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23–761 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–143] 

FORCE MANAGEMENT LEVELS IN IRAQ 

AND AFGHANISTAN; READINESS AND 

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

DECEMBER 1, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER BRIGHT, Professional Staff Member 

KATY QUINN, Professional Staff Member 

ANNA WATERFIELD, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................................................... 2 

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ............................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Dubik, LTG Jim, U.S. Army (Ret.) .........................................................................

Ham, GEN Carter F., U.S. Army (Ret.) .................................................................

Russell, Cary B., Director, Military Operations and Warfighter Support, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dubik, LTG Jim ................................................................................................ 55 

Ham, GEN Carter F. ........................................................................................ 50 

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky ........................................................................................ 29 

Russell, Cary B. ................................................................................................ 31 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

FORCE MANAGEMENT LEVELS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN; READINESS AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 1, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Good morning. I would like to extend a warm 

welcome to our witnesses testifying before us today. Before I begin, 

I would like to welcome the members of the committee present 

today, or who may yet arrive, who are not members of the subcommittee. I ask unanimous consent that these committee members be permitted to participate in this hearing with the understanding that all subcommittee members will be recognized for 

questions prior to those not assigned to the subcommittee. Without 

objection, so ordered. 

This hearing will help the subcommittee to assess force management levels, or FMLs, which are more commonly known as troop 

caps. The White House set a troop cap for Iraq and Afghanistan. 

That cap is 5,262 for Iraq. In Afghanistan, the cap is 8,448 beginning this January. Now, these are very, very precise numbers. 

Some might argue that setting a troop cap upends an orderly military planning process. Typically, military leaders are first given a 

mission, and then they determine what resources are required to 

meet that mission. Setting the cap first, however, constrains subsequent military choices. An imposed force management level leads 

to potentially dangerous tradeoffs. 

Indeed, one consequence of a troop cap may be our military readiness. I look forward to learning about the extent to which readiness factors are, or should be taken into consideration when a troop 

cap is implemented. In July during a Readiness Subcommittee 

hearing, the deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command expressed concern that because of 

troop caps, Army aviation brigades were deployed to Afghanistan 

without maintenance personnel. 

He said, and I quote, ‘‘Combat aviation brigades are not meeting 

readiness rates.’’ He noted that soldiers were losing their edge in 

maintenance skills. This was, he warned, degrading, quote, ‘‘the 

ability of an aviation unit to regain readiness.’’ 
2 

I am eager also to know how troop caps affect the deployments 

of Army brigades, which are charged with the train, advise, and assist mission. As I understand it, although it might be preferable for 

the Army to deploy entire brigade combat teams for this work, this 

is not possible, because doing so would breach the troop caps. 

Therefore, as an alternative, individual senior soldiers are chosen 

from a variety of units to undertake the TAA mission. 

I want to gain a better understanding of how this practice might 

harm Army readiness, unit cohesion, career development, and retention. Furthermore, I am concerned about how troop caps might 

influence the positioning of force protection personnel. For example, 

are medevac [medical evacuation] teams being placed outside of the 

theater in Iraq because doing so allows them to not be subject to 

troop caps? If so, can they still respond quickly to recover injured 

warfighters? 

I would also like our witnesses to discuss other considerations associated with setting troop caps. How does the development of a 

troop cap fit into the planning process? 

Before I introduce the witnesses, I turn to my colleague, Mr. Cooper, who is serving as our acting ranking member until Representative Speier arrives, for your comments. Mr. Cooper. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mr. COOPER. I thank chairwoman and I welcome the witnesses. 

I look forward to your testimony. I share the chair’s concern about 

the arbitrariness of any troop cap. It seems to be the opposite of 

a threat-based analysis. I also share your concern about fudging on 

the cap, manipulating things so that you don’t bring your Army 

aviation maintenance crews with you or keep your medevac folks 

outside of the region. 

Furthermore, I share the concern that when we fund contractors 

to do the same job we are paying twice essentially for the same 

work, and also undermining our readiness and Active Duty forces. 

But, of course, we need to be forward-looking. It is up to the new 

administration now to solve these problems, and I think the public 

back home wants some reassurance that we are not going to mindlessly escalate in a region, but also, we want to, when we have 

forces, use them in a proper fashion. So I thank the chair for having this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. So I am pleased 

to recognize our witnesses today. I want to thank them for taking 

time to be with us. Members have been provided with the full biography of each witness. 

But joining us today is Mr. Cary Russell, the Director of Military 

Operations and Warfighter Support for the Government Accountability Office. Mr. Russell will summarize some of the important 

work the GAO has done on this subject. 

We have retired Army General Carter Ham. General Ham retired from the United States Army in 2013 as the commander of 
3 

U.S. Africa Command. He spent nearly four decades in the Army, 

and is one of a very small number of military leaders who rose 

from the rank of private to four-star general. 

And we have retired Army Lieutenant General Jim Dubik. General Dubik retired from the U.S. Army in 2008 after 37 years of 

active service. General Dubik’s last job on Active Duty was as the 

commanding general of the Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq, and the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 

training mission in Iraq. So thank you all for being with us here 

today. We will now hear your opening remarks. 

Mr. Russell, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF CARY B. RUSSELL, DIRECTOR, MILITARY OPERATIONS AND WARFIGHTER SUPPORT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Chairwoman Hartzler, Representative 

Cooper, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for having me 

here today to discuss some of the actions the Department of Defense [DOD] has taken to maximize military capabilities while operating under force management levels. My statement today draws 

upon a body of work GAO has conducted over the past several 

years examining aspects of military operations in contingency environments. 

Let me start out with some overall context about force management levels and their use in past and present operations. Basically, 

force management levels, also referred to as force caps, limit the 

number of U.S. military personnel deployed to a given region and 

have been a factor in military operations for a very long time, going 

back at least to the Vietnam War, where troop ceilings were set to 

manage the number of deployed U.S. forces. 

Force management levels are often set by the executive branch, 

but can also be influenced by external factors, such as host nation 

limitations and coalition presence. More recently, force management levels have been used to shape the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and now, in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq and 

Syria, in support of the fight against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria], U.S. forces are deployed under force management levels 

set by the current administration. Those levels are presently 9,800, 

which are going down, as Chairwoman Hartzler noted, in Afghanistan, and around 5,300 in Iraq and Syria under Operation Inherent 

Resolve. 

While force management levels have long been used as policy 

tools to shape and direct the deployment of U.S. military forces, 

they present a unique challenge to military planners, creating a 

planning paradox of sorts. As military doctrine states, planning begins with the end state in mind, providing a unifying purpose 

around which actions and resources are focused. Basically, the 

focus is on defining the military mission first, and then developing 

plans with the necessary resources to accomplish that mission. 

Thus, force management levels may have the effect of essentially 

reversing that order and establishing resource limits that DOD 

planners and commanders must then work within. 

With these challenges in mind, I want to highlight four key takeaways we have observed from current operations where DOD has 
4 

leveraged existing capabilities to help work around limited boots on 

the ground. These include increased reliances on partner nation security forces, U.S. and coalition airpower, U.S. special operations 

forces, and contractor and temporary duty personnel. 

With regard to partner nation security forces, DOD has increased 

engagement with partner nations through advise and assist missions that rely on partner nation security forces to do the planning, 

execution, and sustain operations. That is, working by, with, and 

through our partners more so than ever before. This can create 

complications, however, for U.S. planners, in terms of providing the 

necessary supporting capabilities and resources where and when 

they are most needed. 

Further, as we have reported in the past, splitting up U.S. brigade combat teams to provide advisers creates challenges for maintaining readiness in training those brigades. Regarding airpower, 

DOD has relied on significant U.S. and coalition airpower to provide support to partner ground forces in lieu of U.S. ground combat 

capabilities. Since U.S. operations related to ISIS began in August 

of 2014, coalition members have flown nearly 44,000 sorties, releasing more than 57,000 munitions. Air-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] systems have also proved critical 

to commanders by providing them timely and accurate information, 

particularly in the absence of a large U.S. ground presence. However, this reliance on airpower is not without its cost or challenges. 

For example, the Secretary of Defense has recently stated that 

previously that the intensity of the U.S. air campaign against ISIS 

has been depleting U.S. stocks of GPS [Global Positioning System] 

and laser-guided munitions. Regarding the use of special operations, DOD has increased its use of U.S. special operations forces 

to increase its operational reach and maximize capabilities under 

force management levels. However, the increased use of special 

forces in these current operations has resulted in a high pace of deployments which can affect readiness, retention, and morale. 

Finally, DOD has increased its reliance on contractors in temporary duty assignments to round out its force constrained by force 

management levels. During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 

contractors have played a critical role in supporting U.S. troops 

and in past operations, sometimes even exceeding the numbers of 

deployed military personnel. However, the increased use of contractors and temporary personnel to provide support during operations 

has its complications. For example, DOD has had longstanding 

challenges overseeing contractors in deployed environments, even 

when there was a much larger robust troop presence on ground to 

perform that oversight. 

This completes my statement and I would be pleased to respond 

to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Russell, General Ham. 

General HAM. Thanks, Madam Chairwoman. I think the members of the committee have my written statement. If it is okay, 

we’ll just let that stand and be ready to progress to questions and 

answers. 
5 

Mrs. HARTZLER. All right, thank you very much. General Dubik? 

You are all about efficiency. We appreciate it. That is great. 

[The prepared statements of General Ham and General Dubik 

can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 50.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Well, we will go to some questions. And I will 

ask General Ham the first question. So in July, Lieutenant General 

Kevin Mangum, the deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, testified before HASC [House 

Armed Services Committee] that deploying combat aviation brigades without their maintainers was causing an, quote, ‘‘atrophy of 

critical skills.’’ When aircraft maintainers are left behind in the 

United States during their combat aviation brigade’s deployment, 

what task relating to their primary military occupation do they accomplish at home station to remain skilled since they do not have 

equipment to work on? 

General HAM. Madam Chairwoman and Mr. Cooper, thanks 

again for the opportunity to appear before you. I think that is precisely the right question. In addition to the others that you raised 

and Mr. Cooper raised in your opening statements. So when a unit 

is split apart, a unit that is not designed to be severable into various deployable components, there is, I think, a very real readiness 

concern. So in a specific case of Army aviation units, when most 

or all of the airframes, most or all of the aircrews are deployed, and 

most or all of the maintenance capability of that unit remains at 

home station, there is a very real concern about how do you—how 

do the remaining maintenance personnel retain their proficiency? 

It requires an extraordinary level of effort on the part of the 

home station chain of command to find opportunities for them. 

Sometimes that could be at increased cost, sending personnel on 

temporary duty to other installations where the airframes upon 

which those personnel need to work to sustain their proficiencies, 

there could be some increased cost. But for the most part, I think 

those skills would atrophy. They also lose the cohesiveness of an 

aviation unit. It is designed for the aircrews and the maintenance, 

the ground support elements to operate together. 

When you separate them, post-deployment, it takes a much 

longer period of time to rebuild the readiness for which that unit 

was intended. So there are several consequences that affect readiness and the point that Mr. Cooper raised of essentially paying 

twice for the same capability. We have those uniformed maintainers. We have paid for them. We have trained them. We have developed them. We have bought their equipment, but, yet, we then pay 

again to provide a contract maintenance capability in theater. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. We have tried to get the dollar numbers from 

the Department of Defense on how much it is costing to backfill 

with contractors in Afghanistan. We haven’t gotten those yet. Mr. 

Russell, has the GAO done any study? Do you have an idea of how 

much money we are expending for contractors to maintain the aircraft in Afghanistan while we leave the maintainers at home here? 

Mr. RUSSELL. No. At this point we haven’t looked specifically at 

those costs. They may be difficult to get. I know, in general, trying 

to pull together contract costs can be a challenge within the Department, but we haven’t looked at that specific number. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. General Dubik. 
6 

General DUBIK. Madam Chairwoman, I made some calls to some 

friends of mine who were aviators, asked the same question, anticipated this. The report to me was about 400 to 500 civilian contract 

maintenance personnel to work on a brigade’s worth of aircraft at 

about $100 million a year. Now, I would certainly not take those 

numbers as gospel, because I think, as Mr. Russell pointed out, you 

really need to bear down on them. But it is a good ballpark figure. 

And this is for a capability that already exists in the force. So, in 

addition to paying the cost of a soldier to maintain, you are paying 

the additional cost as General Ham suggested, of sending some of 

those soldiers to other places so there is temporary duty costs. You 

are paying the cost of an additional deployment which is, in fact, 

what it is on temporary duty, and then the cost of the maintenance. So this is a complex and very costly approach to conducting 

what could be a military task, should be. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Absolutely. We are paying multiple ways 

through this scenario, and it is very, very concerning. 

Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is relatively easy to 

beat up on troop caps, or FMLs, as a flawed device. And since I 

suggested in my opening statement, we need to be more forwardlooking anyway, why don’t we try to use this panel to focus on 

what might work in Iraq or Afghanistan, because I think most people would agree a light footprint is better than a heavy footprint, 

but that is if a light footprint works. And no one really has talked 

so far about the way special forces are treated, you know, sometimes unacknowledged, sometimes not counted, sometimes counted. 

So rather than focus on the flaws of a particular tool, why don’t we 

try to choose what tool might work? And I know that requires vast 

knowledge of what is actually going on in country. But can you 

gentlemen, with your military expertise, and I am particularly 

proud of General Ham, because it is remarkable to ascend from private to full general. That is a rare accomplishment. 

What might work, because the public back home really doesn’t 

care about these places. They really do care about our troops. They 

want what is effective, but also what is affordable. You know, there 

are foreign powers sometimes involved in these regions. Our NATO 

allies are varying, trustworthiness. You know, this is a very complex problem to figure out and it is easy to criticize. It is hard to 

perform. So what would be a better policy? 

General HAM. Well, Mr. Cooper, I will take a first attempt at 

that. First, I note for the record that I didn’t go from private to 

four-star general in one step. There were a few years intervening 

there. But so it took a bit of a while, but thank you for that acknowledgment. 

In my experience as a theater commander, as a service component commander, as a director for operations on the Joint Staff, I 

think there is a role for force management levels. It is in the—in 

principle, I think force management levels serve a useful purpose 

in terms of conveying to military commanders and to military planners, the intent of proper civilian authority, the Commander in 

Chief, the Secretary of Defense, making sure that the level of commitment of the United States Armed Forces are consistent with the 

intent of the civilian authorities. So I think there is a utility in 
7 

force management levels. I think it is in the application where we 

have difficulty sometimes. It is, as the gentlewoman commented, if 

you start the planning process with a force management level, I believe that leads you to a flawed planning process, and will preclude 

military planners from offering civilian authorities the full range of 

capabilities and options that they ought consider. 

So I would, my preference would be to see force management levels applied after a full consideration of a wide variety of options 

and when the appropriate civilian authority, Secretary of Defense, 

Commander in Chief, makes a decision. This is what we want to 

try to achieve. This is the level of effort that I think is about right. 

That, to me, is the time where force management levels ought be 

applied. 

And I would just finally note, Mr. Cooper, that I think you are 

right. Again, in application, what troops count, what don’t, which 

don’t. I don’t believe it was the—it is the intent of force management levels to simply substitute uniformed U.S. military personnel 

for contractors, or for temporary duty personnel and the like. So 

getting to the intent, I think, is the right start and the appropriate 

application of force management levels at the appropriate time in 

the planning process which, to me, is more toward the end of the 

planning process rather than at the beginning. 

General DUBIK. I can only echo that, Mr. Cooper. When the force 

management level decision is the product, or the result of an extensive and thorough dialogue between the civil and military authorities, and that dialogue informs the final decision authority, whether Secretary of Defense, or the President, of the range of option and 

risks, that is the time then to start talking about force management levels. 

If that process is aborted, or an arbitrary force management level 

is set in lieu of having that kind of discussion, then the result is 

generally a level of force that is unlikely to succeed; just won’t fail. 

And that is not a good position to be in. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, and I will add on to that, too. I totally 

agree with what the gentleman to my left said about the planning 

part of it. It is really important, you know, in terms of identifying 

what your risks are given the risk management level and knowing 

that and sometimes, I think as we have heard anecdotally anyway, 

that if you provide a number early on, sometimes it almost serves 

as an appetite suppressant to folks that would submit requirements, and it may suppress the requirements coming in, so you 

may not have a full range of unconstrained requirements coming 

in to look at. So I think that part of risk assessment is right. 

Also, Mr. Cooper, what you pointed out, I think is an important 

point as well, and is what the other gentleman said, was, you 

know, as you look forward, I mean, troop caps and force management levels have been around a long time. I think you have got to 

look at them as a way of life. It is likely they could continue in the 

future. So I think it is important that DOD look at ways to manage 

its forces in theater given those troop caps. What can be learned? 

And I think an important aspect of looking at these current operations where the troop caps are fairly low and limited, is how do 

you manage a force to do that? And in this case, in Iraq, for exam-
8 

ple, working more by, with, and through the Iraqis. How is that 

working? 

In some cases, you know, there is advantages because you do free 

up ground forces outside of the theater to do other things and 

maintain and develop readiness. You might have readiness enhancements with the partner forces that you are doing. But in the 

same sense, if you shift that burden over to other support functions 

such as air, special forces, that has other effects too. And I think 

it is up to DOD to kind of look at that whole mix and say what 

is the optimal way to operate given a force structure? And I think 

right now, we are really at an optimal point in time, given the operations in Iraq and Syria, and particularly in Iraq, taking stock 

at lessons learned and saying how are we doing? What have we 

learned? What has worked well, what hasn’t? And DOD could 

maybe develop that into a model for how they might be able to 

apply forces going forward in future deployments should that be a 

continuation in the future. 

Mr. COOPER. Not to put too fine a point on it, but lest we be more 

critical than we are forward-focused, I would challenge the members of this subcommittee, if they don’t like the current FML levels, 

and as Mr. Russell suggests, it is likely that FML approaches will 

be around for a long, long time. Then what is your favorite number? If you don’t like 10,000 or 5,000, pick one, and then justify it, 

because it is too easy for us to say, oh, you know, whatever the 

Pentagon does is wrong. What is our approach? Because I think 

there is an ambivalence in the American public that is very hard 

to reconcile right now, and we feel that acutely in our districts, because we want to win. But how do you win? And what does it take 

to win? And that is where the gap is. 

So if anyone has any specific suggestions, any particular numbers, because that is what policy boils down to. If you are not for 

this, what are you for? You can’t just be against something. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, in following up on Mr. Cooper’s comment, 

though, we are not in a position to know all of the answers as to 

what those levels ought to be without the full range of planning 

that needs to go on. So if force management levels or troop levels 

are the Holy Grail, not only during the planning phase but in the 

execution phase, what you see is workarounds. The DOD is really 

good at working around whatever it is. 

Now, they might not have been able to plan it properly on the 

front end because somebody put an arbitrary number out there, uninformed, like we would be doing, like you just suggested, and then 

clings to that number against everything else, as if that is the 

measure of what we need to be doing. It is just the number of people we have got in the fight. 

I would rather DOD have the flexibility of putting the range of 

what the fight needs to look like from the civilian folks, what do 

you want to accomplish, here is how you do it, and then a policymaker has a better idea of what goes on and how to get it done. 

Then, as the fight changes, which every fight does, then clinging 

to a number seems to me to be the wrong mechanic. It ought to 

be clinging to getting the job done. So what you are seeing is TDY 

[temporary duty] and contractors and everything else. I mean, the 
9 

Department of Defense figures it out some way to get around whatever it is we have done. 

So I think the idea that policymakers cling to a number on the 

front end, uninformed, quite frankly, and you have seen that number change and move around. My question would be, TDY folks, do 

we have any sense, Mr. Russell, how many of those are involved? 

What the rotation cycles are? And what and where they are being 

pulled from and the impact it has, as well as the number has 

changed, particularly in Afghanistan. As the President got new information, did the mechanics for that process work efficiently 

enough, and nimble enough, to make sure that the folks in the 

fight aren’t trapped at a number that the workaround can’t get to 

and the mission is hurting as a result of lack of nimbleness in adjusting that number? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yeah, thank you for that question. With regards to 

the number of TDY, we actually have some numbers but, unfortunately, they are in a classified report. So I don’t have it unclassified. But we had delivered a copy to the committee and there is 

some information in there on troop levels, contractors, and TDY 

folks. 

But with regard to rotations, they are typically 90- to 120-day rotations, which creates some complications. Because one of the 

things is, you lose that continuity as people come in and come out. 

You sort of lose that learning curve and that continuity of folks 

that are working that problem in and out. Right. 

Mr. CONAWAY. In terms of General Ham and General Dubik, the 

process of changing, adjusting, has the Department of Defense been 

able to get to the White House to get the number changed? Is that 

nimble enough? 

General HAM. Well, Mr. Conaway, I suspect military commanders would always ask for greater flexibility, as you raised. But 

I think the point is that as conditions change, then there ought be 

a mechanism by which force management levels can be reassessed 

and adjusted. For me, I think this is an appropriate role for the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the most senior body of military advisers who 

have a global approach. As a former theater commander, you know, 

I kind of had my blinders on and my head down and I was mostly 

concerned, almost exclusively concerned about what was going on 

in my particular area of responsibility. And so I would place operational demands, requirements for forces based on that. 

It is the Joint Staff who, advising the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that 

has this global view of things, and this is another role I think 

where force management levels can play an appropriate role in balancing and prioritizing the global effort of the U.S. Armed Forces. 

So I think a mechanism that allows the Joint Chiefs to consider 

various force management levels and then render their statutory 

best military advice to the Secretary and Commander in Chief, I 

think that process is a pretty good one. And I think that collective 

body of the most senior military advisers is in the best position to 

give best advice to the senior civilian authorities. 

General DUBIK. So, Mr. Conaway, I agree with General Ham’s 

description of the process. My experience, at least in Iraq in 2007– 

2008, was that the process is very slow. And that the pace of what 

happens in theater is much quicker than the pace of decisionmak-
10 

ing back here. And the result is often either having people with the 

wrong skill set, or having insufficient numbers of people. 

Now, that could well have been fixed. It has been 7 years. And 

the numbers are a lot smaller, so they are easier to manage. But 

I have to report that my experience is that there is a disconnect 

in the speed of what happens in theater and the speed of decisionmaking in adjustment here. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, General, I appreciate it. I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Representative Graham. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I have a lot of 

questions. Historically, you mention, I believe, Mr. Russell, that 

troop caps have been in place since the Vietnam War. Is that accurate? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. GRAHAM. What have we learned over time of the impact that 

troop caps have on our ability to fight the fight? And I was recently 

on a CODEL [congressional delegation] with Chairman Conaway. 

Good to see you, Mike. And we were in Kuwait at the beginning 

of the Mosul, liberation Mosul. And so that greatly affected me. 

And in terms of my question of do troop caps—are they having, 

over time, historically, what have we learned as to the effect or 

challenges that troop caps place on our ability to be successful in 

operations like Mosul? Thank you. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Oh, yes, thanks for your question on that. Yeah, 

I think that is a good question. I am not sure that anybody has 

captured lessons learned to that extent. I can tell you, though, now, 

where the environment in my experience is quite different, the 

troop caps in Vietnam were troop ceilings at a very high level. You 

can also look at where we were in terms of Afghanistan, with 

100,000 soldiers on the ground at one point; 170,000 in Iraq at one 

point. These are much larger. 

I think the real question now, as we look at an environment 

where it is much, much smaller, and I think that is where, as you 

get smaller now, the tradeoffs become much, much greater. So I 

think you are seeing more of an impact and more of a challenge 

when you get down to that number. And I am not sure yet—that 

is why I mentioned earlier, I think that the lessons learned now 

are really critical because it is in terms of what have we been able 

to accomplish at what cost and what risk in terms of getting the 

mission done, both in Iraq and now in Afghanistan as the numbers 

come down even lower. But I think we are kind of in a new area 

in terms of just the sheer number of constraint with regard to the 

levels where we are at now. It is kind of difficult to compare it back 

to those larger operations. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Do you—and this is, sorry, Madam Chairwoman, I 

am going a little off topic—but I have not seen recently how we are 

doing in Mosul. If anyone can give me a brief update? Anyone 

know? 

Mr. RUSSELL. At this point I don’t have the update and of course, 

you have to be careful because a lot of the information is classified 

where it is going. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I think, you know, we are looking now in terms of 

our current work and enablers and how we are supporting them. 
11 

And I think we will have some work coming down the road. It will 

probably be classified, but we will be looking into how enabling 

support is working to help the Iraqis. I think the important thing 

to know about Mosul is, it is really an Iraqi-led operation. We are 

really working by, with, and through the Iraqis, probably more so 

than ever before. And so as we look to push through Mosul, I think 

it will be a real telling sign in terms of how well and how successful we are. I mean, we say the proof is in the pudding, I think the 

pudding is Mosul and we have to see how it goes. 

Ms. GRAHAM. I agree. We don’t want to continue to be in this circle in Iraq at some point. We have to figure out how to be successful and get out. 

What is the role of, as we replace—based on troop caps, replace 

with contractors, if we can just talk about Mosul, if you have 

enough information about that, what is the role in the offensive 

that contractors will be playing as opposed to troops as we are 

under a limitation on the troops that we can bring into the offensive? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yeah, I mean, it is kind of difficult to answer, particularly at the classification level, and I don’t have the on-theground knowledge of how Mosul is being conducted with regards to 

that. I can step back and say more generally, contractors play a 

wide role in a military operation. Not just in specific military functions with regards to maintenance as folks have talked about, but 

they do base security, they do construction, they do dining services, 

and so there is a great wealth of, I guess, things that happen that 

contractors are responsible for. 

Sometimes it can be difficult to really isolate how much of that 

is because of a troop cap versus how much of that is just because 

overall, the force doesn’t provide those kinds of services. So it is 

kind of a challenging answer to really gauge how much contractors 

are supporting it, but I would just step back and say in any operation, particularly in the last several years, contractors have been 

an integral part of the fighting force, a lot of perspective. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Yes, General. 

General DUBIK. Yes, ma’am. With respect to Mosul, there is a lot 

of open-source information on Mosul and I would commend you and 

your staff to read the updates from the Institute for the Study of 

War. They are sometimes daily and at least weekly. And the last 

update that I had read from those sources, again, all open source, 

nonclassified, is that the pace of the operations in Mosul had 

slowed; that as the forces have—Iraqi forces moved into the city 

from the outskirts and the small villages, that the pace of operations is much slower, both on the east and in the south. 

Further, that there is some concern about Iranian-sponsored militias operating west of Mosul and into Tal Afar. So the fight has 

gone, I think, at least from my experience, about how I expected 

and I think we will have many more months of fighting there. 

With respect to the train and advise mission, and your questions 

there, my opinion is to ask first, what is the objective? Is the objective merely to raise the tactical proficiency of the Iraqi Security 

Forces to a level to defeat ISIS in Mosul, and then pat ourselves 

on the back and say we kicked them out of Ramadi, we kicked 
12 

them out of Fallujah, we kicked them out of Mosul now let’s go 

home? 

Ms. GRAHAM. Yeah. 

General DUBIK. If that is the mission, we are about wellresourced. But under those conditions, we may be doing the Battle 

of Fallujah Five. So I think the troop cap is the easiest thing to 

talk about. But what the strategic aim is really the key question. 

Because if the troop cap is not based on the strategic mission that 

the country can buy into, it is going to be wrong, regardless of 

whether it is high or low. 

Ms. GRAHAM. I couldn’t agree with you more, and I appreciate 

your comments and I yield back because I am out of time. Thank 

you very much, gentlemen. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, lady. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Dubik, your comment large enough not to fail, not large enough to succeed. I didn’t 

get it exactly right. What—do you remember what you said? I 

thought that was pretty—— 

General DUBIK. That was pretty much it. 

Mr. SCOTT. That is pretty much the way we are fighting our war 

in a politically correct manner, isn’t it? I mean, it is a—— 

General DUBIK. I wouldn’t characterize it as politically correct, 

but I would characterize it as prolonging an already long war unnecessarily. 

Mr. SCOTT. I never served, certainly appreciate those who do, but 

my granddad was one of those World War II guys, and I can just 

imagine what he would be saying right now. I know he would ask 

me before we went into anything, have you made a decision to win 

it, because if you haven’t, then don’t waste the lives that it is going 

to cost if you are not willing to do what it takes to win. 

And I want to get to the cost of this, if I can. And just, we know 

it cost us more than it cost to deploy our men and women that are 

in the military, to fill most of those gaps with contractors. But if 

the DOD or the Secretary of State, if they can’t tell us how much 

it is currently costing, then to me, it seems that there is an extreme gap in oversight with regard to this. I mean, if they can’t tell 

you, they can’t tell us, they can’t tell the Government Accountability Office, who knows what it is costing us? 

General DUBIK. I can only defer to Mr. Russell on the cost issue, 

because I have been out of the business now for detailed knowledge. But the cost, the fiscal cost of the war is an important element of waging this war. And, again, the issue for me is the strategic gain. What are we trying to do? And is the cost, in terms of 

dollars and lives, worth that strategic gain? That is the key discussion. All money is wasted if we either have no strategic gain, or 

have one that can’t be attained or have the wrong one. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Russell, who has the information? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Various places in DOD, they certainly can track, 

I think, contract costs. And I agree. I think when you get to your 

question, it becomes much more difficult and that is, we are trying 

to understand the incremental cost of what exact contractors are 

doing that might be related to working under an FML, for example. 

It just becomes very difficult because then you have to be able to 

parse out which tasks and which contracts support them, and that 
13 

is where you start losing that granularity. Just from a perspective 

in terms of contractors, right, there is a lot of money in contractors. 

Now, the information I have is somewhat dated, but going back to 

Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011, when we had the height of operations, we were spending $16 billion on contracts. I mean, if you 

look back at the contracting commission for wartime contracting 

between 2002 and 2011, we were spending about $166 billion in 

Iraq and Afghanistan on contracting. 

So you are absolutely right. It is a very large dollar that is being 

spent and I think where you start to lose that granularity is when 

you start going down to exactly what are they doing, what are they 

working on, and which missions are they supporting, it becomes a 

lot more difficult. 

Mr. SCOTT. General Ham, you served at probably more levels 

than anybody else in the military. Thank you for your service. 

What impact does it have on the readiness of our units when you 

deploy part of a unit and not the rest of the unit? Aviation brigades 

is something that I am thinking of and what do you think the impact on morale is? 

General HAM. Mr. Scott, I think that is a great question. There 

are, I think, some identifiable readiness impacts in terms of when 

you split a unit that is not intended, not designed to be severable, 

when you split it apart, whether it is an aviation unit as we have 

discussed, separating maintenance from the flying crews, whether 

it is, as the chairwoman identified, whether it is an advise and assist brigade that most of the young soldiers stay at home and most 

of the noncommissioned officers and officers deploy. 

So you have time and expense to re-form that unit upon redeployment, because they are no longer a cohesive unit. It will take 

additional money, additional ammunition, additional time to rebuild readiness. But I think the point that you hit upon in terms 

of morale, esprit, I think that those are somewhat intangibles, but 

have a very real effect on readiness. If in the same unit you have 

soldiers who are deployed and those who aren’t, you have a little 

bit of haves and have-nots. 

There are, obviously, as the Congress has approved, there are financial advantages to service members who are deployed, that 

those who aren’t deployed don’t enjoy. There are different family 

hardships. Those who are deployed, those who are not deployed. I 

think those have a yet-to-be-determined effect on unit morale and 

long-term what the effects may be on retention of some very highly 

qualified individuals in our service. So I think it is a great question. I don’t know that those answers are readily available. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. Representative McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you gentlemen for your testimony. And Mr. Cooper, I do want to follow up. 

When you said provide an alternative, an alternative to just random numbers, it would be to set strategic objectives in these theaters, identify what we are trying to do, and then figure out what 

we need to do to get the mission done, and then that ends up being 

the number. I mean, this is, you know, to have a number be the 

driver for causing all of the things that are in the discussion in the 

testimony today—I led a CODEL back to Afghanistan, been there 
14 

myself in uniform, of course, but last—in May, and deep concerns 

seeing what we are talking about here firsthand with also commanders and others spending a tremendous amount of time to find 

workarounds and measure the jerry-rigging in order to comply. 

So these real concerns are there, and they are taking the time 

of the commanders to not do the mission, but to actually comply 

with these random numbers. 

I think the first question I would have is, what is the purpose 

of the caps? What is the purpose of the numbers, the limits on 

boots on the ground? Is it cost? Is it risk to Americans? Because 

in these cases, the cost we are seeing is probably higher. As discussed already today, a risk to an American contractor is similar 

to a risk to an American troop. So it is not even clear what is the 

objective of these particular force management limits right now in 

Afghanistan and Iraq? Because it seems like we are not achieving 

either of them, if it is risk or if it is cost. 

And I think about—you know, I remember back when I was at 

Bagram with my A–10 squadron on Christmas Eve, out on the 

flight line with my maintenance troops trying to get an engine 

fixed that had been problematic and had an emergency on Christmas night in the middle of the cold and the snow trying to get this 

done, and everybody doing everything they can to keep the mission 

going around the clock; those were my maintenance guys that reported to me. 

The one thing with contractors is, they don’t report to the commander, they report to some program manager, and if you want to 

have to get them to do something differently, you can’t direct them 

to do that. 

So it hasn’t, first of all, the question is about what do you think 

the purpose is of the caps, because I think we are not achieving 

any of the purposes, potentially, and then secondly, what is the impact on unity of command, chain of command, because if you have 

got contractors out there, it is just a different relationship than if 

they are your unit. General Ham first. 

General HAM. I will take, again, a first attempt at that, if I may. 

I think there are valid purposes for force management levels. I 

think it does ensure that the application of U.S. Armed Forces is 

consistent with the policy decisions that are made by the Commander in Chief, by the Secretary of Defense, and within the resource constraints that have been approved by the Congress. So I 

think there are appropriate—there is an appropriate role for force 

management levels. From a purely military standpoint, I think it 

is one way to manage the global force and the requirements that 

the Department of Defense needs to meet around the globe. 

It does have a tendency, it does constrain unanticipated growth, 

so-called mission creep, from occurring without appropriate approval and authority. So I think there is a proper role for that. But 

I think you are exactly right, ma’am, to say when the—when activities are driven by a number, rather than by the mission—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

General HAM [continuing]. Then I think we have got things out 

of whack and out of priority. So, again, back to my earlier statement, I think it is—when is the force management level decided 

upon and the planning and decisionmaking process, and what is 
15 

the appropriate mechanism for revisiting that as conditions 

change? 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. And then comments on the chain of command, or General Dubik, do you want to—— 

General DUBIK. I will first reiterate that I have been under force 

management levels three times, first in Haiti, second in Bosnia, 

third in Iraq. And at each of those times, in my opinion, the force 

management levels were set correctly by the strategic objective; not 

as high as the military commanders wanted; not as low as they are 

now. So there is a role for these things. 

In terms of contractors, I have to report that I have only had 

good experiences with those contractors that had worked for me. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Oh, they are great people. Don’t get me wrong. I 

mean, I worked along tremendous contractors as well. 

General DUBIK. And in terms of responsiveness, I have had bad 

experiences, though, with respect to flexibility. Because when you 

change the task, you have to change the contract. And that is a 

very timely affair. 

For example, we had to change the contract for police development in Iraq in 2008. It took 8 months. I initiated, I left, my successor inherited it. And in that intervening 8 months, we had the 

mismatch of skill sets and personnel to do the job that was required. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Got it. Just a final comment on the TDY element 

when I was there in the spring. We had entire units TDYed to 

Helmand Province to help stop the bleeding there. You don’t go 

TDY to Helmand Province. You go TDY to Nellis Air Force Base. 

To be calling TDY to a combat zone to be out there addressing the 

combat situation is ridiculous and that is what these random force 

management levels have, you know, have created. I mean, that is 

just insane. And I would just say—I know I am out of my time— 

Mr. Russell, if there is any study of the exact costs, I would ask 

that it would consider also the cost of stationing air assets outside 

Iraq and Afghanistan, like combat search and rescue [CSAR], ISR, 

tactical airlift that are now in the theater, but further away. Both 

the financial costs with fuel and the other assets, and then the 

risks. If you don’t have CSAR right there, you are talking about 

risk to lives because you are not as responsive. And these things 

need to be included in any discussion as well. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, I appreciate it. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. You bet. Mr. Russell, will there be a study on 

that? 

Mr. RUSSELL. At this point, we are not looking at it. We can look 

into it. We do have a study going on where we are looking at enabling support that is being provided. So potentially, as we look at 

that, we could get into some those issues as well in terms of what 

enabling support is being provided. But we will have to look at that 

and see. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yeah. I would encourage you to do that and get 

back with us on that because I think that Representative McSally 

brings up a really good point. It would be great to have you look 

into that. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Representative Walorski. 
16 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thanks, Madam Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for your service to our country. I very much appreciate it. Just as 

a follow-up, I mean, there has been a lot of the same kind of questions going down the same trails here, but are there areas now that 

are critical to the ANSF’s [Afghan National Security Forces] future 

viability and success that we can’t effectively impact due to the low 

troop cap? I wanted to just do a follow-up on that really quickly. 

For example, are soldiers unable to advise certain units who may 

need it simply because we don’t have the boots on the ground necessary to adequately secure the training area? And I want to wrap 

this third question into this, to follow up on that in a more quantity versus quality question, if General Nicholson were to see 

progress in one area like basic soldiering, but not in another like 

vehicle maintenance, or command and control, does he have the 

flexibility to alter the composition of the troops on the ground, or 

is that the kind of flexibility, General Ham, that you were speaking 

of that there just needs to be more flexibility? 

General HAM. Ma’am, I am sorry. I am not sufficiently current 

with the answer to your questions about the ANSF. I think they 

are absolutely valid questions, to be sure. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Sure. 

General HAM. On the last point, my sense is that the theater 

commander has the ability to determine the requirements within 

the troop cap. I mean, he can request certain capabilities so if he 

needs more maintenance and less infantry, I think he has the ability to make—there is a process through which he makes those 

changes in the requirements so long as they stay within the force 

management level. I think it is much more difficult for him to 

make a recommendation—the processes we have discussed—to exceed, to change the force management levels is a much more 

cumbersome, much more time-consuming process. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. General Dubik. 

General DUBIK. Yes, ma’am. With respect to the ANSF, my guess 

is that the allocation of forces there is insufficient. And I base that 

on a general knowledge of the task. This is what I had done in 

Iraq, and I have been to Afghanistan about four times looking at 

the ANSF and overall mission. When you are trying to build a selfsufficient Army, there are four pieces of that Army that you have 

to look at. The first is, I will say, the tip of the spear. That is the 

tactical proficiency. 

The second is a layers or echelons of command that support the 

tip of the spear. 

The third part is the senior military commands that generate the 

resources, people, things, and money to flow down through the 

chain of command. 

And the last is the ministry of defense, which of course, has the 

mission to acquire people, acquire things, determine the size of the 

force, make policy decisions. 

All four of those are necessary for a self-sufficient Army. And my 

belief is that the current numbers are insufficient to adequately address all four pieces simultaneously. So what General Nicholson 

has to do is a matter of priorities where he wants to shift closer 

to the tip, closer to the, you know, and that is part of his job. 
17 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I appreciate it. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield 

back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. Mr. Russell. 

Mr. RUSSELL OF OKLAHOMA. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and 

thank you for calling this panel here today. I had the honor to 

serve with General Ham on several assignments and his thumbprint is pretty deep in my life with his influence. And General 

Dubik’s reputation is second to none, also. Thank you for being 

here. I think, Mr. Cooper, you ask an important question that we 

rarely ask, and it has been articulated here by several of us. What 

will work? 

And I want to echo, establish the purpose of what it is that we 

want to do and then the tasks that would accomplish that purpose 

and then put troops to the task. It really is that simple. Military 

leaders do that all the time. And, yet, ofttimes what happens is 

that after those requests are made, we have to have the political 

will as politicians—as much as I hate that word being a warrior 

most of my life—we have to have the political will to back up the 

recommendations. And at that point, support it rather than equivocate and we need to avoid accusations when we force them into a 

cap area that wasn’t adequate to accomplish the task by saying, 

well, it is mission creep. And you keep coming back and asking for 

more. It probably wasn’t adequate to begin with. 

Civilian authority often fails to recognize that the most humane 

thing you can do in battle is to end the carnage and suffering as 

quickly as possible. That is rarely achieved with halfhearted or restrained commitment. I guess my question, General Ham, sir, to 

you, would be, would you say that military capacity that is translated to contractors increases efficiency and saves money? Or reduces it and causes more money to correct lack of continuity and 

cohesion on both ends of active operations and redeployment? 

General HAM. Well, thanks, sir, and it is great to see you again. 

And I guess I would make the argument that your imprint is perhaps deeper on me than mine on yours. But thanks for that and 

thanks for continuing to serve. 

I think this—the issue of contractors is one that deserves lots of 

study. Mr. Russell and others have looked at this, and I think appropriately so. There is, in my view, an absolutely appropriate role 

for contractors in combat theaters. There are a number of functions 

that they can perform, often at less cost than uniformed personnel, 

but not all tasks. 

I think where we, in my view, where we get it wrong is when— 

whether because of force management levels or other factors, we 

seek contractors to perform inherently military tasks. If the military doesn’t, if we don’t have sufficient capacity, if that capability 

is applied somewhere else in the world and it certainly isn’t—and 

just isn’t available, then to me it makes sense, perhaps, to turn to 

a contracting option. 

But in the example that we have cited a number of times this 

morning for aviation maintenance as one example, aviation units, 

as you know very well, are built with organic maintenance capability. To not employ that, but employ contractors in lieu of that 

uniform capability seems to be not only fiscally a bad choice, but 

operationally a bad choice as well. But I certainly would not, you 
18 

know, discount the important role that contractors perform in a 

wide variety of functions. 

Mr. RUSSELL OF OKLAHOMA. And I appreciate the distinction of 

contractors having a role on tasks that are not inherently military. 

I would totally agree with that. I think where we have made errors, since the peace dividend days where we have reduced everything and put so much shift to contractors is that we have forced 

them into a lot of military roles, complicating things, such as civilians on the battlefield, the laws of land warfare and many other 

aspects that we fail to recognize. 

General Dubik, I guess in a follow-on on this, sir, would be if 

contractors cannot support certain combat operations due to the 

limitations of their contracts, and I know you faced this in some 

unique environments from disaster support, to failed government, 

to also combat operations, what impacts does contractors’ lack or 

limitation in those roles have on the ability to swiftly accomplish 

the tasks as a commander? 

General DUBIK. Well, thank you, sir. I actually have just a slightly different perspective and that is that contractors can perform the 

tasks that they are contracted to do actually pretty well. But there 

is zero flexibility for the commander beyond that. 

Mr. RUSSELL OF OKLAHOMA. Right. 

General DUBIK. With a soldier who is a cook, or a mechanic, or 

a clerk, and you need additional force protection people, there they 

are. You need additional convoy security people, there they are. So 

a soldier deployed is much more flexible than a contractor deployed. 

Mr. RUSSELL OF OKLAHOMA. He is probably cheaper, I am guessing? 

General DUBIK. I would say at least as expensive, if not way 

cheaper. 

Mr. RUSSELL OF OKLAHOMA. Thank you, sir. And thank you, 

Madam Chairman, for allowing me to join today. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great questions. I have a few more questions I 

would like to ask and welcome the ranking member here. And I 

know she has some questions so we will turn to her in just a 

minute. 

But I wanted to go back to the maintainers issue and how they 

are splitting those out of the units. Is there any rational reason 

where you would split those in developing the number, the troop 

levels? Do you think that was considered? 

General HAM. Madam Chairwoman, I think it goes back to the 

point that General Dubik has raised. It starts with what is the purpose that you want to achieve? And if in the analysis of that purpose, and in an articulation of a mission, if you come to the conclusion that the right application of force is perhaps not all of a unit 

so, would take an aviation brigade, maybe you don’t need the entirety of the aviation brigade that you would only deploy part of it, 

then I think there would be some rationale for deploying part of 

the unit, leaving part at home. 

But to me, that would be, you would deploy airframes, aircrews, 

maintenance and ground support in proportion to the mission, and 

those that would stay at home station would also retain the capabilities of maintenance, ground support and the like. So again, 
19 

these units that are not designed to be severable, you have to be 

very careful when we do, in fact, separate them, particularly if the 

purpose is to meet a number rather than to meet a mission. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So you would assume that the 8,448 number 

that they came up with has caused the maintainers to stay home. 

There is no rational reason for them, in their planning, to send an 

entire unit over there and leave their maintainers at home? 

General HAM. Madam Chairwoman, it is my understanding that 

in those cases where those decisions were made, they were made 

primarily as a consequence of the force management level. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Russell, how are—how does the U.S. Government oversee 

contractors in the theater? So, say, the maintainers? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yeah, and I think that is a great point because for 

the last several years, we have looked at oversight issues and oversight challenges, and typically, when you are in theater, you have 

contractors offices’ representatives that would be assigned, and 

typically, these are military personnel that get this as a secondary 

duty, and they would be responsible for making sure the contractor 

does what is supposed to be done under the contracts that they are 

required to do. 

They are basically the eyes and ears of the contracting officer. 

And even when we look at the heyday, when there were 100,000 

troops on the ground in Afghanistan, we found challenges where 

the contracting officer representatives had too many contracts, and 

they weren’t able to get out and actually observe the performance 

of the contracts, leading to all sorts of undesirable effects, such as, 

in one case, a five-compound building was built, for example, outside the wire of a base. The contracting officer just couldn’t simply 

get out there and do the job they had to do. 

And so while adjustments have been made, and DOD has made 

some progress, it does raise big questions when you have a smaller 

troop ground, can you be able to absorb that oversight capacity in 

addition to all the other missions that you are trying to accomplish 

under the same cap. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Good point. I want to follow up on the TDY 

questions. Do TDY forces cost more than other deployed forces? 

Mr. RUSSELL. I am not sure if I have any information to be able 

to answer that question. I think one of the—to get to the point, 

though, about TDY, one concern I would like to bring up is the fact 

that when you do the TDY, sometimes you lose visibility over the 

total force that is actually doing the mission. 

I think that is some of the risk that you face with the TDYs, are 

we capturing and tracking and matching that up to the folks that 

are on the ground to ensure that that is the real requirement and 

that is what it takes to get the job done. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So has the use of temporary personnel strained 

in any way medical or logistical support forces? 

Mr. RUSSELL. I have not looked at that, so I wouldn’t be in a position yet to be able to say that. So with the ongoing work, may 

get into it. Of course, that would be a classified level. We can talk 

about that in that kind of a venue. 

General HAM. If I may, Madam Chairwoman, I think, again, it 

goes back to purpose. If we are making a decision to send people 
20 

into an operational theater in a temporary duty status as a means 

of circumventing the force management level, then I think that 

probably ought to be questioned. There are certainly legitimate 

purposes for people to go into an operational theater on temporary 

duty. 

For example, perhaps fielding a new piece of equipment might, 

you know, a short duration, specific purpose, temporary duty might 

be exactly the right status for those individuals, but if it is just intended to keep them below the force management level, that probably is circumventing the intent. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. General Dubik. 

General DUBIK. That is all I was going to say. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. All right. Very good. 

Ranking Member Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you for participating today. I apologize for not being 

here at the beginning, but we have organizational hearings going 

on and other committee hearings that I had to participate in, but 

I am here now, and I thank you. 

I would like to just clarify the term FML. It is my understanding 

that force management levels are not set in stone. This is a question for you, General Ham, and that the administration has been 

relatively flexible about this. What flexibilities for adjustments are 

there? 

General HAM. Well, ma’am, thanks. It is good to see you again. 

I think that once a force—once a force management level is decided 

upon by an appropriate civilian authority, there ought be sufficient 

flexibility to adjust that based on changing conditions on the 

ground, and I think, in my experience, that system is pretty cumbersome. And from a military standpoint, it has been more difficult, I think, to adjust the force management level, so that is 

where—that is why I think we have seen military commanders 

make some decisions to keep the troop level underneath the force 

management level, the use of contractors, some of the issues that 

Mr. Russell articulated in terms of—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. 

General HAM [continuing]. Special operations forces and the like. 

Ms. SPEIER. So what you are suggesting, then, is that the FML 

is too inflexible, and you don’t have the opportunity to increase it 

by 3 percent, 2 percent, 10 percent. 

General HAM. As a former military commander, I would argue 

for greater flexibility and agility for the appropriate civilian authority to adjust force management levels, based on changed conditions 

and recommendations of the theater commander, and of the Joint 

Chiefs in their role as managing the global force. 

Ms. SPEIER. Which is a really important point, because in the 

end, it is a game that is being played, right, in terms of numbers? 

So if you have the FML and you can’t exceed it, then you are going 

to hire more contractors to do what you need to do, sounds like. Is 

that right? 

General HAM. Well, I think, ma’am, we certainly have seen 

some—you know, some examples of that, and I believe—and I do 

believe that there is an appropriate role for force management lev-
21 

els, but I think we have seen in implementation what I think 

some—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Adverse consequences? 

General HAM. Yeah, ways to get around it. 

Ms. SPEIER. To what extent is the FML determined in conjunction with another sovereign nation? 

General HAM. It is an important consideration. Certainly, you 

know, in most of the places where U.S. Armed Forces are deployed, 

there is a sovereign government, not always, but when there is a 

sovereign government, certainly that is a very, very important consideration. And I think it certainly has been the case, and I think 

that has been one of the reasons why—one of the determinants of 

what the force management level is. 

I think that is appropriate that the host nation would have some 

say in that, but it has also got to be a communication between the 

U.S. Government and that host nation government in terms of, you 

know, what is achievable at various levels of forces. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, in the end, unless we do it in conjunction with 

the host country, we are in occupation mode, correct? 

General HAM. Yes. I think certainly, you know, we respect the 

sovereignty of these nations, and it is important to do this in conjunction with them. 

Ms. SPEIER. So my understanding is that Iraq has been fairly 

clear that they want us in advisory roles and at limited FML. Is 

that correct? 

General HAM. That is my understanding, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. And in terms of the whole issue of readiness, and, you know, I think there probably is a difference of opinion on the committee in terms of how many more troops we want 

to have in engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that is one 

question. But then the other question is really one about readiness 

and whether or not we want them there or ready to engage in 

other conflicts. 

So let me ask you this question, and you might have to take it 

down to make sure you get your answer right. I am going to ask 

all three of you this question. If you had a choice, if you could 

spend more money, would you, A, give it to our troops in terms of 

more time at home to rest, train, and recuperate between deployments; B, increase the number of troops we have in Afghanistan; 

C, increase the number of troops we have fighting ISIS in Iraq and 

Syria; or D, forward deploy to increase deterrents in Europe? 

So Mr. Russell, what would be your answer? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, I wouldn’t want to speak on behalf of the administration in terms of what the best course of action to be. I 

think you have to go back to look at what are the objectives and 

have we really defined what it is we are trying to accomplish. I 

think, as you mentioned, just as a precursor, when you look a 

FMLs, you do have advantages and disadvantages that go with it 

that have to be—the tradeoffs have to be compared. I mean, as you 

mentioned one of the things, to the extent that you have a smaller 

force cap, obviously, the more troops you are going to have available to do other things. And so I think having the objective and the 

force cap lined up right has to be looked at globally across the 

board. 
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So I think those are some of the significant considerations that 

have to be made in order to make those choices. 

Ms. SPEIER. So you are not going to answer my question? 

Mr. RUSSELL. It is a little difficult for me to pick one from where 

I sit. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. General Ham, would you—— 

General HAM. Yeah, I think I find myself probably in the same 

case as Mr. Russell in terms of not giving you a precise answer. 

Ms. SPEIER. You are a politician, you realize that. 

General HAM. But I—but this is—the question you raise, ma’am, 

is exactly the right question, because this is—there are finite resources, and so this is the balancing between operational requirements in theaters across the globe, balancing that with readiness 

for future contingencies, some of which are unforeseen, so we have 

to have some capability to meet that. 

Certainly, the preservation of the All-Volunteer Force, I think, is 

a very, very high priority, and that means you have got to have— 

afford a quality of life for people that they are not constantly deployed, so that is a balance. 

The one I would answer specifically, and I will fall back on my 

time on the National Commission on the Future of the Army, I do 

believe there is a requirement for an increase in forward deployed 

forces in Europe. 

Ms. SPEIER. So you would answer D? 

General HAM. I would answer D for an increase in forward deployed. 

Ms. SPEIER. I would concur. Thank you. 

General Dubik. 

General DUBIK. Yes, ma’am. So I am looking at readiness in two 

senses: readiness for current operations and readiness for the 

unforeseen contingencies. With respect to the first, I would answer 

D also, but I would do so not in a rotation basis, but a PCS [permanent change of station] basis, because then you can accomplish 

both A and D at the same time. 

But the other part to the question, readiness for contingency operations, is one that is equally important. For example, right now 

we have five brigade combat teams doing train and assist kind of 

things. Well, that means you have five doing it, five preparing to 

do it, and five recovering. That is 15 brigade combat teams allocated to that task, and as soon as they deploy with all of their leaders but not their soldiers, you have five brigades instantly unready 

for a contingency operations, and when they return, you have five 

brigades that are unready for 1 to 3 years—1 to 2 years in terms 

of preparation. 

So I would answer the second part for contingency operations, actually E, we have not allocated, I think, a sufficient number, the 

total end strength of the Armed Forces, to serve the global requirements of the United States. And part of the contractor issue, part 

of the force management issue is a mask to that requirement that 

is not being met, and we are taking significant risk being focusing 

on near-term readiness for current operations, which is absolutely 

required, but the risk is being unable to respond to a contingency 

operation. 
23 

And as Secretary Gates has famously said, you know, we are always 100 percent wrong and 100 percent surprised, and we have 

placed the armed services in a very risky situation if anything happens other than current operations. 

General HAM. Ma’am, could I add one more? 

Ms. SPEIER. Of course. 

General HAM. So the other place, I think would be helpful would 

be increased flexibility, authority, and resourcing for the Reserve 

Components of the U.S. Armed Forces so that they can be more 

operationally employed. Certainly on a predictable basis and certainly not as frequently as the regular forces, but there is great capacity, great skill, great experience in the Reserve Components. We 

want to keep them ready as well. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you all. I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great questions. Well, I think we have had very 

good discussion today. It has been very helpful to look at where we 

are now, what are some of the issues that we are facing with the 

troop levels, caps that have been set into place, and as we look to 

move forward, you know, what needs to be done, and so I appreciate your expertise. Thank you for being here. Thank you for your 

continued service to our country, and this hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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