to press its claims in the South China Sea, and 

their actions have shown that it too will resort to gray zone tactics 

short of open conflict to achieve foreign policy goals. Instead of further provocation, China should abide by internationally accepted 

norms and contribute to a peaceful and equitable resolution to the 

disputed claims. 

These developments, as we all acknowledge, emphasize the need 

for a persistent U.S. presence. We should continue to bolster collective security, help to peacefully address concerns, facilitate productive multilateral exchanges, encourage democratization efforts, and 

reinforce ties with our many allies and partners. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our presenters today. 

Thank you again very much for being here and for your great 

service to our country. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Just to remind members, immediately upon the conclusion of this 

open hearing, we will go to a closed classified session with our witnesses today, so if you have questions that touch on classified material, it would be best to do that later. 

I am very pleased to welcome our witnesses today: Admiral 

Harry B. Harris, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; and General 

Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces in Korea. 

Without objection, both of your written statements will be made 

part of the record, and feel free to summarize them or make such 

other comments as you would like. 
3 

Admiral Harris, thanks for being here. 

STATEMENT OF ADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry and Representative Davis and distinguished members. It is an honor for me 

to appear before this committee. I am pleased to be here with General Scaparrotti to discuss how U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM] is 

protecting America’s interests across the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific. 

Since taking command of PACOM last May, I have had the extraordinary privilege of leading the 400,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians serving our Nation. 

These dedicated men and women and their families are doing an 

amazing job, and I am proud to serve alongside them. 

To provide you some issues of concern, I would like to briefly 

highlight a few regional issues. As China continues its pattern of 

destabilizing militarization of the South China Sea, we have resumed our freedom of navigation operations there, a waterway 

vital to America’s prosperity, where $5.3 trillion in trade traverses 

each year. 

General Scaparrotti and I remain aligned in dealing with North 

Korea’s recent underground nuclear test, followed by its ballistic 

missile launch. 

A revanchist Russia is revitalizing its ability to execute longrange strategic patrols in the Pacific to include the basing of its 

newest strategic ballistic missile submarine and last month’s bomber flights around Japan. 

Recent terrorist attacks in Bangladesh and Indonesia underscore 

the fact that violent Islamic extremism is a global concern that 

must be crushed. 

We have continued to strengthen our alliances and partnerships. 

Japan’s peace and security legislation authorizing limited collective 

self-defense will take effect this year. This legislation and the revised guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation will significantly increase Japan’s ability to work with us. 

Thanks to the great leadership of General Scaparrotti here, 

South Korea and the United States have taken a strong and unified stance to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In the face of recent North Korean aggression, PACOM 

hosted a tri-CHOD [Chief of Defense] meeting between U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford; Japan Chairman, Admiral Kawano; and South Korea Chairman, General Lee. Trilateral 

cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the United States is 

a priority, and I am doing everything I can to enhance it. 

Our alliance with the Philippines took an important step forward 

when the Philippine Supreme Court recently upheld the Enhanced 

Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, which will provide significant partnership and access benefits. 

I am also excited about our growing relationship with India, 

where I will visit next week. As the world’s two largest democracies, we are uniquely poised to help bring greater security and 

prosperity to the entire region. 

Two visionary policies are now coinciding as the United States 

rebalances west to the Indo-Asia-Pacific and India implements its 
4 

‘‘Act East’’ policy. Last month’s Malabar exercise between India, 

Japan, and the United States shows the security interconnectedness of the Indian Ocean, Asia, and the Pacific Ocean. 

I rely heavily on Australia, not only for its advanced military capabilities across all domains but, importantly, for Australia’s warfighting experience and leadership in operations around the world. 

These examples clearly demonstrate to me that the United 

States is a security partner of choice in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. It is 

also why I believe that our strategic rebalance has taken hold. 

Given that four of the five strategic problem sets identified by Secretary Carter—China, North Korea, Russia, and ISIL [Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant]—are in our region, I would say that 

we can’t rebalance fast enough. But there is more work to do, and 

we must not lose the momentum. 

So I ask this committee to support continued investment in future capabilities. I need weapons systems of increased lethality 

that go faster, go further, and are more survivable. If funding uncertainties continue, the U.S. will experience reduced warfighting 

capabilities, so I urge the Congress to repeal sequestration. 

Finally, I would like to thank this committee and the whole Congress for your enduring support to PACOM and to the men and 

women in uniform, our civilian teammates, and our families. 

Thank you. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris can be found in the 

Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES 

COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES–KOREA 

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member 

Davis, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored 

to testify today as the Commander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and the United States ForcesKorea [USFK]. On behalf of the American soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

and marines, and our civilians serving in the Republic of Korea, 

thank you for your support. 

Admiral Harris, thank you for your vision and the professional 

support of the entire PACOM team for USFK. 

I have prepared brief opening remarks, and I appreciate that my 

written posture statement is being entered into the record. 

Since my last testimony, our U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea] alliance has continued to focus on advancing our combined capabilities. Some of these advanced capabilities include the establishment 

of the first U.S.-ROK combined division, additional rotations of 

U.S. forces to the peninsula, the execution of our annual combined 

training exercises, and steady progress on our $10.7 billion plan to 

relocate U.S. forces in Korea. Furthermore, the Republic of Korea 

has improved its capabilities with the recent establishment of the 

Korean Air and Missile Defense System and Center and the Allied 

Korea Joint Command and Control System. 

The Republic of Korea has also invested in modern equipment, 

with the purchase of the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, Global Hawk, 
5 

the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile upgrades, and also AH– 

64 Apache helicopters. These alliance advances help counter the 

real and the proximate North Korean threat. 

North Korea continues to conduct provocations and to resource 

its large conventional force. And, of greater significance, North 

Korea continues to aggressively develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in direct violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, as demonstrated with its fourth nuclear test and its fifth 

TD–2 launch in January and February. 

In regards to this threat, my top concern remains the potential 

for a North Korean provocation to start a cycle of action and 

counteraction which could quickly escalate, similar to what we experienced this past August. While I am proud to report that our alliance stood shoulder to shoulder and deescalated the situation, it 

could have spiraled out of control and demonstrates why we must 

remain ready to ‘‘fight tonight.’’ 

To maintain this level of readiness, we will continue to focus on 

sustaining, strengthening, and transforming the alliance, with an 

emphasis on our combined readiness in four critical areas. First, 

ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] remains my top 

readiness challenge. CFC [Combined Forces Command] USFK requires additional persistent all-weather ISR capabilities, as well as 

dependable moving target indicator support to maintain situational 

awareness and provide adequate decision space. 

Second, it is critical for the alliance to establish a layered and 

interoperable ballistic missile defense. To advance this goal in the 

near future, we will begin bilateral consultations regarding the feasibility of deploying the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] system to the Republic of Korea, which would complement 

the Patriot system’s capabilities. 

Third, we must maintain an adequate quantity of critical munitions to ensure alliance supremacy in the early days of conflict on 

the peninsula. This requirement is further amplified by the approaching loss of cluster munitions due to shelf-life expiration and 

the impending ban. 

And, fourth, we must focus on command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, or C4I. Both the United States 

and the Republic of Korea are investing in new tactical equipment 

that will comprise a reliable C4I architecture, but more is required. 

In closing, I would like to express how proud I am of our service 

members, our civilians, and their families serving in the Republic 

of Korea, who never lose sight of the fact that they are serving on 

freedom’s frontier. 

I would also like to recognize Ambassador Mark Lippert, Admiral 

Harry Harris, and the U.S. and ROK senior leaders for their enduring commitment to our mission. 

I thank you and this committee for your support, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found in 

the Appendix on page 67.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Let me ask you each to address really a very basic question, and 

that is, do you have the military forces required to fulfill the missions you have been assigned? 
6 

And, Admiral Harris, you mentioned the freedom of navigation 

operations, which have been underway. From what one reads, they 

are pretty few and far between and don’t seem to be making much 

of a difference, because we also read that the Chinese have put surface-to-air missiles on these new islands they are constructing. So 

if you could address, broadly, in your theater, do you have the military forces to carry out the missions you are assigned, and then, 

more specifically, the Chinese South China Sea issues that have 

arisen. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. Happy to do that. 

With regard to the first issue of do I have the forces necessary 

to conduct our missions, today, I feel I do. I think we are set up 

well in NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 2016. Thanks 

to the Congress for that. And in the budget submission for fiscal 

year 2017, it meets the concerns that I had in the past, the fiscal 

year 2017 budget addresses those concerns. So I am comfortable 

with where we are today, but today we are not at war, and I think 

that is an important point. 

There are concerns that I have, clearly. As General Scaparrotti 

mentioned, there are concerns about munitions. My submarine 

numbers—and I mentioned this yesterday during my testimony— 

I don’t have the submarines that I feel I need, but that is a function of the total number of submarines that the United States Navy 

has and the global demand for that platform. 

More persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

aircraft and systems, ISR, is a requirement, I think, as well as 

cyber and getting after cyber. 

I have testified in the past and have spoken in the past about 

the need for a long-range anti-surface missile, a missile that can 

out-stick, if you will, Chinese missile systems in the Pacific and so 

on. And I am pleased that in the fiscal year 2017 budget, you 

know, there are funds put against development of LRASM, the 

long-range anti-surface missile. Secretary Work recently spoke 

about the work that has been done to improve the SM–6 missile 

and give it an anti-surface and anti-ship capability, which I think 

is dramatic, and that is exactly what I need in the Pacific. 

With regard to your question about China’s actions, in my opinion, China’s intent to militarize the South China Sea is as certain 

as a traffic jam in DC. It is no doubt in my mind what their intent 

is. Their SSMs, their surface—their SAMs [surface-to-air missiles], 

rather, their missiles on Woody Island, their 10,000-foot runways 

that they are building in Subi Reef and Fiery Cross Reef and elsewhere, their advanced radars that we saw pictures of the last couple days at Cuarteron Reef, these are all indications of militarization. And, in my mind, they are changing the operational landscape 

of the South China Sea. 

The CHAIRMAN. And if you could address, sir, the freedom of 

navigation operations. Do you have enough ships, and what kind 

of ships would you say are most effective for those sorts of operations? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. So, on the freedom of navigation operations, clearly, have enough ships to do that. The 7th Fleet out 

there, homeported principally in Japan, has the ships, the requisite 

ships to do freedom of navigation operations. 
7 

The best kind of ship, in my opinion, to do that is the DDG–51- 

class, Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, highly capable, the right kind 

of weapons and the right kind of systems to ensure that freedom 

of navigation operations are conducted well and the ship is well 

able to defend itself should those operations go awry. 

Regarding the frequency of freedom of navigation operations and 

their effect on China’s militarization in the South China Sea, freedom of navigation operations, the military part of that, the freedom 

of navigation operation itself is only a part of the broader policy approach to what China’s doing. So I think my part of that, the execution of the operation itself, is one piece of it, and I think we are 

doing that, as I said, and we will be doing more of it, as I have 

spoken before in other venues. We will be doing them more, and 

we will be doing them with greater complexity in the future. And 

as the Secretary said, we will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. And then there is a policy piece to it and a 

diplomatic piece and a political piece to it, and that is for the 

whole-of-government effort on moving China and their position in 

the South China Sea. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you have the forces you need to carry 

out the mission to which you have been assigned? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman, thank you for the question. I 

would say that, first of all, for the forces on the peninsula, I enjoy 

being financed or budgeted at the very top of the priority list, so 

the forces are getting the funding to do the exercises, the training, 

and assets that they need on the peninsula to be ready to fight tonight, and I appreciate the support of this committee in ensuring 

that we do have that resourcing. 

As I noted in my opening comments, there are areas of concern. 

First is ISR. On the Korean Peninsula, we are facing a foe that is 

a million strong, and it is literally 35 miles from the capital and 

the—you know, half of their population, the Korean population, 35 

miles away with an adversary that uses a cycle of provocation. So, 

typically, I think I have about 12 hours or less warning, and persistent ISRs allows me to have that indication and warning and to 

set my posture to first defend South Korea and the large American 

citizen population that we have there as well. So ISR is something 

that is at the top of my list. 

I mentioned ballistic missile defense. You are well aware of the 

large arsenal that North Korea has in ballistic missiles that are— 

that is growing in strength but also in accuracy. I think that the 

discussions we are having right now to add THAAD to Korea are 

very important. We need THAAD there to have a layered defense. 

I need more munitions so that I have the first 30 days of munitions 

for the fight in terms of interceptors, and I rely on the quick deployment of at least two more battalions of Patriot as well if we 

go to crisis. So, you know, the assets of BMD [ballistic missile defense] there, the more that I have there, the better protected we 

are. 

And I think those are the primary of those four that I would 

mention shortly here, and I can go into more detail later. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
8 

And, again, I appreciate you both being here. 

I wonder if you could expand a little bit more on the South China 

Sea issues, obviously the militarization there, China’s consolidation 

of its claims and rejection of internationally accepted methods of 

dispute. So how might we best mitigate the risk of miscalculation 

leading to increased tensions or even conflict in the area? 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I think, ma’am, that, short of military 

confrontation, which we all want to avoid, I think the way forward, 

the best way to go forward is to present and maintain our credible 

military power and to maintain our network of like-minded allies, 

partners, and friends in the region and encourage them to operate 

in the South China Sea. And we must continue to operate in the 

South China Sea to demonstrate that that water space—and the 

air above it—is international and not the territory of any nation. 

I think the diplomacy, obviously, is probably the most important 

thing. We need to encourage China to act as a responsible actor on 

the international space when it comes to things like the South 

China Sea. Secretary Kerry recently said at Sunnylands that we 

have only one policy with regard to the South China Sea, and that 

is a negotiated settlement, that is to negotiate and work with 

China, and that is kind of where I am on that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Admiral. 

And, perhaps, General Scaparrotti, with your hat as well, how do 

we better complement, then, our efforts? Certainly you are speaking to the defense lane very appropriately here today, but I am 

wondering about other Federal agencies and working with them in 

diplomatic, economic, and certainly assistance efforts in that kind 

of holistic way. What are we doing? Which could we be doing more? 

Where are the gaps? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think, you know, we know from experience that a holistic approach is always the most effective, and 

so I think, including Treasury, many of the other agencies here, including them in all that we do, we on—in USFK as a subcomponent command, we also have close connection to all those agencies 

that work with PACOM, and they are regularly a part of our planning, our exercises, in fact, the one we will do this next month. And 

I think that type of close collaboration with all the agencies in our 

government, bringing them into the planning, the exercises that we 

do, gives them good awareness. And then, you know, as things happen in the theater, we have a relationship, we have an understanding, and we can work and collaborate much more quickly. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And do you see a greater role for Congress in this 

as well, since we tend to stay in our lane also? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I do. And I appreciate the fact that 

many Members of Congress come out to see us. Particularly, I 

know it is a long trip to Korea, but I think Korea is a place that 

is complex, and until you have stood on the DMZ [Demilitarized 

Zone], then just that picture alone is quite informative, and I appreciate the fact that so many make the trip and have the conversation and discussion with us. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 
9 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral, General, thank you so much for your service. I 

want to thank you, the service members, military families. What 

a commitment of protecting American families, also protecting our 

great allies. 

And, Admiral Harris, I am particularly grateful that I have had 

the opportunity to visit with you in the past. And, to me, you are 

a living example of America’s alliance with Japan. It is just, to me, 

so historic and inspiring to know that we have a Japanese-American as the U.S. Pacific commander at Pearl Harbor. How far we 

have come. And just being in your presence has just been so positive and has to be reassuring to the people all over Asia. 

Also, I am very grateful that my family has had an association 

with Asia. My dad served in the Flying Tigers during World War 

II, and I grew up hearing from him a great affection for the people 

of China and the people of India. And so I am hopeful that indeed 

positive can continue to advance, but with that in mind, Admiral, 

I appreciate your interest in maintaining our technological superiority, and later today, there will be a subcommittee hearing of the 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on the Department of Defense science and technology programs. These issues 

continue to be of crucial importance to this committee, particularly 

the chairman, and this is key to our warfighters’ future success. 

Could you please describe what do you see as the right balance 

between investing in future capabilities, like the third offset strategy, and getting the commander what he needs now? How has the 

fiscal year 2017 budget request prioritized the modernization affecting your command? 

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, sir, for those questions. I will just start 

by talking about General Stilwell for just a second. There is an article in today’s clips about how the Chinese are honoring General 

Stilwell in Chongqing in China at a museum that is run by the 

government there, and the relationship that he formed and his feelings for the Chinese. So I think that is an appropriate way to start 

this off. Thank you for that. 

Mr. WILSON. Absolutely. 

Admiral HARRIS. With regard to the fiscal year 2017 request, it 

has, I think, a good mix in it of funding for what we need today 

and funding for technological innovations, such as the third offset. 

Recently, Secretary Work talked about the SCO office, the Special 

Capabilities Office, and the work that they are doing. And this is 

important stuff as we seek to not only modernize our force but also 

to maintain the force we have. 

And so, you know, as a combatant commander, I don’t have the 

luxury of waiting 5 years for the next great thing that is going to 

come down the pike, because I have to be ready to fight tonight, 

and that is the stance that we take in the Pacific most—epitomized 

by General Scaparrotti and the challenge he has on the peninsula. 

So, you know, I can’t say to you all: Hey, just give me a 5-year 

break here while we wait for the next technology thing to come 

down the road. So I need to have a modernized, capable military 

today, but I recognize as a uniformed officer that we have to modernize, and so that is the challenge, I think, for the service chiefs. 
10 

You know, I talked yesterday about how much easier it is to be 

an insatiable combatant commander than it is to be a service chief 

in 2016, but as a nation, we have an insatiable need for security, 

and rightfully so. And so, you know, it comes to the point, I guess, 

in the forward forces. 

So I am pleased with how my input to the Secretary was upheld 

in the fiscal year 2017 budget, and I am pleased that that budget 

not only ensures that I have a modern, capable force to fight today 

but that the needs that I have identified, the shortfalls that we 

talked about in the last question, are being addressed. 

Mr. WILSON. And we look forward to your input. 

And, General Scaparrotti, China and North Korea’s increased 

utilization of hybrid warfare, are we prepared for cyber warfare potential on the Korean Peninsula? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, it is one of my concerns, given that 

North Korea has made a deliberate effort to improve their capabilities as much as they can. Kim Jong-un has stated that. And, as you 

know, he has demonstrated their capability with Sony and the attack on South Korea’s media and banking industries in 2013. So 

I am very concerned about it. 

I would answer your question and say, yes, I believe we are prepared today on our—you know, defense of our military systems and 

within the cyber domain, but it is a rapidly developing domain and 

area that we have to stay on it every day. We specifically have 

been working on our joint cyber center. I recently have been added 

a cyber mission team specifically for Korea, and that is building 

now. That is a great addition to our capability. 

I would mention to you that I also have another concern, and 

that is that I am within an alliance, the ROK’s capability and ours, 

so we are collaborating with their joint cyber center as well to 

make sure that we don’t have a vulnerability because of our combined systems, et cetera, and that is work that we need to continue 

to do. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks, gentlemen, for making it out. 

You know, on the West Coast, it is not that far to go to Korea, 

so maybe, from here, it is, but it is not that far from home. 

So we get a lot of questions about when North Korea does things 

and when China does things. First, for Admiral Harris, a couple reports have come out recently, one looking at the rebalance strategy 

and what can be done to improve that and enhance that. One suggestion—this is out of CSIS [Center for Strategic and International 

Studies]—one suggestion was a western Pacific joint task force, and 

I was wondering what your opinions about that are. And in the answer, if you could relate that to building partnership capabilities 

and whether or not, much like we do with NATO [North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization], there is a NATO commitment of a 2 percent 

of GDP [gross domestic product], but we can do that in a formal 

structure, if there is a value of informal commitments from our 

friends and allies in the region to invest in their capabilities to support regional objectives. 
11 

And then I have got a question for the general after that. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. Good to see you. 

Mr. LARSEN. Good to see you. 

Admiral HARRIS. On the CSIS study, I have read it, they had a 

number of interesting recommendations in there. I had a meeting 

with the CSIS leadership and spoke to them in my last trip to 

Washington. 

On the idea of a maritime task force for the western Pacific, we 

have one, and it is called PACOM. And if there is some smaller entity of that, we have that also, and it is called the 7th Fleet. So 

I am very comfortable with the command and control structure and 

the forces as they are arrayed under PACOM. So there is a commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which is a JTF [Joint Task Force]- 

certified, large combatant level staff headed up by a four-star that 

can carry out any operation that I need; the same with U.S. Army 

Pacific, General Brooks, four-star Army general, huge land forces 

under his command that can do that, if necessary. And then, in the 

far Pacific, in the Far East, you know, there is the U.S. 7th Fleet 

and all of its capability, there is the 3rd Marine Expeditionary 

Force and all of its capability. So I think that we have in existence 

today the thing that CSIS recommended by another name. So I am 

comfortable with that, but I appreciate the insights that I got from 

their study. 

Regarding partner capabilities, we could not do what we need to 

do alone, and we have great allies and partners in the region. I will 

start with Japan and its capability: a very powerful military, a tremendous maritime self-defense force, a great submarine force, a 

very capable land force, and a very strong air force in Japan. And 

on the other end of the globe down there is Australia, a partner 

and ally who has been with the United States, fought with us in 

virtually every conflict in the 20th century, and certainly into the 

21st century. They are—they have a highly specialized, highly 

trained, very capable military that are completely aligned in terms 

of equipment and training and that with the United States. So, as 

I mentioned in my opening statement, I rely heavily on Australia, 

not only for their operational capability but for their warfighting 

experience and advice. 

I think we will not see anything resembling NATO—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. In the Pacific. It is—each country 

there is so different—and they face different levels of threat; they 

have different levels of relationships with other countries—that I 

don’t think we will get this large, broad multilateral alliance like 

NATO. But the good news is we have strong alliances with five nations in the Pacific. We have strong partnerships with a whole lot 

more. And we are working hard, working strongly on improving trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and Korea; between 

the U.S., Japan, and Australia; and the U.S., Japan, and India. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Yeah. I just have very few seconds left for— 

thank you. 

General, just quickly, would the ROKs be prepared today for 

THAAD if there was an agreement today to deploy THAAD to the 

Republic of Korea, and if not, what does that timeline look like? 
12 

General SCAPARROTTI. Representative, we will have a—we are 

forming a joint working group that I think will have its first meeting probably within a week. I think we will have that settled. 

THAAD is a complex system. It is going to take some time for us 

to find the right location, because where you locate it makes a difference of how effective it is. So we have got to find the right location and do that work, which we will do in accordance with our 

SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement]. I am confident that that process will go well, but at this point, it is hard—it is difficult for me 

to tell you what the timeline looks like, but I should be able to do 

that, you know, and relatively soon. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Scaparrotti, I wanted to follow up on that area. Given 

Kim Jong-un’s erratic behavior and recent nuclear tests and ballistic missile tests, what capabilities do you need to make sure you 

can maintain the security of your forces as well as the ROK? 

General SCAPARROTTI. As I said, the most important to me is 

ISR, because it allows me to be in the proper posture to be able 

to get ahead of whatever it is he intends to do. And on the Korean 

Peninsula, I have got a very large conventional force in very close 

proximity to Seoul. That is one problem set. And then I have their 

asymmetric problem set, which is primarily their nuclear; their 

missile; their SOF [special operations] forces, the largest SOF 

forces in the world, 60,000 strong; long-range artillery capability; 

and their cyber. Many of those are deeper into the country, so it 

is a very difficult ISR challenge, probably one of the toughest in the 

world, given the terrain, mountainous. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are your current ISR capabilities adequate? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I need more persistence, sir. That would 

be very, very helpful. So that is the one I come up. And then the 

other four in particular that I mentioned earlier are the ones that 

I most need. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you. 

Admiral Harris, can you please explain the advantages of ensuring that U.S. Patriot battalions have modular capability? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. Clearly, Congressman, because of the mobility associated with that and the fact that I can move the Patriots 

around with some degree of flexibility. So in the Pacific, Patriot is 

a key part of our ballistic missile defense, as is THAAD. So we 

have a THAAD battery in Guam that is there on a temporary basis 

now, expected to go to a permanent status, PCS [permanent change 

of station] status, if you will, later this year, and then, as General 

Scaparrotti mentioned, as we work with the Koreans to consult on 

putting THAAD in Korea as well. Then the other part of that, of 

course, is Aegis, so—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Speaking about Aegis, my understanding is the discussion was to take the Aegis Ashore site there in Hawaii and activate it instead of just being a training facility. Now I hear there 

is discussion of closing it down. What is going on with—— 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, that—so I talked about my desire to keep 

it as a permanent facility, because it has demonstrated a great capability. Now, it was built as a training facility and testing facility 

for the Aegis Ashore sites in Europe, but I think we should study 
13 

it. I think we should take a hard look at it and whether we want 

to make it a permanent facility or not, but there is a lot between 

now and then. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Admiral HARRIS. This is just an idea now, but the Aegis Ashore 

in Hawaii, for example, has no interceptors, right. I mean, it— 

so—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. We would have to put them in. I agree. 

Admiral HARRIS. So there is a lot there, but I think it is worthy 

of study, and that is kind of where we are now. So we are a long 

way from making a decision either way right now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. As I read the President’s budget, there are 

four Baseline 9 destroyers that we are losing. Were any of those 

going to PACOM, and if so, what is the effect of losing those destroyers? 

Admiral HARRIS. I will be honest with you, I am not familiar 

with that number, but we are getting new Baseline 9 destroyers in 

Japan now; we are setting out there in part of the overseas homeporting program. So, in the Pacific, I am comfortable with where 

we are with regard to that capability, and that is a tremendous capability. I mean, that ties together—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. 

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. The E–2D and the Aegis system for 

this thing we call cooperative engagement. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. 

Admiral HARRIS. So I am pleased with that. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the benefit of having an Aegis Ashore site 

in Japan for the U.S. and for Japan? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I don’t know that there is a benefit to it. 

You know, we have—Japan has Patriot batteries, and that is—they 

are very capable. We have the TPY–2 radar systems at Shariki and 

Kasumigaseki, and those are helpful. I think there is a study in 

place to look at whether an Aegis Ashore site has utility in Japan, 

but it is premature for me to make that statement now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah. My understanding was it would free up our 

Aegis ships in the Asian Pacific. Is that not—— 

Admiral HARRIS. That could be, I mean, certainly. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to remind my colleagues that my home is next door 

to North Korea, when we talk about distances. 

So, Admiral and General, thank you for your testimony and for 

your service and leadership. 

Mr. Wittman and I were just out in your region a day ago, and 

I appreciated the opportunity to get updates on the progress we are 

making in realigning forces and trying to posture our force to respond to the environment in the region. One of the things that people become aware of when traveling in the region is the tyranny 

of distance. This is never more evident than when it comes to making sure we maintain a forward and deployed fleet. 

And, Admiral, you noted the need for more submarines as a top 

priority yesterday. To support this, I believe it is critical that we 
14 

maintain robust ship repair and dry-dock capabilities, including at 

a nuclear capable level, in the western Pacific. 

Now, you wrote a letter to the Guam Economic Authority stating, 

and I quote: ‘‘The Navy has consistently stated a robust ship repair 

capability in Guam as a matter of strategic importance and remains an operational priority for the Pacific Fleet.’’ 

Do you continue to share this view, Admiral? 

Admiral HARRIS. I do, Congresswoman. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral, in your testimony before the SASC 

[Senate Armed Services Committee] yesterday, the Japan press 

picked up on a 2-year delay in IOC [initial operational capability] 

for the Futenma Replacement Facility, and I believe this delay is 

due to legal challenges after the election of Governor Onaga. I just 

want the people of Guam to be clear about whether this delay in 

Okinawa would impact Guam. And, as you know, the 2012 2+2 

statement delays progress on Futenma from progress on Guam. 

Moreover, Chairman Wittman noted in his recent visit to Guam 

that we were light years ahead of where progress stood several 

years ago. So I would note that we have made great progress. So 

can you comment on this progress on Guam in the coming years 

and the importance of the investments in military construction for 

Guam in this year’s budget? And how does that help you as 

PACOM commander address the changing nature of threats in the 

Asia-Pacific region? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. I believe that Guam is a strategic 

bastion for the United States. The capabilities that are there and 

its location demand that we consider it a strategic bastion, and so, 

you know, we have put our fourth SSN there, nuclear submarine 

there, and we have brought in our second submarine tender there. 

So that is very exciting and I think the right level of emphasis on 

our submarine force in the western Pacific. 

With regard to Futenma, I will defer to the Marine Corps on 

where they stand on the linkages between the Futenma Replacement Facility and the exodus of that group of marines from Okinawa to both Guam and Hawaii, but clearly the plan as conceived 

was, you know, we would move marines from Futenma to Camp 

Schwab-Henoko and then subsequently move a group of marines, 

8,000 or so, from Okinawa to Hawaii and Guam, Guam and Hawaii 

in that order, but whether we are going to link that now or not, 

given that there is a delay in the movement of forces from 

Futenma to Schwab, I will have to defer to the Marine Corps on 

that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I just want to be clear as to whether Guam would 

be affected in—— 

Admiral HARRIS. It would only be affected perhaps in terms of 

timing, but the intent to move marines to Guam remains as strong 

as ever. That intent is there, and the resources we are putting into 

Guam and in the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, that is 

proceeding apace. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
15 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for your service and thank you 

for the great job that you are doing in the Asia-Pacific. As Ms. 

Bordallo said, we had a great trip there. 

Admiral Harris, I want to ask your perspective. As we got the 

laydown on the situation there in the Asia-Pacific, one of the things 

that was really compelling to me was the effort by the Chinese in 

the South China Sea. As you pointed out, their efforts there on 

Woody Island and the Paracels is something that is done. There is 

nothing that we can do to necessarily reverse that. The place, 

though, where I do believe we can have an impact is in the Spratly 

Islands. As you know, over 3,000 acres of reclamation there, those 

places are set up specifically, I believe, for them to militarize those 

areas. 

As you spoke in your opening testimony, you talked about submarines as one of the elements that you have as a critical part of 

force structure. There is also a suggestion of a second aircraft carrier. In looking at what we can do to deter or prevent further militarization of the South China Sea, give me your perspective on the 

priority that you would need as far as naval assets, and I am asking you submarines versus the second aircraft carrier. Give me 

what your priorities would be in that situation. 

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, Congressman. 

My priority, given the way you framed the question, is clearly 

submarines. Submarines are the original stealth platform. They 

clearly give us an asymmetric advantage. Our asymmetry in terms 

of warfare, because of submarines, is significant. And, you know, 

in the modernizing sense, we need to maintain that asymmetric advantage. 

The second aircraft carrier, you know, I am a combatant commander, and I want more, and I want it now, right? The more I 

can get it, the faster I can get it, the happier I am. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

Admiral HARRIS. But I think there are fiscal, diplomatic, and political hurdles—significant ones—to overcome before we would put 

a second carrier strike group in the western Pacific, you know, 

when you talk about an air wing, where would you put it, where 

would you train them, the 10,000 sailors, their families, the housing, the schools, the hospitals, the whole thing. But there are other 

things that we could do, in my opinion, that would improve our capability in the western Pacific and have an effect. We could consider putting another SSN [attack] submarine out there. We could 

put additional destroyers forward. We could put maybe the new destroyer, the DDG–1000s, move them forward. So there are a lot of 

things we could do short of putting a full carrier strike group in 

the western Pacific. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. And you believe that is the most effective way that we could deter further militarization there in the 

Spratlys? 

Admiral HARRIS. I think that is a big part of it—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Good. 

Admiral HARRIS [continuing]. Yes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thanks, Admiral Harris. 

General Scaparrotti, I appreciate your time when we were there 

visiting at U.S. Forces-Korea and the great job you are doing there. 
16 

One of the questions I wanted to ask is, as you look at your 

needs—and, as you have pointed out, the threat, ISR, a critical portion of that to make sure you can look at what potentially is happening to the north. Another element, though, that is important is, 

if you do need to act, is to make sure that you have not only the 

information and people, the manning, but also the hardware. 

Give me your perspective on where you are right now as far as 

munitions stores and whether they are adequate for what you look 

at as the potential scenarios there with North Korea. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you, sir, for the question. As you 

know—I will first describe the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, 

because while we have seen provocation, if we went to conflict in 

the Korean Peninsula, given the size of the forces and the weaponry involved, this would be more akin to the Korean War and 

World War II: very complex, probably high casualty. And because 

of that, first of all, it is just going to be a situation where I want 

to be ahead of that and be able to deter the aggressor. So my need 

is particularly to have the forces, the ballistic missile defense 

forces, et cetera, so that when I pick up the indication and warning, I can establish my defense, protect South Korea, our forces, 

and our population there immediately. 

I think I have a good force for doing that today in the peninsula, 

but I also rely on PACOM for immediate forces to respond: for example, the air forces stationed in Japan and throughout the 

PACOM theater; ISR to be responsive; the Marine force and MEF 

[Marine Expeditionary Force] to be responsive. And we keep a 

package—‘‘we’’ being PACOM commander, his force, his subordinate commands, and myself—that we know the readiness of those 

forces on any given day and any given hour that I need immediately, and we track those, and that is very important to my ability to respond and defend Korea. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General, I have had a request from the recording people, if you 

would make sure the microphone is right in front of your face, then 

it seems to work better. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to both witnesses for your leadership and your 

testimony this morning. 

Admiral, on page 5 of your testimony, you pretty much laid out 

what is sort of the guideposts for the sovereignty claims issues, 

which we have discussed this morning with the island building, 

and basically, it says, we encourage all countries to uphold international laws reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Should 

the United States ratify UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on 

the Law of the Sea], the Law of the Sea treaty? 

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, sir, for the question. Before I answer, 

I want to just say that I have spent a lot of time talking to proponents and opponents of UNCLOS in the last 3 or 4 months, and 

I appreciate the time I have spent with those experts, and I understand their arguments. And I understand those arguments for 

those folks who are opposed to UNCLOS, but I am a proponent of 
17 

it. And I think, in the 21st century, our moral standing is affected 

by the fact that we are not a signatory to UNCLOS. I think there 

are some economic disadvantages as well. We could get into a discussion about the Russian stuff in the Arctic and how they are 

using UNCLOS to their advantage, and we are unable to because 

we are not a signatory to it. 

So, you know, I will tell the members of this committee and anyone else that for me, personally, my opinion is the United States 

should accede to UNCLOS. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. And, again, when we discussed this 

at PACOM earlier, or last fall, that was before the Hague Convention ruled against the United States request to be part of the—just 

as an observer on the Philippines claim on the Spratly Islands, 

which Mr. Wittman referred to earlier. I mean, it is kind of unbelievable we are allowing sort of litigation to proceed that the consequences in terms of military strategy and resources of this country in the Asia-Pacific could hinge on the outcome of that claim, 

and we are completely shut out because of an unforced error. I 

mean, we have done this to ourselves. And so, you know, thank you 

for your frankness this morning. Myself and Congressman Don 

Young are going to introduce a bipartisan resolution in the House, 

again, citing events in the South China Sea as why we really need 

to take a fresh look at the Law of the Sea treaty. And, as a nation, 

we need to move forward and get in the game in terms of, you 

know, these critical issues, because it is going to determine the 

course of maritime policy and military policy and budgets for decades to come. So thank you, again, for that input. 

Earlier you mentioned the fact that we have a shortage of submarines in the Asia-Pacific. Again, today, we are operating with an 

attack sub fleet of about 52. Even with the two-a-year build rate 

that we started in 2011, that is going to continue to drop to, at this 

point, based on the shipbuilding plan that was submitted last 

week, to 41. Can you talk about what that will do to future commands in terms of the challenges that you are already facing with 

a larger fleet size? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. So PACOM suffers a shortage of submarines today. My requirements are not being met, as are not the 

requirements of other COCOMs [combatant commands] as well. So 

we have a submarine force of about 52 attack submarines, and all 

the COCOMs need them for all their reasons. And when you add 

up all their requirements, it exceeds the ability of the Navy to provide submarines forward, when you consider a lot of those are in 

maintenance and a lot of other things. 

I worry that we are going to go down to 41, because as we go 

down to the low 40s, China is going to increase their submarine 

force, even as they are today. And then Russia, which has the most 

capable submarine force in the world next to ours, they are moving 

their latest generation SSBNs, the ballistic missile submarines, to 

the Pacific. So the Dolgorukiy-class SSBNs got there at the end of 

last year, and that is just the beginning. And then China, meanwhile, has their Jin, J–I–N, Jin-class SSBNs that they are bringing 

online, and we are seeing them now. 
18 

I feel that I must be able to keep those submarines at risk, and 

I am able to do so today, but as we go down in numbers, then that 

becomes a concern to me. 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. Thank you. And we have actually an 

opportunity on Seapower [Subcommittee] to look at the next block 

contract, because, frankly, there is a dip in that, and we should do 

everything we can to avoid that, because that will at least bring 

the number up somewhat and mitigate, you know, what you just 

described. 

As long as I have 10 seconds left and people are boasting about 

proximity to Asia-Pacific, if an attack submarine leaves Groton, 

Connecticut, and goes under the ice, it can actually get there ahead 

of the folks from Washington State. 

And, with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank God for Connecticut. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General Scaparrotti and Admiral Harris, for 

being here—all your entourage—for your commitment to protecting 

us all. We appreciate it. Sometimes you don’t get told that enough. 

Admiral Harris, I guess I will start out with a really easy question: Are you aware of any collusion between Iran and North Korea 

with regards to North Korea’s intermittent but ongoing nuclear and 

missile tests? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I am not aware of collusion directly. But we 

know that there is a relationship between North Korea and Iran, 

but I am not privy to the details of the nuclear collusion, if you 

will. 

Mr. FRANKS. General Scaparrotti, that is your perspective as 

well? 

General SCAPARROTTI. That is mine as well, yes, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Admiral, your colleague here, General Scaparrotti, 

called BMD one of USKF’s four critical needs and is certainly—that 

is—but given the unpredictable and belligerent nature of the North 

Korean regime combined with their steadily increasing ballistic 

missile technology, how important do you believe this layered missile defense system that we have is in deterring North Korea? 

And in light of some of the recent events that I think are pretty 

serious, can you describe if you think that there are currently 

enough defense assets in your command to deter or defeat a North 

Korean ballistic missile attack? 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, first, I will talk about the criticality of a 

layered defense. It is absolutely critical. You know, we have 28,000 

American troops on the Korean Peninsula. We have their families. 

We have several hundred thousand Americans who live and work 

in South Korea, and the North Korean capability is growing. And 

they threaten not only our fellow citizens and our allies in Korea; 

they threaten Japan, they threaten Hawaii, the West Coast in the 

mainland of the United States, and then potentially the East 

Coast. 

They are on a quest to miniaturize their nuclear weapons and 

the means to deliver them intercontinentally, and they pose a very 

real threat to the United States. So I think the layered defense is 

the only answer to go after the missiles once launched. That means 
19 

THAAD—and I am glad we are engaged in consultations with 

Korea on putting a THAAD battery there—Patriot, Aegis, the 

whole thing. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, how has the fiscal year 2017 budget request, 

prioritization of modernization, affected your commands? I mean, 

do you currently have the assets you need to fight tonight while 

currently modernizing? 

Admiral HARRIS. I am pleased with the fiscal year 2017 budget. 

I was asked to make comments about it up my chain, and my concerns were addressed, and principally those concerns were in antisurface weapons and anti-surface ship missiles and in advanced 

fighter aircraft for the PACOM theater. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. I guess, let me put it this way, and I will 

address the question to both of you: If there is anything that you 

feel like that if you had the option that you could increase in terms 

of your capability, meaning particular area, what would that be? 

Admiral HARRIS. In my case, sir, I would ask for more Joint 

Strike Fighters, more fifth-generation aircraft to go after the A2/ 

AD [anti-access/area denial] threat that we face in the Pacific. 

Mr. FRANKS. General Scaparrotti. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I would say, one, high-altitude multiINT [intelligence] intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and I would go back to the ballistic missile defense assets: for 

instance, Patriot. It would be ideal to have more Patriot than I 

have now as opposed to relying on the additional Patriot at crisis. 

But the fact of the matter is, is that our missile defense forces are 

stretched. There is great demand around the globe of that for similar kinds of threats; THAAD, for instance, same. 

So, you know, if I were to tell you what more could I use and 

we had the budget to do it, I think those would be my top two right 

there. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am going to do something 

crazy; I am going to yield back my last 18 seconds. 

And thank you, all, very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Chair appreciates that. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to our witnesses for being here. 

I too just returned from Japan. I was part of a congressional delegation that spent 3 days in Tokyo and 2 days in Okinawa. And 

I had spent years there—many years ago, I was a high school student there. 

And as I hadn’t been back in the interim, I really was struck by 

the tremendous changes in that country but also in the relationship we have developed with Japan. Because at the time I lived 

there, it was really not too long after World War II, and there was 

certainly an effort to constrain Japan militarily and, yet, to reassure it about its being protected. 

So, as we have moved forward, we are in a very different environment. And I appreciate the rationale for it, as things have really 

changed in that part of the—in the Asia-Pacific area. 

And, Admiral, you referenced the peace and security legislation 

that Japan just passed that really authorizes it to engage in a more 

expansive way in regional security efforts. And one of the questions 
20 

I had there and posed there was, is money following that? As 

Japan is sort of—as the ties are being loosened on what it can do 

and cannot do militarily, is funding following that effort so that 

they absorb a little more of the financial responsibility for protecting that part of the world? 

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

I believe it is, but I don’t know that for a fact. I know that the 

government and the Prime Minister have said that funding will follow, that they are going to fund their aspirations to improve their 

military and their capability. But I will also add that the primary 

costs of our U.S. forces in Japan are paid for by Japan. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Yes. And what is that amount? I know we were 

given a figure over there. Do you know off the top of your head? 

Admiral HARRIS. No, ma’am, but I will find out before the closed 

hearing. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I would welcome that. 

Admiral HARRIS. It is in the hundreds of billions of dollars, but 

I will find that out and get back to you on that. 

[The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you for that. 

And the other issue that came up too was sort of encouraging 

jointness between Japan’s security forces and our forces as we are 

seeking ways to work together. And I am wondering how you are 

thinking that through and encouraging that. 

Admiral HARRIS. And encouraging—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. Jointness, more joint operations between our 

forces and theirs. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So everything we are doing is joint these 

days in the U.S. side. And I think the other countries are observing 

that and learning from that. 

So, last fall, we had an SLS, a senior leader seminar, with the 

Japan Joint Staff, which is their joint headquarters in Tokyo. And 

we went through some of our war planning and some of our efforts 

in that arena. So I think Japan recognizes that they need to be 

more joint within their military than they are, and they are working with us closely to improve their jointness. 

So I was honored last week to travel to Japan, and I spoke at 

the 10th anniversary of the Japan Joint Staff. And I have been associated with Japan, their military, for most of my career, and they 

are far and away further along in jointness today than they have 

been. That is not to say that they don’t have a ways to go. 

And I think that the jointness between their air force and their 

navy, for example, should be improved, and I think they recognize 

that. They are moving toward a greater amphibious capability, and 

that forces a level of cooperation between their ground self-defense 

force and their maritime self-defense force. 

So I am very optimistic about where Japan is going in terms of 

jointness and their ability to work with us in a joint manner across 

our services. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And that is what I was getting at, was they are 

working us with as much as they are within the different branches 

of their services. 

Admiral HARRIS. That is right. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 
21 

I too will yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are on a roll here. 

Mr. Bridenstine. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here. It is an honor to have you 

before our committee. Certainly, I have spent plenty of time in the 

Pacific as a Navy pilot myself, now serving in the Oklahoma Air 

National Guard. 

General Scaparrotti, I wanted to ask you or actually share with 

you one of my big concerns I have heard from one of my constituents. I want to make you aware of a recent Army regulation change 

regarding dining facility use for rotationally deployed forces under 

your command. Effective February 15, 2016, the Army declared essential unit messing for rotationally deployed soldiers serving in 

the Pacific. In other words, all soldiers deployed temporary duty to 

Korea must use the dining facility, the DFAC. 

This policy will literally take money out of soldiers’ pockets, hundreds of dollars per month, in two ways: First, the Army will 

charge for meals at the DFAC through automatic payroll deductions. That is automatic payroll deductions. These deductions will 

occur whether or not a soldier actually uses the DFAC. And, as you 

are aware, when you do missions in these areas, those missions 

happen during breakfast, happen during lunch, and you are not 

able to use the DFAC. So soldiers will have money deducted, even 

though they are not using the DFAC. 

Second, the Army is also taking away their daily food allowance, 

known as the government meal rate. I have a constituent in the 

10th Combat Aviation Brigade currently at Camp Humphreys. The 

Army’s bureaucratic jiggery-pokery will reduce his paycheck over 

$700 per month through the automatic DFAC deduction and stopping meal allowances. I want to repeat that: $700 per month. 

These soldiers are not going to Korea for a week or even a month; 

they are going for 9 months. And so when you lose $700 a month, 

that ends up being a good chunk of money. 

In contrast, a soldier at Camp Humphreys, under the permanent 

change of station orders, is apparently exempt from the automatic 

meal deduction. Aviation units, such as the 10th CAB [Combat 

Aviation Brigade], don’t plan training or missions around the 

whims of the DFAC, as I have already talked about. That is why 

the food allowance exists in the first place. That is why it was 

there. 

And I would like to show you some pictures here of what is going 

on at the DFAC in Korea. There are a couple of pictures. Can we 

just slide through a few more? 

[The slides referred to were not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So these soldiers, they are having their money 

automatically withheld, and then they are being forced to wait in 

an hour line in order to go through the DFAC. Some of them can’t 

go through the DFAC at all because of missions. When they do go, 

they are waiting an hour, and that is three times a day. That is 

3 hours a day where they are being delayed. Again, this happens 

three times a day. 

I just want to get a commitment from you, General, that you will 

do something for our soldiers, who are flying, in many cases, high- 
22 

risk—and these are steady-state missions. This isn’t like a surprise. This isn’t something that just came up. These are steadystate missions at the DMZ. And, number one, I want to make sure 

they get their meals. I want to make sure that they are not waiting 

in line for 3 hours three times a day. And I want to make sure that 

they are not having their money taken away. Can you commit to 

me that you will look into this? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Absolutely. And I will come back to you 

personally on it. We have got not only the CAB that you mentioned, but, you know, we have other rotational units, obviously, as 

a part of our readiness that rotate regularly on 9-month rotations. 

They are probably affected as well. 

[The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

And, Mr. Chairman, before I yield back, I just want to note that 

I want to introduce legislation to make sure that this is taken care 

of. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Takai. 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Admiral Harris, General Scaparrotti, for being 

here. 

Admiral Harris, again, regarding the Aegis Ashore facility—or 

the hope for a facility—North Korea’s nuclear test in January 

underscores the concern that we have, that North Korea may develop the ability to place a bomb on a long-range ballistic missile 

that could reach the U.S. West Coast. I referred to public comments you made that converting the Aegis missile defense test site 

in Hawaii into a combat-ready facility is a good idea to help protect 

the U.S. mainland. 

Since we have assets on Kauai, why not use them? How would 

this permanent land version add to U.S. defense needs? And what 

would it take to integrate the site into a larger U.S. ballistic missile defense system? 

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, Congressman. Good to see you again. 

I believe that we need to do everything we can to defend our Nation, and that is my job in the Pacific. I think the Aegis Ashore facility in Kauai is a national treasure, and we should use it to the 

best of our ability. And I think one of the ways that we could improve our national ballistic missile defense capability is by converting that to a permanent facility with interceptors. It seems reasonable to me, but it demands further study. It demands a lot of 

study. 

I think, at the end of the day, we will learn that what it will do, 

it would be able to defend Hawaii, and other systems we have 

would defend the continental United States. But that is good. I am 

good with that. And that is what I have recommended, that we 

begin the study to see if it is feasible and what it would take to 

do it. 

There is not only the technical aspects of the architecture, the 

ballistic missile defense architecture; there is a political dynamic, 

as you well know, and the whole piece would increase in footprint 

in Hawaii and all that. So it is a whole effort that needs to be 
23 

looked at. But I am advocating it because I think we need to do 

it. 

I noted that after I made that statement, that China objected, 

just as they have objected to the consultations we have with Korea 

to put THAAD in Korea. And I find it preposterous that China 

would insert itself in negotiations between us and our Korean ally 

on how best to defend our Korean ally and our Americans there, 

and they would interject themselves in our internal discussions of 

whether we should improve our ability to defend our own homeland. 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you. 

Actually, just a few days ago, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman compared the United States military infrastructure in Hawaii to China’s land reclamation and strategic placement of missiles on disputed territory in the South China Seas. Can you just 

tell us your perspective on whether Hawaii should be and could be 

compared to the disputed territory in the South China Seas? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. That statement that the Chinese spokesman made almost doesn’t merit comment. I mean, it is ridiculous, 

and to me, it is indicative of the spokesperson’s tone deafness. 

Mr. TAKAI. I agree. 

In regards to the status of the rebalance, if U.S. defense spending remains limited to the cap set forth in the Budget Control Act 

of 2011, as amended, the so-called sequester levels, how might this 

impact the plans for bolstering U.S. force posture and presence in 

the Asia-Pacific region? And what might be the implications of 

maintaining deterrence and for operational risk in a potential combat situation? 

Admiral HARRIS. As I have testified before, certainly at my confirmation hearing, that I think that if we return to sequester levels 

for the duration of the law, out to the early 2020s, it will harm our 

ability dramatically, our ability to defend our Nation. I think all 

that would be affected. And we are going through that now as we 

look at downsizing the Army, and should we do that? Where should 

those forces come from that would be part of the downsizing and 

everything? 

So I have testified before that I think a continued sequester 

would hurt us significantly in our military readiness, and I stand 

by that. 

Mr. TAKAI. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. 

Admiral Harris, let me ask you some questions about the littoral 

combat ship [LCS] program. You have stated that the littoral combat ship was a vital capability for you to engage through the 

PACOM area of operation. You note the LCS was needed to do missions not suited for DDGs, destroyers. How beneficial is having 

such a capability in your AOR [area of responsibility] to patrol waters not easily navigated by larger platforms? 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, thanks for the question, sir. Just by definition, I mean, the littoral combat ship is designed to operate in 
24 

shallower waters than our destroyers and cruisers. I think in 

where we are now in phase zero, the LCS is a terrific platform to 

work with our allies and partners in the region. 

I think that there is work, though, that could be done to the LCS 

to make the ‘‘C’’ more ‘‘C,’’ the combat part of littoral combat ship. 

And I am pleased, through the Senate and the House and the Congress writ large, that we are looking at doing that. So we are going 

to, quote-unquote, ‘‘up-gun’’ the LCS. And I think that is terrific. 

I want our adversaries in the Pacific to think about the LCS the 

way I thought about the Nanuchkas, Osa’s, and Tarantuls of the 

Soviet Navy back in those days, back during the Cold War. We 

used to track and be concerned about those little, tiny patrol boats 

that the Soviets had because they were missile-armed corvettes. 

And I want the Chinese and the Russians and other adversaries we 

might have to think about the LCS in that way. And I think we 

can think of it in that way if we put the right kind of missile on 

it and up-gun it. 

Mr. BYRNE. Of course, that is the plan. As you know, the last, 

I think, 20 ships in the 52-ship buy would be frigates that would 

have the up-gun and the more heavier platform. But I guess what 

I hear you saying is, is that because you have so many of them— 

and it is a cost-effective way to have so many of them—that it is 

another way for us to project our strength in a maritime environment, in a shallow-draft environment we find in many of those islands. 

Admiral HARRIS. That is correct. I stated when I was the Pacific 

Fleet commander that I value the LCS. I believe there is a place 

for LCS in the joint force now that I am the PACOM commander, 

and I look forward to working with them as they come online. 

Mr. BYRNE. You also mentioned how we are able to work with 

other nations and their navies with littoral combat ship. Could you 

expand on that some, please? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. A lot of our friends and partners in the 

region have small navies. And they want to learn from us or they 

want to learn from somebody, and I would rather they learn from 

us than other potential partners. And their navies are small. And 

when a cruiser comes in there or even a DDG for that matter, it 

can overwhelm them. And so an LCS is the right platform to do 

that. 

It is also the right platform to train in areas of shallower depths, 

just by definitions, as I talked about, and the cruisers are smaller 

so that footprint is smaller. And, for that reason, I think in a partnership environment way, the LCS is, again, an ideal platform. 

Mr. BYRNE. Let me ask you about another vessel. It is called the 

joint high-speed vessel [JHSV]. They just renamed it the EPF [expeditionary fast transport]. And I understand that those vessels are 

getting some pretty good use in PACOM. This is a well-built ship 

with ability to add a lot of additional capabilities. What do you see 

as the future of the joint high-speed vessel, the EPF, in your AOR? 

Admiral HARRIS. I think it has great potential for some of the 

mission sets that I have to be concerned about, more so the Pacific 

Fleet commander would worry about it. But the joint high-speed 

vessel has a great ability to move a lot of things quickly. And by 
25 

‘‘a lot of things,’’ I mean, troops and their equipment. And the 

Army is using a version of that now in the western Pacific. 

So I am looking forward to the JHSV EPF coming online in 

greater numbers. I think that you could put an expedition or a field 

hospital, for example, on a JHSV and turn it into a hospital ship. 

We explored that in the last few months in my time as Pacific Fleet 

commander during Pacific Partnership. That is an exciting new capability that I think we should take a hard look at. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, thank you for your service, gentlemen, both of 

you. 

And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

The U.S. PAC [Pacific] Command has given authorization in the 

fiscal year 2016 NDAA’s South China Sea initiative to build our 

maritime security in the region and improve the domain awareness 

of our partners in the region. In your opinion, does this authority 

need to be expanded, and if so, what changes would you like to see 

made? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, that is the maritime security initiative. I 

am pleased with where we are with it now. I think we will get 

about $50 million this year for that. My team is working with OSD 

[Office of the Secretary of Defense] on that to figure out the best 

ways to improve the maritime domain awareness of some of the 

countries in the region, and I am satisfied with where we are with 

that this year. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

General. Anything you would add, General? 

General SCAPARROTTI. No, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

Admiral, you mentioned in your testimony PAC Command’s need 

for enduring cyber capability in the theater. Cyber warfare is undoubtedly a growing aspect of modern warfare and something we 

must strive to be ahead of as much as possible. Would making 

USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] a combatant command like 

CENTCOM [Central Command] help funnel focus and funding to 

a vitally important aspect of this new theater of warfare? 

Admiral HARRIS. In my opinion, sir, CYBERCOM should be an 

independent combatant command. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Would you pull that mike closer. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. In my opinion, sir, CYBERCOM should 

be an independent combatant command on the level of PACOM or 

CENTCOM, as you say. Currently, it is a sub-unified command 

under USSTRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command]. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you have any thoughts on how Congress can 

be effective in helping bring that about? 

Admiral HARRIS. No, sir. I think it is being addressed adequately 

within DOD [Department of Defense], and ultimately, the Chairman will make his best military advice known to both the President and the Secretary and a decision will be rendered. And I think 

that is appropriate in this case at this time. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

General, anything to add? 
26 

General SCAPARROTTI. No, sir. I agree with Admiral Harris. I 

know it is under discussion now. And I think the DOD, as he said, 

is considering that, and it will be handled in a normal process. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Admiral, considering Vietnam’s claims in the Spratly and Paracel 

Islands and rising patriotism in Vietnam, and animosity towards 

China resulting from the 2014 oil rig standoff, and Hanoi becoming 

the eighth largest arms importer from 2011 to 2015, a maritime 

dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea has 

perhaps the greatest possibility for becoming a flash point in the 

region. 

However, in recent public discussions on the issue of the South 

China Sea, it has been surprising to understand the dearth of information on our engagement with Vietnam. Most of the focus has 

been instead on our defense treaty with the Philippines and their 

arbitration case. Moving forward, do you see a place for increased 

bilateral dialogue between the U.S. and Vietnam, and if so, what 

developments would you like to see? 

Admiral HARRIS. So I have made Vietnam and India focuses— 

foci—focuses, I guess, of effort for PACOM. I think there are great 

opportunities in both countries for us to move forward in our relationship and partnerships in the region. So I am excited by our opportunities in Vietnam just for the reasons you mentioned. You 

know, they are a growing nation. They have a like view with us 

of China and our concerns in the South China Sea. And they are 

becoming a player on the world stage, and they are certainly a 

player in ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]. 

So I look forward to continuing our relationship with Vietnam. 

I appreciate the fact we are able to increase our trade with Vietnam, including in the defense arena. I went to Vietnam when I was 

a Pacific Fleet commander, and I look forward to having the opportunity to go there as a Pacific Command commander. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

Anything to add, General? 

General SCAPARROTTI. No, thank you. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

General Scaparrotti, you said earlier that should we have to be 

involved—God forbid—in military conflict on the peninsula, it 

would be more akin to Korea or World War II: complex, high casualty. Are you concerned at all—we have heard, you know, the 

service chiefs come before us in the last year, sequestration, the 

impact, and us being in 15 years of a counterinsurgency mindset 

has had a real impact on the readiness of units. The squadron I 

commanded was ready to head over there on 24 hours’ notice, but 

a lot of the readiness has really been degraded across the joint 

force that are on a TPFDD [time-phased force and deployment 

data] ready to go for supporting that kind of contingency. Are you 

concerned at all about the real readiness levels of being able to respond quickly? 
27 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. Yes, I am. As you 

know, all of our services are really coming out of a bathtub in readiness, and it has been improving because of the increased funding. 

And we appreciate that support, but it is going to be some time before our forces are at a point where all of the units have now been 

through training that prepares them really for a complex environment, high-intensity conflict. 

I can speak specifically of the Army. It takes time for us to get 

units through those complex rotations at our national training centers. We have got younger generations who haven’t combined fires, 

for instance, et cetera, fire and maneuver in large formations. 

Those are things that an individual, small unit, and larger unit 

training that is complex. 

So I am concerned about it. I know that all the services are focused on this, and we, on the peninsula, are as well. So, when we 

do our exercises and we bring units in, that is the kind of training 

at each level that we are focused on. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. I am interested in following up a little bit 

more in the classified session as well as far as the risks we are at 

right now. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I think I also heard you say in the shortage of munitions that you mentioned that the potential cluster munition ban 

and the impact that that would have on your ability to do your job. 

I just want to make sure I understood that. 

Neither the U.S. nor South Korea are signatories to the cluster 

munition ban, so can you just clarify what you meant? And if we 

were to become a signatory and those would be banned, what impact would that have on munition? 

General SCAPARROTTI. That is correct, neither signatories. However, the U.S. has a policy that in 2019, in January of 2019, we 

would essentially comply with the Oslo treaty through policy. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So what impact would that have? 

General SCAPARROTTI. The impact for me would be significant because the majority of my munitions are cluster munitions that are 

affected by that policy. And, of course, then what I am concerned 

about and the reason I am bringing it up now is we need to begin 

to replace those munitions so that I have the proper stockage for 

the first 30 days on site. 

Cluster munitions in and of themselves provide an effect that in 

this fight is very important, is very difficult to replicate with unitary rounds. So we need to get to a cluster munition. We need to 

keep this cluster munition until such time that we are able to 

produce a replacement that meets the less than 1 percent dud rate 

and we can produce it in numbers to meet my need. 

Ms. MCSALLY. But just to clarify, it would be best for the military mission that you have for that ban to not go into effect? 

General SCAPARROTTI. That is correct. That is what I mean by 

we need to keep what we have and be able to use it until we can 

replace it properly. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. 

Admiral Harris, I want to talk a little bit about the ISIS [Islamic 

State in Iraq and Syria] threat and how you are seeing that in the 

whole theater. I am on Homeland Security as well. You know, look-
28 

ing at the foreign fighter flow, we know there is at least a couple 

thousand coming from your theater—China, Indonesia, some from 

Australia—that we are aware of; also, about a half a dozen affiliates that have allegiance to ISIS; and obviously, the Jakarta bombing that ISIS claimed in January. 

Can you just talk about the trends you are seeing? And is there 

any concern with us or our allies in the direction this is going? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. It is a significant concern of mine, 

the numbers of fighters that are leaving PACOM countries and 

going to the fight. Of greater concern are those, however, that are 

returning because not only are they even more radicalized; now 

they are militarized, weaponized, and so that is a concern. 

I am concerned by some of the trends I am seeing in the region. 

In one of the countries, recently, there was a Pew survey where 

over 50 percent of the respondents said it was okay to execute a 

Muslim who converted to some other religion; 30 percent of the respondents in that country said it was okay to use violence in the 

name of Islam. That sounds like something coming right out of the 

pages of the ISIS handbook. So I worry about that quite a bit. 

I made the comment in the past that there are more Muslims in 

the PACOM region than in Central Command. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Exactly. 

Admiral HARRIS. And so Islamic extremism is an area of concern, 

as I mentioned in my opening statement, and we look at that very 

closely. And fortunately, Special Operations Command Pacific, 

SOCPAC, is there, and Admiral Kilrain is charged with monitoring 

that and having an effect on that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. My time is expired. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Harris and General Scaparrotti, thank you very much 

for your testimony today and your service to our Nation. 

For years now, we have underinvested in our EW [electronic warfare] capabilities, where our adversaries have actually invested 

heavily in those areas. Now, some of this you may not be able to 

go into an open session, but to the degree that you can, where are 

we held risk because of that underinvestment as we are shifting to 

the Asia-Pacific region? And how overmatched are we? And what 

areas do we further need to invest? And where are our adversaries’ 

capabilities strongest? What keeps you awake at night should conflict ever break out and we need to confront this? 

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, sir. 

In trying to dance on the unclassified side of this question, I will 

say that I am concerned about principally in the EW environment 

with Russia and China. They are our peer competitors in this. I 

think we are investing now more than we have been in electronic 

warfare, and our new concept electronic warfare maneuver, I think, 

is gaining a foothold in the Navy and in the joint force. 

So I am pleased with where we are moving along, though I think 

that we need to invest more in it, not only in terms of fiscal resources but also in terms of tactical development. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, do you want to add anything? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yeah, I would agree. I think that our 

investment in that has been periodic, and as a result, we have seen 
29 

the need, started to respond to it, and then probably dropped off 

over time, I think, specifically over the last 10 years. And we are 

now beginning to invest in that in terms of our people, our skills, 

and our assets, and I think we need to continue that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral Harris, in your testimony, you highlighted that the world’s 300 foreign submarines, 200 are located in 

the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and 150 of those belong to China, 

North Korea, and Russia. How is the United States keeping pace 

with this growing force in the region, and what investments need 

to be made to enhance our undersea and antisubmarine warfare capabilities as well as to our anti-access and area denial strategies? 

Admiral HARRIS. So one of the biggest asymmetric advantages 

that the United States enjoys over any peer competitor or other 

competitor in the world is our undersea warfare capability. The 

submarine gives us an advantage over any other adversary we 

might face. Unfortunately, those adversaries recognize that, and 

they are improving and increasing their own antisubmarine warfare and undersea warfare capabilities. 

Clearly, while our submarines are far and away better, in my 

opinion, today, quantity has a quality all its own, and the numbers 

of Russian and Chinese submarines, particularly Chinese submarines, are a matter of concern. I think the Russian submarine 

force never took a hiatus at the end of the Cold War, and we are 

seeing some very impressive platforms come out of Russia, including the Dolgorukiy, as I mentioned earlier, the SSBN. 

So I think that we must continue to invest in our undersea warfare capabilities, not only in terms of numbers of submarines but 

in improving the submarines that we have. I think the Virginia 

Payload Module, for example, is fantastic. We can’t get enough of 

them and the capabilities that it brings to the fight. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. Thank you. 

I would like to shift, if I could, to cyber. And I have a pretty good 

understanding of our cyber capabilities. But, again, as we are shifting to the Asia-Pacific and we are going to be partnering more 

closely with our allies in the region, where is your level of confidence in their cyber capabilities should we need to partner with 

them and should conflict break out? 

I know the challenges that we face in securing our own systems, 

but to the degree that we are going to be dependent on our allies 

in the region and their cyber capabilities, which may be not as robust as what ours are. 

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, sir. I will defer to General 

Scaparrotti for the specifics of your question with regard to Korea. 

He has some ideas on that. 

But, in general, I am concerned about it. As we work on this with 

our allies, friends, and partners, we are as strong as only the weakest link in the chain, and cyber could be that weak link. And so 

their vulnerability to intrusion and exploitation is a matter of concern to me. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I would echo Admiral Harris’ point 

with respect to Korea as well. We have a good working relationship 

in terms of our two joint cyber centers and our cyber domain work 

overall, but it is initial. It is new, and it is developing, and it needs 

to develop rapidly, because we have a threat. North Korea is active 
30 

every day. And so my concern is that we act with enough focus and 

we act fast enough and with enough assets. 

The second thing I would say, when you are into that domain, 

each country has their own concerns about protection of information and capabilities, and so it is an area that is very difficult to 

work in a collaborative way that you need to at times as well. And 

that is something that we have got and other nations have to work 

their way through in order to really close the gaps that we have 

got to close in our systems. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome. Aloha. I am not going to harp on this, but 

I will mention it quickly. I know it has been talked earlier about 

the Aegis Ashore on Kauai and just the paramount importance of 

protecting Hawaii and the United States from North Korea’s 

threat. 

But, Admiral Harris, I would like to talk to you a little bit about 

India. I know you have a trip very soon to go and visit India. Two 

things: there is a potential sale of eight F–16s to Pakistan that I 

and other Members of Congress have expressed very serious concerns about, given the fact that Pakistan has long harbored and 

given safe haven to various terrorist groups that continue to launch 

destabilizing attacks within India as well as Afghanistan; the recent release of Hafiz Saeed, one of the masterminds of the 2008 

Mumbai terrorist attack, where six U.S. citizens were killed, even 

at the protests of the United States. 

There are a number of other concerns that we have. But, in particular, I am wondering if you can talk about how, as you and others have spoken of the importance of this opportunity to strengthen 

our relationship with India as we head into a strong partnership 

into the future and the benefits that that brings us, what impact 

could this sale of F–16s have on our relationship with India and 

the work that you and others are doing to strengthen that? 

Admiral HARRIS. That is a great question and timely too, ma’am, 

because I go to India on Monday to keynote the Raisina Dialogue 

event in New Delhi. 

I view India as our great strategic opportunity in PACOM, and 

we need to do as much as we can with India in a mil-to-mil sense 

and in every other sense. We have a terrific ambassador there in 

Richard Verma, who is looking aggressively at ways to improve our 

relationships with India across the board. And I am excited by 

that. 

With regard to the sale of F–16s to Pakistan, while I don’t have 

a professional opinion on that sale itself, certainly it will affect 

some aspect of our relationship with India. I know that I will be 

asked about it when I go to India, and I hope to be able to tell 

them that that sale is just one aspect of many military sales we 

make across the world, and that we view our relationship with 

India very importantly. And I hope that we can work through this 

sale and their perception of it to continue to improve our relationship with India. 
31 

Ms. GABBARD. Yeah, thank you. I think this is something that 

they will definitely be bringing up with you at that dialogue, in 

particular because of the recent attack at their air force base and 

the terrorist organization behind that being from Pakistan. 

What do you see here really as the next critical step towards 

strengthening that U.S.-India partnership? 

Admiral HARRIS. So we are moving out aggressively in the technical field with the DTTI [Defense Technology and Trade Initiative] 

initiative that Under Secretary Kendall is pushing. And I think 

that is excellent. There are some what we call foundational agreements that have to be executed with partner nations in order to 

move, quote-unquote, to the next level. And we are working with 

India on the signing of those foundational agreements. 

One of those is the LSA, Logistics Support Agreement, which allows us to do acquisition cross-servicing, for example. Another one 

is called the CISMOA [Communications and Information Security 

Memorandum of Agreement], and it involves communications security so that we can be assured that India will protect our communications as we would protect theirs. And so these are foundation 

agreements that we enact with every country we work with. 

We have not gotten to the point of signing them with India, but 

I think we are close. We are closer now than we ever have been. 

And I am encouraged by what I am hearing from my colleagues in 

India, and I look forward to having that discussion with them when 

I go there next week. 

Ms. GABBARD. Great. 

Thank you, Admiral Harris. I appreciate the leadership that you 

have taken, in particular on strengthening this relationship and 

recognizing the importance of it in our overall strategy within the 

Asia-Pacific. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, I would like to ask you to discuss and provide some 

guidance for me and others on how to approach the issue of cost 

sharing for our obligations and the benefits that we provide in the 

Pacific. 

The easy way for me to look at it when it comes to Europe is 

through the 27 other NATO members who have a target of spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense, even though only 4 of 

them today are doing that. But it is something that I can ask of 

our allies who enjoy the benefit of the U.S. disproportionate presence there and defense capacity. 

How should I look at that when it comes to Asia and the Pacific? 

Admiral HARRIS. A great question, sir. And I think that the 

NATO model, as I mentioned before, doesn’t work for the Pacific. 

So you have to look at each of our treaty allies individually and 

look at those—that subset of treaty allies where we have major 

concentrations of U.S. forces. And who is the greater beneficiary of 

that, or who are the beneficiaries of that? 

Certainly, part of the beneficiary of us having a large carrier 

strike group bring expeditionary force presence in Japan is us. We 

are there for us and the values that we hold dear and what is important to the United States. Certainly, it is a benefit to Japan. 

And so our obligation to Japan under our treaty is to defend them 
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and their obligation to us under that same treaty is to provide us 

a place from which we can defend them. So that is simplistic, but 

that sort of gets at that issue. 

So they provide us an enormous host nation funding level—which 

I promised I would get to you in the closed session—to foot the bill, 

if you will, for U.S. forces that are based in Japan. And that model 

extends to Australia, for example. We are undergoing host nation 

funding discussions with Australia now as we move a sizable Marine and Air Force presence to Darwin and Tindal. And the level 

of that funding and how much it should be is a subject of negotiation. We certainly get a benefit from operating out of Australia, as 

do the Australians. 

Singapore is another case, a very important case. Singapore is 

not a treaty ally, but it is certainly an important strategic partner 

to us. And they allow us to put our littoral combat ships, to 

rotationally deploy them out of their nation, and they have agreed 

to allow us to operate rotationally P–3s and P–8 surveillance and 

reconnaissance aircraft. And we get that benefit from operating out 

of Singapore because of our interests in the South China Sea, 

Strait of Malacca, and the eastern Indian Ocean. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Yeah. All of that makes sense, and I think that 

same logic could extend to our presence in Europe, and yet there 

we have a very defined commitment from our allies there. As you 

outline some of the challenges that we face, a rising China, a resurgent Russia, just to name two, and some of the investments that 

you are going to ask or the Department of Defense and the administration will ask the taxpayer to make, all of which I think are 

sound, I think it is also an appropriate time to think about what 

our allies and other beneficiaries in the Asia-Pacific region should 

expect to contribute. And we, the taxpayer, the Representatives 

should have a clear understanding of that. 

And I don’t know if, General Scaparrotti, if you want to talk 

about Korea as an example with the THAAD batteries and Patriot 

missile battery deployments there, use that as an example. What 

part of that cost is shared by—understand the benefit to us of having our service members and those defenses there. What does 

Korea share in that in terms of cost? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I would just say that this is a unique alliance with the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and it has started and has grown 

since the Korean War. And in this case, we have got a treaty partner and a partner that spends 2.5 percent pretty routinely each 

year in their defense. And they spend portions of their defense 

money to meet commitments that we have agreed upon mutually 

that they need to develop in order to strengthen the alliance. And 

in the closed session, we can talk specifically about that. 

Secondly, through negotiations, they also—called a special measures agreement—they annually pay a certain percentage of the cost 

of U.S. forces to be stationed in Korea and assist in their defense. 

So I think it is a good construct. They are great partners in this 

respect. And they have been true to the—they have the same funding challenges that we have, but they have been true to meeting 

their commitments in that respect. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
33 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Harris, it is good to see you here again. 

My question is actually for General Scaparrotti. It has to do with 

the Army’s ARI [Aviation Restructure Initiative] and how that is 

going to affect the combat aviation brigades in Korea. In Korea, the 

Army will be relying on rotational forces if this ARI is complete, 

as opposed to a CAB that is stationed there. 

The National Commission on the Future of the Army recommended keeping a CAB permanently assigned to the peninsula, 

because short-term rotations—and I am quoting—‘‘short-term rotations will not permit aviation units the time needed to properly 

mitigate risks posed by the threat situation in Korea, and, specifically, rotating units will not have time to master the geographic 

and environmental conditions well enough to operate effectively 

and safely in the region.’’ 

Obviously, Korea is a country with numerous terrain and extreme weather conditions. Our aviation crews will have to be able 

to operate in all sorts of environments, and they are, but a permanently assigned unit there will be better able to handle and maintain proficiency. 

Permanently stationing a CAB in Korea would come with a significant upfront price tag as well as enduring costs. So, despite the 

operational concerns, the fiscal reality is that it just might not be 

realistic. Your written testimony lays out an array of complex 

threats that we face on the peninsula. So I think that, despite the 

cost, it is worth discussing. 

As a commander, which force structure—a rotational force or a 

permanently stationed combat aviation brigade—do you feel best 

enables you to meet the threats and operational needs in the peninsula? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you for the question. 

We have a permanently stationed combat aviation brigade there 

now, and there is discussion about perhaps going to a rotational 

one. I completely agree with the commission in terms of this is an 

environment that is difficult to fly in, mountainous, weather. It is 

an environment that they also have to fly in close proximity to an 

adversary that will shoot at them. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Right. 

General SCAPARROTTI. And, third, we have mission sets there 

that are joint in nature. We do a lot of work with our air and our 

naval forces off the coast. And as a result of that, it is very difficult 

to get pilots to that level of proficiency, come into the peninsula, 

and, in a 9-month rotation, be able to sustain that, because some 

of that simply has to be done on the peninsula after they arrive. 

And because of that, I have said that I do not agree with a rotational force in Korea. I think it will produce a less-ready force, and 

also, it will be more dangerous for our crews. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

Do you think politically—well, for our allied militaries, do you 

think a rotational force will signal to the ROK a decrease in U.S. 

commitment to the region’s defenses? Is there a perception on their 

side that switching to rotational force would give them? 
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General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think the key to this is what force 

you do rotate and their readiness when they arrive. For instance, 

I agree with the forces that we rotate today. We are now rotating 

an armored brigade, for instance, and the ROKs are fully in support of this. But our commitment is that we deliver one that is 

combat-ready, fully manned, and also has been trained culturally 

for that environment. That is something that we have to do. 

And I think as long as—I know for the Republic of Korea—as 

long as we meet that commitment, they will be supportive of using 

a rotational force. Now, I think there is a certain base that we have 

there that is permanent, and we have got to maintain that. You 

couldn’t go to a larger percentage of that rotational force. I personally wouldn’t be in support of that. But for the specific needs that 

we have today that we have asked for a rotational force, it has 

been productive. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. Great. Thank you. 

I want to transfer onto whether or not the Korean wartime operational control transfer is ever going to really happen. You know, 

we have pushed this off. Do you think they will ever be ready? Are 

there conditions that need to be in place, metrics that we are looking for? 

General SCAPARROTTI. First, yes, they will be ready. They are a 

modern force, and they are working hard to, one, improve their capabilities but also build the capabilities they need. In the OPCON 

[operational control] transition plan that was—again, another step 

was taken that in October between the two Secretaries, we have 

laid out in detail the capabilities that they have to meet, and we 

are now working on the next layer of that that provides the timelines on each of those capabilities. 

Generally, we have agreed on those in the past. We are confirming those this year, and they are already working on most of 

those as well. So, yes, I think there will be an OPCON transition. 

I, too, believe that it should be conditional, not time based. And in 

the closed session, I can talk in a little more detail on the commitments that we have mutually made to ensure that we can bring 

that about. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. I look forward to that classified 

briefing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, Mr. O’Rourke made a passing reference 

to Russia. We see increasing Russia in Europe, in the Middle East. 

Are you seeing that in the behavior of their ships and planes and 

so forth? 

Admiral HARRIS. I am, Mr. Chairman. We are seeing in the Pacific, as I mentioned before, their new Dolgorukiy-class SSBN. I remind folks that there are 3,000 miles of Russian coastline that is 

in my area of responsibility, including six major strategic bases 

from which they deploy their submarines, their ships, and their 

long-range bomber aircraft. 

We are seeing long-range bomber aircraft patrols increasing in 

East Asia. They circumvented Japan just recently. And their ship 

task forces are operating in the region as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. We often don’t think of Russia in your theater, 

but as you just described it, they have a big presence there. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I think of them often. 
35 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the fact that you do. 

I recently had someone say that they were meeting with a Chinese official who said explicitly: You are the past; we are the future. 

I think many of us had not expected the degree of aggression, 

provocation just within the past few years that we see from China. 

Do you believe that that is their attitude, and do you have a reason 

why we are seeing it seemingly sped up, certainly in their activities 

in the South China Sea? 

Admiral HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that that is their attitude. As I testified yesterday, I think they are on—they have a 

goal of certainly regional hegemony, and they would like to see the 

United States out of what they consider their affairs. 

But I think that their provocations are causing the other countries in the region to look hard at their relationships with China, 

and they are turning to the United States as their security partner 

of choice. And you have to ask yourself why these countries, who 

were formally leaders in the Non-Aligned Movement, for example, 

are turning away from China and turning toward the United 

States, not only giving us access to their bases for our ability to operate but increasingly in terms of trade and military interoperability. 

So I think that the statement from China that, quote, ‘‘We are 

the future, and you are the past,’’ unquote, I think that is another 

indication of the tone deafness of the spokesman who made that 

comment. 

The CHAIRMAN. Fair point. The key for us then is to be a reliable, 

credible partner for these nations who are turning to us, and that 

gets back to the responsibilities of this committee, in part. 

Thank you both for being here and testifying. I think, if it is 

okay with you all’s schedule, what I would like to do is just within 

about 5 minutes or so reconvene upstairs in our SCIF, 2337, and 

continue on a classified or have a classified discussion. 

But, for now, this hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the committee proceeded to classified 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 24, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 24, 2016 

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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. North Korea is seen as a technologically backward nation, and yet 

there is a growing presence of computers and other digital media devices that serve 

as a widow to the outside world. Do you see a way this be used to increase their 

awareness about the outside world, and help to break the information blockade their 

government tries to impose on them? 

General SCAPARROTTI. As a result of increased electronic media in North Korea— 

including cell phones that number in the millions—outside information is indeed 

much more prevalent than in the past. Strong ideological campaigns backed by Kim 

Jong Un’s documented and aggressive use of corporal and capital punishment, however, have limited the impacts of this outside information on North Korean society 

and leadership. Computers, in particular, are overwhelmingly tied to a nation-wide 

‘‘intra-net’’ and cannot access the world wide web—only a few computers in select 

organizations have internet access. We do believe the North’s leadership is concerned and sensitive to the type of information its citizens are receiving. It is indeed 

a regime vulnerability, albeit one Pyongyang has successfully controlled to date. Increased efforts targeting this vulnerability would add additional stress to the regime. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. You stated in the hearing that you would rely on two more battalions of Patriot if we ‘‘go to crisis’’ on the Korean peninsula. Do you believe the overall inventories of Patriot missiles and total number of Patriot battalions are sufficient to be able to deliver this capability? 

General SCAPARROTTI. [The information referred to is classified and retained in 

the committee files.] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CASTRO 

Mr. CASTRO. You mentioned in your written testimony that the U.S. relationship 

with Japan is a cornerstone of regional stability. Can you speak to how we can further leverage our relationship with Japan to maintain peace and security in the region? 

Admiral HARRIS. We further leverage our relationship with Japan to maintain 

peace and security through continued cooperation and support as they implement 

their national security strategy and legislative changes in the newly passed Peace 

and Security Legislation. 

Japan’s 2013 National Security strategy, their first-ever published strategy, emphasizes the need to make ‘‘proactive contributions to peace.’’ 

We welcome this approach by the Japanese and are cooperating with them to help 

them identify their priorities and coordinate with USPACOM and other partners 

(e.g. Australia) to complement our Theater Campaign Strategy. 

For example, Japan is embarking on a program to ‘‘build partner capacity,’’ especially maritime domain awareness capability and capacity for partners such as the 

Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Those efforts by Japan are complementary to our own efforts to help our partners manage their own security environment, and we are using venues such as security assistance synchronization/coordination fora to work together to maximize the benefits to countries like the Philippines. 

Japan is very early in its process of executing its new strategy and building partner capacities. Our coordination and synchronization with them on this new strategy are also in the early stages, but Japan is making progress and we are learning 

how to work together to maintain peace and security in the region. 

USPACOM will continue to encourage and support Japan in the conduct of presence operations throughout the region and, hopefully, we will see Japanese freedom 

of navigation operations in the future. As Japan looks to become more active in the 

theater, the regular presence of Japanese ships, aircraft and personnel operating in 
86 

accordance with international law supports and reinforces our own messages about 

adherence to international norms, law and standards of behavior. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Please describe the importance of space capabilities, such as communications, missile warning, and reconnaissance is to your mission. Related, to 

what extent are you concerned with our posture to adequately respond to the growing Chinese counterspace threats? 

Admiral HARRIS. USPACOM relies heavily on space-based capabilities to conduct 

joint functions necessary in the execution of our OPLANs. Commanders at all levels 

rely on satellite communications (SATCOM) to command and control their forces 

and conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) across the range 

of military operations. The USPACOM area of responsibility spans over half the 

globe and available SATCOM is a high-demand, low-density resource. Space-based 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities provide crucial intelligence data support to provide warning and enable targeting, force deployment and 

defense. Space-based positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), primarily from global positioning system (GPS), is fundamental to the maneuvering of forces and is a 

critical enabler for search and rescue efforts during peacetime and conflict. Finally, 

timely missile warning is essential to support active and passive defense of U.S., 

allied and civilian infrastructure and personnel. 

As the shared domain of space continues to grow increasingly congested and contested, adversaries continue to develop means to curtail our access to space-enabled 

capabilities. I have significant concerns regarding China’s continuing development 

and fielding of lethal and non-lethal counter-space systems, as these systems can 

threaten my ability to achieve OPLAN objectives. USPACOM requires resilient 

space capabilities to support operations. Resilience is achieved through careful consideration of the existing and required space, ground, and terminal segments of 

space systems to maximize flexibility and minimize vulnerability. As these threats 

continue to mature, the U.S., in coordination with our allies and partners, must develop and implement both material and non-material solutions to mitigate these 

threats. 

Mr. COFFMAN. According to public reports, at a recent parade in North Korea, four 

missiles on KN–08 launchers were noticeably different than earlier missiles shown. 

Why? Are these the same missiles as previously seen or did we see in a new variant 

of these missiles in October? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. What additional resources do you need to dominate the cyber-battlefield? And, how would the creation of a Cyber Command enhance your ability to oppose technologically advanced adversaries? 

Admiral HARRIS. To dominate the cyber-battlefield, USPACOM requires growth in 

the areas of cyber personnel, training, and tools. USPACOM requires additional personnel capable of conducting cyberspace operations planning and to effectively command and control the cyber mission forces operating in the Pacific theater. These 

personnel and the collective DOD cyberspace professionals require additional training in cyber intelligence, operations, and planning to better react to rapidly evolving 

cyberspace threats. Lastly, USPACOM requires additional tools such as a common 

operational picture capable of providing situational awareness for all three cyberspace lines of operation: DOD Information Network Operations, Defensive Cyberspace Operations, and Offensive Cyberspace Operations within the USPACOM area 

of responsibility. These tools would enhance my ability to create effects within 

cyberspace to counter the constant advancement of our adversaries’ cyberspace capabilities. 

I support the establishment of US Cyber Command as an independent combatant 

command. I believe this will enhance unity of effort within the department and accelerate the coordination and execution of global cyberspace operations. 

Mr. SCOTT. In the wake of the nuclear test, what was the change in military relations between the United States and our South Korean partners? 

General SCAPARROTTI. In short, the adversities we have faced since last August, 

to include the nuclear test, have revealed the strength of our U.S.-Republic of Korea 

(ROK) Alliance and made the Alliance stronger. Our military relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK) remain robust and agile as we coordinate in assessing the 
87 

situation, consider Alliance options, close divergences through candid discussion, 

and as nations, support each other’s national interests. Through these efforts, we 

have toughened our resolve to deter North Korea and improve our interoperable capabilities through combined actions that illustrate our Alliance strength. Extending 

beyond these actions, we continue to hold regular bilateral consultations at multiple 

levels, to include participation from other U.S. and ROK agencies, which further displays our combined dedication to deterring the threat and defending the Korean Peninsula. 

Mr. SCOTT. What are the current gaps in your in-theatre intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with regard to North Korea? How does 

the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) platform integrate into the current ISR network? 

General SCAPARROTTI. [The information referred to is classified and retained in 

the committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAKAI 

Mr. TAKAI. Building Partner Capacity: What is the United States doing to build 

up the naval power and MLE capabilities of Southeast Asian countries? Please provide specific examples. 

Admiral HARRIS. Using Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1263, ‘‘South China Sea Initiative’’ authority, the United States Department of 

Defense is planning to spend approximately $50 million this year to develop the 

naval and maritime law enforcement capabilities of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei by investing in systems and 

training for those nations’ navies and certain maritime law enforcement agencies. 

Congressional notification of specific capabilities is planned for March 2016 in accordance with U.S. law. 

USPACOM has also made a number of investments in maritime security and 

maritime law enforcement in the Southeast Asia region using the DOD Counternarcotics Program. Specifically, there are three countries where USPACOM has ongoing 

efforts. First, in the Philippines, USPACOM has a long-running program in the Sulu 

Sea area to enhance the capability of the Philippine National Police Maritime 

Group. USPACOM provided extensive training and infrastructure development to 

expand the effectiveness of this element in policing the Sulu Sea area. In Cambodia, 

we have a multi-year effort underway with their National Committee for Maritime 

Security based in Sihanoukville, to expand their operational capability. Lastly, in 

Vietnam, USPACOM is in the beginning stages of program development with the 

Vietnam Border Guards to enhance their capabilities to combat illegal entry, transnational crime, smuggling and trade fraud. 

Mr. TAKAI. Please describe the strategic and military/operational implications of 

China’s deployment of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) on Woody Island, in the disputed Paracel Island group. Do you expect similar deployments of SAMs, anti-ship 

cruise missiles, or other similar equipment to disputed islands in the Spratlys? 

What would be the strategic and military/operational implications of such deployments for the United States? What is your assessment of the potential military and 

law-enforcement utility of these newly expanded sites, both for China’s asserting 

and defending its territorial claims in the South China Sea, and in potential conflict 

scenarios against U.S. forces? 

Admiral HARRIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. TAKAI. What is your assessment of China’s ability to use hybrid warfare tactics to gain control of small islands that are administered by another country? How 

might a hybrid warfare approach by China in the East China Sea and South China 

Sea create problems for the United States and its allies? What should the United 

States and its allies do to deter a hybrid warfare approach by China and to improve 

the options for responding in a contingency? 

Admiral HARRIS. China has been using a hybrid warfare approach (blending conventional and irregular forces to create ambiguity, seize the initiative, and paralyze 

the adversary which may include the use of both traditional military and asymmetric systems) for years to incrementally increase its control over its South China 

Sea claims and to put greater pressure on other South China Sea claimants. It has 

been using a similar approach to challenge Japan’s exclusive administration of the 

Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. This is a whole-of-government Chinese approach that incorporates military and civil maritime forces, diplomacy, economic 

carrots and sticks, and legal warfare. If unchecked, this approach, I believe, will 
88 

allow China eventually to be in a position through coercion or force to wrest control 

of the islands and features it claims in both the East and South China Seas. 

This approach is a challenge to the U.S. and its allies because it demands a unified, whole-of-government effort to counter it. Military action alone will not be sufficient to counter a Chinese approach that is designed to achieve its goals while remaining below the threshold of military conflict. That is why coordination among 

the interagency and the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships in the region are so important. 

Mr. TAKAI. Building Partner Capacity: What is the United States doing to build 

up the naval power and MLE capabilities of Southeast Asian countries? Please provide specific examples. 

General SCAPARROTTI. I believe this question would best be answered by the Commander of Pacific Command and would respectfully defer to Admiral Harris’s views 

on this matter. 

Mr. TAKAI. What is your assessment of China’s ability to use hybrid warfare tactics to gain control of small islands that are administered by another country? How 

might a hybrid warfare approach by China in the East China Sea and South China 

Sea create problems for the United States and its allies? What should the United 

States and its allies do to deter a hybrid warfare approach by China and to improve 

the options for responding in a contingency? 

General SCAPARROTTI. [The information referred to is classified and retained in 

the committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT 

Mr. NUGENT. We know the Asia-Pacific is a key region for illicit trafficking of everything from counterfeit goods to narcotics to humans. How do you see illicit trafficking networks affecting U.S. policy interests in the Asia-Pacific region and what 

assets and capabilities do we have to tackle these threats? Additionally, are we seeing any indications that any of these illicit funds are being used by foreign terrorist 

organizations, or local insurgencies in places like Thailand or Burma, to support 

their operations? 

Admiral HARRIS. Illicit trafficking exists to generate revenue for the traffickers. 

This distinction is primarily what separates transnational criminal organizations 

from ideologically driven terrorist or insurgent organizations. 

I believe that how this revenue is ultimately used underlies a much larger national security issue. It isn’t really about crime as much as it’s about the ultimate 

stability of current global systems. These criminal organizations have amassed unprecedented wealth from illicit trade and they pose a significant threat. Drugs are 

still the foremost money-maker for criminal enterprises, but counterfeit goods of all 

types, endangered wildlife, and even human organs contribute to a massive, globalized black market enabled by technology, whose value even by conservative estimates would rank amongst the top twenty nations in the world by gross domestic 

product. 

No longer do we simply have a counter-drug problem, we face an expanding, 

globalized, transnational crime problem. 

Developing and transitional states offer the most fertile ground for growth of 

transnational crime and the nearly inevitable result is an intermingling of criminal 

and political power that sanctions corruption and undermines governmental institutions. 

I see this corruption and associated instability as one of the biggest impacts on 

U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. 

Instability is particularly visible in countries like Burma and Thailand, but exists 

elsewhere in the region as well. Countries positioned astride major drug trafficking 

corridors, especially those that also have disputed areas within their borders, are 

especially vulnerable to instability due in large part to the violence required to 

maintain these criminally lucrative areas. The illicit criminal networks formed by 

these elements are far reaching, transnational by definition, and between terrorism 

and crime is born more out of logistical convenience than any ideological convergence, and actually has its strongest overlap at the lower organizational levels. Various aspects of the criminal networks including travel facilitation, document fraud, 

and weapons procurement, help to meet the basic logistical requirements of terrorist, insurgent and criminal organizations across the region. 

From a Defense Department perspective, the challenge is that we are tasked to 

fight and win the nation’s wars—our authorities, our systems, our processes and our 

people were all built around traditional nation-state threats. Four of the five priority challenges listed in the Fiscal Year 2018 to 2022 Defense Planning Guidance 
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are traditional state actors. The increasingly asymmetric threats from non-state actors, from terrorists to high-end criminals, continue to present new and unique 

issues for us. We must continue to creatively examine our approaches to defending 

the homeland using DOD assets and authorities such as the Department’s counternarcotics program. 

My command remains actively engaged with partner nation law enforcement and 

military elements to counter these illicit activities and strongly advocates and supports regionally focused cooperation. 

My approach to dealing with these issues really comes down to partnerships and 

international norms. I am focused on modernizing and strengthening our alliances 

and our partnerships, and we are working to advance international rules and norms 

in everything we do. All of our bilateral engagements and capacity building efforts 

are underpinned by these guiding principles. Whether we are working on information sharing with French Polynesia to enable successful interdictions of drug smugglers transiting Oceania, or building capacity with Philippine National Police to improve maritime security in in the Sulu Sea—we are committed to building a cooperative network of partners to help defeat these threats. 

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