## In **T he**  **Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo** 

No. 07 - 22 - 00306 - CV THE LAW OFFICES OF DOMINGO A. GARCIA, P.C. , A PPELLANT V. DAVID TROSMAN , APPELLEE On Appeal from the 352nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No . 352 - 309003 - 19 , Honorable Josh Burgess , Presiding 

### July 25 , 2023 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 Before QUINN , C.J. , and PARKER and YARBROUGH , J J.
The Law Offices of Domingo A. Garcia, P.C. (“ Garcia ”) appeals from the trial court ’ s judgment in favor of David Trosman. Through f our issues, Garcia complains of the t r ial court ’s rulings concerning 1) venue ; 2) its counterclaim ; 3) Trosman ’ s breach of cont ract claim; and 4) attorney ’ s fees

. We address only the first , fo r it is dispositive. So too do we reverse.

1 Because this matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent when it conflicts with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 41.3.2 **Ba ckground**  A ft e r Trosman graduat ed from law school, he began working a s a Tier 1 associate at the Dallas C ounty law office of Domingo A. Garcia, P.C. Ap parently, the firm had o ffices elsewhere , including T arr ant County, but the Dallas County facility served as it s pr in c ipal office from which the firm operated. Trosman officed there for nearly ten years, mostly handling cases that were val ued between $30,000 and $50,000. D uring his time at the law firm, he earned and received a salary a nd monthly bonus per a for m ula Ga r cia utilized and explained to his employees . Th e form ul a provided that i f an attorney reco vered $30,000 in fees during a particular month, he received a bonus of $ 1,000 and 10% of any a ttorney ’ s fees over $30,000

. T rosman
re gu larly earned and rece iv e d b o nuses based on this formula

. Gar cia eventually terminated Trosman ’ s employ ment in November 2018 . Th e
reason related to the quality of Trosman ’ s work , allegedly. Trosman su ed in Tarrant County for breach of contract and quantum meruit , alleg ing he wa s owed bonus payment s on twenty
- one cases. O ne dispute d bonus involved a suit which settled for $9.5 milli on during the same month as Trosman ’ s termination

. T he latt er argued he had worked on the case and had i t “ settlement ready

. ” Garcia disagreed, arg u ing that it had removed him from the matter in late 2017 or early 2018. Prior to trial, Garcia moved to transfer venue of the s uit to Dallas County

. The trial court denied the request

. This decision underl ies the dispositive issue before us. Yet, t o complete the backg round of the appeal , we also note that the trial court ultimately convene d a bench trial , denied Trosman ’ s recover y of a bonus related to the $9.5 million settl ement, f ound Garcia had breach ed its contract with him regarding bonuses on 2 0 other cases , and granted him attorney ’ s fees.3 **Venue** As previo usly mentioned , Garcia questions the trial court ’ s denial of its motion to transfer venue from Tarrant County to Dalla s County. The latter wa s whe re the contract at issue arose and where the pu rported breach occurred. Trosman asserts that v enue
wa s proper in Ta rrant County because much of the purported bonus owed him rela ted t o the prosecution of a case pending in Tarrant County

. Furthermore, a large portion of work on that case happen e d in Tarrant County. Thus, venue lay in Tarrant Co u nty. We sustain the issue. We review th e trial court ’ s denial of a motion to transfer venue de novo. H eckert
v. Heckert , 02
- 19
- 00298
- CV, 2020 Te x. App. LEXIS 4007 , at * 4 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 2 1, 2020, no pet.) ( mem. op.) ; Devon Energy Cor p. v. Ion a Energy, L.P

. , No. 02
- 19
- 00343
- CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 210, at * 5 Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Jan. 9 , 2020 , p et. denie d ) (mem. op.). Furthermore, i mproper venue results in reversal without a harm analysis

. T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN . § 15.064(b ) ; Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Capital Partners, Ltd ., 546 S.W.3d 110 , 130 (Tex. 2018) (stating that the

“ erroneous denial of a motion to transfer venue requires the judgment ’ s reversal and a remand for new tr ial ” )

. And, i n assessing the prop riety of the decision , we consider the entire record, including the trial on the merits. T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN . § 15.064( b ). So too do we construe the evi dentiary record in a light most favorable to the t r ial c our t ’ s ruling. Garza v. State & C ty Mut

. Fire Ins

. C o. , No. 0 2
- 06
- 202
- CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 3070 , at * 8 (T ex. App.

— Fort Worth April 19, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Venue m ay be proper in man y counties under general, mandat ory, or permissive venue rule s
. Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife D ep ’ t , 886 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1994).4 And, t he plaintiff is given the first ch oice when selecting it

. Id. Yet, i f a defendant objects to the selection and specifically denies the venue facts , t he burden lies with t h e plaintiff t o prove the legitimacy of the selection

. Id. If the plaintiff fails to meet it , the trial court must transfer the lawsu it to another specified county o f proper venue. Id. The partie s agree that the general venue pr ovision applies here. See T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 15.002. T he subsection in play states that “ all l awsuits shall be br ought

. . . in the county in which all o r a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred

. . . . ” T EX
. C I V
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN . § 15.002 (a)(1)

. Determinin g whe ther a “ substa ntial part ” of the events giving rise to “ the claim ” occurred in the county of suit, one looks at the relationship between the events or omissions and the claim. See , e .g. , Tex. Speci a lty Trailers, Inc. v. Jackson & Simmen Drilling Co. , No. 02
- 07
- 228
- CV, 2009 Tex . App. LEXIS 6318 , at *17
- 18 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug. 13 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ; (sta ting that one looks at the relationshi p between the events and elements of the cla i m); Ch iriboga v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co ., 96 S.W.3d 673 , 680 (Tex. App.

—Austin 200 3, no pet.) ( sam e)

. See In re Red Dot Bldg. Sys. , 504 S .W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. 2016) (stating that when making venue decisions in breach of contract cases, court s gener a lly consider where the contract was made, performed , and breached)

. The Fo rt Worth Court of Appeals recently illustrated how that i s done in Devon Energy Corp. , 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 210 , at *2

. In Devon , suit was filed in Wise County against De von En ergy Corp. The plaintif fs, which included Iona Ene rgy , L.P. , complained about the underpaymen t of royalties due them and averred numerous causes of action t hrou g h which to recover damages . Those claims ranged from breach of contrac t to fraud. Id . at * 2
- 3. Further more, like here, section 15.002(a) was used to justify the ir forum selection in that5 c oun ty. They argued that a substantial part of the events g iving rise to the claim occurred there because that was where the gas was processed and their royalties related to the production of that gas. Devon questioned t he selection and moved to have the suit transferred to Tarrant County. The trial cou rt denie d the motion , and t he Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed

. In arriving a t i t s decision, the reviewing court fo cused on the na ture of the claims asserted by Iona. It observed that they a rose “ from

. . . royalty calculations and from the Devon Parties ’ alleged s tatements or misstatements to Iona about how the royalties
were c a lculated, not from the actual pro cedur es by which the gas was transported and processe d

. ” Id. at *15. “ In short, Iona attacks the Devon Parties' accounting practices that led to the disb u r sed royalty amounts. ” Id. at *16. Then it o b served that Devon performed t h os e calculations and accounting practices in Oklahoma and sent payment to Tarra nt C ounty. Id. at *14. So, framing the deba te led it to conclude that Iona did not prove that subs t antial facts giving rise to its claims against Devon occurred in Wise , even though the gas was processed there

. Id. at *17. We find particularly enlightening a passage the court ci ted from a n opinion by a sister cour t of appeals. The passage alluded to “ ‘ the he art of the dispute

. ’ ” Id. at *15 ( quoting Beard v. Endeavor Natural Gas, L.P ., No. 0 1
- 08
- 00180
- CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 9629 , at *9
- 10 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 19, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

. In other words, the court determine d the “ hea rt of the dispute ” and then assesse d whether a substantial part of the facts giving rise to it occurred in the selected forum. We follow that guidance here. Trosman alleged causes of action sounding in breach of contract and quantum meruit. Each per t ai ned to the failure of Garcia to abide by its compensation struct ure. In other words, the “ heart of the dispute ” concerne d the firm ’ s failure to pay him under6 their agree ment

. Trosman cited us to nothing of record indicating that the omission , default , or any p art the reof occurred in Tarrant County , and we found none. Nor did he cite us to evidence that the a greement purportedly br each ed ( i.e. , the agreement to pay) was formed or performa ble in that c ounty , and we found none. Those were the pertinent i ndicia, acco rding to In re Red Do t. Instead, facts related to the loca tion at which he prosecut ed a certain case assigned him were offer ed to satisfy section 15.002(a)(1). T hat location was Tarrant Co unty . Neverthele ss , w here he prosecuted the case and e vents relate d to it s prosecution had little relationship to the compensation arrangement , its formation , its performance, or its breach. Each of the latter elements underlying his claims occurred in Dallas County. G iven t hese circumstances, we
con clude t hat Trosman failed to p rove that all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giv ing rise to his claim against Garcia occurred in Tarrant County and , th erefore, the trial court erred in denying Garcia ’ s motion to tr an sfer venue. W e rev erse the tri al cou rt ’ s judgmen t and remand the c au se with instructions for the trial court to grant Garcia ’ s motion to transfer venue and t ransfer th e cause to Da llas County. T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 1 5.063. This relieves us from the need to addr ess the ot her issues urged b y Garci a.

Brian Quinn Ch ief Justic e